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HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"—VERDUN

*FULLY ILLUSTRATED*

VOLUME ONE

THE ATTACK ON FRANCE

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*TO MY WIFE*

# PREFACE

The World War, entering its thirty-fourth month, as these lines are written, has had three distinct phases, both on the military side and on the larger and more significant human side. The three military phases are supplied by the Marne campaign and its immediate consequences; the Russian campaign, with its Balkan episode and its Verdun ending; the Allied offensive in the west, which began at the Somme in July, 1916, and is still proceeding before Arras and along the old Aisne battlefield.

In the Marne campaign Germany sought a complete triumph by a swift and terrible thrust at France, the only one of her foes then in any sense prepared for war. Her thrust was parried at the Marne and permanently blocked at the Yser and at Ypres. Thereafter she had to turn east and restore the failing fortunes of Austria and protect her own imperilled marches.

In the Russian campaign Germany sought to dispose of Russia, as she had endeavoured to dispose of France in the Marne campaign. Immediate success escaped her in this field. Despite terrible defeats and long retreats, Russian resistance was not broken, although the Russian Revolution, now the main factor on the eastern front and unmistakably a consequence of Russian defeat, gives to the German campaign of 1915 a value that was not perceived at the time. What the permanent value will be remains problematical. But as she had to turn east, with her western task incomplete in 1914, Germany had, after a brief and glorious campaign on behalf of her Turkish ally, to return west in February, 1916, and seek at Verdun what she had not attained on the Marne. Her failure there cost her the initiative and condemned her to the defensive.

The campaign which opened at the Somme is still proceeding. Since they began their attack on July 1, 1916, the Allies have steadily, if only slowly, pushed the Germans back and the recent victory of Arras demonstrates that the British army has at last reached a high state of efficiency, while there are signs, far from conclusive to be sure, of a decline in German morale. At all events, the Germans remain on the defensive and the end of this third phase has not come.

Looking now to the broader horizon, it will be perceived that here, too, there are three aspects. In its inception, in the first months of battle, the conflict still seemed to men, not alone of neutral nations but of involved nations, one more war, greater and more terrible than all past wars, but a war comparable to them in origin and purpose.

But as the struggle progressed, it brought more and more clearly to the eyes of men of all nations, save those of Central Europe, the truth that the German attack was something more than a bid for world power; comparable with that of France under Napoleon or Louis XIV, of Spain under Charles V. It became clear that Germany was not attacking armies or nations alone, but also the whole fabric of our common civilization and all the precepts and doctrines of humanity, which represent the slow progress upward from barbarism.

The invasion of Belgium shocked the whole world. The crimes committed by German soldiers in Belgium and northern France, crimes not belonging to the order of excesses incident to war, but crimes ordered by commanding officers for the deliberate purpose of terrifying a helpless population and disarming men by the brutality practised upon women and children, these slowly but surely inclined the balance of neutral opinion against Germany. At first these brutal and bestial crimes only gave new heart and new determination to the nations directly assailed, but in the end they earned for Germany the condemnation of neutral nations the world over.

In its third phase there came, together with the growing anger and detestation of German violence and the clearer perception of the danger of Germanism to all civilization, the recognition that the war was, after all, one more stand of autocracy against democracy, that in its essence the German thing, already become abominable in the sight of all the non-German world, was the final expression of militarism, which had its origin in caste and Crown; that the "Superman" was only the old tyrant in a new disguise.

In this stage we have seen the Russian Revolution and the entrance of our own country into the war. The clearest definition of the war, as it is now seen everywhere save in the Central Empires, has been supplied by the President of the United States in that document which determined in fact, if not technically, American enlistment.

In succeeding volumes I shall endeavour to set forth the development of this world verdict upon German purposes and German methods. In the present volume, I have sought merely to outline the events preceding the war and the first campaigns in the struggle. Not until the first phase was completed had the real character of German menace been established, save in the minds of the French and Belgians on whose soil German armies had written their history of shame. Not until the war had entered its second phase was there apparent that spirit which was to dominate the councils and arm the spirit of the nations allied against Germany. Not until that hour was it to take on, consciously, in the minds of millions, the character of a crusade, a concerted defence of civilization against a new barbarism, which combined the science of the head with barbarism of the heart, the weapons of the Twentieth Century with the spirit of Attila.

And, conversely, when the war did take on this new character it became

something different from all wars of which we have trustworthy record—a war fought not for territorial gain or battlefield success, but a war fought between two ideas, two conceptions of life, of civilization, of humanity; two faiths, of which there can be room for but one in this world, since each is utterly destructive of the other.

Tardily, perhaps, but completely in the end, we in America, far removed as we are from the European world, have perceived the issues of the war. Instinctively the mass of men and women, the plain people of the United States, like those of Britain and France, have prevailed over the wisdom of politicians and the doubts of statesmen. Late, but not too late, the nation which had Lexington and Concord in its own history, recognized that neutrality was impossible when a new battle for democracy was going forward. And almost at the same moment there has been heard, broken as yet and uncertainly, a new voice in Germany, repeating something of the words that now fill the world outside of the Central Empires. Whatever be the outcome of the war, at least it is certain now that even German things will never be again what they were when Prussian militarism crushed Belgium under an iron heel and German necessity thrust its bayonet through international good faith and common humanity.

My acknowledgments are due both to the French and to the British Governments and General Staffs for the courtesy which permitted me to visit their armies and their battlefields, among others the Marne, Nancy, Champagne, and the Somme, escorted by officers who explained the actions, and for the kindness and frankness with which they supplied all information at their disposal. To the interest of the President of France I owe my opportunity to visit Verdun and to meet General Petain during the great battle, and to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig I am indebted for the chance to see the British army and to meet its Commander-in-Chief just before the battle of Arras and to look eastward from Mont St. Eloi at Vimy Ridge, soon to fall to Canadian valour. Nor should I fail to acknowledge here my gratitude to General Dubois, Governor of Verdun, who twice welcomed me to his ruined city and permitted me to visit Fort de Vaux, newly reconquered from the German Crown Prince.

On one other point I desire to make an explanation; the absence of any discussion of naval operations from my narrative is not due to any failure on my part to appreciate the greatness or the importance of the work performed by the fleets, and in an overwhelming majority of cases by the British fleet, but to the fact that it was agreed at the outset that the history of the naval operations of the war should be written for a later volume. The subject is of too great importance to be crowded in the space at my disposal in this volume.

In the years that have followed the outbreak of the war, during which I have been writing steadily about its progress, I have made too many mistakes

and been too frequently in error not to appreciate the limitations of the present volume. It represents merely an effort to interpret fairly and to an American audience the earlier incidents in the world struggle, hitherto mainly explained to Americans by commentators belonging to nations already at war who have reviewed the campaigns from the perspectives of belligerents, and have naturally paid small attention to the point of view of the citizens of a nation separated by its history, by its long neutrality, and by the expanse of the ocean from the conflict.

In so far as I have been able, I have striven to make this book an American comment upon a world war, and no one can be more conscious than am I of its limitations.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

*Upper Montclair, New Jersey,*
May 1, 1917.

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# PART ONE

# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

# CHAPTER ONE

# EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904

## I

## THE FIRST YEARS

The full generation that lay between the signing of the Treaty of Frankfort and the crisis of Tangier was marked by no very clear and definite march of events. Between the Revolutions of 1848 and the close of the Franco-Prussian War, Europe had lived through a long series of wars, not comparable in magnitude or sacrifice to the Napoleonic and Revolutionary struggles, but sufficiently considerable to satiate the people of the various nations and reconcile the statesmen to pacific policies. Germany, during the years of Bismarck, pursued a moderate course. His greatest concern was to preserve and strengthen the great structure he had reared. If the swift rise of France from defeat led him to a minatory gesture in 1875, he heeded the warnings that came from London and Petrograd. Throughout his period of power he skilfully managed to keep the door to the Russian capital open, and while he detested the British, he never sought to challenge them upon the water.

To be sure, the Russo-Turkish War and the settlement of the Congress of Berlin led to an inevitable estrangement with Russia. Germany, having to choose between Russia and Austria, decided for the Hapsburg, and the Congress of Berlin, by destroying the Treaty of San Stefano, deprived Russia of the fruits of her Turkish triumph, and by putting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the road to Saloniki, thus made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. But in Bismarck's time this alliance was never a threat to German interests nor to German supremacy on the Continent, for Russia was in no mind to undertake the destruction of the Treaty of Frankfort to satisfy her French ally, while France was not willing to invite another invasion to replace the Crescent by the Cross at St. Sophia.

In 1881, Bismarck, by clever manipulation, thrust France into Tunis and effectively aided by Crispi, the inveterate foe of France, was able to harvest from Italian anger the entrance of the Italian Kingdom into the Austro-German Alliance, thus creating the Triple Alliance, which was too strong to be challenged by France and Russia, and, as a defensive alliance, served as the corner-stone of European peace until the middle of the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

Great Britain, moreover, inclined rather to the German than to the Franco-Russian group. Her foreign policy was still in the Beaconsfield era. She regarded Russia as her true enemy. She had joined Austria in vetoing the Treaty of San Stefano, as she had persuaded France to join her in the Crimea. Friction between Russia and Britain on the frontiers of the Indian Empire, with France all over the world where colonial enterprises were clashing, contributed to keep alive animosities born of the Crimean and Napoleonic wars. Thus, while nominally pursuing that policy, known in its day as "splendid isolation," Great Britain actually inclined toward the Germans and, while Germany under Bismarck pursued a clearly pacific course, British policy was markedly pro-German.

France, recovering materially from her terrible defeat with an alacrity that alarmed her conqueror, found herself for the time isolated in Europe. Slowly the hope of a reconquest of the "Lost Provinces" weakened in the eyes of the older generation while the newer generation found its attention and its energies consumed in the domestic strife between the Republic and its enemies, in the struggle with Boulangerism, in the battle with the Church, and in that grotesque episode which was the Dreyfus Case. It would not be fair to say that the memory of Alsace-Lorraine was banished from the French mind, but it is true that even Frenchmen believed it had disappeared in the mournful and ignoble years of the nineties. While German population increased by millions, that of France stood still, until France found herself distanced by her great rival and no longer able to match army corps with army corps on the open frontier of the Vosges. For France the years

between Frankfort and Tangier were years recalling the equally unhappy age of Louis XV. And in both periods there were not lacking those who foretold the disappearance of France as a great nation and spoke with ready conviction of the decadence of the French race, forgetting how frequently in past centuries the flame of French genius had grown dim, only to burst forth with new brilliance and dazzle the world with its radiance. And in this time not only did the desire for peace increase with each year in the hearts of the French people, but a too-eager acceptance of the illusions of pacifism and internationalism left the nation well nigh defenceless, when the crisis of Tangier brought France within two steps of war.

In the closing quarter of the Nineteenth Century, too, the Great Powers, with the exception of Germany and Austria, turned their eyes beyond Europe and laboured to construct great colonial empires. France spread her colours from Algiers to the Congo. Tunis, the Sahara, Senegal, the regions of the Upper Niger, the shores of Lake Chad, and the vast area between the Congo-Ubangi and the Atlantic were occupied. Madagascar was conquered. Indo-China was expanded into a colony greater than France in area.

Britain on her part kept pace with France in Africa, extended her Indian Empire, expanded her commercial and political influence in China, pushed France out of Egypt, and carried her conquests up the Nile until Cecil Rhodes' dream of a British "all-red route" from the Cape to Cairo was all but realized.

Russia on her side turned from the disappointments of the Dardanelles to the still unrestricted possibilities eastward to the Pacific and southward to warm water at Port Arthur. Siberia began to rival the American Far West in resources and opportunity and Russia seemed destined to achieve at the expense of the Chinese what she had missed in the estates of the Osmanli.

Even Italy, still struggling with the terrible problems of poverty and misery, also embarked upon the colonial enterprise, only to find disaster in Abyssinia and military disgrace at Adowa. Little Belgium, through the efforts of her able if unscrupulous monarch, acquired the

vast empire of the Congo Free State and took rank with the Great Powers in possessions beyond the seas.

### II. A NEW KAISER AND A NEW POLICY

In all this time Germany alone stood still. Great as Bismarck had been as the creator of the German Empire, he lacked the vision to grasp the new horizons. While he remained in power, he gave only contemptuous attention to the colonial ambitions within his own country. He welcomed the concentration of French energy upon colonial expansion because it promised the gradual extinction of the Alsace-Lorraine question. He skilfully turned every opportunity to account in bringing the French and the British into collision. Nor was he less contented to see Russia, forgetful of Constantinople and the Balkans, fixing her eyes upon Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

More than all else, perhaps, this failure of Bismarck contributed to the great catastrophe that he did not live to see. A new Germany was rising, a Germany he neither understood nor recognized. The whole fabric of German life was being made over and Germany was rapidly transforming herself into a great commercial nation, into a factory nation, into a nation whose organization, whose resources in minerals, made her a rival of Great Britain; whose merchant marine was growing by leaps and bounds and carrying the German flag into every sea and every port. This new Germany felt it unjust, immoral, that she, alone of the great nations, she, who had become in fact the most powerful nation on the European continent, should be without her colonies, without lands to which Germans could carry their language and their national faith, colonies which might serve as the markets for German manufactures and the plantations on which could be grown the raw materials needed by German industry.

And it was this Germany that William II represented when at last he came to the throne, speedily "dropped the pilot," and took from Bismarck's control the direction of the policies of an Empire which had been the Iron Chancellor's creation and for long years an instrument in his hands. In his anxiety to preserve what he had brought into being,

Bismarck had withheld Germany from the world competition in colonial expansion, he had submitted to the naval supremacy of Britain, he had smiled upon the Russian adventures in the Far East, he had uttered no protest when Great Britain had added new empires to her vast realms. And the world upon which William II looked when power at last came to him, was a world already parcelled out, with but few and unattractive patches bearing the colour of the German Empire.

In the mind of the new Emperor it was clear from the outset that the real barrier to German development, to rightful German expansion, to the acquisition of that place in the sun that soon appeared in all German patriotic phrase, was Britain. It was Britain who held the fairest spots upon the face of the earth, so far as colonial considerations were concerned. It was British sea power that dominated the trade routes. Moreover, British arms protected the sinking power of Portugal, closed Morocco because it faced Gibraltar, was presently to join with France in an agreement that should bestow upon the Republic this rich and promising colonial field of Morocco, was to conquer the Boer Republics toward which German eyes had been turned, was to lend its support to an American admiral in Manila Bay, when German thoughts turned toward the expiring colonial empire of Spain.

Unless Germany possessed a great fleet, she must be contented to accept British dictation abroad. The dictation was not aggressive, the world had endured British supremacy at sea for nearly a century without too much protest or too great discomfort. But the cardinal doctrine of British policy for centuries had been that the British fleet should be supreme and there was no inclination in London, no matter what party ruled in Westminster, to permit an equal on the blue water.

The decision of the Kaiser, summed up in the famous phrase, "Our future lies upon the sea," involved an ultimate challenge to Britain. No one can read the pages of British history from the days of the Spanish Armada to the not-less-splendid moment of Trafalgar, without recognizing this fact. Indeed the development of steam transport and the change in the character of British industry had made it inevitable that Britain would starve, unless she were able at all times to keep

the seas open and insure the inward flow to her ports of the food for her dense population.

### III. ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRAW NEAR

In the same fashion this challenge made it inevitable that in the end Britain should join the Franco-Russian group, as in her long history she had ever joined the weaker powers who made head against that Continental nation which at the moment crossed her path and challenged her supremacy.

Germany could believe, did believe up to the fatal moment in August, 1914, that Britain would be beguiled into staying out of that European war which was necessary to clear Germany's flanks, to dispose of a France still mindful of Alsace-Lorraine and certain to take advantage of German complications with other powers; the war that was necessary to send the Slav back behind the Niemen and the Bug, no longer a rival of Austria in the Balkans or a peril to Germany in East Prussia and Posen. But this was to mistake the genius which underlies the stupidity of the Anglo-Saxon in world affairs. For if Britain has always muddled her affairs in times of peace and in the opening hours of conflict, her instinct has saved her invariably.

In the early years of his reign William II seems to have cherished the notion that he could deal with France and Russia without war. Following the policy of Bismarck he encouraged the Russian to embark in the Japanese War. The earlier years of his reign are marked by a series of clumsy but no less sincere efforts to bridge the chasm that the Treaty of Frankfort had opened between France and Germany. But for this chasm there was but one bridge and this he could not take; Germany would not surrender Alsace-Lorraine, even at the behest of its young Kaiser, and no such idea ever entered the imperial mind.

Such hope as the Emperor may have entertained of winning France, of making her his ally against Britain, perished with the wholly unexpected termination of Anglo-French bickerings that followed Fashoda. When Kitchener, after his successful campaign to Khartum, and Colonel Marchand, after his memorable journey across Africa from the Congo

to the Nile, met at the miserable little village of Fashoda, two great imperial dreams came into collision. A century and a half before France and Britain had met on the Ohio, and the whole story of Nineteenth Century Anglo-French colonial enterprise is a marvellous repetition of the American episode. In Africa as in America, too, French explorers had out-distanced British.

There was a moment in 1898 when it seemed inevitable that France and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France bowed. The French Foreign Minister, Hanotaux, went into retirement, as his successor Delcassé was to go after Tangier, seven years later. Kitchener prevailed and Marchand retreated. When these two soldiers met again, they met as allies on the hills of Artois, Marchand wearing the stars of a French general and Kitchener the master of Britain's military establishment.

Oddly enough Fashoda left no permanent scar. France had to decide between England and Germany. She chose to remain faithful to Alsace-Lorraine. Britain on her part, having at last perceived the solid foundation of French colonial conception, already beginning to feel almost subconsciously the challenge of German sea power, held out a hand to France. More than all else, Edward VII, when he came to the throne, animated as he was by a real affection for the French, opened the way, by his skill and tact, for that Anglo-French Entente, which was to threaten the whole edifice of German hope.

Thus, when the momentary bitterness had passed away, France and Britain proceeded to the adjustment of all their world-wide quarrels. There was a wholesale liquidation of claims and counterclaims, culminating in the famous agreement of 1904 by which France recognized British supremacy in Egypt, and Britain withdrew her half-century-old veto to French expansion in Morocco. Not since the Hundred Years War had Anglo-French relations been placed on so friendly a basis and henceforth French and British policies were to converge until a friendship expanded into a virtual alliance and a virtual alliance into an actual union in the presence of a common foe.

All of this was not the work of a moment. When the Boer War came

there were not a few Frenchmen who openly expressed their hatred for Britain and their sympathy with the Africander Republics. To the very eve of the Great War there were influential Frenchmen who still nourished the ancient grudge against "perfidious Albion," as there were Britons who preserved the immemorial distrust of the "fickle Gaul." But, for all this, Fashoda was a landmark in European history, and the Anglo-French settlement that resulted carried with it the promise of the world conflict that followed the 1904 agreement by a short decade.

### IV. THE CONVENTION OF 1904

The Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 was a heavy and well-nigh fatal blow to the policy of the German Emperor. With perfect accuracy he foresaw that it was the first step in the inevitable drawing together of France and Britain. Quite naturally he and the German nation as well saw in it the deliberate purpose of Britain to return to the old policy of balancing the Continental nations against one another and throwing her decisive influence on the side opposing her immediate rival. From this hour German teachers and German publicists were to speak with growing bitterness of the "iron ring" that was being forged about the Fatherland and the cult of hatred of Great Britain was to take on untold and unsuspected expansion.

In an Anglo-French understanding, limited as it was at the outset to a liquidation of lawsuits, to a settlement of wholly personal claims, Germany beheld the British nation taking its stand behind the French and giving its tremendous influence to encourage the French desire to destroy the Treaty of Frankfort and regain the "Lost Provinces."

And with this date there disappears the German policy of placating France which had long held sway in Berlin and had moved the Kaiser to innumerable gestures, which had been coldly rejected by the French or suffered to pass unnoticed. Out of this arrangement grew the German conviction that one more war with France was necessary and that there could be no realization of the dream of a German "place in the sun" until the ever-enduring French resentment was disposed of by a war, which should relegate France to the rank of a second-class nation

and leave her too weak ever to cross German purposes again. By force Germany was to try once more to separate France and Britain, without, in fact, arriving at war, but the failure of Tangier was to confirm the conviction born of the Anglo-French arrangement, and in it were the seeds of all that wrath which was to come.

## CHAPTER TWO

## FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON

### I

### TANGIER, THE FIRST GESTURE

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 was the first clear warning of what was to come. It put forces squarely in opposition which were to meet again and again thereafter in similar conflict until there was no longer the smallest chance of preserving world peace. It was to open a new era in European history, the end of which no man can now see. It preceded the general conflict by less than ten years and it foreshadowed it with such clarity that those who come hereafter will marvel at the blindness that was subsequently displayed in many nations.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, while nominally a business arrangement between two nations, in fact undermined the whole structure of German policy. German challenge to British sea power was taking shape, but German policy contemplated the separation of Britain from the rest of Europe and gave its best effort to encouraging the bitterness between Paris and London and between Petrograd and London. A complete settlement between France and Britain foreshadowed a similar liquidation between Britain and Russia, which did come in due time, and beyond this it held out the menace of something more, of a possible alliance between these three Great Powers.

Was this in the minds of the British and French ministers who signed the treaty of 1904? Subliminally perhaps. Delcassé was a frank foe of Germany. British foreign policy was in Tory hands and the Government and the Crown alike felt the reality of the growing German challenge. More than any Englishman of his time Edward VII feared the German danger, and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. In the German mind, it was his policy that led to the Triple Entente. In the German mind, he con-

ceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany, to unite Britain with France and Russia, to keep Germany from the realization of her dreams. Many years may not solve this problem, and it seems inevitable that Germans will read history one way and the rest of the world another. It does seem clear, however, that Lord Lansdowne, who held the Foreign Office, was mindful of the German challenge; it does seem patent that Delcassé saw in an understanding with Britain the possibility of a concentration of French energies toward national regeneration and defence. But underneath all lies the solid fact that the original challenge had been delivered by Germany to British sea power. Germany was free to seek her future on the sea, but Britain was bound, in the nature of things, to meet such a challenge as she best could.

At the moment it was announced, the Anglo-French agreement made no great noise in Europe. Delcassé did not communicate it directly to the German Government, a fatal blunder, as it now seems, but he informed the German Ambassador at Paris, who notified his Government, and Berlin gave no sign of disapproval, even gave an apparent assent. The agreement itself, while insuring ultimate French political supremacy in the Shereefian Empire, guaranteed the "open door" for all, and thus for German quite as much as British trade.

But Germany was only waiting. For the first time since the Treaty of Frankfort an international agreement of great importance—concerning her but slightly, to be sure—had been made without regard to her. This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow that had been struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles.

In the opening weeks of 1905 Germany spoke. Russia had been defeated at Mukden, her prestige was gone and her military reputation had crumbled. France stood alone, notoriously ill-prepared for war. Not even with British help could she hope to make head against the German army, and there was yet no certainty that Britain would go to war to help France. Accordingly the Kaiser landed in Tangier and suddenly proclaimed the integrity of Morocco. He thrust a German sword

through the Anglo-French agreement and Europe came to the first grave crisis of the century.

For days European peace seemed shattered. Germany demanded that the question of Morocco should be reopened, that it should be submitted to a council of nations. Delcassé refused. In the end France yielded, a weak and terrified ministry bowed. Delcassé went into exile, a council was summoned to meet at Algeciras, and Bülow, the German Chancellor, became a prince, in token of his sovereign's appreciation of this "shining triumph."

### II. ALGECIRAS—A GERMAN DEFEAT

But if this incident was a "crowning humiliation" for France, and the going of Delcassé the greatest sorrow France had known since Sedan, Germany lost at Algeciras almost all she had hoped to win. In this conference Britain stood solidly behind the French. Russia was not less loyal to her ally, while Italy displayed a lack of sympathy with her German ally which roused bitterest recrimination in Berlin and was the first authentic sign of the crumbling of the edifice of Bismarck. Germany and Austria stood alone, the Moroccan question was dealt with in a fashion that insured new troubles, but in effect, the predominant influence of France in Morocco received the seal of approval of Europe and the door to German participation in Moroccan estates, which the Anglo-French agreement had closed, was not reopened.

Germany had humiliated France and angered Britain. She had thrust her sword into the balance against European peace, but it had not prevailed. She had not separated France from England. She had brought the two nations more closely together. Russia, already humiliated by defeats in the East, bore with ill-concealed resentment the effort of the Kaiser to take advantage of temporary weakness in Russian armies. Italy turned from Germany and Austria to France and Britain to make arrangements for the realization of her own Mediterranean ambitions.

All this the Germans clearly perceived, all this was gall and wormwood to the Kaiser. He had hoped to separate France from Britain but he had, in fact, brought them closer together. He had hoped to show a

mastery of a European council comparable to that of Bismarck in the Congress of Berlin but, save for Austria, he had been without friends in the council, a majority of which had been frankly hostile. It was Britain and not Germany that actually prevailed at Algeciras, and there was no mistaking the fact that Britain was even more willing than France to risk a deliberate rebuff to Germany, even if it should carry with it an appeal to arms.

Hence for Germany there was a new grievance against Britain, a new accentuation of Anglophobic sentiment, a new looking forward to "the day" which was becoming uppermost in German minds and hearts, the day when the British obstacle to German hope should be removed by a victory. But there were reasons why wise statesmanship should have perceived the facts that were now disclosed. Germany had feared that she would find herself faced by a triple alliance, she had made one gesture of war and all three were disclosed united against her. Unless she believed herself strong enough to face all three in arms, her course was marked out by Bismarck's successful policy of separating Austria and France and dealing with the former in 1866 and the latter in 1870. Instead, the German policy tended fatally to unite three possible foes and transform into allies, united against Germany, three nations widely separated up to the moment of Tangier.

For France, Tangier was a memorable incident. It marks the beginning of that new French spirit which was to blaze forth at the Marne and at Verdun and fill the world with the glory of French courage and patriotism. It was the beginning of the reconstruction of France, politically, spiritually, nationally. The French perceived the danger, the threat, the menace of German policy. They perceived that it had become a question of the future existence of France, and to such a threat France responded as she had to the menace of all Europe in the days of the Revolution.

### III. AFTER TANGIER—THE NEW FRANCE

If French politicians still fettered French preparation, if French organization was still inferior to German, if France went to war in 1914

lacking in much, still there could be no comparison with 1905, when France must have fallen at the first blow. And what was all-important, the French mind was mobilized with the first call. France was saved by Tangier, although ten years were to pass before even the French would realize the fact of their deliverance.

With the British it was far different. The Tory ministry, which negotiated the Anglo-French convention, went out of power shortly. The Liberal Government that came into office turned the attention of the nation to domestic problems and in the bitterness of class war and Irish disputes the international situation passed from the minds of the British people. They forgot Germany, the Empire, the outside world; they devoted their energies and their attention to domestic differences, and they gave only impatient hearing to the few voices like that of Lord Roberts, which from time to time warned them of the danger that was Germany. Yet at the moment that they refused to recognize the outside peril the British ministers declined to renounce the policy from which flowed the danger. Faithful to the tradition of their race, they clung to the idea that Britain should be supreme at sea, and if, for a few years, they permitted British construction to fall perilously low by comparison with Germany, they changed their policy in time. And they accepted the legacy of friendship with France, they accepted the Moroccan commitment of Lansdowne, they remained steadily resolved to surrender nothing of British Empire or British influence to Germany, and only such a surrender could have conceivably appeased Germans.

In all this there was a fatal paradox. Pretending or even believing that Germany was friendly, the Liberal and Radical majority continued to follow a course which gave Germany no promise of a realization of her dreams. But against the danger that this policy brought they took no adequate step and members of the Government like Haldane continued to call Germany their "spiritual home" and make frequent visits to Berlin, after all real hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals.

# BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES

*Copyright, 1895, by Henry Graves & Co.* *From a painting by Stanley Berkeley*

NAPOLEON'S CUIRASSIERS AT WATERLOO

Waterloo (June 18, 1815) marked the overthrow of Napoleon's ambition to dominate Europe. Germany was the next nation to cherish the dream of world dominion

## THE RISE OF GERMANY

### BISMARCK

*By permission of the Berlin Photographic Co.*

THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

**I.** The Battle of Königgratz or Sadowa was an important step in the building of the German Empire. It was the decisive battle in the Seven Weeks' War (1866), where 220,000 Prussians defeated 205,000 Austrians. This victory assured to Prussia a leading position in the German political affairs

*Copyright by Brown Brothers*

THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

II. Napoleon Third's Capitulation at Sedan (1870) marked another important advance in the building of the German Empire. It was the first of the series of French surrenders in the Franco-Prussian War and cost the Emperor his throne. At once came the proclamation of the Third Republic in France. The Peace of Frankfort concluded the war five months later. Alsace-Lorraine was ceded by France to the German Empire, and Prussia in Germany became stronger than ever.

Prince Bismarck is seated at the table facing the defeated French Generals. Von Moltke, the victorious Prussian general, stands with his hand on the table. He was the uncle of the Count Von Moltke who was the German Chief of Staff at the opening of the World War in 1914.



THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

III. William I, the present Kaiser's grandfather, was proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles a few weeks before the close of the Franco-Prussian War. This marked another step in the unification of Germany, under the leadership of Prussia. (It is of interest to note that the lesser German states have never acknowledged the Kings of Prussia as *Emperors of Germany*. They can be correctly spoken of only as *German Emperors*.)

In the picture Bismarck stands, at the height of his success, close to the first step of the throne.



THE MAN WHO BUILT THE GERMAN EMPIRE

Prince Bismarck, the Germans' "Iron Chancellor," had a large part in the building of the German Empire and the creation of the Triple Alliance, in the days of the present Kaiser's father and grandfather. He did not realize the need for colonial expansion, otherwise Germany might have secured her "place in the Sun" while the other Powers were securing theirs. But Germany came into the colonial field too late to get her share peacefully. This was one deep-lying cause of the World War.



BISMARCK AS THE GREATEST STATESMAN IN EUROPE

The Congress of Berlin was convened in 1878 at the invitation of Bismarck to settle the affairs of the always troublesome Balkan States. Austria, France, Italy, England, Russia, Turkey and of course Germany—the chief contestants in the World War—were all represented. The most influential members of the conference were Prince Gortchakoff, Count Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, M. Waddington, Count Corti, and Caratheodori, some of whom will be recognized in the picture. Bismarck was chosen President and is shown welcoming the delegates.

*By permission of Manzi Joy and Co.*

*From the painting by A. de Neuville*

"THE DEFENCE OF THE LONGBOYEAU GATE," DURING THE SIEGE OF PARIS, 1870-'71

FOUR GENERATIONS OF HOHENZOLLERNS

William I is seated; Frederick III, his son, who married a daughter of Queen Victoria, stands at his right; the present emperor, William II, Frederick's son, stands at his grandfather's left; the present Crown Prince, now active as a general in the field, is an infant in his great-grandfather's lap.

WILHELM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

This portrait was taken a year or two after his accession to the throne, which occurred in 1888, when he was twenty-nine years of age.

And the people of Britain, lulled to sleep by their rulers, their passions stirred by home problems and domestic debates, gave no heed to European matters. Thus it was that when at last the whole fabric of the British Empire was in deadly peril, the British population was totally oblivious to the truth, and Liberal journals could tell their readers that the conflict which was breaking in the first days of August, 1914, was without importance for Britain.

### IV. THE END OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

For France, for Russia, for Germany, for Italy, Tangier is a landmark; its meaning was promptly made a part of the sum of human knowledge of millions in these countries, henceforth it gave shape to the policies and impulse to the purposes of the patriots of these nations. Frenchman, Russian, and German, alike, perceived in it the sign of an inevitable war, but the Briton saw nothing. From Tangier to the day when Belgium was invaded, British understanding of international conditions and British influence in the world declined until Germany could believe that the British had forgotten her challenge to British sea power and in July, 1914, could hope for a few brief hours that Britain would remain neutral at Armageddon.

Finally, and this is of prime importance, with the Algeciras Conference there expired the legend of a concert of Europe. Henceforth there were two groups of Great Powers and these groups naturally and inevitably tended to take opposite sides on every question of international importance that arose until their hostility paralyzed their influence and enabled the small Balkan States to unchain the tempest, by their attack upon Turkey in 1912.

After Tangier, too, it was plain that the understanding between France, Britain, and Russia marched steadily toward an alliance in fact if not in terms; an alliance which, by accident or design, found common ground in resistance to German policies. On the other hand, at Algeciras, Italy manifested patent weariness of the Triple Alliance, and her course thereafter was away from Berlin and Vienna and toward Paris and London. This course was to bring her into opposition with

Vienna over Tripoli and the Balkans and ultimately into alliance with the foes of the Central Powers.

The Tangier incident therefore early forecast a time when Italy would change sides, and this would leave Austria and Germany actually outnumbered and outweighed in European councils and abolish that real supremacy on the Continent which Bismarck had earned for Germany and preserved to the hour when he surrendered his office to the young Kaiser. With their larger ambitions wholly unrealized, Germans could foresee a time when they would be powerless to attain their visions of a Germany proportioned upon their own conception of her true stature.

And between Algeciras and Armageddon, Germany marched steadily from disappointment to disappointment, while the whole edifice of her power began to crack; not alone through the disaffection of Italy but through the perils which the rise of a Slav state in the Balkans, under Russian inspiration, brought to her one faithful ally, brought to Austria, half of whose population was Slav.

Thus, one may say accurately that the ten years that followed Tangier were but dominated by the consequences of this fatal episode. Henceforth the whole stream of European history flowed between circumscribed banks toward the inevitable cataract, which was the World War. Once it had entered these banks, the course was inescapable and the destination, however hidden from the view of those who sailed the stream, was ineluctable.

### V. BOSNIA—THE SECOND GESTURE

Berlin had perceived with utter clarity that the entente between Britain and France would inevitably bring Russia and her ancient enemy into better relations. A Russian statesman had, indeed, remarked on the morrow of the Anglo-French convention, quoting from a Russian proverb: "The friends of my friend are my friends." Such a change would have the profoundest consequences in international relations, for the antagonism of Britain, which had again and again barred the Russian way to Constantinople, and British apprehensions

for the safety of the northern frontiers of India menaced by Russian advance, had been pivots on which German policy had turned for years.

And in 1907, Britain and Russia signed a document which in all respects recalled the Anglo-French compact of three years before. The questions that had divided the two nations, above all the question of Persia, were solved by a mutually satisfactory partition of Persia into zones. Britain and Russia, as it were, struck hands in compromise over half a century of differences, and behind the things agreed was the suggestion that, in due course, British opposition to Russian possession at Constantinople would vanish.

Again German answer was tardy, but unmistakable. This time Austria spoke, but the words were recognized as German. The Young Turk Revolution had now come to shake the crumbling foundations of Osmanli power. Europe stood amazed while a new and professedly Liberal Party seized the reins of power in Constantinople and first tied the hands of Abdul Hamid, and, when he plotted against it, threw him into prison, stripped him of his power, and put a Sultan of their own choosing in his place.

For the moment there was a promise of progress, of a renewed and reformed Turkey, and in that moment the various subject races of the Turk—the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Armenian—shared in the efforts of the Young Turks while even the faithful Albanians deserted their friend the deposed Sultan. But the Young Turk cherished grandiose dreams of a restoration, not of the Turkey that remained, by internal reform, but even more strongly the dream of a restoration of the Turkey of the past by the reconquest of the lost provinces of Bulgaria, of Serbia, of Bosnia, and Herzegovina which had passed to the protection of the Hapsburgs at the Congress of Berlin.

Seizing this pretext Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself Czar of Bulgaria, thenceforth beyond even the nominal sovereignty of the Turk. The results of this annexation were tremendous. Austria had many claims upon Bosnia, no colonial effort in European history had been more successful on the material side. She had brought civilization,

industrial development, railroads, and highways to one of the least advanced communities in the world. But by virtue of the mandate of the Congress of Berlin her rule was unquestioned and the fiction of an occupation had become only a fiction; to translate it into a legal as well as a nominal possession was to change nothing, but to bring instant difficulties.

The Turkish protest was of no moment. But Serbia, now become in fact the ward and protégé of Petrograd as she had been of Vienna in the days of the Obrenovitches, saw the extinction of her dream of a restored Serbia, which should include the 2,000,000 Serbs who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, moved by her Serbian interests, protested vehemently against the transformation of the agreement of the Congress of Berlin into a "scrap of paper." France and Britain supported Russia. Italy stirred uneasily, for she had no interest in seeing Austria advance southward along the Adriatic or toward Saloniki. In all this Austria was a rival, not an ally.

At the critical moment there came from Berlin another gesture like to that of the Kaiser at Tangier, but directed this time at Russia and not France. Once more Germany thrust her sword into the balance, and once more the governments of Paris, London, and Petrograd had to decide between war and surrender. And as France had been helpless in 1905, Russia, still suffering from her Japanese defeats, could not venture to risk a war with Germany. Nor did France or Britain at this moment manifest any strong enthusiasm for carrying their championship of Russia's protest to the firing line.

Russia therefore bowed, as France had bowed, but the time was to come when Petrograd would say, when the Czar himself was to be reported as saying: "We have stood this thing long enough." Russia accepted her humiliation in the spirit in which France had accepted hers. Henceforth the eyes of Russia turned toward Europe, toward the Balkans; the German gesture at Tangier had recalled France from Africa to Europe, the Bosnian affair recalled Slav thoughts from Asia to the Balkans.

Viewed at the moment, Bosnia was a shining success for German

diplomacy. But if for the moment the Triple Alliance seemed mighty and the Triple Entente a broken reed, Bosnia, like Tangier, had consequences which were unforeseen to the German statesmen who provoked the trial of strength, consequences which abolished the profits of the play. Above all, the blow did not permanently break the connection between Russia, Britain, and France, which alone could have counted for a clear success.

On the contrary, it did weaken still further Italian attachment to the Triple Alliance, as it stimulated Italian apprehension of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans and along the Albanian shore of the Adriatic. From this was presently to flow the Italian attack upon Turkey, while the expression of opinion in Rome, consequent upon the Bosnian incident, disclosed how rapidly the Triple Alliance was weakening, so far as the Italian partner was concerned.

### VI. AGADIR—THE THIRD AND LAST TIME

Before Italy stirred, however, there was one more great crisis—the last before the coming of the general war—in which the two groups of powers were ranged against each other. After Algeciras, Moroccan affairs had gone from bad to worse; anarchy had spread and extended. This anarchy had brought French troops to preserve the lives and properties of Frenchmen in Casablanca and along the Algerian frontier. In 1909 there had been a separate treaty between France and Germany, which was accepted for the moment as eliminating the question of Morocco. But there had been subsequent delay on the French part in carrying out terms, that Germany had insisted upon, for joint commercial activity in German Kamerun and French Congo.

In 1911, accordingly, Germany reasserted her liberty; Morocco, as Prince Bülow had said after Algeciras, was a bell which Germany could strike whenever she desired to call anything to French attention. In 1911 French troops had gone to Fez, called there by the revolt of the Moroccans. The expedition may or may not have been necessary. The stay of the French troops may have been prolonged. These were but incidents. The fact was that Morocco was no longer capable of

saving itself, the integrity proclaimed by the Kaiser at Tangier and reasserted at Algeciras had become an empty fiction.

In this situation and recognizing that French possession of Morocco was now become inevitable and that "Tunisification" would shortly close the Shereefian Empire to German desires unless Germany acted, the Kaiser suddenly sent the notorious *Panther* to Agadir, thus serving notice upon France and upon Europe that he purposed to share in the division of the Moroccan estate. At the same moment Berlin journals were filled with the promise of "*West Marokko deutsch*," and colored maps appeared assigning to the Kaiser the Moroccan provinces from the mouth of the Sebu to the Wady Dra.

Once more a European war seemed inevitable. Conversations between French and German ministers made no progress. The "sword-rattling" at Berlin was ominous. Presently the fact began to leak out that Germany was demanding from France "compensation" for French possession in Morocco, compensation amounting to most if not all of French colonial estates in Central Africa. Meantime British influence and British official actions tended more and more to take the form of solid support of France.

The situation was made the graver because suddenly a new spirit manifested itself in France. The Caillaux Ministry had given evidence of bowing before Germany, as the earlier ministry had sacrificed Delcassé in 1905. But now the French people suddenly spoke. There was a swift and unmistakable reassertion of the old spirit of France, a firm determination to make no further surrender, even though the alternative should be war. Caillaux fell. A ministry made up of all the greater men of France, headed by Raymond Poincaré and containing Delcassé, came into power. France in 1911 had marched far from the days of 1905.

Then in London, Lloyd George, speaking for the Liberal Government at a public banquet, uttered words that could not be mistaken, and were not. He gave the assurance to the world that the Liberal and Radical Government controlling British destinies did not purpose to permit British interests to be sacrificed or to allow Britain to be ignored. The words were of little consequence, the effect of the words was amaz-

ing. After a slight pause Germany changed her course, the Moroccan dispute was settled by the mutual cessions of territory in Central Africa by France and Germany. By the exchange France lost a hundred thousand square miles of Congo territory, but she acquired title to Morocco and placed her title beyond the reach of further German dispute.

### VII. A GERMAN DISASTER

Agadir was, then, a defeat for Germany that approximated a disaster. Here was no superficial success as at Tangier, here was no temporary accession of prestige as after Bosnia. Germany had laid claim to a share in Morocco, having in 1905 bestowed her protection upon the Sultan. Her people had come to believe that there was in Morocco a chance for German colonial development and a new "place in the sun." But German power had yielded to British threat and French firmness all that had been won at Algeciras, so far as Morocco was concerned, and all that had been acquired in prestige through the Bosnian episode. Germany had now acquired a few thousand square miles of Congo swamps; France, "decadent" France, had annexed an empire, and her possession had been insured by British interference. Agadir was to the Germans as complete a disaster and national humiliation as Tangier had been to the French.

To the Kaiser was ascribed the surrender to Britain. Never in his reign had he known such unpopular hours, and even his son joined the ranks of his critics. There persists a legend that, at the critical moment, he summoned the financiers of Germany and asked if they were ready. Their negative response inclined his decision to peace, so the story runs. But if this be only legend, there is solid fact enough to show that his whole nation blamed him for his course. Looking to the future it was plain that never again could William II safely run the risk of thwarting the will of his countrymen, even to preserve European peace, and the aftermath of Agadir was in many minds, when the crisis of late July, 1914, placed in William's hands the destinies of Europe.

After Agadir the real hope of European peace vanished; Germany turned feverishly to prepare. France presently returned to the three-

year law, to meet new German levies, and Germany responded with a *levée en masse*, not to raise recruits but to raise money to meet the needs of a war chest. Neither in France nor Russia was the future misread. After Tangier many Frenchmen and some Russians may still have preserved the hope of avoiding war. After Agadir there was no hope. Only Britain again misread the truth and lapsed back into her domestic quarrels, having by her brief intervention brought humiliation to the proudest sovereign and disappointment to the most ambitious people on the surface of the earth.

For Berlin, for Petrograd, for Paris, the question now became—"When?" Men looked to the future wonderingly, conscious that a storm was soon to break, and seeking to discover in the passing clouds some sure sign of the approach of the whirlwind. Read the French Yellow Book, published after the war began, and this state of mind is disclosed beyond all cavil—disclosed as the state of mind of those directing the fortunes of France, of Russia, and of Germany. So fixed was this belief that when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was uttered in July, 1914, men of all three nations simply said: "So *it* has come at last!"

The Agadir crisis was followed promptly by the Italian attack upon Turkey. Italy had found, in German activity on the west coast of Morocco, a hint that there might be a subsequent voyage of the *Panther* to the Tripolitan coast. She had found, in the German demand for "compensation" from France for French expansion in Morocco, a warrant for demanding a compensation to match Austrian annexation of Bosnia. She had found in the disorder created by the Young Turk régime, in the disarray of Turkish military force, that opportunity to which she had long looked forward. Finally, her consent to French and British bargains in the Mediterranean had been purchased by their assent to her own plan.

But the attack upon Turkey was an attack upon a nation which in Berlin was looked upon as an ally. Austrian sensibilities were instantly provoked by Italian naval operations in the Adriatic and, in fact, Italy was charged in Vienna and Berlin with being faithless

to her allies and having attacked the solidarity of the alliance of the Central Powers, to which, in fact, if not in theory, Turkey adhered. Bernhardi could write in this very year that Germany ought to have attacked Italy, when Italy assailed the Turk and the complete collapse of the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed. Here was a new blow to the edifice of German influence.

After the Tripolitan War had dragged on for many more months without bringing much of glory to Italian arms, although Italian troops slowly occupied the towns of the African coast, Turkey suddenly surrendered, and the Treaty of Lausanne gave Tripoli to Italy. Turkish surrender was due to the coming of a new storm, which was in its turn to add still more to the anxiety of Austro-German statesmen, and a new peril to Austro-German—and above all to German—policy.

### VIII. THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

Turkish difficulties and defeats had now raised other hopes. The Balkan States, long looking forward to the liberation of their Christian brothers beyond their own frontiers and properly alarmed by the programme of the Young Turks, seized the moment to unite in an alliance against a common foe. To the amazement of Europe, the Greek and the Bulgar put aside a hatred of a thousand years, the Bulgar and the Serb compromised their Macedonian rivalries, and all three turned to attack the Osmanli.

Until the discord between the two great groups of powers had paralyzed Europe, such an alliance would have been powerless before the mandate of the Concert of Europe. But there was no concert, and neither group cared to invite the hostility of this new alliance, so closely balanced were the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One group, influenced by Russia, who had helped to form the Balkan Alliance, hoped for its success; the other, stirred by their own ambitions in the Balkans, hoped and expected Turkish victory.

But the Turk was swiftly and decisively beaten. The Bulgars defeated the main Turkish army at Lule Burgas, invested Adrianople, and reached the base of the peninsula on which Constantinople stands.

The Serb avenged Kosovo at Kumanova, took Uskup, completed his victory before Monastir, and flowed down the Vardar Valley toward Saloniki, upon which Greek and Bulgarian troops were converging. Even Greece, wiping out the disgrace of the earlier Turkish War, defeated the Turkish armies before her and seized Saloniki, the prize of the Near East, and at the same time sent her troops into Albania and conquered all northern Epirus, investing Janina as the Bulgars had invested Adrianople. Here then was an end of Turkish empire in Europe. The real contest was over in as brief a time as that in which Germany had vanquished France in 1870. The prize had been won and the only question was the division of it. Now at last Europe interfered. Repulsed at the Chatalja, the outward lines of Constantinople, the Bulgar was served with notice that he would not be permitted to hold the city, even if he took it. Then Serb, Bulgar, and Greek were bidden to come to London and put their case before the Concert of Europe at last reëstablished. To this conference the small States came, and it was to prove their ruin. Only Greece refused to discontinue her military operations, while Bulgaria declined to permit the revictualing of Adrianople.

### IX. THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON

At this conference the aims of the Central Powers were at last disclosed. The Balkan Alliance had been a blow to their whole purpose. If it lasted it would bar the way to Austro-German expansion toward the East; it would erect a strong Serbia on the flank of Austria, a Serbia responsive to Russian influence and ambitious to reclaim the millions of southern Slavs remaining under Hapsburg rule. Italy looked with frank disapprobation upon Greek progress northward to Avlona and the Skumbi, and Italy and Austria agreed in opposing Slav expansion southward from the Montenegrin boundary to the new Greek frontier.

Wherefore Austria served notice that there must be a free Albania. On the surface the claim was fair. Albanians inhabited all the region from the environs of Janina to Scutari, and there was patent desire on the part of the Albanians to be free, not to be the subjects of a Greek or Slavic sovereign. But the true Austrian purpose had no concern with the

wishes of the Albanians. Her desire was to break up the Balkan League. If Serbia were denied the right to reach the sea, through northern Albania, then it was inevitable that Serbia would seek compensation in the Vardar Valley. Such compensation would be at the expense of Bulgaria, for although Bulgaria and Serbia had signed a treaty partitioning Macedonia before they went to war, Serbia and not Bulgaria had conquered and held all of Macedonia and could remunerate herself as she saw fit.

The comedy of Albania long occupied the representatives of the Great Powers of Europe. Germany cleverly made Sir Edward Grey the "honest broker" of the conference and used his ignorance of the Near Eastern situation to destroy the Balkan League. He was permitted to accommodate the differences between Austria and Russia over the future boundaries between the Serb and the Albanian. There were mutual concessions made with great show of good will, although it was of more than passing consequence that the peace of Europe hung on the disposition of Ipek and Jakova, wretched Albanian villages unknown to most of the millions who would have been called to arms had the Conference of London ended in war.

Without regard to the mandate of Europe, Bulgaria burst impetuously from the conference and returned to her work, which was the capture of Adrianople. This done, she bowed to the decision of London and agreed to accept the frontier drawn from Midia to the Gulf of Enos, while Greece consented to give up northern Epirus, and Serbia and Montenegro resigned Scutari and Durazzo. But now it was necessary to settle the division of conquered territory between the three victors. Serbia and Greece had agreed. But deprived of northern Albania, through Sir Edward Grey's Albanian operation, Serbia insisted that she be permitted to hold Macedonia west of the Vardar, while Greece insisted upon keeping Saloniki, although agreeing to surrender Kavala and northern Epirus.

### X. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Bulgaria, driven by Austrian influence, declined all compromise, insisted that she should have all that her treaty with Serbia had assured

her, and maintained troops in Saloniki as a sign of her determination to possess this city also. To all appeals of Russia she remained deaf. To all dictates of caution imposed by the alliance of Serbia and Greece she turned a deaf ear. Even Roumanian warnings, combined with the demand for "compensation" about Silistria, left her obdurate. Her heart was set upon Macedonia and she refused to barter.

Finally in the closing days of June, 1913, a great Bulgarian army in Macedonia attacked the Serbs, standing behind the Bregalnitza, won a temporary advantage, but was presently forced to retreat, while a Greek advance from Saloniki and a Hellenic success at Kilkis compelled the rapid retirement of the Bulgars from all Macedonia. A Roumanian army now entered northern Bulgaria, while the Turk reoccupied Thrace and regained Adrianople. Bulgaria's ruin was complete. She had heeded Austrian advice and Austria shared in her misfortune. Austrian purpose to destroy the Balkan League had prevailed, thanks to Sir Edward Grey, but it had raised up a dangerous Serbia, it had enhanced not weakened Russian influence in the Balkans, and it had shaken the ties that had bound the Roumanian to the Austrian for a generation. The Roumanian troops which had invaded Bulgaria had openly proclaimed that they were following through Bulgaria the road which led to Transylvania and Bukowina.

The Treaty of Bukharest confirmed the Bulgarian defeat. Serbia acquired all of Macedonia and emerged from her trials a state equal in area and importance to that Sardinia which had with French help driven the Austrian out of Italy. Greece acquired all of the coast from her ancient frontier to the Mesta, including both Kavala and Saloniki. Roumania took a province from Bulgaria, and the Turk made good his claim to his Thracian districts. After two bloody wars and terrible sacrifices, Bulgaria was able to show only a small strip of land between the Rhodopians and the Ægean; Macedonia was lost, and the dream of the hegemony of the Balkans had gone temporarily to dust and ashes.

But the worst aspect of the Balkan settlement was the menace that it carried to European peace, through the inevitable rivalries of Austria and Serbia. Ever since the change of dynasties had given Petrograd

and not Vienna control at Belgrad, the relations between Serbia and Austria had been bad. Time and again Austria had bullied and mistreated her small neighbour. The annexation of Bosnia had been as heavy a blow to the Serb as the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany had been to the Frenchman. By refusing to permit Serbia to gain a window on the sea, Austria had renewed all Serbian resentment.

### XI. BUKHAREST AND AFTER

Now, from Bukharest, Serbia emerged a considerable state; in the eyes of her own soldiers and citizens she was a real military power and the easy victories of her armies over Turk and Bulgar were taken as a promise of future success over the Austrian. Beyond the Drina and the Save were four million Serbs and two million Croats, toward whom Serbians now looked as the Italians of the Sardinian Kingdom had looked toward their brethren of the Milanese and the Kingdom of Naples. Nor was there any mistaking the similar stirring of race sympathy within the Hapsburg domains.

Worst of all, it was plain that Russia would henceforth regard Serbia as a ward, and never, unless under threat of war, permit Austria to strike the little Slav state. The growth and glory of a free Serbia might shake the very foundations of the Hapsburg empire with its millions of Slavs, uneasily bearing the German and Magyar yokes, but backed by Russia, Serbia was bound to endure as a menace to Austria as far as Austrian statesmen could see. Austria had challenged Russia in the Bosnia time; Russia had temporarily bowed, but the real answer came when Russia appeared at London, after the First Balkan War, to support the claims of the Serbs, and after Bukharest gave her protection to the new and strong Serbia, which not alone closed the Hapsburg pathway to the Ægean, but dreamed of extending the renaissance of the southern Slav to Fiume and to Triest, depriving German and Magyar alike of a window on the sea, from which they had excluded the Serb.

The Treaty of Bukharest placed Austria-Hungary in jeopardy. It had hardly been promulgated when Austria sought the permission of her Italian ally to attack Serbia. Italy, as Giolitti later confessed,

declined. But the Austrian suggestion leaves no doubt as to the Austrian purpose. The blow that was suspended in 1913 was to fall in 1914; it could no longer be permanently prevented, after Serbia had made good her place in the sun and Austrian diplomacy had proven bankrupt in the Balkan wars.

Unhappily the question between Austria and Russia over Serbia could no longer be regarded as one concerning them alone. Tangier, Agadir, and the intervening Bosnian episode had transformed Europe into two camps. A dispute between two nations, each belonging to a different group, became instantly the cause for difference between the two groups. Germany had twice challenged France and Britain, and her challenge had contributed to binding them still more closely together. The Anglo-French friendship had expanded to include Russia, the ally of France. And this relation between Russia, France, and Britain had barred the road to German colonial expansion at Tangier and Agadir, it had endeavoured to thwart Austrian purpose in the Balkans in the Bosnian time, and it had, in fact, appeared as a potential force at the Conference at London, if it had never been forced to declare its solidarity, because no test question was pressed to an issue.

Such, in sum, was the transformation that Europe had undergone in less than ten years. Such had been the inexorable consequences of the Kaiser's determination to challenge British sea power and his subsequent determination to prevent Britain from drawing close to Russia and to France. Britain had met his challenge on the water. She had drawn close to France and to Russia until a war was to show that she stood with them absolutely. The play of ten years had all turned against the German. His influence in Europe had been undermined; the safety of his Austrian partner had been compromised; the loyalty of his Italian ally had been weakened and, as it turned out, destroyed; and all this had happened to a Germany, every year growing stronger in all that makes a nation strong and possessing an army unequalled in Europe, unexcelled in history. In the minds of every German the shadow of Britain had crossed the path of rightful Teutonic expansion, and a Germany that felt she could win her rightful place in the sun by

the sword felt also that, in the preceding ten years, she had not only failed to win it, but had actually lost it by reliance upon peaceful methods.

This was the Germany that spoke in July, 1914, less than a year later. The Treaty of Bukharest, in restoring peace in the Balkans, had doomed the peace of the world.

## CHAPTER THREE

## THE TWELVE DAYS

### I

### THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE

The Treaty of Bukharest was signed on August 10, 1913. Such reservations as to its provisions as may have been cherished in Petrograd, Vienna, and Rome, were abolished when the Kaiser—by a gesture, memorable thereafter—conveyed to his brother-in-law, the King of Greece, his recognition that the terms of this settlement were definitive. And for ten months Europe settled back after two years of the acutest apprehension. On the surface all was calm, although the subsequent admissions of Giolitti have informed us that the ink was not dry on the document of Bukharest when Vienna began to sound Rome on the possibility of an attack upon Serbia. Rome was unresponsive and this bad moment passed.

But on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife were assassinated in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crime was committed by a man of Serbian race, but a resident of Bosnia and a subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The deed was an abhorrent one and if no evidence that the world has yet been able to submit to any impartial jury has fixed upon the Serbian Crown or the Serbian Government any complicity in the murder, still the crime itself was manifestly the outgrowth of the agitation of the Pan-Serbs, who aimed at extending the domain of King Peter from the Drina to the Adriatic and from Cattaro to Fiume. It was a logical and unmistakable consequence of the Serbian propaganda for racial unity, which had been permitted in Belgrad and not unkindly observed from Petrograd.

There were some days when Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from Vienna. But no sign appeared and slowly, yet in the

# BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES

KAISER GREETS KAISER

Germany and Austria, the two faithful members of the Triple Alliance, salute each other in the persons of their sovereigns, Wilhelm and Franz Joseph.

THE TWO KAISERS
DROPPING THE PILOT
GROWTH OF THE ENTENTE
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO

DROPPING THE PILOT—TENNIEL'S FAMOUS CARTOON

A clash was inevitable between two such masterful natures as those of William II and Bismarck. The ideas of the old man had been principally confined to building and buttressing the strength, first of Prussia, then of Germany, within her own borders. The young man, of broader vision, looked beyond the seas and sought in other lands for Germany's place in the sun. Bismarck was retired in 1890, two years after William's accession

M. DELCASSÉ, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN 1904

He and Lord Lansdowne negotiated the extremely important Anglo-French Agreement without consulting Germany. "This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles."



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LORD LANSDOWNE

Lord Lansdowne was the British Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1904, and he is called "the father of the Anglo-French Agreement." On Black Sunday, during the fateful Twelve Days in August, 1914, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith, declaring in no uncertain terms that "*France must not be deserted*".

TWO STAUNCH FRIENDS AND PROMOTERS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

President Fallieres of France, and King Edward VII of England—father of the present King and uncle of the Kaiser. "More than any man of his time Edward VII feared the German danger and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. Many Germans believed he conceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany"

GENERAL KITCHENER AND COLONEL MARCHAND—THE PRINCIPALS IN THE FASHODA INCIDENT

Six years before the Anglo-French Agreement, British and French plans for colonial expansion came into conflict when Kitchener and Marchand met at Fashoda on the frontier of the British and French spheres in Africa. "It seemed inevitable that France and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France bowed." These two soldiers were to meet once again, sixteen years later, this time as allies on the Plain of Artois.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

CZAR NICHOLAS AND PRESIDENT POINCARE

This picture is evidence of a political friendship warmly cherished between the Powers to the east and west of Germany. Even while the diplomatic interchanges of the Twelve Days (in August, 1914) were in progress, President Poincare of France was returning from a visit to the Russian Czar.

THE KAISER WITH A FORMER FRIEND ALBERT OF BELGIUM

The Kaiser in former years took such delight in visiting other monarchs that he was sometimes criticized at home as a gad-about and received the nickname of *Der Reise Kaiser*—the traveling Kaiser. He has justified his wanderings in the following terms. "On my travels I design not only to make myself acquainted with foreign countries and institutions, and to foster friendly relations with neighboring rulers, but these journeys, which have often been misinterpreted, have high value in enabling me to observe home affairs from a distance and submit them to a quiet examination".

LORD ROBERTS AND LORD HALDANE

One vainly urged preparedness, the other minimized the danger and called Germany his "spiritual home," even after all hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. "The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals."



*Photograph by Brown Brothers* *Photograph by International News Service*

ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND (HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE)—
WITH HIS MORGANATIC WIFE

Both were killed by an assassin's bomb at Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914

THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN

Austria asserted that his act was inspired by the Pan-Slavic propaganda in Serbia and declared war. Russia stood behind Serbia. Germany stood behind Austria. Then came Armageddon.

end completely, the crime slipped from the headlines of the newspapers and the minds of the public. On the surface, European politics seemed in the most tranquil state in the long and troubled decade that had passed. A British fleet visited Kiel; the French President set out for Petrograd; there was not a ripple on the surface of the diplomatic waters. This was, however, only the calm before the storm. On July 23d Austria sent to Serbia the most formidable ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to another.

The ultimatum itself—in addition to prescribing rules and regulations with reference to anti-Austrian propaganda and propagandists in Serbia; in addition to calling for the disbanding of patriotic societies with aims inimical to Austria and the punishment of their leaders, who were also servants of the Crown in the army and in the civil service—demanded that Austrian officials should be associated with the Serbian in the carrying out of the tasks that were set. To this ultimatum there was added a time-limit of forty-eight hours.

Here, then, on July 23d, was a new crisis, graver than the three that had preceded, because, instead of abstract questions of territory and commerce, there were now raised the concrete questions of national honour and dynastic interest which were involved in the crime of Serajevo. Ostensibly seeking to punish agitators, whose activities had led to the killing of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian thrones; ostensibly aiming to put an end to an agitation injurious to Austrian safety, the Government of Vienna had, in fact, challenged Russia, the avowed protector of Serbia.

If Russia did not now step forward to defend Serbia it was plain that the kingdom would fall under the weight of Austrian arms, or if it bowed to Austrian demands would pass actually, if not nominally, under the influence of Vienna. If Russia stood aside and permitted this to happen, then her own prestige in the Balkans and among the Slav peoples of Europe was gone. It was Bosnia over again, but Bosnia with a new and still-more-disturbing set of complexities, for in annexing Bosnia Austria had only transformed the name under which she exercised authority in Bosnia, but now she would transform the actual condition under which Serbia lived from independence to servitude.

And if Russia did step forward to protect Serbia, then she, by this act, asserted that she claimed the right to exercise an actual protection over Serbia; she claimed the right to speak for Serbia; she extended Russian influence and Russian power to the very shores of the Danube, and from Belgrad, as from the Galician frontier, threatened the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. If Austrian will prevailed, Serbia would become a Hapsburg appendage, but not less clear, once the issue was raised, was the fact that if Russia intervened and prevailed, Austrian safety was compromised and her prestige destroyed.

### II. THE AUSTRIAN CASE

Stripped of all detail the fact was that Serbia, if not through direct governmental action at least by general popular agitation and with the benevolent blindness of the government, had plotted to undermine Austrian unity. To be sure the movement had its origin in the fact that Austria contained some million of Slavs, who were Serb by race, and perhaps desired to become subjects of King Peter. It was a situation on all fours with that which existed in Italy, before the Austrian war with France. But, whatever the moral title of a nation to its own territories and subjects, no nation can permit itself to be destroyed by outside intrigue and no nation will voluntarily surrender provinces and citizens.

When France undertook to assist in the liberation of northern Italy from Hapsburg rule, war resulted, as it was bound to result. If Russia now asserted on behalf of Serbia the same doctrine that Napoleon III had practised with regard to Sardinia, Austria would have to fight. The only difference was that Austria now raised the issue herself. She did not raise the issue until the heir to the Hapsburg throne had been murdered, although she had proposed to raise it ten months before the crime; but, having raised it, her own safety, her own integrity, her own existence as a Great Power were at stake.

And if one look squarely at the facts, there is little question that she was bound to raise the issue, because this Pan-Slav agitation was destroying the very foundations of her national existence. The right

of ten million Germans and as many Magyars to rule twenty-five million Slavs may be questioned on the moral side, but the legal and international right of a nation to preserve itself cannot be questioned, save on the basis of some law higher than that recognized by nations in their common intercourse.

Austrian treatment of the Slavs within her boundaries, and her treatment of the neighbouring Slav states, had been brutal and stupid. She had gained their hatred and she had deserved it. She had sought in the Balkan wars to thwart their growth and her policy had gone bankrupt. But if her mistakes had gained her deserved hatred, and her failures had enabled the very state that hated her most to menace her existence, it was not less true that she was bound to defend her existence and her unity.

In the minds of many, Serbia has come to share the glory of Belgium and to occupy the niche of a martyr quite as completely. But the idea is fallacious. Belgium threatened no one, plotted injury to no one of her neighbours, permitted no propaganda of sedition which menaced the security and order of either France or Germany, for example, to be conducted from within her boundaries. Serbia did all these things. She did them as Sardinia carried on the *risorgimento;* she did them in the name and in the fact of patriotism; she sought to liberate and unite the mass of her race, but this liberation was predicated on the collapse of Austria.

If there had been no crime at Serajevo, it was inevitable that Austria would presently take the sword against Serbia, because only by taking the sword could she defend herself. But it was equally inevitable that Russia, bound by race and religion to the Serbs, animated as she had always been by the keenest race sympathy for her fellow Slavs, would defend Serbia, who had become her soldier on the Danube, her ally against Austria's dreams of an advance to the Ægean. Actually Serbia was only a detail in the rivalry between Romanoff and Hapsburg, which was several centuries old.

Bismarck himself had hesitated in making an alliance with Austria, because he foresaw that this meant to inherit the rivalry between the

two nations in the Balkans. His influence at Vienna had sufficed to keep peace, but his support of Austria at the Congress of Berlin had made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. For the moment, for his own time, he had met this by expanding his alliance to include Italy, by keeping on friendly terms with Britain, and by executing a "treaty of reassurance" with Russia. But it had needed the skill of Bismarck to keep the balance true and the successors of Bismarck had neither his skill nor his resources. Italy and Austria were natural enemies and he had made them allies, Russia and Austria were natural rivals and he had kept them at peace with each other. But less than two decades after he laid down the reins, natural tendencies had overcome fortuitous circumstances.

The peril of the Balkan situation was no longer the peril of a war between Austria and Russia, or between Austria and Germany on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, with Italy a possible ally of the Central Powers. The challenge of the Kaiser to Britain had brought Britain back to the Continent. France herself would have hesitated in the early nineties to fight on the Serbian issue for her Russian ally. But the French spirit had undergone a new birth since Tangier and Agadir.

Since the war came, volumes have been published devoted simply to proving upon which of the several nations the responsibility for the conflict rests and to demonstrating that one or the other of the nations, during the fateful twelve days before the storm broke in its full fury, actually desired war, or served the cause of peace more loyally, than its neighbours.

Yet it seems probable that, in the long time hereafter, those details will be forgotten by the historian, who will perceive that the twelve days were of little meaning, that they marked a period after real hope of peace had expired, that the whole system under which Europe had lived for so long had been destroyed, and that the statesmen who laboured so frantically in the closing hours were actually as impotent as medicine men who hurl incantations and invoke charms to check the approach of a cyclone.

### III. SIR EDWARD GREY

In the Albanian time Europe had permitted Sir Edward Grey to act as its agent. He had passed from one group to the other, persuading Russia to resign Scutari to the new Kingdom of Albania, wheedling Austria into consenting that Dibra should be Serbian. Austria and Italy for once were agreed, both seeking to preserve from Serb and Greek alike that Albania each hoped to inherit. Neither Russia nor Germany was in a state of readiness for war, and France was, as she continued through the critical days of 1914, willing to serve the cause of peace to her limit, provided it did not interfere with her duty as an ally of Russia.

When the Serbian crisis came, Sir Edward Grey—still under the influence of his success over Albania, still convinced that he had to deal with a question that could be adjusted as the Albanian had been—began that earnest and industrious campaign to preserve the peace of the world, which remains the admiration of the Briton—and the target of the German. From first to last he had, in this campaign, the support of the French and the Italian statesmen; he had the assent of Russia to all the propositions which he made; but never, to the closing hour, does he seem to have grasped the fact that he was in the presence of a question which could not be settled by discussion about the green table, since it involved the safety of Austria and the honour of Russia.

The whole burden of Sir Edward Grey's words, messages, explanations, discloses his conviction that to preserve the peace of Europe it was necessary to persuade Austria to withdraw her ultimatum, to suspend her action against Serbia, to consent to submit to the Concert of Europe the question between Serbia and herself, which was the question of her own integrity aggravated by the new problem raised by the murder of the Archduke.

In the very nature of things Russia was prepared to consent to any arrangement that spared Serbia, but any arrangement that spared Serbia and submitted the Austro-Serbian question to the Concert of Europe vindicated Russia's assertion of a right to protect Serbia and

was bound to constitute a moral victory for Russia and a new blow to Austrian safety. Nor could Austria, remembering the experience of Germany at Algeciras, anticipate a victory in any new international gathering.

To Germany Sir Edward Grey continued to address appeals to intervene to restrain Austrian action. Conceivably it had been Germany who had moved Austria to action, to the despatch of the ultimatum, but of this there is as yet no sufficing proof. Unmistakably it lay within the power of the German Government by a word, by a gesture, to deprive Austria of the assurance German support gave. But this would have been in fact a desertion of her one faithful ally at the moment of deadly peril, and it would have foreshadowed the collapse of the Austro-German Alliance, if it had not been but the prelude to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, already shaken by Slav intrigue within and without.

Unless Russia abandoned her championship of Serbia, or Austria consented to recall her ultimatum and leave to Europe the task of disciplining her little neighbour—a task beyond the capacity of the fragile Concert—war was bound to follow. And there never was any chance that either Austria or Russia would surrender. When Sir Edward Grey asked Germany to restrain Austria, Germany with perfect justice retorted by asking Sir Edward Grey to restrain Russia. Always the British Minister seems to have been obsessed with the immediate present, always the action of Austria in issuing the ultimatum seems to arouse his indignation and awaken his protest, but to the fatal chain of events that had made Serbia a deadly peril to Austrian existence he gave no thought.

Actually he accomplished nothing for good or for evil, actually he sought peace by suggesting temporary devices that were of no value and could be of no avail in the presence of the storm that was rising. When the storm broke he found himself without a policy, so far as his own Government was concerned, but bound by honour, if not by treaty, to stand with France and with Russia. Nor was he alone bound by honour. He had failed beyond all forgiveness, together with his as-

LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR

As the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had been almost silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. An old and broken man he had gone to France at the moment of the crisis to cheer on his well-loved Indian troops. Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it

sociates, in not warning the British people of the danger that had for ten years been growing, but he now saw with utmost clarity that a Germany victorious over France would be a Germany which Britain could not resist and could not expect would refrain from attack.

German invasion of Belgium saved Sir Edward Grey, it saved England, because it supplied a moral issue and a moral impulse which served to enlist British effort until the nation at last perceived the material interests, the national existence, that were at stake. But if the successor of Bismarck will hereafter have to answer to his own people and in history for having involved Germany in a war against three great nations at once, the successor of Pitt and Beaconsfield will be indicted for having brought Britain to the edge of Armageddon without permitting the British people to suspect that their life and their Empire were in jeopardy.

Having entered into an arrangement with France, by which the French fleet was to guard British interests in the Mediterranean while the British fleet concentrated against the German menace in the North Sea, Sir Edward Grey could not desert France at the opening of the war, even if there were no written alliance. But if the British people had not been aroused by the invasion of Belgium it may be questioned whether Sir Edward Grey could have persuaded his Government to make good its obligations or his fellow countrymen to honour their Government's commitments.

It is difficult to find any warrant in Sir Edward's course for the storm of abuse that Germans have directed at him as a monster of bad faith, but equally difficult is the task for one, writing with such facts as are now at hand, to escape the belief that he acted with a blindness and a fatuity almost passing human comprehension. His party associates had kept Britain blind to the truth of world affairs for a decade, and when the storm arrived there was lacking any national understanding which could give force to the decisions of a Minister, at last aware of the deadly peril of his country. He knew England must stand with France to save her own life, but until Germany invaded Belgium, he was destitute of any resource by which he could reveal to his fellow countrymen the imminence and the magnitude of their peril.

Those who saw Sir Edward in the closing hours, when the World War had become inescapable, think of him as one who revealed in every word and act the emotion of a man who had seen the hope and the work of a lifetime gone suddenly to dust and ashes. He had believed that a settlement with Germany, which would lay forever the peril of what was now to occur, was possible. In the Bosnia time, in the Agadir crisis, at the Conference of London, he had not only striven to avoid war, but had found cause for hope that, since war had been avoided on these three occasions, the cloud that had hung over Europe so long might be finally dissipated.

His optimism had led him far afield. It had persuaded him to sacrifice the Balkan Alliance at the Conference of London, when he accepted the Austro-German programme for Albania. It was to cost his own country dearly in the first years of the war, which found her unprepared, because a Liberal Government, under Sir Edward's influence, had turned a deaf ear to all the warnings of those who saw Europe as it was and not through the golden haze of lofty but insubstantial dreams of world peace. Yet complete as had been his failure, absolute as had been his misreading of the essential facts of his own time, when he occupied a post of honour and responsibility, no one could doubt the sincerity of his purposes or the tragedy, the personal tragedy, that came with the destruction of all his lifework.

### IV. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

The Austrian ultimatum was despatched to Serbia on July 23d, and it carried a time-limit of forty-eight hours. When it was sent, the President of France, with the important members of the French Cabinet, were on the sea, returning from Russia. The Irish crisis in Britain seemed to be about to end in civil war. The Kaiser was in Norwegian waters. There was no Russian ambassador in Vienna. The Caillaux trial was dominating French attention and a French senator, speaking in his place, had just called attention to grave defects in French military organization.

In only one detail—but this a vitally important one—did chance

favour the Triple Entente. The British fleet had been mobilized for its annual manœuvres shortly before the crisis came and, on a hint from Italy, received in the third week of July, demobilization was postponed. Thus British sea power was on a war footing at the crucial moment. If Germany had ever planned a raid on British shores in the first days of an Anglo-German conflict, as British naval authorities believe—such a dash as the Japanese made at Port Arthur in the opening hours of the Russo-Japanese War—the scheme was frustrated by the accidental posture of British fleets and the timely Italian hint.

On Friday, July 24th, Austria informed Russia that she did not have any intention to annex Serbian territory, and Russia replied by asking an extension of the time-limit attached to the ultimatum to Serbia. This was refused by Austria on Saturday, the day on which Russia issued her first warning note, published in the Petrograd press, an official assurance that Russia would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, which, through its Crown Prince, now acting as Regent, had appealed to the Czar on the preceding day.

On this same day, Saturday, July 25th, just within the time-limit, Serbia sent a reply to Austria, which contained a surrender on most points and an agreement to submit the rest to arbitration. Austria forthwith declared the Serbian response to be unsatisfactory and withdrew her minister from Belgrad.

On Sunday, July 26th, Sir Edward Grey began his task of accommodating the world crisis. He suggested that the case between Russia and Austria be left to the mediation of the four Great Powers not directly concerned, acting through their ambassadors in Vienna and Petrograd. These nations were, of course, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Russia, having first suggested conversations directly between Vienna and Petrograd, a suggestion subsequently rejected by Austria, accepted Sir Edward's proposal but Germany rejected it on the next day.

On Monday, July 27th, when Germany had rejected his proposal, Sir Edward invited the German Government to present a formula of mediation of its own. This elicited no response from Berlin, because

Germany had already on July 25th invited France and Great Britain to restrain Russia, that is, to urge Russia to stand aside and permit Austria to punish Serbia. This proposal, described by the Germans as "localization" of the disturbance, was rejected both by France and by Great Britain.

A collapse of all preliminary efforts of Sir Edward follows the declaration of war upon Serbia, by Austria, on Tuesday, July 28th, as fighting commenced forthwith. Meantime the Kaiser, having returned from Norway on Sunday night, now addressed his first message to the Czar urging him to permit Austria to discipline Serbia. To this the Czar responded the next day by urging that the whole matter be submitted to The Hague, a suggestion never answered by the Kaiser.

Meantime the question of mobilization had become acute. Austria had been partially mobilizing against Serbia, and as early as July 25th the Russian Council had considered partial mobilization against Austria, at the same time informing the German Government that there was no hostile meaning for Germany in the approaching mobilization.

Now on the 29th, Germany for the first time began to sound Great Britain on the possibility of British neutrality if war should come. Her proposals were promptly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

By Friday, July 30th, general Russian mobilization was proclaimed, but at the eleventh hour Sir Edward Grey suggested that the operations of Austria against Serbia should be recognized as a punitive expedition and that Austria, having reached a point within Serbian territory fixed by agreement, should permit her future course to be submitted to a conference of Powers. Austria assented to a portion of this suggestion and for the first time manifested a decided change in spirit. Russia agreed.

But on July 31st Germany addressed an ultimatum to Russia demanding that Russia desist from her mobilization within twelve hours. This was naturally ignored by Russia and on Saturday, August 1st, Germany declared war upon Russia. A general war now became inevitable and the only question that remained was as to the course of Britain and Italy.

### V. GERMANY'S COURSE

In all this period it is quite clear that the British and German statesmen, alike, pursued a course aimed, ostensibly and probably honestly, at averting a general war. But Germany insisted that the war could only be averted by action of Britain and France in restraining Russia from intervening in the quarrel between Serbia and Austria, while Britain insisted that Austria should be compelled, by her German ally, to submit her dispute with Serbia to a European conference and asked Germany to restrain Austria.

Such purposes were irreconcilable from the start and failed as they were bound to fail unless one of the two great nations involved was prepared to yield everything, as France had yielded at Tangier, and Russia in the Bosnia time. Action by the German Emperor, in the sense requested by Sir Edward Grey, would have brought down upon him far more criticism at home than had beaten upon him in the Agadir time. Peace was no longer to be preserved by a compromise between the two groups of nations; the sole chance of avoiding war from July 23d onward was by the surrender of one of the groups and this, possible in 1905 and 1909, was unthinkable in 1914.

Germany's course prior to the outbreak of the war, her relation to the efforts to preserve peace made by Sir Edward Grey, has suffered naturally from the odium that justly attaches to the manner in which she acted, once the conflict had begun, both in invading Belgium and in the manner in which she conducted operations on Belgian and French soil, as well as on the high seas. This was inevitable if not entirely logical. But certainly she was as fully entitled to support Austria as was France to support Russia. France never considered demanding that Russia should abandon Serbia, and it was equally unreasonable to expect Germany to compel Austria to refrain from abolishing the Serbian menace, once Austria had so admirable an issue as the assassination of the Archduke furnished.

The fact that Germany alone was ready when the war came has contributed to creating the conviction that she alone wished it. It is

unmistakable that for twenty years she had proclaimed her purpose, through her acts, to modify the *status quo;* she had challenged Britain on the sea, she had assailed France through Morocco, and backed Austria against Russia. Her teachers and soldiers had proclaimed that only through a victorious war could Germany attain her rightful place in the sun. This was strange doctrine in the Twentieth Century, but familiar doctrine in the preceding centuries that had seen the rise of France and Britain. What is essential is that it be recognized that millions of Germans held this doctrine. It was a doctrine that Europe had resisted over years when Napoleon applied it, when Louis XIV asserted it, when Charles V employed it. Europe was bound to oppose it now, but in the larger view of history it will doubtless take its place beside the other efforts of great races to revive the Roman tradition and use their superior organization and unity to dominate a continent.

That Germany actually procured the war, in the critical days of July, is as yet a mere unsupported allegation; that her whole course since the present Kaiser came to the throne had made the war inevitable, is hardly to be mistaken. That the language of her teachers and her scholars, the words of her Emperor, and the frequent utterances of her official spokesmen had ended by convincing the statesmen and several of the peoples of Europe that Germany was seeking world power—thereby bringing together nations whose unity, once achieved, threatened her interests, her legitimate interests, perhaps all her hopes and ambitions—certainly, is manifest.

But in all this the incidents of the days preceding the war are of minor consequence. We may see and believe that the war was the inevitable consequence of the new visions and purposes of the German people, but it is difficult not to see and to believe that the actual occasion of the outbreak was accidental and that the decision for war rather than surrender had already been reached, not by one but by all nations before Sir Edward Grey undertook to perform that task at which Mrs. Partington had failed with equal honour to herself.

### VI. BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Something less than a hundred hours separate the German declaration of war upon Russia from the British declaration despatched to Germany after midnight on August 4th. In this time the real drama concerns only Britain and Germany, for Italy in due course proclaimed her neutrality while France affirmed her fidelity to her Russian ally.

In these momentous hours the whole play of German diplomacy was to keep Britain out of the conflict, for reasons too obvious to need mention. And it should be remarked that not only did Germany have good reason to believe that she would succeed, but also that she came desperately near to accomplishing her purpose, as will be disclosed when the history of what took place in London on August 2d at last sees the light of day.

Sir Edward Grey's rôle in this period is also plain. He knew that, not because of Belgium, not because of sympathy for Albert's kingdom or responsibility for its integrity, not because of unwritten but potent claims of honour binding Britain to France, must his country enter the war. Now at last he perceived that it had become a matter of life or death for his own nation and that a German victory and the destruction of France would leave Germany an enemy greater than Napoleon had been, and more menacing than any foe England had known in her long history. Unmistakably his course was to find the cause on which his nation could enter, just as Germany sought to abolish all causes.

In this situation Sir Edward's position was excessively difficult. The Cabinet in which he sat was by no means resolved to fight. Some of its members were frankly opposed to standing with France; others were, to say the least, doubtful. Strong Liberal newspapers, on which the majority party relied for support, openly proclaimed that there was no reason for British participation. The country at large had no inkling of the actual European situation and, thanks to Liberal-Radical rule for nearly a decade, had been taught to regard all discussion of the German menace as without other warrant than domestic political exigency might supply. In the critical hour Britain was asleep and Sir Edward's

associates divided as to their duty and paralyzed by the lack of any popular emotion which might supply a warrant for Governmental action.

From this terrible dilemma Germany rescued Sir Edward by her decision to strike at France through Belgium. But no one can read the various documents without feeling that for him Belgium was a pretext rather than a policy. The right and the duty of Britain to defend Belgium were manifest, but it was always as essential to British interest and policy that France should be saved and only a sacrifice of British safety could have resulted, if Sir Edward, lacking the Belgian issue, had been unable to find some other on which he could bring his nation to the point of war. Nor is it less plain that the moment France was involved in the war, the commitments of the British Government in the matter of the fleets bound Britain to stand by the Republic, no matter what course Germany should take—short of guaranteeing to respect the integrity of France, her colonies and her coasts, and to refrain from attacking France.

This was clearly perceived by Lord Lansdowne, who had negotiated the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 and, on the "black Sunday," when British Liberalism stood aghast and shaken before the abyss, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith affirming the belief, which was the opinion of the whole Tory party, that France could not be deserted. Conceivably this was the decisive gesture. But it was not until the invasion of Belgium became a fact that there was the suggestion of a resolved policy disclosed in the words or the actions of Sir Edward or his associates.

It remains now, rapidly to summarize the events of the closing days from August 1st, the date of the German declaration of war upon Russia, until the expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum addressed to Berlin.

Meantime it should be recalled that Germany, in addition to declaring war upon Russia, had demanded of France information as to what the French attitude would be; had been informed that France would follow the course dictated by her own interests; and that in due

course she declared war upon the French Republic on August 3d, alleging certain acts by French aviators over German soil that were too ridiculous to obtain even passing credence.

### VII. SIR EDWARD'S DILEMMA

On July 24th, following the Austrian ultimatum by twenty-four hours, Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked the British Ambassador in Petrograd to use his influence to have Britain declare that she would stand with France and Russia. The conviction of Russian officials, held consistently by Russian and French diplomacy alike, was that the sole hope for peace was to be found in the chance that Germany would not care to fight if she knew she would have Britain in the field. This view was steadily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, who on July 25th informed the British Ambassador at Petrograd that Great Britain could give no assurance as public sentiment would not warrant a decision to participate in a war over Serbia.

This attitude endured right down to the time of the German declaration of war upon Russia. On July 30th the President of the French Republic made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris and on July 31st he addressed a letter directly to King George, asking for an assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. But it is fair to say for Sir Edward that at the same time he spoke with far more explicitness to Germany, and as early as July 29th warned the German Ambassador in London that he must not mistake the pacific tone of British diplomacy for any assurance that Britain would stay out. This warning was totally ignored in Berlin, where the ruling statesmen pinned their faith to the weakness of British foreign policy and the division in the British Cabinet.

On this same day the German Government made a clear bid for British neutrality by offering to respect Dutch neutrality, to guarantee Belgian integrity and independence, provided Belgium did not stand out against Germany, and to give assurance not to annex French territory in Europe if the war turned in Germany's favour. But Germany thus tacitly declined to promise not to violate Belgian neutrality or to give

any pledge not to annex French colonies after the war. This was the "shameful" proposal to quote Sir Edward Grey, which was rejected upon July 30th.

On this same day, too, the French Ambassador in London reminded the British Government of letters exchanged by France and Britain in 1912, after the Agadir crisis, which provided that, if the peace of Europe should be endangered, the two nations should proceed to a discussion of what they proposed to do. Actually this meant a discussion of combined land and sea operations. Still Sir Edward remained unresponsive and King George, on Friday, July 31st, could give only the vaguest of reassuring words to the appeal made to him directly by the President of the French Republic.

And yet on this same day, the situation began to clear, for on this day Sir Edward Grey addressed to France and to Germany an identic note asking their purposes with regard to Belgian neutrality. By the Treaty of 1839, reaffirmed by that of 1870, Britain had declared her purpose to defend the neutrality of Belgium, an engagement made also by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. France promptly agreed to respect Belgian neutrality, but the British Ambassador at Berlin was unable to get any response. The next day the German Ambassador inquired in London whether a German pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium would insure British neutrality. Sir Edward Grey declined such a bargain at once.

But on August 1st a new problem arose. By virtue of an arrangement made long before 1914, and probably after Agadir, French fleets had taken over the British task in the Mediterranean that the British might concentrate their fleets in the North Sea. The French Atlantic coast was therefore undefended. Wherefore Sir Edward Grey was moved on this day to give to the French Ambassador a promise to ask the Cabinet, which met that afternoon, to agree that if the German fleet undertook to attack the coasts of France, the British fleet would intervene. This assurance was given by the British Cabinet and the French were informed of it on August 2d.

On August 3d Germany on her part agreed to refrain from an

# THE TWELVE DAYS (AUGUST 4-16, 1914)

KING PETER OF SERBIA

In the Twentieth Century, one does not expect to see a king, clad in velvet and ermine, riding through the streets of his capital on a snow-white steed, with his golden crown upon his head. But King Peter is quite the old-fashioned, fairy-book monarch. In December, 1914, when his troops were about to begin their successful effort to retake Belgrade, he rode along the front of his line and harangued them, even as their chiefs of remoter centuries were accustomed to do.

## PORTRAITS OF PERSONS THEN PROMINENT

WILLIAM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

"The Soldier and the army," he said in 1891, "not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army." In 1900, he added, "If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword." And in 1906, "My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea."

THE LATE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA HUNGARY

When he came to the throne in 1848, more than one revolution was in progress in his dominions. During his reign his army was badly beaten by the Germans and there was much dissension among the many races over which he ruled. His domestic troubles were numerous and heartrending. They included the assassination of his wife and the suicide of his son. Yet he lived on through a record-breaking reign of almost seventy years, and died leaving his people engulfed in the greatest disaster of history.



THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Nicholas, once Czar of all the Russians (*left*), the only autocrat among the Allies, was a weak ruler, much under the influence of his German wife and of wonder-working priests. But when revolution threatened he is said to have indignantly repudiated the traitorous suggestion of one of his generals, to overcome "the canaille" by letting in the Germans.

King George of England (*right*) is more fortunate. A sovereign in name only, he occupies a secure position in the hearts of his countrymen, as the focussing point and symbol of their patriotic but self-respecting loyalty.

THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

M. Raymond Poincaré, President of France, hurried back to France from Petrograd during the fateful Twelve Days in 1914 and set to work on diplomatic correspondence with England. On July 30th, he made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris, and the following day addressed a letter directly to King George asking for an assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. England refused to commit herself till she was sure that Germany was to invade Belgium, and that the Belgians meant to resist.



MR. ASQUITH, BRITISH PREMIER AND SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER

Sir Edward Grey never grasped the inevitability of the World War. Consequently he was driven to a temporizing policy as the great catastrophe drew near. In the clear light of retrospect it is evident his position demanded that he should have warned the British people of the danger which had for ten years been steadily increasing

Mr. Asquith, like Sir Edward Grey, seems to have been simply bewildered in the crisis. They felt that they ought to stand by France, but the invasion of Belgium was needed to stir the British public to action. Only after that event was a definite settled policy disclosed by the words and acts of the Members of the Government.



DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG—GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

For nearly forty years—he was born in 1856—the German Chancellor has held public office. He is a Brandenburger, that is to say, a Prussian of the Prussians. Before becoming Chancellor in 1909, he was the Prussian Minister of the Interior (1905), and Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior (1907). His was the hard task of confessing to the world on August 4, 1914, that Germany was in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore invaded Belgium.

COUNT BERCHTOLD, AUSTRIAN PREMIER, 1914

After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from Vienna. But no sign came and the crisis seemed to have passed when, nearly a month after the crime of Sarajevo, Count Berchtold sent to Servia the most formidable ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to another. To this ultimatum was added a time-limit of forty-eight hours. One wonders what was secretly going on during these weeks of apparent inaction.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

M. SAZONOF VON JAGOW M. VIVIANI

DIPLOMATISTS OF THE TWELVE DAYS

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister who appealed to England to declare she would stand by France and Russia on the day after Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. Sir Edward Grey replied then that England was not ready to go to war on Serbia's account. But the violation of Belgium greatly changed England's attitude.

Gottlieb Von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. His admission to the British Ambassador of Germany's invasion of Belgium at once provoked the British ultimatum.

Renè Viviani, Premier of France during the Twelve Days; later, Minister of Justice, and, in 1917, head of the Allies' War Commission to the United States.

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TO PROVIDE THE SINEWS OF WAR

The Finance Ministers of the Triple Entente meet to discuss ways and means. On the left is M. Bark, representing Russia; in the centre, M. Ribot, representing France —in 1917 he became French Premier; on the right, Lloyd-George, then England's Chancellor of the Exchequer and later, Prime Minister.

attack upon France by sea, if Britain would remain neutral, but declined to give any commitment as to Belgium. This occasioned no surprise because on the previous day Germany had informed the Belgian Government of its intention, provoked by alleged French activities, to enter Belgian territory and to advance up the Meuse Valley to attack France.

On this same day Belgium addressed an appeal to Britain for diplomatic support and Sir Edward Grey told the Belgian Minister that a German invasion would mean war with Great Britain. France offered Belgium five army corps, which were declined. But the British assurance sent to Belgium arrived only on the morning of the 4th of August, when the German invasion of Belgium had begun.

### VIII. BELGIUM DECIDES TO FIGHT

On Monday, August 3d, Belgium reached its heroic decision to defend its own neutrality and responded to the brutal German ultimatum with a declaration of purpose, contained in moderate language, which will remain memorable. In declaring that she purposed to defend her soil against German violation she asserted that she had at all times been equally prepared to defend herself against France or Britain and thus demolished the whole German edifice of allegation, that France was planning to attack Germany through Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey was getting on firm ground now. An invasion of Belgium, unless Belgium were willing to defend herself, might still have left his Cabinet cold, but once Belgium had made up her mind to fight he was assured that there would be little more hanging back in England.

August 4th is the last day. King Albert, now in the presence of actual invasion, appealed to Great Britain, Russia, and France to help him defend his country. Great Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany, which expired at midnight, demanding that satisfactory assurances be furnished of German determination to respect Belgian neutrality.

Notable on this last day, also, was the speech of the German Chancellor in which he told his countrymen and the world that Germany was in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore invaded Belgium. It is in this speech, too, that he made the frank

admission that the invasion of Belgium was in violation of the rules of international law. He went further and openly conceded that what was being done was "a wrong that we will try to make good again as soon as our military ends have been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way through."

When the public indignation of the world had become manifest, the German Government endeavoured to find post-mortem warrant for its course in Belgium by the "discovery" of documents in Brussels alleged to disclose a conspiracy of Belgium with Britain and France. Such devices were as futile as the efforts to find excuse for a declaration of war upon France in imaginary aeroplane raids by French craft dropping bombs over German cities. Whatever effect they may have had upon German opinion, these fictions have long been dismissed by neutral publics, which have accepted as final the blunt, brutal, but at least honest words of the German Chancellor spoken at the moment when the decision had been made.

Not less memorable is the incident that marked the final interview between the British Ambassador and the German Chancellor. To Sir Edward Goschen, calling to take his leave of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg made his famous inquiry as to the purpose of Great Britain to make war upon Germany merely for the sake of "a scrap of paper." The "scrap of paper" was the British guarantee of the integrity of Belgium, contained in the Treaty of 1839 and reaffirmed in the document of 1870. The full extent of German surprise, apprehension, and anger, provoked by the decision of Great Britain, was revealed in this interview for the first time.

Meantime, as Von Jagow had already told the British Ambassador, the invasion of Belgium had become an accomplished fact and there could be no drawing back for Germany. Accordingly, with expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum at midnight on August 4th, Great Britain declared war upon Germany. Thus the triple Entente in the presence of the fact of war became a triple alliance at the precise moment when the Triple Alliance was facing the defection of Italy, who promptly

announced that the terms of her alliance with Austria and Germany, which were for action in a defensive war only, did not require her to participate in a war which she considered aggressive on their part, and that she therefore proclaimed her neutrality. This prompt declaration of Italian neutrality was of incalculable military advantage to France, since it automatically released for service on the German frontier several army corps stationed along the Alps.

August 4, 1914, therefore, marks the complete ruin of the whole edifice that Bismarck had erected; his alliance had collapsed; the union of all the rivals of Germany, which he had feared and in his life time prevented, had come to pass. All of this, too, German statesmen might have perceived would inevitably occur, had they been guided by British tradition rather than contemporary British policy. Such, across the centuries, had been the unfailing answer of Britain to a challenge to her supremacy at sea.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THE GERMAN ATTACK

## I

## THE TWO STRATEGICAL CONCEPTIONS

From the morrow of the Franco-Prussian War the German General Staff, like the French, had been engaged in formulating the plans by which they would act in the next war. With the lapse of years it had come to be accepted as inevitable that the superior organization and the largely increased population of Germany, together with her central position, would enable her to take the offensive at the outset of operations. The alliance of France with Russia and of Germany with Austria and Italy had broadened the scope of the plans without changing the essential fact that Germany would have the initiative. And as Italy yearly moved farther away from her partners, her assistance was presently eliminated as a factor both by Germany and her enemies.

Having the offensive, the German problem was to decide whether to attack France, leaving to Austria, reinforced by a few German covering troops in East Prussia and Posen, the task of containing Russia until France was disposed of, or to detain France at the strongly fortified and easily defensible Alsace-Lorraine frontier, and level the main blow at Russia. The decision was made for the attack upon France. Since it failed, and perhaps before, the alternative has been strongly advocated, but it is easy to understand and accept the reasons that controlled the decision for France.

These reasons were various. As to Russia it was recognized that her mobilization would be slow, it was known that in organization and equipment her troops were inferior to the German. But it was equally notorious that Russian strategy did not include an immediate offensive; that the Russian plans for mobilization were to be carried out behind the Bug and far east of Warsaw; that Russian strategy, in fact, rested upon

the conception, enduring from the Napoleonic Era, of a retreat, without decisive engagement, into the vast regions to the east, where Napoleon's army had perished, where roads were few, transport difficult, and the machinery of the German army would work at the least advantage. Finally, this meant not a quick decision but a long delay; it meant also, in a war opening in August, that Germany would meet winter on the road to Moscow or Petrograd.

Speed, too, was the very essence of German strategy. Napoleon had been defeated in the Waterloo campaign in less than a week after he took the field. Six weeks had sufficed to dispose of Austria in 1866, and the decisive battles of the Franco-Prussian War were not divided by a longer span from the date of mobilization. German finance, the whole nature of Germany's economic fabric, was not adjusted to a long war. What was to be sought was a quick decision. This might also serve to keep Britain out of the war as a French defeat might lead Russia to abandon the struggle, when Paris had fallen.

A quick decision could only be obtained in the west, but such a decision there might be expected to settle the war. At all events, the French army beaten and flung back behind the Loire, Paris and northern France conquered, the Germans could send their best troops east and rely upon reserves to meet the French efforts, while the costs of the war would already be saddled upon a France which would no longer be able to avoid paying the huge indemnity Germany had reckoned on in her calculations before the war.

All German calculations had arrived at the same point that France could be crushed within six weeks after the war broke out, that in this time Russian activities would not become too serious for Austria to deal with alone, or aided by a few German corps in the north. But the success or failure of the German strategy would be measured by the success or failure of the German army in bringing France to a decisive battle early in the second month of the war, destroying the French field armies in that battle and, thanks to the German heavy artillery, taking Paris and all the barrier fortresses from Luxemburg to Switzerland.

Unhappily for Germany, the question of Belgium was involved by

reason of the manner in which French strategy, in the years following the great French disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, had undertaken to guard against the blow German strategy was preparing.

### II. THE BELGIAN PROBLEM

Recognizing the growing superiority of Germany in numbers, France had sought to meet this by the erection on her eastern frontier of a splendid system of forts, based upon the four great fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Épinal, and Belfort and buttressed by many other detached forts connecting the larger strongholds. Actually a wall of steel—with but one gap, southwest of Nancy—opposed itself to German advance across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier.

Given German superiority in heavy artillery, these forts were likely to fall, but defended by the whole field army of France, they would in all probability hold out far beyond the six weeks' period and knowing as we now know, that trench war was bound to come, there is no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the German General Staff against attempting to force this barrier, given their time limitation, was wise.

There was, then, only the road through Belgium, since the Swiss route was unsuitable for use by great masses of men and Switzerland had an army far more formidable than the Belgian. The decision, therefore, was for the Belgian route and it was made many years before the war. The proof of this is found in the strategic railroads built to the Belgian frontier and signalled by military writers as early as 1909. Well-built double-track lines led through the comparative wilderness of the eastern Ardennes and ended exactly on the Belgian frontier. They had no commercial value and served no peaceful purpose. But they did enable Germany to mobilize vast masses, far more rapidly than any one suspected would be the case, squarely on the Belgian frontier.

Once across the Ardennes, the road by the Meuse and Sambre valleys led straight into the plains of northern France. This road was not barred by any French forts. The sole obstacles were the Belgian fortresses of Liége and Namur, both out of date, both unprovided with modern equipment, and both lacking in subsidiary defences. Germany

reckoned, wisely, as the event showed, that these would prove no considerable obstacle and would fall to her great howitzers with a minimum of delay. As for the Belgian army, German High Command could hope that it would not intervene. But if it did, it was too small and too poorly organized to offer serious resistance. The event proved this to be true.




WHY THE GERMANS WENT THROUGH BELGIUM

"A wall of steel, with but one gap, southwest of Nancy, opposed itself to German advance across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier"

With the political aspects, as well as the moral problems, involved in the invasion of Belgium, German High Command did not concern itself. It could hope again, that Britain, like Belgium, would not interfere with the march of Teutonic hosts against France by the Belgian road. It could believe that, even if Britain entered the war, she would not

send her scanty army to the Continent in time to intervene (another calculation almost justified by the event). But it was satisfied that even if this should take place, it still possessed a margin of superiority in numbers and material, which would insure the victory, even at the very worst.

It is impossible not to believe that German High Command overbore German diplomacy in the matter of Belgian neutrality, and that the soldier imposed his will upon the statesman. The conviction of the soldier was that, using Belgium as a highway, he could destroy France in the time at his disposal and that no other method would avail. He came so near to absolute success that it is impossible to criticize his decision, on the military side.

Here then, in brief, is the whole German strategical conception for the first thrust of the war. It was broken at the Battle of the Marne, but it was not until after the battles of Flanders had made the western deadlock absolute that it was finally abandoned. It supplies the clue to all of the first phase of the war. In this conception all was foreseen except the possibility of a French retreat without a decisive battle, until the conditions of contest should have turned against the Germans and the balance of numbers, rightly reckoned certain to be heavily with the invader at the outset, should be partially restored.

### III. FRENCH STRATEGY

French High Command had based its course upon the lessons of 1870. It knew the purpose of Germany to risk all on a single throw and seek a decisive victory in the opening weeks. It knew that Germany might come through Belgium, but it could never be certain of this and it was compelled to base its initial concentration upon the more probable objective of German attack, which remained the eastern frontier. But it had made its plans to meet the Belgian thrust. What it could not foresee was the number of troops Germany would send through Belgium, the rapidity with which Belgian forts would fall, and the extraordinary mobility of German troops, due to the unexpected use of motor transport.

It was understood between France and Russia that if the German blow was directed at France, Russian troops would enter East Prussia in the third week of the war, as they did. It was believed that this would compel the Germans to return east and weaken their armies in France before the decisive battle. The terrible defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg partially wrecked this hope, but the Russian victories in Galicia ultimately compelled the Germans to give over their efforts in the west and go to the rescue of their Austrian ally.

It was the hope of the French, by taking the offensive in Lorraine and Alsace, as well as in the Ardennes, if the Germans came through Belgium, to win such successes as to imperil the German armies in the north and force them to return to the Rhine to defend their own country. This hope expired in the heavy defeats of the French at Morhange and Neufchâteau in the first three weeks of the war. It was the hope of the French, if they were beaten in these opening contests, to stand on their own frontiers, before Nancy, behind the Meuse from Verdun to Charleville and thence to Lille and break the fury of the German assault on lines long foreseen. This hope was realized absolutely before Nancy, momentarily behind the Meuse, but fell when the Germans succeeded in sending unexpected masses far west and overwhelming the British. It was the further hope of the French, if all these plans failed, that it would be possible to make a successful stand behind the Aisne, the Oise, and the Somme. But the collapse of the British and the unforeseen rapidity of Kluck's advance defeated this hope also.

But beneath all these conceptions lay the fundamental purpose not to risk the fate of the whole French field force until the chances of victory were unmistakable. There was to be no repetition of the blunders of 1870, the defeat of French armies in detail, the isolation of Bazaine, the sacrifice of MacMahon to political and dynastic considerations. French High Command was even prepared to evacuate Paris, if necessary, but it did not mean to risk a decisive battle, while the odds were against it. This was the conception that dominated the whole French campaign and led to the supreme victory of the Marne, which wrecked

the whole German strategy and obtained a tactical triumph on the battlefield as well.

Thus, while the various French armies suffered local defeats, none was ever routed, none was ever captured, and all retained their form from the beginning to the end of the campaign. This purpose, and not the local reverses suffered by the French in the opening days of the war, explains the great retreat, which at the moment seemed to the world the promise of French ruin and long deluded the German commanders into believing that they had achieved the purpose for which they were acting. But for the Russian disaster at Tannenberg, the whole French fundamental conception might have prevailed, and after the Marne the Germans might have been compelled to go back to their own frontier, because of the Russian pressure in East Prussia and along the lower Vistula.

The second phase of the war came with the German attack upon Russia in May, 1915. At this time Germany definitely adopted the plan of crushing Russia, while holding France and Britain in the west. She was able to do this because, with all her successes, Russia had not quite succeeded in performing her part of the Franco-Russian plan; she had not been able to invade East Prussia and make good her hold there. But to understand the first months of the war, it is simply necessary to see the rival plans working out, to observe Germany endeavouring to crush France while holding back Russia, with Austrian aid; France seeking to avoid disaster and strike back at the favourable moment; Russia trying to take advantage of the despatch of German troops to the west and sweep through East Prussia to the Vistula, while defeating Austrian troops in Galicia and Volhynia.

Having been defeated at the Marne, Germany was able, by reason of her heavy artillery and machine guns, instruments that she had expected to win for her the decisive battle, to take a defensive position in France and hold it, but she never was able again to win any considerable ground on the offensive, even in her tremendous Verdun drive in 1916, and she was unable to prevent her western foes from ultimately passing to the offensive. All her conceptions for forty years had been of a swift,

tremendous thrust, a colossal battle, and a victory that should settle the fate of France for the period of the war, probably forever. When the decision at the Marne was made absolute in Flanders, the whole character of the war and the nature of the outcome were changed. That is the reason why, in the minds of military writers, the Battle of the Marne remains the most important incident in the first two years of the war.

Tannenberg was only less important than the Marne, since it brought about the ruin of the original Franco-Russian conception, gave Germany the necessary time to make good her hold in France and to make her final effort in Flanders. Russian pressure in the east ultimately became effective, precisely as French and Russian General Staffs had expected, but it became effective in November, instead of September, in Galicia, not in East Prussia. When it became effective Germany had to abandon her western campaign, turn her attention to the east, undertake a number of more or less limited efforts, and at last organize her great drive against Russia, which began in late April, 1915.

If Joffre had been defeated at the Marne the whole German plan would have succeeded precisely as Germany had calculated. If Hindenburg had been defeated at Tannenberg, the whole German plan would have collapsed as French and Russian strategy had expected. But Tannenberg was relatively a small affair, and Russia's losses, although large, were insignificant compared with her main strength. Hence she was able to keep on with Galicia and ultimately to force Germany to abandon the west. On the other hand, the whole German plan was defeated at the Marne because the bulk of German military strength was used there.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE

### I

### LIÉGE

In the event of an attack coming from Germany, the main reliance of Belgian defence was the fortress of Liége, situated some twenty miles west of the German frontier, commanding the crossings of the Meuse River and the railroad coming from the Rhine at Cologne to Brussels and Antwerp, the great trunk line from Germany.

Liége was surrounded by twelve isolated forts, the work of the celebrated Brialmont. It had ranked in its day as one of the finest of European fortresses, but it had been allowed to fall into disrepair and no effort had been made, as in the case of the French fortresses of Verdun and Belfort, to strengthen its works as the improvement in heavy artillery became pronounced. These forts were isolated and they were neither connected by any field works nor had there been any care taken to keep their field of fire free by forbidding the construction of buildings.

The forts had permanent garrisons of trained artillerymen, but the city itself was without any sufficient garrison and it had been calculated that it would take 75,000 men to defend its wide circle. Still it was the general expectation of Europe that Liége, however insufficient as a permanent barrier to German advance, would serve as a sufficient obstacle to permit the arrival of French and British troops to the west of the town and their junction with the Belgian field army. This army, actually in process of reconstruction, had been organized and trained with the idea that it would take its position west of Liége, behind the Geete River, its right resting on Namur, its left upon the Diemer at Diest. Here it was expected that it would be able, thanks to the resistance of Liége, to hold a solid front and prevent the overflow of German masses into the plain east of Louvain until aid came.

Belgian mobilization was ordered on August 1st; it was completed by August 6th. Something more than one hundred thousand men, the field army of the nation, were then concentrated behind the Geete. The King took command, establishing his headquarters at Louvain.

Meantime, there had been very striking developments. On August 4th, twelve regiments of German cavalry had crossed the frontier from the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle; moved rapidly west to the Meuse, which they reached at Visé, just south of the Dutch frontier and north of Liége; forced the crossing of the river, driving in a weak Belgian force, which recoiled upon Liége; and thus gained the west bank of the Meuse.

On August 5th the Tenth German Army Corps under Emmich reached the front of the eastern forts of Liége, demanded permission to pass unopposed and, this permission being refused, undertook to take the town by assault, seeking to penetrate between the forts.

At this time the whole 3d Division of the Belgian field army, and two brigades of the 4th, occupied the ground between the forts and, supported by their fire, successfully repulsed the German attacks through the days of August 5th and 6th. On this latter day, however, the arrival of masses of German troops, which began to cross the river above and below, threatened to cut off the retreat of the field forces and General Leman, the commander of Liége, ordered these to retire upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. This retreat was successfully conducted.

On August 7th the German infantry penetrated between the forts, occupied the city and the citadel, but were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire until German and Austrian heavy guns were brought up, but under this attack they crumbled almost instantaneously. The last fort fell, accepting the Belgian official report, on August 16th, but the German reports place it much earlier. Actually, as an obstacle to German advance, Liége lost its importance by August 10th and the city itself was in German hands on the 7th.

As German mobilization and concentration were hardly completed before August 12th, and the great advance did not begin until several days later, it may be fairly said that Liége, despite the common belief

at the time, actually did not delay the Germans materially. It gave a great moral impulse to French and British peoples, it earned a place in history through the devotion of its defenders. It was, however, taken with no great loss, in spite of contemporary reports. But it was not taken by a *coup-de-main* as the Germans had hoped.

### II. BELGIAN "BATTLES"

Meantime the Belgian field army, having completed its concentration, was standing behind the Geete between Diest and Namur, that is between the Meuse and the Diemer. Against it there now began to beat the first waves of German advance, the screen of cavalry, which preceded the advance of the infantry. On August 12th there was a very sharp skirmish at Haelen, in which German cavalry were handsomely repulsed. This "battle" filled the press of the world at the time, and, with the grotesque reports of the resistance at Liége, then current, gave a totally inaccurate impression of what was happening.

From August 12th to August 18th this skirmishing continued, the Belgian army keeping its position. Its expectation was that the French and British troops would arrive in time to make possible the defence of Belgium on the line of the Geete, or at the least on the lines of the Dyle, famous in the wars of Louis XIV, one flank resting on Antwerp, the centre covering Brussels, and the line continued through Namur and prolonged by French troops behind the Meuse to the forts of Givet in France. On August 15th the first German attack upon the line of the Meuse south of Namur at Dinant had been repulsed by French troops, which had just entered the town.

On the morning of August 18th, however, the King of the Belgians at last realized that the French and British would not arrive in time. At that moment he was faced by six German corps—three advancing from the Meuse, having crossed north of Liége; three from the south, which had forced the passage of the river at Huy. These were the advance corps of the armies of Kluck and Bülow respectively. Behind them five more corps were known to be advancing. To face more than 500,000 Germans (eleven corps), the Belgians had about 100,000, the

value of two big corps. At this moment the British were just detraining near Maubeuge, and the French army, which was to act with the Belgians, was just south of Philippeville, on the edge of French territory.

It was useless to wait longer. Belgian resistance had been prolonged to the last moment and, unless the army was now to be uselessly sacrificed, a retreat was inevitable. Accordingly, on the morning of August 18th, King Albert ordered a retirement upon the fortified camp of Antwerp, which had been constructed with the idea of serving as a place of asylum for the entire field army of Belgium in just such an emergency as had now arrived. The retreat was made good on August 19th, and on August 20th, the entire army, less a division detached to Namur, was inside the Antwerp defences.

Meantime, the German army, now beginning to display that mobility which was due to an enormous train of motor transport, moved rapidly forward, occupied Louvain on August 19th, entered Brussels on August 20th, and then, turning half left, started for France. This was the army of Kluck. On the same day that Louvain was occupied the advance guards of Bülow appeared before Namur, which was defended by a weak division of Belgians, who, four days later, were to receive as a reinforcement two battalions of French troops. These arrived just in time to retire, thus doing precisely what Winston Churchill's British detachments were to do in the case of Antwerp, less than two months later.

Namur, like Antwerp and Liége, was defended by a circle of detached forts, which were, however, in much worse condition than those of either of the other fortress towns. Against these forts the Germans now brought up the heavy artillery which had demolished the forts of Liége. The bombardment began on August 21st, the day after Brussels fell; by the next day most of the forts were in ruins. The following day the situation was hopeless and almost all the forts had been silenced. Accordingly the garrison, some 12,000 Belgians, together with the French who had come so tardily, slipped out, just avoiding envelopment, and retreated south. August 23d, then, saw the occupation of Namur, which had been the corner-stone of the whole Anglo-French strategy

in the Belgian campaign. Two days later the last fort fell, but by this time the war had gone south into France.

The fall of Liége was far more prompt than Allied commanders had expected, but it did not gravely injure their plans. It did prevent a junction between the Anglo-French and the Belgian armies, if such a junction was ever contemplated. But this is not certain, for there were grave dangers apparent in any campaign in eastern Belgium. The collapse of Namur, under two days' bombardment on the other hand, was not only unexpected, but turned out to be a real disaster, which was the prelude to many that were now to follow.

### III. THE MORAL VALUE

Such, briefly, is the story of the Belgian campaign, which lasted from August 4th to August 18th, the date when the Belgian army retired from the pathway of German advance. Belgian resistance continued at Namur for five more days. Actually the Belgian army was only able to hold back the cavalry screen of German advance for the days before the infantry had concentrated and began its great drive. When this began, the Belgian army had no choice but to get out of the way.

There were no engagements of any size during the whole period; there was no battle, and the forts of Liége and Namur fell as the Germans had calculated they would fall. In so far as they had reckoned on Belgian submission the Germans had been disappointed, but otherwise their plans had worked exactly as they expected them to work; they had brushed the Belgian army out of the way in a minimum of time and with inconsiderable losses. Having now contained the Belgian field army in Antwerp, they turned south for the drive at Paris, August 20th, the date of the occupation of Brussels, marking the turn of Kluck.

The surprises of this brief Belgian campaign were supplied by the efficacy of German heavy artillery and the number of troops the Germans had been able to mobilize and send through Belgium. Miscalculation on the first point had wrecked any Allied plan to join the Belgian field army on the Geete or the Dyle. Miscalculation as to the

# BELGIUM "THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE" IN PICTURES

ALBERT OF BELGIUM (BORN 1875, ACCEDED TO THRONE, 1909

The fighting king of "the Cockpit of Europe" is so old-fashioned that he led his army in person and asked no better fate than to share the hardships and dangers of his soldiers. His democratic attitude toward his soldiers he himself has attributed in part to his observation of the late James J. Hill's attitude toward his railroad employees—for King Albert, before his accession to the throne, paid a long visit to the United States, spending a large part of the time studying American railroading as Mr. Hill's guest.

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BELGIAN CAVALRY

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

ONE SHOT FROM A GERMAN 42-CENTIMETRE GUN PUT THIS BELGIAN FORT OUT OF COMMISSION

Students of German strategy assert that the Germans long ago decided to strike quickly at France through Belgium when "The Day" should come. The French frontier was strongly fortified. Switzerland was a difficult country and strongly defended. There remained—Belgium, dangerously peaceful and prosperous, like the United States. Her little army and her forts were easily reducible by the terrible German guns.



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BELGIAN BATTERY ON THE MARCH

*Copyright by the American Press Association*

WAR ENTHUSIASTS IN BRUSSELS

Shouting, flag-waving crowds in the cities of Belgium enthusiastically voiced their approval of the Government's decision to resist the violation of Belgian territory. And the little Belgian army, in full realization that the day of fairy-tales was past, set itself to play the rôle of Jack, against the German Giant.

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BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT REST DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING

Germans under Emmich arrived before Liége on August 5, 1914. For two days of almost incessant fighting General Lehman with the third Division of the Belgian army maintained his defence of the city. Then fresh masses of German troops arrived and to save his exhausted soldiers Lehman retired upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. The Germans occupied the city on the 7th, but the nearby forts held out against them for several days.

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A typical Belgian soldier

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General Lehman, defender of Liége

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Awaiting the Uhlans



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THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, EPITOMIZED IN PICTURES

The German hordes invaded the land which was open, flat, sea-girt, seeming to invite the invader.

The little Belgian army stood its ground as long as possible, resisting to the limit of its strength.

But it was all of no avail and the Germans marched into Brussels, the capital city, on August 20th, seventeen days after crossing the border.



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RUINED TOWN HALL AT YPRES

About the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres for more than a month raged one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of the war; fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.



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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

**I.** General Von Bissing, military governor of Belgium, is here shown in consultation with his staff. He is the man with the heavy moustache who stands with the knuckles of both hands resting on the map, upon which the attention of all is concentrated. (He died at his post in Belgium in March, 1917).

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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

II. Even the civil governors of Belgium, here shown, have a decidedly military appearance. Nearly all are in uniform, booted and spurred. His Excellency Von Sandt, head of the Commission, is at the end of the table leaning slightly forward, with eyes cast down.

second factor was shortly to lead to heavy defeats at Mons and Charleroi. Nor were German numbers in Belgium to be measured solely by the ten corps of Bülow and Kluck (an eleventh was detached to watch the Belgians in Antwerp). Still a third army, composed of three Saxon corps under Hausen, coming west through the Ardennes and aiming at the Meuse crossings south of Namur, notably at Dinant, was to surprise the Allies completely and further contribute to the destruction of all their plans. By August 21st hardly less than 700,000 German troops had crossed Belgium and were approaching the French frontier. In addition there were the army of the Grand Duke of Würtemberg, five corps strong, which was in the Belgian Ardennes north of Sedan, and the army of the Crown Prince, also containing five corps that had passed through Luxemburg and was just breaking into France about Longwy. Twenty-three corps were then employed by the Germans—aside from two cavalry corps, a corps left in Belgium, and twenty-one were to come on the battlefield of the Marne. Eight additional corps were presently identified in Alsace-Lorraine.

Even the briefest military summary of the Belgian episode cannot, however, completely ignore the moral value. The Belgians had failed, as did the Spartans at Thermopylæ. A dwarf had met a giant, and, as invariably happens outside of fairy tales, the dwarf had been beaten. Yet the decision of Belgium to resist, transformed the character of the whole war in the minds of the nations which were now fighting Germany; it contributed materially to influencing Italian sentiment; it gave form and colour to the world conflict, and it had an influence which cannot be measured either by the paltry numbers or the insignificant skirmishes, the very names of which were forgotten in a few days by a world that was to see a Battle of the Marne within a fortnight after Namur fell.

Had Belgium failed to resist German invasion, the whole significance of the German decision to disregard the Treaty of 1839 would have been lost. As it was, Belgium became in a very real sense the issue of the war, and popular sympathy in neutral countries all over the world was lost to Germany at the outset of the conflict. This would have been of

minor consequence had Germany been able to win that decisive victory which alone could justify the invasion of Belgium even in her own eyes. But when the decision of the Marne turned against her and the war became not a short and swift triumph but a long and terrible agony, the Belgian incident was a heavy and a permanent handicap.

No one who was alive in the August days, when Belgian resistance began, and dwelt outside of German or Austrian frontiers, will ever forget the instant and enduring impression that Belgian heroism created, and nowhere more than in America was the Belgian incident destructive of German hopes of sympathy and even of more practical assistance in her tremendous struggle. But for Belgium it is not difficult to believe that American neutrality would have taken a very different character, and it is far from improbable that the Allies would have failed to find in America that source of munitions which was to contribute so much to save them from disaster in the first two years of the war.

### IV. FRENCH BEGINNINGS—MÜHLHAUSEN

Of a necessity, French mobilization was based upon the assumption that Germany would attack from Alsace-Lorraine. Modifications to follow the disclosure of a purpose to use Belgium had long been prepared. But it was not only a question whether the Germans would pass through Belgium at all; there was also the question as to whether they would make the main or even a considerable attack from this direction. There could be no way of knowing about this in advance. Accordingly the French had always assigned five army corps to act between the Meuse and the Sambre and relied upon the British expeditionary army to supply the balance needed to hold the line in this region should the Germans come this way. Presumably they also relied upon the Belgian army.

French mobilization proceeded with extreme regularity. The great masses of men were equipped and concentrated within the time set. There was nothing of the disorder and confusion of 1870, although a lack of guns and of equipment was presently signalled, when it came to reserves. The French mobilization was slower than the German, of which

it fell far short in the numbers it prepared for the first shock, but it was an eminently successful operation.

Meantime, while mobilization was proceeding, the French undertook their first thrust. A large garrison had been maintained in peace times in the fortress of Belfort, commanding the gap between the Vosges and Switzerland. This garrison, reinforced by the first troops mobilized, stepped out and over the frontier on August 7th, the day the Germans penetrated Liége. The next day it had reached Altkirch and defeated a German force. On August 9th it entered Mühlhausen, next to Strassburg the largest city of Alsace-Lorraine. This success thrilled France and was accepted as proof of the approaching deliverance of the "Lost Provinces."

But on the night of August 9th a surprise attack by the Germans turned the French out of Mühlhausen, which was retaken after desperate street fighting. In this first operation French commanders began to display faults which were to prove expensive a little later. New forces had now to be sent to Alsace; General Pau took command, succeeding the general that had failed. By August 19th the French were back in Mühlhausen, while other detachments were overflowing from all the Vosges crests and approaching the Rhine. Unhappily for the French this campaign was to come to a sudden end, because of the first real disaster not far away.

### V. MORHANGE—THE FIRST DISASTER

In all the military discussion which preceded the present war it was fully recognized that the first great clash between the French and German troops, in the next struggle, would come east of Nancy and along the frontier which had been created by the Treaty of Frankfort. No forts, on either side of the line, barred this natural gateway between the valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle. Nancy itself was but eleven miles from the frontier. North of this gateway the forts of Metz and Thionville in Germany, the Verdun-Toul barrier in France, closed the way; south, the Vosges and the forts of Épinal forbade any general operation, as far as the Belfort gap. But here in a fairly open country it was

believed that the first, and perhaps the decisive, battle of the war would be fought.

French mobilization and concentration were here completed behind the Moselle and the Meurthe, while the covering troops occupied their regular post upon the considerable mass of hills, known as the Grand-Couronne of Nancy, just across the Meurthe, and extending north almost to Pont-à-Mousson. Despite a few early skirmishes at the frontier, the Germans seem to have made no especial effort even to disturb the French concentration.

But about August 12th there came the first official announcement of French operations. These seemed to push steadily forward; by August 13th there was a French success across the German frontier. In the week that followed, the movement swelled into something approaching a real invasion. By August 19th, the day Mühlhausen was reoccupied, the French had passed the line of the Metz-Strassburg railroad and were in Saarburg, Dieuze, and Delme, fifteen or twenty miles from the frontier. This was the high-water mark.

On August 20th the French army at last came in contact with the main German force, the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, while a second German army, that of Heeringen, was signalled west of Strassburg and north of the Donon Mountain. These two armies faced respectively the armies of Castelnau and Dubail. They seem to have waited for the French attack upon positions carefully selected and prepared.

The battle which followed, named Morhange by the French and Metz by the Germans, is noteworthy, apart from its local value, as revealing the type of engagement in all the first days of the war. The French, advancing to attack, displaying much impetuosity and some lack of discipline, came suddenly under the fire of the heavy German artillery—field artillery, not the sort of gun that had already levelled the forts of Liége.

This heavy artillery outranged the French field gun, the famous "75," and, unsupported by any artillery, the French infantry were beaten upon by a storm of shells, fired from a distance and by an unseen

foe. They were also held up by barbwire entanglements and trenches. After a brief engagement a French corps—the Fifteenth, of Marseilles—broke and fled. Its rout compromised the whole army although the Twentieth Corps—the famous Iron Corps, commanded by Foch, who here won his first laurels—now, and in the subsequent retreat, performed miracles. At the same time the Germans passed to the attack. The end of the invasion of Lorraine had come.

In the next days the French retirement was rapid; some thousands of prisoners, some guns, and several flags were left in the German possession. By August 23d the Germans were well within French territory, they had occupied Lunéville, pressed beyond to Gerbéviller, were at the edge of the Grand-Couronne, hardly eight miles from Nancy. They had now got about as far into French territory as the French had been in German territory at the Battle of Morhange. But this was another high-water mark.

With great rapidity the French troops, which had retaken Mühlhausen, were drawn out of Alsace and brought back to the Nancy front. They were put into action, while many French batteries were massed on the Saffais plateau, a few miles south of Nancy. The German advance was halted, and the French, passing to the offensive, pushed the Germans back materially.

Thus the German victory of Morhange was without real consequence. It was a severe defeat for the French and wrecked their offensive. But the defeated troops were able to rally and save Nancy. In the opening days of September and during the time of the Battle of the Marne a new German attack on this front was beaten down, and the French, although weakened by the transfer of several corps to the Marne, were still able first to repulse a new and heavier attack and later to take the offensive and push the Germans back to the frontier. There a deadlock ensued which endured right through the next two years. But after September, 1914, the Nancy front became inactive.

Morhange was the first considerable Franco-German battle since the War of 1870. It was a real defeat for the French and, taken with the defeats that followed, it unpleasantly suggested Wörth and the earlier

*débâcle*. But the French rally showed, as German official reports later conceded, that French armies were not like those of forty-four years before.

### VI. NEUFCHÂTEAU AND CHARLEROI

At the moment when the Battle of Morhange was opening, two more French armies, north of Verdun, on a front from Luxemburg to the point where the Meuse quits France, were also taking the offensive. These were the armies of Ruffey, north of Verdun, and of De Langle de Cary, north of Sedan. A day after the defeat of Morhange these armies were heavily beaten in the same fashion. In the difficult region of the Ardennes they came suddenly in contact with armies of the German Crown Prince near Virton, south of Arlon and of the Duke of Würtemberg north of Neufchâteau. Once more the German heavy artillery triumphed, and the French, caught before barbwire entanglements, deprived of all artillery support, were repulsed in disorder, lost flags and guns, and surrendered the offensive.

Having won the encounter, the German troops now pressed forward. The French retired, first behind the Othain and the Semois and then behind the Meuse. Their retreat was more orderly than that of their fellows at Morhange. Behind the Semois and the Othain they were able to inflict heavy losses on the Germans and subsequently made good their position behind the Meuse, as Castelnau's troops had made good theirs before Nancy. Henceforth the retirements of these two armies—Ruffey's which passed to the command of Sarrail shortly, and De Langle de Cary's—were never seriously shaken. They shared in the general retreat because they were compelled to keep their alignment with the other armies. But as late as August 28th they inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, who were attempting to cross the Meuse all the way from Sedan to Dun.

These two opening engagements were French defeats and they contributed to raising German hopes and expectations, but the really decisive action was elsewhere. It was in the triangle between the Meuse and the Sambre and westward about Mons that the real blow was now

about to fall. Against this triangle, in which four French regular corps and some divisions of reserves and African troops were standing, their left prolonged by the British army, thirteen German corps, the armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, were now striking, having already disposed of the Belgian field army.




THE FIRST BATTLES, AUGUST 15TH-23D, 1914

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A–Belgians | C–Lanzerac | E–Ruffey | G–Dubail |
| B–British | D–De Langle de Cary | F–Castelnau | H–Pau |

On August 22d, two days after Morhange and one day after Neufchâteau, the French army commanded by Lanzerac, holding the crossings of the Sambre about Charleroi, was suddenly attacked by Bülow. A terrific battle followed. There was street fighting of the most desperate character, ground was taken and lost, the losses on both sides were

very heavy, and by night the French had been pushed back across the Sambre and the Germans held the river crossings. Lanzerac had lost the day but he was still capable of renewing the conflict. Unhappily at this time he learned that Namur was about to fall and that the army of Hausen, three corps strong and hitherto unsuspected, had forced the crossing of the Meuse at Dinant and was advancing across his rear, seeking to cut his line of retreat to France.

A retreat was inevitable and the French drew back rapidly until their flanks rested upon the forts at Givet and Maubeuge. By the next day all danger of envelopment was over, but the superior numbers of the enemy necessitated further retreat. The following day the misfortunes that had overtaken the British involved the Lanzerac army, soon to pass to the command of Franchet d'Esperey, and it was unable to stand again until it had reached the Oise. There, on August 30th, it inflicted a heavy check upon the Prussian Guard at Guise. But by this time its retreat, due to the British situation, had involved the armies of De Langle and Ruffey, which were compelled to leave the Meuse and retire south.

By August 23d, then, four French armies had been defeated on Belgian or German soil and driven back into French territory. Two had suffered something like routs at Morhange and at Neufchâteau; a third had lost a considerable battle at Charleroi but had left the field in order; all would soon be restored to fighting shape. The time had promptly passed when there was a chance that the first German victories would have decisive results. Already a new French army, under Foch, was ready to enter the line at the north between De Langle and Lanzerac.

To understand what followed, it is of prime importance to recognize that all the French armies were by August 30th in shape to attack again, and from the Oise to the Meuse north of Verdun the French line was intact. Only by grasping this fact is it possible to understand how the French, after another week of retreat, were able suddenly to pass to the offensive and win the decisive Battle of the Marne

### VII. BRITISH DISASTER

In his original conception, it seems clear that Joffre had intended to hold the army of Lanzerac and the British at the French frontier facing Belgium until the magnitude of the German blow through Belgium could be measured. During this time he relied upon his armies to the east, and particularly the army operating from Nancy into Lorraine, to deal heavy blows that might compel the Germans to draw back troops from Belgium to reinforce their armies in Alsace and Lorraine. In this plan the British and Lanzerac's armies would have stood from the Scheldt to the Meuse resting upon Valenciennes, Maubeuge, and Givet.

Yielding to the appeals of the Belgians, and apparently to the urgings of French politicians, however, Joffre changed his plan and sent Lanzerac and the British northward to Charleroi and Mons just before the defeat of his Lorraine army ended all chance of lessening the force of the German blow coming from Belgium. This change in plan led to the subsequent disasters, for it threw two small armies, still imperfectly concentrated and amounting to barely seven corps, against the mass of Germans, thirteen corps strong. We are bound to conclude, too, that Joffre had no conception as to the numbers the Germans would send through Belgium or as to the rapidity of their movement, thanks to motor transport.

These miscalculations, together with an error not yet explained, were now to bring the British to the edge of ruin. On Sunday, August 23d, the British army, two corps strong, perhaps 80,000 men, took their positions behind a canal, extending their front from the Scheldt at Condé to a point of junction with Lanzerac north of the Sambre near Binche. Mons was the centre of their position. Here they were attacked, before they had time to entrench, by masses of German troops whose approach seems to have been almost totally unexpected.

The battle which followed was severe, but never reached a decisive point. At some places the British retired to straighten their line, and German heavy artillery caused material but not excessive losses. All the afternoon the British held on; there was nothing to suggest that they were facing a foe overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and not the

smallest hint that they were threatened with envelopment on their left flank. At this moment the British army was at the extreme west or left of the whole Allied front, extending from Switzerland right up to Condé. West of Condé to Lille the British believed their flank was covered by French reserves.

But about five o'clock in the afternoon Field-Marshal French suddenly received a despatch from Joffre informing him that Namur had fallen, that the Lanzerac army had been in full retreat for many hours, and that there were in front of the British not two corps, as they had thought, but four, while a fifth was now swinging round their left flank, which they had believed was covered by French reserves, and was striking for their rear.

Why the message came so late, what had become of the French reserves toward Lille, why the British had not been informed earlier of the retreat of Lanzerac, why their own observation corps had failed to discover the size of the German army, these are questions that must wait until the end of the war for answer. But with this despatch the veil is lifted from German purpose. It was now plain that Kluck, who had been at Brussels on August 20th, had swung west and south; that with 300,000 troops he was now rushing forward in a desperate effort to get around the end of the whole Allied line, interpose between it and Paris, and produce a Sedan, tenfold magnified.

In his front, now, he had less than 80,000 British troops. His fifth corps—four were facing the British—had passed through Tournai and was moving toward Cambrai, while a vast horde of German cavalry were driving through northwestern France spreading panic and disorder and reaching for the British line of communications with the Channel. August 23d, the day after Charleroi, two days after Neufchâteau and three days after Morhange, is the day the campaign entered its decisive stage.

On this day we see very clearly that unless the British army can get away, unless its retreat can be effected and its left flank covered, Kluck will interpose between Paris and all the Allied armies. And Kluck is to play the decisive part in the German plan. Not until two weeks later, when he comes to grief in the opening phase of the Battle of the Marne,

is he to lose the advantage gained through his appearance in an overwhelmingly superior force on the extreme flank of the Allied armies.

### VIII. THE GREAT RETREAT

In the presence of an impending calamity, Field-Marshal French displayed that slowness of action which so long marred British operations in the war. Not for many hours did he actually begin his retreat; hours that were precious were lost; and lost, nearly brought ruin. By seven o'clock the next night, however, his army was back in France with its right resting on the forts of Maubeuge and the centre at Bavay. At this point French recognized the peril that confronted him. It was plain that the Germans were endeavouring to drive him in on Maubeuge, as Bazaine had been driven in on Metz in 1870. This would mean the ultimate capture of his army and would uncover the flank of all the French armies to the east. Accordingly, despite the weariness of his troops, French ordered the retreat to be continued through the night.

Now begins that period of terrible suffering for the British army, which tried the temper of the veterans, resulted in the loss of many prisoners and some guns but in the escape of the army. On the night of August 25th the two corps were widely separated: one was south of Cambrai to the west, and the other at Landrecies to the east. Here the First Corps, about Landrecies, was beaten upon by a terrific night attack, which it managed to repulse. But the troops were becoming totally exhausted. August 26th was "the most critical day of all." The burden was borne by the Second Corps, Smith-Dorrien's, reinforced now by a fresh division just arrived. Ordered to resume the retreat at daybreak, Smith-Dorrien found it impossible and was compelled to fight until three o'clock in the afternoon before he could break off the engagement, which was fought about the town of Le Cateau but better known as the Battle of Cambrai. On this day an appeal for help made to Sordet, of the French cavalry, could not be answered, and the Second Corps stood alone, for the First Corps was still too far away to render any assistance.

But late in the afternoon the Germans, on their side, began to show

weariness. Smith-Dorrien was able to get his troops on the road. All through the night and through the next day and night the retreat continued, but the crisis was passed. August 28th, the British were back at the Oise from Noyon to La Fère and a new French army had come up on their left, the Army of Maunoury, sent by Joffre after he had measured the extent of the German thrust through Belgium. Five days of fighting and marching, day and night, separated Mons from the British arrival at the Oise, but the army that reached the Oise was no longer in shape for the battle that Joffre was planning. It was not, in fact, to regain its confidence or its cohesion until after the Battle of the Marne. Nor was it able, in that struggle, to perform the allotted task. Yet it is difficult to believe that any, save a veteran army of professional soldiers, could have endured these five terrible days and lived.

In this whole period it was the pluck and the endurance of the individual soldiers that saved the day. Just detrained, these men had suddenly been flung into a battle, their own corner of which was bigger than Waterloo, and their immediate enemy's numbers surpassed, three times over, those Napoleon brought on to his last battlefield.

While they were still holding their ground at Mons, the British were forced to retreat because the defeat of the French army at Charleroi had left the British to the west "in air." Magnificently supported by the French army of Lanzerac on their right at Guise, they were not supported by French cavalry on their immediate left until the critical day of Cambrai-Le Cateau had passed.

At the time, British public opinion, misled by grotesque reports published in British newspapers and fired by the enthusiasm of having a fighting army on the Continent for the first time in sixty years—for the first time in a century one might say, for the Crimea hardly counted in popular imagination—fired by the undoubted rapidity and efficiency of British mobilization and transport, gave the British army in the retreat and at the Marne a rôle which it did not play. Not only was the Marne a French battle, but the greatest blow struck at the Germans in the retreat was struck at Guise and not at Le Cateau, and by the French and not the British. In point of fact the real glory of the British

army in the opening months was earned at Ypres, where it died, as few armies ever have died. But no praise can be too high for the manner in which the private soldiers met a great and utterly unforeseen crisis.

It is essential to point, here, the difference between the situation of the British army on August 28th and that of the French armies at its right and left. All these latter were not only intact but in a condition to take the offensive. Two fresh armies, those of Foch and Maunoury, had come up in the centre and at the left. Joffre had now been able to correct the errors of his early concentration and to meet the unforeseen German concentration. But the necessarily precipitate retreat of the British had opened a gap in his line. This and the condition of the British army now combined to compel him to take the great decision, which led directly to the Battle of the Marne.

### IX. JOFFRE'S LAST PLAN

In all his disappointments Joffre had never surrendered the idea of taking the offensive at the right moment. He never conceived the opening reverses as anything but incidental, while German High Command wrongly interpreted them as evidences of complete collapse. Having been beaten at all points in his first attack, Joffre was prepared to fight again at the frontier. This became impossible when the size of Kluck's army was disclosed. By August 30th Joffre was again ready to attack along the lines of the Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne. He did attack at Guise and north of Rethel, winning a pretty little success at the former place.

But at this point he had to face the question of risking the decisive battle, with the British exhausted and in retreat far south of the Somme. He chose still to retreat, calling back his victorious troops from Guise; but the decision was not due to the early defeats the French had suffered, it was due to the collapse of the British, incident to the unforeseen strength of the armies that the Germans had sent through Belgium, the failure of French reserves to cover their flank, and the undreamed-of rapidity with which Kluck, thanks to motor transport, had pushed his advance south from Mons to the Somme.

On August 30th Joffre knew that Russian armies were in East Prussia and Galicia; he could calculate that Russian success inside of German territory would promptly compel the Germans to draw back troops from his front. This calculation was to be wrecked on the next day, when the Germans began the conflict at Tannenberg which was to destroy Russian pressure in Prussia. Believing that Russia would be able to fulfil her part, Joffre could afford to wait, even if waiting necessitated further retreat. But by August 30th all his armies were restored to fighting condition, had indeed been reorganized and strengthened, while Sarrail and D'Esperey had replaced Ruffey and Lanzerac.

Between August 20th, the date of Morhange, and August 30th, Joffre had, then, rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use. On the latter date he still found the opportunity lacking, hence he ordered a new retreat, but with fixed limits and with the clear purpose to attack again with only a brief delay. He had now escaped any great disaster, he knew his foe's plans, and he had the resources to prepare his own answer.

By September 1st the whole French line from Verdun to the Somme is in retreat, Maunoury's army is to come back on the entrenched line of Paris, Sarrail's is to swing in until one flank rests on Verdun, the other on the Ornain west of Bar-le-Duc, the remaining armies are to draw back south of the Marne, with the Seine as their southernmost limit of retreat. Meantime more troops are to be brought west from the Lorraine front. When this new concentration is complete, the French will have overcome all the handicaps imposed upon them by the size of German armies sent through Belgium and will have survived the initial defeats with only incidental losses. The morale of the French armies will not be impaired, their ammunition will be renewed, and the Germans will now begin to show the strain of their long, forced marches and begin to outrun both their ammunition and their heavy guns.

To understand the French strategy it is essential to remember that the French Commander-in-Chief necessarily kept in mind the events of 1870. Then the first battles had resulted in heavy defeats for the French armies. But following them these armies had been separated, Bazaine

had been shut up in Metz, and MacMahon, driven by political pressure, had led his army to the disaster of Sedan. In 1914 the initial defeats had come, all the offensive plans had been wrecked, but the central idea of preserving the cohesion of all the armies and preventing isolation or envelopment had been rigidly adhered to from the outset.




THE SITUATION OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES ON AUGUST 30, 1914
Between August 20th, the date of Morhange, and August 30th, Joffre had rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use

On the battlefield, French commanders showed themselves gravely inferior to German in the opening engagements, but French High Command was never shaken by the first reverses, never provoked into premature offensives, never permitted political pressure to drive it to risk a decisive engagement under unfavourable conditions. And by September

1st the advantage passed sharply to the French side; it was the German strategy that now began to break down. If the French Commander was totally deceived as to the magnitude of the German thrust through Belgium and as to the efficacy of German heavy artillery, the German General Staff was utterly misled as to the condition of French armies after the first battles and soon permitted itself to be led into a fatally defective position and thus lost the decisive battle for which it had been planning for over forty years.

# CHAPTER SIX

## THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

### I

### SEPTEMBER 5

On September 5, 1914, at noon, a French battery of "75's" leaving the village of Iverny, something less than twenty miles due east of Paris and less than five from Meaux, suddenly came under the fire of a German battery on the Monthyon-Penchard hills, a little to the east. The captain was killed and the battery made a hasty retreat. These were the first shots fired in the Battle of the Marne. The next four days saw the greatest battle of modern history, fought by far more than two million men over a front of not less than one hundred and fifty miles—from the environs of Paris to the forts of Verdun.

In this battle, a German army, which had moved from victory to victory, whose marching flank had passed from Liége through Brussels almost to the gates of Paris, was turned back, compelled to retreat, on one flank not less than seventy miles, leaving behind it guns, flags, and prisoners. More than this, the decisive battle, for which German military men had been preparing for forty years, was lost; the promise of a swift, short, and irresistible blow, which the violation of Belgian neutrality held out, was vitiated; the offensive was lost, and a beaten army was compelled to dig itself into trenches from which it would be able to make no considerable advance during the next two years of the war.

This is what the French call the "Miracle of the Marne." While it was going forward, no detailed accounts were possible. After it was completed, the great events that followed robbed it of public interest. I shall endeavour to set forth briefly the story of the decisive phases of this battle as it was told to me on the battlefields by French officers, a year and a half later, or as it is disclosed in the writings of French military critics unhappily little translated as yet.

To understand the course of this gigantic struggle it is necessary first to dismiss the familiar legend that the French armies, which won the battle—the British contribution was insignificant—were ever routed. The battle was not the sudden rally of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who had been for days fleeing before a victorious enemy. It was the result of a clear, cool, and deliberate plan, and it was in obedience to this plan that the several French armies, together with the small British force which fought at the Marne, had been drawn back from the frontier to the field of the conflict.

The sole purpose of French strategy in the opening days of the war had been to keep these armies intact until the direction and nature of the main German thrust were disclosed. Incident to this plan, and not for political or sentimental reasons, as was asserted at the time, Joffre had undertaken several minor offensives, in Alsace, in Lorraine, and in Belgian Luxemburg. These had resulted in the defeats of Morhange, Neufchâteau, and the useless victory, after initial defeat, about Mühlhausen.

All the armies engaged in these battles had retired to their earlier positions and made good their lines, repulsing all attacks. But the French army sent north toward Belgium, together with the British expeditionary force, had been beaten upon by an unexpectedly large German mass coming in three armies through Belgium. The French army had suffered defeat at Charleroi and had retreated in good order; the British army had almost found destruction, because upon it the full force of the German blow had fallen.

All this was clear to Joffre in the first days of the last week of August. The Germans, having the initiative, had elected to send a huge mass of troops through Belgium, and the troops were not discovered in full numbers until they had reached and passed the Franco-Belgian frontier.

But starting about August 25th, Joffre set himself to the task of matching his troops against the Germans, of reconcentrating his armies until he should have equal or superior numbers at the decisive point; he was never to have equal numbers at all points. While this reconcentration was going on he always foresaw a new French offensive.

About September 1st it looked as if the moment had arrived. He

had assembled two new armies, one in the centre and one on the left, on the flank of the British, thus abolishing the peril that Kluck's army had had for him after Mons. On the line of the Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne, from Amiens to Verdun, the French armies were ready, but unhappily the British army, having suffered disproportionately, had




THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE MARNE

I–Kluck
II–Bülow
III–Hausen
IV–Würtemberg
V–The Crown Prince
VI–The Bavarians
VII–Heeringen

retreated too far. Therefore, despite local advantage in several conflicts, notably at Guise, Joffre determined on a new retreat. When this was accomplished, his line would rest at either end on Paris and Verdun. His centre would curve south almost to the Seine. From this point he planned to attack the Germans.

This retreat, which began about September 1st and ended by September 4th, placed the Germans in a difficult dilemma. In retreating south of Paris, Joffre offered Kluck, on the German right, the chance to attack the city. It was a tempting bait, but Kluck wisely refused it. Such an operation would consume too much time and would require weakening the line elsewhere to get necessary numbers. But, having refused it, Kluck had no choice—since he was compelled to keep in touch with Bülow—but to turn southeastward and march straight across the face of the forts of Paris. His objective was the left wing of the French field armies; the purpose of the whole German host was, of course, to smash the field forces of France.

### II. KLUCK TURNS SOUTHEAST

Kluck's turn southeast was safe only if there was but a small garrison in Paris. If there was an army, then, when his front had got south of Paris, his flank and rear would be open to attack from this direction and he would be in exactly the position that the British had been in at Mons and at Cambrai. And as the British were on the end of the whole Anglo-French line from the Vosges, west, and it was thus exposed, so the whole German line would now be exposed.

We now touch on the first of the two determining circumstances of the Battle of the Marne, which in French history are known as the Battle of the Ourcq and of La Fère-Champenoise, respectively. Kluck, in common with all German generals, seems to have been satisfied that the opening conflicts of the war had been decisive; he seems to have been sure that he had before him only beaten troops, and he had no suspicion of the fact that Joffre had concentrated before Paris a new and strong army, that of Maunoury, which was now prepared to strike on his flank as he had struck on the Anglo-French flank from Mons to the Oise.

It was in the evening of September 3d that General Gallieni, commanding the Paris camp, learned from his observers that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast from Senlis toward Meaux and the crossings of the Marne. He communicated

the fact to Joffre by telephone, and on the next day there was arranged the plan which precipitated the Battle of the Marne. The credit for this plan is still disputed by partisans of the two generals. It was on the day following (September 5th) that Joffre published his famous order announcing that the moment to attack had come, thanks to the blunders of the enemy; that failure would not be forgiven, and troops that could not advance must die on their positions.

Actually, it was planned that the Maunoury army, emerging from the intrenched camp of Paris and moving due east, should attack the small flank guards which Kluck had left facing Paris; drive them east across the Ourcq River, which runs from the north down into the Marne above Meaux; and, passing the Ourcq, cut across the rear both of Kluck's and Bülow's armies. The mass of Kluck's army was far south of the Marne, in front of the British and the Fifth French Army, under Franchet d'Esperey. A very good parallel for Maunoury's blow, as planned, is that delivered by "Stonewall" Jackson on Hooker's right at Chancellorsville.




KLUCK'S CIRCLE

About Sept. 1st, at Senlis, Kluck began to move eastward away from Paris. On Sept. 5th the van of his army was south of the Marne beyond Coulommiers. At that time his rear and flank guard just north of Meaux was attacked by Maunoury coming from Paris. Kluck then drew back the mass of his troops in a complete circle north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq. On Sept. 9th, following the reverse of Hausen, he began his retreat upon Soissons

To the British was assigned precisely the rôle that Napoleon assigned to Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Field-Marshal French's army was expected to engage and hold Kluck's army while Maunoury struck its flank and rear. Kluck had two corps south of the Marne facing the British, in addition to cavalry; the British had three corps facing the Kluck army, and on its right the line was prolonged by General Conneau's cavalry to the left of D'Esperey.

### III. BRITISH FAILURE

In this particular mission the British failed exactly as did Grouchy, and the consequence of their failure was the escape of Kluck and the restriction of the extent of the Allied victory. The failure long remained unknown to the British public, which was early informed and generally believed that the British had won the Battle of the Marne and saved France. The fact was quite different. Not only were the British not actively engaged at the Marne, but had they been able to do that which had been hoped, if not expected of them, Kluck might have been destroyed and the Battle of the Marne might have been as immediately conclusive as Waterloo.

The story of the British failure is simply told. On September 4th Generals Gallieni and Maunoury went by automobile to Field-Marshal French's headquarters at Melun. They asked the British commander to change front and attack the two corps of Kluck's army facing him; this attack was requested for the following day, September 5th. At the same time Maunoury was to attack the flank and rear guards of Kluck along the Ourcq. Such an operation would crush Kluck in the closing blades of a scissors-like movement. Here was the major strategy of the Marne.

But Field-Marshal French declared that he could not get ready to attack in less than forty-eight hours. He did not get ready and as a result Kluck drew his two corps out of the front of the British, put them in against Maunoury, totally wrecking the whole strategic conception of the French High Command and coming within the narrowest margin of destroying the Maunoury army under the walls of Paris.

MARSHAL FOCH

This is the man whose tremendous thrust routed the Prussian Guard at the Battle of the Marne. Launched at exactly the right moment it went through the Guard "as a knife goes through cheese," routed the whole army of Hausen, and earned for Foch, Joffre's verbal decoration as "the first strategist in Europe." A few weeks later, through his generalship and the help of the flower of the British Army, Foch's troops won the terrible struggle that we call Ypres. There is a legend that this time he won commendation from Lord Roberts who, after studying his plans, is said to have remarked to officers of his staff, "You have a great general." His appointment as Generalissimo of the Allied forces marked the beginning of their final forward drive to victory.

All that was left in front of the British was a cavalry screen, but this sufficed to hold up the British advance. Field-Marshal French's army did not get across the Marne until September 9th, and the British left, whose aid was most desired, did not get across the river in time to help Maunoury at all.

Thus to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. On this point the British and French commentators of any authority are completely in agreement. Here is the end of the legend that the British saved anything at the Marne; the sole question must be whether what was lost by reason of their failure was unavoidably lost. Could French have moved more swiftly? Did he let the supreme opportunity of the war slip through his fingers? Unmistakably this is the view of the French military commentators and to this view British military criticism now points clearly.

Field-Marshal French's apologists insist that Maunoury struck too soon and that the responsibility for the failure was his and not the British commander's. But will such a defence hold? We know now that the decisive blow in the battle was struck by Foch on September 9th and at La Fère-Champenoise. We know that it was struck when his army was in a critical condition and that it succeeded only because Maunoury's attack, opened on September 5th, had just produced that dislocation in the German lines which opened the gap through which Foch penetrated.

We may say without hesitation, then, that Maunoury did not attack prematurely. He attacked at the moment fixed by Joffre, who was surveying the whole battlefield of which Field-Marshal French saw but one corner, and he attacked because Joffre perceived that the hour had come beyond which it was dangerous to wait. What happened on September 9th, prior to the moment Foch seized the chance to save himself and France, completely demonstrated the correctness of Joffre's view.

This would show that Maunoury's attack was not premature, but it would not prove that Field-Marshal French was tardy, or "over cautious" to use the severe words of one British commentator. But,

unfortunately for French, his whole record is against him. He delayed at Mons; he procrastinated in the retreat, notably at the moment of Guise, under conditions that had tragic consequences for one French commander; he was late in sending up supports at Neuve-Chapelle and Loos. All these delays were fatal to success at the moment, and the cumulative effect of them led to his retirement from the command of the British army in France.

On his own record, supported as it is by a wealth of testimony with




BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 5TH

A–Maunoury D–Foch I–Kluck IV–Würtemberg
B–British E–De Langle de Cary II–Bülow V–Crown Prince
C–Franchet d'Esperey F–Sarrail III–Hausen

*Note*—The small black and white square above Meaux represents the Fourth Reserve Corps left by Kluck to cover his flank

respect to his actions during the Battle of the Marne—when he continued to appeal to the hard-pressed Maunoury to send him reinforcements, after he had permitted all of Kluck's army but a cavalry screen to escape from his front and attack Maunoury—it is difficult to escape the conviction that Field-Marshal French failed to rise to the greatest opportunity of the war, either because he did not perceive it or lacked the necessary energy and initiative.

At all events, as to the main fact there can be no doubt. The British




BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 8TH

Armies distinguished by same symbols as on previous map. The small square north of the British represents the cavalry corps




BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 9TH

Armies distinguished as above. The arrow shows attack by Foch's Forty-second Division which won the Battle of La Fère-Champenoise

were never seriously engaged at the Battle of the Marne and did not make any material contribution to the French victory. Field-Marshal French failed as completely here as did Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Grouchy's failure cost his Emperor a throne; French's failure did not have anything like so grave consequences, but it did deprive France of the maximum of possible profit from a magnificently conceived stroke, and it almost infallibly saved the army of Kluck from destruction.

### IV. THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

On September 5th Maunoury's army was on the move, one half advancing straight against Kluck's flank guard, the Fourth Reserve Corps, the other circling round from the north and aiming at the flank and rear of that corps. Maunoury had considerably less than 100,000 men at the outset; his army was doubled as the engagement proceeded, but it was made up of very heterogeneous elements, Algerian and Moroccan troops, reservists, and only a few first-line units. It had before it on September 5th not many more than 40,000 Germans.

The battlefield of the Ourcq is a broad, level plateau, stretching north from the Marne and ending on the east abruptly, where it falls down into the deep Ourcq Valley. To the eye it seems perfectly level, save for two wooded hills, a few miles east of Meaux, the hills of Monthyon and Penchard. It is cut by several brooks, contains a number of small villages, but is without walls, hedges, or anything that would offer great obstruction to troops, or artillery fire. Several large farm buildings, recalling the Château of Hougoumont at Waterloo, played a similar rôle in the battle.

In the afternoon of September 5th this army of Maunoury advanced and came in contact with the German troops on the hills of Monthyon and Penchard. These hills were taken in the evening hours. By the morning of September 6th the Germans were recoiling toward the very edge of the plateau, with the Ourcq Valley at their backs. A number of villages were taken by storm, notably Barcy and Étrépilly, and the French from the north were able to threaten a flanking movement

which promised to turn the Fourth Reserve Corps out of their position.

But now comes the change. Kluck seems to have appreciated the full extent of the peril incredibly swiftly. By September 6th he was drawing his troops from the front of the British. Actually he was able to withdraw first the Second (active) Corps and then the Fourth (active) Corps, leaving only cavalry under Marwitz to hold the British. With these troops he counter-attacked Maunoury, threw him back materially on September 8th, and on the next day bent the northern flank of the French army back until it stood at right angles to the rest of the line, and on this day seemed destined to drive Maunoury back into Paris. On the night of September 9-10, the Paris garrison stood to arms and Maunoury's troops waited anxiously for daybreak, still with orders to attack, but expecting to be attacked and destroyed. After three and a half days of fighting they were at the end of their strength.

When daylight came on September 10th the Germans were gone. For Kluck the retreat to the Aisne had begun, but it was not a retreat due to his own defeat. The first blow of the French had been parried; the failure of the British to retain even one corps of Kluck's army before them, their extreme slowness of movement, had permitted Kluck to reconcentrate his army, escape from the vicious position in which he stood when battle began, had enabled him to throw back Maunoury's army, insure his retreat, and to come within an ace of winning a decisive battle.

### V. LA FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE

If it had failed in its chief purpose, still the effect of Maunoury's attack had been to dislocate not only Kluck's army, but that of Bülow to the east, the army which had won Charleroi and now faced the Fifth French Army along the Grand Morin, south of Montmirail and east to the marshes of St. Gond. This army drew back to keep its alignment with Kluck, heavily pursued and fighting many minor engagements right across the battlefields of the famous Napoleonic campaign of 1814. Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Champaubert woke from a century of

peace to new carnage. But the fight between D'Esperey and Bülow was not to the finish, because Bülow was steadily compelled to retire to keep his contact with Kluck. Hence this part of the whole Battle of the Marne is of relatively minor importance. Had Kluck attacked Paris, D'Esperey's army might have played another and decisive rôle, for Joffre had also prepared for this consequence.

To the east of D'Esperey was the army of Foch, which now played the decisive part. This army stood, at first, with its advance guards on the north side of the famous marshes of St. Gond, a strange swamp full of stagnant ponds and crossed by only a few highways. This was a considerable military obstacle. Behind it ran a line of hills, north of the town of Sézanne and dropping away to the southeast, looking down on La Fère-Champenoise from the Plateau of Euvy and losing themselves in the monotonous plain of the Camp de Mailly.

When Maunoury's attack compelled the immediate retreat of Kluck's troops south of the Marne and the ultimate retrogression of Bülow, the German High Command resolved to seek victory by a redoubled pressure upon Foch, who held the French centre. In a word, the Germans undertook to break the French line, the whole line from Paris to Verdun, and to break it at the exact centre, which was where Foch stood. Foch was heavily outnumbered, and although he began, on September 7th, a brave offensive, he was steadily driven south and suffered great losses. The fighting here was the most sanguinary of the whole engagement, and there are ten thousand graves in the little town of La Fère-Champenoise alone.

Nor was this the worst. Not only was Foch driven south, but his right or eastern flank was driven very far south, until his army, instead of facing north, faced nearly east, and a wide gap began to open in the whole French line between Foch and the French army of De Langle de Cary to the east.

September 9th is here, as at the Ourcq, the decisive day. On this day Franchet d'Esperey, having cleared Bülow from the banks of the Petit Morin and finding his Tenth Corps freed by Bülow's withdrawal to the northwest, toward Kluck, lends this corps to Foch, and it now begins to act on the western flank of the German centre.

This aid assures the safety of Foch's western flank and he now withdraws his 42d Division from this flank, transports it eastward to Linthes, and very late in the afternoon suddenly launches it in a terrific drive at the Prussian Guard between the marshes of St. Gond and La Fère-Champenoise.

At this point the German line has been thinned as a result first of the withdrawal of Bülow toward Kluck and secondly in consequence of the eagerness of the Germans to press their advantage to the south, where they were at the point of piercing the whole French line about Gourgançon. These two movements, going on at the same moment, stretch the lines of the Prussian Guard—which is charged with preserving the contact between Bülow's army on the west and Hausen's in the centre facing Foch—as an elastic is stretched by pulling both ends. The 42d Division goes through the Guard as a knife cuts through cheese, as the French afterward explained; it throws the Saxons in and about La Fère-Champenoise into disorder which becomes a rout, for Foch at the same moment launches a general attack.

This tremendous thrust earned for Foch Joffre's verbal decoration as "the first strategist in Europe." It routed the Prussian Guard, which lost most of its artillery; it crumpled up the flank of the two Saxon corps; it routed the entire army of Hausen, who was forthwith retired in disgrace. It resulted in the wild retreat of the whole Hausen army as well as that of the Prussian Guard. Here, and only here, was there anything approaching a great battlefield triumph. Bülow had retired with little or no disorder; Kluck had retrieved his earlier reverses, and, at the moment when Foch struck his blow, was winning the Battle of the Ourcq.

But the retirement of Kluck and Bülow and the disaster which had overtaken the German centre, under Hausen, together decided the fate of the battle. It was on the receipt of news of this disaster that Kluck started his rapid retreat to the Aisne; that Bülow at last gave over his effort to regain control of the north bank of the Marne, which he had too hastily abandoned; and from Paris to Vitry-le-François the German armies all took the homeward roads.

### VI. DE LANGLE DE CARY AND SARRAIL

It remains very briefly to mention the incidents to the east. Here, behind the Ornain, the army of De Langle de Cary stood for three days rigidly on the defensive, beating off German attacks made by the army of Würtemberg on a front from Vitry-le-François to Revigny. More physical destruction was done here than anywhere along the battlefield, and the ruins of Sermaize supply evidence of the wanton fury of the Bavarians. But like the battles around Montmirail, these contests were without issue, because the decision at La Fère-Champenoise ultimately compelled the Bavarians to retire.

As for the army of Sarrail, standing from Revigny north to Souilly, where it touched the positions held by the garrison of Verdun, it resisted all attacks of the army of the Crown Prince, operating east of the Argonne, to penetrate its front and isolate Verdun. It had a bad moment when its rear was threatened along the Meuse at Forts Tryon and Liouville by a drive coming from Metz, but the garrisons of these forts held out until aid came, and the destruction of the bridges of the Meuse proved sufficient to bar the Germans.

For the armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen the day of September 9th was decisive, and as early as September 6th the first two were in partial retreat. But both the Würtemberg army and that of the Crown Prince held on for several days more and retired in good order in the end, when the recoil of the armies to the west made their retreat necessary to keep the alignment. Of the five German armies only those of Kluck and Hausen actually put forth their whole strength, and of these only that of Hausen was decisively beaten. Of the French armies, only those of Maunoury and Foch were engaged to the limit, and Maunoury failed to accomplish his purpose because he did not get the help from the British that was expected.

Had the plan conceived by Joffre or Gallieni, or by both together, been realized, the Germans would have suffered a decisive defeat and would have been unable to remain in France. Had Hausen been able to break the French centre, even after Maunoury's attack and the

retreat of Kluck and Bülow, the Battle of the Marne would have ended in a decisive victory for the Germans and the French army would have been cut in two, one fragment driven in on Paris, the other on the barrier fortresses to the east.

There was a time when it was generally believed that the Battle of the Marne was won by the operations near Paris, and there is a legend of a victory won by the transport of troops through Paris in taxicabs. The troops were transported in taxis, but they arrived not in time to win the Battle of the Marne, but only in time to save the Battle of the Ourcq. Equally fallacious is the story of the British part in the battle. The British were never actively engaged in the battle at all; they never had anything but rearguards to deal with, and these rearguards held them up until the chance for a supreme success had totally disappeared.

It is open to question whether Foch would have been able to deal his decisive blow if Maunoury's thrust had not compelled the retirement of Bülow, by making Kluck draw his corps north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq, thus dislocating the whole German front. But it is not open to question that the blow of Foch was decisive. It was delivered by a beaten army almost at the last gasp, an army which had been recoiling under pressure for three days and had suffered losses that amounted to extermination in the case of some of its units. American army officers who visited the battlefield before the bodies had been removed will some day supply conclusive evidence of the bitterness of the conflict as measured by the carnage.

### VII. THE CONSEQUENCES

No estimate of total losses, of prisoners, of booty, has ever been published. But it seems conservative to estimate that of the 2,250,000 men engaged between Verdun and Paris there were more than 300,000 killed or wounded. The French loss was not less than the German; it may have been more, for the French in many fields did the attacking. Certainly between the opening of the campaign and the end of the German retreat after the Marne the French losses exceeded the German

—the losses in killed and wounded—while the total of prisoners taken by the Germans in the various fortified positions, Maubeuge, Longwy, etc., were very much greater.

It is reasonably certain that the Germans outnumbered the French on the battlefield, but owing to faults of German concentration and deploying the French certainly got much more out of their inferior numbers, while the Germans seem to have handled their masses badly and to have suffered from an excess of numbers at certain unimportant points.

The consequences of the battle were wholly misunderstood at first by both the French and the Germans. The French believed that they had won a victory which would turn the Germans out of France. The Germans believed that they had merely suffered a minor reverse and that after a new concentration they would be able to take the offensive again and renew their bid for a decision. Both illusions perished at the Aisne. Here the Germans were able to repulse the French and dig in, but on their side they never were able to get on their feet and advance again.

Actually the Battle of the Marne broke the German offensive, wrecked their whole strategy, which was to bring the French to a decisive battle in the first six weeks of the war, win that battle, and put the French out of the war. They advanced to the Marne seeking a second Sedan, and the French there won an Antietam. All the original German conceptions were definitely defeated in this battle; they were compelled to retreat, to give over the offensive, to accept a long war. But, save for the Prussian Guard and the Saxons of Hausen, they were nowhere routed, and they were able within a week after the decisive day of the Marne, September 9th, to halt the Allies along the Aisne, establish their front unbroken from the Aisne to the Meuse, and even to undertake a new attack. But this failed almost instantly.

It is essential—as has been said before and cannot be said too often—to keep in mind, in examining the Battle of the Marne, the story of the opening weeks of the Franco-Prussian War. The two conflicts began in much the same way. In both cases German mobilization put more troops and better-equipped troops into the field. In both cases all the

# NOVEL PHASES OF MODERN WARFARE SHOWN IN PICTURES

A HIDDEN AND DEFENDED MACHINE GUN

Except for the noise, which resembles a pneumatic rivetting machine, this gun gives the enemy no indication of its whereabouts. It fires through a painted net curtain.



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THE "AGENT DE LIAISON"

This French soldier's official designation is as sinister as his appearance. He is an *agent de liaison.* It is a relief to know that this means simply telephone operator. He wears his mask as a protection against poison-gas bombs. A hand grenade is in the pouch suspended from his belt.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

"POISON GAS" IN THE WAR

The upper picture shows the cylindrical containers from which the poison gas emanates. The Austrians left them behind when the Russians drove them from this position. Trenches have to be dug sometimes when gas-bombs and shells are exploding close at hand. These British "Tommies" are wearing respirators as a protection against poisonous fumes.

MACHINE-GUN POSITION IN THE OPEN

Where guns and men are protected only by small dugouts and shell-craters—conditions which obtain during an advance

PERISCOPE AND METAL HELMET

The French soldiers soon bowed to grim necessity and gave up the blue tunics and red trousers endeared to them by a romantic and glorious tradition. These entrenched *poilus* are sensibly making themselves as safe and comfortable as they can. Clad in serviceable and inconspicuous "horizon" blue uniforms with metal helmets, one man is trying a pot-shot with his rifle, which is equipped with a periscope so that he need expose himself no more than is necessary, while his comrade is solacing himself with a glance at his favorite Paris newspaper.

THIS IS THE RESULT WHEN A FOREST BECOMES A BATTLEFIELD

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

BUCKLER, HAND-GRENADE AND HELM

History repeats itself in war as in other human relationships In 1913 the world thought the day of warriors with steel helmets and shields had passed forever. But here is one very much alive. He is a grenadier, too, in the original sense of the term, for he stands ready to throw a hand-grenade in the face of his enemy.

*Photograph by the International News Service*

## BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

Barbed wire has been used in the World War on an unprecedented scale. These troops (*upper picture*) are advancing upon an abandoned fort by the side of a formidable entanglement which has been firmly anchored by stout posts. The French have invented a gun (*lower picture*) which fires into the midst of the wire entanglement a hook attached to a cable. The hook is then hauled back, supposedly bringing with it large masses of the wire.



THE GASOLINE ENGINE

The gasoline engine has greatly increased the mobility of modern troops. The lower picture shows a little British fortress that can be moved at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, wherever there is a decent road. The upper and middle pictures show one method the Germans have adopted for increasing the mobility of their artillery. The armoured car affords protection to the gun-crew while in transit to the point at which they are needed. Arrived on the ground the car's armour is removed (as shown in the centre picture and the gun cleared for action in two or three minutes.

## WORK AND PLAY AT THE FRONT

These French gunners (*upper picture*) are working to excellent purpose in a dugout carefully concealed from the air-scouts of the enemy.

This seems a strange place for a candy-shop, yet it is doing a big business. The Young Men's Christian Association maintains many little booths like this, just back of the firing line. The soldier's small change is apt to burn a hole in his pocket, and he highly appreciates such opportunities to get rid of it in exchange for sweets and other little luxuries.

opening battles were won by the Germans. But at this point the parallel stops short. Instead of Mars-la-Tour and Sedan, with their fatal terminations, you have an orderly retreat of all French armies until a new concentration permits a fresh offensive, and when this happens you have a German retreat followed by a German rally, which ends in a deadlock and more than three years of trench war.

This, after all, is the "Miracle of the Marne." The German High Command said: "We have more men, better guns, better troops; we will violate the neutrality of Belgium, turn the French fortresses and, arriving in the plains of northern France, we will destroy the French armies, take Paris, and then turn east and dispose of Russia. We shall win the war in six weeks and take Paris in seven. We shall hold France to ransom and dispose of the French danger for all time."

Not one detail of this grandiose plan was realized. Not one detail has been realized after three years of war. We all see that if France had failed, Russia would have been conquered, and even the British Empire would have come to the edge of ruin. But France did not fail. She won her greatest victory in a wonderful history with but the least possible support from Britain; she saved herself, Britain and Russia, and after the Marne the war had new horizons and different possibilities. Thus in every sense the Battle of the Marne was one of the few truly decisive battles in all human history, a battle whose consequences, though we may not yet accurately measure them, seem, at the distance of nearly three years, incomparably greater than on the day when the world first learned that the German invasion would not reach Paris.

### VIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF NANCY

During the whole of the first week of September, ending before the Battle of the Marne reached its decisive stage, another contest was going forward on the front which had been successfully maintained by the French after their defeat at Morhange. Coördinating their movements with those of the armies to the west, eight German corps under the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Heeringen, in the decisive hours, acting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself, undertook to cut their way

through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Épinal and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies fighting from Verdun to Paris.

Had this drive succeeded, the decision of the Marne would have been reversed, and German strategy would have triumphed despite the checks elsewhere. It did not succeed, because, although his armies were heavily depleted to reinforce armies to the west, General de Castelnau was able to repulse all attacks in fighting which was unquestionably the most costly to the Germans in the whole period of the war preceding the struggles in Flanders. Unfortunately the larger issues at the Marne, the proximity of the western battlefield to Paris, have served to obscure these operations. Thus, precisely as the victory of Foch at La Fère-Champenoise is little known save to military men; although it did, in fact, decide the Marne, the success of De Castelnau, which permitted the victory of the Marne and held the whole eastern line of the French field armies, has, as yet, no place in current history.

When the German attack began, De Castelnau stood thus: his left or northern flank rested on the Moselle south of Pont-à-Mousson and on the Plateau of Ste. Geneviève, a gentle hill, which is the northern extremity of the Grand-Couronne. Thence it followed the Grand-Couronne, facing the little Seille River, to the Plateau d'Amance, at the southern end of the Grand-Couronne. Here the ground falls sharply and the French line passing through the Forest of Champenoux and a dozen little towns, scenes of desperate fighting, still unknown, crossed the Meurthe at the foot of the Plateau of Saffais-Belchamps, due south of Nancy, and extended along the ridge between the Meurthe and the Moselle, south toward the Vosges.

This was a position long ago surveyed as the final line of French resistance if the German attack came from Alsace-Lorraine. Every higher officer in France knew it. Here, if anywhere, the French could be expected to make a successful resistance—and they did.

The first attack came upon Ste. Geneviève. The Germans advanced south on both sides of the Moselle, took Pont-à-Mousson, entered the Forest of the Advance Guard, and opened a cross fire upon the French

at Ste. Geneviève. Despite orders to retire, the French, only a battalion strong, held on and repulsed massed attacks, after which the Germans left 4,000 bodies in the Bois de Facq. Finally, just as he was withdrawing in obedience to peremptory orders, the French Commander perceived that the Germans were also drawing out, whereupon he returned to his lines.

The second and main attack came at the other end of the Grand-Couronne on the edge of the Plateau d'Amance and through the large Forest of Champenoux. No more desperate fighting in the whole war has occurred than here. Heavily outnumbered, the French were driven back to the western edge of the forest; the Germans for a brief hour seized a small farm at the foot of the Plateau D'Amance but were driven out. Terrific fighting and enormous losses marked the engagements to the south, notably about the little village of Corbessaux. In front of the Plateau of Saffais-Belchamps the Germans were slaughtered in masses, attempting to cross the Meurthe.

A final attack, around Amance and the Forest of Champenoux—currently believed to have been made while the Kaiser, surrounded by his guard in white uniform, waited at Eply to enter Nancy—was rolled back. Before Foch had won his great struggle at La Fère-Champenoise, the drive through Lorraine was over and the Second Battle of Nancy had saved the eastern barrier to France. Afterward, as the Germans began to draw troops out of this line to meet the new situation in the west, the French pushed out, retook Pont-à-Mousson and Lunéville, and reëstablished their front along the frontier from the Vosges to Pont-à-Mousson.

The Second Battle of Nancy was a defensive battle to save the main French operation, westward at the Marne. It was really a vital phase of the Marne itself, the foundation on which Joffre built his whole strategy; it was probably bloodier than any fight at the Marne, and its relative value must be recognized to appreciate the whole picture of the Marne campaign. It was won by the army that had been defeated at Morhange, but by only a fraction of the force that fought in that disastrous engagement, for Joffre had long ago depleted it to supply troops for his

new armies and to reinforce the others, while the Battle of the Marne was still in progress.

### IX. TANNENBERG

To complete the story of the Marne, it is necessary to recount now the disaster that overtook the Russian army, which had invaded East Prussia from Warsaw. In the general Franco-Russian plan, it was




FIRST RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA, CHECKED BY HINDENBURG AT TANNENBERG, AUG. 31, 1914

Two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Hindenburg defeated the Warsaw army decisively at Tannenberg and the other army then drew back

A–Rennenkampf B–Samsonoff

agreed that Russia should promptly invade East Prussia if Germany sent her masses through Belgium and against France. It was believed that such an operation would mean that Germany would have to leave her eastern front insecurely guarded and that a Russian inva-

HINDENBURG, VICTOR OF TANNENBERG

When the Russians surprised the Germans by their quick mobilization and invasion of East Prussia, in August, 1914, the German Emperor summoned General Hindenburg from retirement and gave him command in the region which he had made a life study. He concentrated most of his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims he massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost about 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, which made Hindenburg the idol of the German people.

sion would promptly force her to withdraw troops from France in advance of the decisive engagement.

Accordingly two Russian armies were at once sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Both won immediate and considerable successes, and the Germans on the day they reached Brussels learned that Russian armies were carrying the whole eastern frontier and advancing after victories at Gumbinnen and Insterburg, toward Königsberg and toward the east bank of the Vistula north of Thorn. Refugees fleeing before the storm were flowing into Berlin at the precise moment that French and Belgian exiles were reaching Paris.

So far the Allied plan had worked amazingly well and the promptness of Russian invasion had taken the Germans by surprise.

Now, however, the Emperor summoned Hindenburg from retirement and gave him command in the region which he had made a life study. Hindenburg acted promptly. Leaving only a screen of troops in front of the Russian army advancing from the east, he concentrated his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the difficult swamp region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims, he massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost more than 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, celebrated on Sedan Day by all Germany as a deliverance from deadly peril.

After Tannenberg, the other Russian army drew back safely and Hindenburg still lacked the numbers to press it hard, but he was able to clear German territory, and the mass of German armies in France were permitted to go forward to their decisive battle without fear for this eastern front. Half the Franco-Russian strategic conception had been wrecked. After the Marne the Germans would not be forced to face immediate peril in the east as well as the west. They could still concentrate their energies on retrieving the situation at the Aisne.

The French victory at the Marne and the great Russian triumph at Lemberg obscured the Allied mind and the mind of the neutral world as to the value of Tannenberg. It has not even now, outside of Ger-

many, received its just appraisal. Yet, to judge it rightly it is only necessary to consider what would have been the German situation if, at the moment the Marne had been lost, Russian troops had occupied all of Prussia east of the Vistula. This would have happened but for Tannenberg; it would have happened infallibly if the action of the two Russian armies had been properly coördinated, for their combined strength was far greater than Hindenburg's.

For this disaster Lemberg was no counterweight, because Germany and not Austria was the true enemy and German disaster might have ended the war. Had the Germans been driven behind the Lower Vistula all their later and successful campaigns would have been impossible and, taken with the collapse of Austria at Lemberg and the defeat of the Marne, the Central Powers would have found themselves at the close of the second month of war in a situation difficult in the extreme, if not well-nigh desperate.

All this was avoided by Hindenburg's amazing victory, one of the most complete in history and rivalling any Napoleonic combination in skill and effectiveness. More than all else this German victory at the other end of Europe robbed the Marne of its greatest possible fruits and condemned northern France to a German occupation which still persists. The victory on the eastern front enabled Germany to go forward to the Marne without hesitation; it did not enable her to win this battle, but after the retreat to the Aisne it permitted her to concentrate her energies and her resources in new attacks upon the west which did not terminate until the Battle of Flanders in mid-November.

Therefore, just as the Marne deprived Germany of any chance to get a quick decision on her main front, the disaster of Tannenberg deprived the Allies of any similar chance for a prompt victory. Later historians will certainly do fuller justice to the importance and service of Tannenberg to Germany. It was not the greatest German victory of the war, but certainly it was the most useful, and as such it can rank only second to the Marne in the first two years of the contest. It is hardly too much to say that it saved Germany almost as unmistakably as the Marne saved France.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

# DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

## I

## THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

On the morrow of the victory of the Marne, French purpose is clear. A great strategic victory has been won, the whole German conception has been broken. All the German armies are in retreat. It is essential to pursue these armies; to turn the retreat into a rout, if possible; in any event, to prevent the Germans from taking root in France and from presently stepping out in a new general offensive, reopening the decision of the Marne. In all save the last of these purposes French strategy failed.

This failure, although materially affected by the condition of the French army after its long struggle and the disorganization of French cavalry, was due primarily to the fact that only one German army, and that the smallest, Hausen's, had actually been beaten on the battlefield. German armies had allowed themselves to be drawn into a hopelessly bad position; they had suffered heavy losses and, in the case of the Saxon army, a real rout; but they had, in the main, seen the danger in time; drawn themselves out of the trap with great skill and speed; and begun a retreat, which if rapid was, in the main, orderly, and successful. In justice to the British, it should be added that if their share in the Battle of the Marne was insignificant, their part in the pursuit was considerable and they not only did exceedingly well but, having recovered from the disorganization incident to their long retreat, came into this operation relatively fresh and thus in condition to do what would have been beyond the strength of their exhausted allies had they been unaided.

In this same time the purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France; reëstablish contact between the various armies separated by the movements of the battle; and then seek, in a new contest, to

win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne. The German official statements did not admit the loss of the Battle of the Marne. From September 3d to September 13th they preserved a complete silence on western operations. It is clear, too, that German High Command, even as late as September 25th, did not regard the Marne as the decisive action, and remained confident that a new battle would win whatever had been temporarily lost.

And in this time German High Command lost forever the chance to seize the French and Belgian seacoasts, which lay open to their occupation from the moment that they passed the Somme until their new efforts from the Oise to the Meuse had been checked. We shall see, a few weeks later, a frantic effort to repair this great error, when it was too late. For this blunder, together with rumoured mistakes in the Battle of the Marne not yet established, the younger and lesser Moltke was presently to lose his great position as master of the German General Staff, turning over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

German armies were able to realize many of the hopes and conceptions of their commanders in the weeks following the Marne. They did make good their position in France, behind the deep Aisne, resting on the hills from Noyon to the Craonne Plateau. They did restore contact between all their armies and they were able, within ten days after the decisive day of the Marne, to renew the offensive. But they were not able to reopen the decision of the Marne, because, while they were beginning a new offensive between Noyon and Verdun and striking a heavy blow south of Verdun, at St. Mihiel, French High Command opened a great turning movement, west of the Oise, which compelled the Germans to displace their armies, sending masses from Lorraine and Champagne to Picardy and Artois, and thus resigning their plans farther east.

All these operations, very complex when read in official bulletins and utterly confusing to the public at the time they took place, become perfectly simple if the main purposes are kept in mind. You have first the French and British pursuit, begun on September 10th. You have

next the complete check of this pursuit, after September 13th, when Kluck stands behind the Aisne, digs himself in and, reinforced by the troops and guns which are freed by the capture of Maubeuge on September 7th, stops Field-Marshal French, Maunoury, and D'Esperey. By




THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE AISNE, SEPT. 10TH–15TH, 1914

The purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France, reëstablish contact between the various armies, and then seek, in a new contest, to win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne

September 18th Kluck is able to take the offensive and drive the British and French out of some of the ground they have taken north of the Aisne.

Meantime to the east, Bülow, Einem (who succeeds Hausen), Würtemberg, and the Crown Prince, have retired slowly, save for the

Saxons, who disappear soon as an army. The German line curves around Rheims and through the Argonne. By the third week in September, Bülow, who has held up Foch just outside of Rheims, attacks, takes the forts of Brimont and Nogent-l'Abbesse, bombards the cathedral at Rheims, but is checked. Würtemberg and the Crown Prince make a considerable advance west and east of the Argonne, but are stopped in turn. Troops from Metz make a sudden and successful attack upon the barrier forts south of Verdun, and take St. Mihiel.

No one of these three attacks had immediately important military consequences, yet all three are of permanent interest—that of Bülow, because of the bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims, which had a greater moral effect upon the French nation than anything but the victory of the Marne; that of the Crown Prince because, taken together with the operations about St. Mihiel, it had a very great value in a later phase of the war, when the Germans attacked Verdun.

The Crown Prince was checked after a few days. But he got forward sufficiently on the road along which he had recently retreated to occupy the town of Varennes, and from this and other points was able, with his heavy artillery, to cut the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire. Even more complete was the success to the south, where the Germans, by taking Fort Camp des Romains and occupying the west bank of the Meuse, facing St. Mihiel, were able to cut the Commercy-Verdun line. There was a moment when it seemed possible that they might actually penetrate through the breach they had opened in the French barrier and join hands with the Crown Prince. This danger passed; Verdun was not enveloped, but it was left practically without rail communication with the rest of France, a circumstance which contributed gravely to its danger when the Germans returned to the attack in February, 1916.

About September 20th Joffre, now assured that he cannot break the German lines, which have become a wall of trenches from the Vosges to the Oise, begins to send troops to work around the German right, which does not extend west of the Oise. These troops come east from Amiens and aim at St. Quentin and the whole network of railroads on

which the German armies depend for their supplies. So confident are the French of the success of this thrust that at this time Millerand, the French Minister of War, forecasts the immediate retirement of the Germans from France, and London has a rumour that Kluck has surrendered.

Nothing like this happens. Instead, the Germans begin to answer the French flanking operation by bringing troops of their own from their main front and putting them in west of the Oise. These troops very quickly put an end to the first French flanking operation; they retake Péronne, Roye, Lassigny, and win an action at Bapaume, establishing in this sector that front which will endure up to the time of the great Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916.

### II. THE RACE TO THE SEA

But Joffre sticks to his plan. He has brought De Castelnau from Lorraine with much of the army which had defended Nancy. Oddly enough the army of De Castelnau, which has long faced the army of Rupprecht of Bavaria east of the Moselle, arrives west of the Oise just in time to meet the same German army. A general dislocation of French and German armies is going forward, General Mand'huy, brought from the Aisne and put in command of a new army, encounters Bülow, brought over from before Rheims. Finally the Grand Duke of Würtemberg arrives from the Argonne and faces Foch but recently commanding the army which had reconquered Rheims.

And with this general dislocation the German hope of resuming the offensive between the Oise and the Moselle expires. The campaign enters the second phase. The front from Noyon to Nancy becomes relatively unimportant and the deadlock of trench war along this line becomes absolute. Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure. Joffre puts De Castelnau in about Roye and he encounters Rupprecht of Bavaria. He puts Mand'huy in and he meets Bülow

east of Arras. He puts Foch in and Foch encounters, not merely Würtemberg come from the Argonne but Besseler, striking south, when the Antwerp episode is completed. Even Field-Marshal French, quitting his trenches near Soissons, will presently arrive at Ypres.




THE RACE TO THE SEA

Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea, and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure

The French strategy begins to reveal itself. As the French line mounts to the north it points first toward Lille, lost in the first hours of the invasion and subsequently retaken, then toward Antwerp, where the Belgian army still stands, with a line of retreat open to the south, on the west bank of the Scheldt.

What this means the German High Command at last perceives. It can no longer continue its effort to advance between the Oise and the Meuse, it has been compelled to draw off troops in Lorraine and Champagne to meet the new thrust in Picardy and Artois. Already the active front has mounted into Flanders. Unless a change comes promptly the French line will extend until it reaches Belgium, joins with the Belgian front behind the Scheldt, and not only will there ensue a trench deadlock from Holland to Switzerland, but the Germans will be permanently excluded from the Belgian seacoast. If such a deadlock ensues, then there is an end to all hope—and already this hope is becoming remote—of a quick decision over France, and a short war.

There remains in late September only a gap forty miles wide between the French lines in position from Lille southward and the Channel. Unless German troops can penetrate this gap and come south, sweeping behind the Channel ports of Calais and Boulogne, the whole western campaign will have ended in a stalemate and the French, British, and Belgians will hold an unbroken line from Antwerp to Belfort.

Hence in the latter half of September begins the new and final German concentration. German strategy has now three purposes: to take Antwerp and capture the Belgian army, thus preventing a junction of the Belgians with their allies; to move south through the gap between Lille and the Channel, taking the Channel ports and finally, if possible, thus regaining the initiative; to reopen the decision of the Marne and win a real victory north of Amiens. Even if this last object is not realized the Germans can hope to shorten their front by establishing their western flank on the sea near the mouth of the Somme and at the same time complete the occupation of northern France and that seacoast which would be the logical base for operations against Britain. And for the German people this last phase is summed up by the word "Calais," as the earlier drive was comprehended in the magic term "Paris."

For clarity and convenience we may regard the Battle of the Aisne as covering all the operations between Soissons and St. Mihiel in the

time in which the Germans endeavoured to regain the initiative and advance over the ground they had covered on the road to the Marne. We may regard the "Race to the Sea" as describing the complicated operations following the effort of the French to outflank the Germans between the Oise and the Channel, which resulted in extending the deadlock of trench warfare at right angles to the old front nearly as far north as the city of Lille.

Then comes the German effort to destroy the Belgian army in Antwerp and drive south through the open gap between Lille and the sea, which results in the capture of Antwerp and the advance south as far as the Yser and Ypres, the occupation of most of the Belgian seacoast, and finally the bloody defeats at the Yser and Ypres, where the French and British close the last gap in the line from the sea to Switzerland and thus checkmate German strategy.

In capturing Antwerp the Germans won a moral not a military victory, since the Belgian army escaped. But the occupation of the Belgian seacoast was a considerable material advantage and it was due primarily to the fatal interposition of Winston Churchill, who made his celebrated entrance into Antwerp after King Albert and the French General Staff had agreed upon an evacuation, inevitable by reason of German progress through the Belgian defences. Yielding to the importunities of Churchill, King Albert delayed his evacuation for two days. When he did leave he lost a whole division, crowded into Dutch territory by the Germans; his army was disorganized by its pressed retreat; it was no longer possible to hold the line of the Scheldt; and the Germans were not only able to take Ostend and the Belgian seacoast, but also to seize Lille, the greatest manufacturing city of northern France, which they still hold after two years and a half.

Only by a narrow margin did the intervention of Churchill miss causing the capture of King Albert's whole army and a great Allied disaster. Never was there a better example of the folly of political interference with military operations, no single blunder in the whole opening days of the war was more costly to the Allies than this grotesque venture of a British Cabinet Minister into the realms of higher strategy.

### III. ANTWERP

It was the Siege of Antwerp which supplied the single unmistakable circumstance of the October fighting and on the human side the only dramatic incident in a war which had now become a bewildering tangle of operations obscure to the contemporary observer and without immediately apparent result. From the attack on Liége to the Battle of the Aisne the world had looked eagerly for a Sedan or a Waterloo. But in October it was plain that the time for Sedans and Waterloos was passing.

Thus it was that the first shots of the German cannon before Antwerp on September 29th instantly drew the attention of the world to an action which was easily comprehensible, and already promised to be promptly decisive. More than this, there was in the final stand of Belgian patriotism an appeal to American admiration, lacking in all else in a war between rival cultures, ambitions, races. For a nation whose own history began at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defence of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of life, of all that men could hold dear, was a moving spectacle. For Americans there was bound to be in the final tragedy of the Belgians a claim on sympathy. Already to the neutral eyes beyond the Atlantic the Belgian resistance had taken on the character of that of Holland to Spain, of the Greeks to the Persians.

On the military side the German attack upon Antwerp was easily explicable. German attempts to force a short road into northern France by taking Verdun had failed. West of the Oise and the Scheldt the Allied advance was pushing north toward Antwerp. If the Allies and the Belgians should join hands, German hold on Belgium would be precarious, for Antwerp was now like the citadel of a captured fortress, which still held out. But far more serious was the fact that such a junction would close the last open gap on the western front and rob Germany of her only remaining chance not merely to reverse the decision of the Marne, but also to reach the Channel and the North Sea, facing the British coast.

Already Belgian resistance had contributed seriously to impeding German plans. In the days when every German soldier was needed in France, an army corps had to be kept in Belgium to protect the German lines of communication and contain the Belgian field army in Antwerp. At the moment of the Battle of Charleroi the Belgian army had made a sortie, in the course of which it had almost reached Louvain. The destruction of this city followed this fighting, and was an act of reprisal by the Germans, who ruthlessly executed many men and women. This deed promptly filled the civilized world with horror and awakened protest in all lands. Again, at the Battle of the Marne, a second Belgian sortie had detained troops which were starting south and held them until the critical days of the retreat to the Aisne were passed.

To rid themselves of this annoyance, to clear their flanks, to prepare the way for a final attack to the south, the Germans now resolved to have done with King Albert and his gallant little army. The closing days of September, therefore, saw Belgium approaching her final agony.

In all military history of the future the capture of Antwerp must necessarily be a landmark. Here, briefly, terribly, the superiority of the gun over the fort, of the mechanic over the engineer, was demonstrated. Aside from Paris, there was no city believed to be as strongly fortified as Antwerp, and the fate of Antwerp gave a new value to the French for the recent deliverance of Paris. Unlike Paris, however, its position on the neutralized Scheldt and near the Dutch frontier prevented complete investment. Along its southern front, ten miles distant, the Nèthe flowed through deep marshes, forming a natural moat, strengthened by forts once held to be impregnable.

Before these forts, in trenches long ago prepared, stood the whole Belgian field army, reinforced in its last days by British marines. All that the art of the engineer, all that the courage of brave men fighting with their backs to the wall could contribute to making a fortress impregnable, were to be found in the ancient Flemish city.

Yet before the German artillery, Antwerp's defences crumbled with incredible rapidity. What the 42-centimetre gun and the Austrian "305" had accomplished at Liége, at Namur, at Maubeuge, but hith-

# "ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND!"

## FRANCE AND ENGLAND STAND TOGETHER

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BRITISH HIGHLANDERS LANDING AT BOULOGNE

## "VIVE LA RÉPUBLIQUE!"



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GENERAL JOFFRE GENERAL GALLIENI

General Joffre commanded the French during the first seventeen months of the war, was then retired,as Marshal of France, and in April, 1917, came to America as a member of the French War Commission. He was the idol of the soldiers who spoke of him affectionately as "Grand-papa" and "Our Joffre." His ringing message to the army before the Battle of the Marne will long be remembered: "Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come; let each man die in his place, rather than fall back."

General Gallieni was the defender of Paris. On the evening of September 3d, he learned from his observers that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast toward Meaux and the Marne. He telephoned this news to Joffre and the next day the plan for the Battle of the Marne was arranged.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

THREE FRENCH GENERALS

These generals were all active during the first year of the war. "Grand-papa Joffre" stands in a characteristic attitude with field-glasses "mobilized." At Joffre's right and left are Castelnau and Pau. All three are good-naturedly quizzing the orderly who stands at attention while the man at the extreme left enjoys seeing his comrade "on the carpet."

LORD KITCHENER AND SIR JOHN FRENCH

There were persistent rumors of differences between Lord Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War, and Sir John French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Army. General French was relieved of his command six months before Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea, June 5, 1916.

The British believed for some time that their help enabled the French to win the Battle of the Marne. But to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. When Joffre asked for instant action, Field Marshal French replied that he needed forty-eight hours in which to get ready. He failed to rise to the greatest opportunity of the War, either because he did not perceive it or because he lacked the necessary energy and initiative. That is the verdict of French criticism and British students of the war are being driven to the same conclusion.



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GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN

Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French in command of the British forces in France. He is a more active man than his predecessor and nearly ten years younger, having been born in 1861. Throughout his military career he has been concerned chiefly with cavalry, and he possesses all the cavalryman's traditional fire and dash.

General Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second Corps of the British Army during the terrible days of the retreat which preceded the Marne.



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FRENCH ARMY JOINS BELGIANS

The advance guard of the French Army on their way to join the Belgians.
French marines welcomed by the residents of Ghent.

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THE ADVANCE OF FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS AND RIFLEMEN

Some types of machine guns may be carried by one man. Others are carried piecemeal by two or more. In this case the second man has the gun itself on his shoulder while the third man follows with the tripod.

*Copyright by Lavoy*

A BIG FRENCH GUN ON THE RAILROAD AT VERDUN

The big German 42-centimetre guns seemed in the early days of the War to be irresistible and incomparable. But with the appearance of such creations as this the French artillery regained its traditional superiority.

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TWO REMARKABLE AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE FRENCH FRONT

(*Above*). The devastated city of Clermont, in the Argonne region. It was burned by the Germans at the Battle of the Marne. Roofless ruined walls are all that remain in the foreground. Up the road toward the top of the picture a cluster of buildings is seen which must have been just beyond the zone of fire.

(*Below.*) The French aviation camp near Verdun. One can plainly see the hangars with the insect-like war-planes in front of them. Behind the hangars motor trucks are parked, and behind these are tents, the living quarters of the aviators.

erto behind a veil, they now did in the full sight of the whole world. In less than a week these forts which had been pronounced impregnable were heaps of dust and ashes, and German troops had forced the river defences and the field trenches, driving the Belgians before them. By October 7th the Krupp shells were falling about the noble tower of the Antwerp Cathedral. The city and the suburbs were breaking out in flames. The end was in sight.

The next day the field army of Belgium, commanded by its still-undaunted King, crossed the Scheldt on pontoons, moved west along the Dutch frontier, accompanied by the British contingent, and made good its escape to join the Allied armies, still moving up from the south, although 20,000 Belgians forced across the Dutch frontier were disarmed and interned. Meanwhile, by every ship, train, road, thousands of refugees, fleeing from the shells that were falling in Antwerp, flowed out to Holland, to England, to France. A new migration of a people had begun.

The end came on October 9th, when the city surrendered, the remaining Belgian forces escaping to Holland and there laying down the arms they had wielded so valiantly. Not a city, but a nation, had fallen. For England only less than for Belgium, the fall of Antwerp had been a terrible blow. The "pistol pointed at the heart of England," as Napoleon had described the city, was now in the hands of William II.

With the fall of Antwerp and that of Ostend, which promptly followed on October 15th, British public opinion at last recognized that a new Napoleonic war, with the same issues and many of the same circumstances, was before them. British observers already foretold accurately the launching of German submarines and German Zeppelins from Zeebrugge. A new Napoleon had reached the Channel. Once more it was for the British people to watch the narrow strip of sea as they had a century before. But now it was necessary also to watch the skies for that new engine which had added so much to the terror of war.

### IV. THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS

In late October there opened between La Bassée and the sea the most deadly campaign the war had yet seen. For the next six weeks, on

a front of barely forty miles, some hundreds of thousands of men struggled by day and by night for the possession of a score of villages lying straight across the pathway of the new German advance, between the Lys and the mouth of the Yser. When it had ended, in part through the exhaustion of both combatants, the Germans had gained a few parcels of territory, a few wrecked villages, but in the main the line stood as it had stood in the opening hours of the conflict, despite the fact that the German Emperor had come himself to spur on his brave but beaten soldiers and that the whole German nation had set its heart upon Calais.

The purpose of the German strategy was plain. Antwerp taken, Ostend captured, there was an apparent opportunity to sweep down the coast past Calais and Boulogne; to seize Dunkirk, the last French fortress in the north; to take root on the eastern shore of the Straits of Dover; to bring by canal and river the submarines, already so fatal to British warships, to threaten England with invasion as Napoleon had threatened it; to menace London by Zeppelin fleets; by heavy artillery and mines, to close the Straits of Dover and leave the port of London as dead as that of Hamburg. Underlying all these magnificent details, too, was the dominant determination to regain the offensive, to take up again the road to France.

Once Antwerp fell, the army corps released from this operation drove south upon the heels of the retreating Belgians. From every corner of the German Empire garrisons and artillery were gathered up for a supreme thrust, a thrust through France but in part aimed at England, the nation now become the object of the concentrated hatred and wrath of all Germany.

Not less rapid was the concentration of the Allies. Coming north across the French frontier, French regular troops, British forces withdrawn from the Aisne in early October, Sikhs, Ghurkas, all the Indian contingent now to have their baptism of fire, Senegalese and Moroccan riflemen, Turcos and Légionnaires—finally the retreating remnant of the Belgians reinforced by French and British divisions—gathered around the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres, on the shores of the North Sea at Nieuport, and behind the Yser River and the canal that

joined it to the Lys, to meet the storm. And once more the post of honour and danger fell to Foch under whose supreme command the Britons and the Belgians, as well as the French, fought.

A more admirable country for defence than the Yser front it is difficult to imagine. Eastward from the dunes stretched an intricate maze of river, canal, and ditch—much of the land subject to inundation, once the sluices were open; all of it certain to become a swamp when the first storms of winter began. On this front a dozen large and small villages and hundreds of little stone farmhouses offered cover. Trenches dug to-day might be flooded to-morrow; artillery dragged within range over level fields one day might be submerged and bemired the next.

Such was the country between the Yser and the sea. Here and about Ypres for more than a month there continued, with slight interruption, one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of war, fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.

The first blow fell along the seacoast south of Ostend, fell upon the remnant of Belgian forces, led by their intrepid King standing behind the Yser River at Nieuport, where it enters the sea. Here for days the Belgians maintained an unequal combat. At the critical moment a British fleet took station beyond the dunes and with its heavy artillery beat down the German advance, after a slaughter which was terrible.

Halted here, the Germans moved inland and came on again about Dixmude, half way between Ypres and Nieuport. Here once more they made progress until the Belgians in their despair opened the sluices and the water flowed over fertile fields carrying ruin with it, turning the whole country into a lake, drowning the invaders in numbers, creating an obstacle impassable for the present, repeating the exploit of the Dutch in their glorious fight against Alva.

Eastward from Dixmude, which presently, after the most desperate of struggles and after changing hands many times, remained with the

Germans—who were halted in its ruin by the ever-memorable resistance of the famous Fusiliers Marins, the "Golden Lads" of Brittany—the attack was directed at Ypres. Here the British stood. Here the Kaiser's wish was gratified and the troops of England met the gallant Bavarians; but they did not succumb. At points the line bent back. Such real gains as were made, were made by the Germans, but the line held. Day and night the slaughter went on. Trenches, hills, farmhouses were taken and retaken. Villages and towns were transformed into heaps of ashes.

To add to the horror autumn began, and sleet and rain, finally snow, fell, transforming the whole country into a swamp. In the inextricable tangle of roads, buildings, and ruined towns, the bodies of men lay unburied for days. The streams and ditches were choked with the human wreckage. All semblance of strategy vanished.

Tactical considerations were subordinated to the simple, single purpose of an advance by the mere weight of numbers. It became not a struggle based on the application of modern theories, but a death grapple between thousands and hundreds of thousands of men, transformed by suffering, by deprivation, by the misery of the autumn storms, to mere animals, clad in clothes reduced to rags or undiscoverable beneath the outward layers of mud.

Again and again more losses, frightful attrition, seemed to bring the German effort to a standstill. Yet always in a few hours or days new thousands returned to the charge. Always, too, they came forward fearlessly, a song upon their lips. Regiments of youths took the place of the older men of the first line, but the boys were not less brave than the men, the recruits than the veterans.

### V. CHECKMATE

Such were the battles of Flanders, the Battle of the Yser, won by the Belgians and the French, the Battle of Ypres won by the British and the French. Never was a race more closely run. Never was victory nearer to the Germans than in the early days of November. The jerry-built dyke that Joffre had stretched across the last open gap on his

front barely held. On November 15th, when the last effort of the Prussian Guard failed, the British Expeditionary Army had become almost a memory and its losses had passed anything in British history. At Ypres fifty thousand British were killed, wounded, or captured—a third of the whole Expeditionary Army. On the same field the French lost seventy thousand and the Belgians twenty thousand. As for the German loss, it certainly passed a quarter of a million.

Memorable, hereafter, will be the fact that as the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had almost been silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. Come to France at the moment of the crisis, come to cheer his well-loved Indian troops, now fighting bravely on the western line, Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory, which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it. Worth repeating, too, is the legend, credited to De Souza, that having studied the maps, having examined the plans and preparations of the French general, who held supreme command over British and French troops alike, Lord Roberts said to staff officers of Foch: "You have a great general."

At Ypres the British troops did all that was expected of them, and more could not be expected of any troops. "Wipers" of the English "Tommy" deserves a place beside Waterloo and Blenheim in British military history. Yet here, as elsewhere, it was the British soldier who shone, for the generalship was French and the victory was won through the genius of that general who had delivered the decisive thrust at the Marne. And for Foch the supreme test came in the midnight hours of a day in which his son and son-in-law had died on the field of honour.

But however close the race, the decision was absolute. The whole German conception of a swift, terrible, decisive thrust at France had ended in the bloody shambles of the Yser and Ypres. Not a French army had been destroyed, not a French army had been captured. The great battle that was to come six weeks after the declaration of war

had come; it had been a French victory, not a Waterloo or a Sedan, but a victory compelling a general German retreat dislocating their whole strategic conception. After that retreat it had never been possible to regain the offensive and renew the bid for a decision. Each separate




DEADLOCK IN THE WEST, NOV. 15, 1914

November 15th sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. Behind her trench lines Germany held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger part of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France was in no position to take the initiative, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of a considerable offensive

offensive effort from St. Mihiel to Nieuport had been beaten down almost where it had started.

Save for Russian defeat at Tannenberg, the defeat at the Marne might have necessitated a retreat to the Rhine. Hindenburg's victory

had given Germany two more months in the west. She had used them up and now the eastern situation had become critical. Russian pressure in East Prussia had not recalled German corps from the Marne or before the Marne. But Russian victories in Galicia, the disasters that had overtaken Austria and seemed to forecast her collapse, the crisis in Hindenburg's campaign in Poland cried out for attention.

November 15th, then, sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. In that time Germany had overrun Belgium and occupied more than 8,000 square miles of France and devastated much more; she had approached Paris, and on September 5th its suburbs were visible where her armies stood, but, within sight of the prize, she had been compelled to recoil, and from that hour until the end in Flanders, her strategy had conformed to Joffre's and her purposes had all wrecked in conflict with his will.

Behind her trench lines Germany now held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger share of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France, after her terrific struggle, was in no shape to take the offensive, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of considerable offensive. Germany's prevision in the matter of heavy artillery and machine guns gave her armies a real and long-enduring advantage in trench war.

But the other side of the picture was unmistakable. Germany had staked all on a quick decision; she had become involved in a long war. She had planned to dispose of her enemies in detail, destroying first French military establishments and then Russian; she had failed to destroy France, and Russian armies were now pounding down to the Carpathians.

Despite her manifest gains and her brilliant preliminary victories, Germany had, then, lost the first round of the war. She had lost it at the Marne and all her desperate struggles from the Marne to the Yser had availed her nothing. Now at last she must go east and deal with Russia; new horizons and new victories beckoned; but while she turned her face east, Britain and France, behind the dyke they had erected in the west,

began to gather up their strength for a renewal of their offensive in a future which was far more distant than they could dream.

With the close of the fighting about Ypres the western battle falls to the level of a deadlock, which endured until March, 1917, with no material change in the battle fronts.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

# THE EASTERN FIELD

## I

## RUSSIAN AND GERMAN PURPOSES

With the failure of the German effort at Ypres, the western field loses its importance for more than a year and a quarter. It is not until the colossal bid for Verdun in February, 1916, that the events on the French and Belgian front take on that importance which they had in the opening days of the war. It is, of course, true that long before the battles of Flanders in October and November the eastern field had been the scene of many terrific engagements, and of campaigns whose relation to those in the west is not patent, yet, for the purpose of narration, it is simpler to deal first with the western operations right through the Battle of the Marne until the decision there had been made absolute in Flanders, and then examine in detail the eastern operations from the morning of hostilities.

These operations were seen only confusedly and understood but little in the early days of conflict. There is lacking still and will remain wanting for many years, perhaps, that complete detail which we already possess in the case of the French operations in the west. But it is possible to perceive, upon the least scientific study, that from the opening days of the eastern struggle until the German victory at the Dunajec transformed the whole eastern situation, two very clear and well-defined plans were working out.

In the last days of August, acting in strict conformity with a prearranged plan made by the French and Russian General Staffs, two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, where one found disaster at Tannenberg and the other was compelled to fall back to the frontier and assume a defensive posture. Despite subsequent ventures, leading directly to a second disaster, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the

East Prussian field was thenceforth of secondary interest and importance.

On the other hand, concomitant with the Russian defeat at Tannenberg was the first of the two great Russian victories about Lemberg, which exercised a permanent influence upon the eastern campaign down to the Battle of the Dunajec. In these battles about Lemberg the military establishment of Austria was temporarily wrecked and Russian strategy henceforth was concentrated upon the effort to make absolute the consequences of the early victories, to enforce the decision of Lemberg, and put Austria out of the war.

This purpose led to the steady pressure upon Austria on the Galician front, to the advance to the San, to the suburbs of Cracow, and finally, when further progress in this direction was proven impossible, to the gigantic campaign in the Carpathians, which aimed at passing the crests of this range and pouring down into the Hungarian Plain. In the course of the effort many battles, most of them Russian victories, were fought, and the great fortress of Przemysl, with a huge garrison, was captured. The disaster at the Dunajec occurred while the fighting in the Carpathians was still going in the Russian favour, but it is nevertheless true that Russia had failed to achieve her main purpose, when she was forced to give it over.

By contrast with the Russian campaign and purpose, the German efforts in the east were directed at preventing Russia from crushing Austria. These efforts were not originally or mainly confined to supporting Austria in Galicia; rather the Germans undertook, by a campaign of their own, to compel Russia to turn her attention away from Austria and give the Austrians time, under German direction, to get on their feet again. In addition, the German plan had the local object to take Warsaw, seize the west bank of the Vistula River, one of the most serious military obstacles in Europe, and thus insure their own eastern front.

When they began their operations in Poland in October, at the moment they were also attacking Antwerp and preparing for their final effort to break the decision of the Marne, the Germans had only small

effectives, and their advance to the outskirts of Warsaw suggests Early's dash for Washington in 1864, designed primarily to shake Grant's grip on Petersburg and Richmond. Even if they did not get Warsaw, which was a gamble, the Germans expected, justly, to compel the Russians to send troops from Galicia and thus give Austria respite. In this they were entirely successful.

The second drive, begun in November and leading promptly to the terrible Battle of Lodz, was a more serious undertaking. This time the Germans not only expected to relieve the pressure on the Austrians but also to get Warsaw. Temporarily they helped the Austrians, but they failed wholly in the attempt to get Warsaw, and the Austrians were soon in danger again.

November saw, in the west, the final surrender of the German purpose to abolish the decision of the Marne. This was given over, not because it was proven hopeless—in fact, the Germans were almost at the point of victory when they stopped at Ypres—but because it was no longer safe to attempt to deal with their eastern front with the slender effectives which they had there. Up to this moment the Russian campaign had not materially affected the western. It had drawn two Austrian corps out of Alsace at the perilous moment of the Marne, but it had not compelled the Germans to withdraw troops from the western front. On the contrary, they had sent at least six new corps to Belgium for the Ypres and Yser battles.

Had the Russians won at Tannenberg their pressure would have begun to affect the Germans in the west before the Battle of the Marne. When the Russians failed, the Germans were able to go right ahead with their western campaign until November. But at this point the Battle of Lemberg began to have consequences, which the Battle of Tannenberg would have had, had it been a Russian victory. With her western campaign unwon, Germany had to go east in November. So far, the Franco-Russian strategy had prevailed over the German, but the result had been reached so tardily that German armies in the west had been able to dig in on French and Belgian soil from the Vosges to the sea.

After Lodz, Germany turns east and gives her main attention to the Russian front. When she began in November, it is clear that her High Command expected to take Warsaw and beat down the Russian danger before spring, using several corps borrowed from the western front, which had now fallen to the level of trench war. Her High Command obviously had expected to return to the west in the spring and try again to abolish that Marne decision, always weighing upon Germany, because if this decision were to stand, time would be allowed Britain to arm, equip, and munition her millions.

Once Germany did turn east she began a tremendous effort. In December, in January, and in February there are terrific attacks on the whole Polish front facing Warsaw and one great attempt to get to Warsaw and behind Warsaw from East Prussia. But all these fail. The February failure establishes the fact that Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west and new Russian victories in Galicia make it clear that the Germans' effort to relieve Austria by her campaign for Warsaw has failed.

Sometime in February at the latest, Germany discovers that it will not be possible to shake Russia off in time to go back west and renew her effort to get France, still her main foe, out of the war in the spring and summer of 1915. Instead, it is clear that Austria must be kept in the war by a major effort directed against Russia. It is then become essential, since Russia must be attacked, that the blow shall be sufficiently heavy to put Russia out of the war altogether and leave German hands free to deal with France, reinforced by Britain, before Britain has reached the point in her preparation where she will be strong enough to lend France the necessary aid.

Here is the genesis of the great German campaign of the summer of 1916, which begins in Galicia and ends far in Russian territory. With this campaign we are not concerned now. But what it is necessary to recognize is that Russia succeeded in defending Warsaw and holding back Germany, while beating in upon Austria, just long enough to prevent Germany from returning to the western field in 1915. In doing this she gave France and Britain fifteen months to prepare. The ser-

vice was invaluable. In performing it, Russia invited that German attack which brought her to the edge of ruin. But she, also, escaped.

Here, then, is the whole story of the eastern campaign in the period which we are now to examine. In this time Russia is crowding more and more steadily in upon stricken Austria, pushing her back from Lemberg, from the San; coming close up to Cracow and then, checked here, turning toward the Carpathians and struggling up and in places over summits. And in the same time Germany is attempting, with ever-diminishing success, to compel Russia to let up on Austria by attacking Russia in Poland. German pressure is great enough to rob Russia's blow of just that weight which would have made it completely decisive, but it fails to divert Russian attention sufficiently. So at last we come to the decision to spend the summer in the east and direct the main blow in the spring and summer against the eastern enemy.

While all this is happening in the eastern field, Great Britain and France are making every effort to get their military forces into shape to take the pressure off their Russian ally in the spring. But the task is far too great and too long for the British. More than a year is to pass after the Battle of the Dunajec before Britain can be armed or munitioned; France, after the sacrifices of the Marne, is not strong enough, alone, to break the German lines in the west. The failure of all the French and British efforts from Alsace to Flanders supplies the German High Command with proof that their campaign against Russia can be pushed in the spring without danger to their western front. It is the failure of Allied efforts in the west straight through the winter, that makes the Russian burden so great, and it is the failure in the spring that precipitates the catastrophe of the Dunajec.

### II. TURKEY'S ENTRANCE

The whole course of the eastern operations was affected and Russian disaster finally achieved through the intervention of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers. In the days when Antwerp had fallen and Warsaw seemed on the point of yielding to Hindenburg, the Turk suddenly put his sword at the service of the two Kaisers. Conceivably this

Turkish decision could not have been prevented either by Allied diplomacy or Allied naval action, but the event is the first in a long series of reverses for Allied statesmanship and High Command in the Near East, which changed the whole course of the war in its second year.

The military effect of Turkey's decision was not measured by the new front it opened on the Russian Caucasus or the British lines at Suez. Turkish military operations were neither fortunate nor influential, aside from the defence of Gallipoli. But when Turkey entered the war, Russia was automatically cut off from the outer world for many months by winter on the north and by Turkish forts at the Bosporus. The result was that her munitionment was gravely affected. Before spring she had exhausted all her stocks of ammunition, and when the German blow came in April she was almost without heavy shells. This was the prime cause of all the subsequent reverses. This was Turkey's real service to her allies and her terrible revenge upon her hereditary enemy.

The political causes of Turkey's entrance are not hard to fathom. With the rapprochement of Russia and Britain, the latter resigned, in fact if not by formal engagement, her long-standing rôle of the defender of the Turk. It was well understood in Stamboul, as elsewhere, that the Persian bargain between Russia and Sir Edward Grey had an implied consent to eventual Russian possession at the Straits. Under the stress of circumstances, because British title to the Suez Canal had been made absolute by the French withdrawal from Egyptian ambitions—a part of the 1904 bargain—Constantinople lost its old value for the British, England resigned her position as the first friend of the Sultan, and the Kaiser instantly and eagerly replaced his rival at the Golden Horn.

When the Balkan States attacked Turkey, Germany and Austria hoped for their defeat. Britain and her Russian and French friends hoped for their victory, and Russia and France contributed materially to training and munitioning the armies that won at Lule Burgas, Kumanovo, and Yenidze-Vardar. It was, too, by virtue of an understanding with France, Russia, and Great Britain, that Italy attacked Turkey and took Tripoli.

No Turkish statesman could mistake the fact that France and Britain had abandoned the policy which produced the Crimean War and the abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano. No Turkish statesman could misunderstand the evidence that proved that Russia would never again have to resign Czarigrad at British behest. So far as London, Paris, and for that matter Rome, were concerned, Russia was free to take Constantinople. Therefore a victory of Russia and her allies in the war that had now broken out meant a Russian attack upon Turkey, with the consent of Russia's allies.

Turkey could have no illusion as to German ambitions. An Osmanli Empire administered by Prussian officials was as hateful to the Turk as a lost Constantinople, but this peril, if patent, was not immediate; he could hope that the outcome of the war would leave the enemies of Germany strong enough to prevent this, even though they were defeated. He could hope that the turn of events might save him as it had saved him for so many decades. But the Russian danger was immediate, unmistakable, carried with it a death sentence for him.

Actually the Turkish decision was procured by the intervention of two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, which were caught in the western Mediterranean at the moment of the declaration of war and fled via Palermo to the Dardanelles, escaping the whole French and British fleets. Had British and French warships followed them up the Straits, sunk them under the very eyes of the Turkish Government, the course of events might have been altered and the worst of Allied disasters avoided. But Allied purpose had not yet reached this point; Allied admirals lacked the courage of Nelson in the case of Copenhagen.

With the safe arrival of these ships, Turkey was lost to the enemies of Germany. Aided by their presence, Enver Pasha was able to throw his government into the hands of the Germans. More than this, these same ships, at last issuing forth from the Bosporus and attacking Russian ports and shipping, provoked that Russian declaration of war which placed Turkey definitely on the side of the Central Powers. Count d'Erlon's blundering march and countermarch in the Waterloo

campaign was only one degree more disastrous to his Emperor than was this failure of British naval officers to the Allied cause—French ships were then engaged in covering the transport of French troops from Morocco and Algeria to France—to the whole Allied cause in the spring and summer of 1915.

# GLIMPSES OF THE SQUADRONS OF THE AIR



AMERICANS WHO FLEW FOR FRANCE

This picture shows some of the members of the Escadrille Lafayette, an organization made up of American aviators. From left to right: Lieutenant de Laage de Mieux (the French instructor), Johnson, Rumsey, McConnell, Thaw, Lufbery, Rockwell, Masson, Prince, and Hall. Within a short time after this photograph was taken, McConnell, Rockwell, and Prince, had been killed in action.

THE DREADNOUGHT OF THE AIR

The huge Brequet air cruiser, used for bombardment purposes and carrying machine guns as well as racks for launching bombs.

THE BATTLE CRUISER OF THE AIR

The new model Nieuport fighting machine mounts at great speed, rising to 7,000 feet in six minutes, and flies as high as 20,000 feet. The machine gun is mounted on the hood and shoots through the rapidly revolving propeller.



*Copyright by the International Film Service*

THE WAR IN THE AIR

This giant Zeppelin was brought down in the suburbs of London by anti-aircraft guns. The envelope burned up but the gondola was barely scorched. The whole incident afforded the British an excellent opportunity for studying the secrets of German Zeppelin construction. The upper picture shows a German dirigible intact.

WOMEN VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FRENCH AËRIAL SERVICE

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

This picture reminds one of the photographs of the crater-pitted face of the moon. But in reality it is an aviator's photograph of a modern battlefield. The numerous spots are the craters made by shell-explosions. The heavy lines drawn with mathematical precision are fortifications; and the lighter lines, more or less wavering, are the trenches.

# SOLDIERS FROM ALL THE SEVEN SEAS

A PAIR OF ABLE-BODIED ZOUAVES FROM THE GOLD COAST OF AFRICA

Decent Europeans at the front were often hard put to it, to explain the horrors of war to half-civilized men like these, who were familiar with such scenes among savage men and beasts in the African jungles. But as missionaries had assured them that such behaviour was abhorred by civilized men, they were much puzzled by the "frightfulness" rampant in France and Belgium.

*Copyright by the International News Service*

TURCOS

In this war of many nations, men and costumes of all sorts were to be met with. This picture shows a group of French Turcos from Algeria, solicitous as to the manner of preparation of their midday coffee.

*Copyright by the International News Service*

CANADIAN TROOPS

A large proportion of the sparse population of Canada crossed the sea to fight for the mother country. With them went many Americans. After a period of training in England the Canadians and the Americans stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches in France.

A TRUE WORLD WAR

From all quarters of the globe men come together to resist aggression by the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg. Never before in the history of the world—not even in the Crusades—were men of such diverse and wide-scattered races banded together in a common cause. Here are Cossacks from Russia, Sikhs from India, and English Colonials from New South Wales.

A SENEGALESE INFANTRYMAN

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

ANNAMESE SOLDIERS

MEN OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Few realize that there were troops of Mongolian race on the battlegrounds of Europe. The Japanese have taken a hand only upon the sea and at Kiao Chau. But here (*upper picture*) is a column of soldiery from French Cochin-China marching to their camp near Versailles. The lower picture shows a French Senegalese battalion going forward into action in the great Somme offensive.

## CHAPTER NINE

## THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

### I

### RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Russian mobilization, for which the preliminary orders were given as early as July 25th, was conditioned upon circumstances of Russia's western frontier. Here Poland projects, like a fist against a pillow, to use a familiar figure, deep into the block of Teutonic territories. Thus Russian armies operating about Warsaw or to the west of Warsaw would be fatally exposed to German or Austrian attacks coming south out of East Prussia or north out of Galicia, which touches the longitude of Brest-Litovsk, more than a hundred miles east of Warsaw.

This situation Russia was in the process of remedying when the war broke out. North of Warsaw from the Vistula, at the point where the Bug enters it, to the Niemen, the Russians had stretched a line of forts, beginning at Novogeorgievsk and ending at Kovno on the Niemen. This was the famous Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier, but it derived its main strength not from fortifications but from the swamps and from the rivers that give it the name it bears. Westward, Warsaw had once been guarded by forts, but these had been demolished and Russian armies had planned, when the scheme of fortifications was complete, to stand before Warsaw, on the Blonie line, a system of field fortifications suggesting the Chatalja lines. Thence southward the Vistula supplied an admirable defensive position being in itself a serious military obstacle, a broad deep river with high wooded banks.

But Russian preparation had only begun, and south of the Vistula, from Ivangorod to the Volhynian province, there was a gap, between Lublin and Cholm, through which Austrian armies could advance upon Brest-Litovsk, operating far in the rear of Warsaw and behind the line of the Vistula. Until this gap had been closed, all positions to the west-

ward were gravely imperilled. And it is worth noting that the German advance to Warsaw, when it came, was successful because of this gap.

In this posture Russia was compelled to mobilize behind the Bug instead of the Vistula, using the Niemen and the three fortresses of the Volhynian triangle, Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, to guard her flanks. Only covering troops were left in Warsaw, and it was not until the strength of German numbers going west and the weakness of the army left in the east were disclosed, that Russia began her forward movement in Poland, the first positive evidence of which was the army pushed north out of Warsaw to the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg.

It seems now unquestioned that Russian mobilization, slow as it was because of the vastness of Russian area and the paucity of Russian railroads, took both the Germans and the Austrians by surprise and later led them to make angry charges about Russian preparations before the Serbian crisis. But this is a debate for the future. What is clear is that, by the middle of August, Russian armies were beginning to move. This movement was in two distinct areas. Two armies, one from the Niemen and one from the Vistula at Warsaw, pushed into East Prussia, met with considerable success in the third and fourth weeks of August, and were then brought to a dead halt by the disaster at Tannenberg, which destroyed one of the armies and eventually forced the retirement of the other.

The second group of armies was the more considerable and did not number less than a million, at least twice the strength of the other two armies combined. This group was divided into three armies commanded by Ivanoff, Russky, and Brusiloff, names that were to become famous in the history of the war. Ivanoff's army was based upon Brest-Litovsk and by the middle of August was moving south covering Lublin and the gap that opened toward Brest-Litovsk. His mission was to hold any Austrian invasion south of Lublin, but the main thrust was to be made by the other armies.

Russky's army came west along the Kiev-Lemberg railroad, having Kiev as its base, and advanced directly upon Lemberg, crossing the Galician frontier about Brody in the fourth week of August. Brusiloff

brought his army up along the Odessa-Lemberg railroad, taking the field only when it became clear that Roumania intended to remain neutral. The original mission of this army was to protect Odessa and southwestern Russia from Roumanian attack, if Roumania remained faithful to her alliance with Austria and Germany. The release of this army actually made the victory of Lemberg possible and in this way Roumania




THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON ALL FRONTS, SEPT. 1ST, 1914

I–Rennenkampf III–Ivanoff V–Brusiloff
II–Samsonoff IV–Russky

served her old allies an evil turn quite comparable with that served them by Italy, when her proclamation of neutrality released French troops to fight at the Marne. Brusiloff crossed the frontier near Tarnopol, also east of Lemberg, and advanced toward this city, his flank along the Dniester. His junction with Russky was completed before the battle began and his part in the first engagement was decisive.

### II. AUSTRIA'S PLANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France. At the very outset it is plain that the High Command of the Dual Alliance fatally underestimated the speed and the force of the Russian blow. Thus Germany borrowed two of the best Austrian corps for her western drive and was putting them into operation in Alsace when Austrian disaster came. In addition, three or four more corps had been sent south to deal with Serbia. This latter army was far too small to fight an offensive campaign with the well-equipped and well-trained veterans of King Peter and suffered immediate and terrible disaster at the Jedar, while Russia was still just beginning to get across the frontier into Galicia, a full week before Tannenberg, and about the time of Charleroi.

It may be doubted whether Austria actually put in the field against Russia many more than 600,000 troops at the outset. In any event, she was outnumbered by at least two to one. She further invited disaster by dividing her armies. One (Auffenberg's) she stationed across Galicia from north to south, east of and covering Lemberg; its right or southern flank rested on Halicz on the Dniester, its northern flank was behind the Bug, and its centre behind the Zlota Lipa, on high ground. This position was excellent and it had been protected by well-constructed field works, but it was far too extended for the number of troops Austria had available.

The second Austrian army (Dankl's), leaving railhead at the San, moved straight north into the Lublin gap, aiming at Brest-Litovsk and having for its ultimate purpose to compel the Russians to evacuate War-

saw and all of Poland. This was an exceedingly ambitious thrust, it was entirely beyond the capacity of the army and the generals that first undertook it, but it did actually succeed less than a year later, and its success demonstrated the weakness of the Russian position and the wisdom of the original Russian strategic conception, which called for an evacuation of all the territory west of the Bug.

It will be noted that neither the Russians nor the Austro-Germans, in the opening days, undertook any operations in that part of Poland west of Warsaw. The Germans lacked the numbers for any such operation; the Russians were stopped by the concentration of Austrian armies opposite Lublin, which had a deadly menace for any army west of Warsaw. It is only after the German thrust at Warsaw, made possible by Tannenberg, had been undertaken and failed, that Russia ventures into this area, resigning the Galician field for the moment, and then she comes within a hairsbreadth of a crushing defeat at Lodz and makes no further effort in this field, standing stolidly on the defensive.

The opening of the last week in August, then, sees these two major efforts on foot. Russia is advancing with her two armies along the Kiev and on the Odessa railroads and standing firm with her Third Army about Lublin; Austria is holding one army before Lemberg and sending the other north into Volhynia and actually approaching Lublin, its presence already signalled by Austrian reports of victories about Krasnik. We may calculate that the Austrian armies are outnumbered about two to one and that as the armies before Lemberg begin the battle, the Austrians have learned that the Serbians have just won a sweeping victory at the Jedar and that Austrian invasion of Serbia has been abandoned.

Meantime, to complete the eastern picture, one Russian army is approaching Königsberg, having won a battle at Gumbinnen, and a second is approaching Allenstein in East Prussia, while Hindenburg is already preparing his amazing counterthrust. In the west Namur has fallen, the French have been beaten at Morhange and Charleroi, and all the Allied armies are beginning the great retreat which Berlin and Vienna interpret to be the collapse of French military power.

### III. LEMBERG

The First Battle of Lemberg lasted not less than eight days. In its earlier stages it began along the Zlota Lipa, but the Austrians presently retired to their main front behind the Gnila Lipa, their southern flank still at Halicz and their centre about Krasne, on the Brody-Lemberg railroad, where it is joined by the Tarnopol-Odessa railroad there left behind the Bug. All this ground was again to be fought over by Brusiloff's great offensive in June, 1916.

The fact that the Austrian resistance finally collapsed has somewhat misled the world as to the nature of the struggle. It was exceedingly severe and for many days the Russians, despite heavy losses, were able to make no progress. Finally Brusiloff broke through to the south toward the Dniester and about Halicz, which he took. This success imperilled the whole Austrian line and it retreated through and beyond Lemberg—which fell on the first days of September, just at Tannenberg time—and took its stand behind the chain of Grodek lakes, a few miles west of Lemberg, its left flank reaching and passing Rawaruska.

This time the decisive thrust is made by Russky. His numbers are so much superior to Auffenberg's that he is able to turn his flank, and the Austrian line swings at right angles around Rawaruska and runs east and west; Russky takes Rawaruska, breaks the whole centre of the Austrians and throws the entire force, shaken by its defeats before Lemberg, into an utter rout.

Meantime Ivanoff, having at first retired before Dankl and permitted him to follow deep into Russian territory and become separated from Auffenberg, turns and delivers a heavy blow. Dankl's army is now left in air, its southern flank exposed by the collapse of Auffenberg, and he is compelled to make a disorderly retreat, approximating a flight, back to and across the San, giving up Jaroslav and coming back behind the Wisloka and approaching Cracow. Auffenberg's army retires over the Carpathian passes into Hungary. Before the Austrian flight had at last paused the Russians announced that they had taken 250,000 prisoners, vast numbers of guns, and an enormous store of munitions and material.

In point of fact, Lemberg was one of the complete disasters of military history; it brought the Austrian war establishment to the edge of ruin and disclosed a fundamental weakness, which, despite German effort and temporary success in the summer campaign of 1915, could not be quite cured and was revealed afresh on the same ground in the campaign that opened the summer of 1916. Differences of race, the manifest lack of




THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA—BATTLE OF LEMBERG

A–Russky C–Ivanoff E–Dankl
B–Brusiloff D–Auffenberg

sympathy on the part of Slav contingents with their task of fighting Russians to please their German and Magyar masters, defective training and insufficient preparation, above all inadequate numbers for the task assigned, all these things combined to make Lemberg an Austrian disaster of first magnitude.

The immediate consequences were the loss of all of Galicia to the San, the advance of Russian troops beyond the San as far as the Wisloka, the investing of Przemysl, the passage of the Carpathians by Cossack raid-

ing parties, and the first arrival of the invader in the Hungarian Plain. Austrian troops had to be recalled from Alsace and from Serbia to retrieve the lost situation and the first demand was made upon Germany to come to the aid of her Austrian ally. By the battle Austria lost 20,000 square miles of territory; Lemberg, a city of more than 200,000 people; the great oil district of eastern Galicia. She lost also not less than half of her first-line troops, counting the Jedar casualties, and, in addition, material of war which could only slowly be replaced.

Austrian defeat at Lemberg coincided with German repulse and retreat at the Marne. But for the unhappy disaster at Tannenberg, the second week in September would have seen all the armies of the Central Powers in retreat or rout. Had Tannenberg not released Hindenburg's army, it would have been from the western armies that Germany would have had to draw corps to repair the Galician situation. She was not now compelled to do this, but the consequences of Lemberg were ultimately to put a term to western operations for a year and a half.

The decision at Lemberg did not endure so long as did that of the Marne; the Germans abolished it at the Dunajec in April. But while the decision stood, it continued to hamper and embarrass German effort. Russia was temporarily compelled to withdraw from the region west of the San, by the first German drive at Warsaw; after Lodz, she was still before Cracow, and it required a new effort in Poland to compel her to abandon her thrust for Cracow. Then she turned to the Carpathians, and the immediate demand of Hungary compelled Germany to send troops to guard Hungarian passes.

In the end Germany had to give over the attack upon Warsaw through Poland and turn her main attention to Galicia. When she did this she reversed the decision of Lemberg and promptly turned the Russians out of Galicia, but this was only in the last days of April, and the Russian victory had begun in the last days of August. Lemberg is, then, the second great Allied victory of the war, ranking immediately after the Marne. It gave the world its first evidence of the new character of Russian armies, demonstrated that the evils of the Japanese War had been remedied, and that Russian generalship was as good as German or

French. Disasters due to the failure of ammunition somewhat marred this new reputation, but in 1916, when munitions had been supplied, Russian armies began to win new victories of an impressive character.

It is fair to say that Lemberg and the Marne together demonstrated that Germany had terribly underestimated her Continental foes. Two years were to pass before she was to reform her estimate as to British troops. But by the middle of September she and her Austrian ally had fought three great battles, as she had planned, which should have decided the issue of the war, but two had been lost, and the third had only saved Germany from ruin and had not crushed France or Russia.

# CHAPTER TEN

## WARSAW

### I

### CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST BID

About October 1st the Russians had passed the San in Galicia and were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain. In the west the Siege of Antwerp was approaching its promptly decisive stage, and the German campaign to abolish the decision of the Marne by a final offensive through Flanders was taking final shape.

It was now necessary to aid the Austrians, but it was not possible to withdraw troops from the west, unless Germany was willing to accept a deadlock from Switzerland to the North Sea, and she was far from ready to do this. There remained the possibility of using the larger portion of the army of Hindenburg, which had won Tannenberg and pursued the second Russian army in East Prussia—that of Rennenkampf—from the very gates of Königsberg across the frontier. Gathering up the mass of this army and leaving the balance to retreat slowly before the Russians, the German General Staff might transport it rapidly, by those admirable strategic railroads which follow the frontier in a semicircle from East Prussia to Cracow; put it in at Lodz, which had fallen into German hands early in the war; call upon Austrian troops, returning from Serbia or from Alsace, and make a sudden drive at Warsaw.

If the drive achieved the maximum of success, Warsaw would be captured, together with Ivangorod to the south, the objective of the Austrian fraction of Hindenburg's army; Germany would, at a single thrust, win the west bank of the Vistula, an enormously strong military position. Behind this line she could hope to stand inexpugnably and

devote her efforts to preparing to renew the conflict in the west in the spring.

But if this maximum was not realized, there was a minimum that was assured, Russia had no troops of material consequence between Lodz and Warsaw: most of her military strength was now in Galicia




RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA, ABOUT OCTOBER 1, 1914

The Russians were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain

pressing against the Austrians and moving toward Cracow. Unquestionably the first sign of a German thrust for Warsaw would compel the Russians to give over their Galician operations, draw out many corps and send them to save Warsaw, and thus dislocate their whole Galician concentration. When this began the Austrians could undertake a new offensive in Galicia, designed to crush the weakened Russian armies, and the danger to Cracow, as well as the menace to Hungary through the Carpathians, would be abolished.

This was the main purpose of the offensive toward Warsaw. Austria must be helped. The help she required could still be furnished without any draft upon the western lines, but such help would not be sufficient to win a decisive battle, if Russia made a prompt concentration. It could only get Warsaw if speed enabled the Germans to seize that strong position before Russian numbers could be brought up. It was a serious bid for Warsaw, but it was a bid begun with the full recognition that it had at best no more than half a chance of success.

In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with precisely the same purpose in view. It was possible that Early might get Washington. If he did, the success would be of enormous political and moral value; but even if he failed he was likely to compel Grant, hanging doggedly to his footing before Petersburg, to weaken his front to relieve Washington, and this would give Lee a respite. It might lead Grant to abandon his whole effort to get Richmond, from his position south of the James. Early failed, as did Hindenburg, because troops from the other front arrived in time. But unlike Lee's thrust, that of Hindenburg succeeded in dislocating the other enemy concentration, that in Galicia.

There was further, a political purpose in the German thrust. The attitude of the Poles toward the conflicting nations was obscure. It was possible and reasonable for the Germans to hope that the Poles, if a German invasion carried Warsaw, might turn from their Russian allegiance and become the allies of the invader, as they had in the Napoleonic time when they furnished the great Emperor with at least one marshal and some of his best and bravest troops. This German hope was not realized, partly because the failure to get Warsaw necessitated a retreat, in which Poland was laid in ashes by contending armies, but it was an important consideration in the German mind and it was a possibility recognized fully by the Russians.

### II. AT THE GATES OF WARSAW

Under these circumstances and about October 1st, Hindenburg began his advance in two columns—one following the railroad east from Kalisz

to Warsaw; the other, mainly composed of Austrians, moving northeast along the railroad from Cracow to Ivangorod. Combined, these armies did not number six army corps, possibly there were but five; certainly their total strength was less than that of Kluck's army in the Marne campaign. These armies had something like a hundred miles to go; they had, when the advance began, practically no Russian




HINDENBURG'S FIRST CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW, OCT. 20, 1914

The German thrust for Warsaw diverted the Russians from their operations in Galicia. This was its main purpose. In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with a precisely similar object in view

troops before them, and they had reasonably good roads to follow. They began with the full expectation of taking Warsaw within the fortnight, and the news of the fall of Antwerp overtook them on the road and gave them new enthusiasm.

With little or no fighting, moving with almost incredible rapidity, these two armies advanced until, on October 14th, one army stood on the

outskirts of Warsaw, in the suburb of Prushkow, seven miles from the centre of the city, while the other had cleared the west bank of the Vistula before Ivangorod. At this moment German shells fell within the Polish capital, German aeroplanes bombed the city, there was a general exodus of the population, and the world believed that Warsaw was to share the fate of Antwerp. So sure did German victory now seem to the Turk that, under German pressure, Enver Pasha chose this moment to put his country into the conflict.

But Russian concentration was just prompt enough. While the Germans were in the suburbs of Warsaw, Siberian regiments pushed through the town and began to defend the outskirts. They were the advanced guards of eight corps, which came to Ivangorod and to Warsaw in the next few days. For a whole week there was sharp fighting before Warsaw, where Hindenburg stood checked but not convinced. But presently the Russian reinforcements crossed the Vistula about Ivangorod and north of Warsaw and came in on both flanks of the Hindenburg forces. October 21st Hindenburg broke off the engagement. He had never fought to the limit; he had stood before Warsaw long after the possibility of taking the town had passed, to preserve the threat as long as possible. His Austrian allies before Ivangorod had suffered severely; he had gotten off far more lightly.

Beginning October 21st, the first thrust at Warsaw transforms itself into a swift and orderly retreat, such as Frederick the Great taught Europe to expect from his Prussians, and in trim columns Hindenburg moved back to the frontier. As he retreated, the fact was disclosed that he had constructed fieldworks along his route, foreseeing retreat, and these gave his rearguards admirable protection. In this retreat he destroyed roads, railroads, bridges, actually abolishing most of the means of communication in Poland.

Meanwhile, in Galicia, the effect of the Warsaw drive had been exactly what had been hoped. The Russians had come out of the Carpathians and retired behind the San. The Austrians had rallied and taken the offensive, reaching and in spots passing the river. Przemysl had been relieved; there was a moment when the reconquest of Galicia

seemed to be within Austrian possibilities. But this moment passed. As the Germans retired from Warsaw the Russians in Galicia retook the offensive. This time, passing the San, they again—and as it turned out, finally—invested Przemysl and approached Cracow at the precise moment when the armies which had saved Warsaw and Ivangorod were coming southwest, and that of Ivangorod threatened Cracow from the north as the Galician army now threatened it from the east.

Thus the real benefit of Hindenburg's thrust was shortlived. By the time he had fallen back to the German and Austrian frontiers, his retreat was mainly toward the southwest, the Russian menace in Galicia had become even more serious than it had been when he started. He had but postponed the danger for a moment and he had now to deal with it in an aggravated form.

### III. LODZ

We have now come to the moment when the western and eastern campaigns merge. Hindenburg is now compelled to make a second effort to relieve the Austrians in Galicia and save Cracow. He has still only very restricted numbers. The Germans are making their last desperate effort in Flanders; they have failed against the Belgians and French from Nieuport to Dixmude; they are attacking the British about Ypres, and the British are holding on doggedly while the French are striving to reinforce them. Unless the Germans can now break through in the west in a brief time, they will have to abandon the western effort and turn their attention eastward. The Russian pressure—which, in Allied plans, made before the war, should have become effective in the last days of August—is about to count in the last days of November.

For his second effort Hindenburg takes advantage again of the strategic railroads which run in a circle about the Russian frontier. In his drive at Warsaw he had used these railroads to move troops from East Prussia to Silesia. When he had failed at Warsaw he had retired southwest upon Cracow and Breslau, destroying Russian railroads as he retired. The Russian troops had followed him through Lodz and even

to the Silesian boundary. But, owing to the configuration of the territory, they were now farther from Warsaw than German troops at Thorn would be, and they had behind them only the ruined roads and railroads, which Hindenburg had wrecked.




HINDENBURG'S SECOND DRIVE FOR WARSAW

Hindenburg left only Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz, moved north to the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers, and there sent in several corps under Mackensen

# MEN AND GUNS OF THE TWO KAISERS

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THE IMPERIAL GUARD PASSES IN REVIEW BEFORE EMPEROR WILLIAM

At the left of the Kaiser is General Lowenfeldt, and at the extreme right General Von Bülow.

GENERAL VON MOLTKE

GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN

GENERAL VON HEERINGEN

CROWN PRINCE RUPERT OF BAVARIA

General Von Moltke, nephew of the great Moltke of Bismarck's day was Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the World War. Because of his failure to seize and hold the French and Belgian seacoast when opportunity offered and because of rumored mistakes in the Battle of the Marne, Moltke lost his position and turned over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

The armies of General Von Heeringen and Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria met the French after they had penetrated German territory some fifteen or twenty miles, about a fortnight after the War began. The battle was an undoubted German victory. The French "75's" were outranged by the heavy German field artillery, and in three days the French were driven back across the border and the invasion of Lorraine was at an end.

A fortnight later, while the Battle of the Marne was on, these same generals fought another engagement on this same front—"the Second Battle of Nancy." They were opposed, as before, by the French general Castelnau. Their aim was to cut through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Epinal and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies. Though fighting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself they were repulsed with great slaughter—else the Battle of the Marne might have ended very differently.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

GENERAL MACKENSEN

GENERAL LUDENDORFF

THE KAISER IN WARTIME

GENERAL VON KLUCK

General Mackensen, conqueror of the Russians under Dmitrieff at the Dunajec, in the spring of 1915. The trapped Roumanian army surrendered to him in December, 1916.

General Ludendorff, close associate of Hindenburg. He has been called "the brains of Hindenburg," and even the "real German dictator." His mastiff-like visage recalls the bull-dog countenance of Hindenburg and even more the resolute mask of the old "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck.

The Kaiser's wartime photographs betray the fact that he has aged greatly during the conflict. This shows him in his field uniform, with helmet covered so as to offer no glittering mark to sniping aviators. For all the dozens of gaudy uniforms in which he used to take so much delight, he has never been indiscreet enough to lead an army in person—except at manœuvres. He is said, however, to have waited "in shining armour" to take part in one or two triumphal entries which failed to come off.

General Von Kluck, about August 23d, made a desperate effort to "run around the end" of the Allied line, interposed between it and Paris and produce another Sedan. He did not quite succeed, and immediately found himself in a very dangerous position during the Battle of the Marne. Thanks to Sir John French's failure to rise to the occasion, Kluck was able by dint of desperate fighting against the gallant Maunoury to make good his retreat to the Aisne.

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

ONE OF HINDENBURG'S THRUSTS AT WARSAW

There is plenty of room on this broad road for ammunition and supply trains to advance along with the infantry.

*Copyright by Brown & Dawson*

AN INCIDENT DURING THE GERMAN EFFORT TO DRIVE THE RUSSIANS HOME FROM GALICIA

The German soldiers are coming out of the garrison church at Przemysl, after attending Sunday morning service. Few civilians are in the street and the shop-windows are tightly shuttered.

*Copyright by Brown & Dawson*

EFFECT OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF PRZEMYSL

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

GENERAL VON AUFFENBERG (Right)

The unlucky Austrian general from whom the Russians captured a quarter of a million prisoners at the Battle of Lemberg, one of the great disasters of military history which brought the Austrian war establishment to the verge of ruin.

TYPICAL AUSTRIAN INFANTRYMEN

As is shown in another part of this book the Austrian makes a good and courageous soldier. Men of many diverse races fight under the colours of the Dual Monarchy yet no dissension has appeared.

PARCELS FROM FRIENDS AT HOME ARRIVE TO CHEER GERMAN ARTILLERY OFFICERS BEFORE WARSAW

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## THE AUSTRIANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France. But Austria was unable to carry out her part of the program, and when she had been defeated by the Serbians at the Jedar and by the Russians at Lemberg, Germany was compelled to draw troops from the western front to send to her rescue and thus lost her own chance for a quick victory over France

The upper picture shows some of the celebrated Rangers Corps guarding a road; the lower one, a group of officers seated before one of the guns used in bombarding Antwerp.



ONE OF THE SKODA HOWITZERS THAT REDUCED LIEGÉ

On August 7th, the German infantry penetrated between the forts before Liegé and occupied the city and the citadel; but they were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire till German and Austrian heavy guns were brought forward. Under this attack the forts crumbled almost instantly. They were the work of the famous Brialmont, and supposed to be very strong. But they had been allowed to fall into disrepair and their reduction proved to be child's play to the mighty new engines of destruction.

Accordingly Hindenburg left only the Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz and moved his mass right along the frontier north to Thorn and the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers and there sent in several corps under Mackensen, soon to earn world fame. These troops moved rapidly




THE BATTLE OF LODZ, DURING HINDENBURG'S SECOND CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW

Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians, and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners

across the flank and rear of the Russians to the southeast, turned their flank and presently interposed between them and Warsaw, much as Kluck sought to interpose between the Anglo-French forces and Paris in the September campaign in the west.

Here, then, in the last days of November, while the Battle of Ypres is just ending, is the promise of a second Tannenberg, the capture of a large Russian army, and the ultimate fall of Warsaw. The position of

the Russian army is desperate, it would seem, because its northern flank is turned by the Germans, while it is assailed in front by more Germans, and the Austrians have advanced north from Cracow, threatening its southern flank. But the Russians escaped, showing again the same qualities which shone, even in disaster, in the Manchurian campaign.

At the moment when Russky, who commanded at Lodz, seemed lost, the Germans on his northern flank are involved by a thrust out from Warsaw and south from the Vistula made by troops brought down from East Prussia and out of the fortress garrisons. Two German corps are surrounded and Petrograd, long silent in the midst of disaster, suddenly claims a huge success. This does not happen. General von François, the German commander whose corps are trapped, manages to fight his way out, by exertions which the Russians frankly concede to have been "unbelievable." The Germans are helped by failures of Rennenkampf, who once more, as in the Tannenberg times, discloses tardiness and now goes into retirement.

But already the situation has compelled the Germans to borrow aid from the west. The end of the western campaign has come and the decision of the Marne stands. Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting the war in the east had yet seen. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners; the Russians claim material captures, but the actual effect of all the fighting has been, in the immediate area of conflict, to reproduce western conditions of deadlock, and the Polish front rapidly tends to descend into the same state of trench warfare that has obtained on the Aisne since the middle of September.

### IV. THE THIRD BID FOR WARSAW

When in October the Russians began their advance from Warsaw, following Hindenburg toward Cracow, it seems clear that they temporarily renounced the Galician field as the main theatre of operations and put forth their full strength in Poland. After Lodz they again reverted to their old idea. Lodz demonstrated clearly that it would be impos-

sible to move west out of Poland. It was, in fact, as the Germans said in their official announcements at the time, a permanent check to Russian offensive toward Silesia and Posen.

On the other hand, while the first Hindenburg advance toward Warsaw had checked the Russian operations in Galicia and turned them into a retirement behind the San, the Lodz operation did not affect the Galician field and the Russians still continued to press on toward Cracow, after their Polish army had evacuated Lodz, and retired toward Lowicz and Skierniewice, covering Warsaw. A new effort was required to relieve the Galician situation. This new effort was made in Poland; in it we see, unmistakably, the contribution of troops brought from the west. The necessity for this operation was revealed in the severe defeat suffered by Austrian armies coming up out of the Carpathians and seeking to relieve Przemysl and redeem western Galicia.

Accordingly Hindenburg resumed his pressure in Poland; from the Lower Vistula south before Lodz he began a terrific frontal attack upon the Russians, employing the numbers he had now borrowed from the west. Under this pressure the Russians retired slowly, giving over Lowicz and Skierniewice and retiring upon Warsaw. They finally took their stand on the eastern banks of the Bzura and Rawka, little rivers which together stretch straight across the front of Warsaw from the Lower Vistula for many miles south. Below this system the Russians fortified the banks of the Pilitza and then of the Nida, which enters the Upper Vistula north of Tarnow.

The position was largely accidental. The Russians had intended to defend Warsaw from the Blonie lines, much nearer the city; the Bzura is more than twenty miles west of the Polish capital. But little by little they discovered that their lines held; they found that they had been driven into a defensible position, and they hung on. At the same time they drew back from before Cracow, north of the Vistula, standing behind the Nida, south of it behind the Dunajec. They had now entered the lines they were to hold from December until May between the Lower Vistula and the Carpathians, and until August before Warsaw.

The German attacks upon the Bzura-Rawka lines recalled the similar efforts in Flanders, at the Yser and before Ypres. German losses were exceedingly heavy; German gains were inconsiderable, a trench here, a farmhouse there. Meantime the weather had come to the rescue of Russia. An early and severe winter had destroyed Napoleon. The winter of 1914-1915 was one of the mildest in Polish history and the roads were turned into swamps. The superior mobility of the Germans was abolished as a factor and they were unable to use their heavy artillery because of the difficulties of transport. These conditions had materially affected the Lodz operation; they had an almost decisive influence now.

By January 1st the attempt to get Warsaw by frontal attack has failed. It will be resumed in January and February, combined with a thrust south from East Prussia, via Mlawa and along the railroad up which the Russians had marched to disaster in the Tannenberg time. But it will fail again, and this failure will be absolute. Meantime, the Russians will abandon their momentary plan to move west from Poland toward Breslau and through Galicia to Cracow. They will more and more direct their energies toward forcing the passes of the Carpathians and reaching the Hungarian Plain.

Well into February the Germans will continue their efforts to get Warsaw from the front and from the north. In all of this time they will content themselves with bolstering up Austrian defence in Galicia by more and more considerable reinforcement, and by a gradual taking over, first of High Command and then of the direction of the smaller units. It is not until the February attacks fail, and the Russian line before Warsaw is proven too strong to be broken, that Germany, in her turn, will go to Galicia and make her main effort in the field where, for many months, Russia has been steadily progressing.

January 1st, then, is a date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. From the Baltic to the Carpathians the line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed. There is a slight fluctuation in East Prussia; it will be February before the Germans,

having won the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, can announce that East Prussia is freed from the invaders. But actually the decision has been reached, Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west. Germany must make up her mind to this, and when she makes up her mind it will be too late to hope to resume the great western offensive in the spring.




DEADLOCK IN POLAND, DEC., 1914–MAY, 1915

January 1st is the date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. The line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed

Instead, there must be prepared a new eastern campaign and that campaign will have for its real purpose, not alone taking Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, not merely abolishing the threat of Austria, but destroying the military power of Russia and compelling a separate peace; in a word, adopting against Russia the strategy and purpose which failed against France at the Marne.

### V. SERBIA TRIUMPHANT AGAIN

While the German advance from Lodz upon Warsaw was going forward, a fresh Austrian disaster attracted the attention of the world. As far back as the first days of November, Austria, hoping permanent relief from the German operations toward Lodz, had detached troops to dispose of the Serbian nuisance, which, since the victory of the Jedar, had injured Austrian prestige and imperilled Hapsburg power in all the Slav regions, but particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And once more it was reserved for Serbia, prime cause of all the terrible world conflict, to give Europe a great surprise, the fourth in three brief years, and to win a shining and conspicuous triumph.

In 1913, at the outset of the First Balkan War—when Europe preserving the memory of Slivnitza, forecast Serbian defeat, and the invasion of Serbia by the Turks was prophesied by those most hopeful of Bulgarian victory—it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who proved irresistible, invincible, won back Old Serbia at Kumanovo, Macedonia at Monastir, and captured the Turkish Commander at Adrianople.

A few months later, when Austria had precipitated the Second Balkan War to destroy King Peter's nation, it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who again prevailed, and the Battle of Bregalnitza as completely shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility as the reverse of Mars-la-Tour had wrecked that of France. The victims of a breach of faith, attacked by night and without warning, without declaration of war, the Serbs rallied, took the offensive, sent the Bulgars in rout back over the Rhodopians and restored to Serbia the southern half of the empire of the great Dushan.

Finally, in the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period that culminated at the Marne. At the Jedar four Austrian army corps had been routed, Austrian prestige in the Balkans shattered, the first Slav triumph won in that long series which by December was to bring Austria to the lowest ebb in her history since the Hungarian Revolution.

On December 1st Serbia was once more in the presence of grave peril. The October drive of Germany had released several army corps of Austrians in Galicia and Poland, and these came south to complete the work of destroying the troops of King Peter, who had for months defended their frontiers. Before this overwhelming force the Serbs had retreated. All the corner of Serbia between the Save and the Drina was lost. Coming east from Bosnia the Austrian right approached Belgrad, which for four months had defied daily bombardment; the centre




SERBIAN BATTLEFIELDS

I—The Jedar, August, 1914. In the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne

II—Valievo, December, 1914. One of the most complete of Austrian disasters

reached Valievo, the left penetrated to Uchitza, on the Serbian Morava. Presently Belgrad fell, a birthday present to the aged Francis Joseph, the only conquest of his army in the whole struggle.

In the first week in December the fate of Serbia seemed sealed. A second Belgium, another little state destroyed in the contest between the great, seemed assured. Austrian armies appeared certain to reach Nish, the temporary Serbian capital, to open the Orient Railway to the Bulgarian frontier and persuade Bulgaria, still smarting from her defeat by Serbia, to cast her lot with the two Kaisers and open her territory for the passage of the Turks to the battlelines of western Europe.

In the moment of greatest peril, however, Serbia was saved—partly by her own courage, by her own determination, without which destruction was inescapable; partly by the new advance of the Russians. While the Austrian troops were still before Belgrad, Cossacks once more crossed the Carpathians, swept down into the Hungarian Plain; panic reached the very gates of Budapest, and three army corps were hurriedly recalled from Serbia to defend Hungary. Once more at the critical moment the Austro-German Alliance had to surrender triumph in one field because of deadly peril in another.

No sooner had the three corps been withdrawn than the Serbs again took the offensive. Old King Peter, now stricken in years and infirmities, but retaining something of the fire that earned him his cross of the Legion of Honour as a soldier of France in 1870, rode in front of his troops, mounted on a white charger, and harangued them as their chiefs of remote centuries were accustomed to do. Then followed one of the most complete of Austrian disasters. In a few days the whole force had fled across the frontiers, leaving thousands of prisoners, many cannon, and much material, behind them. Belgrad was retaken; by December 15th Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being; saved until the third—and fatal—attack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN

## NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS

### I

### NEW YEAR, 1915

The New Year—which was to witness the most brilliant military triumphs of Modern Germany, triumphs rivalling the Napoleonic cycle—opened dismally enough for Berlin. Five months of war and a million casualties had sufficed to complete the destruction of all the initial plans and hopes of Germany. The supreme hope, that of a short war, had gone glimmering and Lord Kitchener's forecast of a three-year war had begun to find converts even in Germany. And the prospect of a long war raised new problems, of which the military, if it was not the most pressing, was by no means the least.

In point of fact, new political considerations were now becoming apparent. There was the question of Austria, a question at once political and military; there was the problem of Italy, destined to become more and more grave as the months passed until the spring should see the House of Savoy again in the field against the House of Hapsburg. There was, too, the similar and only less serious problem of Roumania, which was not to find so speedy a solution as that of Italy, but was destined to prove even more dangerous to German safety. There was the additional necessity to care for Turkish defence, a necessity which would grow with the months and become pressing in the spring, when the Allied fleets knocked at the door of the Dardanelles and Allied armies took root on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Finally, the problem of sea power was beginning to become acute. A world which too eagerly and too completely accepted the British view as to the effect of the British blockade was not completely mistaken in recognizing thus early that the British fleet would steadily and increasingly hamper the domestic economy of Germany and compel

her to employ one expedient after another to meet the shortage incident to the blockade. Only in food did the reckoning prove radically mistaken and even in this department there was discomfort, without immediate or intolerable privation.

The sense of this closing net, the anger at the nation which thus struck the whole German people while it remained removed from the weight of German arms, was to drive the German Government, the naval school of Tirpitz, into a submarine campaign that would involve neutrals, and in the case of the greatest of all neutrals, the United States, produce a situation which after many clashes would at last add the United States to the nations at war with Germany.

The paralysis of the German merchant marine; the closing of the seas to the German flag while British, French, and even Belgian ships still sailed the ocean and brought to French and British ports the munitions and supplies essential to preserve them, while their own factories were still unready and their own industrial system not yet readjusted; the resources of ships and sailors, which permitted the transport of armies; the arrival of colonial troops from Australia, Canada, India, which permitted the nations to redress the balance which was with Germany at the outset, thanks to her superior preparation; these were things that exercised an ever-growing influence upon German thought and German action.

Nor could there be any mistaking the resentment in the whole Fatherland, as it was recognized that, so far as the world was concerned, Germany had become a besieged city, and German explanations and German statements, save for the few fugitive messages sent through the air, were condemned to satisfy German readers alone; while the world, the neutral world to which Germany desired to appeal, found its evidence and drew its conclusions from anti-German sources alone.

## II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Looking first at the military problem, it was plain on January 1, 1915, that German prospects, without being desperate, were dark. It was true that men, the world over, too promptly began to compare the

posture of Germany in 1915 with that of Napoleon in 1813. The outside world neither understood the enormous accession of faith and confidence the restricted victories of the opening phase had brought to Germans, and the unparalleled magnitude of German effort which was to come, nor could they realize, as the Germans did, how futile were many of the hopes in Allied quarters of the prompt arrival of Kitchener's millions and the limitless flow of Russian masses.

Yet, despite the exaggerations, the fundamental conception of the non-Teutonic world was correct. Germany had failed at the Marne and in her subsequent efforts to reverse the decision of the Marne. Her armies now stood on the defensive in the west and there was no promise that the initiative could be reclaimed. Two months of terrible slaughter before Warsaw had proven as sterile as the murder done in the battles of Flanders. Warsaw stood as Calais and Boulogne stood.

Looking southward to Austria the picture was dismal in the extreme. The defeat of Lemberg had shaken the whole fabric of Hapsburg military life. After Lemberg the efforts of German commanders to rally and reorganize Austrian armies had saved the armies, but it had failed to make them victorious. Temporary Russian retirements in Galicia had again and again been followed by Russian victories, and in the last days of the year a second Serb triumph had revealed the permanent disorder of Austrian forces. The Russian armies were again pressing up and over the Carpathians, and from Budapest came insistent demands that Germany should guard the Magyar marshes against the Slav danger.

Reckoning on the basis of country occupied, it was true that Germany was now fighting in foreign lands, for the most part. The East Prussian invasions had been repulsed, but not until grave injuries had been done to Junker estates. Not less than 8,000 square miles of industrial France, holding in peace times 2,000,000 people, was occupied, as was the bulk of Belgium and some 15,000 square miles of Russian soil. But, to balance this, France clung to a corner of Alsace, Russia to a paring of East Prussia, and Austria had lost in Galicia and Bukowina nearly 35,000 square miles of territory including the oil-fields of Galicia.

If anything else were needed to incline the balance toward the Allied

side, it could be found in the isolation and inevitable extinction of German colonial power. Togo and the Kamerun were both lost, Kiaou-Chau and the islands of the Pacific were gone. The doom of German Southwest Africa had been sealed by the failure of the Boer rebellion, and a Boer General, Louis Botha, was gathering up the troops which would presently conquer it. German East Africa still endured, but not even a German could believe that it would permanently escape the fate of the other colonies.

On the military side Germany had now once more to bend her energies to restore Austria. She had to reckon on the eventual demand of the Turk for guns, and men to man them. The chance of a resumption of the offensive in the west in the spring was already fading, but the failure meant more time for France and Britain, aided by the workshops of America, to restore the balance in numbers and preparation. The story of how Germany met the military problems is one of the most magnificent in military and industrial history. Unfortunately for her, the political problems were beyond her capacity—beyond all human capacity, probably—and, as it turned out, her military successes could only in part postpone the political perils that were now revealed.

### III. ITALY

Of all the political problems, that of Italy was the most dangerous. Count Nigra had once said that Italy and Austria, in the nature of things, could only be allies or open enemies. The Triple Alliance had been denounced by Italy in the opening days of the war. With the denunciation of the fact of the Treaty, although the letter endured for some months thereafter, Italian hopes turned again to the Irredenta, and the Italian people, far more promptly than the Crown or the politicians, began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest, of the islands of the Adriatic and the lost Venetian province of Dalmatia, still adorned by some of the most splendid monuments of Ancient Rome.

Such an agitation could have but one consequence unless Austria were prepared to resign Triest and the Trentino, and Austria was not prepared for any such sacrifice. Under the influence of Germany she

tardily, very tardily, consented to certain cessions, but they were too slight to satisfy Italian demand. Bismarck, in refusing to allow his ally of 1866 to acquire Trent, had sown the seeds of later disaster, and almost from the morning of the war it was clear that Italy would eventually enter the alliance against Germany.

Turkish participation merely increased Italian agitation for war,




ITALIA IRREDENTA

As soon as the Triple Alliance was denounced, Italian hopes turned to the Irredenta, and the Italian people began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest

because the alliance of the Turk with the Central Powers, besides reopening the Tripolitan question, assured the latter of supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, where Italy had great ambitions, all of which ran counter to those of Berlin and Vienna but found ready hearing and small opposition in Allied capitals. It was a desirable thing for Italy that Germany and Austria should be beaten. It would be a fatal thing for many Italian hopes if they won.

Nor was it less essential that Italy should contribute to the defeat of

the Central Powers, if she was to share in the results. There were in Greece and Serbia eager aspirants for the eastern shores of the Adriatic and the islands and shores of Asia Minor. The noise of Allied fleets before the Dardanelles forts presently awoke echoes in Rome that German diplomacy could not silence. The hereditary antipathy to the Austrian and the longing for Triest mounted with the weeks until they reached a point in popular emotion where Prince Bülow grimly conceded that "the street" had won; and Italy, despite the fears of her Sovereign and the opposition of Giolitti, her most influential politician, was plunged into the world strife.

We shall see that the decision came too late to prevent the German victory of the Dunajec, which transformed the whole face of the eastern war for a year. We shall see that Italian hesitations, taken with Allied blunders in the Balkans, combined to clear the way for the great drive through Serbia to Constantinople. But also, at a still more distant time, we shall see Italy sending her troops to Saloniki, as she had sent them to Valona, before she entered the war. We shall see her, at a critical moment, extending her declaration of war to include Germany.

But in January, 1915, the Italian danger was only apparent, it was not yet imminent, and Berlin could believe for many months that Italy would remain neutral. To this end she exerted all her efforts, and it was with an eye to the moral effect in Rome that she prepared the greatest of her victories, the Dunajec, which, unhappily for her, came just too late to check Italy's course, although it did avail to restrict the influence of Italy in the war for nearly a year. Fatally, however, the prospect of a long war was beginning to weigh upon Berlin, for if a swift victory such as those of 1866 and 1870 might have left the neutrals still reconciled to their rôles, a long war held out attractions to their racial and national hopes which could not be mistaken.

### IV. ROUMANIA

Not less real than the Italian was the Roumanian danger. Within Austrian and Hungarian frontiers there lived more than 3,250,000 people of Roumanian tongue and race. They were a majority in the great

Hungarian province of Transylvania; the largest group amongst the many races in numbers in Temesvar; a considerable element in Bukowina. All these provinces touched the Roumanian frontier. In every Roumanian heart there had been for many years a desire to achieve the re-union of Roumania, as that of Italy had been achieved in the previous century. Could the Austrian provinces be won, Roumania would become a compact state of nearly 100,000 square miles, as large as the mainland of Italy; if not a Great Power, second only to Spain among the lesser nations of Europe.

Such hopes had seemed impossible of realization until the Second Balkan War first revealed the weakness of Austrian policy and the crumbling of the Hapsburg edifice. Until that time Roumania had, perforce, consented to remain a minor member of the firm of the Triple Alliance, and, as Italy had been drawn to Berlin by the quarrel with France over Tunis, Roumania had been influenced in the same sense by the gross injustice and ingratitude of Russia after the Turkish War. In that conflict Roumanian troops had saved the Russian army at Plevna, but Russia had robbed Roumania of her portion of Bessarabia and flung her a morsel of the Bulgarian Dobrudja as an insufficient recompense.

Ruled by a Hohenzollern, who in the opening days of the World War sought to cast the lot of his country with the head of his House, Roumania had marched with Berlin, Vienna, and Rome—held not a little by the presence of Italy in the partnership, which enlisted the Roumanian tradition of Latin origin—from the era of the Congress of Berlin to the outbreak of the Balkan wars. But when Austria, eager to crush Serbia, had given her support to the creation of a Bulgaria even greater than that which had been erected by the Treaty of San Stefano and abolished by the Congress of Berlin, Roumanian allegiance faltered.

Bulgaria was the rival of Roumania in the Balkans and had openly declared her purpose to reclaim the Dobrudja. Bulgarian plans looked forward to achieving a hegemony in the Balkans comparable to that which Prussia had achieved in Modern Germany. To all such plans Roumania was necessarily hostile, because they both threatened her integrity and menaced her influence. When Austria sacrificed Bukhar-

est for Sofia, Bukharest openly altered her policy; accepted Russian warrant for attacking Bulgaria; and, by her attack in 1913, completely demolished the whole structure of Austrian statecraft. Moreover, the Roumanian soldiers who invaded Bulgaria openly announced that they were taking this route to Transylvania and Bukowina.

Once the breach had been made, the consequences were inevitable. Roumania followed Italy in declaring her neutrality when the war came, despite the desire of the King, whose subsequent death soon removed a Teutonic ally not less potent than Constantine of Greece. When Italian policy began to drift toward the Allies, Roumania tacitly followed. More and more Roumanians looked over the Hungarian boundaries to where, beyond the Transylvanian Alps, millions of their race brothers suffered something approaching intellectual and moral slavery under the Magyar yoke.

When the first Russian victories brought the Slav to the Roumanian boundaries of Bukowina and even across the Carpathians into the Hungarian Plain, Roumanian patriots and politicians listened eagerly to Russian promises, based upon Roumanian participation. Only Russian disaster could abolish or postpone such participation. Had Russian diplomacy been a little less stiff or Roumanian demands a little less grandiose, Roumania might have followed Italy at once. As it was, the Dunajec postponed what it could not prevent. At Bukharest, as at Rome, German diplomacy was to perform miracles, but the ultimate failure was already assured, short of German victory in the war, when 1915 began.

### V. AUSTRIA

The military side of the Austrian problem was plain. But the political aspects were not less patent to Berlin. Half of the Austrian population was Slav. In the opening battles Czech, Croat, Serb, and even Polish regiments fought with something less than half-hearted zeal. The Italians from Triest and the Trentino, the Roumanians from Transylvania and Temesvar, easily succumbed to the assault of enemies a degree less hateful to them than the races whose yoke they bore. The vast Russian captures after Lemberg, the Serbian disasters, the later

# PICTURES OF TRENCH WARFARE

GERMAN SHELTERS OF SANDBAGS, IN THE DUNES ALONG THE BELGIAN COAST




THE ELABORATION OF TRENCH WARFARE

A typical trench on the western front, braced to prevent caving in, with the usual boardwalk and the numerous telephone and telegraph lines needed in a modern communication system. The shell case, hanging from the cross beam, is struck when a gas attack is discovered, as a warning to all within hearing to put on masks. The inset shows an underground telephone exchange which is part of the system of communication between the front lines and headquarters in the rear.

AN OBSERVATION STATION

These are placed in buildings, trees, shell craters, etc.—wherever the observer can see the effect of his batteries' fire. Telephone communication back to the gun is arranged and the observer then reports as to the range, the movements of his own and the enemy's infantry, etc.



AN UNDERGROUND PASSAGE DUG BY THE AUSTRIANS AT DUBUS, RUSSIA, WITH AN OUTLET IN A CHURCH

*Copyright by Brown & Dawson*

WINTER QUARTERS

These German soldiers have made themselves very snug just behind the front in the Argonne region. The hut in the foreground is a field post office. The "corduroy" paths are reminiscent of pioneer days in America.

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

ANOTHER ASPECT OF LIFE IN THE TRENCHES

These Frenchmen are in the front line of trenches during a brisk bombardment. The shell-hole shows the Germans have got the range. The less venturesome of the pair finds his pipe useful in helping to preserve his sang-froid.

A LIGHT GUN ELABORATELY ENTRENCHED

Note the curtains which are closely drawn when there is danger of aërial observation. These guns are used to cut wire entanglements, destroy parapets, silence enemy artillery, and for barrage fire either with or without gas shells.

BELGIANS ENTRENCHED OUTSIDE ANTWERP

In this final stand of Belgian patriotism against the German invaders there is a strong appeal to American admiration. For a nation whose own history begins at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defense of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of all that men hold dear, is a moving spectacle.

UNDERGROUND WITH THE BRITISH

(*Above*) King George inspects a trench won from the Germans.
(*Below*) These British Red Cross Officers have "dug themselves in" very comfortably and are just sitting down to dinner. Cave life is not always incompatible with good cheer.

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SHELTERS IN THE ALPS

Galician defeats, were all due in some part to the failure of the subject races of Austria and Hungary.

Yet it was of prime importance to prevent this disintegration from spreading, because every evidence of crumbling was but a new incentive to Roumanian and Italian appetite, and every Austrian disaster had an echo in Bukharest and in Rome which no one could mistake. It was not alone that the crumbling of Austria weakened the Central Alliance directly, but it was also that each new crack, each fissure, in the Austrian unity was a new invitation to other nations to enlist and add their numbers and resources to the enemies of Germany.

Napoleon faced the same problem in 1813, when he lingered in eastern Germany, because he realized that a retreat behind the Rhine would mean that his German allies would, either from desire or necessity, enter the ranks of his foes; as they did, when, at last, after the disaster at Leipzig, he was compelled to retire behind the old frontiers. More than all else this political situation forced itself to German attention in the shaping of the campaigns of 1915. It compelled the abandonment of the west, quite as much as any military consideration. It compelled Germany to allow to Britain the time to begin to get her masses in the field, and it held Germany in the east until February, 1916.

More and more it became clear that, while Germany continued to win victories, she could count on the neutrality of Roumania and the annoying rather than dangerous hostilities of Italy. But only in victory was there safety. On the military side, the Austrian armies would take on new efficiency when a German general and German artillery had won the Dunajec, and the great Russian retreat from the Carpathians to the Beresina began. But once the Russian counter-offensive came, Austrian armies would crumble in a new disaster comparable to that of Lemberg and having more immediately unfavourable consequences.

More and more Austria became a burden, a deadweight upon German military and civil policy. Less and less useful became Austrian military assistance, and greater and greater became the share of Germany in the work of the Alliance. But in addition to this was the posi-

tive peril that grew out of the long-standing enmities Austrian policy had engendered or out of the weaknesses inherent in the heterogeneous nature of Hapsburg populations, weaknesses that at one time contributed to the breakdown of the Austrian army and to the growth of the number of nations at war with Germany.

All this is clearer now than at the moment—yet little was hidden from German eyes—when the Kaiser's Ministers, with the opening of the new year, took up the problems of a long war and were compelled to estimate the assets and liabilities of their new undertaking. These influenced the military situation; they compelled strategy to bow before considerations of state; they forced the Germans to make their main effort in the east; and, even at this early date, they made clear the consequences of immediate or eventual failure either in the east or the west. From the task of destroying France, Germany was now definitely recalled to devote her best skill to the salvage of Austria.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

## ON THE EAST FRONT TO THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

### I

### IN THE CAUCASUS

The first days of January saw a considerable Turkish disaster on the Russian frontier in the Caucasus. Into this difficult region, where campaigning was made the more difficult by the severity of the winter, the Turks had, in obedience to German dictation, sent several of their best corps. The ostensible purpose was to recover the famous fortress of Kars, lost after a gallant defence in the last Russian war. But, in fact, Kars had small value for the Turks. The real purpose of their effort was to compel the Russians to divert troops to this front from the Austrian frontier and thus take off some of the pressure upon their hard-pressed German ally.

For the Turk there were much more pressing services to be performed near at hand. His entrance into the war had cost him the last, shadowy title to his ancient Egyptian estate, and the friendly Khedive had lost his throne. Britain had proclaimed a protectorate and placed an Anglophile ruler on the Khedivial throne, thus completing the work of making good her position in Egypt, recognized by France in the famous and fatal agreement of 1904. To Suez and to Cairo and to the lost African provinces, Tunis and Tripoli, opportunity seemed to beckon the Osmanli along the road that his Arab predecessors of the Caliphate had marched.

That such a venture might have succeeded seemed and seems possible. Britain still lacked the men to defend Egypt; the native troops were at least cold to their Christian masters, if they were not disloyal. Time had not been allowed for the fortification of the shores of the Suez Canal, which, less than a year after, were to face and master a Turkish attack. Could Suez have been reached, and the canal blocked,

the injury to Britain would have been great, although by no means as considerable as German military writers announced a year later, when the road from Berlin to Byzantium had been opened and Germany found a Teutonic purpose to be served by Osmanli effort at Suez.

German control of Turkish military policy was, however, complete, and while the proclamation of the Holy War was still stirring the imagination of the world, even if it fell flat in Islam, beyond the immediate territories of the Turk; while the world was looking for revolts in India and Egypt, in Tripoli and Tunis; while it was expecting Turkish attack at Suez, several Turkish corps were making the difficult advance from Erzerum toward Kars, and the Russian troops, heavily outnumbered, were falling back into the Caucasian marshes, south and east of Batum and Trebizond.

In this difficult country, suffering from insufficient equipment and from the rigours of a terrible winter, the Turks, after brief preliminary successes, met complete disaster. Of three corps, one, with its Turkish and German officers, was captured. Two more, striving to cover the retreat, were heavily beaten, losing flags, guns, and prisoners. Not less than 100,000 Turkish troops were thus eliminated from the battleline, and German prestige suffered its first heavy blow in Constantinople, a blow from which it did not recover until the successful defence of the city a few months later.

From this moment and for more than a year the Caucasus front loses its importance. The subsequent changes in position were not considerable. The Russians did not bring many troops east from the Galician front; the German purpose was not served by the Turkish effort. But when, in the next winter, the Russians were ready to move in this Armenian district, the fall, first of Erzerum and then of Trebizond, to the sword of the Grand Duke Nicholas, gave the world the first hint of the renaissance of Russian military strength, so shaken at the Dunajec and after.

### II. LAYING THE ROUMANIAN PERIL

In December and early January Austrian disaster had for the second time led the world to believe that a collapse of the Dual Empire might

presently change the whole face of the conflict. While Russian armies again passed the central and eastern Carpathian passes, other forces swept Bukowina and approached Transylvania. The occupation of the Crownland was a fair invitation to Roumania to join the conflict on the Russian side and receive Bukowina as a bribe and Transylvania as a reward for participation.

For Germany the problem was promptly set to protect Hungary, grown impatient through disaster and anxious because of impending attack from Serbia, from Galicia and Bukowina, and because of the possibility of Roumanian hostility. The resignation of Count Berchtold and the selection of Baron Burian were evidences that, within the empire, Hungarian apprehensions were recognized. The visit of Count Tisza to the Kaiser was a sign that Germany had been warned.

This warning Germany received with all possible attention and acted upon with amazing promptness. Thus in January, while the Russian occupation of Transylvania was being discussed, German troops were brought south and concentrated in lower Hungary. Their purpose, it was duly announced from Vienna and Berlin, was a new invasion of victorious but stricken Serbia. Yet a few weeks later these troops appeared in Transylvania, and moved east, parallel to the Roumanian frontier, as a warning to the Hohenzollern king of this state that, to take Transylvania, he must fight the head of the House of Hohenzollern.

Under the pressure of these troops, Russian armies in Bukowina speedily began to give ground. Like the Shenandoah Valley in our Civil War, Bukowina was becoming a thoroughfare of invasion and a pathway of destruction. Step by step they were driven from before the Borgo and Kirilibaba passes; they were cleared out of the foothills of the Carpathians, and by the middle of February their retreat had halted at the Sereth River, a few miles south and west of Czernowitz and the Russian frontier; more than two thirds of Bukowina had been reconquered, and the Germans had interposed a wall of troops between the Czar and his prospective Roumanian ally.

At the same time there came from Budapest new rumours of Russian disaster, of the suicide of a Russian commander, and the capture of the

General Staff of the defeated army. These rumours were duly denied, but there remained the solid fact that Bukowina had been reconquered; the invitation to Roumania to participate in the war had been abruptly cancelled by German arms, and from Bukharest there came no more reports of the intervention of the Latin state without delay. On the contrary, there were credible reports of the release of vast stores of grain previously purchased by Germany and Austria, temporarily held up by the Roumanian Government, but now permitted to go north. A military campaign waged for obvious political ends had succeeded.

Nor did the quieting of Roumania end the success of German policy. A German loan to Bulgaria again stimulated rumour that Ferdinand and his Bulgarian subjects were contemplating an entrance into the war on the German side, were planning to retake Macedonia, to strike at Serbia and Greece, and, by cutting the Orient Railway, shut off the Slav state from Saloniki and foreign supplies, and, by invading the Valley of the Morava, open a road between Berlin and Constantinople and thus unite the Central European nations. This rumour, however idle at the moment, supplied an interesting forecast of what was to come, and gave Allied diplomacy a warning which it stupidly failed to take.

Finally, from Albania came a fresh incursion into Serbia along the marches of the Drina, directed at Prisrend and the territory still populated by Albanians but ceded to Servia and Montenegro by the Treaty of London. Here was new work for the Serbian army, calculated to keep it occupied, south of the Danube and away from Bosnia, until Germany had dealt with Russian activity in the southeast.

Such, briefly summarized, were the purpose and achievement of German arms in Bukowina. Thus promptly and completely had the Kaiser answered the appeal for help made a few weeks before; thus had he justified the affection and esteem in which he had long been held by the Hungarians, and temporarily silenced the whispers of discontent in Budapest.

### III. THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

To answer the Austro-German thrust through Bukowina and over the Carpathians, the Russians chose to strike at East Prussia. Strateg-

ically such a move was advantageous because it meant moving troops a far shorter distance away from Warsaw, which remained the centre of military operations in the whole eastern front. Practically, could East Prussia be overrun, the whole Russian front would be straightened; a great province, a source of food supply to Germany, would be conquered; and, ultimately, the German position between the Bzura and the Nida in Russian Poland would be exposed to attack in the flank and rear.

Thus, while the main Russian and German armies faced each other west of Warsaw on the lines they had taken when Hindenburg's great offensive against the Polish capital had been halted in December, new armies were directed against the German positions north of the Vistula and south of the Niemen, on a front from Tilsit to Johannisberg, while another force moved down the north bank of the Vistula toward Thorn.

Again, as in the case of Tannenberg, the geographical circumstances explain the military operations. Inside the eastern frontier of East Prussia some fifty miles there extends from north to south, between Insterburg and Johannisberg, that intricate tangle of water known as the Masurian Lakes, out of which flows the Angerapp River, which joins the Inster at Insterburg to make the Pregel, a stream that enters the sea at Königsberg. West of this region Samsonoff had suffered his great disaster in September at Tannenberg. To this obstacle the Russians had returned in October after defeating a German invasion of Suwalki Province at the Battle of Augustovo.

For three months Russian and German forces had faced each other in this region with little or no change of position. Now the Russians undertook to turn the Germans out of their strong position behind the Masurian Lakes by attacking from the north and south; that is, by coming in on the flanks. At the outset this move met with apparent success. Coming west on the solid ground between the Niemen and the Angerapp rivers, the Russians approached Tilsit, took Pilkallen, began to talk again of a siege of Königsberg. At the same time, to the south of the Masurian region, between the East Prussian frontier and the Vistula, they made headway toward Thorn.

In the first week in February, however, Hindenburg countered with terrific force. The first sign was a renewal of the German offensive south of the Vistula and along the Bzura-Rawka front. On this line the Germans began a series of desperate assaults, which were announced as a new drive at Warsaw. Petrograd proclaimed the slaughter in these




THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians. Line *A-B* shows the Russian front before the battle. The *arrows* show the lines of the Russian retreat

fights the greatest in the whole war, and there were circumstantial reports that the Kaiser himself had been shocked by the sacrifice of life in a forlorn undertaking.

By the second week in this month, however, the truth became apparent. The German attacks had been mere screening movements to cover the withdrawal of troops from this front to East Prussia, and

very soon Petrograd began to concede defeat and retreat in East Prussia, while Berlin announced a second Tannenberg and the capture of 40,000 Russians. In any event, it was clear that by the use of automobiles, by again employing the strategic railways along the East Prussian frontier, the Germans had rushed overwhelming forces into East Prussia, beaten the Russian flanking force between the Niemen and the Angerapp and completely redeemed East Prussia, save for a little corner about Lyck.

By February 15th German troops were advancing eastward all along the front from the Vistula to the Niemen, were across the Russian frontier in many places, and were still driving the Russians back toward their fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Bielostok, and Ostrolenka; that is, behind the Niemen and the Narew. Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians, and from the Roumanian frontier to the Baltic German troops, with the support of their Austro-Hungarian allies, were advancing. Their success in East Prussia was to tempt them to one more bid for Warsaw, from the north, but this failed, like the others. The road to Warsaw ran neither through East Prussia nor northern Poland.

### IV. PRZEMYSL

The disaster of the Masurian Lakes, which divided the attention of the world with the Allied naval operations just beginning before the Dardanelles, was counterbalanced in the following month by the Russian capture of Przemysl on March 22d. Invested for a moment in September, relieved when Hindenburg made his first drive for Warsaw, and promptly surrounded again when the Russians resumed the road to Cracow before the Battle of Lodz, Przemysl had been shut in ever since. Its surrender was one of the most spectacular incidents in the war and it did much, temporarily, to destroy the effect of recent Russian reverses and checks. Since Bazaine had laid down his arms in Metz four decades before, Europe had seen no such capitulation, and Russian estimates placed the number of captives at 130,000.

Before his surrender, the Austrian commander, General Kusmanek,

had destroyed all the forts, blown up the bridges, turned the rifles and cannon into useless junk. But this diminished the material rather than the moral effect of the victory. Actually the last considerable fortress of Galicia, east of the Dunajec and north of the Carpathians, had now fallen. As for the numbers of prisoners, they astonished the whole world and explained a surrender which took the Russians by surprise. Like Metz, Przemysl had fallen to hunger, and, like the Lorraine fortress, it had fallen because it was provisioned to hold a garrison, not a host.

The siege itself had been marked by no considerable military effort. The Russians had merely invested the place and sat down before it. A few brief attacks had demonstrated that it was beyond the resources of their artillery train. Now and again there had been sorties; a desperate effort by Hungarian troops just preceded the surrender. Several attempts on the part of the Germans and Austrians to relieve it had come close to success, but ultimately failed. Time and hunger did the rest.

In the closing days of the siege, cats and dogs had sold for prices recalling the Paris market in 1871. There seems to have been much mismanagement of resources, and the defence shed little lustre on Austrian arms. The last sortie of the Hungarians seemed to the Russians useless sacrifice, for it was promptly and completely checked.

With the fall of Przemysl the Galician campaign entered its final stage. The troops released by the surrender joined the armies that had long been battling in the Carpathians, advancing when opposed only by Austrians, retreating when German reinforcements came up. Each attack after retreat found the passes more strongly fortified, found the task more terrible. Still Russia stuck to it, and with the fall of Przemysl the world looked for the arrival of spring and the Russians together in the Hungarian Plain.

In this it was mistaken. Carpathian hopes, like the expectations aroused by the Allied fleet before the Dardanelles, were soon to be destroyed, and one failure after another was to meet Allied armies and fleets in the whole eastern field. Yet it is worth recalling that the moment when Przemysl fell was the most fortunate moment, from the Allied point of view, since the struggle had opened. Austrian collapse, German

surrender, these were the things that the press of the world outside German and Austrian territories talked of at the very moment when Germany had gotten well forward in the preparation of that tremendous thrust at the Dunajec, which was to usher in a full year of Teutonic victories.

Przemysl is a high-water mark; dead low water in Allied prospects comes something more than a year later, with the disaster and surrender of the British at Kut-el-Amara. It remains, now, briefly to examine the final phases of the great Carpathian battle in which the Russian flood was finally checked, the Russian armies were exhausted and shaken by their terrible efforts and losses, and the failure of Russian munitions brought disaster comparable in modern military history only with that of Napoleon in the Moscow campaign.

### V. THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS

There had been fighting in the Carpathians as early as September, after Lemberg, when the Cossacks crossed the range. There had been new and more serious fighting in October and November, when the Russians came west again and approached Cracow. But it was not until the new year that the Russians definitely abandoned the attack to the west and set their faces toward the south and strove to cross the Carpathians into Hungary. Their attempts to the south on the edge of Roumania, designed to influence Roumanian policy, had met a swift check at German hands, and Bukowina had been cleared of Slavs in January and February. Similar German operations, made in response to Hungarian appeals, had closed the passes immediately to the north of Bukowina, through which the shortest rail line to Lemberg goes.

By March, when the Battle of the Carpathians takes its final form, the Russian effort is concentrated upon the Dukla and Lupkow passes while the Austrians and Germans are now on the north side of the Carpathians from this point south to the frontiers of Roumania.

The passes by which the Russians were now seeking to reach Hungary are the lowest in the range. The Dukla is but 1,500 feet at the crest and opens easily into the headwaters of the affluents of the Hun-

garian Theiss. In this pass, as in several of the others, there had been terrific fighting all through the winter and the casualties had been exceedingly heavy. White uniforms had been adopted to deceive the outposts, every device had been employed to aid the assailant and the defender, alike. And slowly but steadily the Russians had progressed in the Dukla until they were actually at the edge of the Hungarian Plain. But in the other passes the stiffening of German reinforcements had permanently checked the Slav.




THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN, SEPT, 1914–MAY, 1915
Russia's Carpathian Army literally beat itself to pieces against the barrier that faced it

The opening weeks of April saw the crisis. A stupendous Russian effort gained still more ground at a frightful cost. The world believed that Russia was forcing her way through the passes, when, by the third week in April, Ivanoff's army came to a practical but not an absolute standstill. The cost had been beyond the resources of Russia in men, in guns, above all in ammunition. To the south, Austrian troops, with

German contingents, were actually breaking out in the foothills of the Carpathians on the Galician side, threatening the flank of the Russians in the Dukla and the Lupkow.

Actually the Battle of the Carpathians was over, although it had two more weeks to run. Germany had succeeded at last in erecting a bulwark against Russian floods in Galicia, as she had promptly broken the force of Russian invasion twice in East Prussia. By the third week in April there is something approaching a deadlock along the whole eastern front from the Baltic to the Roumanian frontier. There is, as yet, no sure sign of the Russian halt, but it had come.

Looking backward we may now perceive that Russia had for all the months since November, since the opening of the Battle of Lodz, been bearing an ever-increasing burden of German effort. Her mission to deal with the Austrians had been triumphantly discharged by the victory of Lemberg and its immediate consequences. All German efforts to abolish this Lemberg decision by Polish and East Prussian drives upon Warsaw had failed. Only when Germany had sent her troops into Galicia and Bukowina had Russian advance slowed down. Przemysl, in late March, had been an authentic sign of Russian strength; the attack upon the Carpathian passes had been a final proof of Russian devotion and determination. But Russia had now reached the point where she must have aid, and effective aid, from her western allies. If they were ready to begin, if Anglo-French efforts in Flanders and France recalled German troops from Galicia and Poland, Russia was still capable of useful service.

But if this help did not come, Russia could no longer bear the burden she had been bearing through the months of furious fighting that separated Lemberg and Tannenberg from Przemysl and the Carpathians.

The best of Russia's officers and of her first-line soldiers had found their graves on the fields of victory and defeat in East Prussia, Poland, and Galicia. The Carpathian Army had literally beaten itself to pieces against the barriers that faced it. Russian military achievement had surpassed her own and her enemies' expectation, but no Russian warning, although there had been many, had sufficed to moderate the hopes

and expectations of the western allies of the Slav. They were soon to be undeceived.

It remains, now, to look westward and examine rapidly the progress of events from the German defeat at Ypres to the moment when Russian effort was checked at the summit of the Carpathians and Russia began to lack the strength to continue the work begun at Lemberg and carried forward, to the very great advantage of her western allies, up to the arrival of spring. It is well to remember, too, that at this moment Russia had at last realized, through the failure of the Allied fleets in the Dardanelles, that she was to receive no immediate aid in munitionment or supplies, of which she stood in desperate need, from her western allies.

# CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915

## I

## THE PROBLEM

When the German attack in Flanders ceased and the Germans began to transport some fraction of their main force eastward to relieve Hindenburg in his Lodz venture, to aid him in his later attacks upon Warsaw and finally to prop up the crumbling Austrian armies, they left a field upon which they had missed victory by the narrowest margin. Napoleon was never nearer to winning Waterloo than were the Germans to achieving a complete success about Ypres. Had Russian pressure been one whit less severe, had Austrian collapse been one degree less imminent, it is difficult to believe that the Germans would have missed arriving at Calais and crushing in the whole western flanks of the Allies.

When the German flood at last subsided it left behind it a victorious but well-nigh-annihilated foe in Flanders. To meet the storm the Allies had flung into the gap the most heterogeneous mass of men that Europe had known since the Mohammedan invasion. Asia and Africa, Australia and Canada, were represented by white, by black, and by yellow troops who fought beside the French, the Belgians, and the British. Sailor lads from Brittany marched shoulder to shoulder with the Senegalese; troops from British India held ground within sight of Arabs and Berbers from Algeria and Morocco. Languages, customs, religions of four continents and a score of races were represented in this strange horde.

Actually the Allies had striven, as men strive when there is a break in the dyke, to stop the rapidly growing gap by every conceivable and available resource. Never in military history was there such a jerry-built wall as stretched across the pathway of German floods, wavered and faltered under German attack, and just held at the final moment, when, with the eastern crisis becoming ever more insistent, the

Germans, under the eyes of their emperor, called upon the famous Prussian Guard to deliver the final blow.

And when the wave at last was spent, there stretched from Switzerland to the sea that long line of trenches which henceforth for more than two years was to be the western front. Such an ending to a Franco-German campaign had been foreseen neither in Berlin nor in Paris. That such a condition would endure, not for months but for years, was a thing wholly hidden from German and French High Command in November, 1914.

For the Germans there was the firm belief that a few months of winter campaigning would dispose of the Russians, permit the capture of Warsaw, and that spring would see the return to the west of the troops borrowed from the west for the winter months.

As for the Allies, their forces already began to talk of that happy hour when Kitchener's "Million" would arrive, by Easter at the latest, and the long German lines would be broken, the whole of France delivered, and the decision of the Marne enforced along the Rhine. No one yet foresaw the magnitude of German resources or effort; no one yet foresaw that the heavy artillery, prepared to win field battles and reduce fortresses; the machine guns, which only in the German army had been provided by thousands to obtain victory in the decisive battle in the open field, would give Germany an advantage in trench warfare enabling her to hold her lines, not for weeks or months, but beyond the date of the second anniversary of the war, with wholly insignificant changes.

Actually, the German problem had been posed in the east; it was the problem of disposing of Russia by spring and returning to the west to reopen the Marne verdict in the summer and win the war in the first year. The problem of the Allies was to reorganize their shaken armies, to raise the British forces that could supply the necessary superiority of numbers in the west, and to provide that heavy artillery and ammunition which were utterly lacking and without which the attack, in the new conditions of war, was a mere murder. All this it was imperatively necessary that the Allies should accomplish before Russia was beaten down by the whole weight of German attack—before the victory

# THE SLAVS IN THE WORLD WAR

PART OF THE CRACK CAVALRY CORPS FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE CZAR'S OWN HUSSARS

## PICTURES OF RUSSIAN AND SERBIAN SOLDIERS

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GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

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GENERAL RENNENKAMPF

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GENERAL RUSSKY

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GENERAL BRUSILOFF

## FOUR RUSSIAN GENERALS

The Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Czar, is a real soldier and an able soldier. Though a Romanoff his political tendency is toward liberalism. The Czar was probably jealous of him, and after his abdication a plot was launched to offer Grand Duke Nicholas the crown.

General Rennenkampf. After winning Tannenberg from one Russian army under Samsonoff, Hindenburg pursued a second, that of Rennenkampf, from the very gates of Königsberg across his frontier. Later, two German corps under Von Francois were surrounded and Petrograd claimed a victory. But it failed to materialize. The trapped Germans by exertions which the Russians frankly conceded to have been "incredible" found their way out, thanks to the tardiness of Rennenkampf, who went at once into retirement after this fiasco.

Russky and Brusiloff commanded two of the five armies which took part in the great Russian offensive in August and September, 1914. They operated in Galicia, while Rennenkampf and Samsonoff invaded East Prussia.

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BATTERY OF RUSSIAN HOWITZERS ON THE POLISH FRONT

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RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

The Russian muzhik makes a good soldier. To begin with there is an inexhaustible supply of him. He has great endurance, is patient, good-natured, and obedient, but lacks initiative. On the whole he has given a good account of himself in the war. He would have done better had he been equipped and supplied as efficiently as the soldiers of the other races. Moreover, there is good reason for the suspicion that he has sometimes been led to his undoing by traitorous pro-German generals.

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

THE FORMER CZAR'S BODYGUARD OF PICKED COSSACKS RIDING TO THE DEFENCE OF WARSAW

RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS

When Russians and Austrians are pitted against each other as man to man in a fair encounter, this is apt to be the result. The Austrians march to the rear as prisoners. The Austrians have more spirit and dash, but they lack the stolid strength and steadfastness of the Russian peasants. Moreover, the Russians are racially a unit; while the Austro-Hungarians are of many races, and the Slavic blood in many makes them laggards in war against their kinsmen of the steppes.

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SERBIA IN THE WAR

The raw material of which Serbian soldiers are made.

The finished product.

Gallant little Serbia was finally overcome by the overwhelming strength of her adversaries. But the world will not soon forget the splendid succession of victories which preceded her days of disaster. In the First Balkan War she defeated the Turks at Kumanovo, at Monastir, and at Adrianople; in the Second Balkan War she shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility at Bregalnitza; in the opening month of the World War when the fortune of the Allies was most desperate it was the victory of the Serb at Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne. In the early days of December Belgrad fell, but once again the Serbians rallied. Belgrad was retaken; by December 15, 1914, Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being, saved until the third—and fatal—attack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later. In October, 1918, the Serbian army again showed its mettle in its marvellous dash to final victory.

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

SERBIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH NEAR THE AUSTRIAN BORDER

of Lemberg, which had given the Russians the initiative and the advantage in the east, should have lost its influence.

We have seen that the Germans failed in the east. All their mighty efforts were insufficient to abolish the consequences of the initial Austrian collapse and the early Russian triumphs in time to resume the western campaign in the spring. Not less absolute was the Allied failure in the west. For another year, after the critical spring, Kitchener's million, as an offensive force, was to be a myth. The task set for Britain was beyond the capacity of any nation, untrained to wars of the national sort and lacking the resources in trained men which conscription alone supplies.

Without Britain, France could not free her soil. Almost a million French had been killed, wounded, or captured in the first four months of the war. The industrial districts of France had been seized and were held. France could and did address herself to the task of organizing her national life within a brief time. But such organization was for long beyond the capacity of British Government or people. Months after the need for heavy explosives had been disclosed, the faults of the British military system—its inability to learn—combined to keep the munition works at the task of turning out useless shrapnel.

From political, military, and industrial aspects, the story of the British department of Allied effort, deduction of course being made for the Navy, remains the story of failure, of inability to perceive the character and magnitude of the war, of failure to understand the new horizons, the new conditions, to grasp the fundamental fact that the war could only be won when Britain conscripted her youth and set her maturity to the organized task of munitionment. Under the strain of the first really considerable war in British history, the whole fabric of British Imperial life broke down.

On the military side the British failure was complete in all but defensive operations. The world knew little of the original campaign of Field-Marshal Sir John French. The legend that he had saved the French before the Battle of the Marne and contributed the decisive thrust in this engagement served to deceive and delude the British

themselves. Not even Neuve Chapelle opened their eyes and it required the dismal slaughter at Loos in September, 1915, to demonstrate the need of a new commander-in-chief and of a new system.

Field-Marshal Sir John French's services to his country and to the Allied cause at the Aisne and at Ypres were incontestably great. On the latter field the British army—the old army—died, holding a line whose collapse would have brought ruin to the Allied defence in the west. Not a little of the failure of the British commander must, in fact, be charged to Lord Kitchener. We shall not know until history has cleared the ground how far the commander in the field was blocked, handicapped, finally exhausted by an administration of the War Department, which in such instances as that of heavy explosives starved the army in France because it misunderstood the conditions of the new warfare. Yet in the light of such evidence as exists, the recall of the Field-Marshal seems to have been inevitable and the responsibility for failure in the field in some part his own.

As for the British army, more was asked it than could fairly be asked of any army in the first year of the war. And what it did was a larger portion of the impossible than was then conceivable. It fought with rifles against machine guns—with shrapnel against high explosives; it manufactured its bombs out of jam tins and matched them against the products of prepared machinery. It was often defeated but never conquered; and never—save between Mons and the Marne—greatly disorganized.

In the nature of things this British army was for nearly two years a "forlorn hope"; it could not be compared on the military side with the highly organized German armies or with the French conscript armies; yet, without its contribution, the war would have been irrevocably lost in the first year; and after the first year, its mounting strength and growing efficiency were recognized even by the foe.

During the first two years of the war, this British army never had an equal chance, most of its offensives were sheer sacrifices, made gallantly and willingly, but foredoomed to defeat because equipment was lacking and training was still to be acquired. Political blunders, such

as Antwerp and Gallipoli, added further burdens and led to further disastrous consequences. Many of the blunders were censurable and indefensible; many were the inevitable concomitants of national unpreparedness. Yet the critic who recognizes necessarily the failure, from the military point of view, feels his words unfair, in the presence of the spirit and the devotion of the men who held the line from the first Ypres battle to the coming of the new armies or died unhesitatingly in the opening days of the Somme, a sacrifice to the tuition of a nation which had to learn modern warfare in the most expensive of all schools.

With the weapons they had; with the officers that were available—officers as destitute of training as their men; under the burden of the most powerful attack military history records, both in numbers and in mechanical appliances, the British army hung on; and if the original "contemptible little army" died on the line, its presence there prevented an immediate disaster to the Allied cause and its tenacity insured the coming of the other British armies which were to know victory and regain the offensive.

The close of the period we are now to review was to reveal the fact that the Allies in the west were still unready. A moment was to come when, coincident with the fatal thrust that Mackensen was to deliver against Radko Dimitrieff at the Dunajec, German attacks in Flanders were to disclose the fact that Russia could not be relieved by pressure exerted on Germany's western front and must go from retreat to retreat until the coming of winter found her terribly beaten armies at the Beresina and Dwina.

The military operations in this period are of practically no value, compared to that attaching to the struggles in the east, because they resulted in no tactical or strategic advantage to either side—did, in fact, no more than contribute to revealing the fact that Russia could expect no help in the west, at the precise moment when the temporary success of Russia had compelled Germany to turn all her attention for the summer campaign toward Warsaw and not toward Calais.

## II. JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING"

To the operations in the west in the period we are now to examine, and, indeed, for many months thereafter, there was applied the picturesque term of "nibbling." Actually, these operations were local offensives, undertaken in all but one of the more considerable instances by the French, and they were designed to keep as many German troops as possible occupied, to prevent the transfer to the east of any large number of army corps, to strain German resources in men and munition by a double pressure on the eastern and western fronts. Beside these purposes local objectives were insignificant.

The world misunderstood these operations completely. It saw in each activity from Switzerland to the North Sea the evidences of a grandiose attempt to reach the Rhine or the lower Meuse. It did not understand the weakness of the Allies, the difficulties of the British, the inadequate resources of the French—in men as a result of their terrible losses, and in munitions because of German occupation of so much of the industrial portion of France. From November to May the whole outside world waited for the new Allied "drive" in the west, were waiting for it when the German thrust at Ypres crushed in half of the whole salient and won a local success more considerable than any the Allies had achieved in all the months preceding.

The first of these "nibbles" was in some respects the most considerable and successful. In December French forces appeared along the western slopes of the Vosges and beyond the summits in that corner of Alsace to which the French had clung after they had abandoned Mühlhausen in August. They flowed down the valley of the Thur and reoccupied Thann; they approached the village of Cernay, which is the key to Mühlhausen, and, after long and desperate fighting, took the mountain of Hartmannsweilerkopf, from which they could look down into Mühlhausen a scant ten miles away.

But despite local successes in the villages of Steinbach and Anspach, despite a slight advance along the plain toward Altkirch, the larger purpose could not be realized. The French were unable to break the

German line at the point where it left the plain and approached the Vosges. Mühlhausen could not be taken, nor were any of the later efforts more successful. Some little territory was won north of the Thur, some more Alsatian villages were "redeemed," upward of 350 square miles of Alsace was reunited to France, but although each new general who came to the Vosges eagerly undertook, with the limited resources allowed him, to break through to Mühlhausen, the failure was absolute.

Checked in Alsace, the French turned to Champagne and endeavoured to push up the slopes of the hills north of Soissons and beyond the Aisne, where Kluck had held the British in September. Again there was a preliminary success in early January, the gain of several miles. But as promptly came a German counter-thrust and this time the French lost, not alone what they had gained, but the ground turned over to them by the British when Field-Marshal French had gone north in October. Only on the southern bank of the river were the French able to hold. Germany claimed a crushing victory and talked rather obscurely of Gravelotte; the French explained that the floods in the river behind them had made their position indefensible. Neither statement is worth considering. The Germans never tried to advance farther; the French were unable to progress on this front until April, 1917. The local operation promptly lost all importance.

In February the French undertook a still more ambitious operation in Champagne, on the ground which was to see the great and desperate attack in the following September. Over a narrow front and for the possession of insignificant ridges commanding a railroad line vital to German communications, the French and Germans fought for weeks. The battleline rested on the east upon the Argonne and from the western flank the cathedral of Rheims was visible. After casualties not much under 200,000 for the French and German combined—and the French loss was much the heavier—there ensued a new deadlock. The French had gained rather less than a quarter of a mile on a front less than a dozen. But there was never much promise that they would actually penetrate the German lines, and any original hope was promptly extinguished when German reserves arrived.

While this last attack was going forward the British undertook their first, and for the present period their last, offensive, attacking in the district south of Lille. This effort is worth examining in more detail because it disclosed the extent of the weakness of British organization and was the first of that series of failures, extending through Gallipoli and Loos, to Kut-el-Amara, which revealed how little British military training had kept pace with that of continental nations in later years, and how long was to be the task of organizing new British armies.

But in dismissing these early French operations it is well to recall that each of them was designed primarily to aid the Russians and to divert German attention from Galicia and from Poland; the Alsatian attack coincided with the great drive of Hindenburg to the Bzura-Rawka line; the Champagne attack with the opening of the Battle of the Carpathians; and the Soissons fight which just preceded it with the demand of the Hungarians for German aid to repulse the Russian menace in Bukowina and the growing Roumanian threat, due to Russian victories in the Crownland.

In this synchrony of operations east and west it is possible to see what the French were striving to do, not on their own frontier primarily but in the wide field of the continental strife. Nor can one doubt that, while their efforts were not fully successful in this larger field nor of any real consequence locally, they did materially reduce the pressure upon their Slav ally and postpone the day when Germany was able to regain the offensive in the east.

### III. NEUVE CHAPELLE

On March 10th at Neuve Chapelle, a few miles southwest of the great city of Lille and just north of the strong German post of La Bassée, which had seen desperate fighting in October and November, the British launched a great attack upon a four-mile front. The immediate objective of the attack was the Aubers ridge, which in military comment is described as the key to the city of Lille itself.

This attack was preceded by the first of those avalanches of artillery bombardment to become familiar thereafter and to be described at once

by the Germans, who gave it the enduring name of drum-fire. Under this storm of fire, delivered from 300 guns concentrated in a narrow area, the German first-line trenches disintegrated, even the second line was shaken, and the British infantry made its first advance with little or no serious opposition, finding the ground strewn with German dead, and capturing scores of men overcome by the noise and shock of the fire.

But beyond the first-line trenches the British came under machine-gun fire from scattered points in which the German second line had not been destroyed. They also suffered severely as a result of the miscalculation of their own guns, but the fatal circumstance was the failure of reserves to arrive.

There was a moment when it seemed as if the road to Lille was open. But the British could not seize the moment, and it passed forever. After two days the Germans were able to repulse all attacks with terrific slaughter. The British had gained a mile on a front of four; the ruins of the village of Neuve Chapelle were in their hands, but the larger success had been lost. British Command had failed to synchronize men with guns, to prepare reserves to follow the first waves of attack. What was to happen at Loos and Gallipoli on a far larger scale had now occurred at Neuve Chapelle.

In this battle, which filled the bulletins at the time but is now hardly more than a forgotten skirmish, the British first tasted the cup of bitterness which the Germans had drunk to the dregs in the Battle of Ypres. Under German artillery and machine-gun fire, the British losses surpassed that of the British contingents who fought with Wellington at Waterloo. The "butcher's bill" had been 13,000 casualties; the gains, a mile of territory, 2,000 German prisoners, and the privilege of burying 3,000 Germans fallen to British guns.

In Allied strategy this blow in Artois had been delivered in strict conjunction with the French offensive far off in Champagne and at the moment when the arrival of German reserves on the latter field disclosed the fact that Germany was weakening her line before the British. In September a similar double thrust was to be undertaken in Champagne and Artois, which would cost the French 120,000 casualties and the

British 60,000. Looking back to it, after the mighty struggles of the later months, Neuve Chapelle seems insignificant. Yet it was the first time that a considerable use was made of massed fire. It forecast exactly the tactics Mackensen was to employ in his great victory in Galicia not many weeks later, and it did come within sight of a considerable triumph that might have restored Lille to France.

In the first blush London celebrated Neuve Chapelle as the "battle bigger than Waterloo"; but the later disclosures changed the whole tone of British comment, and England presently realized that a meaningless local gain had been achieved at a frightful cost, because British troops had fallen under their own guns and British reserves had wholly failed to arrive at the moment when real victory was within easy grasp. Taken with the scandal over the shell supply—which soon developed and revealed that the British High Command was still sending shrapnel in limited quantities to an army that required heavy explosives in enormous quantities and could not get them at all—Neuve Chapelle was a saddening incident to the British people.

### IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

In early April the French undertook an interesting campaign to abolish the St. Mihiel salient, the single breach in the yoke of permanent French fortifications from Verdun to Switzerland, which the Germans had been able to make in September. Coming out from Metz and ascending the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, the Germans had actually crossed the Meuse, taken foot on the west bank, and also captured Fort Camp des Romains, above the town of St. Mihiel on the east bank.

The ground held by the Germans was a narrow spearhead thrust straight through the armour of France. Never had the Germans been able to widen the wound or deepen it after the first thrust, but they remained in possession of a portion of the hills of the Meuse and they cut the railroad from Commercy to Verdun. Now the French, coming north out of Toul and south out of Verdun, endeavoured to break this salient along its sides. Some initial success they had at Les Éparges;

they took several hills and a village or two. But then they were stopped. German heavy artillery in Fort Camp des Romains held them up. The local success did not hide the larger failure. A still more ambitious effort in July, and from the Bois-le-Prêtre, above the west of Pont-à-Mousson, similarly failed. Verdun was left in danger and the extent of the danger was to be disclosed in February, 1916.

Finally we come to the last of the battles in the west in the period under examination, the Second Battle of Ypres, which coincided almost exactly with the date at which the world believed that Kitchener's million were to begin their triumphal advance in the west; and it terminated in a local German success at the moment when Mackensen was to regain for Germany the initiative in the east.

The new blow fell on April 22d. It was delivered by relatively small contingents, and it is plain that the Germans had no expectation of anything but a local triumph, the moral effect of which would far surpass the military. Not only did it come in an hour when the news from the east was to fill the world, but the Allied failure at the Dardanelles had dashed the hopes of all the enemies of Germany and a shining Teutonic triumph held out a promise to hold Italy to neutrality. Again, the Allies were already collecting an army to send to the Dardanelles on the most foolish of all ventures and German pressure was conceivably calculated to withhold troops from the Near East.

The German attack was preceded by the first discharge of "poison gas" of the war. Not since the slaughter in Louvain and the bombardment of Rheims had any event made such a noise in the world as this first use of gas as a weapon of destruction. It added instantly to the horrors of conflict and it was in violation of all the restrictions that humanity and international agreement had placed about the conduct of war. It instantly changed the whole temper of the British, who suffered most severely, mainly in the Canadian contingent; it abolished quarter on the western front for many months, and it brought in its train a savagery and brutality that the wars of the Nineteenth Century did not know.

Even in its immediate purpose, this weapon was unsuccessful. It did not give Germany a shining triumph. It did not open a gap in the

Allied defence, it merely brought to horrible death a few thousands of Allied soldiers, and, before many weeks had passed, the Allies had prepared an apparatus protecting their soldiers and had in their turn adopted this hideous method of killing, which subsequently brought as many thousand Germans to terrible agony and frightful death.

In selecting the Ypres front as the point of attack, the Germans had pitched upon the point best known to the outside world in the whole Allied line from Belfort to Nieuport. Here the Germans had attacked in the autumn and by but a shadowy margin failed to get through. Belligerent and neutral nations, watching for the advance of the Kitchener army, still hardly taking shape, saw, instead, what seemed to be a new German drive for Calais and for several days a real German advance. Nor were the military reasons less weighty in determining the point of attack; Ypres was a salient on which the Germans from higher and encircling ground could pour down a converging fire, cutting all the lines of communication.

The original attack fell to the west of Ypres, at the moment when this beautiful city, with some of the most interesting monuments of Flemish art, was melting into dust and ashes under a terrific cannonade. At the point where the French and British lines touched—the French position held largely by native troops—the Germans launched immense clouds of gas. First amazement and then terror followed. The men who had endured artillery fire and faced death with unfaltering courage for many months broke and fled, a gap opened in the Allied front.

This break exposed the flank of the Canadians. They, too, had suffered from the gas, but less severely than their French neighbours. They did not break or immediately retreat. They extended to cover the exposed flank and hung on. No reserves were available for hours, and in these first hours nearly a third of the Canadian contingent died or were wounded and captured on their lines. Presently the crisis passed. Reinforcements arrived, the Belgians extended their aid to the French, the British brought up troops from the south. Ypres was not lost, the dyke between the Germans and Calais still held.

It is worth recalling, too, that for England, the Canadian contingent bore the brunt as the Australian Anzacs were to win equal glory at

Gallipoli. In the history of the British Empire the Second Battle of Ypres may well prove memorable, for Canadian loyalty there gave shining answer to German forecasts of colonial secessions; while in German Southwest Africa, British South Africa was presently to emulate the example of Canada in Flanders and Australia and New Zealand at the Dardanelles.

The Second Battle of Ypres lasted five days; by the third the Germans no longer claimed to be making progress and at points they were presently pressed back, but the whole Ypres salient had to be flattened out. Actually the British gave up more ground than they had surrendered in the First Battle, but solely because of the collapse of the French line to the west, under the poison gas attack. Guns, prisoners, ground, the Germans had taken, but the triumph was local and of no permanent value on the military side.

Yet the lesson of the Second Battle of Ypres was unmistakable, although the world was long in learning it. A swift, heavy blow had disclosed the fact that the Allies were unready. Their previous offensives had disclosed the same weakness. Now it was clear that only by heroic efforts could they check a German attack. They could not break the German lines, they could only with difficulty hold their own. The whole British front had been affected by the attack and new dispositions had to be made.

Before she went east, Germany had undertaken one attack to demonstrate that she need fear no real danger from the Anglo-French quarter. She had established the fact. Not until September would her western lines be threatened and not until July, 1916, would the British be ready to take an effective share in the western offensive operations. The legend of "Kitchener's Million" disappeared in thin air, the hope of the speedy deliverance of France vanished, the first authentic sign of German recovery was now perceived by the world which was to have a second and greater proof in a few hours.

In the major problem, to reorganize, to get forward in time to take the pressure off Russia, France and Britain had failed at the moment when the Russian strength was becoming inadequate for the task on the Russian front.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

## CONCLUSION

While the echoes of the guns about Ypres were filling the world, the Austro-German army of Mackensen attacked and almost destroyed the Russian army, commanded by Radko Dimitrieff—the victor of Lule Burgas—which stood behind the Dunajec River, in western Galicia. The immediate consequence of this disaster was the dislocation of the whole Russian front; the eventual result, the retreat from the Carpathians and the Vistula to the Dwina and the Beresina.

These great events do not concern the present narrative, they belong, as I see it, to the second phase of the war, the attack upon Russia. With the Battle of the Dunajec ends that first phase, comprehended in the attack upon France and the consequences of this attack. These consequences, since the attack failed, were the deadlock in the west and the loss to Germany of the initiative in the east and west. To obtain the necessary numbers to deal the colossal blow that should destroy France, Germany had weakened her eastern front and relied upon Austria to hold up Russia. Still relying upon Austria mainly, after the Marne, Germany had elected to endeavour to reopen the decision of the Marne in all the weeks from September to the middle of November.

Compelled at last to go east, while the Battle of Flanders was still unwon and the decision of the Marne stood, Germany had then to labour under the disadvantages which had resulted from the successes won by Russia over Austria and the position gained in Galicia. Not until the Dunajec did Germany finally restore the balance, not until the Dunajec did she escape from the consequences of the Marne campaign, consequences which affected the eastern quite as much as the western field.

Had the Allies been prepared to take the offensive in the west,

when Germany at last turned eastward in November, they would have won the war. Had they been able in the spring, when the German attack at the Dunajec began, to make a similar attack in the west, German disaster would have been immediate. The failure in the autumn enabled Germany to erect those colossal dykes against the Allies in the west which extended from the North Sea to Switzerland. Failure in the spring condemned Russia to bear that terrible burden which almost brought irreparable disaster and real German victory.

In the spring of 1915 it was plain that the advantage belonged to the alliance which could strike the first heavy blow, but the superficial circumstances alike favoured the Allies and seemed to indicate that they would be able to retain the initiative which they had won at the Marne and bring Germany to swift and complete defeat. All this was impossible because Great Britain had been unable to transform herself into a military nation and to do in months what her Allies and enemies had achieved only by long years of patient and universal training. As for France, she lacked the numbers, now, to risk alone the supreme effort, for if it failed, German victory in the west, while Britain was still unprepared, was inevitable.

In this situation there was allowed to Germany a new opportunity, and as it turned out, another year, in which to win the war. If she could dispose of Russia and return to the west before Britain had at last organized her millions and her industries, she might hope for the complete victory that had escaped her in the Marne conflict. But if she failed in the east, if she were compelled to come west with the Russian task incomplete, as she had been compelled to go east while France still stood, then German failure in the second phase would be as patent as it was now in the first.

Only victory in the east, followed by triumph in the west, could permanently abolish the decision of the Marne. Unless it was abolished the time was bound to come when Germany would have to face fresh millions coming from Britain and find herself outnumbered and deprived of all the advantages that superior preparation and organization had given her at the start. This is what did happen, but not until the sum-

mer of 1916. And as it did happen the decision of the Marne stood, and stands, the one great event in the whole World War from August, 1914, to September, 1916.

All that the science, knowledge, skill, genius of two races could mobilize met at the Marne in a struggle in which the fate of one race, at least, was in the balance, and if France fought for life, Germany fought for a world power that could hardly have escaped her had she prevailed. But she did not prevail; everything she hoped to attain escaped her on this field. Afterward she still had numbers, the fruits of her years of preparation remained in her hands, but the moment had escaped her and did not return. Had Napoleon won at Waterloo, his old domination of Europe would not have been regained, but had Germany won at the Marne, William II would have attained an eminence that Napoleon never reached in his most fortunate hour.

At the Marne, France willed to live; in the gravest hour in the history of their race, French commanders and French soldiers alike displayed not merely the courage that was traditional and was equalled by German devotion, but those qualities which have often given France the supremacy in Europe and have never failed to save her when her condition seemed desperate. And by her will to live, France saved Britain, Russia, Europe, from a German domination, which in the German mind was to renew the glories of the Roman Empire.

A second sacrifice and a second agony were to be demanded of the French people at Verdun, but the stakes of that terrible contest were incomparably smaller, and the greatest possible fruit of German victory on the Meuse would have been provinces and indemnities. Nor was there ever a grave danger of this harvest. At the Marne, Germany fought for a World; at Verdun, for a War; and while she fought at Verdun, her statesmen talked of a victorious peace, which if it still indicated great ambitions, no longer disclosed Napoleonic aspirations.

With all its mighty events, with all its noble and splendid pages, the history of the first two years of the great conflict is the history of the Battle of the Marne. We have seen in these chapters how Germany strove to abolish that decision; we shall see in those which describe the

attack upon Russia how she continued to strive to abolish it in tremendous struggles from the Straits of Dover to the Golden Horn, from the Meuse to the Beresina; but after splendid successes, we shall see the continuing failure. Like Marathon, the Marne was a mortal wound; but, unlike Marathon, it did not kill at once.

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volumes.

Editor

# APPENDIX

## THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

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## THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

In the third week of August, 1914, a French army crossed the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and entered the Promised Land, toward which all Frenchmen had looked in hope and sadness for forty-four years. The long-forgotten communiqués of that early period of the war reported success after success, until at last it was announced that the victorious French army had reached Saarburg and Morhange, and were astride the Strassburg-Metz railroad. And then Berlin took up the cry, and France and the world learned of a great German victory and of the defeat and rout of the invading army. Even Paris conceded that the retreat had begun and the "army of liberation" was crowding back beyond the frontier and far within French territory.

Then the curtain of the censorship fell and the world turned to the westward to watch the terrible battle for Paris. In the agony and glory of the Marne the struggle along the Moselle was forgotten; the Battle of Nancy, of Lorraine, was fought and won in the darkness, and when the safety of Paris was assured the world looked toward the Aisne, and then toward Flanders. So it came about that one of the greatest battles of the whole war, one of the most important of the French victories, the success that made the Marne possible, the rally and stand of the French armies about Nancy, escaped the fame it earned. Only in legend, in the romance of the Kaiser with his cavalry waiting on the hills to enter the Lorraine capital, did the battle live.

When I went to France one of the hopes I had cherished was that I might be permitted to visit this battlefield, to see the ground on which a great battle had been fought, that was still unknown country, in the main, for those who have written on the war. The Lorraine field was the field on which France and Germany had planned for a generation to fight. Had the Germans respected the neutrality of Belgium, it is by Nancy, by the gap between the Vosges and the hills of the Meuse, that they must have broken into France. The Marne was a battlefield which was reached by chance and fought over by hazard, but every foot of the Lorraine country had been studied for the fight long years in advance. Here war followed the natural course, followed the plans of the general staff prepared years in advance. Indeed I had treasured over years a plan of the Battle of Nancy, contained in a French book written long ago, which might serve as the basis for a history of what happened, as it was written as a prophecy of what was to come.

When the Great General Staff was pleased to grant my request to see the battlefield of Nancy I was advised to travel by train to that town accompanied by an officer from the General Staff, and informed that I should there meet an officer of the garrison, who would conduct me to all points of interest and explain in detail the various phases of the conflict. Thus it fell out, and I have to thank Commandant Leroux for the courtesy and consideration which made this excursion successful.

In peace time one goes from Paris to Nancy in five hours, and the distance is about that from New York to Boston, by Springfield. In war all is different, and the time almost doubled. Yet there are compensations. Think of the New York-Boston trip as bringing you beyond New Haven to the exact rear of battle, of battle but fifteen miles away, with the guns booming in the distance and the airplanes and balloons in full view. Think also of this same trip, which from Hartford to Worcester follows the line of a battle not yet two years old, a battle that has left its traces in ruined villages, in shattered houses. On either side of the railroad track the graves descend to meet the embankments; you can mark the advance and the retreat by the crosses which fill the fields. The gardens that touch the railroad and extend to the rear of houses in the little towns are filled with graves. Each enclosure has been fought for at the point of the bayonet, and every garden wall recalls the Château of Hougoumont, at Waterloo.

All this was two years ago, but there is to-day, also. East of Bar-le-Duc the main line is cut by German shell fire now. From Fort Camp des Romains above St. Mihiel German guns sweep the railroad near Commercy, and one has to turn south by a long detour, as if one went to Boston by Fitchburg, travel south through the country of Jeanne d'Arc and return by Toul, whose forts look out upon the invaded land. Thus one comes to Nancy by night, and only by night, for twenty miles beyond there are Germans and a German cannon, which not so long ago sent a shell into the town and removed a whole city block beside the railroad station. It is the sight of this ruin as you enter the town which reminds you that you are at the front, but there are other reminders.

As we ate our dinner in the café, facing the beautiful Place Stanislas, we were disturbed by a strange and curious drumming sound. Going out into the square, we saw an airplane, or rather its lights, red and green, like those of a ship. It was the first of several, the night patrol, rising slowly and steadily and then sweeping off in a wide curve toward the enemy's line. They were the sentries of the air which were to guard us while we slept, for men do sentry-go in the air as well as on the earth about the capital of Lorraine. Then the searchlights on the hills began to play, sweeping the horizon toward that same mysterious region where beyond the darkness there is war.

The next morning I woke with the sense of Fourth of July. Bang! Bang!

Bang! Such a barking of cannon crackers I had never heard. Still drowsy, I pushed open the French windows and looked down on the square. There I beheld a hundred or more men, women, and children, their eyes fixed on something in the air above and behind the hotel. Still the incessant barking of guns with the occasional boom of something more impressive. With difficulty I grasped the fact. I was in the midst of a Taube raid. Somewhere over my head, invisible to me because of the wall of my hotel, a German airplane was flying, and all the anti-aircraft guns were shooting at it. Was it carrying bombs? Should I presently see or feel the destruction following the descent of these?

But the Taube turned away, the guns fired less and less frequently, the people in the streets drifted away, the children to school, the men to work, the women to wait. It was just a detail in their lives, as familiar as the incoming steamer to the commuters on the North River ferryboat. Some portion of war has been the day's history of Nancy for nearly two years now. The children do not carry gas masks to school with them as they do at Pont-à-Mousson, a dozen miles to the north, but women and children have been killed by German shells, by bombs brought by Zeppelins and by airplanes. There is always excitement of sorts in the district of Nancy.

After a breakfast broken by the return of the airplanes we had seen departing the night before for the patrol, we entered our cars and set out for the front, for the near front, for the lines a few miles behind the present trenches, where Nancy was saved but two years ago. Our route lay north along the valley of the Meurthe, a smiling broad valley, marching north and south and meeting in a few miles that of the Moselle coming east. It was easy to believe that one was riding through the valley of the Susquehanna, with spring and peace in the air. Toward the east a wall of hills shut out the view. This was the shoulder of the Grand-Couronne, the wall against which German violence burst and broke in September, 1914.

Presently we came to a long stretch of road walled in on the river side by brown canvas, exactly the sort of thing that is used at foot-ball games to shut out the non-paying public. But it had another purpose here. We were within the vision of the Germans, across the river, on the heights behind the forest, which outlined itself at the skyline; there were the Kaiser's troops and that forest was the Bois-le-Prêtre, the familiar incident in so many communiqués since the war began. Thanks to the canvas, it was possible for the French to move troops along this road without inviting German shells. Yet it was impossible to derive any large feeling of security from a canvas wall, which alone interposed between you and German heavy artillery.

We passed through several villages and each was crowded with troops; cavalry, infantry, all the branches represented; it was still early and the soldiers were just beginning their day's work; war is so completely a business here-

Transport wagons marched along the roads, companies of soldiers filed by. Interspersed with the soldiers were civilians, the women and children, for none of the villages are evacuated. Not even the occasional boom of a gun far off could give to this thing the character of real war. It recalled the days of my soldiering in the militia camp at Framingham in Massachusetts. It was simply impossible to believe that it was real. Even the faces of the soldiers were smiling. There was no such sense of terribleness, of strain and weariness as I later found about Verdun. The Lorraine front is now inactive, tranquil; it has been quiet so long that men have forgotten all the carnage and horror of the earlier time.

We turned out of the valley and climbed abruptly up the hillside. In a moment we came into the centre of a tiny village and looked into a row of houses, whose roofs had been swept off by shell fire. Here and there a whole house was gone; next door the house was undisturbed and the women and children looked out of the doors. The village was St. Geneviève, and we were at what had been the extreme front of the French in August, and against this hill burst the flood of German invasion. Leaving the car we walked out of the village, and at the end of the street a sign warned the wayfarer not to enter the fields, for which we were bound: "War—do not trespass." This was the burden of the warning.

Once beyond this sign we came out suddenly upon an open plateau, upon trenches. Northward the slope descended to a valley at our feet. It was cut and seamed by trenches, and beyond the trenches stood the posts that carried the barbed-wire entanglements. Here and there, amidst the trenches, there were graves. I went down to the barbed-wire entanglements and examined them curiously. They at least were real. Once thousands of men had come up out of the little woods a quarter of a mile below; they had come on in that famous massed attack, they had come on in the face of machine gun and "seventy-fives." They had just reached the wires, which marked high water. In the woods below, the Bois-de-Facq, in the fields by the river, 4,000 Germans had been buried.

Looking out from the trenches the whole country unfolded. Northward the little village of Atton slept under the steep slope of Côte-de-Mousson, a round pinnacle crowned with an ancient château. From the hill the German artillery had swept the ground where I stood. Below the hill to the west was Pont-à-Mousson, the city of 150 bombardments, which the Germans took when they came south, and lost later. Above it was the Bois-le-Prêtre, in which guns were now booming occasionally. Far to the north was another hill, just visible, and its slope toward us was cut and seamed with yellow slashes. Those were the French trenches, then of the second or third line; beyond there was still another hill, it was slightly blurred in the haze, but it was not over five miles away, and it was occupied by the Germans. From the slope above

me on a clear day it is possible to see Metz, so near are French and German lines to the old frontier.

Straight across the river to the west of us was another wood, with a glorious name, the Forest of the Advance Guard. It swept to the south of us. In that wood the Germans had also planted their guns on the day of battle. They had swept the trenches where I stood from three sides. Plainly it had been a warm corner. But the French had held on. Their commander had received a verbal order to retreat. He insisted that it should be put in writing, and this took time. The order came. It had to be obeyed, but he obeyed slowly. Reluctantly the men left the trenches they had held so long. They slipped southward along the road by which we had come. But suddenly their rear guards discovered that the Germans were also retreating. So the French came back and the line of St. Geneviève was held, the northern door to Nancy was not forced.

Looking down again it was not difficult to reconstitute that German assault, made at night. The thing was so simple the civilian could grasp it. A road ran through the valley and along it the Germans had formed; the slope they had to advance up was gentle, far more gradual than that of San Juan. They had been picked troops selected for a forlorn hope, and they had come back four times. The next morning the whole forest had been filled with dead and dying. Not less than a division—20,000 men—had made the terrible venture. Now there was a strange sense of emptiness in the country; war had come and gone, left its graves, its trenches, its barbed-wire entanglements; but these were all disappearing already. On this beautiful spring morning it was impossible to feel the reality of what happened here, what was happening now, in some measure, five miles or more to the north. Nature is certainly the greatest of all pacifists; she will not permit the signs of war to endure nor the mind to believe that war itself has existed and exists.

From St. Geneviève we went to the Grand Mont d'Amance, the most famous point in all the Lorraine front, the southeast corner of the Grand-Couronne, as St. Geneviève is the northern. Here, from a hill some 1,300 feet high, one looks eastward into the Promised Land of France—into German Lorraine. In the early days of August the great French invasion, resting one flank upon this hill, the other upon the distant Vosges, had stepped over the frontier. One could trace its route to the distant hills among which it had found disaster. In these hills the Germans had hidden their heavy guns, and the French, coming under their fire without warning, unsupported by heavy artillery, which was lacking to them, had broken. Then the German invasion had rolled back. You could follow the route. In the foreground the little Seille River could be discerned; it marked the old frontier. Across this had come the defeated troops. They had swarmed down the low, bare hills; they had crossed and vanished in the woods just at my feet; these woods were the

Forest of Champenoux. Into this forest the Germans had followed by the thousand, they were astride the main road to Nancy, which rolled white and straight at my feet. But in the woods the French rallied. For days there was fought in this stretch of trees one of the most terrible of battles.

As I stood on the Grand Mont I faced almost due east. In front of me and to the south extended the forest. Exactly at my feet the forest reached up the hill and there was a little cluster of buildings about a fountain. All was in ruins, and here, exactly here, was the high-water mark of the German advance. They had occupied the ruins for a few moments and then had been driven out. Elsewhere they had never emerged from the woods; they had approached the western shore, but the French had met them with machine guns and "seventy-fives." The brown woods at my feet were nothing but a vast cemetery; thousands of French and German soldiers slept there.

In their turn the Germans had gone back. Now, in the same woods, a French battery was shelling the Germans on the other side of the Seille. Under the glass I studied the little villages unfolding as on a map; they were all destroyed, but it was impossible to recognize this. Some were French, some German; you could follow the line, but there were no trenches; behind them French shells were bursting occasionally and black smoke rose just above the ground. Thousands of men faced each other less than four miles from where I stood, but all that there was to be detected were the shell bursts; otherwise one saw a pleasant country, rolling hills, mostly without woods, bare in the spring which had not yet come to turn them green. In the foreground ran that arbitrary line Bismarck had drawn between Frenchmen forty-six years before—the frontier—but of natural separation there was none. He had cut off a part of France, that was all, and one looked upon what had been and was still a bleeding wound.

I asked the French commandant about the various descriptions made by those who have written about the war. They have described the German attack as mounting the slope of the Grand Mont where we stood. He took me to the edge and pointed down. It was a cliff almost as steep as the Palisades. "*C'est une blague*," he smiled. "Just a story." The Germans had not charged here, but in the forest below, where the Nancy road passed through and enters the valley of the Amezeule. They had not tried to carry but to turn the Grand Mont. More than 200,000 men had fought for days in the valley below. I asked him about the legend of the Kaiser sitting on a hill, waiting in white uniform with his famous escort, waiting until the road was clear for his triumphal entrance into the capital of Lorraine. He laughed. I might choose my hill; if the Emperor had done this thing the hill was "over there," but had he? They are hard on legends at the front, and the tales that delight Paris die easily on the frontiers of war.

But since I had asked so much about the fighting my commandant promised

to take me in the afternoon to the point where the struggle had been fiercest, still farther to the south, where all the hills break down and there is a natural gateway from Germany into France, the beginning of the famous Charmes Gap, through which the German road to Paris from the east ran, and still runs. Leaving Nancy behind us, and ascending the Meurthe Valley on the eastern bank, turning out of it before Saint Nicholas du Port, we came presently to the most completely war-swept fields that I have ever seen. On a perfectly level plain the little town of Haraucourt stands in sombre ruins. Its houses are nothing but ashes and rubble. Go out of the village toward the east and you enter fields pockmarked by shell fire. For several miles you can walk from shell hole to shell hole. The whole country is a patchwork of these shell holes. At every few rods a new line of old trenches approaches the road and wanders away again. Barbed-wire entanglements run up and down the gently sloping hillsides.

Presently we came out upon a perfectly level field. It was simply torn by shell fire. Old half-filled trenches wandered aimlessly about, and beyond, under a gentle slope, the little village of Corbessaux stood in ruins. The commandant called my attention to a bit of woods in front.

"The Germans had their machine guns there," said he. "We didn't know it, and a French brigade charged across this field. It started at 8:15, and at 8:30 it had lost more than 3,000 out of 6,000. Then the Germans came out of the woods in their turn, and our artillery, back at Haraucourt, caught them and they lost 3,500 men in a quarter of an hour. Along the roadside were innumerable graves. We looked at one. It was marked: "Here 196 French." Twenty feet distant was another; it was marked: "Here 196 Germans." In the field where we stood I was told some 10,000 men are buried. They were buried hurriedly, and even now, when it rains, arms and legs are exposed.

Two years had passed, almost two years, since this field had been fought for. The Germans had taken it. They had approached Haraucourt, but had not passed it. This was the centre and the most vital point in the Lorraine battle. What Foch's troops had done about La Fère Champenoise, those of Castelnau had done here. The German wave had been broken, but at what cost? And now, after so many months, the desolation of war remained. But yet it was not to endure. Beside the very graves an old peasant was ploughing, guiding his plough and his horses carefully among the tombs. Four miles away more trenches faced each other and the battle went on audibly, but behind this line, in this very field where so many had died, life was beginning.

Later we drove south, passing within the lines the Germans had held in their great advance; we travelled through Lunéville, which they had taken and left unharmed, save as shell fire had wrecked an eastern suburb. We visited Gerbéviller, where in an excess of rage the Germans had burned every structure in the town. I have never seen such a headquarters of desolation. Every-

thing that had a shape, that had a semblance of beauty or of use, lies in complete ruin, detached houses, a château, the blocks in the village, all in ashes. Save for Sermaize, Gerbéviller is the most completely wrecked town in France.

You enter the village over a little bridge across the tiny Mortagne. Here some French soldiers made a stand and held off the German advance for some hours. There was no other battle at Gerbéviller, but for this defence the town died. Never was death so complete. Incendiary material was placed in every house, and all that thoroughness could do to make the destruction complete was done. Gerbéviller is dead, a few women and children live amidst its ashes, there is a wooden barrack by the bridge with a post-office and the inevitable postcards, but only on postcards, picture postcards, does the town live. It will be a place of pilgrimage when peace comes.

From Gerbéviller we went by Bayon to the Plateau of Saffais, the ridge between the Meurthe and the Moselle, where the defeated army of Castelnau made its last and successful stand. The French line came south from St. Geneviève, where we had been in the morning, through the Grand Mont, across the plain by Haraucourt and Corbessaux, then crossed the Meurthe by Dombasle and stood on the heights from Rosières south. Having taken Lunèville, the Germans attempted to cross the Meurthe coming out of the Forest of Vitrimont.

Standing on the Plateau of Saffais and facing east, the whole country unfolded again, as it did at the Grand Mont. The face of the plateau is seamed with trenches. They follow the slopes, and the village of Saffais stands out like a promontory. On this ridge the French had massed three hundred cannon. Their army had come back in ruins, and to steady it they had been compelled to draw troops from Alsace. Mühlhausen was sacrificed to save Nancy. Behind these crests on which we stood, a beaten army, almost routed, had in three days found itself and returned to the charge.

In the shadow of the dusk I looked across the Meurthe into the brown mass of the Forest of Vitrimont. Through this had come the victorious Germans. They had debouched from the wood; they had approached the river, hidden under the slope, but, swept by the hell of this artillery storm, they had broken. But few had lived to pass the river, none had mounted the slopes. There were almost no graves along these trenches. Afterward the Germans had in turn yielded to pressure from the south and gone back. Before the Battle of the Marne began the German wave of invasion had been stopped here in the last days of August. A second terrific drive, coincident with the Marne, had likewise failed. Then the Germans had gone back to the frontier. The old boundary line of Bismarck is now in many instances an actual line of fire, and nowhere on this front are the Germans more than three or four miles within French territory.

If you should look at the map of the wholly imaginary Battle of Nancy,

drawn by Colonel Boucher to illustrate his book, published before 1910, a book describing the problem of the defence of the eastern frontier, you will find the lines on which the French stood at Saffais indicated exactly. Colonel Boucher had not dreamed this battle, but for a generation the French General Staff had planned it. Here they had expected to meet the German thrust. When the Germans decided to go by Belgium they had in turn taken the offensive, but, having failed, they had fought their long-planned battle.

Out of all the region of war, of war to-day and war yesterday, one goes back to Nancy, to its busy streets, its crowds of people returning from their day's work. War is less than fifteen miles away, but Nancy is as calm as London is nervous. Its bakers still make macaroons; even Taube raids do not excuse the children from punctual attendance at school. Nancy is calm with the calmness of all France, but with just a touch of something more than calmness, which forty-six years of living by an open frontier brings. Twenty-one months ago it was the gauge of battle, and half a million men fought for it; a new German drive may approach it at any time. Out toward the old frontier there is still a German gun, hidden in the Forest of Bézange, which has turned one block to ashes and may fire again at any hour. Zeppelins have come and gone, leaving dead women and children behind them, but Nancy goes on with to-day.

And to-morrow? In the hearts of all the people of this beautiful city there is a single and a simple faith. Nancy turns her face toward the ancient frontier, she looks hopefully out upon the shell-swept Grand-Couronne and beyond to the Promised Land. And the people say to you if you ask them about war and about peace, as one of them said to me: "Peace will come, but not until we have our ancient frontier, not until we have Metz and Strasbourg. We have waited a long time, is it not so?"

END OF VOLUME ONE

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

THE DECISIVE FACTOR?

Admiral Von Tirpitz long clung to the belief that the German submarine would be the decisive factor in the war, but was reported to have abandoned this opinion toward the close of the year 1917. In many quarters there is growing conviction that the war will be decided in the air.

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"—VERDUN

*FULLY ILLUSTRATED*

## VOLUME TWO

## THE MAKING OF MIDDLE EUROPE

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# PART ONE
# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
BY
FRANK H. SIMONDS

# CHAPTER ONE

## THE NEW PHASE

### I

### RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

From August, 1914, to the closing days of April, 1915, the history of the World War is the history of the German attack upon France and of the consequence of the failure of this attack in that great battle of arrest, the struggle at the Marne. The gigantic conflicts in France, in Belgium, the struggles in Poland, East Prussia, Galicia, these were but logical consequences of the decision of the German General Staff to stake all, risk all, win or lose all, on the narrow front between the Straits of Dover and the Swiss frontier.

When the German General Staff made this decision, sweeping away all moral and political considerations involved in the violation of Belgian neutrality, there was a clear perception by them that if they failed, a thing unthinkable of itself, it was conceivable that Russia would destroy Austrian military power and in addition invade East Prussia. Six weeks of immunity from attacks in the east, six weeks in which Paris might be taken and the French military establishment destroyed, this was the calculation of the German military power, a calculation that at moments seemed almost realized, but in the end escaped all realization, when Kluck turned back from Paris for Soissons.

Thenceforth the war became a confused and involved series of battles, great in themselves but indecisive in their character, and inexplicable to a world public still seeking a Sedan or a Waterloo and far from realizing that Europe was just on the threshold of one of the long complicated wars, in which exhaustion rather than military decision might in the end terminate the fighting.

Actually, what occurred in these months is unmistakable. The failure of Russia at Tannenberg permitted the Germans to ignore the eastern

battle ground for many months, the lack of men and munitions on the part of the French and of the British enabled the Germans to seek from October to December to reopen the decision of the Marne. But in the end the complete breakdown of Austrian military power under Russian assault necessitated the transfer of German activity to the east and Germany accepted a defensive war on the west, while she sought, first to reorganize Austrian armies and then to dispose of Russia as decisively as she had sought to dispose of France in the Marne campaign.

This is the story of the eastern campaign from December, 1914, to the autumn of the following year, from the Battle of the Dunajec to the escape of the Russians about Vilna. Germany endeavoured to eliminate Russia as she had tried to dispose of France. Austria's necessities compelled her to go east while there was still hope, even real possibility, of a decision in the west. The slender force that held the Allied line in Flanders was all but blotted out when Germany at last gave over her assaults at the Yser and about Ypres. The British army had not been broken, but it had been well-nigh annihilated. And many months were to pass before the first considerable contributions of the new British armies were to be made to Field Marshal French's skeleton battalions.

But perforce Germany was condemned to the defensive on the west and in Artois in May and June, and again in Champagne and Artois in September, she had to endure great attacks, which all but opened a road through her trench lines and nearly brought to an end the deadlock in the west. Yet in the end her lines just held, her troops in the west by their tenacious and successful defensive enabled those in the east to win the most spectacular European victory since Sedan and to conquer more territory than had fallen to victorious European armies in any campaign since the days of the great Napoleon.

Nor was this all. A feeble and amateur venture into higher strategy on the part of the Allies at Gallipoli, the effort to prosecute an undertaking which could not succeed and was as much beyond Allied resources as a promenade to Berlin, drew German attention to the Balkans and prompted German and Austrian commanders to resolve on a campaign which was to open the corridor from Berlin to Stamboul and to

Bagdad, thus consolidating German power from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf.

Between May-day, 1915, and New Year's, 1916, German soldiers were to overturn the political situation of Central Europe and to modify the markings of the map as only the soldiers of the Revolution and the First Empire had modified them in the thousand years separating Otto the Great from William II. Actually, they were to transfer from the realm of hope and dream to the world of accomplished fact all the visions and aspirations of those German patriots, poets, and soldiers who had longed to see the restoration of the ancient German Empire of the remoter centuries.

## II. MIDDLE EUROPE

In this new phase which we are now to examine we are to see the creation of one more of those mighty empires which from Charlemagne to Napoleon have been constructed upon the soil of Old Europe. But this new empire was in one respect markedly different from all that had preceded since the days of Rome itself. It was not primarily built about or by one great man. William II was neither a Napoleon nor a Charlemagne. In certain respects, indeed, he did not differ from the least of his subjects—all were servants and workers in a system and in a machine which was itself the genesis of this new empire.

It is to Rome that one must turn for a parallel to this new German phenomenon which now filled Europe and carried its influence to the remotest corners of the world. Before the war, German influence in Constantinople had become supreme. When Russia turned from the Balkans to Asia in the last century, the British had ceased to concern themselves with the Sublime Porte; they had, quite unconsciously to be sure, evacuated Constantinople, and in their place the German came. The army of the Osmanli had been reorganized by the soldiers of the Kaiser. Far down in Asia Minor, by the famous Cilician Gates through which Alexander the Great had passed in his mighty invasion, German engineers had pushed the Bagdad Railway, which was first to enable German civil administrators to reorganize Turkey while German soldiers reconstituted the Turkish army, and eventually to permit a German-

led attack upon Egypt from Syria and upon India by the Persian Gulf, along the road trod by the soldiers of Alexander.

All this was before the war. When the war came, Turkey responded to German impulse and the Osmanli entered the conflict as the ally of the Teuton. Even more impressive was the penetration of Austria-Hungary by the German influence. Austro-Hungarian military power had been broken at Lemberg; it had suffered defeats humiliating and complete at the hands of the Serbs on two fatal fields. Reorganized in part by the Germans, Austrian and Hungarian armies had gone to new defeats which lost Galicia well-nigh completely and included the impressive capitulation of Przemysl, where an army almost as large as that of Napoleon III at Sedan, laid down its arms.

It was then that Germany was led, by force of circumstances but doubtless with a full recognition of the ultimate possibilities, to assume the mastery of the whole military establishment of Austria-Hungary. Austrian generals disappeared, even archdukes vanished or accepted honorific positions which only partially concealed their subservience to German generals.

Austrian armies were stiffened by German contingents, German divisions were introduced in Austrian armies, and the interpenetration extended to smaller units. Here, in a restricted period of time, was a conquest more complete than had been expected in France or realized subsequently in Russia. First his military establishment and then his political independence, so far as the making of war policies was concerned, passed out of the hands of the Austrian. Vienna gave way to Berlin; Austrian diplomacy, like Austrian strategy, was made in Germany; and Austrian ambassadors the world over, and conspicuously in Washington, became only the agents and servants of German policy.

From this there was no escape. Under the assault of Russia, Austria had almost collapsed. Her Slav populations had disclosed a disloyalty which threatened extinction of Hapsburg imperial unity. The attack of Italy, soon to come, was to open one more deadly peril. Rumania, still neutral, continued to look over into Hungarian provinces with unmistakably growing appetite. The Austrian German and the Hungarian

Magyar, the elements which had ruled although they were a minority in the Austrian Empire, could only preserve the semblance and shadow of their ancient power by the aid of the German, and it was inevitable that the German, called upon to make greater and greater contributions of men and of money to the Austrian, should demand the right to supervise the expenditure of both.

Thus, in the period between the Dunajec and Verdun, we are to see the conquest of Austria and of Hungary by the German; peaceful, logical, ineluctable; stirring heartburnings and jealousies in Vienna and apprehensions in Budapest, but, despite all this, meeting no real opposition since none was possible, for if the eventual extinction of Hapsburg independence was plainly forecast, yet to resist it was to invite Russian armies to the Hungarian plains, Italian hosts to the Istrian and Dalmatian littoral, and Rumanian divisions to the Transylvanian marches.

### III. BERLIN TO BAGDAD

To the political and military assimilation of Austria-Hungary by pacific penetration there was soon added the similar absorption of Turkey and Bulgaria. Turkey, assailed by Allied troops at the Dardanelles, and facing Russian invasion at the Armenian frontier, inevitably turned to Berlin for aid. And when that aid came, when the slender Serbian barrier was demolished and the road from Berlin to Constantinople was open, it was natural that the liberator should, in turn, become the master, and Turkish policy, like Austrian, become, in fact, of German making.

Nor was the Bulgarian case different. Ferdinand had made his bargain with the German. He had his reward when German and Austrian troops joined his in Serbia and the Bulgarian people saw the odious Macedonian articles of the Treaty of Bucharest abolished. Monastir, Uskub, Ochrida, received his garrisons. Southern Serbia was joined to the Bulgar Czardom and, under German driving, even the obstinate Turk levelled the fortifications of Adrianople and ceded to Ferdinand that strip along the Maritza which gave Bulgaria a railroad to the Ægean on her own territory.

But in accepting this long-sought boon at German hands, Ferdinand had invited new and deadly perils. He had made a foe of Russia; he had involved himself in war with Great Britain and with France; he had assumed responsibility for the destruction of Serbia and had thus made it inevitable that the Allies should henceforth make Serbia their soldier in the Balkans to the utter ignoring of all Bulgarian aspirations and interests. Against the new powerful enemies Germany was the sole barrier and bulwark. Actually Bulgaria had bartered her freedom against certain provinces and cities. These she could hold only with the aid of their donor, and while she held them she was exposed to all the dangers incident to the hostilities of the nations fighting Germany—above all, to the hostility of Russia, always the nearest and the deadliest peril to the Bulgar State. Thus, in gaining provinces, Bulgaria had lost independence. And, in the nature of things, the Bulgarian army, like the Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian, passed under German control; its strategy, its high command were no more its own; it marched and fought at the dictation of Berlin.

The fall of Serbia completed the creation of this vast empire which tardily but emphatically claimed the attention of the statesmen of the nations fighting Germany. Uninterruptedly German will and German purpose ruled from Berlin to Bagdad. On the western front the Germans erected against France and Britain a wall of trenches like to that which the Romans had in their later days stretched between the Danube and the Rhine to hold back the Germanic hordes. Eastward, behind the marshes of the Pinsk and the Dwina, broken Russian armies held the field. But these lines and the sea were the frontiers of the new central empire.

To Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey—united to Germany voluntarily, through the pressure of their necessities or the urgings of their ambitions, at the outset—there was added, in the period we are now to examine, a vast area: Russian Poland, Lithuania, a fraction of the Courland, and Volhynia, on the east; Serbia and Albania on the south. In addition, tragic Belgium was still under the German heel, as were most of the industrialized and mineralized districts of northern France.

At the apex of his power, Napoleon had never ruled over an empire comparable with this vast region which was now under the domination of the German. And at all times the Napoleonic edifice was founded upon the genius of the man who had made it. Those who most hated and feared Napoleon could, even in the midst of their sufferings and discomforts, confidently believe that the death of the Emperor would see the passing of his empire, as that of Alexander the Great had crumbled when the great Macedonian came to his inglorious end.

But this new empire was not even remotely connected with the personality of William II. It was the product of a system, not of a man; it was the product of a system that for more than a century had been growing in efficiency and in power, without regard to kings or generals. Kaiser, Field Marshal, Chancellor, all Germans were but the agents and servants of this centralizing spirit and this vitalizing efficiency. The soldier had not completed his victory before the functionary appeared to begin the organization of conquered ground and the absorption of this new district into the great central unity.

Such, in the large, was the great Middle Europe, which grew up, following the most marvelleous military successes since the Napoleonic era—which took shape in the period we are now to review.

## IV. THE GERMAN CONCEPTION

How much of this grandiose work was deliberate, how far this empire was constructed according to preconceived designs, how far it resulted from the accidents of military necessity, one may not say. Yet it is true that, long before the war, the German patriots had dreamed a new German Empire whose frontiers should, in fact, include the regions which were under German direction when the year 1915 closed.

One may look backward into the yellow files of Pan-German documents and find maps strangely prophetic of the Europe that is disclosed in the war maps of 1915 and 1916. Northern France and western Russia, Belgium and Russian Poland, together with Holland and Denmark, were included in the frontiers thus drawn, and the expansion of German influence through the Balkans to Anatolia and Mesopotamia was

unmistakably foreshadowed. A German place in the sun meant just this to the men whose policies and purposes had made the war inevitable.

But the fact is far more important than the dream which preceded. Whatever the dreamers of the past—whose visions were neither idle nor divorced from industrious effort, by Christmas, 1915, Germany had created this empire and by this date there had crystallized in Germany a determination to make the war map permanent. Minor modifications of frontiers, retrocessions to France, more remotely conceivable an evacuation of Belgium, these were possible; but the essential integrity of this Middle Europe from the Meuse to the Beresina and the Niemen, from the Belt to the Persian Gulf, this was the fixed war aim of the German mind.

In this vast empire, with its millions of people, German order and German system were to prevail, and the achievement of Rome was to be repeated. Slavs, Hungarians, Bulgars, Osmanli Turks, Arabs, all were to be organized in the German fashion; endowed with the real blessings born of German system, order, efficiency; the willing were to become partners, at least in a limited sense; the rebellious were to be crushed. Such was the German conception, Augustan in its character, such was the fixed idea of thousands and hundreds of thousands, the idea of the leaders and makers of a Nation, not the personal ambition of a single individual.

This empire, comprising not less than 150,000,000 inhabitants, geographically compact, possessing within its boundaries enormous wealth in minerals, beyond the reach of sea power to threaten its internal communications, touching on the one hand the bleak north and on the other the deserts and tropics of Arabia and the once-flourishing region of Mesopotamia, pausing only temporarily at Suez and at the door of India, became, in the period between the Dunajec and Verdun, a solid fact. It was the fact that the German perceived in all the time when the Allied press talked of his failures in Russia and its victories in France. It was the grandiose reality beside which trench losses in Champagne and Russian escapes along the Dwina were insignificant.

When this empire had been completed, there was in the German mind

but one more step necessary. Russia was for long months incapable of offensive campaigning, might in fact lapse to revolution or make a separate peace. Italy had been checked definitively. Britain was still unready. France only remained, and if there could be delivered against France one more blow, a blow as heavy as that which had been parried at the Marne, France might now fall, at the least might make a separate peace on terms which would not be too onerous. With France out, the safety and permanence of Mitteleuropa would be assured. Such was the spirit and reasoning of Germany when the period now under consideration came to an end. Such was the purpose in the German mind when she again turned westward to seek once more to reopen along the Meuse the decision of the Marne.

To understand this period nothing is more necessary than to dismiss those Allied notions which prevailed in that time—notions of a defeated Germany, conscious of its own impending ruin and already seized with madness and desperation. Nothing could be more false. Weary of the war the Germans were, but no more weary than the French people after Wagram and before Moscow. But victorious they certainly felt themselves to be, and the proof of their conclusion was for them written over the map of Europe in colours that were unmistakable. The Allies were taking trenches, the Germans were conquering provinces. The Allies were regaining hectares of lost France. The Germans were overrunning cities and districts so remote as to have only a vague meaning for the resident of Berlin or the peasant of Bavaria.

### V. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PICTURE

Another side of the picture there certainly was. In this period Germany failed to get an immediate decision in the east as she had failed at the Marne to dispose of France. A British army and a British nation were gathering strength each hour and each day, and this strength was to be exerted in unsuspected violence in a time that was to come. France was not broken in spirit and was stronger in reserves than the Germans suspected. Russia was to deal rude blows in a campaign further in the future than Germany could believe the war would extend.

Indeed, the very magnitude of the German success, coupled with the manner in which it had been won and the fashion in which German methods had aroused the hostile nations, had made it inevitable that the war should continue until there was an absolute German success, a conquest of Europe that deprived the conquered of all power of resistance, or a dissolution of this enormous empire and a restoration of the balance of power. France perceived clearly that without this dissolution she would pass to the rank of a vassal of Germany. Italy saw that her position would be exactly the same. Britain recognized that her imperial edifice was doomed and her domestic security abolished if German power ruled on the Egyptian frontier and on the Belgian coast.

The magnitude of German victories in 1915, together with the brutality and violence of German methods in 1914 and 1915, at one time aroused the apprehensions and steeled the determination of her enemies. But in the summer and autumn of 1915 the Allies were still incapable of freeing France or saving Serbia. They felt themselves victorious because they knew they were not beaten, but with the same spirit the German was able to look upon unmistakable conquests and undeniable victories.

We see then, in all this period, Allied weakness. We shall see ineptitude and folly which made the German success possible. We shall see a total inability to grasp the idea of Middle Europe which permitted British armies to be wasted at Gallipoli, when these armies might have saved Serbia at the Danube and prevented the opening of the road from Berlin to Bagdad. Serbia was sacrificed, Bulgaria lost, Greece alienated by Allied blindness; the people of the Allied countries themselves were left in the dark as to the real nature of this new German Empire which was building, and, having long had their attention fixed upon trench lines and the most insignificant of local successes, woke suddenly to find a victorious Germany at Suez and in Bagdad, in Warsaw, Lemberg, and Belgrade, while despite their own desperate efforts, Lille, St. Quentin, and Laon contained Teutonic garrisons, and German shells still fell in Rheims, Soissons, Arras, and Ypres.

More than this; at the moment they perceived these things, the

peoples of the Allied nations were to feel the weight of one more German offensive, more terrible than all that had preceded, and realize that, so far from approaching victory, they were still in danger of defeat.

Such briefly is the period which lies between the Battle of the Dunajec and the German attack upon Verdun; the period in which Germany—lacking a Napoleon in the field or a Bismarck in the cabinet, by virtue of the collective strength of its people, through the efficiency of its political system, and served always by the devotion of its sons—marched from conquest to conquest and from victory to victory until the German will was law alike in the capitals of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg, in the seats of power of the rulers of the ancient Caliphate and of the contemporary Osmanli Empire.

## CHAPTER TWO

## THE TRANSFORMATION

### I

### IN THE BEGINNING

The first months of the war were marked by such desperate fighting, by battles unequalled in the magnitude of the numbers engaged and the losses incurred—battles upon whose issue hung the fate of continents and the destiny of nations—that all mankind looked upon the amazing cycle of events, the early French defeats in Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, and northern France; upon the Marne, the Aisne, and the Yser, with breathless attention, having little thought for the larger questions involved or the permanent meaning of this conflict in human history.

No one who lived through the days from the German attack upon Liége to the final defeat of the assault before Ypres, who read day by day the bulletins reporting battles greater than Austerlitz, Gettysburg, or Leipzig, can forget the tension and the strain of those hours, hours which, regard being had for modern means of communication, were probably the most interesting and the most crowded in all human history. Africa, Asia, the remote Pacific, and the little-known Indian Ocean furnished daily some new glory of heroism and some fresh horror of destruction.

From the moment when the army of Kluck emerged out of the cloud of official darkness, almost within sight of Paris, to the time when the Flanders struggle descended to a deadlock amidst fog and mud, the whole world viewed the German eruption as a super-Napoleonic drama. All the memories of the great struggles of a century before were translated into fact and familiar history repeated itself upon the pages of the daily newspaper.

But when at last winter and exhaustion had temporarily stayed the conflict, when artillery alone continued the battle from Switzerland to

the North Sea, and the contest was transferred to the remote Carpathians and to Poland, there came a transformation in the aspect of the war to the minds of mankind generally. It no longer seemed one more of the struggles familiar in modern history—a struggle like those Europe fought against Charles V, against Louis XIV, against Napoleon—a struggle for the preservation of the balance of power and the prevention of European supremacy by a single state or monarch. Rather, it took on the character of the remoter struggles of the Latin world against the barbarians coming down out of the North; of a struggle between savagery —this time equipped with all the weapons of science—and unorganized civilization. First for the belligerents, directly assailed by Germany, then for the greater neutrals, and finally for more distant nations, the war assumed the appearance of a struggle for existence—a struggle against a common peril—until the roll of nations fighting Germany became a score, and, at the moment these lines are written, countries as remote and little concerned with European rivalries as Siam and Liberia have declared war against the German Empire.

## II. BELGIUM

This transformation was due exclusively to the spirit disclosed by the German people in making war and the methods employed by them in prosecuting it; and the revelation of this spirit and this method had begun with the invasion of Belgium.

The invasion of Belgium had been a profound shock to the whole world beyond the German frontiers. The phrase of the Chancellor, describing the German guarantee to observe the neutrality of Belgium as a "scrap of paper," instantly gained and steadily held a place in the memory of all the observers of a world conflagration. It was naturally coupled with his other assertion that the invasion was, in itself, a wrong, but that Germany stood in the state of necessity, and German necessity knew no law.

And had there been no subsequent horrors, no crimes against humanity and civilization; had the German armies conducted themselves in Belgian territory with every regard for the rights and personal safety of

the Belgian people, the invasion of Belgium would still have stood as a reproach and a blot, because it was everywhere recognized as a violation of a national pledge and the invasion of a weak state by a powerful empire, not as an act of self-defence, but as a detail in a plan for the conquest of France.

With the invasion of Belgium a whole system of thought and of policy fell. To neutralize the weak nations, to give them the opportunity to preserve their independence and to live their own lives, withdrawn from the quarrels of the great, had been a part of Nineteenth-Century political morality. The maps of the ante-bellum period, solemnly shading Switzerland and Belgium in neutral gray as areas withdrawn from European strife, were not merely accepted as foundations of the new international doctrine, but as half-way marks on the road to a complete neutralizing of all states by the mutual accommodation of all old jealousies and the construction of a new confederation of the nations of the world. It was accepted as a beginning of the era of world peace by world consent.

When Germany invaded Belgium all this edifice went instantly to dust and ashes. Of a sudden the world stepped back into the Eighteenth Century, to the age of Napoleon, of Frederick the Great. Anew there was formulated the doctrine that force was the sole consideration, that small states had no rights when great nations were on the march, and that the lesser nationalities must again bow before the will of the strong nation armed.

In all neutral nations the invasion of Belgium deprived Germany of any moral advantage at the outset of the war. Her agents might protest, her champions argue, her statesmen explain; to all these explanations the world turned a deaf ear. The attack upon Belgium was perceived the world over to be an act of violence, not merely breaking down Belgian integrity, but also opening a breach in that wall which recent decades had sought to erect to prevent a relapse to the old, unhappy times of other centuries. There was a sense that, at a single bound, by reason of German policy, the world had leaped backward to the age of wars of conquest.

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AFTER THE BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS

Von Spee's naval victory in November, 1914, off the coast of Chile, where the English Rear-Admiral Cradock and 1,500 men were lost, was amply avenged five weeks later off the Falkland Islands by Rear-Admiral Sturdee who sent to the bottom the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Leipzig* with 1,800 of their crews.

This picture of the sinking *Scharnhorst* was taken from H. M. S. *Invincible*, whose boats may be seen picking up the German survivors.

THE VOYAGE OF A TORPEDO—I

This torpedo left its tube on a British battleship only a fraction of a second ago. It is just taking the water, with propeller blades already rapidly whirling



THE VOYAGE OF A TORPEDO—II

A white streak like the two shown in this picture strikes terror to the hearts of modern sea-farers. It is the telltale wake of a torpedo. In this case two have been fired from the United States battleship *Texas* while at target practice, and the picture has been taken from her deck. The white water is foam churned up by the rapidly revolving blades of the torpedo's propeller.



THE VOYAGE OF A TORPEDO—III

A head-on view of a torpedo, taken from the target. Needless to say this one was fired for practice only and is unloaded, else camera and photographer would have been blown into a million fragments an instant after the click of the shutter. In target practice the unloaded torpedoes are picked up, for subsequent use, when their power is exhausted.

BOMBARDING THE TURKISH BATTERIES AT THE DARDANELLES

This picture was taken in the spring of 1915 from the deck of the British dreadnought *Canopus* at the Dardanelles. A 12-inch gun has just been discharged in answer to the fire from the Turkish batteries. This ship has since been lost

THE ENGLISH BATTLE CRUISER *QUEEN MARY*

Lost in the Battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916, with about 1,000 men. Besides her equipment of 10-inch guns, she had eight 13½-inch guns and three torpedo tubes. Her armour-belt was 9 inches thick. Her displacement was 28,850 tons, her indicated horse-power 78,000, and her speed 28 knots.

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GUNS OF A BRITISH BATTLESHIP FROM THE FIGHTING TOP

This is the stern of the ship. Two turrets are seen, one elevated slightly above the other. There are two big guns in each. The turrets revolve so the guns may be aimed in almost any direction. The odd-looking circles strung on wires are part of the "wireless" equipment.



GERMAN BATTLESHIP FIRING A BROADSIDE AT TARGET PRACTICE



*Copyright by International News Service*

BRITISH BATTLESHIPS BOMBARDING THE GERMAN POSITION ON THE BELGIAN COAST

The land and naval forces were here able to coöperate to excellent effect in the early days of the war. "The first blow [in the Battle of Flanders] fell upon the seacoast south of Ostend. . . . A British fleet took station beyond the dunes and with its heavy artillery beat down the German advance after a slaughter which was terrible."

CHURCH ON THE *QUEEN ELIZABETH* IN THE DARDANELLES

The muzzles of two 15-inch guns jut out through the midst of the congregation. "*Big Lizzie*" or "*Black Bess*," as she is called by the sailors, did excellent service during the ill-fated attempt to force a passage through the Dardanelles (February and March, 1915). She fired her shells from the open Ægean, over the hill, a distance of twelve miles, and dropped them neatly on Fort Kalid Bahr, at the entrance to the narrows.



THE GRAND FLEET OF THE BRITISH NAVY GOES TO SEA

The ships go forward in double column, perfectly aligned, with the flagship, *Iron Duke*, leading. She is a super-dreadnought, and carries ten 13½-inch guns, twelve 6-inch guns, and five torpedo tubes; her displacement is 25,000 tons; her maximum speed 21 knots; and her armour-belt is extraordinarily thick—13½ inches.

The *Iron Duke* was Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's flagship at the battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916.

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF A MAN-OF-WAR'S DECK

Visitors' day on the light cruiser, *Melbourne*, of the Australian navy



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BATTLESHIP FIRING A BROADSIDE

The shock of a modern broadside is terrific. At target practice it is part of the routine to prepare for heavy firing by removing pictures from the ward-room walls, screwing the ports tightly closed, etc. Even with these precautions, some glass is always broken. The men cram their ears with cotton to prevent the rupture of their ear-drums. Sometimes a gunner is thrown to the deck by the concussion. A story is told of a photographer who was one day lifted bodily, camera and all, and thrown into the sea, when a broadside was fired.

While there was no other question than that of abstract right, while men were still thrilled with the reports of Belgian resistance and not yet aware of what German soldiers were doing in the Belgian Kingdom, the judgment of the world ran on the German attack upon Belgium, and in the Americas, as elsewhere, public sentiment turned against Germany. This revulsion of feeling was to have a profound effect in the future. It was to prove the first in the long series of steps by which the American nation marched toward conflict with Germany, because it felt that Germany had become the common danger for all democratic nations and equally the enemy of all nations which served republican ideals.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the German General Staff, when it decided to ignore moral considerations and invade Belgium, insured the verdict of mankind against Germany—a verdict possibly of no immediate weight if Germany won the war, but a verdict bound to have material as well as spiritual consequences if the gamble turned out badly and the passage of Belgium were not followed by the arrival in Paris. Thus we must recognize in the invasion of Belgium the first and the most important in that long series of events which were to end by alienating from Germany the sympathy of nearly the whole civilized world and enlisting one after another of the nations against her, until the United States, one of the most remote and the least materially interested of all, should draw its sword and send an expeditionary army to fight the German hosts upon European soil.

### III. LOUVAIN

But the invasion of Belgium promptly became a minor episode. Soon the press of the world was filled with the stories of what German armies were doing in Belgium and northern France. Tales of cities burned, women and children murdered, women outraged, civilians executed; reports of the reign of terror wherever German armies penetrated, became the common property of all educated men and women the world over.

As a culmination to these horrors there came presently the tragic story of the massacre and burning at Louvain. Of itself, Louvain is in-

teresting and significant only as a larger and more clearly perceived example of what took place in scores of French and Belgian villages, towns, and cities.

The origin of the Louvain crime remains obscure. Apparently German troops, returning from a fight with the Belgians to the north, were mistaken by other German troops for the enemy and fired upon. This firing was attributed to Belgian civilians and thereupon began a reprisal worthy of the best achievement in infamy of any age.

In the slaughter that followed either age nor sex nor condition was respected. Women were turned over to the soldiers to wreak their will as a matter of discipline, children were slain, old men and young massacred, while whole quarters of the town were consigned to flames.

What was now done in Louvain had already been done in many other Belgian communities. What was sought was not to be mistaken. Belgium had resisted, the Belgian soldiers had fought instead of dispersing when German armies had sought passage through their country. A revolt in Belgium, barely possible now that the mass of the German armies had passed on, might threaten the German cause. The remedy was found in resort to a system of terrorism, to that peculiarly German method which has been identified by all other races as "Ruthlessness."

Louvain was only a symbol. Actually the same spirit was disclosed in scores of places and upon many thousands of men and women. Although Louvain was long closed to the inquiring witnesses of neutral nations, the German retreat after the Marne permitted the investigation of other towns where the method had been employed. In Lorraine, in Champagne, wretched survivors and smoking ruins of Sermaize, of Gerbéviller, of a score of villages and towns, equally testified to German presence and German method.

When the German armies crossed the French frontiers they were preceded by hosts of fleeing Belgians, already crazed by the knowledge of what had taken place in towns the Germans had occupied. All during the Marne campaign the roads behind the battle lines were filled with the women and children, with old men and young, fleeing as the Latin

world had fled before another barbarism which also had a Teutonic origin and similarly employed the system of ruthlessness.

Nor were brutality to helpless human beings and violence to women the sole characteristics; not only were towns burned to terrorize districts, to impress upon the French mind the power and the force of an unconquerable Germany; but where the invaders did not destroy they defiled. The homes of the poor, the bedrooms of the insignificant, quite as much as the châteaux of the rich and the residences of the prosperous, were made the depositories of filth; and the most high-placed officers found pleasure in committing offences against common decency which in children are cured by corporal punishment.

In all this there was only in minor part the evidence of that lack of restraint which belongs to soldiery and has made invasion, even in civilized warfare, a curse and a horror. The worst crimes committed were committed not by brutes escaping from discipline, but by soldiers obeying orders. They were not accidents of war, but details in a carefully compiled plan of making war. They expressed the conclusion of the German mind that the way to conquer a foe was to terrify him, that the way to rob his arm of strength and his spirit of determination was to burn, to rape, to rob, and to murder, until the spirit broke and the soldier laid down his arms to escape a continuation of horrors wreaked upon his women and children.

It was but another manifestation of the same spirit which prompted the Germans, when the Marne was lost and the retreat had come, to turn their artillery against the cathedral at Rheims and begin the systematic destruction of this glorious monument of an ancient world, a destruction which was to continue more than three years. To murder the weak, to dishonour the helpless, to destroy the beautiful; such, it seemed, were to the German mind necessary steps in conquering a foe in the field and destroying an army and a nation.

## IV. The "Lusitania"

The reports of German "terribleness" in Belgium and France were not immediately accepted by the outside world. Even England long

remained incredulous, and not until the Bryce Report set forth the full and duly-proven evidence did the British public accept the testimony of its Belgian and French Allies, confirmed by the reports of British soldiers in Belgium.

Even this testimony might have been rejected by neutral nations had not the invasion of Belgium undermined German credit in the world and the subsequent sinking of the *Lusitania* served to confirm in the minds of men all the worst that had been alleged against German soldiery in Belgium and France. The narration of the *Lusitania* Massacre belongs to the discussion of America's relation to the war, but the moral effect must be emphasized in any discussion of the transformation of the war due to German methods.

This murder of some hundreds of women, children, and non-combatants, many of them citizens of neutral nations; their slaughter in the open sunlight of the whole world, was an offence that could neither be concealed nor explained. The echo of German songs wherever Germans gathered, celebrating this *Lusitania* killing, served to demonstrate how wide was the gulf opening between German and non-German mankind.

When to this crime against the laws of humanity and of nations there was promptly added that of Ypres, where the Germans employed poison gas, forbidden by every convention of civilized warfare, the transformation of the war for the British people and for a great and growing fraction of the American public, was accomplished. Zeppelin raids on London, the bombardment of unoffending and open sea resorts, ultimately the enslavement and deportation of the Belgian people into Germany, were but natural and logical extensions of the German method. They merely gave new force to the argument that the war was a war of moral, not material, interests—a war for civilization and against barbarism.

Stripped of all else, the German spirit, as it revealed itself in these and other incidents, seemed to contemporary mankind unmistakably the assertion of the doctrine that all conventions of humanity, all pledges of national faith, all restrictions of international law, became null and void when they conflicted with a German policy or interfered with a German purpose. Crimes which should have put the guilty beyond the

pale of human society, became meritorious acts when performed by German soldiers and sailors in obedience to orders and in conformity with German plans. Deeds, inhuman beyond all palliation, took on an heroic aspect for the German public when they served to terrorize occupied districts, thereby releasing fighting men for the front. The murder of women and children, the violation of women, the destruction of the homes of the poor and the insignificant, the slaughter of neutral women and children at sea; all means and methods included in the German term of "ruthlessness" were justified, defended, exalted, when they served a German end, and at rare intervals when the offence itself passed the ample German powers of justification, imaginary offences were alleged, after the fact, to explain outrages which were indefensible even on the basis of the invented provocations.

The consequences of this German spirit and method were patent when the period we are now to examine opened. A host of German agents, spies, servants, the ablest of German diplomats and the most astute of German ministers, aided by German residents and fortified by every resource of corruption, were unable permanently to combat the opposition and the hostility aroused in neutral nations. The German policy compelled neutral governments to act in defence of the lives and property of their citizens. The agents of the German Government attacked these governments, seeking to destroy them at home and with their own people. And in the end the governments were driven into open war with Germany, alike to preserve unity at home and to defend the lives and rights of their citizens abroad.

A monstrous German propaganda was conducted in Italy and the United States. Politicians were bought, all the resources of German commerce and finance were invoked, but again and again German intrigue abroad was confounded by German action in Europe. Italy entered the war on the very morning of the *Lusitania*, the German case was destroyed in America by this and succeeding crimes which steadily brought America to a realization of the actual character of the war and an acceptation of the European view.

In Europe the German methods nerved the French people to a

heroism and endurance unsuspected even of this brilliant people. Zeppelin raids, submarine slaughter, the poison gas of Ypres, wakened a sluggish Britain, first to unexpected response to the call for voluntary enlistment and then to conscription itself. Canadian survivors of the "gas attack" brought to America new and veracious reports of German methods, which found slow but sure credence as the meaning of the *Lusitania* Massacre came to the people of the United States.

### V. THE CONSEQUENCES

The consequences of the transformation of the war were not early perceived or justly appraised. It was not until Germany—victorious in the contemporary situation but palpably war weary—made the first peace gesture in the winter of 1916, that it became apparent how completely the war differed from preceding conflicts and how utterly Germany had become, for the peoples at war with her, an outlaw nation with whom it was impossible to negotiate in accordance with time-honoured usage, because peace by negotiation would permit Germany to escape from the consequences of her evil deeds and even, conceivably, to profit by methods which had roused the indignation and abhorrence of all civilized beings.

As the war progressed and more nations were drawn into the whirlpool, agreements were made between Germany's foes to right old wrongs, liberate subject peoples, remake the map of Europe. Utopian schemes were proposed, and schemes which were selfish. But when the Russian Revolution and the consequent restatement of Russian aims destroyed many of these arrangements, there still endured the determination to fight onward until this German purpose was obliterated, this German method discredited in the eyes of the German people, and either a German renunciation of "terribleness" or a German military defeat should put a term to a common peril of all civilized peoples.

To analyze the German spirit, to explain the use of these methods by a people which, before the war, had seemed substantially at one with all other civilized nations in respect of humanity and international faith, must be the work of the psychologist and historian of the future. Certainly it is beyond contemporary power, as it is outside of the resources of the

present writer who has stood amidst the ruins of Gerbéviller and Sermaize and heard from eyewitnesses and participants the shameful story of German deeds in Belgium and France.

And yet despite the passions of the present hour one must perceive elements of grandeur amidst all that is repugnant and hateful in the German idea. The German people as a whole seemed to the world to have been seized with a vision of a magnified and glorified Germany—an ideal Germany for which they gave their blood and treasure without stint and without hesitation. Something of the spirit of the successors of Mohammed certainly shone through the achievements of German soldiers and teachers, who went forth to conquer, sword and torch in hand. They sacrificed life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. They gave up all to serve that ideal German State, and they performed great deeds and mean deeds with equal self-abnegation. And however terrible in detail was this German conception, however regardless of the lives and the rights of other races, however contemptuous of the conventions of other generations, it still acquired a measure of dignity through the devotion it inspired.

Yet since this German ideal actually aimed at German supremacy in the world, the possession of Central Europe, the control of the land routes to Asia and Africa; since it assailed the existence of Frenchman, Belgian, Russian, Serbian; since it aimed at the ultimate destruction of the British Empire and the extinction of Italian aspirations; since, in the pursuit of German ends, it assailed the lives and property of neutrals and denied their right to sail the seas; since it employed methods, abhorrent to all mankind, to obtain ends dangerous to most nations, the whole world gradually took alarm and, one by one, nations far removed from the scene of actual conflict, and little concerned with European questions, took up arms against Germany.

All through the period which we are now to examine this process goes forward. All through this period German methods make new enemies, and the German people, on the morning of great victories, are faced with great combinations of nations, and hand in hand with this goes the ever-constant widening of the gulf between the German people and the rest

of mankind, between the German and the non-Teutonic mind. Actually the transformation of the character of the war was accomplished for Europe by the spring of 1915. The invasion of Belgium, Louvain, the devastation of northern France, Rheims, the *Lusitania* Massacre, the "poison gas" attack of Ypres; these are the stages. By May, 1915, the transformation is complete and the consequences still endure at the opening of the fourth year of the World War, which sees the United States among Germany's foes.

And even if it were conceivable that history should hereafter destroy the contemporary judgments and Germany find justification for all her deeds in the eyes of the future, this would not change the fact that the transformation of the character of the war for the nations fighting in 1915, and for those nations which were to enter it in 1916 and 1917, was one of the dominating and controlling influences in the first three years of the contest. It was with the memory of Louvain, Rheims, and of the newly lost provinces in mind that the French people fought on to and through Verdun; it was with the *Lusitania* in mind and the Zeppelin raids in their eyes that the British people created their volunteer armies; it was with Belgium and the *Lusitania* in their thoughts that the United States first endured the British interference with its commerce and remained the magazine of the enemies of Germany and, at a later date, broke with its oldest tradition and entered a European war.

# CHAPTER THREE

## NAVAL HISTORY

### I

### THE TEACHINGS OF THE PAST

Long before the outbreak of the World War Admiral Mahan had laid down the value of sea power in the wars of the past and estimated its prospective influence in the next war. For Britain and for Germany Admiral Mahan's volumes had become the law and the gospel in naval history, and to the first volume of this American sailor is ascribed the change of policy of the German Emperor, the decision to seek Germany's future on the sea, which led inexorably to the conflict between Teuton and Briton.

Sea power, in all the great conflicts of the past, had not been immediately decisive. Admiral Mahan had pointed out at great length and with a wealth of detail how the French were able, both under Louis XIV and Napoleon, to win, not alone campaigns, but temporary Continental supremacy, only to lose it in the end because they were unable to come to grips with sea power and, thereafter, on British soil, to crush their one implacable enemy.

In our own War of Independence the conclusive victory of Yorktown came when Britain had temporarily lost control of the waters of the American seaboard. Yet, by contrast, absolute supremacy at sea in 1870 did not avail to save the French because the decision on land was immediate and complete. In our own Civil War the North used its sea supremacy to the uttermost and the isolation of the South by blockade was the most potent single factor in the ultimate collapse of the Southern Confederacy.

And with the British declaration of war, in August, 1914, Germany became an isolated nation, so far as sea communication was concerned. First, her merchant marine was swept from the sea. Neutral harbours

became the haven of the great liners which had carried German commerce and German prestige to the ends of the earth. The German flag disappeared from the ocean and the great ports of Hamburg and Bremen became as deserted as Charleston or Savannah in the Civil War epoch. All the vast trade in raw materials and in manufactured articles, the enormous export and import trade, which were the foundation of the prosperity of the new Germany and which had been created by the generation following the Franco-Prussian War, were paralyzed almost in an hour and remained paralyzed in the years of war that followed.

Next, within a time that was relatively brief, such German squadrons and cruisers as were at sea when the storm broke were methodically "mopped up." The *Emden*, the *Königsberg*, the *Karlsruhe* won fleeing fame and rivalled in destruction the exploits of the *Alabama*, but they were in turn remorselessly hunted down and destroyed, in the Indian Ocean, in the Rufigi River on the African coast, and in the South Atlantic. Admiral von Spee's squadron, escaping from a Japanese fleet and sweeping across the Southern Pacific, won a momentary success at Coronel, only to perish gloriously at Falkland Islands, in a fight that did honour to German seamanship and valour but revealed the hopeless inferiority of German naval strength. When this process of sweeping the seas was completed the oceans lay open to Allied commerce and were closed to German vessels of war and of commerce alike.

Never had a victory been more complete than that of the British navy in this first phase of the war, at sea. The old apprehension of a German raid upon British coasts, the idle but familiar legend of a contemplated German invasion of Britain, was revealed in its full absurdity. The accident of the mobilization of the whole British fleet at the moment of the outbreak of the war for its annual manœuvres; the rare good judgment of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, in countermanding the orders for demobilization and retaining the fleet in being during the critical days from July 25 to August 4, gave Britain, on the water, precisely that advantage Germany enjoyed on land, and abolished not merely the remote chance of a German attack upon Britain, but the

very real danger that German cruisers might escape from their naval ports to the high seas and carry on a long and costly war upon British and Allied commerce.

In this phase of the war the British fleets accomplished what had been impossible a century before. Villeneuve's fleet had eluded Nelson on a famous occasion, Napoleon had taken an army to Egypt and himself escaped to France at a critical moment in European history. But under the new conditions of steam navigation the command of the sea by the supreme naval power had attained a degree of the absolute, unknown in history. And so far as German commerce and German sea power were concerned this power was to remain absolute, even when the submarine began to take its toll of belligerent and neutral merchant marine.

## II. THE CONSEQUENCES

The first consequence of this assertion of sea power was the successful despatch of the British army to France. While the Grand Fleet moved majestically out of the vision of the world and took its station in northern Scotland, there to keep watch and ward, to take and retain a silent but remorseless grip upon the throat of German commerce, the lighter craft assured the safe passage of the Channel by Field Marshal Sir John French's army, transported with a speed and a success which established new records in this department of war. From the outbreak of war to the end of the First Battle of Ypres not much less than 200,000 troops were thus ferried across the Channel, and their presence in France was essential to the safety of the whole Allied cause. Had these troops not arrived, France would have fallen. At the moment when the western battle was reaching a crisis, the arrival of an Indian Army Corps brought from the Far East saved the day. Thus, in a very real sense, the war on land was made possible for the Allies, and defeat was avoided, not merely by the valour of the troops at the front, but equally by the service of the British fleet.

Later the tide of Colonial support was in turn brought to Europe. Asia, Africa, Australia, Canada were able, as they had been always willing, to take their place beside the Mother Country on the French and Belgian

fronts and elsewhere, when the flood of war turned to the Near East. In the first three years of the war not less than three million men were thus carried from all over the world to France and Belgium, and this mighty task was accomplished without the loss of a transport, while the passage from Boulogne to Folkestone, from Calais to Dover, continued as safe from German attack as the ferries in the North and East rivers of New York City.

Once more, as in the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon, Britain sat safe behind the silver ribbon of the Channel. Zeppelins and airplanes might at intervals reach her cities and exact their toll of lives, mainly of children and women; an occasional German raider might come down Channel or bombard a seacoast resort; but despite these hostile manifestations, Britain remained secure in her islands and gathered up her millions to strike her great foe.

Nor was the second consequence of supremacy at sea less important to the Allied cause. Germany had struck at her own hour and after full preparation. Her first blow had given her possession of the industrial districts of Belgium and northern France, the iron mines of Lorraine, the coal regions of Mons and Lens. She had in her grip the factories of Liége, of Lille, of Tourcoing, and of Roubaix. St. Quentin, all the great manufacturing districts of the valleys of the Scarpe, the Deule, the Scheldt, and the Sambre were at her disposal.

Thanks to the British fleet, however, this enormous initial advantage was promptly counterbalanced by the transformation of industrial America into the workshop, the arsenal, the granary of the Allies. In a few short months all the vast machinery of the great plants of the Western Republic were working for the Allies. Ammunition, guns, all the necessary implements and munitions of war were manufactured and transported across the ocean, until the whole western front met German attack with American rifles, American ammunition. The vast new armies of Britain were equipped in considerable part by America, and, thanks to this, were able to take their place upon the western front months in advance of the hour that they could have arrived save for American factories. What the British factories had done for the North in

the Civil War, those of the United States did for Britain and France in the new world struggle.

Nor was the food supply less important. When the mobilization of an ever-growing percentage of the manhood of the warring nations brought with it diminishing food supplies, the United States, with Canada and Australia, supplied the Allied deficit. Thanks to the British fleet and the American wheat fields, the French people could still procure white bread long months after it had disappeared in Germany, and procure it at the ante-bellum price. When want invaded Germany, and privation, if not starvation, arrived; when the sufferings of the masses due to the blockade were very great, Britain still was well fed, and France had not yet begun to feel that need of economy in food which came only with the third winter of the war.

### III. THE NAPOLEONIC PRECEDENT

Because of this situation; because the sea power of Britain enabled America to feed and arm the Allies and thus deprive Germany of most of the advantage due to superior preparation and early military successes; because the people of Britain and France escaped hunger, while it already threatened the German people; because sea power, in fact, made all neutral nations the allies of the enemies of Germany, the sources of the arms and munitions employed to destroy German armies, Germany was in the end led to imitate the Napoleonic policy, which led to the downfall of the First Empire.

At Jena, Austerlitz, Wagram, Friedland, Napoleon won victories which brought Prussia, Austria, Russia, the Continent to his feet. But ever and again British money and British influence roused a new coalition and compelled a new war. And it was the effort to get at Britain which led him to Egypt, to Warsaw, at last to Moscow. It was his effort to compel the nations of the Continent to join France in closing their ports to British ships and British commerce, thus to destroy commercial Britain, that was his undoing.

We are accustomed to think that it was the insatiable ambition of Napoleon which led him to seize Hamburg and Danzig, to establish

French rule along the Adriatic, and deprive Austria of her Illyrian coast. But the purpose of the great Emperor was rather to lay hands upon all the doors by which British goods reached continental ports. His Berlin and Milan decrees were provoked by British hostility and in these lay the seeds of his downfall. To get at Britain, he had to deprive the German and Austrian States of their sea front; it was because of Russian refusal to accept the Napoleonic policy that the Moscow campaign was provoked. The long and deadly wastage of the war in Spain was alike the consequence of a desire to close Spain and Portugal to British ships, and of the ability of the British themselves to transport armies to the Iberian peninsula.

Seeking to isolate Britain, Napoleon was led from campaign to campaign, from annexation to annexation. He was brought to the necessity of destroying the commercial life, not merely or primarily of France, but of Russia, of Prussia, and of Austria; and, as a consequence, Austria, Russia, and Prussia were driven inexorably into alliance with Britain. And ultimately, such an alliance, at Leipzig and Waterloo, destroyed Napoleon.

In precisely the same fashion the German situation led to a similar policy. The neutral nations had become the arsenal and the granary of the Allies. It was impossible for Germany, acting in accordance with international law, to prevent this. It was the unquestioned right of neutral nations to trade with belligerents—it was not their fault that the British fleet had closed German ports. No law, no conception of international law, warranted Germany in asking them to declare an embargo upon munitions, to abandon the policy Germany had pursued as recently as during the South African War.

And Germany could not blockade Britain. Her sole weapon was the submarine; but to employ the submarine necessitated the sinking of neutral as well as belligerent ships, whether carrying contraband or merely engaged in lawful trade allowed by all the rules of civilized warfare. German necessity, which had led German armies into Belgium to strike at France and thus insured British entrance into the war, now confronted a new obstacle, which carried with it an even deadlier peril, since it involved the ultimate defeat of Germany, so her statesmen and

soldiers reasoned, if Britain in security could arm her millions and feed her population with American meat and wheat.

Thus we shall see Germany, in this present period, led, through the direct influence of British sea power, to one deed after another, to one policy after another, designed to interrupt the flow of munitions and food to Britain, provoked by the shadow of hunger at home while her great enemies still had plenty, but calculated to rouse the neutral nations of the earth, and destined, in the end, to bring the United States and a whole powerful group of other neutrals into the war on the Allied side and thus transform neutrals into enemies. By adopting a course designed to deprive Britain and France of the benefits flowing from intercourse with these neutrals, Germany, in the end, made war with neutrals inevitable.

This was the achievement of British sea power. It was, ultimately, a decisive influence in the progress of the war. It did produce conditions which led Germany to attack neutrals; it did bring other nations into the war as the German invasion of Belgium had mobilized British sentiment for war. But it was not until a later phase that the real importance of this consequence became clear to the world.

Yet, at the outset, it is essential to see the German conception. Only by a rapid dash through Belgium could Germany hope to win her war as she meant to win it. Since this was the plain fact, Germany disregarded her pledge, ignored the rights and liberties of Belgium, and made her progress from Liége to Mons and thence to the very gates of Paris. Her necessity justified, to German minds, that wrong to Belgium which was incidental.

When the end of the first land campaign had failed to bring a German victory, and a long war was certain, German defeat became a possibility if the United States and the other neutrals were to remain the sources of Allied munitions and weapons. Germany might not starve, but she was sure to be outgunned, outmunitioned, outnumbered, if she failed to achieve a decision before British and French and Russian armies could be equipped from America, while British and French millions were fed from American food sources.

The sole alternative was a "ruthless" submarine war, which would destroy British merchant marine engaged in American commerce and so terrify neutral and particularly American shipping that it would refrain from entering British and French waters and bringing food and munitions to the enemy. And as in the case of Belgium, Germany made her decision. In the case of Belgium she risked British entrance into the war. In the case of the submarine she risked the entrance of the United States and of other states. Again the German people and the German rulers argued themselves into the belief that they would derive the profit without encountering the peril of such a course. Again they deceived themselves.

The submarine war upon commerce belongs to another chapter, but its genesis is in the successful assertion by the British of sea power in the first phase of the war. Inexorably this led William II into the fatal pathways of Napoleon I. Inevitably, as in the case of the French Emperor, William II found himself, on the morrow of great victories, compelled to deal with fresh coalitions of foes. Thus, though the British armies were long in arriving, though France had to bear two years of agony before the new British hosts could begin, British sea power exerted an influence quite as great as Mahan had forecast, and without this British aid the French and Russians would have succumbed almost at the start, and thereafter whenever it had been withdrawn. This was Britain's great contribution over two years and its value cannot be exaggerated.

### IV. NAVAL ENCOUNTERS

The outbreak of the war saw the British fleet take its post in Scotch waters, facing the German ports. For the first days and weeks the whole world awaited a Trafalgar or a Salamis at sea, as it watched for a Waterloo or a Sedan on land. But the German fleet was too inferior in strength to challenge the British armada, and the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe dominated the North Sea. Not until the still-remote day of Jutland was the German High Seas Fleet to venture forth within range of British first-line squadrons. German strategy was from the outset to disclose itself as a strategy of waiting, a strategy which had for its chief

# THE NAVIES AT GALLIPOLI



H. M. S. *QUEEN ELIZABETH*

H. M. S. *IRRESISTIBLE*

H. M. S. *OCEAN*

SOME BRITISH SHIPS AT THE DARDANELLES

The *Irresistible* and *Ocean* were sunk by Turkish mines on March 18, 1915, the day when an attempt was made to force a passage through the Dardanelles. The crew of the *Irresistible* escaped, but the *Ocean* went down so quickly that most of her people were drowned.

Of this trio the great super-dreadnought *Queen Elizabeth* alone lived to fight another day, because she was too valuable to be subjected to the risks run by the other ships.




*Drawn for the "Independent" by Arthur Elder*

## THE LONG, HARD ROAD TO CONSTANTINOPLE

"Dardanelles" and "Gallipoli" are words that will always evoke memories painful to the Allies. For here the naval attack of February and March, 1915, failed utterly, and three battleships with 2,000 lives were lost in a few hours. The combined attack by land and sea, which came later, was equally futile and far more disastrous. "The Gallipoli venture, first and last, used up not less than a quarter of a million British troops and cost more than 100,000 casualties on the British side alone."

A great deal of ancient history has been made in this region. Here the Greeks fought the Trojans in prehistoric times; here the Spartans defeated the Athenians in the eventful battle of Aegospotamos in 405 B. C.; and here Xerxes crossed from Asia to conquer Europe in 480 B. C., and Alexander crossed from Europe to conquer Asia in 334 B. C.

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

FRENCH BATTLESHIPS AT THE DARDANELLES

When this photograph was taken these ships were bombarding the Dardanelles forts, firing over the hill which forms the background of the picture. A glance at the picture-map on the opposite page will show the station of the French ships in the Gulf of Xeros, from which they destroyed Bulair fort, overlooking the entrance to the Sea of Marmora.



FRENCH HYDROAEROPLANE AND WARSHIPS AT THE DARDANELLES

This hydroaeroplane has been sent out by one of the ships to observe the effect of the bombardment



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ON BOARD A CRUISER AT THE DARDANELLES

French marines directing the fire of a light, rapid-fire gun against the Turkish batteries on the shore

THE BRITISH FLEET AT ANCHOR OFF KUM KALE

The observer stands near the Dardanelles' entrance where the Allies easily won a foothold. "With no great trouble the first barrier was destroyed and the mine-sweepers entered the straits and began the work of clearing the channel for the larger ships. This work continued from February 19, until March 18, 1915, when the road was clear for the great attack. On this day the whole fleet steamed up the straits toward the narrows. It was the belief of naval officers that the long protracted bombardments had silenced the Turkish forts. They were promptly undeceived."

GERMAN SHIP CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH IN THE DARDANELLES

When her capture became inevitable, the Turks managed to torpedo her. This gaping hole just above the water-line is the result

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

ON BOARD A TRANSPORT STEAMING UP THE DARDANELLES

The uniforms and faces of these soldiers and sailors betray their English origin. They are some of the "Anzacs," who fought and died devotedly, but in vain on the terrible Gallipoli peninsula

FRENCH TROOPS LANDING AT THE DARDANELLES

This landing-place is on the Asiatic side of the straits, just inside of Kum Kale, at the mouth of the little River Menderes, which was called the Scamander when the Siege of Troy took place upon its banks. A fleet of transports lies in the offing and the dim land beyond is Cape Elles, on the European side of the straits, where Fort Sidd El Bahr (captured by the Allies) was located.

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AN EXPLODING MINE

This picture was taken from on board a British destroyer in the Dardanelles, at the instant a Turkish mine exploded within a few feet. Photographers in the World War have had many hairbreadth escapes, but few have missed death more narrowly than he who took this picture.

aim to weaken the British by successful attacks upon individual ships until resulting attrition should restore the balance between the two fleets.

Such strategy was wise and inevitable. Behind the sand banks and narrow channels of German shores, covered by the fortress of Heligoland (which a pacific Britain, unmindful of the future, had surrendered to Germany for a price, now become ridiculous), preserving by the Kiel Canal the sure entrance into the Baltic and the consequent supremacy in that sea, the German fleet waited. Winston Churchill might later utter bold words about "digging the rats out," but the task was beyond the capacity of a modern fleet, threatened with all the perils of contemporary naval warfare.

Thus the naval warfare resolved itself into minor encounters and incidental losses—none of real importance, none calculated to change the balance between the two fleets—and thus enable the Germans to risk all in that long-toasted encounter "The Day," when German was to meet Briton on the high seas and German victory doom a modern Carthage. Powerless to prevent British armies from crossing the Channel and British cruisers from sweeping the seas clear of German merchantmen, the Kaiser's navy was compelled to confine itself to filling the North Sea with mines, attacking isolated ships with submarines, and risking minor encounters with smaller units.

In this time the French fleet, in strict conformity with arrangements made before the war, arrangements cited by Sir Edward Grey when he declared that Germany must not attempt to come through the Channel or attack France unless with the clear recognition that Britain would intervene, took over the task of maintaining Allied security in the Mediterranean and sealing the Austrian fleet up within the Adriatic, a task that the French were to perform until the hour when Italy should enter the war and Italian squadrons take over a portion of this difficult task.

Yet before the French could assume the whole burden, their fleets had necessarily to cover the transportation of French troops from Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco to the home ports. And in this time there occurred an event which was fraught with fatal consequences. The German cruisers, the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, caught in the western Mediterranean at

the onset of hostilities, fled to Messina, after having bombarded Bona and Philippeville on the Algerian coast. Ordered to leave the Italian port, they sailed to what seemed certain death, since a British squadron was in their pathway.

Yet, as a result of circumstances that can hardly fail to be a permanent ground for censure of the British Fleet, these ships escaped, reached the Dardanelles, passed them, and came to anchor in the Golden Horn. Having permitted them to get away, the British admiral failed to follow them into Turkish waters, risking Turkish resistance. As a result the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* became a decisive influence in driving Turkey into conflict with the Allies. The ships, retaining their German crews, passed to the Turkish navy. Presently they appeared in the Black Sea and, by attacking Russian ships, provoked a Russian declaration of war. In this incident is seen the first in the long series of failures and blunders which were to cost the Allies so dearly in the Near East. And even at the end of three years the explanation of the escape of these ships remains hidden.

By contrast, the dash of British smaller craft into the Bight of Heligoland and the sinking of two German cruisers was a detail, although the brilliance of the exploit filled Britain with pride at the moment. But British rejoicing was brief. Less than a month afterward one German submarine accounted for three large British boats, the *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, and *La Hogue*, under conditions that were again a reproach to British naval generalship, while in following weeks other British ships of greater value were victims of this new weapon. The war had not proceeded for two months before the British as well as the rest of the world were aware that, given her inferiority in resources, Germany was to prove no mean antagonist on Britain's own element.

At the moment of the German advance in Flanders, when the 1914 phase of western operations reached its crisis and the Kaiser and his hosts came pounding down from Antwerp on the road to Calais, the British fleet intervened and saved the Belgian army by sweeping the invaders from the road along the sand dunes which led by Nieuport to Boulogne.

But by far the most interesting and considerable naval operations between the outbreak of the war and Gallipoli were the two battles in South American waters, one at Coronel on the Pacific Coast, the other at the Falkland Islands. In the former, an inferior squadron of British boats, the antiquated *Monmouth* and *Good Hope*, accompanied by the *Glasgow*, which had little fighting value, and deprived of the doubtful aid of the *Canopus*, encountered the squadron of Admiral von Spee, which included the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, two swift and powerful cruisers, as well as the *Nuremberg*, *Dresden*, and *Leipzig*. The fight was short and the end complete. Admiral Cradock went down with his flagship, the *Good Hope;* the *Monmouth* shared the same fate; the *Glasgow* escaped. Once more there had been a blunder—the size and strength of the German Pacific squadron had been known, and to send such old and inadequate vessels to meet it was to send ships and men to certain doom.

The defeat was quickly avenged. Two new battle cruisers, the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, were sent swiftly and secretly from England. With them went three armoured cruisers, the *Carnarvon*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall;* at sea this squadron, commanded by Admiral Sturdee, met the *Bristol* and then the *Glasgow*, the sole survivor of Cradock's battle. This considerable squadron entered the port of the Falkland Islands to coal and on the next day the squadron of Spee, seeking the *Canopus* and the *Glasgow*, appeared. Cradock had perished on November 1; on December 7 Spee's whole squadron, save for the *Dresden* which escaped and kept afloat until March, went down in a running fight. A few survivors were picked up by the victors, but most of the officers and men under Spee met a sailor's death after a brave but hopeless fight, quite as unequal as had been the struggle at Coronel. Thus an unnecessary defeat was avenged by a brilliant victory, and Germany's only squadron outside of home waters annihilated.

### V. THE DARDANELLES

A single other naval venture alone commands attention in the first year and a half of war. The entrance of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* into the Dardanelles had determined the decision of the Turks and the

Turkish declaration of war had isolated Russia. Germany, holding the mastery of the Baltic, her Osmanli ally master of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, there was left to Russia only the remote ports of Archangel on the north and Vladivostok in the Far East. And both were closed for long periods by winter and neither could serve as the base for Russian armies.

Already, before the end of the autumn of 1914, Russia was beginning to feel the pinch for munitions and, since it was necessary to finance Russia in part, nothing was more essential than that Russian wheat should flow outward to balance the Allied credits and repay the Allied loans. Nor was it less necessary that the crushing of Turkey should be prompt, that Allied ascendancy in the Balkans might be maintained and Bulgarian stirring checked.

Were it possible then to force the Dardanelles, to push through with a fleet, as Admiral Duckworth had done a century before; to arrive before Constantinople, as a British fleet had done in the critical days of the last Russo-Turkish war when Russian armies were approaching the Golden Horn, the profit would warrant paying any reasonable price alike in ships and lives. Here, very concisely, were the terms of that great gamble, which was the naval attack upon the Dardanelles. It failed absolutely. One of its consequences, but not an inevitable consequence, was the subsequent land and sea attack, the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign, which brought such a train of evil and even of scandal.

Yet the original risk, accepted by Winston Churchill, whose imagination, as usual, passed his judgment, calling as it did for the risk of a few obsolete ships, supported by only one or two modern and first-line units, did not pass British and French resources; nor were the actual losses, as the event proved, sufficiently heavy to weaken in any measure either British or French sea establishment.

The real criticism of the Dardanelles affair is to be found, if at all, in the fact that all the lessons of naval warfare were against it. Sampson had declined a similar venture before Santiago when confronted by forts far inferior. Farragut had passed the forts at the mouth of the Missis-

sippi, and New Orleans had fallen as a result; but in that earlier period, indeed down to the contemporary era, the menace of mines had been practically non-existent, and Farragut could without too great rashness say at Mobile: "Damn torpedoes, go ahead!" since the torpedo of the Civil War age was to be classed as well-nigh futile. But the Japanese at Port Arthur had not risked any forcing of the entrance.

More difficult than the entrance to Santiago or to Port Arthur, better defended as to forts and as to guns, since the defences had been the work of the German General Staff and German officers commanded many of the batteries of heavy guns, themselves the product of Krupp, the Dardanelles were in fact beyond the power of a fleet to reduce, and from the very outset the attempt was doomed to repulse. Since this was patent, plainly the wiser course would have been to wait until land forces were available and make a joint operation; and such a joint operation could have a chance of success only if it were not preceded by a naval attack without land aid, which would forewarn the Turks and lead to the immediate fortification of the Gallipoli peninsula and thus to the defeat of any land operations.

But in February, 1915, neither were land forces available nor was it easy to see whence they could be derived in any immediate future. When General Ian Hamilton's army was at last sent to the Gallipoli Peninsula it was not only inadequate for its task, but its departure weakened British armies in France, contributed to the failure of the British effort in Artois, and produced a situation in which Field Marshal Sir John French, on the evening of a day at Festubert, when he had lost thousands of men because his guns lacked ammunition to prepare an attack, received orders to send a considerable share of a non-existent reserve stock of shells to the Dardanelles.

And since men were lacking and the opportunity dazzled those who played with it, the fleet undertook an impossible task, failed, and gave it up, wisely and in time. Had there been no further venture, the Dardanelles experiment would have been a detail; indeed so unmistakably tremendous were the certain rewards of success that the judgment of those who ordered the attack might have been accepted. As it was, the

Dardanelles was the first step in one of the most gigantic blunders in military history and its consequences were fraught with incalculable harm to the Allies.

### VI. THE DEFEAT

The actual naval operation at the Dardanelles is simply told. About a hundred miles west of Constantinople the sea of Marmora narrows to a channel in places less than a mile wide and rarely more than three. For sixty miles this channel winds to the Ægean, separating the Gallipoli Peninsula from the Asiatic mainland and at its mouth washing the shore, forever memorable as the scene of the Siege of Troy. Through this channel the current runs southwestward at the rate of four miles an hour. In the time of sailing ships this current was an obstacle to navigation, and it became a peril to the modern battleship when floating mines were adopted as an engine of destruction.

At the point where it enters the Ægean, this channel is several miles wide and it was imperfectly guarded by a few old forts, mounting guns of no real value against armoured ships. But fourteen miles upstream the channel narrows to a pass hardly three quarters of a mile wide, and makes a sharp turn. At this point, strongly reminiscent of the entrance to Santiago harbour, the Turks had erected a series of strong forts on either shore. Here is the village of Nagara, on the site of the ancient Abydos; here Leander swam the straits to meet Hero; and here Lord Byron repeated the feat centuries later. Here was the great obstacle—the sea gate to Constantinople.

Having assembled a fleet of French and British warships, mainly composed of ships mounting heavy guns but no longer in the first line, although there were also present the *Queen Elizabeth*, one of the newest British superdreadnoughts mounting fifteen-inch guns, and the *Inflexible*, which had shared in the winning of the Battle of Falkland Islands, the Allies, on February 19, began the work of silencing the forts at the entrance of the Straits, and the Plains of Troy and the hills that had looked down upon the Homeric struggle echoed to the roar of modern high explosives.

With no great trouble the first barrier was destroyed and the mine

sweepers entered the Straits and began their work of clearing the channel for the larger ships. This work continued until March 18, when the road was clear for the great attack. On this day the whole fleet steamed up the Straits toward the narrows. It was the belief of the naval officers that the long-protracted bombardments had silenced the Turkish forts. They were promptly undeceived.

Suddenly all the forts opened fire. Soon three great shells fell upon the French ship *Bouvet* and at the same moment she touched one of the floating mines the Turks had launched. In three minutes the ship had disappeared, carrying most of her crew down with her. An hour later the *Irresistible* struck a mine; her crew escaped but the ship subsequently sank. Next the *Ocean* touched a mine, and she went down almost as quickly as the *Bouvet.* Meantime the French *Gaulois* and the British *Inflexible* had been put temporarily out of action by gunfire.

This was the end. Three battleships and two thousand lives had been lost and the Straits had not been forced; the forts had not been silenced; the peril of mines had not been surmounted. At the moment when the world was still looking for the arrival of the Allied fleet at the Golden Horn and the restoration of the Cross at St. Sofia on Easter Sunday, the Allied fleet had abandoned the task as impossible. Once more, as so often in his long European history, the "Sick Man of the East" had recovered on what had seemed his death bed.

This decisive defeat at the Dardanelles was the second in the series of Allied failures in the Near East; allowing the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* to escape had been the first. By this later failure, Allied prestige in the Balkans was dangerously impaired. In Sofia and Athens the defeat of sea power produced echoes which were not heard at the time, but were memorable at a later date.

Yet even after that failure, the dazzling lure remained. No man could exaggerate the value to the Allies of a victory that should open the sea gate of Constantinople and restore communication with Russia. Hence, when the fleet had failed, the temptation to try again, with an army to support the navy, was almost irresistible. It could not be resisted, because it had seized the mind and fired the imagination of one

of the most brilliant, if most erratic, of Allied statesmen. The first venture was to be ascribed to Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. He was now to push his project in the teeth of the opposition of Field Marshal Sir John French and General Joffre, and to draw away from the main front, at a critical hour, men and guns sadly needed in Artois. But for the moment, while the new operation was preparing, the Gallipoli affair languished.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# SEA POWER, AND THE GERMAN PLACE IN THE SUN

## I

## THE FAMILIAR STORY

In one other respect the dominant sea power in the present struggle repeated the familiar achievements of the past. In the long struggle between Britain and the House of Bourbon in the Eighteenth Century, France, frequently victorious in Europe and usually, although not always, fighting on enemy soil on the Continent, saw her overseas empire extinguished. India and Quebec were lost by the Old Monarchy, and Napoleon, having for a moment conquered Egypt and acquired Louisiana, was obliged to flee the former and sell the latter. Thanks to sea power Britain was able to wreck all the colonial aspirations and efforts of France at Plassey and on the Heights of Abraham, and at the end of the Napoleonic Wars France was once more restricted to the European Continent, after two centuries of colonial effort and no small temporary success.

The destruction of the German colonial edifice was much more prompt, as British control of the seas was more nearly absolute in the twentieth than in the preceding centuries. The very first week of the war saw the German colony of Togo in Anglo-French hands; thereafter in steady succession the other outlying possessions of the German Empire were conquered. With the outbreak of the war they were isolated from the Fatherland; thereafter it became merely a question of time until they should fall like ripe fruit into the hands of the enemy, and, though their defence was brave and the task of occupation arduous, by reason of distances, poor communications, and sparse population, there was never a moment of hope that German East Africa could escape the fate of Quebec, or the German Kamerun that of French India. From August, 1914, onward, the various colonies simply awaited the

moment when the British and their allies should feel willing to spare the men and material for "Side Shows," for these minor campaigns necessary to extinguish German "places in the sun" of Africa and of Asia.

GERMANY'S FORMER POSSESSIONS IN THE PACIFIC

The black area shows Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and the other German possessions in the Pacific—now lost to her. Their proximity to Britain's "island-continent" explains why the Australians have resolved that this territory shall never be returned to Germany.

And there was one more notable detail in which these campaigns recalled the past. In her great struggles with France on the American Continent, Britain had been aided and even led on by her American colonists.

Now it was the Australians who crossed the narrow channels to seize the German islands to the northward. New Zealand stretched a hand out to German Samoa; South Africa, having suppressed a German-incited rebellion, sent an army under Botha, the famous Boer commander now wearing the British uniform, to clean out German power and German intrigue from German Southwest Africa, as it later sent Smuts to repeat the achievement in German East Africa.

Aided in the Pacific by Japan and by her own Australasian subjects, in Africa by the Boer and British colonists alike, supported by French and Belgian troops in Central Africa, drawing upon East Indian and black troops, Britain slowly but surely dealt with the German overseas colonies.

And in all this there was nothing that rose to the level of a great campaign—there was nothing that suggested the glories of the Eighteenth Century struggles in India and America. Nowhere had German occupation sent down the roots that French settlement had developed in America. Brilliant achievements there were, achievements that gladden the sporting instinct of the Briton or delight those who love the romantic and picturesque. Yet, in the main, the destruction of the German colonial empire was comparable with the absorption of a helpless victim by an anaconda.

It was the recognition of this very helplessness of their colonies that had made the Germans furious before the war; it was this helplessness beyond the seas which accentuated their passion when their victorious armies were approaching Warsaw and within reach of Constantinople, while their guns were still audible in Paris.

In all this, too, history did but repeat itself, and the German, familiar with his history, could feel even in victory something of the cold breath of the past which had blown in upon Napoleon's Empire and stayed the hand of the great conqueror. Like Napoleon, William II could win battles and campaigns in Europe, but like Napoleon he was halted at the seashore, while beyond the range of his land guns he saw an empire disappear and, in addition to the empire which was German by possession, that other far more considerable empire which was the creation of the

merchants, the bankers, and overseas representatives of that new commercial Germany, which on every sea and in every continent had been threatening British commerce. Small wonder was it that a German Hymn of Hate rose shrilly and even more shrilly as time went on.

### II. GERMANY'S PLACE IN THE SUN—MITTELAFRIKA

At the moment when the World War came, Germany had a far-flung circle of colonies. Murdered missionaries in China had been paid for by the cession of Kiaou-Chau, which was already raising its head as a rival to British possession and Japanese. A German Hong Kong in the making, a counterweight to Port Arthur newly won from Russia, Tsingtau was showing swift progress and extending a railway tentacle deep into Chinese territory. Southward, Germany had purchased from Spain the last remnant of her Pacific empire, the stray islands excluded by the United States from its purchases following the Spanish-American War. One of the Samoan group, the northeastern quarter of New Guinea, near Australia, these were the widely separated and comparatively insignificant colonial possessions of the Germans in the Far East, ridiculously insignificant to the German mind reflecting upon the European greatness of his country, when he contrasted them with British India, French Indo-China, American Philippines, Japanese Corea, or with the great English-speaking empire growing up to the south of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land.

But it was in Africa that the German had laid the foundations of a real empire, although even here his possessions seemed to him all too limited and scattered. A million square miles in area, Togo, Kamerun, German East Africa, and German Southwest Africa, were divided from each other, cut off from the fertile regions of the Congo Valley, walled in by British and French colonies vastly more desirable; or strangled by Portuguese and Belgian territories whose integrity was guaranteed by British and French treaties.

In the face of all this Germany had cherished a dream and conceived a plan. Already German patriots had constructed maps showing a German colony extending from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic,




GERMANY'S AFRICAN EMPIRE

The checkered areas show the German colonies at the outbreak of the war. In the first year of fighting the Germans were driven out of them all except East Africa in some parts of which they continued a stubborn resistance into the fourth year of the war.

The heavy black line incloses the African territory that Germany hoped to acquire. Note its junction with Turkey-in-Asia and thus with Middle Europe, through Egypt.

including Belgian Congo and French and British possessions between Stanley Falls and Lake Tchad. Portuguese colonies on the east and west coasts were also marked with German colours. Here, in the great basin of the Congo, including the headwaters of the Nile, extending from the Orange River to the mouth of the Niger on the west coast and from the Zambesi to the frontiers of Uganda on the east, the German had traced out a tentative place in the sun of Africa.

Nor did the dream end with this huge proposal. In addition not a few German patriots, never reconciled to British conquest of the Transvaal and Orange Free State and firmly convinced that both states would welcome the chance to throw off British rule and exchange the yoke of King George for the sovereignty of the Kaiser, boldly coloured Africa with the German shade from the Cape of Good Hope to the borders of Egypt and spoke confidently of the time when this Mittelafrika would be joined to a Mitteleuropa, dominated by Germany, by way of the Bosporus and Suez, and Cecil Rhodes's dream have a German realization.

Meantime, Germany had already taken the first step toward the achievement of this colossal project. In 1911, when the Agadir crisis had broken, Germany had, after vain efforts to claim a share of the Shereefian Empire, found her "compensation" for French Moroccan gains in the Congo and thrust forward two long tentacles across French territory, bringing German garrisons to the west banks of the Congo and Ubanghi rivers at the moment when a German railroad was approaching the eastern frontiers of the Belgian colony on Lake Tanganyika. While Britain was intent upon realizing her Cape-to-Cairo project, Germany was preparing for the Transafrican railroad, which, unlike the long-contemplated French Transaharan condemned to desert regions, would tap some of the most fertile regions on the planet.

Behind all the commercial advantages lay the prospective hosts that Germany could enlist among the natives of the African empire under German officers, submitted to German training, equipped with all the resources of Krupp. Already envious of the progress made by France in training Arab, Kabyle, and Negro troops, whose fighting qualities had

been revealed in Europe in 1870, Germany contemplated organizing black armies which should sweep Africa from one end to the other and carry German power from Suez to Tangier, from Cairo to Cape Town.

If Germany, the Pan-Germans, nourished a dream of a restoration of the Old German Empire in Europe, of a Mitteleuropa which should stretch from the Channel to the eastern limits of Courland and Poland and from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and Suez, the German Colonial Party had a vision of a Mittelafrika only less splendid, and there were not a few who dreamed that the two conceptions might be fused, when German armies, with Turkish aid, should enter Cairo and other German forces, armies created out of the boundless human reservoirs of Central Africa, should liberate the South African Republics, restore the Boers to the Teutonic world, and extinguish British power at the Cape.

### III. THE FACT

Such was the vision. But in July, 1914, the fact was still far different. In an African empire five times the area of the Fatherland the Germans had established less than 22,000 white settlers. All the sea gates to these colonies were either held or watched by British possessions. Whalefish Bay, the one good harbour of German Southwest Africa, was British. From Zanzibar the British dominated the coast of German East Africa, while the French in their Congo colony, the British in Nigeria, held the harbours of the west coast of Africa, from which railroads would eventually lead inland to the Congo basin.

In North Africa more than a million Europeans were settled under the French flag, and cities like Algiers, Oran, Tunis, calling places of German ships, contrasted unpleasantly for German pride with the little stations of German Africa. Even Dakar, on the west coast, the coaling station for the South American trade, was French, while at Casablanca a new harbour and a new French base were rising. At the other end of Africa another million of whites, British subjects, were opening a new empire which was moving northward toward the Congo valley with swift leaps along railroads which were already approaching the shore of Tanganyika.

Nor had his colonial rule, despite the construction of some railroads and a few model towns, been the success that the German had expected. The inability of the Teuton to deal with a subject race had produced one of the bloodiest of all wars between the white and the black in Africa. In German Southwest Africa the struggle with the Hereros had ended only with the practical extermination of the native, and the colony had been left without labour when the terrible contest was over.

Yet it is but just to say that, before the outbreak of the war, there had been a growing realization in Germany that the African adventure had been badly conducted and that, unless new methods were employed, there could be no success comparable with that of France with its millions of blacks in West Africa or with that of Britain all over the world. Tales of atrocities in their colonies had stirred the sluggish German pulse and men of the commercial rather than the military class were beginning to appear in colonial offices.

In the making of the colonial empire in Africa, Germany had already roused the fear of the Belgians, who saw their territory between the Atlantic and Lake Tanganyika the object of German design. Was it not Bernhardi who had suggested, long before the war, that merely by taking the Congo Free State, Belgium had forfeited her right to have her territory in Europe respected? Portugal had shown alarm when the Germans had prevailed upon the British to agree to a partition of Portuguese colonies when Portugal consented to sell them. Yet, the Germans later charged that Portuguese anxieties were stilled by a renewal of British promise to defend these colonies until Portugal wished to part with them.

France, after the Agadir affair, had seen her Congo territory mutilated. Across that stretch of French territory which had hitherto extended without interruption from Algiers to the shores of the Congo, the Germans had thrust two coils, and French Congo seemed, on the map and to the French mind, already enveloped in the folds of the German boa constrictor and doomed to ultimate disappearance. Already the Congo suggested to the French a second Quebec.

As for Britain, until the outbreak of the war she regarded the German

"HAVE MERCY, O DEVIL OF THE AIR!"

The World War has brought strange things to far corners of the earth. These natives of the French Congo are panic-stricken at their first glimpse of an aeroplane

DRIVING THE GERMANS FROM LAKE TANGANYIKA—I

Part of the British expedition on its way, crossing the reedy swamps of Lake Bangweolo, in northeastern Rhodesia. There were only twenty-seven white men in the party under Commander Simson, R. N., whose success earned him the D. S. O.

DRIVING THE GERMANS FROM LAKE TANGANYIKA—II

Bearers wading the shallows of Lake Bangweolo, with supplies for the expedition upon their heads. Livingstone died not far from here in 1873

A CONVOY IN THE EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Soon after this picture was taken this convoy was attacked by a German force, but successfully defended by British African and East Indian troops

CAPTURE OF MAFIA ISLAND—I

Mafia Island was German territory off the coast of German East Africa. East Indian troops are shown landing at Kissimani Beach. The English *sahib* is conspicuous as he stands in sun-helmet and spotless white uniform at the bow of the boat.

CAPTURE OF MAFIA ISLAND—II

The British flag is being hoisted at Utende, while the King's African Rifles surround it in hollow-square formation

GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA CAMEL CORPS

At the beginning of the war British South Africa was invaded from German Southwest. But the Boers disappointed the Germans by remaining true to the British. Botha had fought against England in the Boer War, but he led the Boers against the Germans, and soon conquered German Southwest for the British Empire.

CAMELS EN ROUTE FOR PALESTINE

It is possible that the same animals may appear both in this picture and in the preceding one. For when the British conquered German Southwest Africa they would naturally have realized the potential value of the German trained camels in safeguarding Egypt, and, later, in the campaigns of Mesopotamia and Palestine.

FRENCH AFRICAN TROOPS AT DUALA—I

Machine gun drill at Duala barracks. As German Southwest Africa was exposed to assault from its more prosperous neighbour, British South Africa, so the (German) Kamerun was at the mercy of the French who were well established in the adjoining French Congo and Sudan. The British colonists in Nigeria and the Belgians in the Belgian Congo were other hostile neighbours.

FRENCH AFRICAN TROOPS AT DUALA—II

A practice march.

The German possessions in western equatorial Africa melted away before French-drilled and British-drilled troops like these, soon after the war began. "German Togoland was conquered by Anglo-French forces after a campaign which lasted but three weeks and was ended in August, 1914. On February 18 of the following year the Kamerun was also in British and French hands."

JAPAN STRIKES GERMANY AT KIAOU CHAU—I

Japanese artillerymen awaiting telephone orders from Headquarters before starting the bombardment of Tsing-tau. They were assisted in this bombardment by the Allied warships.

"Early in September (1914) a Japanese expedition, amounting to one strong division, was landed at Kiaou Chau. . . . Without haste and methodically the Japanese pushed their trenches forward and November 6 saw the forts of the German colony in ruin. The next day Tsing-tau surrendered."



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JAPAN STRIKES GERMANY AT KIAOU CHAU—II

Part of the obstacles which a strong Japanese force found no difficulty in overcoming. The city of Tsing Tau was encircled by miles of this barbed wire entanglement

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JAPAN STRIKES GERMANY AT KIAOU CHAU—III

The effect of the bombardment on the big guns of the German fortress

efforts in Africa with something between disdain and benevolence. Even a German colony extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific and including the Belgian and French Congos did not stir the Briton's pulse, nor did the covert menace to South Africa, for a single moment revealed to the whole world when the Kaiser sent his historic message to President Kruger, disturb the equanimity of a Liberal Ministry, little concerned with Imperial ambitions and convinced that Britain had already reached the point of satiation so far as overseas annexations were concerned. In Central Africa, as in Asia Minor, the British Government and public of 1914 were reconciled to German development, provided it did not threaten the legitimate interests of France or precipitate any European conflict.

And it was this dream of a great African Empire, of a German Congo become almost as real as the German Rhine, of a German Tanganyika, of a Transafrican Empire, which was extinguished—for the period of the war at least—in the first months of the conflict and at the very hour when German victories in Europe filled the bulletins of the world. Thus the Hohenzollerns in their turn fared as had the House of Bourbon when at last sea power was roused.

### IV. JAPAN

In the story of the extinction of German colonial power the Chinese incident naturally takes first place, not merely because it happened to be chronologically the first, but because the participation of Japan gave it unusual value and raised questions which may have incalculable importance in the future, both in the Far East and for the United States and the British colonies of the Australian and American continents.

By her treaty with Britain, by the terms of the alliance that followed the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was bound to support Britain east of Suez, so her participation in attack upon Kiaou-Chau was always assured. Yet there were deeper reasons which made the war popular in the Japanese mind. Following the war with China and after a sweeping victory, German intervention had denied Japan the harvest her victories had earned and her rulers demanded. At this moment in

Far Eastern history, Germany played the part she had played at Berlin. Then she had vetoed Russian aspirations at the Dardanelles. In the later episode she barred the Japanese route to equally cherished objectives and made herself the spokesman for Europe. Here was an injury which the Japanese never forgave, although at the moment they were powerless to revenge.

Not less an affront to Japanese pride was the constantly repeated appeal of the German Emperor to the Western nations to unite in a crusade against "the Yellow Peril." The words of the Emperor when he sent a German expedition to Pekin, exhorting his troops to remember the deeds of Attila and emulate them—an exhortation faithfully observed and remembered in later days when German armies in Belgium and France outstripped the Huns of Attila in destruction—and the attack upon the "Yellow race" therein contained, were a memorable affront to a proud nation, conscious of its growing power and its great achievement, already rivalling the Western races in its development, commercial and industrial, and determined to take an equal rank amongst the great nations of the world.

Nor were these sentimental reasons alone of importance. The Far East, China, was the natural field for Japanese industrial and political expansion. The war with Russia had banished the Slav from the Korean Peninsula and gained both Southern Manchuria and Port Arthur. Having thrust one European nation out of China, Japan could with real enthusiasm aid in the expulsion of another. Nor was there any comparison between the Russian and the German in the matter of commercial rivalry. If Russia could be regarded as a future rival, when she had, in her time, become an industrial and manufacturing nation, Germany was already a real commercial rival. Russia lacked a commercial fleet, but already German ships sailed the Chinese waters and the German flag appeared ever more frequently in Chinese ports. Moreover, from Tsingtau a German railroad had already tapped the coal regions of Shantung, and Teutonic appetite for Chinese territory showed marked expansion.

When Germany, like Russia, was expelled from the Far East, while

Britain and France were occupied with a long war—for the Japanese were not in the dark as to the prospects of the western war—while the United States was still given over to pacifist dreams, unarmed and incapable of defending its colonies or, for that matter, its own Pacific Coast line, Japan might look forward to a long period of unchallenged supremacy in the Far East, and in this time she would be able, not alone to establish her influence in China, but, through her manufacture of war materials for the Russians, acquire that capital she lacked and restore her finances shaken so severely by her war with Russia.

On the other hand, to every suggestion that she send her armies to Europe, Japan was bound to return a polite but firm negative. It was not her concern; it was obviously to her profit that the Western nations should cripple themselves by a long war and find their whole energy for years concentrated upon the European battlefield. If the war ended in the exhaustion of all the contending nations, Japan, still strong in her military and naval establishment, still possessing a huge and well-equipped army, her finances restored and her situation in China fortified by long occupation, could well believe that her place in the world would be increased, her power expanded. Such a struggle might bring her incalculable profit; it could not threaten her with any real danger. Such was Japanese policy.

By contrast with the political aspects of Japanese participation in the war the military incidents at Kiaou-Chau were insignificant. On August 15 Japan despatched an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the departure of German ships from Chinese waters and the transfer of Kiaou-Chau to Japan, as a first step in its return to Chinese control. The time limit fixed in the ultimatum was August 23 and on that day Japan declared war upon Germany.

Early in September a Japanese expedition, amounting to one strong division, was landed near Kiaou-Chau. Fifteen hundred British troops presently joined the Japanese, warships belonging to the Allied nations covered the transport operations and opened the bombardment of Tsingtau. Without haste and methodically the Japanese pushed their trenches forward and November 6 saw the forts of the German colony

in ruin. The next day, November 7, Tsingtau surrendered. A garrison of less than four thousand had made a brave but unavailing resistance. At the moment the German failure at Ypres was assured and the road to Calais barred, Berlin heard through enemy proclamations that her Far Eastern colony was lost.

In this same time Japanese warships had seized German islands in the Pacific, New Zealanders had occupied Samoa, Australians had taken Kaiser Wilhelm's Land. German rule in the Pacific had been abolished.

### V. IN GERMAN AFRICA

The conquest of German Africa is interesting, in the larger view, solely because of the South African episode. Hardly a decade had passed since British armies had at last extinguished Boer resistance in the two Afrikander republics. Only eight years had elapsed since home rule had been granted to the conquered Boers and the Union of South Africa had become a fact. In all German calculations there had been the expectation that at a German appeal, South Africa—Boer South Africa—would rise again and that the outbreak of the European War would be the signal for the end of British rule south of the equator.

That this did not happen was due to the genius of the British race in dealing with its colonies. South Africa had been swiftly reconciled after having been ravaged by a long, bitter war. Forty-four years after French defeat, forty-three years after the Treaty of Frankfort, the mass of the people of Alsace continued to resent German rule and remained loyal to France. But in less than a fifth of this time the conquered Boers had been reconciled to the new condition.

When the war came it had its echoes in South Africa. De Wet, one of the most famous of the Boer leaders, promptly raised the standard of revolt and to this some thousands of the old Boers flocked. But the real power in South Africa was Louis Botha, the greatest of Boer generals in the previous war and now the first Prime Minister in the new colony. In the great crisis he never hesitated, and his influence was decisive. The last days of October saw the outbreak of the rebellion; by December 1 the whole thing had been stamped out, De Wet was a prisoner, all the

raiding bands, which never attained the importance of armies, had been dispersed or captured. South Africa had demonstrated its determination to remain under British rule.

The next step was inevitable. British South Africa had been invaded from German Southwest Africa; the adjoining German colony had been the base for conspiracy and the starting point of invasion. Now, just as the American colonists in the Eighteenth Century had shared with the British the task of expelling the French from Canada, the Boers followed Botha in the invasion of German Southwest Africa and the end was not long in coming. July, 1915, saw the surrender of the last German commander, German Southwest Africa passed to the control of the Union of South Africa. And just as the American colonists disclosed a determination that Quebec should not be returned to the French, the South Africans early proclaimed their annexation of German Southwest Africa as definitive.

Germany had reckoned on the disaffection of British colonies the world over. She had believed the war would cause the loosening of the bonds that held together the British Empire. The response of Canada had been heard in the Second Battle of Ypres, when the Canadians had saved the day in the great gas attack. Australia and New Zealand answered to the roll call on Gallipoli Peninsula and the story of the Anzacs had become a part of Imperial history when the South Africans completed their task of extinguishing German rule in South Africa and accepted as the next duty the invasion of German East Africa. No disappointment of all that Germany suffered was more real or more serious than that caused by the course of the British colonials. She had hoped to disrupt the British Empire, but before the first anniversary of the war was over it was plain that she had cemented it.

As for the other colonial incidents, they call for but passing mention. German Togoland was conquered by Anglo-French forces after a campaign which lasted but three weeks and was ended in August, 1914. On February 18 of the following year the Kamerun was also in British and French hands. Only German East Africa remained and this was able, because of its size and the problems of transport, to resist with

ever-diminishing force until the fourth year of the struggle. But the resistance was always hopeless and, long before this time, restricted to inland districts removed from that great railroad which had been the life line of German plans in Central Africa.

And in this collapse of her overseas empire may be found one more incentive to Germany's military activity in the period we are now to examine. Since sea power had demonstrated her helplessness beyond the mainland; since her colonial establishments had disappeared; it was patent that if Germany were to have her place upon the map, a place commensurate with her real greatness, it must be sought where her armies could march and where British sea power could not reach. And this led inevitably to the great Pan-German dream, to *Mitteleuropa*, with its Asiatic extensions.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# SUBMARINES

## I

## THE GERMAN CASE

With her flag banished from the high seas, her seaborne commerce paralyzed, her colonies one by one being gathered in by British, Japanese, and French troops; with the prospect of a long war where she had expected a swift triumph; with the realization that the United States was becoming the arsenal and the granary of her enemies, the Germans, after their defeats at the Marne and in Belgium and those of their Austrian ally at Lemberg and in Galicia, were, in the closing months of 1914, brought face to face with a situation which, however much it might arouse their anger, demanded such attention as might abolish what was now a threat of ultimate defeat.

To meet sea power Germany had no fleet commensurate with the task, and the first months of the war demonstrated that she could not by submarine warfare so diminish the British Grand Fleet as to make a decisive victory at sea even remotely possible. Her dream of carrying the war into Britain by Zeppelins and by airplanes was presently to prove idle. Zeppelin fleets were, it is true, to arrive over London and deposit their burden of bombs, but the ensuing destruction was soon shown to be relatively insignificant, while each return of the German air fleets stimulated British volunteering, roused British spirit to new determination, and brought British appreciation of the character of the war to a still more dangerous clarity.

As the war progressed, it became quite clear that Admiral Mahan's dictum would be proven accurate and that the dominant sea power would rewrite the rules of international war governing blockades to suit its own necessity. Very early in the contest the British Government repudiated the agreements contained in the Declaration of London, never, be it said,

accepted by the British Government by any official act, although they had been formulated in a conference which took place in the British capital and had enlisted the support of British representatives at the gathering. Nor is it unworthy of note that, when the war came, Britain refused to follow the principles championed by her delegates at the precise moment when Germany demanded that these same principles—rejected by her delegates—should become the rules of marine conflict, thus supplying one more example of the vagaries of diplomacy.

From the very start it became clear that British naval power would more and more seek to seal up Germany, to interrupt the flow of food and material, non-contraband as well as contraband, of wheat and cotton as well as shells and copper. Nor was it less clear that the British naval policy, and in this policy all of the Allies concurred, would aim also at shutting up those neutral doorways by which necessary food and munitions could reach Germany, although this involved an actual, if not a technical, blockade of the ports of Holland and the Scandinavian countries and an ever-increasing interference with American trade on the high seas.

How was Germany to deal with this problem which carried with it the very real threat of ultimate privation for her people and of complete exhaustion of war material for her armies? Should she seek to employ her submarines against enemy and neutral marine alike and, by arousing fear, forbid the use of European waters by neutral ships bearing food and munitions to her foe and thus bring her enemies to terms by turning their tactics against them? Should she refrain from direct acts herself so far as neutrals were concerned and await the very probable embroilment of the neutrals with Great Britain and the subsequent action of the United States to protect its overseas commerce from British interference?

Both policies had much to commend themselves to the German mind. Immediate war upon all British shipping, passenger ships as well as cargo boats, would bring the meaning of the struggle home to the seafaring nation of Britain. It would abolish that intolerable situation in which the mass of the British people were able to rest safe and secure on their islands, while the threat of invasion and the peril of starvation over-

hung the German people. It would strike Britain at her most vital and sensitive point—her fleet, her merchant marine. More than this, it would rouse German confidence and German enthusiasm as nothing else could, for in the early months of the war the "Hymn of Hate" was on all lips and "Gott Strafe England" the most familiar of German salutations.

On the other hand, while such a course was calculated to injure Britain, it might conceivably rouse the neutrals. The United States might be driven to take steps against Germany and become a member of the alliance against her, while if Germany held her hand, all German representatives in America could, with reasonable accuracy, assure her that the American people, with the memories of 1812 still in mind, would not permit British fleets to bar their ships or their products from the European trade when these ships and these products were proceeding in strict conformity with international law. Moreover, even if the United States did not, in fact, declare war upon Britain because of British offending, there remained the possibility that she would embargo all war material destined for British and French armies and vital to their safety, to their existence. And, after all, this would mean the realization of the chief German purpose, for, deprived of this American aid, the Allied armies would almost inevitably fall to German arms.

## II. GERMAN POLICY

In this dilemma the German statesmen were not able early to adopt a definite policy. They could not decide at first upon an absolutely "ruthless" submarine war. They could not make up their minds to leave the initiative to Britain and await the eventual profit when American public opinion should be properly roused, as their agents and representatives were bound to arouse it. And in the end this faltering between two policies led to the failure of both. The history of the relations between America and Germany, growing out of the submarine controversy, belongs to that volume which will discuss America's entrance into the world conflict and there will be examined in detail, but it is appropriate now to examine the submarine question as it affected the war situation in the first eighteen months of the conflict.

With the coming of the New Year (1915) the British were moved to the first important step in the long series that led to ultimate rallying of the United States and many other neutrals to the Allied cause. Foreseeing the eventual shortage of food, the German Government, with a prevision strikingly contrasting with Allied blindness, ordered the organization within Germany of a sort of glorified trust, which, under Government authority, was to seize all the wheat in Germany and to regulate its distribution. Alleging that this warranted treating wheat as contraband, the British Government announced that it would henceforth adopt such a course and it fortified its decision by declaring that this policy was to be recognized also as a reprisal for German offences against international law.

To this Germany responded with her proclamation of a blockade of Britain to begin in February, a submarine blockade, further strengthened by the wholesale sowing of mines. She announced a policy of sowing mines within the waters of Britain, sinking belligerent merchantmen on sight, and warned neutrals against entering these waters lest they should be the victims of accidents. In this first declaration there was no suggestion of "ruthlessness" so far as neutral ships were concerned.

But such a policy not only did violence to all international law regulating blockades, but also was perilous alike to non-contraband goods of neutrals carried in belligerent bottoms and to the lives of American and other neutral citizens travelling upon passenger ships flying belligerent flags. In both cases, too, it was an invasion of the unquestioned rights of neutrals, although not more serious than certain British invasions, save in a single circumstance. It involved the lives of neutrals, whereas the British acts involved only property and even there left an opportunity for redress in British prize courts.

As between the sinking of belligerent merchant ships and passenger boats there was a distinction which might have been established in the neutral minds had Germany permitted the matter to await argument before going further. International law as it existed was based upon conditions that obtained in the Civil War era. Then the ability of the

warship, having captured a prize, to take it to port; the opportunity for searching suspected merchantmen, and for manning them with prize crews were unmistakable. But between 1864 and 1914 a half century had elapsed, and the whole machinery of marine warfare had changed while the precepts of international law governing this warfare remained unmodified.

By Britain's blockade, which had taken on illegal features and was patently destined to transgress still further international law, the whole civilian population of Germany was threatened with starvation. In the submarine Germany possessed a weapon which might enable her to strike back. Was she estopped from using it because international law had been compiled before the submarine became a detail in war? That she should be prevented from employing this against belligerent merchantmen, despite the incidental added risk in the case of the crews of such vessels, was manifestly unfair. The submarine could not, like the old sailing ship of war or the steam craft of the Civil War period, put a prize crew aboard a merchantman; it could not take off the prize's crew because it had no room to house it. Moreover, it was itself in deadly peril, by reason of its fragility, if such merchant ships as crossed its pathway did as they were promptly to do, namely arm themselves with guns sufficiently powerful to dispose of a submarine.

Therefore, when Germany did actually put into practice her threatened policy in the matter of enemy merchant marine—as one distinguished British naval authority, Sir Percy Scott, in a memorable statement, had forecast before the war—there was no clear and immediate reaction in neutral nations. The solemn warning of the President of the United States, evoked by the Berlin proclamation of this "blockade" and indicative of a determination on the part of the American Government to defend the lives of its citizens and to hold Germany to "strict accountability" for any injury to American shipping, was not accepted in America as covering the case of British and French merchant ships. It was felt at once to be designed to meet the case of American ships and American sailors navigating them, and to belligerent passenger

ships carrying American citizens to Europe, since the rapid decay of American merchant marine, due to unintelligent shipping laws, had almost compelled Americans having business in Europe to travel by foreign passenger craft, as the Germans themselves well knew.

And in the early days of this first submarine campaign, while merchant ships of the Allies were the sole victims and the Allied press was filled with denunciations of the Germans as pirates and murderers, American and other neutral opinion remained calm. Between the two belligerent principles, both illegal, both violating all the letter if not the spirit of international law, the neutrals did not feel themselves called upon to choose, and the United States signalized its attitude by addressing an identic note to Great Britain and to Germany protesting against injuries suffered at the hands of both.

So far then the German submarine campaign encountered no great obstacle, but, on the other hand, it accomplished no great result. Merchant ships were sunk, but not in impressive numbers. British seaborne trade was not paralyzed. American munitions continued to pour into Britain and France, and Kitchener's new armies were in part equipped in America, while for France and England, America became the farm and the factory. More than this, the Germans could suspect a growing tendency in America, as the trade of the country with their enemies expanded, to endure hardships and wrongs incident to Allied policies, to permit Allied interference with German-American trade, when Allied-American trade was more and more occupying all the industrial establishments of the nation and promising profits beyond the dreams of avarice.

### III. "RUTHLESSNESS"

In this posture Germany was led to an extension of her submarine policy which had fatal consequences. Always in the German mind there appears to linger the notion that it is possible to accomplish by terror what cannot be achieved by the more familiar and legitimate methods of international intercourse. Now it seems clear that the Germans concluded that by extending their submarine campaign to include all belligerent ships—there was still no direct suggestion of an attack upon

neutral vessels—the results would terrify neutrals and above all Americans into submission to German will and bring them to the prohibition of trade with the Allies.

So far the Germans had found the neutral world resigned, if not complaisant, in the face of their invasion of neutral rights. Could they not expect that this temper would endure—since to the German mind it was due in no small degree to fear of German might—if their submarines attacking British passenger ships should demonstrate in a striking and unmistakable manner the reality of their submarine threat, now become a little discredited in neutral minds? And the sinking of a few passenger ships, of some great and famous boat, would it not have an effect upon public opinion not to be exaggerated, an effect well-nigh necessary in the dark moments before the great German victories of 1915 began?

The flaw in all this reasoning was in the inability of the German to recognize that while nations can submit to many injustices and permit many of their rights to be invaded, no nation, save in a condition of absolute helplessness, can endure the murder of its own citizens and take no step to check the policy which involves their murder.

That the United States would take any drastic step against Germany, as long as her aggressions were aimed only at belligerent merchant ships, was always unlikely. Even in the case of American ships there was a plain disposition to accept apology and indemnity, where the injury had been manifestly or even apparently the result of mistake and not of design. But never at any time was there any real possibility that the United States would permanently tolerate that its citizens, travelling in strict accordance with their rights, be murdered upon the high seas, even if as an alternative the United States had to enter the war. To something approaching piracy the American Government did submit, both in the case of Britain and of Germany, but to murder it could not submit, and when the Germans at last definitely adopted a policy of murder the United States entered the war.

The decision of the Germans in the matter of unrestrained submarine operations is one of the great incidents of the war. It takes rank with

the invasion of Belgium. It was born of similar ideas and it led to similar results. The condition of modern land war, the development of French defence, had left Germany but one avenue of attack upon France promising swift victory, and she took it. The invasion of Belgium made British entrance into the war certain. British sea power left Germany but one weapon on the ocean—the submarine. She took it, and, by employing it in a ruthless fashion, brought the United States and other neutrals actively into the war at the moment when a favourable peace was not beyond her reach, and war-weary Allied nations were only roused to new determination by the arrival of American ships and soldiers in France.

Like the invasion of Belgium, the first German submarine campaign, which covers the period we are to examine, failed to achieve its main purpose. Had it been restricted to merchantmen it could not have succeeded at this stage, but there would have been a very real possibility that the United States might have come to grave disagreements with British sea power and even to the point of embargoing war munitions. After the submarine policy had been expressed in the *Lusitania* Massacre there never was a chance of this, and the United States marched surely, if unwittingly, to the declaration of April 6, 1917. But it is useful to recall that until this crime, German submarine warfare upon the merchant marine of belligerents failed to arouse American anger and seemed one of the injuries incident to a world conflict, which should be endured by a nation resolved to remain outside the struggle. In the Napoleonic Wars both England and France behaved toward us even more outrageously than the Germans before the *Lusitania* crime, and between the German and Allied policies there was a difference in method rather than spirit, since both were equally regardless of international law and neutral rights.

### IV. AMERICA AND GERMANY

Between April, 1915, and February, 1916, the period in which the submarine played only a minor part, its depredations were not serious, its potentialities were hardly appreciated, and the British naval authorities were too easily satisfied by their apparent success in dealing with

the menace. Neither on land nor on sea was the effect of this new engine of real weight.

Yet the consequences of the unrestricted use of the submarine were ultimately to raise an issue between the United States and Germany which led to war. When the year 1915 opened no man could safely forecast the ultimate course of American policy. The British decision to forbid the transport of foodstuffs to German ports, announced in a decree of February 2, raised instant protest in America. The German response of February 4, proclaiming the war zone, transformed the problem from a quarrel between America and the Allies to a dispute between the United States and both coalitions. The Anglo-French response of March 1, which interdicted all seaborne commerce with Germany, temporarily gave to the Allies the larger share of American resentment.

It is only after the *Lusitania* Massacre of May 7 that the tide definitely turns in America, that the question at issue between the United States and Germany excludes from real discussion the disputes between the United States and the Allies. After May 7 Germany becomes more and more involved, while the Allies are less and less impeded by American protest or American indignation. Presently the whole question becomes German-American and the United States more and more assumes the position of insisting that Germany shall, no matter what the cost to herself, abandon a policy jeopardizing American lives and property.

All this belongs to the narrative of America's relation to the war. Yet it is essential to recognize that, in the period that we are to review now, Germany lost the chance of utilizing American insistence upon the rights of neutrals as a weapon to break down British blockade. She lost it by her submarine campaign and she lost it forever by the *Lusitania* crime. Her first submarine campaign thus cost her all hope of American aid, aid to come by an American defence of international law; her second submarine campaign led straight to war with America.

We know now that Germany was forced into the first campaign by Admiral Tirpitz and a few of his associates, who exaggerated the possible achievement of the submarine fleet. We know now that wiser statesmen

objected to the campaign, not because of any tenderness of heart, but because they believed the profit would not balance the loss, since the German submarine fleet was too small to obtain any real success. We know now that, in the end, in the spring of 1916, this unrestricted submarine warfare was abandoned temporarily, because it had been proved that Germany could not pursue it further without bringing the United States into the war and because at that date she had but few submarines available. Presently we shall see the British people and their naval authorities convinced that Germany had abandoned the first campaign because of the achievement of the British fleet, and had only used American dangers as a pretext, and later we shall see how mistaken were these Englishmen and how costly their complacency proved.

In the second phase of the war, German use of the submarine led to grave consequences without considerable profit. On the material side it insured to the Allies all the resources of American factories and mines, since it abolished all chance of an embargo following a dispute between Washington and London over patently illegal British use of sea power. On the moral side it transformed the character of the war in the neutral mind. Thus May 7, the morning of the *Lusitania* Massacre, is a date memorable in the history of the war; memorable therefore in all human history. Off Old Head of Kinsale, as before Liége, Germany invoked the law of necessity, and as the former crime roused Britain, the latter eventually stirred the United States.

Here, after all, is the real significance and the only actual achievement of the first submarine campaign. It did not bring Great Britain to her knees, as the violation of Belgian territory had not resulted in the destruction of France. It merely enlisted a new enemy where it sought to conquer an old antagonist. Again the greatest price of their "terribleness" was destined to be paid by Germans.

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THE BURNING OF AN ALLIED FOOD SHIP

This steamer was set on fire by a German U-boat commander. The picture was reproduced from a German newspaper. It was part of the consistent German effort to cheer up the German people by attempting to prove to them the efficiency of the ruthless submarine campaign.



WHY U-BOAT COMMANDERS DO NOT ALWAYS REPORT—I

An interesting scene in the submarine drama as enacted in the Mediterranean. The ship from which the photograph was taken fired a shot at a German submarine. The shell is seen breaking over the spot where the U-boat submerged. A French hydroplane and a submarine chaser are manoeuvring for an attack on her in case she reappears.

WHY U-BOAT COMMANDERS DO NOT ALWAYS REPORT—II

A disabled German submarine which was cast ashore, and broke her back on the French side of the Straits of Dover



U-BOAT INTERIORS—I

Cross-section of a German submarine captured at Pas-de-Calais. She is far more comfortable and less crowded than the mine-layer shown on the opposite page




U-BOAT INTERIORS—II

The densely packed interior of the German submarine mine-layer *U. C. 5*. Captured by the British navy in the English Channel, she was loaned to the United States for use in the Second Liberty Loan Campaign. She was cut into three sections and carried across the Atlantic on a steamer. On her arrival at New York, she was set up in Central Park for the inspection of prospective buyers of Liberty Bonds.



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AN ENGLISH SUBMARINE

She is running high in the water, with practically all her crew on deck and in the conning-tower



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THE GERMAN SUBMARINE MINE-LAYER *U. C. 5*

A cross-section of the interior of this vessel may be seen on the preceding page. Two mines are visible on her deck in this picture. She can carry twelve more in the six tubes in her forward hold, as shown in the other picture

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KING GEORGE INSPECTS A BRITISH SUBMARINE

The sea is rough and the King is feeling cautiously for the top step of the companion ladder

A SUBMARINE IN A SEAWAY

Looking aft from the conning-tower of a British U-boat in the North Sea, where it is often rough going for submarines travelling on the surface



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A BRITISH SUBMARINE THAT PASSED THE DARDANELLES MINES

The crew of the British *E 11* are being cheered by comrades on another British vessel, as the *E 11* returns from a venture into the mine-strewn waters of the Dardanelles

# CHAPTER SIX

# THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

## I

## THE EASTERN SITUATION

On May Day, 1915, a huge German army under Field Marshal von Mackensen attacked the Russian army commanded by a Bulgarian general, Radko Dimitrieff, and standing between the Dunajec and Biala rivers, some thirty miles east of Cracow, well-nigh destroyed it and began that long offensive which was not to end until German armies had penetrated deeply into Russian territory, taken Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk, and temporarily paralyzed Russian military power.

The Battle of the Dunajec is the second of the great conflicts of the war—the Marne, the Dunajec, and Verdun. These are the great struggles of the first three years and in many respects the Dunajec must rank after the Marne, while viewed from the standpoint of the present hour it seems certain to prove one of the truly decisive battles of human history, for by this disaster were sown the seeds of that Russian Revolution which was to come less than two years later. It marked the decisive step toward the overthrow of the Romanoff dynasty and the consequent total transformation of the character and prospects of the war on the eastern front and, in a sense, of the whole war. Just as the Battle of the Marne supplies the central unity of the first phase of the war, the Dunajec furnishes the same central point for the second. All the campaigns and all the important developments derive their chief significance from this great struggle, which (so remote did the Galician field seem to the world at the moment) appeared insignificant beside the barren trench struggles about the ruins of Ypres.

The conditions under which this battle were fought are simply told. From the Battle of Lemberg onward Germany had sought steadily to bolster up the shaken Austrian armies. She had endeavoured by one

costly offensive after another, directed at Warsaw from her own territory, to relieve the pressure upon her ally, throw the Russians back behind the middle Vistula and the Niemen, and compel them to give over their great effort to crush Austria. None of these efforts had been a complete success nor yet a total failure. The victories of Hindenburg at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes had taken a terrible toll of Russian troops. Russian victories over the Austrians at Lemberg and afterward just missed dealing the final blow to the Hapsburg armies because of German aid promptly given and efficiently administered.

But long before spring came the Germans had recognized that it was no longer possible to save Austria by offensives directed from Breslau, Posen, or East Prussia upon Warsaw. They had perceived, too, that it was not going to be possible to renew their bid for a decision in the west until they had settled with Russia by inflicting a sweeping and complete defeat upon the Czar's armies, which should eliminate them from the reckoning and might procure a separate peace by producing such a revolution within Russia as would dispose of the Slav enemy for the duration of the war. At the least they were now determined to drive the Russian armies from Austrian territory and so disorganize their military establishment as to gain time and opportunity to go west again.

Having resolved that their major campaign for 1915 should be made in the east the Germans had to decide at what point they would make their main offensive. The failures along the Niemen-Narew-Bobr line from Grodno to the Vistula, the bloody repulses on the Bzura-Rawka front, had exhausted the possibilities on the north and in the centre. Despite all efforts, these attacks had been repulsed and Russian pressure upon Austria had continued. Nor was there a more shining opportunity to be found far to the south on the Rumanian frontier. To attack here was still to permit the Russian pressure, the main thrust at Hungary, to continue. Equally unattractive was the front along the Carpathians, for here the Russians, even were they driven back, would be able to maintain a long and costly defence in the Dukla and Lupkow Passes, possessing communications behind them and already holding

the crests of the range along the portion of the mountain front which was available for operations.

The decision of the Germans was therefore for the front between the Carpathians and the Vistula, where the Russian line, having made the great "elbow" west of the Dukla Pass, ran straight to the north. Could they break the Russian line here, the Germans would threaten the rear and communications of the armies fighting along the Carpathians, particularly that of Brusiloff. Here they might hope to achieve, as they did in fact almost achieve, another Sedan, but they could be assured that in any event a successful penetration of the Dunajec line would cause the collapse of the whole Russian front from the upper Vistula to Rumania, with the consequent liberation of most of Galicia.

## II. GERMAN TACTICS

The method by which the German sought to attain his goal is of supreme interest because it reveals a new form of warfare. It was repeated in every detail at Verdun and in a modified form at the Somme, and an examination of the system sheds invaluable light on the later struggle. It represented the application of new weapons and new discoveries to the art of war and it is a landmark in military history, on the scientific side. All the battles that came after this struggle for the next two and a half years were in the main of the same type.

At Neuve Chapelle Field Marshal Sir John French had almost achieved a major success, the actual breaking of the German line by means of massed artillery bombardment. On a front of less than a mile he had concentrated three hundred guns. The storm from this artillery, the "drum fire" of this unprecedented concentration, had swept away the German trenches and the German barbed wire. The road to Lille had been open for hours after this tornado of shells and it was the failure of reserves to arrive that had spoiled the best chance the Allies were to have for more than two years to break the German line from Switzerland to the sea.

The method of French was now adopted by Mackensen, but it was magnified to colossal proportions. In place of three hundred guns, the

Germans transported to western Galicia not less than two thousand, many of them of the heaviest calibre, and behind them they massed a head of shells previously unprecedented in war. What Sir John French had done to a mile of German front in Flanders, Mackensen now purposed to do to many miles of the Russian front. Nor was this all. Having broken the lines before him he purposed, still moving his heavy artillery forward, to continue to break down and destroy each successive line on which the Russians might rally. He had thus fashioned a mobile battering ram.

And behind the ram were many corps of the best German troops. For this campaign the pick of German first-line troops had been selected. The army that Mackensen commanded was probably, given its size, the best army that Germany had put into the field, for despite heavy losses her military machine had not yet begun to break down through wastage of its officers and annihilation of its youth.

The mission of this army of attack, Mackensen's "phalanx" as it presently came to be described, was to finish the work begun by the guns, to stamp out the last feeble resistance, and sweep on as a wave might rush through a dike already undermined by dynamite. There was no intention that this army should extend its front; it had no part in the work of the flanks; it had no part in the work of the regular forces holding the line before it attacked. Its mission was to batter its way, steadily, irresistibly, through the Russian positions, always attacking on the narrow front which could be prepared by the guns.

The effect of this strategy is easy to grasp. Right and left of the sector attacked Russian armies stood firm, even took the offensive, but the Russians could not concentrate guns or munitions to meet this main thrust and each time they endeavoured to stand before it their line was crumpled up under the storm of shells that fell upon it. And when this line had crumpled, the "phalanx" pushed through and opened a new breach, which compelled a reorganization of all the Russian front to conform to the retreat of the army which yielded to the main German thrust.

Time and again Russian armies north and south of Mackensen's

THE RUSSIAN FRONT WHEN THE DUNAJEC BEGAN

*White arrow* shows the point chosen by Mackensen for the attack of his mobile battering-ram

operative front swept forward, defeated and drove German and Austrian troops, winning victories of considerable magnitude, taking thousands of prisoners, but always on the morrow of such successes they were faced with the fact that this Mackensen "phalanx" had pushed forward over another barrier, broken the Russian centre between the mountains and the Vistula at a new point, and the wings had to retire to keep their alignment with the centre.

Actually there was something glacierlike in this German advance. It was necessarily slow, because the guns could only move short distances in any day, and the transport of munitions became more and more difficult as the Russians destroyed the roads and bridges, but it was always irresistible, it was always beyond Russian resources to halt it, until the hour when it passed the Russian frontier and reached a region destitute alike of good roads and good railroads; then it came to a halt of a necessity. But by this time its work had been done and the task that remained fell to other armies and in another field.

### III. THE GREAT BLOW

When the great blow fell the position of three Russian armies immediately affected was this: North of the Vistula the army of General Evarts stood behind the Nida River, which enters the Vistula from the north near the point where the Dunajec flows in from the south. His troops had enjoyed quiet for a long time and had no further mission at the moment than to hold the sector entrusted to them. South of the Vistula was the army of Dimitrieff, standing behind the Dunajec before Tarnow and thence behind the Biala, right down to the Carpathians. It, too, was charged with a defensive mission merely. The army of Brusiloff, which made junction with Dimitrieff's in the foothills of the Carpathians, faced south, not west as did the other two, and was fighting its way into Hungary. It had forced the Dukla and Lupkow passes and its victorious troops were already almost within sight of the Hungarian plain. This army was the hammer of the Russian military establishment, and Allied capitals all too easily believed that, since it had now passed the crests of the range, the road to Budapest and Vienna lay open to it.

Przemysl had fallen on March 22; the Russian troops which had thus been released had in the main been sent to Brusiloff, and on May 1 he was still advancing; his army was still victorious, yet it was possible to detect a slowing down. Russian progression in the Battle of the Carpathians was never actually ended until the Battle of the Dunajec




THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC, MAY, 1915

*A* shows position of General Evarts north of the Vistula.
*B* shows where Dimitrieff's army was practically destroyed by Mackensen's "phalanx."
*C* shows position of Brusiloff's army which just managed to escape destruction.
*Lines* 1, 2, and 3 show the positions successively occupied by the Russians; and the *dotted line* shows the resistless advance of Mackensen's "phalanx."

compelled Brusiloff to flee a field of victory to escape ruin in consequence of disaster elsewhere, and yet the strain upon Russia of eight months of campaign had been tremendous; Russian supplies of munitions were already beginning to dry up and were presently to fail at the crucial moment.

At first only Dimitrieff's army was involved in the German attack. Its position was exceedingly good. It had before it the Dunajec River and then the Biala, an affluent coming down out of the mountains. Both streams were in flood as a result of spring thaws. The lines had been very thoroughly fortified and had withstood heavy attacks in the past. Indeed, so successfully had they withstood attack that Dimitrieff

had been led into a fatal error and had prepared no positions to the rear, although the Wislok and the Wistok rivers, behind him, offered equally good fronts on which to withstand German attack if the Dunajec line should be forced.

Despite the belief at the time, the Russian army at the Dunajec was by no means lacking either in munitions or guns. It had the fair allowance of a Russian army, but this allowance was totally inadequate to face the German concentration. In addition, Dimitrieff had behind him admirable railroad and highway lines. Two trunk lines, one connecting Cracow with Lemberg via Tarnow, the other running from Gorlice to Stryj, supplied his rear. No position of the whole Russian front seemed in the closing days of April, 1915, better calculated to hold, and no general had a better reputation than the soldier who had broken Turkish armies at Lule Burgas and won new laurels in the Lemberg campaign.

Yet on May Day this army was almost totally destroyed by the first German attack. The Teutonic artillery had been concentrated before Gorlice, which, for the Germans, gives its name to the battle. Under a bombardment estimated to have consumed 700,000 shells the whole Russian lines of defence collapsed, the trenches were levelled, the barbed-wire entanglements destroyed; under the terrible shell-fire the Russian troops died in great numbers. Their resistance was not merely broken—it was destroyed—and at the end of the first day Dimitrieff's army had almost ceased to exist. Only broken detachments were flowing back eastward toward the Wislok. The road was open to Mackensen's "phalanx" and the German infantry, passing to the offensive, forded the Biala and pressed forward.

Was the German attack a surprise? In the main there can be no doubt of it. It was a surprise as Verdun was a surprise. In Galicia, as later in Lorraine, Allied observers had reported German activity. There was a general suspicion that a heavy blow was to fall, but the true magnitude of the blow was not foreseen, could not be foreseen. When it fell it tore the Russian defence into ribbons, just as the later attack tore the French line from Brabant to Ornes into ribbons. On

May 2 and 3 the Russian army was in precisely the state of the French army on February 23 and 24 a year later. Fortunately for France she was able to make a new concentration of men and guns a few miles behind the shattered front and pin down the German advance, thus localizing the struggle to the Verdun sector. This the Russians could not do, and, as a consequence, the effect rapidly extended to adjoining armies.

### IV. BRUSILOFF ESCAPES

The position of Brusiloff's army now became one of extreme peril. The collapse of Dimitrieff's army had exposed his flank and rear; the victorious Germans were nearer to his lines of communication than were his main forces, which were far south of the Carpathians. And the German advance was moving rapidly across his rear with the clear purpose to seize these lines of communication and thus encircle him, throwing Mackensen's forces to his rear, while the armies before him in the Carpathians passed to the attack to hold his troops on their front. Yet Brusiloff did escape and his escape is as brilliant as the similar manœuvre of Kluck before Paris, when the German general slipped away from the British and brought his troops back to parry and beat down the deadly thrust of the French north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq.

Had Dimitrieff taken the trouble to prepare a line behind him at the Wislok, there would have been no great danger to Brusiloff and his retreat might have been deliberate, although there is little reason to believe that the Russians could have fought more than a delaying fight at this stream, for the German artillery concentration was too overwhelming to allow sustained resistance by an army as hopelessly outgunned as the Russian. On May 7 the German advance passed the Wislok at the important railroad junction of Jaslo. The next day the Germans were across the Wistok, another river coming north out of the Carpathians parallel to the Dunajec and the Wislok and again offering an advantageous defensive position, had the Russians guarded against defeat. As it was there was little defence, for there were no trench lines.

Brusiloff was now all but enveloped. His position had been a salient at the start and the Germans were almost across the neck of the loop.

He was saved because Russian reserves, concentrated at Przemysl, were pushed out along the upper Wistok and succeeded in halting the German drive for a few hours. This gave Brusiloff just time to slip out of the rapidly tightening noose. He did not get all his troops away; a division was caught, many guns and men were lost; but by May 12 his main forces were behind the San, and the Russian front had been restored. It had been restored in the sense that thenceforth the Germans were to face organized resistance—the days after Dimitrieff's collapse, when they had no real organized force before them, were over. So also was the chance of a supreme success, the capture of the Russian armies in the Carpathians. Only once more, this time at Vilna, were the Russians to face as terrible a danger, and there their escape was much easier.

The end of the second week in May then sees the Russian armies once more in line. Evarts has retired from the Nida to conform to the retreat south of the Vistula. Dimitrieff's army has ceased to exist, but a new army is in position from the Vistula along the San through Jaroslav and Przemysl to the Carpathians.

On this front was fought the Battle of the San, which was a final effort of the Russians to beat down the German thrust, as they had beaten down an Austrian thrust on the same front in the previous year. But the effort was vain. Mackensen had moved his "phalanx" northeastward along the railroad from Gorlice to Jaslo and from Jaslo to Rzeszow, where the branch line joined the main Lemberg-Cracow trunk line. He now forced the passage of the San at Jaroslav and by forcing the line of the San compelled a new Russian retreat, this time to the very gates of Lemberg, to the famous Grodek line, a system of lakes and marshes a few miles west of the Galician capital.

Meantime the Austro-German army, which had been holding Brusiloff in the Carpathians, pushed north and struck in the rear of Przemysl, seeking to encircle it from the south, as Mackensen, having passed the San, aimed at encircling it from the north. In the face of this double thrust the Russians clung to Przemysl until June 2, always, however, with the clear recognition that it must ultimately be abandoned. Six weeks after this stronghold had fallen to Russian arms a Bavarian con-

tingent entered the town, on the heels of the Russian troops who just slipped between the sides of the closing neck of the salient and took the road to Lemberg.

Meantime, counter-offensives, by Evarts north of the Vistula and by Lechitsky on the front of Bukovina, had won smart local successes, but despite large captures of prisoners these operations could not influence the main campaign. The first days of June saw the Russians standing north of the Dniester and east of the Grodek Lakes. All of western Galicia had been lost and German troops were already across the Russian frontier east of the San. The Galician campaign was entering its last phase.

### V. LEMBERG

In the Grodek line the Russians occupied the last defensive line covering Lemberg. Of itself the position was impregnable and their southern flank was securely posted behind the Dneister. But if the artillery of Mackensen could not penetrate the swamps and marshes of the Grodek region, there was open to them a road by which they might turn them. Northward from Jaroslav to Rawa Russka ran the railroad down which Russky had come in his great attack of September, 1914. He had turned the Grodek line by coming round the northern end of the swampy country and defeating the Austrians at Rawa Russka. Once he had won a victory about this town, the Austrians had to fall back behind the San.

Mackensen simply reversed the proceeding. He moved from Jaroslav north to Rawa Russka, defeated the Russian troops there by means of his heavy artillery, and then began to turn south toward Lemberg and across the rear of the Russian armies. The threat was sufficient. June 22 the Russian armies left the Galician capital, which they had occupied since the first days of September, 1914. All the vast railroad network was restored to Austrian hands. Galicia was reconquered save for a small strip in the east. First taking up their position behind the Gnila Lipa, the line on which the Austrians had defended Lemberg in the previous year, the Russians presently withdrew behind the Zlota Lipa and then to the Sereth, where at last their retreat in Galicia came to an end.

Thus, in a campaign of less than eight weeks, Germany had freed Galicia. She had retaken more than 30,000 square miles of territory, with all their valuable oil wells and railroad lines. She had deprived Russia of the fruits of eight months of effort. She had destroyed one Russian army and disorganized three. She had abolished the threat to Austria and regained the offensive in the east. The consequences of Austrian defeat at Lemberg in August and September, 1914, ceased to dictate eastern operations. Austria was saved. Russia was now endangered and the campaign in the east had only begun.

Actually the German operation had restored the condition on the eastern front that had existed in the first days of the war. The Warsaw salient, abolished by Russian advance in Galicia, was as it had been when Austria had launched her first blow toward Lublin. The Russians were now in the posture they had foreseen before the war, when they had planned to evacuate Poland and begin their fight along the Bug, a plan temporarily discarded when Germany decided to go west and left to Austria the task of disposing of Russian attacks until German armies had entered Paris and crushed France.

The situation of the Central Powers, however, was vastly different from that of August, 1914. Now Germany had great armies in the east, while on the west she was simply seeking to hold her lines and for this utilizing her great superiority in heavy artillery and machine guns. Now that Mackensen had cleared Galicia, Hindenburg was in a position from which he could assail the Warsaw salient north and south simultaneously and at the same time continue pressure at the centre between Warsaw and Ivangorod.

In the previous year Russia had been able to put good armies in the field reasonably well equipped for a short campaign. But ten months of battle had weakened these armies; their supplies of munitions were rapidly diminishing; there were lacking guns and equipment for new troops ready to take their place in line. In fact, Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk were already doomed and a Russian collapse was to be prevented now only if France and Britain, by attacks on the west front, could divert German guns and German troops to Artois or Champagne

in such numbers as to give the Russians a breathing spell. Only this intervention could deprive Germany of the opportunity to harvest the fruits of her great success, and since no such intervention was possible, the tide of German success was to continue uninterrupted for many months.

The Dunajec was therefore the second of the great battles of the war and one of the memorable contests in all military history. It was a Napoleonic triumph in its proportions and in its conception. It must rank in German military history with Tannenberg. The one saved Prussia; the other first rescued Austria, threatened with invasion and destruction, then brought Russia to the point of collapse and then to revolution. Whatever the final outcome of the war, its effect upon eastern Europe was bound to be decisive. For the House of Romanoff, the Dunajec was as fatal as Leipzig proved for the First Napoleon.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## ITALY DECIDES

### I

### 1813–1915

On the morrow of his victories of Lutzen and Bautzen in 1813, Napoleon found himself confronted by a new antagonist. While the French Emperor was still successful in Silesia and Saxony, Austria joined the coalition fighting him. At the moment when their victorious armies were approaching Lemberg, the same thing now happened to Germany and Austria. At the most favourable hour in the conflict since the defeat at the Marne, the Central Powers were confronted by the Italian declaration of war—a declaration directed only at Austria-Hungary, to be sure, but bound to be extended in time to include Germany and, since the fate of Germany was now so inextricably bound up with that of Austria, having the actual effect of a declaration of war upon both Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires.

The decision of Italy proceeded from the mass of the people, "from the street," to use the contemptuous phrase of Prince von Bülow, describing the tumultuous crowds which, in the last days of May, 1915, thronged the streets of Milan, of Florence, of Rome itself, clamouring for war against the ancient oppressor of all Italy and against the dynasty which still held under its heavy hand the Italia Irredenta—Trieste and the Trentino. It was the millions who decided the course of Italy in May. Yet these millions after all were but following the course which clear-visioned statesmen had already foreseen. D'Annunzio, hailed by the masses, speaking in terms approaching lyric frenzy as he denounced the "traitors" to Italy who opposed Italian intervention, had but adopted the course which Sonnino, the Prime Minister, after calm reflection and cold judgment, had determined was the only possible course for Italy.

Like Austria in 1813, Italy in 1915 looked out upon a Europe which

was bound to be remade as a consequence of the great struggle that was being waged. Should Italy remain neutral only a drawn battle could save her from actual injury. No matter which of the groups of powers won the war, a neutral Italy would suffer, for if the Allies triumphed, Slav and Greek states, enormously magnified, might occupy the eastern shore of the Adriatic from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Otranto, while if the Central Powers were victorious, Austria would descend to Salonica and Germany occupy Asiatic Turkey as a detail in the Teutonic dream of Mitteleuropa.

From the first days of the conflict—when the proclamation of Italian neutrality permitted the French to withdraw their troops from the Italian frontier, move their garrisons from North Africa and gather up the armies which were just strong enough, given all these advantages, to check the German advance at the Marne—Italy was bound to choose between the two great groups. Permanent neutrality was impossible, save only if the prospect that a victory would escape both contestants should be unmistakable. Nor was there ever any real hope that Italy could with profit to herself play the rôle described by a witty Frenchman as "rushing to the succour of the victor."

And by May, 1915, it was clear that the prospect of a drawn battle was still absent. Fortune had changed and was to change again. Before the Marne a German victory seemed assured. After the close of the western campaign and the concentration of world interest on the eastern front, Austrian defeats suggested a collapse in the Hapsburg Empire. Russia, victorious for the moment, began to discuss the erection along the Adriatic shores of a Jugo-Slavic state, which would include Serbia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Croatia, and the Istrian shores.

While the war went on, while the decision was still doubtful, both groups of powers were bound to bid for Italian aid, to offer a considerable price, because between the two groups Italy now held the balance of power, but once peace had been restored and the victorious alliance had established its success beyond challenge, it would have no need to consult Italy in drawing its peace terms and no reason to fear an Italian challenge wherever these terms interfered with Italian aspirations.

London and Paris saw this fact only vaguely; the mass of the Italian people did not perceive it at all. Their emotions were roused by ancient wrongs and contemporary grievances. Above all, the intellectual element, the party of youth, was stirred by the fact that, while Italy's unredeemed lands still beckoned, while opportunity to acquire Trieste and the Trentino became more splendid each day, German agents and German representatives, having corrupted Italian politicians and laid hands upon Italian finance and industry, mobilized public men and influential journals in the Peninsula in support of that neutrality which involved the sacrifice of Italian aspirations to German purposes.

In the end the Italian decision was made in an hour of passion hardly to be paralleled in modern history. A Parliament, controlled by corrupt and bureaucratic tools of Germany; a Crown, reluctant to enter a war against a fellow sovereign who had been, until yesterday, an ally and a friend, were swept out of the pathway. Yet when the passion had died away, when the war became a grim and unromantic business and the examination of the Italian decision in the light of sober and matured judgment was made, it was perceived that no other decision had ever been possible and it was recognized that, for once at least, the people had been wiser than many of their leaders and the instinct of a race had asserted itself in wise opposition to the representatives of the people who sat on the Capitoline Hill.

## II. YOUNG ITALY

Young Italy of the first years of the Twentieth Century had certain definite aims and aspirations. These were the aspirations of a people, long the subjects of brutal and selfish foreign tyranny, tardily come to independence, and now, after sombre years of domestic hardship and self-discipline, arrived at the point from which they believed they could undertake to achieve for their country abroad a rank to which its population, position, and recent progress gave it title.

In the generation that lay between the occupation of Rome and the close of the last century Italy had time and again seen her position in the world made humiliating through her inability to urge her own claims

with more than passive earnestness. France had shouldered her out of Tunis. Austria had annexed Bosnia. Britain had laid hands upon Egypt and Cyprus and was transforming the Mediterranean into a British lake. Within the Triple Alliance Italy was treated rather as a poor relative than as an equal. Outside of the Alliance, France and Russia, indignant at Italian presence in a hostile group, treated Italian policies and Italian aspirations with contemptuous hostility.

In Abyssinia an Italian effort to erect a colonial empire had met with terrible disaster and Adowa had been a demonstration for Europe of Italian military weakness. Poverty and misery at home, a feeble foreign policy, and an abject subservience to German dictation, this had been the history of Italian affairs from the moment when unity was achieved to the hour when a new century was to usher in a new and for the Italian patriots a happier age.

Looking at the first years of this century it is possible to detect unmistakable evidence of another "*risorgimento*," a new stirring of old dreams, a growing determination to transform the world view of Italy as a museum and a repository of artistic splendour into a recognition of Italy as a virile and contemporary fact in a world of realities. Like Germany, Italy was seeking her "place in the sun"; like Germany, Italy, the Young Italy which was rising, felt a sense of wrong, of shame, in the fact that its country was still great only in their dreams and that its influence was restricted, while more fortunate rivals continued to paint their colours on the maps of Asia and Africa and lay the foundations for future greatness beyond the narrow limits of Europe.

This Young Italy was, in its first days, neither hostile to Germany nor friendly with the enemies of Germany. It was neither Germanophile nor Francophile; it was not even Anglophile as the Young Italy of Mazzini had been. It was intensely national and it dreamed of attaining national objects, whether by alliance with Germany or with France it did not matter. Another generation had won Piedmont with French aid and Venetia with Prussian. The same realistic spirit stirred in the later generation.

Yet when this Young Italy faced the question of how it could attain

its objectives it was clear from the outset that Austria-Hungary must first be removed from the pathway. Whatever else Italy dreamed of—and the group of nationalists who were rising to influence had far-shining visions—it was essential first of all to achieve security at home by possessing the Trentino gateway to the northern plain. Garibaldi in 1866 had invaded the Trentino and looked down upon Trent from the hills, but had been recalled by a timid government. Bismarck had given scant hearing and no comfort to his ally when, after Sadowa, Italy had asked for the restoration of the frontier fixed by Napoleon for his Kingdom of Italy, the frontier which would give to Italy the gateway to her own lands, the gateway by which invasions, from time immemorial, had descended from the Brenner Pass to the Venetian plain.

Nor did the possession of Trent complete the programme of Young Italy for unifying Italy. Across the Isonzo, in the city of Trieste, more than 120,000 Italians were subjected to a brutal and stupid tyranny. Fearful of eventual Italian advance, Austria had sought to destroy Italian claims by submerging Italian-speaking populations in the flood of Slav immigrants who, led by official suggestion and invitation, descended from the mountains and in ever-growing numbers settled in Trieste and in Istria. In the same fashion German-speaking settlers were thrust into the Italian communities of the Trentino. Thus, precisely as Germany by her stupid and harsh procedure in Alsace-Lorraine kept this question always before the world, always in the news of the day for the Frenchman, Austrian cruelty and oppression multiplied these "incidents" by which Italians were constantly reminded of their brethren beyond their frontiers, who still paid that price for race loyalty which had been demanded of Italians in Venice and Milan half a century before.

And as the Pan-German in Prussia did not limit his aspirations to the liberation of German populations beyond his frontiers but also turned his eyes toward regions once included in the German Empires of the past but inhabited by other races than the German and now destitute of all ambition to become German, Young Italy looked southward from Venice along the Dalmatian coast where the ruins of Roman baths

flanked the palaces of Venetian governors, and thence toward the Near East, in whose waters Venice had been supreme and along whose shores Rome had once ruled unchallenged.

French supremacy in North Africa from the Syrtes to the Pillars of Hercules Young Italy had accepted, reserving Tripoli for their share—their meagre share of what had been one of the fairest fields of Roman colonization—but toward the Ægean, toward Asia Minor, toward Smyrna and Alexandretta, the new generation of Italian patriots looked with undisguised ambition. To make the Adriatic an Italian lake, to hold its ports, still bearing Italian names even on that east coast where the Slav wave was more and more submerging the Italian tongue, from Trieste to Valona, this was the dream of the Young Italy which was rising, which was now making its voice heard.

But all such aspirations encountered the ancient enemy in a new position. The House of Hapsburg, pushed back from the Mincio and the Adda, from the old Quadrilateral of Peschiera, Mantua, Verona, and Legnago, still clung to Riva and Trent, Gorizia and Gradisca; still held the eastward gateway between the Julian Alps and the Gulf of Trieste and the southern sallyport of Teutonism, between the Brenner Pass and the upper reaches of Lago de Garda. Vienna, too, was nourishing a dream of a southward march, by the Vardar Valley to Salonica, by the Morava route to the Golden Horn and thence to the Near East by the Hellespont. And behind this Austrian dream, beyond the Hapsburg capacity to realize unaided were the German hand and the German voice, which had bidden Italy abandon her longings for Trieste and had vetoed the Italian aspiration for Valona and an Albanian protectorate.

### III. ITALY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

An ancient wrong, a contemporary grievance, and a clash of aspirations as to the future in the Adriatic and the Ægean, in Albania and Anatolia, thus divided Italy from Austria, while the two states were still allies. Because the bitterness was so great, Count Nigra had affirmed that Italy and Austria could only be open foes or actual allies and for thirty years Italian policy had deemed it wiser, since Italy was incapable

of fighting Austria backed by German arms, to endure the humiliation incident to an alliance rather than to court the disaster which must accompany war.

Yet now, when one comes to examine the reasons for Italy's decision to join the foes of the Central Alliance, it is essential to grasp how completely this Triple Alliance had been for the Italians a marriage of convenience of a truly sordid character. From this alliance Italy could only derive security; for this security she paid the price which was passive adherence to conditions even then well-nigh intolerable and seemingly destined in the future to be fatal to all Italian aspirations. Italy desired to regain her "lost provinces" of Trieste and the Trentino; both were Austrian, and, while Austria showed no intention of parting with the Trentino, which gave her military control in a real sense of the Northern Italian Plain, which gave her the keys to the Valley of the Po and to the great industrial cities of the Savoy Monarchy, Germany and Austria both were necessarily and unequivocally determined to retain Trieste, Austria's sole considerable seaport and the prospective doorway of the Pan-German Mitteleuropa upon the Adriatic Sea.

The Libyan War of 1912 demonstrated unmistakably the futility of Italy's foreign policy. Austria had annexed Bosnia in 1908. France had acquired German consent to her supremacy in Morocco in 1909, after Agadir and in return for "compensations" paid to Germany in the Congo. Italy had long possessed the consent of France, Britain, and Russia to take Tripoli, but when she sought to realize her claim, at least as valid as that pressed by Germany for "compensations" when France took Morocco, the Italians found themselves confronted by the hostility of Germany and by the undisguised threats and menaces of Austria, while the Turkish resistance in Tripoli owed much to German inspiration.

And this Libyan War was, after all, the first clear expression of Young Italy. It was little understood outside of the Italian Kingdom. It was acquiesced in rather than encouraged in London, where many bitter criticisms were voiced by a press still Turcophile. It was accompanied by sharp clashes with France, whose Tunisian interests were

affected and even injured. But the real opposition came from Italy's allies and every Italian step was greeted by protest and angry denunciation. Was it not Bernhardi who wrote in 1911 that wise German policy would have been served by German attack upon Italy and in behalf of Turkey at this juncture?

After the Libyan War the Triple Alliance, as far as Italy was concerned, was dead. When the World War broke, Italy hastened her proclamation of neutrality, thus giving France a real and incalculable advantage. After August, 1914, the single question became for the Italian people one as between neutrality and participation upon the Allied side. To join the Central Powers was almost inevitably to bring them the victory; but that victory meant the consolidation of German power from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf; it meant transforming the Balkans into a Hapsburg appendage; it meant that Austrian rule would descend the Adriatic to Valona; it meant that Greece, ruled by a sovereign who was a German Field Marshal and the brother-in-law of William II, would become a German puppet, and that Bulgaria, controlled by an Austrian Czarlet, would be but the corner stone in the arch that would bear German power from Europe to Asia.

To give of her blood and her treasure in such a cause could bring Italy no reward. There was no one of her ambitions which could be realized, nor was she prepared to listen to the German urgings to face westward and turn her attention to Tunis and to Algeria, to surrender her dreams of rescuing Italian populations along the Adriatic and seek to reclaim Corsica and Nice, which despite their older association with Italy were now contented and patriotic departments of the French Republic. Even if Italy cherished such aspirations, and she did not, German power could not protect her against British fleets, and her own cities and islands were bound to be victims of any such aggression against France, now allied with Britain.

### IV. ITALY AND THE GRAND ALLIANCE

On the other hand, what would Italian neutrality achieve with respect to the Grand Alliance against Germany should it triumph?

Certainly it would earn temporary gratitude, a new friendship. Neither the British nor the French would fail to recognize the service rendered even by neutrality. But beyond this they might not go. Russia was sponsor for the Serb dream of a new Jugo-Slavic state, including Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and on the maps of the Southern Slavs this state included Trieste as well as Cattaro, Fiume as well as Durazzo.

Nothing was more certain than that if the Grand Alliance won the war it would seek to limit and block German advance to the Balkans by the creation of a great Southern Slav confederation along the Adriatic, and such a confederation would have an area equal to that of continental Italy and at no distant date might become a rival on the Adriatic, possessing, as it would, all the good harbours and occupying those islands which are the naval keys to this inland sea. As between the urgings of Russia, which had borne the burden of the battle, and the pleas of an Italy which had remained neutral, could any one doubt what view would prevail in London and in Paris, particularly as it was becoming a cardinal doctrine in Allied policy that a strong Slav state must be created to bar the road of Germany to the Golden Horn?

Nor was this all. Italy looked both to Albania and to the mainland of Asia Minor for her future colonial expansion. But when the Allied fleet approached the Dardanelles, Allied statesmen began to make bids for Greek aid, bids which were favourably heard by Venizelos, though ultimately repulsed by the Kaiser's faithful brother-in-law, the King of Greece. Northern Epirus, the Greek cities of Asia Minor from Smyrna to the Adalian district, already marked by Italy for her own, were profered to the Greeks as the price for sending their army to Gallipoli.

Here again Italy was faced by an unmistakable fact. Greece was her real rival in the Near East. For five centuries the Greeks had cherished the dream of a restoration of the Byzantine Empire, a hope witnessed when their new King took the title of Constantine. Given the Hellenic commercial ability, given the amazing vitality of the race and its capacity to endure and to reassert itself, nothing was more probable than that the Ægean would be turned into a Greek lake when Greece held both Salonica and Smyrna. Nor was it less certain that this new, strong

state, by reason of its association with the Grand Alliance, would receive their guarantee after the war and would become their soldier in the Ægean, as the new Slavic state would be their servant on the Danube and along the Adriatic.

Thus neutrality was for Italy only less perilous than association with the Triple Alliance. If she chose the German way, she sacrificed to Germany and Austria directly all chance of realizing her dreams. If she refrained from all part in the war she was faced with the probability that a victorious Grand Alliance, able to speak with the assurance and in the tone of the victor, would erect new states on the territory which was claimed for Italy and that under the guarantee of the Grand Alliance, these new Slavic and Hellenic states would shortly become capable of defending themselves against all Italian attack, even if the support of the Great Powers were presently withdrawn.

Policy thus fused with patriotic emotion in the Italian decision. The memories of the old struggle for liberty and unity, which had failed to complete the work of restoring Italy, since it left Trieste and the Trentino outside the kingdom, shared in the Italian mind with patriotic aspirations for the future, for the acquisition for Italy of a position commensurate with her present power and worthy of the nation which was the heir of Rome and the residuary legatee of Venice. From the moment when the war broke the old memories and the old wrongs, which had a present phase, made it imposible for the Italians to fight alongside the Austrian and the German, but as Italy's past and present demanded Austro-German defeat, her future required that she should share in Allied victory that she might, once the victory was won, speak as an ally in the congress in which peace terms would be made and claim as one who had bore her share of the burden that portion of the profits which Italian ambitions had already marked out.

It is necessary, at the outset of Italy's operations, to recognize the distinction between her policy and that of the nations whose ally she became. France fought for her life and, once Germany had forced a new war upon her, for her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Britain fought for her imperial existence, tardily recognized as the ultimate

target of Germany. Russia had drawn her sword to save Serbia. The Turkish enlistment had raised the question of the Straits and the British and French had agreed to Russian possession at Constantinople. But, save in Turkey, Russian purposes were in the main those of liberation. She sought to free the remainder of Poland, still condemned to German and Austrian rule, to win liberty for the millions of Austrian and Hungarian Slavs, her race brothers, subjected to Teutonic and Magyar yokes.

But Italy, pursuing a policy which aimed at liberating the Italians of Trieste and the Trentino, not less clearly sought objects which were selfish and detrimental to the proper ambitions of the Greek and Serb races. She fixed her eyes upon lands which were peopled by races whose wish was not to be Italian but Hellenic or Slavic. And when the Russian Revolution was followed by a renunciation by the new Russian Government of all territorial ambitions cherished by the previous régime, certain of Italy's aspirations stood out in clear conflict with the spirit of her other Allies, who had adopted and in the main adhered to a programme which sought to liberate many races but to enslave none.

Italian purpose was thus, in a measure, tinged with a German spirit. Young Italy, like New Germany, like the Pan-Germans of Prussia, sought to serve the ends of the greater state they dreamed of, by the sacrifice of the nationalistic ideals of other races. Those who cried up Italy's claim to lands inhabited by race brothers along the Isonzo and the Adige cried down the claims of the Serb for Dalmatia and of the Greek for Northern Epirus and the islands of the Ægean which were far more Hellenic in character and more unitedly desirous of Greek citizenship than were the people of Istria Latin or clamorous for Italian sovereignty. It is necessary then to recognize that, great as was the military advantage incident to Italy's accession to the Allied cause, it necessitated certain compromises, which weakened the Allied cause on the moral side in the eyes of neutral mankind.

Nor is it less essential to recognize that when Italy entered the war her known purposes rallied the Southern Slavs to the House of Hapsburg and the troops which had fought indifferently against the Russian resisted with admirable tenacity and success each Italian assault along the

Isonzo. And in the same fashion, the Italian entrance gave new strength to Constantine in Athens and enabled him, with the support of many Greek patriots already enraged by Italian presence at Rhodes and in the Dodecanese, to prevent Venizelos from putting Greece into the war on the Allied side in the critical days of the following summer, when the fate of Serbia was at stake, as it earlier enabled him to veto the decision of Venizelos to send Greek troops to Gallipoli to aid the British army. Either step, had it been taken by the Greeks, might have changed the whole course of the war in the Balkans.

### V. THE MARCH TO WAR

Having now set forth the reasons which made it always inevitable that Italy would one day take her place in the Allied ranks, the actual march of events can be reviewed with little delay. Italy's neutrality had been proclaimed on August 6, 1914. The pact of the Triple Alliance bound the high contracting parties to mutual defence, but the Italians asserted that it had no application in a war that was the result of an Austrian ultimatum designed to provoke war. Since the Italian course had been expected it created no surprise and little bitterness either in Vienna or Berlin.

In the days during which the German armies approached Paris, Italy was condemned to watch with ever-growing anxiety the prospective triumph of an ancient ally, whose course as a victor might be unfriendly toward the nation which had abandoned it at the moment of war. When the German advance was halted and thrown back, this anxiety disappeared. As the probability of a long war grew, it became more and more important that Italy should adopt a definite policy. In December, when Austria invaded Serbia and seemed destined to win a great victory, Italy called attention in Vienna to the provision of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance which asserted that if either Austria or Italy disturbed the *status quo* in the Balkans, the other should be entitled to ask compensation.

But the Austrian disaster at Valievo and the subsequent flight out of Serbia temporarily disposed of this question, although Italy, on Christmas Day, crossed the Straits of Otranto and landed troops at Valona in Albania, a step violently resented in Vienna. During the winter,

while Russian armies continued to advance in Austria, Italian apprehensions were again aroused, this time by the fear lest Austria should collapse and a victorious Russia erect a Southern Slav Confederation along the Adriatic, including lands desired by Italy; and in the spring the sound of Allied guns at the Dardanelles stirred other anxieties not less keen. And all through this time the party which advocated intervention steadily grew stronger in Italy.

Germany sent her ablest diplomat, Prince von Bülow, allied to Italian nobility through his wife, to wage the battle against intervention. To his aid Bülow called all the vast financial agencies which Germany had established in Italy. He bought newspapers and politicians. He conducted a propaganda of colossal proportions. He became in fact almost a master of Italian affairs, and his success was in the end his ruin. The spectacle of a German controlling their public men, their press, and their policy eventually roused the Italians, and Bülow was presently greeted with the old Garibaldian hymn: "Stranger, begone out of Italy."

Again and again the Sonino-Salandra cabinet informed Vienna that Italian neutrality could not be maintained if Austria declined to make any concession in the matter of Trieste and the Trentino. Bülow himself undertook to persuade Austria to yield and ultimately Vienna grudgingly offered to cede a portion of the Trentino, including Trent, the delivery to be made at the close of the war as a reward for Italian neutrality.

To this Rome replied on April 8 by what amounted to an ultimatum, in which Italy demanded immediate possession of the Trentino, the separation of Trieste and its adjoining district from the Hapsburg Empire, and the cession of certain Adriatic islands. Trieste was to be constituted a neutral state between Italy and Austria.

To this Austria made no satisfactory response. Accordingly, on April 24, Italy at last made her arrangement with the Allies and on May 3 denounced the Triple Alliance. The end was now in sight.

At this moment Italy was seized by a patriotic emotion which can hardly be paralleled in history. The anniversary of the sailing of Garibaldi and his Thousand was at hand. D'Annunzio returned to Italy, the prophet and apostle of intervention. The country was filled

with patriotic demonstrations, the cities were nightly the scenes of processions and of outbursts. More and more the spirit of the masses was becoming inflamed.

At this moment Bülow played his last card. Giolitti, the political master of the Italian Parliament, returned to Rome from seclusion. The man who had made and unmade cabinets, who possessed a political machine surpassing any similar American institution, journeyed to the capital for the purpose of overthrowing the Sonino-Salandra Cabinet, accepting new concessions from Austria, which Bülow had provided, and preserving Italian neutrality. Three quarters of the members of the Italian parliamentary body were his own. He controlled the prefects of the various provinces. He was backed by all the financial and industrial institutions which had German sympathies or were under German control.

What followed amounted to a bloodless revolution. The Sonino-Salandra Cabinet, conscious of Giolitti's strength and of his ability and purpose to upset and repudiate their agreement with the Allies made on April 24, resigned. Giolitti saw the King, but at this moment the Roman populace, fired by D'Annunzio's addresses, took charge. In a few hours the streets of the Eternal City were filled with thousands of citizens marching to the music of Garibaldi's hymn and boldly proclaiming that there would be war or revolution. The very safety of the House of Savoy was challenged when the masses came to believe that the King had joined Giolitti in his effort to avoid war.

In a few hours Giolitti was on his way back to the north, a political exile; the Sonino-Salandra Cabinet had been restored and the vote of confidence of Parliament had underwritten its agreement with the Allies. Italian policy had been dictated by "the Street," as Bülow now declared. On May 23 Italy was at war with Austria.

### VI. A GREAT VICTORY

The entrance of Italy into the war was a great victory for the Allies and almost a disaster for the Central Powers. Although Berlin and Vienna had long foreseen this eventuality, when it arrived its effect was not less considerable. It robbed the victory of the Dunajec of

much of its meaning. It inevitably postponed the arrival of a decision and thus diminished the chance of German victory. It forecast the day when Italy would extend her declaration of war to include Germany and thus complete the forging of an iron circle about the Fatherland, as it now closed Italian ports to neutral ships which had hitherto brought copper and other materials necessary to German munition making. It gave to the war the character of the earlier Napoleonic struggles, when the whole continent rallied against France.

The Italian army, numbering more than 700,000 on a war footing and capable of almost indefinite expansion—given Italy's population of 35,000,000—had been reorganized since the outbreak of hostilities the previous year. Lacking still in heavy guns and in the machinery of war—which democratic nations can purchase only after war has come and can be acquired in peace only by an autocratic state like Prussia, preparing for an attack upon its neighbours—it was still an accession of manifest importance; while the efficient and considerable Italian navy was able at once to take over a portion of the task of the French fleet, which had watched at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea.

On the other hand, the Allies naturally exaggerated the immediate effect of Italian intervention. They did not rightly estimate the strength of the barrier fortresses which Austria had constructed nor accurately appraise the obstacles in the way of Italian progress. Nor did they at first understand that Austria, long expecting the attack, had kept her troops on the Italian border on a war footing and was ready for the attack when it came. Equally unknown to them was the fact that Austrian Slav troops would be rallied to the Hapsburg throne by the Italian attack and that out of these elements, next to worthless in the face of Russian troops, Austria would be able to fashion armies which, aided by heavy artillery, would check and subsequently defeat the Italians at the Isonzo and before Trieste.

These miscalculations led to grave disappointments and some unjust criticism as the war proceeded and Italy did not arrive at Trieste or Laibach. Since Austria had made provision against the Italian assault before the Dunajec campaign was undertaken, when it came she did

not have to recall troops immediately from the east. Italy's decision consequently failed to change the course of the Galician or Polish operations. Entering the war after the disaster of the Dunajec, Italy could not save Russia; and to expect this was unfair.

The failure of Italy to participate in the Gallipoli campaign and in the subsequent Balkan operation led to equally unjust criticism. Much of this was stilled when the Austrians made their great offensive through the Trentino the following spring and almost reached the Venetian plain. Then at last something of the Italian problem began to dawn upon the Allied publics. The Italian failure to declare war upon Germany gave just ground for complaint; the obvious clash between Italian and Serb ambitions and the coldness of Italian sentiment toward the Southern Slavs awakened resentment. Yet Italy not unnaturally reserved the right, having entered the war with fixed objects and with definite ends to attain, to pursue her course and serve her own interests first. In the end, this lack of mutual coöperation and of common purpose brought Italy to the edge of ruin in the closing weeks of 1917, but at the outset it merely checked the Allied enthusiasm at Italy's entrance into the war.

As for the Italian campaign of 1915, it was marked by no event of great importance. Along the Trentino and at the Isonzo, after brilliant initial advances, the Italian troops were brought up before the permanent lines of Austrian defence and thereafter made only inconsiderable progress. These operations and the whole field of Austro-Italian fighting will be discussed in the later phase, wherein real Italian progress begins, but in the period now under review Italy's service consisted in permanently fixing some hundreds of thousands of Austrian troops on the southwest, putting a new burden upon Austrian munitions and man-power and thus accelerating Austrian exhaustion. She was unable to do more, nor were France and Britain able to achieve much greater results in their 1915 offensive. And if the results of Italy's enlistment were thus disappointing, by her entrance a possible foe became for the Allies a help instead of a peril, and if the immediate value of the military aid was exaggerated the moral value could not be.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## GALLIPOLI

### I

### ANOTHER SICILIAN VENTURE

Athens, facing a terrific struggle in the Greek peninsula, listened to the specious pleadings of Alcibiades and sent her best troops and her great fleet westward to Sicily to seek there a brilliant victory. The daring gamble failed, the army and ships were lost, and as a result Athens fell before Sparta. In the Gallipoli venture Britain was now to make, there was a fair parallel with the Athenian blunder and there was about Winston Churchill, who was responsible for the decision, much that would suggest Alcibiades.

To send old ships which, even if lost, would not change the naval situation was a legitimate gamble, given the profits that would accrue could the Straits be forced. But when the gamble turned out badly then was the point when British statesmanship and Allied strategy should have abandoned it. Yet the lure of Byzantium remained to tempt those who could not perceive that the war was to be won or lost upon the western front and that effective aid to Russia, now in danger, could come only along the front between the Channel and Switzerland.

Subsequent Parliamentary investigations have revealed the confusion and blindness which prevailed in British Cabinet circles when the Gallipoli campaign was adopted. Voices of warning were not lacking; naval and military authorities did not hesitate to remonstrate; but the words of the politician overbore those of the soldier. Sir John French, in the trenches, begging for men and munitions to hold a line still imperfectly manned, still lacking in guns and above all in high-explosive shells, could not make his appeals heard in the Cabinet Council. The stern warnings of Joffre were unheeded; even Kitchener succumbed to the civilian strategist. The result was one of the great blunders of military

history, hardly equalled since that of Athens and destined to have evil consequences hardly less considerable.

The fallacy of the Gallipoli undertaking is patent. To defend a narrow peninsula, Turkey had not less than a quarter of a million veteran troops, armed, equipped, and officered by Germans. These troops were close to their base and could be munitioned and reinforced with little difficulty, while Allied troops had to be transported for more than a thousand miles by sea and their advanced bases in Egypt and Lemnos were separated from the field of operations by many miles of submarine-infested waters.

But the main obstacle lay in men and munitions. For this great undertaking Britain could not muster more than 120,000 men and the French wisely declined to send any but colonial troops, since they were still facing a foe on their own soil. Outnumbered two to one in any event, the British had no reserves at hand to supply the wastage, and such troops as would later become available would have to be diverted from the western front. There was no chance of a surprise, for the March effort to force the seaward gates of Constantinople and the delay following the defeat and withdrawal of the naval forces, had allowed more than a month for Turkish armies and German engineers to prepare for the next blow.

Looking backward it is easy to perceive that, had the troops squandered on Gallipoli been put in on the western front, the early British operations about La Bassée might have prospered and the autumn offensive at Loos might have resulted in the piercing of the German line and the consequent relief of Russian armies, by this time on the edge of ruin. The Gallipoli venture, first and last, used up not less than a quarter of a million of British troops and cost more than a hundred thousand casualties on the British side alone. For the Allies it became precisely what Spain was for Napoleon in his last years—an open sore, ever demanding more troops, ever eating up more of his resources in men and supplies, yet never offering any possibility of compensating advantages.

In Berlin the decision of the British to go to Gallipoli was hailed with

the same enthusiasm which Napoleon had displayed toward similar ventures of the British in the early wars of his period, when British armies and fleets were scattered all over the world and thus removed from the decisive field, which was Europe. Germany had embarked upon a campaign to crush Russia. She had assigned to her armies in the west the defensive mission, which was comprehended in the task of holding their own front. She had stripped these armies of every division and gun that could be safely spared to give Mackensen his great force. That the British should send their troops away from this western front and thus make the task of the German defensive the easier was a piece of good luck hardly to have been expected.

### II. POSSIBLE PROFIT

Those who defended the Gallipoli venture at the moment and subsequently, insisted that it had a fair chance of success and that this success, if attained, would have changed the whole course of the war. It was argued that Egypt could better be defended at Gallipoli than at Suez and that pressure upon the Turks at the Dardanelles would relieve the Russian armies on the Armenian front. To open the Straits was to break down the blockade of Russia, to send munitions to her armies now collapsing for lack of them, and to restore Russian finance by enabling Russia to market her wheat in England and France and from the proceeds to pay her obligations.

But like many speculations, the alluring character of the prospectus was in direct proportion to the impossibility of attainment. So far as one can judge there never was the slightest chance of success. Winston Churchill, on a celebrated occasion, asserted that the British were within a mile of supreme success, but the mile was the main Turkish position and this was as completely beyond their power to carry as the whirlpool and falls of Niagara are beyond the capacity of a sail boat to negotiate, although their extent is short and beyond lies the calm surface of Lake Ontario.

The brutal truth about Gallipoli is that it was a blunder of the first magnitude, which consumed more than a quarter of a million troops who

IN THE CARPATHIANS

An Austrian ski patrol cautiously advancing through a forest on the mountainside

AUSTRIAN MACHINE GUNNERS SEEK A NEW POSITION

The men are on skis. The gun has been taken apart and roped to a sledge. The deep snow and steep slopes of the Carpathians rendered practically useless all troops not accustomed to these special conditions

AUSTRIAN RIFLEMEN IN THE CARPATHIANS

Note the rests for the rifles and the skis. The third man is using a field-glass. Many of the private soldiers, even of the Austrian and German armies, were equipped with these, though the U. S. War Department found great difficulty in providing them even for officers, as most optical goods before the war were imported from Germany.

A HUNGARIAN CORPS IN THE CARPATHIANS RECEIVES INSTRUCTION IN THE ART OF SKI-WALKING

A SKILFULLY CAMOUFLAGED MOUNTAIN SHELTER WHICH ACCOMMODATED TWENTY-FIVE SOLDIERS

RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ADVANCING THROUGH A CARPATHIAN PASS

This was near the scene of Mackensen's great drive on the banks of the Dunajec. He followed the tactics previously used on a smaller scale by Sir John French in Flanders. Massing not less than 2,000 guns along a narrow front, he delivered a devastating fire and followed it up by "Mackensen's Phalanx," a mobile battering-ram composed of the pick of German first-line troops. Russia never recovered from the terrible blows of this battering-ram.

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DISMOUNTED AUSTRIAN HUSSARS CHARGING THE RUSSIANS

The photographer secured this picture at the imminent risk of his life. One of the Austrians has already been hit by a Russian bullet. Lacking the bayonets customarily used in the charges of regular infantry these men are clubbing their rifles so as to be ready to "give them the butt" when they get to close quarters



AUSTRIAN TROOPS SILHOUETTED AGAINST THE HIGH SNOWS

IN THE HIGH PASSES OF THE CARPATHIANS

Austrian troops ready to oppose the Russian attempt to force the mountain barrier and penetrate the Hungarian plain. Heavy German reinforcements, countless German guns, and the most skilful German generals were needed to drive the Russians home. Unaided, the Austrians could scarcely have hoped to stem the Russian tide permanently—much less to thrust the Russians back in decisive defeat.

HOLY RUSSIA—MORTALLY WOUNDED AT THE DUNAJEC

The upper picture shows defeated and wounded Russians trudging stolidly into the courtyard of a German hospital.

In the lower picture the interior of the hospital is seen, with the old priest of the Greek Catholic Church offering the consolations of religion to wounded and dying Russians as they lie on the straw-covered stone floor.



AUSTRIAN TROOPS ON A FORCED MARCH IN THE CARPATHIANS

might have been used effectively on the western front—conceivably so effectively as to rupture the German fronts; certainly with sufficient advantage to compel the Germans to relax their efforts in the east; unquestionably with enough of weight to have made impossible the German drive to the Golden Horn in the late autumn.

The German was the true enemy. When he was beaten the alliance of the Central Powers would collapse. To send a quarter of a million troops on a futile attack upon the Turk, doomed from the outset to defeat, was merely to lessen the pressure upon the German by just this amount. All summer long the British troops in Flanders lacked reserves, were starved as to munitions that the Gallipoli expedition might be supplied, yet such was the British shortage in men and munitions that the sacrifices in the west were futile and the Gallipoli army still lacked the necessary material for an equal fight with the Turk.

In the spring and summer of 1915 Britain lacked the resources to create and maintain an effective army on one front. Yet she undertook to maintain two great armies on two widely separated fronts. The result was failure in both fields. At Gallipoli some of her best officers and many of her best troops were sacrificed uselessly. On the west front the golden opportunity provided by the German decision to go east was permitted to escape, and in September the attack at Loos, which might have been a shining success, ended in a shambles, terminated in an appeal to the French by the British commander-in-chief to take over a portion of his lines, become too extended for his meagre force and his exiguous stock of ammunition.

Never in British history was there a more splendid example of the tenacity and the courage which have made the great empire. Nothing in English or world history surpasses the devotion of the men of Britain, of Australia, and of New Zealand, fighting under conditions beyond belief, enduring hardships beyond description, transforming what seemed an impossible operation into an undertaking that at moments seemed to promise victory, yet in the end failed as it was always doomed to fail.

The tragedy of Gallipoli is the hopelessness of it, the uselessness of the colossal sacrifice and the degree to which the valour and the unselfish de-

votion of officers and men were without gain to the cause for which they suffered.

On the other hand, it is impossible to escape the conviction that if the commander-in-chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, was charged with an impossible task, his conduct of the operations was open to deepest condemnation. The larger failure was probably not his, but his failure to make even a competent effort was glaringly displayed at Suvla Bay, where the only




THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

The end of the Gallipoli Peninsula is shaped like a badly worn boot. The ankle is at Gaba Tepe, where the Australians landed; the heel at the Narrows, where were situated the forts commanding the Straits, which were the objective of the naval attack in March; whilst the toe is the promontory five miles wide, which ends at Sedd-el-Bahr. And it was at the toe that the main landing was made.

real chance of success—probably an apparent rather than a real chance —was lost under conditions that thoroughly warranted his subsequent removal. Nor is it possible to overlook the fact that the sufferings of the British army at Gallipoli were of the sort that had made the Crimean War an enduring reflection upon British organization and foresight. In this campaign the world was to see a British army hopelessly inferior to the Turk in all that makes the modern army effective and successful. Surely a more illuminating revelation could not be imagined.

### III. GALLIPOLI

That portion of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was the scene of the great struggle, has been aptly described by Sir Ian Hamilton as shaped like a badly worn boot. The ankle is at Gaba Tepe, where the Australians landed; the heel at the Narrows, where were situated the forts commanding the Straits, which were the objective of the naval attack in March; whilst the toe is the promontory, five miles wide, which ends at Sedd-el-Bahr. And it was at the toe that the main landing was made.

The three dominating hills of this end of the peninsula are Achi Baba, which, from a height of 600 feet, dominates the toe and blocks the road north from Sedd-el-Bahr; Sari Bahr which, at the height of 970 feet, overlooks the Anzac Cove and the Gaba Tepe position, the scene of the Australian operations; and the Kilid Bahr Plateau, directly above the forts at the Narrows and attaining a height of 700 feet. This latter was the main Turkish position and it was never reached by the Allied forces. An idea of the smallness of the distances may be gathered from the fact that at the ankle the peninsula is but five miles wide, while from Sedd-el-Bahr to the dominating positions at Kilid Bahr is not more than ten miles.

Apart from the beaches at the toe and another shallow beach under Gaba Tepe, the whole Ægean shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula is unsuitable for landing operations, since the hills rise abruptly from the sea. A third landing place, still farther to the north, at Suvla Bay, offered still greater advantages, which were seized upon in the final attack in August. But the relatively low foreshore of this bay is commanded

by the Anafarta Hills, which were never cleared. Actually, the British had three roads open to them for their advance—from Sedd-el-Bahr straight up the Peninsula to Kilid Bahr, a distance of ten miles; from Gaba Tepe eastward right across the peninsula, a distance of five miles; and from Suvla Bay first east and then south which was materially longer. And from Sedd-el-Bahr they never were able to advance more than three miles. From Gaba Tepe they got forward hardly more than one mile and the Suvla Bay effort ended in a complete fiasco, which doomed the whole enterprise.

The hills that rise abruptly from the shore slope downward and inward, giving the peninsula the appearance from the air of a spoon, hollowed out in the centre, and this made it next to impossible for the guns of the fleet to reach and destroy Turkish positions. Moreover, the whole area was a series of confused gullies, steep hills, and deep ravines, covered with underbrush and admirably suited to the sort of fighting the Turk was best suited to offer.

The climatic conditions were indescribably bad. In winter the peninsula was swept by the cold blasts from the Black Sea. In summer it was baked by a tropical sun which dried up all watercourses and turned the country into a desert and a furnace. All water for drinking had to be brought from Egypt or Lemnos. At all times, all portions of the British position were within easy range of Turkish guns, the landing places were commanded by artillery, the expedition lived under shell fire. There was no respite and no truce.

In the same fashion their rearward communications by sea were at the mercy of the weather. All supplies, reinforcements, and artillery had to be landed under direct observation and fire. No movement could be made without first advertising its character by the preparations carried out under the Turkish eyes. A more hopeless, hapless position for a great army cannot be imagined, nor is there anything in military history since the Crimea to compare with the hardships of the men of Gallipoli. The measure of this is found in the fact that while the battle casualties of the campaign were 112,000—25,000 killed, 75,000 wounded, and 12,000 missing—the hospital statistics revealed

96,000 admissions. Thus the climate was almost as deadly a foe as the Turk.

No survey of the campaign would be complete without a mention of the admirable manner in which the Turk fought. Standing on the peninsula by which, following the route of Xerxes, his ancestors had entered Europe five centuries before, he made a fight which commanded the unstinted praise of his British foe. He not only fought well, but he fought cleanly. In the intervals between desperate fighting the two armies observed those courtesies as to wounded which had been customary in other wars but had been banished on the western front by German savagery. Not only did the Turks conquer their foe in the field, but they won his praise and his admiration for courage and for skill, for devotion and for military efficiency.

### IV. THE BEGINNING

The naval attack on the Straits had failed on March 22. It was more than a month later—on April 25—that the first landing party touched the Gallipoli shore. The date is interesting. On this day the Germans were making their desperate attack at Ypres and were on the point of launching their blow at the Dunajec. Italy, on the preceding day, had made her agreement with the Allies, which was to bring her into the war in another month. The campaign of 1915 was in full swing and the operation in the Near East divided world interest with the German bid for Ypres, still accepted as one more serious attempt to reach Calais.

Sir Ian Hamilton's force had been mobilized in Egypt and transported to Mudros Bay in the Island of Lemnos, which was to serve as its base. He had with him three British corps, some 120,000 men, including the Australian and New Zealand corps, which, under the name of the "Anzacs" (Australian New Zealand Army Corps), was to win imperishable glory in defeat and demonstrate once more the solidarity of the British Empire, as the Canadians were proving it in Flanders and the South Africans along the Orange River. To this force was joined a contingent of French soldiers, under General D'Amade, who had won reputation in the Shawia campaign in Morocco before the present war

and rendered useful service to Sir John French in the retreat from Mons. D'Amade gave way shortly to Gouraud, one of the great French colonial figures, who lost an arm and had to leave in turn before long. The French contingent was a useful but not considerable help to the British. Its main contribution was through its artillery.

On the morning of April 25 the attack was made. The main British force was thrown against the Turkish positions commanding the beaches at Sedd-el-Bahr; the Australians were put ashore before Gaba Tepe; the French were sent across to the Asiatic shore to make a feint and attract Turkish attention. Actually they fought over ground that had seen the battle for Troy in the mighty Homeric drama.

The landing is one of the ghastliest of the incidents in the whole war. For a month the Turks had been preparing. Not only was the shore fortified, but the beaches, the shallows were covered by submerged barbed wires. Against this position the British were sent in open boats, partly but not effectively covered by the fire of the fleet. They made the landing, they made good their hold on the toe, but not less than 15,000 casualties was the price of the effort. As many troops were killed, wounded, or captured on this first day of the Gallipoli fighting as the United States sent to Cuba in the first Santiago expedition.

Afterward, in the next days, the effort to get forward was pressed. Under conditions beggaring description the remnants of the organizations that had made the landing sought to press on to Achi Baba, the first stage of the journey. They failed. When this first phase came to a halt through the exhaustion of the assailants, the Turks still held this height and the village of Krithia on its slopes. Actually the British army had inserted itself in a bottle, of which Achi Baba was the stopple. Before it now were positions impregnable, given its own resources. Some slight progress it was still to make on this front by a war of trenches, but in point of fact the road from Sedd-el-Bahr to the Kilid Bahr plateau, to the dominating positions above the Straits, was blocked.

As for the Australians, they had managed to get up the first slope of the hills above the Anzac Cove, where they had landed, but they were

now condemned to hang on, their backs to the water, their trenches exposed to plunging fire, dominated by the Turkish positions on Sari Bahr. Their losses had been terrible, too. Gallipoli was now become a word of evil omen both in Australia and New Zealand. And despite new efforts and new devotion, despite still greater sacrifices, the Australians were not destined to make any further considerable progress eastward. Sari Bahr was to block them, as Achi Baba held up their comrades to the south.

In British strategy it had been planned that the Australians moving east, the British moving north, should converge in the centre of the peninsula and before the Kilid Bahr Plateau. The Turks had blocked both of the converging columns on their chosen positions and they were to hold them before these positions until the end of the campaign. And with this first desperate effort the original expedition came to the limit of its powers. It could do no more until it was reinforced, so great had been its losses. Henceforth Gallipoli was an open sore, daily wasting more and more of British vitality to no useful purpose.

### V. SUVLA—THE END

In May the difficulties of the Gallipoli army were enormously increased by the arrival of German submarines in Ægean waters. Hitherto the British fleet had been able to support the land forces while British submarines had made daring raids through the Strait and interfered with the seaward communications of the Turk. But on May 15 a German submarine was reported off Malta, while three days previously a Turkish torpedo boat, by a daring raid, had sunk the British battleship *Goliath* just inside the Strait, where it was coöperating with the French.

On May 26 a German submarine sank the battleship *Triumph*, which was covering the Australian position. The next day the *Majestic* met the same fate, and thereafter the fleet had to be withdrawn. The departure of the fleet, the withdrawal of its guns which were necessary to cover any real effort to advance and prepare the way for any attack which could hope for success, doomed the Gallipoli venture in the eyes

of all military men who had not perceived from the outset that it was an impossible venture.

Yet the British would not give up the task. After long delays and many local engagements of only minor value they tried one more stroke. Meantime the cost in casualties was mounting rapidly. May had cost 38,000, including the casualties of the last days of April. Before July ended the toll was more than 50,000, while the French had also suffered heavy losses. In addition, the cost in sick was mounting in an alarming fashion. By August almost half of the men of the six original divisions had been killed, wounded, or captured, and fully a quarter more had been removed by illness. Not even in the terrible days of Ypres had the ratio of losses been greater than in some of the regiments of the 29th division at Gallipoli. But to reinforce the six original British divisions six more—three from the New Army, two territorial, and a mounted division from Egypt—had been sent out.

The final bid for success at Gallipoli was made in the first week of August and extended into the second. The main element in the strategy was the landing of a strong force at Suvla Bay, four miles north of the Australian position, and an advance by this newly landed force due eastward to the Anafarta range, which was the backbone of the peninsula and from which the British would command the Turkish lines of communication along the west side of the Dardanelles. At the same time the Australians were to make a frontal attack, the British before Krithia to push forward to hold the Turks before them. The Suvla Bay forces were to join hand with the Australians and the Turkish position would be enveloped, while the Australians, by their advances, would gain heights from which they could command the waters of the Strait.

The time was well selected. The Turks were celebrating the Ramadan and had no suspicion of the coming blow. The landing at Suvla was made without any difficulty and the Turkish surprise was complete. Meantime, the Australians had pushed out and seized the ground that was allotted to them to take. All now depended upon the energy and determination with which the Suvla advance was made. But here comes the first real collapse. Once the troops were landed

they were permitted to halt. Hour after hour passed and no advance was made. The golden opportunity was slipping away as another brilliant chance had escaped at Neuve Chapelle, when the road to Lille lay open. August 7, the day of the Suvla landing, is the critical day on the Gallipoli front.

On August 8 there was a fair chance, but the Suvla force was still held back. The hold of the Australians upon the vital heights was becoming weak. The Turks were recovering and beginning their terrific counter attacks. August 9, with a faint hope left, Sir Ian Hamilton arrived and urged a night attack. His subordinates declared it was impossible. The commander-in-chief allowed himself to be overborne. Thereafter when the attack upon Anafarta was made, it was too late. Meantime the Australians had been pushed back off their extreme gains. The whole situation was as it had been. Forty thousand casualties in August had not changed the decision.

Whether the Suvla attack, had it been efficiently pushed, would have brought ultimate and complete victory may be doubted. The weight of judgment is against this belief, which long subsisted in the Gallipoli army itself. But no one could mistake that the failure doomed the whole campaign, as it quite justly brought the removal of Sir Ian Hamilton. After Suvla he still appealed for reinforcements. But all too late Britain called a halt. At last the truth was dawning, while, because of Russian defeat and Balkan complications, the necessity for some British offensive operation in the west, in conjunction with the French, to relieve pressure upon the Russians, was imperative.

From August onward Gallipoli diminishes in importance. By December, when the German successes in the Balkans had opened the road between Turkey and her great ally and made certain the arrival of German artillery at Gallipoli, evacuation was inevitable, and on December 19 the troops were withdrawn from Suvla. By December 20 the Anzacs were safely away. By January 9 the last troops had left the peninsula. No portion of the Gallipoli campaign was so successful as the evacuation, which cost neither men nor guns, although conducted under fire and within direct vision of the Turk.

The lesson of Gallipoli was to be emphasized at Kut-el-Amara, where another "side show" was to end in the surrender of a British army, rashly pushed forward on an impossible dash for Bagdad. The two disasters were to produce a profound impression in Britain and in the world they were to have a costly influence upon Balkan affairs. They were to contribute to raising German fortunes to unequalled heights. Taken in conjunction with the failure of the British at Loos—where 66,000 casualties was the price of a slight gain in ground and disorganization and inefficiency were revealed in staff administration comparable to the blunders and failures at Suvla—they were to lead to a total reorganization of British military machinery.

Had Sir John French been able to put to his work on the west front the quarter of a million troops wasted at Gallipoli, the results of the 1915 campaign might have been far different. Even a complete success at Gallipoli would not have saved Russia from her great disaster. It would not have weakened Germany, although it would have ended her dream of a Berlin-to-Bagdad empire. All too late the Allies were to realize that the war would be won or lost in the west. France was to pay at Verdun the price of British folly at Gallipoli, for because of Gallipoli losses Britain was still unready to move when the great German blow, the second assault upon France, came in February and March of the following year.

In sum, Gallipoli was for the Allies what Spain had been for Napoleon. It was in a measure what Syracuse had been for Athens. It was not a fatal blunder, since it did not immediately or eventually lose the war, but it did prolong it. It did accelerate the pace of French exhaustion and it did leave Germany free to strike at Russia and to strike so heavy a blow that Russia, after a temporary recovery, fell to revolution and disorder and in the summer of 1917 ceased to be of value as an ally. It was therefore the worst and most expensive defeat of the first three years on the Allied side—a defeat first correctly appraised when Serbia, threatened with ruin, uttered the despairing cry which could not be answered, because the men and the guns that might have saved the army, if not the nation, had disappeared in the Gallipoli gamble.

# CHAPTER NINE

## RUSSIAN COLLAPSE

### I

### AFTER LEMBERG

Lemberg fell on June 22. With the fall of the capital the Galician campaign loses its importance and becomes a secondary affair. In German strategy there were two clearly separated sections of the eastern campaign of 1915. The first was comprised in the clearing of Galicia of Russian armies; the second contemplated the reduction of the Polish salient, the capture of Warsaw and the various Russian frontier fortresses from Riga to Rovno. Yet always it is essential to remember that the geographical achievement was subordinated to the military. The main German purpose all through this campaign was to destroy Russian military power, either by a great and decisive victory—a Sedan many times greater than that which had destroyed the Third Empire along the Meuse—or by the cumulative effect of successive defeats.

By the first days of July the Russian situation was this: From the neighbourhood of Riga straight to the Niemen at Kovno the line ran north and south. From the Rumanian frontier northward to the Volhynian fortresses of Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk the Russian front was also straight. But from Kovno on the north and Lutsk on the south the line turned westward, making a triangle with Warsaw as its apex. This was the great Polish salient of military parlance, a position so fraught with peril that long before the war Russian High Command had contemplated an evacuation of all this ground in case of a war with Austria and Germany and a stand behind the line of the Niemen, the Narew, the Bug, and great Pinsk or Pripet marshes.

The peril of the salient was just this: Austrian armies advancing from Galicia, German armies coming south from East Prussia, could they

pierce the Russian lines, the sides of the triangle would meet behind Warsaw and would cut off the retreat of all the Russian armies within the triangle unless they had retreated in time. The Russian position was the more dangerous because the two railroads vital to its defence, the Warsaw-Petrograd and the Warsaw-Kiev lines, were both but a short distance from the front, and a relatively insignificant advance, either out of East Prussia or out of Galicia, would enable the enemy to cut these lines behind the Russian armies on the Warsaw front.

All the intricate and confused campaign between July and October in the east becomes easily comprehensible if one but glances at the map and identifies the chief characteristics of the Polish salient. All German strategy is comprehended in the simple purpose to get behind the Russian armies in the Warsaw salient by breaking in the sides near the points where the triangle touches the main Russian line, from which it projects much after the nature of a cape. This main purpose was not achieved, because each time the peril of envelopment became obvious the Russians promptly retired in the centre and held on to the sides of the triangle until the forces at the apex had retired.

The operation has three distinct phases. In July the battle is for the Warsaw salient. In August, after Warsaw has been evacuated, the Russian effort is to hold the base of the salient, the line from Riga southward through Kovno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk and thence to the Volhynian fortresses. This is prevented by German advances to the north and south, which threaten to put German armies behind the Russian centre at Brest-Litovsk, as they had menaced the old centre at Warsaw. Finally, in the third phase, the Russian armies become separated, gaps open between the various groups of Slav armies, and through these gaps the Germans penetrate. Thus in September there is an hour of deadly peril for great Russian forces about Vilna. They are actually enveloped for days, but they finally cut their way out and thereafter the eastern campaign gradually diminishes in importance and Russian and German lines begin to reëstablish themselves on the fronts they are to maintain for many months to come.

Of the German strategic purposes, that of clearing the Austrian

territory was practically realized by July 1. The conquest of Poland, with the straightening of the eastern front and the capture of Warsaw, was realized on August 4, when Warsaw fell. The determination to expel Russia from all her frontier fortresses from Riga to Volhynia was realized, save in the important cases of Riga and Rovno, by the first days of September. No Russian army was captured or destroyed and to this extent the German strategy failed. Nor did the Germans quite reach that eastern front, easiest to hold and doubtless their ultimate geographic objective. Yet the result of their victories was the ultimate collapse of Russian military power.

## II. THE DOOM OF THE EMPIRE

In the period now to be examined we enter that doubtful and difficult region of Russian domestic politics. As the campaign closes the Czar, by a magnificent gesture, puts himself at the command of the beaten armies and under his leading they rally. Could his will have remained firm perhaps his empire might have been saved, but after a brave moment the Czar relapses into weakness, a pro-German and reactionary group seizes the reins of power, and Russian armies are betrayed to the enemy and the Russian Revolution made inevitable.

Already the disclosures that have been made possible by the Russian Revolution begin to reveal things long suspected. That the Russian generals and soldiers who fought so splendidly from the beginning of the war to the autumn of 1915 were betrayed by their government is no longer to be denied. That many of the German triumphs from Tannenberg to the end of the fatal campaign of 1915 were due to official betrayal of Russian interests is as plain now as it was a matter of conjecture two years before.

Time and again in the critical hours of the campaign of 1915 ammunition failed. The vital fortress of Kovno was surrendered to the Germans under conditions that were even in 1915 accepted as proof of treason. Hundreds of thousands of lives were sacrificed, great regions of Russia were devastated and lost to the enemy because of German intrigue in Petrograd and German influence amidst the reactionary

elements of the Russian monarchy. All this the Russian people knew. They learned in the summer of 1915 not merely to expect defeat in the war, but to hope for it as the first step in the destruction of the monarchy and the attainment of Russian liberty.

The campaign of 1915 destroyed the monarchy in the eyes of the people of Russia. All the skill of the really great Russian generals—Brusiloff, Ivanoff, Russky, and Alexiev—all the devotion of the soldiers, all the unquestioned fidelity to the cause of Russia of the Grand Duke Nicholas himself were of no avail. And when Nicholas disappeared into the Caucasus to win new but unavailing victories at Erzerum, the German influence about the Czar became dominant. Thus, while at the moment the military aspect of the great Russian disaster claimed the attention of the world, it is probable that the generations that are to come will see the military events as significant merely because they were the prelude to the political changes, to the Russian Revolution, to all the great and terrible events of the winter and spring of 1917.

And on the larger side it is necessary to point out that, although at the moment Germany seemed to have failed in her chief purpose—to dispose of Russia as she had sought to dispose of France in the previous years—later events proved that Germany did reckon rightly and that when her armies had completed their great campaign in the east in the autumn of 1915, she had achieved the eventual ruin of Russia as a military factor in the war for the next two years at the very least. For if the Russian armies were to win magnificent victories in the summer of 1916, the betrayal of Rumania by the Russian Government in the autumn was to destroy the fairest prospects the Allies were to have in the first three years of the war and thereafter the ruin was to be prompt and inevitable.

It is because it brought the Russian Revolution that the eastern campaign is chiefly significant. It is because it was the first step in this ruin that the Battle of the Dunajec is bound to remain one of the memorable encounters of human history. Looking now at the military operations of the period, we must see in each episode the meaning in Russian political history quite as clearly as in the military history of the

war. Revolution is marching side by side with Mackensen and Hindenburg in all this period and because it was bound to disorganize and well-nigh destroy Russian military efficiency, and Russia's value as an ally of the western powers, we must see Revolution as an ally of the Germans.

When they had reached the threshold of winter the Germans could afford to halt. The example of Napoleon forbade another adventure with Russian winter on the road to Moscow. Thenceforth they could wait until Revolution, entering through the breach they had battered in the walls of the Romanoff imperial structure, should complete that destruction of Russian military strength which they had begun at the Dunajec and carried to the Dwina.

### III. WARSAW

In the first days of July the situation on the eastern front was this: A German army, which had been landed at Libau, was moving east and north on the front between Dvinsk and Riga, with these two towns as objectives. To the south from the Niemen west of Kovno to the Vistula below Warsaw a group of German armies under Hindenburg was preparing to thrust south through the Niemen-Narew-Bobr line of fortresses covering the Petrograd-Warsaw railroad. A second group of armies, under Prince Leopold of Bavaria, faced Warsaw and Ivangorod along the Bzura-Rawka line, which had been unchanged for many months. South of the Upper Vistula a third army group, commanded by Mackensen, was beginning a thrust northward across the Warsaw-Kiev railroad.

It was plain at the outset that if either of the two flank operations succeeded the Warsaw salient must go. The mission of Leopold was merely to continue pressure upon the apex of the triangle and snatch any profit from a Russian disaster on another field. These three German army groups were faced by three Russian groups commanded by Alexiev, Evarts, and Ivanoff. There were as many as a dozen German and Austrian armies on this front, while the Russians were less numerous both in armies and men. Always the Germans possessed an enormous advantage in munitionment and in heavy artillery, while Russian munitions were to fail at many critical moments in the next weeks.




THE WARSAW SALIENT IN JULY, 1915

The *white arrows* show the lines of advance of the Germans under Mackensen and Hindenburg. Compare this map with the one on page 193, showing the similar manœuvre of the Allies on the western front.

THE FALL OF WARSAW, AUGUST, 1915

The Russian rear-guard surrenders to the Germans, and the Russian main body sullenly withdraws from the city



THE FALL OF WARSAW—AUGUST, 1915

The triumphant entry of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and the looting which often follows a German success

About July 5 opening engagements of the first phase of the new campaign begin. The Archduke Joseph and Mackensen are pushing north. They have passed the Russian frontier and are moving upon Lublin and Cholm on the Warsaw-Kiev railroad. They are beginning to be handicapped now by the fact that they have entered a region of poor roads and are beyond the Galician network of railroads. The Russians, on the contrary, are now near their own rail lines and bases. And on July 9 the Archduke, having pushed forward too rashly and thus gotten out of supporting distance of Mackensen, is suddenly attacked and smartly beaten by Evarts at Krasnik, south of Lublin, losing many guns, flags, and some thousands of prisoners.

Mackensen now comes to the aid of his ally, but there is a marked slowing down of the German operation on this side of the Polish salient. In the third week of July there is still a remote basis for hope that the Lublin-Cholm position can be held.

But on July 25 one of Hindenburg's armies, commanded by Gallwitz, suddenly strikes north of the salient and along the Narew, aiming to reach the Petrograd-Warsaw railroad behind Warsaw. After desperate fighting Gallwitz gets across the Narew on July 25. But he, in turn, is forced to slow down. Yet on this same day Mackensen is again getting forward and is within ten miles of Lublin. Both sides of the salient are now in grave danger. To add to the peril, one of Leopold's armies has crossed the Vistula between Ivangorod and Warsaw, finding a weak spot resulting from the transfer of troops to meet Mackensen's thrust.

Warsaw is now doomed. Indeed a decision to evacuate had been taken as early as July 15, although there were moments subsequently when it seemed possible that the Russians might hold on. Lublin falls on July 30. The Warsaw-Kiev line, one of the vital railroads of the salient, is now cut. Therefore, on August 4, the Russians clear Warsaw and Prince Leopold's army enters the Polish capital one year to a day after the British declaration of war transformed the character of the contest into a world struggle. The Battle of the Dunajec had been won on May Day; less than a hundred days later the Germans were in Warsaw.

With the fall of Warsaw the next problem posed is whether the Russian armies can escape—will they be able to get east of the breaches in the sides of the salient before the armies of Mackensen and Hindenburg reach their lines of communication?

Again, as at Mukden, the Russians displayed their great capacity for successful retirement. By August 15 there is no longer any danger of an immediate envelopment, the Warsaw apex of the salient has been safely cleared, the road to Brest-Litovsk lies open, and the barrier fortresses along the Niemen-Bobr-Narew have fulfilled their final mission—those of the Narew are now doomed and there is no great purpose in holding them too long. Far to the south, too, the advance of Mackensen, aimed at Brest-Litovsk, has failed to move at a rate which would threaten envelopment. The first stage of the retreat is safely passed.

### IV. KOVNO, BREST, VILNA

For the Russians the next problem is their ultimate rallying point. Like Joffre after his early defeats, the Grand Duke Nicholas has now to select a point at which to stand and counter-attack, having made his reorganizations. The line is fairly obvious. From Riga to Kovno the Russians are still holding off Below's army, striking east from Libau. From Kovno, which is a fortress of real strength, southward the east bank of the Niemen offers a safe position as far as the fortress of Grodno. Brest-Litovsk is an entrenched camp offering a good base for the Russian centre. To the south the Volhynian fortresses of Rovno, Lutsk, and Dubno hold.

We may assume that the Grand Duke hoped to make his stand on this line, which had been selected long before the war as the first line of Russian defence in a war with Austria and Germany. But on August 17 Kovno suddenly surrenders under circumstances which suggest treachery and later bring the commander to trial for alleged betrayal of his country. Kovno gone, the hope of holding the Niemen-Bug line is at an end and the flank armies on the north are in grave peril, which will culminate in the critical days about Vilna. Two days later the great fortress of Novogeorgievsk, below Warsaw, falls. Its capture was

always inevitable; its mission was identical with that of Maubeuge in the great Anglo-French retreat of the preceding year. It commanded the Vistula, the best line of transport for the Germans, and covered the railroad line coming south out of East Prussia by Mlawa. A large garrison and many guns were taken, but although the defence proved to be shorter than was expected, there was no suggestion of such treachery as had cost the Russians Kovno. Nor did its fall have any effect upon the operations to the eastward save as it opened new lines of communication for the Germans.

Meantime away to the north a joint naval and military descent upon Riga with an attempted landing at Pernau is blocked. In the same fashion the Russians, falling back behind the Dwina from the Gulf of Riga to Dvinsk, hold up a dangerous drive of one of Hindenburg's armies for the extreme northern flank of the Russian line. But on the south Grodno falls on September 4, while Brest-Litovsk has to be abandoned a week earlier, on August 25. And at the precise moment Grodno is lost to the north, Lutsk and Dubno, two of the three Volhynian fortresses, fall. All chance of a stand on the Niemen-Bug line has now disappeared and the Germans are across both rivers, still aiming at the rear of the Russian armies.

Now, on September 5, the Czar takes command of his armies. The Russian Cabinet through Sazonov issues a solemn declaration that Russia will make no separate peace, thus answering German reports. And at this moment the campaign enters its critical stage. The Russian armies are now scattered and that between the Niemen and the Bug is in deadly peril. The disaster of Kovno on August 17 has its sequel about Vilna on September 20, when a great Russian army is enveloped on three sides while large contingents of German cavalry cross its only line of retreat. Berlin begins to hint at a Sedan and the world awaits with tense interest the final act.

Once again, as at Lodz, the Russian escapes. The stolid infantry smash their way through the German cavalry obstacle. By September 21 the road to Minsk is clear—the last Russian army has escaped all real peril of destruction. Far to the south Brusiloff is making a counter-




WHERE THE RUSSIAN RETREAT ENDED IN SEPTEMBER, 1915

offensive which temporarily retakes Dubno and Lutsk and assures the Russians of a permanent hold upon Rovno. Already winter is at hand and the German campaign is visibly slackening.

October 1 the end has in fact come, although there will be struggles about Riga, which will be successfully defended for two years more, and, all along the front, minor contests for certain local positions which have a value in establishing the permanent lines of the two armies, since they are now to return to a war of position, to trench warfare after five months of fighting in the open—five months of a war of movement which in numbers engaged, in prisoners captured, in territory conquered, can only be compared with those great campaigns of Napoleon in his younger days. And even the Napoleonic triumphs will unquestionably seem small when a later generation comes to compare the results of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena with the German achievement between the opening battle of the Dunajec and the closing drama at Vilna.

### V. AFTERMATH

While Berlin and Vienna celebrated the great successes, London, Paris, and Petrograd rejoiced over a German failure to destroy Russian military organization, capture Russian armies, or get Riga. Allied critics expatiated upon the weakness of German strategy as proved by the escape of Russian armies. Yet the fact seems to be that the German method made the prospect of great captures quite unlikely. Napoleon had said that he won his great victories by the legs of his soldiers. German victories had been won by their artillery.

Such an enormous machine as the Mackensen "phalanx" could only move slowly at best over favourable ground and with good lines of communication behind it. As the German advance when it reached Russian territory had to move over country devastated by retreating armies, employing ruined roads and hastily repaired railroads, its speed was necessarily slight. And when the German and Austrian armies undertook to act without the aid of the heavy guns, they incurred heavy losses and the Austrians frequently suffered real defeats. In the Marne campaign the Germans had outrun most of their ammunition and many

of their heavy guns. This had been an important factor in the ultimate loss of the great battle.

In Russia, a year later, the same mistake was not repeated. The guns were brought up; breaches were beaten in the Russian lines; the infantry entered the breaches, thus threatening a section of the Russian front with envelopment and their troops in this section retreated to a new line. Then the process was repeated. As long as the Germans had to face troops without heavy guns there was but one possible ending to such struggles. The Russian defeats, the destruction of Serbia, the terrible disaster of Rumania a year later, these were all the direct result of the German tactics based upon the German supremacy in artillery.

When the same tactics were employed against the French at Verdun they failed because the French were able to bring up heavy artillery. In the same way the Germans at the Somme, themselves faced by a great concentration of heavy artillery, were able to prevent disaster, although the superiority of Anglo-French artillery compelled gradual retirement and the Somme, on a reduced scale, is a repetition of the great Russian campaign of 1915, with the Germans playing the losing part.

The last days of September mark the real termination of the great eastern campaign, and the end was in small part at least influenced by the tardy but terrific effort of the British and French in the west to relieve the pressure upon their ally. Largely because of this effort the Germans failed to get what must be regarded as their extreme geographical objective—that lateral railroad which descends from Riga to Rovno and would have made an ideal line of communication between the German armies could they have pushed beyond it along the whole front. In the same way they would have profited had they been able to take Riga, which would have been even more useful than Libau as base with the coming of spring. But it was the Russian navy which saved Riga.

Had the British and French been able to make a real offensive in the spring, the German offensive might not have broken in the Polish salient and conquered Poland. An offensive in the summer might have exposed German armies to deadly peril east and west, because while the masses of the eastern armies were committed to a great and difficult operation in

a country devastated by the retreating Russians, they would not have been able to detach any considerable reinforcements, and such reserves as they could send west would have been long in arriving.

But France tried in Artois and failed to achieve any great result. Britain, her new troops in large measure drawn off for Gallipoli, was incapable of any considerable effort whatever. Conceivably the fate of Warsaw was sealed by the Dardanelles venture. Certainly the great and permanent Russian disaster would have been avoided had the British been able to make a real effort between April and the last days of September. And it is small wonder that all through this terrible summer the Russians watched with ever-growing apprehension Allied failure to move in the west; that Warsaw and Petrograd alike cried out for help vainly in July and August.

In her East Prussian campaign in August and the first days of September, 1914, Russia had suffered terrible disaster, but the effect of her rash drive had been to draw off German troops intended for the French field of operations, even if, as is now held to be the case, no German corps were actually transferred from the west to the east before the Marne. But what Russia had done for her Allies they could not do for her and thus the Grand Duke failed where Joffre had succeeded. He saved his armies, but more he could not do.

# CHAPTER TEN

# THE BATTLES OF YPRES

## I

## THE BATTLEFIELD

The first campaign in the west ended with the final repulse of the Germans before Ypres in November, 1914. But the Russian campaign in the east proceeded without interruption from the opening operations of August, 1914, until the final halt of the Russian retreat far within Russian territory in September and October of the following year. Actually this campaign changed character when the German victory at the Dunajec finally deprived the Russians of the offensive and ended the endeavour of the Russian armies to dispose of Austria. Thus the real conclusion of the first campaign of the war seems to me to be at the Dunajec and not at the close of the First Battle of Ypres.

In the volume describing the first phase, therefore, I briefly referred to the Second Battle of Ypres, which began before the Dunajec but lasted beyond the period of this great conflict in the east, thus preserving the temporal relation between the eastern and western campaigns. Yet actually the Second Battle of Ypres belongs to the campaign of 1915 in the west, it had consequences fatal to the Allied plans for their spring offensive, and it caused a disorder in Allied strategy which endured for many months. For these reasons and because in addition the Ypres battlefield became in the fourth campaign—that of the summer and fall of 1917—the scene of the principal Allied offensive of the year, and as the First Battle of Ypres was the most considerable British battle in all the history of the race up to the end of 1914, there is, perhaps, warrant for reviewing at this time the operations in the area that became forever memorable as the "Ypres Salient," and for studying the ground and restating the relation of the Second Battle of Ypres to the whole western campaign of 1915.

Turning first to the examination of the country itself, it should be remembered at the outset that Ypres is in the midst of the typical Flanders region—flat country marked by innumerable little brooks and rivulets, many of them canalized for centuries. This country begins as far south as Bethune and stretches north to the estuary of the Scheldt. Hills, mentioned so frequently in the battle despatches, are in reality but gently sloping elevations. Just as the American who is familiar with the history of the Battle of Waterloo and has read of the height of Mont St. Jean stands in amazement looking out upon the field itself when he first sees it and recalls, not the rugged country of the Appalachian seaboard but the prairies of the West, so he would view the district between the Lys and the Yser, on which was fought a battle greater than Waterloo and only less momentous in human history, for, had the Germans broken through to Calais, they might conceivably have abolished most of the consequences of the French victory between Paris and Verdun.

Bearing in mind, however, this qualification as to the stature of the hills about Ypres, it is still necessary to recognize that they played a decisive part in the various contests and that for the possession of the most considerable of them three battles were fought—one in October and November, 1914, a second in April and May, 1915, and the third and greatest, in the size of the armies engaged, from June to the end of the campaign of 1917.

To start at the beginning, there is between Bixschoote, at the edge of the marshes along the Yser River, and Warneton on the Lys, a fifteen-mile stretch of solid ground, that is, ground suitable for the movement of guns, transport, and large bodies of men. West of Bixschoote is the marshy region which was flooded when the Belgians closed the sluices at Nieuport in the critical days of the Battle of the Yser. South and east of Warneton, that is, on the right bank of the Lys, Allied operations were rendered impossible by the German occupation of Lille, with its forts and defences, which were, despite their contemporary condition, too great an obstacle for Allied resources either in 1914 or 1915.

The solid ground between the Lys and the Yser was then in the nature of a sally-port, should an army come north and seek to advance down the Lys valley toward Ghent and Bruges. On the other hand, for an army moving south it was the main gate to Calais and Boulogne, to the Channel ports facing the English coast, once the Yser front had been closed by inundation and the front south of the Yser barred by adequate armies. Could an army moving north push up to Roulers and Menin it would insert a wedge between hostile armies operating on the coast in front of the Yser and those to the eastward about Lille. Could an army moving south thrust through this gateway it would similarly intervene between the army defending the Yser front and the other forces before Lille. And when the British army moved north in October, 1914, its main purpose was to isolate the Germans advancing along the coast from those about Lille, while the German purpose, when the offensive passed to them, was to push down to Calais, isolating all the troops west of Ypres, the Belgian army, and a French force sent to aid the Belgians.

### II. THE MESSINES-ZONNEBEKE RIDGE

Ypres, itself, lies in a little basin, about the tiny Yperlee stream which flows west to the Yser. It is the junction of several roads and railways and through it passes a canal from the Lys to the Yser. It was a fortress in the Eighteenth Century and some of the ramparts of Vauban have survived the artillery of Krupp, but these had no value on the contemporary military side. Of the roads and railroads the more important from west to east were: the Bethune-Bruges railway, which came up from the south and, after leaving Ypres, crossed the canal near Boesinghe, passed through Langemarck, and continued thence to Thourout; the Ypres-Roulers railway and highway, which paralleled each other and ran northeastward to Roulers; and the Menin Road, which ran straight from Ypres southeast to Menin on the Lys. A mile south of this last was the canal connecting the Lys with the Yser and Ypres with Commines.

South, east, and northeast of Ypres, at a distance of rather less than

three miles, is the famous Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge, which is the most important geographical detail in the entire country. This ridge runs from southwest to northeast. It is at no point more than two miles wide and at many not more than one. Its highest point is at the south




THE ENVIRONS OF YPRES AND THE MESSINES-ZONNEBEKE RIDGE

near Messines, where it is 250 feet above the level of the sea; at the other end, beyond Zonnebeke, it is rather less than two hundred feet. At no point is it more than a hundred feet above the surrounding country and it rises in gentle slopes, making a far more impressive showing on the map than upon the vision of the tourist.

Along this ridge, from south to north, are a number of small villages, forever famous in British battle history. These are: Messines,

Wytschaete, Hollebeke, Klein Zillebeke, Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, and Zonnebeke. North of the last it narrows to a point at Paschendaele. Actually this ridge is the watershed between the Lys and the Yser. Down its gently sloping western flanks flow a number of brooks which reach the Yser west of the inundated district. Eastward, over a much shorter course, flow other brooks leading to the Lys. Save in rainy weather—unhappily frequent in this weather-cursed corner of Europe—these streams are not obstacles to military operations.

Separating the streams which flow west to the Yser are a number of lower ridges running at right angles to the main Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge, the only one of importance in the present narrative being that north of Zonnebeke, which first borrows the name of Grafenstafel and then of Pilkem. It is the natural extension of the front of an army standing on the main ridge and troops in position on this Pilkem-Grafenstafel elevation would cover the flank of an army on the main ridge. On the other hand, were both the southern end of the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge and the western end of the Pilkem Ridge in the possession of an enemy, the position of an army defending Ypres would be exceedingly dangerous because its rear and communications would be under the fire and observation of its foe. And it is worth recalling that the Messines position was lost in 1914, the Pilkem in 1915.

So much for the general topography of the country. Bear in mind again that an army holding all the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge would look down on a vast sweep of country to the east and southeast. It would be able through its observation balloons to see as far as Lille, to sweep the whole of the upper valley of the Lys. Its heavy artillery in position behind the ridge would be able to command the Menin-Roulers road five miles to the east and play havoc with enemy communications, while its operations would remain hidden to the enemy, save for aërial observation, and its communications would be beyond reach of effective bombardment. Once, however, should the army be driven over and off the ridge, it would lose all these advantages and would be huddled in the Ypres basin, in a position which it would cost a steady and terrible wastage to hold and would always be a danger point.

It is worth recalling, too, that the Battle of Ypres, the first and in many ways the most famous encounter, was accidental, like Gettysburg. Neither army expected to encounter the other on the ground on which the meeting actually took place. And it is equally interesting to recall that the First Battle of Ypres was the last battle of the old-fashioned sort, that is, a battle in the open as contrasted with trench warfare, a conflict in a war of movement rather than in positional warfare on the western front up to the moment these lines are written in October, 1917, after the third anniversary of the opening contests about Ypres.

### III. THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

On October 14, 1914, the first British troops reached Ypres. They comprised the immortal Seventh Division, commanded by General Rawlinson, which had landed at Ostend a few days before and had covered the retreat of the Belgian army, aided by some French formations. At this moment the Belgians, closely followed by General von Besseler's army, which had taken Antwerp and was advancing along the coast roads, were already near the Yser line, which they were to hold, and French troops were being railed up from the south to support them. Bad as was the condition of the Belgian army, it was still believed—justly as the result proved—that it would be able to hold the Yser line.

At this moment Allied High Command believed that between the German army approaching the Yser and the northern end of the main German front, which now extended from Switzerland to Lille, there was a wide gap, squarely in front of Ypres and extending from Menin to Roulers. Field Marshal Sir John French had sent Sir Douglas Haig north with the First Army Corps; Allenby's cavalry already about Armentièrres was to coöperate with it; and this force, together with the Seventh Division, seizing the crossings of the Lys from Menin to Courtrai, was designed to turn the extreme flank of all the German armies, aim at their communications, and compel a retirement from the coast toward Brussels, which was not felt to be beyond the reach of the Allies. Such a success would isolate Besseler on the Yser and probably lead

to the capture of his army. In any event, it would release Lille and the industrial regions of northern France, now firmly held by the German armies which had been brought north and west from the Aisne and Lorraine fronts. And in conformity with this strategy, French ordered Rawlinson to move out of Ypres on October 17 and seize the crossings of the Lys at Menin.

Once more, as at Mons, British information was wholly out of accord with the facts. Actually the Allies had, in or approaching the region between the Lys and the Yser, less than 100,000 men, of whom only some French cavalry and Rawlinson's Seventh Division had actually arrived, while the Germans were moving four corps and some other formations, upward of half a million men, into this Ypres sector. Already aware of an impending change, but still unable to measure the extent of the threat, Rawlinson conformed to the imperious order of French and the next day moved the Seventh Division out to Zonnebeke.

On October 19 the Seventh Division sent out a brigade from Zonnebeke which actually reached the Roulers-Menin highroad, but there it encountered the advance guards of two German corps and was compelled to fall back rapidly to Zonnebeke. October 19 thus marks the end of the advance toward Menin and the crossings of the Lys. That night Sir Douglas Haig reached Ypres and the next day his First Army Corps came up. At once there was posed the question as to whether it should be put in to the east to support the Seventh Division on the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge north of the Menin Road, or sent north to cover the flank from Zonnebeke through Langemarck to Bixschoote. Unless it was sent to the support of the Seventh Division there was now danger that Rawlinson would be overwhelmed, but if it was sent thither, then a gap would open in the Allied line between Zonnebeke and the marshes, and the Germans coming south through Langemarck would outflank both the British and the Belgians, drive a wedge between them, and have an open road to Calais and Boulogne.

Sir John French chose to risk the former peril and sent Haig north. When he was in position the Allied line from Switzerland to the sea was complete, but from the Lys to the Yser it was incredibly thin and for

some days no reinforcements were available, as the French troops Joffre was sending up could not arrive before the 23d and did not all come until the 24th. As the First Battle of Ypres began, then, the British held the front from the inundated district at Bixschoote along the Pilkem and Grafenstafel ridges to the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge east of this town, and thence south along the ridge through Becelaere and Zandevorde to the Commines Canal. South of the canal Allenby's cavalry held the Messines-Wytschaete sector with ridiculously insignificant cavalry screens. October 20 the real battle opens.

From October 20 to October 31 the fighting about Ypres was intense. On October 23 and 24 the arrival of the French Ninth Corps allowed Sir Douglas Haig to bring his First Corps from the Pilkem-Grafenstafel to the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge and thus reinforce the Seventh Division, which was rapidly approaching the point of annihilation. But despite all effort the British were slowly but surely driven from the crest of the Messines-Zonnebeke Ridge and on October 31 their line was actually broken on the Menin Road, near Gheluvelt. This was the crisis of the whole battle, the moment when Sir John French himself sent the cooks, the hostlers, and every available man to the front line.

A lost battle was saved by the sudden appearance of the 2d Worcesters on the flank of the Germans advancing on the Menin Road west of Gheluvelt. The line was restored, but Gheluvelt was lost, as Zanvorde had been, and the front now ran from Zonnebeke south through the Polygon Woods to a point on the Menin Road just west of Gheluvelt. Like Meade after the first day of Gettysburg, French had been battered into a new but strongly defensible position; from Zonnebeke to the Menin Road the new front was now to endure for many months and never to be lost to a direct attack. But it was an exhausted and almost annihilated force which now held the line.

On November 1 the Germans shifted their attack to the Messines-Wytschaete front and seized the southern end of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. This was their greatest success in the whole battle and a French army corps which arrived the next day and retook both

Messines and Wytschaete was unable to hold either. The capture of Messines and Wytschaete really created the Ypres salient. Henceforth the Germans, from the highest ground in the whole region, looked down upon the rear and commanded the communications of the British in and east of Ypres. After November 1, the Battle of Ypres continued




THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OF YPRES

*A-A* shows the ground lost to the Germans in the First Battle, October 20 to November 11, 1914.
*B-B* shows the additional territory lost in the Second Battle, April 22 to May 8, 1915.
In the First Battle the Germans won the hills of Wytschaete and Messines; in the Second they took the Pilkem Ridge on the other side of the salient. They held on here till the summer of 1917, when British advances abolished the whole salient.

with diminishing energy up to November 11, when the Prussian Guard made its celebrated attack, temporarily pierced the British line between Gheluvelt and Veldthook on the Menin Road and was thereafter annihilated.

The eleven days between October 21 and November 1 were the days of the great stress on the British front, and in this time that portion of

ITALIAN TROOPS ON A TRANSPORT BOUND FOR GALLIPOLI

"On April 24 [1915], Italy at last made her arrangements with the Allies and on May 3 denounced the Triple Alliance. . . . The country was seized by a patriotic emotion which can hardly be paralleled in history. . . . On May 23 Italy was at war with Austria." This, however, was too late to allow of very effective participation in the campaign at Gallipoli.

ITALIAN ALPINI, SHORTLY AFTER SUNRISE, TOILING UP A MOUNTAIN PASS ON SKIS

ITALIAN INFANTRY ADVANCING IN AN ATTACK

Regulation steel helmets have displaced the picturesque feather-crowned caps once so familiar to Italian tourists



AN ITALIAN OFFICER'S HEADQUARTERS

This eyrie is built into the solid face of the cliff, thousands of feet up the mountain side

WATCHING THE OLD ENEMY

These Italians, at the end of one of their rocky trenches, are watching the movements of the Austrians across the valley. It will be noted that at least three of the four soldiers are supplied with field-glasses

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SNOW IN THE ITALIAN ALPS

After a heavy fall of snow it was sometimes necessary to tunnel through huge drifts like this, in order to clear the communication trenches

A BIVOUAC ON THE ISONZO

This little town in Austrian territory having been captured after a heavy bombardment, these Italian infantrymen have entered it to take possession and—they hope—to rest

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ON A MOUNTAIN TOP



ITALIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

A vigilant watch for enemy aircraft is maintained by land and sea. Showing a gun mounted on a summit in the Italian Alps, 8,100 feet above sea-level. A glimpse of the queer-looking craft used in the anti-aircraft motor-boat patrol



THE MOUNTAIN RAMPARTS GUARDING THE ITALIAN PLAIN

An Italian signal outpost commanding a bird's-eye view of the valley thousands of feet below. The canvas-covered object behind the sand bags is a powerful searchlight

the British Expeditionary Army which fought about Ypres was practically exterminated. The Seventh Division alone lost 356 out of 400 officers and 9,664 out of 12,000 rank and file. At Ypres alone the British losses were 40,000. The German loss has been placed as high as 250,000 and certainly exceeded the loss at the Marne. For three weeks the British fought an enemy five times as numerous and equipped with heavy artillery and machine guns, both of which weapons were lacking to the British in any useful number. Probably 60 per cent.—perhaps more—of the British army were killed, wounded, or captured, but in the end they still held Ypres and the lines before it. For such an achievement all praise is inadequare. And at Ypres Britain's professional army perished but its tradition became thenceforth imperishable. Unlike the Spartans, who died in defeat, the British army had held its gate.

### IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

The close of the First Battle of Ypres saw the Allies holding one of the most remarkable positions in all the front from Belfort to Nieuport. Pushed eastward from Ypres was a sausage-shaped salient or bulge, extending north-northeast to its greatest depth at Grafenstafel, six miles from Ypres. The base of this salient was the Ypres-Commines-Yser Canal and between the two points where the German line touched the canal, north and south of Ypres, was barely seven miles. South of this canal possession of the Messines and Wytschaete hills gave the Germans direct observation and splendid artillery sweep of the whole rear of the salient. But north of the canal the British still clung to the western slope of the ridge, from the vicinity of Gheluvelt to a point east of Zonnebeke, and from Zonnebeke westward they held both the Grafenstafel and Pilkem ridges as far as the western limits of Langemarck. Between Langemarck and the canal at Steenstrate a division of French Colonials was in line.

In April, 1915, the British were preparing for their subsequent offensive southward near La Bassée. The French had recalled their best troops from this front to participate in Foch's great Artois operation, and most of the few heavy British guns had likewise gone south. There

was no expectation of any considerable German operation in the Ypres sector and Allied journals were heralding the coming of the spring offensive, which was to throw the Germans out of France and Belgium. Toward the last of the third week in April an attack, preceded by the explosion of a mine, had given the British a brief hold on Hill No. 60, a mound near the point where the Ypres-Commines Canal crossed the battle-front. Heavy attack and counter-attack on this point occupied the attention of the world in the next few days.

But on April 22 came one of the most dramatic and terrible episodes of the war. Toward evening the Germans suddenly loosed vast quantities of chlorine gas against the French Colonial division standing between Langemarck and the Ypres-Yser Canal at Steenstrate. The result was a natural and inevitable panic. The black troops fled south and west, toward Ypres and across the canal. Within a brief period the Allied front was broken and for four miles between Langemarck and the canal there was a gap. The German road to Ypres was at last open.

East of the Colonials were the Canadians. When the French troops fled, the Canadian flank was left in the air, while the Canadians were themselves exposed to gas fumes and suffered severe losses from this cause. Yet, despite all the circumstances, the Canadians hung on. They drew back their left flank, forming in a half circle, and fought on, holding up for many hours the onrush of the Germans. Here, on this front, the Canadian contingent won their title to rank with the old British Army which had held the Ypres position in the autumn and with their Anzac brethren, who were soon to win equal glory at Gallipoli.

The next morning, Friday, April 23, the situation was critical in the extreme. The Germans had forced the crossing of the Yser Canal between Boesinghe and Steenstrate and taken Lizerne, while they were in possession of Langemarck and Pilkem and crowding down the roads from these towns toward Ypres itself. Could they push on for but three miles more, Ypres would be in their hands and all the troops in the salient east of Ypres would be caught like rats in a trap. That they did not do this can only in part be credited to the bravery of the Canadians and

their British supports. In point of fact the true explanation appears to be that the Germans had not expected so tremendous a success and lacked reserves at the decisive point at the favourable moment. A better chance than the British had had at Neuve Chapelle therefore slipped through their fingers.

In the next few days the situation slowly improved, although it remained critical during the first days of May. First the French threw the Germans back to the east bank of the canal. At the same time the British brought up troops from all points of their line and closed the gap between the canal and the flank of the Canadians. Even the Belgians from their side of the Yser River sent over reinforcements. Meantime German heavy artillery destroyed the beautiful buildings of Ypres, till then little injured, and the British army suffered from shell fire as it had not suffered even in the first days of the battle about Ypres in the preceding year. To this heavy gun-fire it had neither the artillery nor the ammunition to make answer.

By the first of May, the day on which the Germans were to win their great victory of the Dunajec, it was plain that the old Ypres salient could no longer be held. It had become a rectangle three miles wide by six long, thrust forth into the German lines. From the Pilkem Ridge as well as the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge the Germans had now a sweep over British communications. Accordingly in the second week of May the British sullenly drew back from the Grafenstafel Ridge, from Zonnebeke, from all the ridge between the Roulers Railroad and the Menin Road, and occupied a new front in a narrow semicircle rather more than a mile east of Ypres.

Almost all the high ground was now lost. All the salvage of the First Battle of Ypres, defended with such great gallantry and obstinacy, was surrendered. Second Ypres had been far more costly than the First in territory given up, although it must be remembered that for this the British were not responsible. It was the collapse of the French, under the first gas attack of the war, which precipitated the disaster. Yet even this was a small solace for the Allied publics, which had expected news of a great victory both in the east and in the west and in the

same hour read of the Dunajec and the surrender of all the ground memorable in the First Battle of Ypres.

By May 13 the Second Battle of Ypres closed. The German purpose had been accomplished; there had been greater success than in the earlier attack, but the purpose of the April operation was far less colossal than that of the October campaign. Then the road to Calais had been sought. Now the Germans aimed merely to weaken the Allied offensive to the southward by drawing from it men, munitions, and guns. They sought also to impress the neutral nations—Italy most of all—with their great strength on both fronts. This strength was proven, but Italy was already lost and the use of the poison gas served to arouse the indignation of men of all nations outside the Central Alliance. It was one more circumstance in the indictment of Germany by civilization. After Ypres, quarter was neither given nor taken for many months on the Flanders front and before very long the Germans, in their turn, were compelled to endure the suffering incident to a gas attack.

Without the gas the German success would have been unlikely. As it was, the success was limited and the moral consequences evil in the extreme for the Germans. The sinking of the *Lusitania* while the Second Battle of Ypres was still proceeding was instantly associated in all minds with the crime of the poison gas. And just as the Zeppelins were the best recruiting agency in Britain, German savagery roused Canada to new effort and in the first three years of the war more than 400,000 Canadians crossed the sea to fight in Flanders and Artois.

Such, briefly, is the history of the origin and development of the Ypres salient. In the First Battle of Ypres the Germans, attacking east of the town, mainly on either side of the Menin Road, gained the hills of Wytschaete and Messines. In the Second they took the Pilkem Ridge at the other side of the salient. Thenceforth they held it as in a vise between these two ridges until June and August, 1917, when the British first retook Wytschaete and Messines and then, with the aid of French divisions, swept the Germans off the Pilkem Ridge, retook Pilkem, Bixschoote, Langemarck, and St. Julien, and thus abolished

the whole salient. Until this time the Ypres salient remained the worst point on the whole Allied front, and for a long period there was a sharp debate in British military circles as to the advisability of holding Ypres or retiring to the hills behind it, Scharpenberg and Kemmel.

Ypres was not evacuated mainly because of the moral value that attached to it as a result of the two great battles. Only Verdun could rival the old Flemish citadel, now gone to dust and ashes, in sentimental value in the first three years of the war, and the return of the British to the offensive in this region in the fourth year of the struggle made it probable that Ypres will remain for the British and the Canadian public the greatest incident in the war. Even the Australians, who came to Flanders ultimately and rewon Zonnebeke and its surrounding woods in the last days of September, 1917, will probably rank it with Gallipoli, and thus Ypres will retain a place in British Imperial history above all other battlefields, for here the solidarity of that Empire Germany sought to destroy was proven by its sons from all the lands about the Seven Seas.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN

# THE WESTERN OFFENSIVES

## I

## GERMANY'S WESTERN STRATEGY

German strategy in the west in the summer and autumn was simple. German High Command had calculated that British preparations would not between spring and winter enable the British to make an effective attack upon the narrow front which they held. They calculated rightly that the transfer of men and munitions to Sir Ian Hamilton at Gallipoli would leave Sir John French powerless to do more than make brave but useless attacks in Flanders and Artois. The world believed that Kitchener's "Million" was a fact and that British preparations had already reached a point where Britain was a peril to the Germans. The Germans not only knew that Britain was not ready in May, 1915, but already guessed that Britain would not be ready in February, 1916. Knowing this Germany could undertake the Russian operation in 1915 and begin her preparations for the subsequent Verdun operation.

As to the French, the Germans rightly perceived that France was becoming dangerous and that the reorganization of French armies and the similar reorganization of French industry were proceeding apace. Yet they estimated that the French would be unable alone to make a breach in the German lines before the Russian campaign had been completed. They multiplied their machine guns and heavy artillery on the western front. They transformed their old trenches into double and triple lines of positions. They constructed dugouts and permanent works in cement. From the North Sea to Switzerland the German line became a veritable fortress.

Having done this the German High Command turned its back on the west and went to Russia. It left great and powerful armies behind. No large number of divisions were taken from the west to the east, but

practically all the reserves available were marked for eastern use. It became the mission of the German armies in the west to hold on as best they could, even if they had to give over a certain amount of ground. Germany gambled with the Allies of the west that despite all their efforts she could hold her western front and at the same time deal Russia a crushing blow. In this she reversed the venture of August and September, 1914, when she sought to crush France while "containing" Russian armies.

And Germany won the gamble. Nor was she ever in very grave danger of losing, despite the terrific struggles of Loos and Champagne in the autumn and the only less considerable French operation in Artois in May and June. The reason of German success was that German High Command had better read the future than French or British. Germany had not expected to see her great drive at Paris end in the trenches above Soissons. She had not calculated that her tremendous push for Calais and the Channel would terminate in the trenches about Ypres. But German soldiers had studied both the Boer and the Manchurian wars. They had seen the possibilities of trench warfare and Germany had provided herself with the weapons which enabled her, standing on the defensive, to beat off her foes.

Alone of the contestants, Germany had perceived the value of the machine gun and she had thousands where her foes had scores. Her heavy artillery had been designed for a war of movement, but in the war of position it enabled her to destroy her opponents' trenches with high-explosive shells, while British shrapnel proved all but useless in preparing an attack. In addition, German troops were provided with trench mortars and hand grenades, while the British were still making their bombs of jam tins and British and French armies were without trench mortars.

To her foresight as to weapons, to her industry and skill in fortification, Germany owed her successful stand on the western front in the critical summer of 1915 when a break in the west would have meant something approaching ruin, for her main forces were committed to the eastern operation and her reserves were consumed in this great effort.

From the outbreak of the war to the Battle of the Somme this mechanical and technical advantage remained with the Germans, although in a rapidly declining measure. At Verdun the French were still inferior in heavy guns as late as July, 1916, but with the Somme, Germany loses her initial advantage permanently on the west front.

Once more, as in the case of the Russian campaign, it is necessary to recall that the contemporary judgment upon the Allied offensive of the west was entirely wrong. The German purpose was completely realized during the period from May to October, 1915. Allied gains in trenches and positions were unimportant. The much-praised victories of the Champagne and Loos had no valuable consequences. They won guns, prisoners, a few square miles of French territory, but they did not break the German line nor save Russia from the defeat which brought eventual ruin after revolution. They did not even prevent the Balkan thrust, following the gigantic Russian operation.

## II. SPRING AND SUMMER

In the last days of April, just before the Dunajec, Germany had attacked west of Ypres, using "poison gas" for the first time and temporarily breaking the Anglo-French lines at the point where the armies of the two nations made contact. All through the first week of May the conflict about the old Flemish town was bitter. But it is plain that the Germans did not intend any new bid for the road to Calais. They sought rather to forestall the Anglo-French offensive which was preparing to the south.

In this, so far as British participation was concerned, they achieved success. When, on May 8 and 9, the great French spring offensive was launched by Foch south of La Bassée, the British share was minor. On May 9 a British operation east of Festubert brought nearly 8,000 casualties in a few hours, because there was lacking ammunition for a proper preparation. After but forty minutes of bombardment the British infantry left their trenches. Such bravery only made the losses greater and Field Marshal Sir John French, returning from the field where he had seen his soldiers slaughtered, met a despatch from the British War

Office asking him to send back 20 per cent. of his reserve ammunition for use at Gallipoli.

The result was the famous shell scandal. Sir John French put the facts of the army condition in the hands of the Conservative members of Parliament, of Lloyd George, and of Lord Northcliffe, who forthwith gave them to the world in the London *Times*. For months French had asked Kitchener for high explosives and had received shrapnel. He had asked for great amounts of munitions and he had seen his guns starved and his men slaughtered because they were without artillery support. Festubert was an unimportant skirmish on the military side, but its political effect in Britain was enormous.

Meantime Foch, attacking on the front of some dozen miles from before Lens to the western environs of Arras, made immediate and considerable gains. The value of Neuve Chapelle had been that it had demonstrated that the German line could be pierced. The attack on that occasion had opened the road to Lille. Only the failure of supports to arrive had allowed the Germans time to restore their shattered front. Thus Foch could hope to do what the British had almost accomplished. In point of fact there was a penetration of the German lines again, but it was impossible to take full advantage because the penetration was only on a narrow front. The main attack was made on the easternmost foothills of the Artois highlands, which near Lens and Arras break down abruptly into the great plain of northern France. The German line clung to the first of these hills, the ridge of Notre Dame de Lorette to the north and of the Vimy Ridge to the south.

In the first days of fighting the French cleared the Lorette Ridge. They took a number of villages toward Arras—Carency, Ablain, Souchez. They mastered the famous German fortification of the Labyrinth, just west of the Vimy Ridge. But in the end the German line held. Advancing at first after great artillery preparation the French captured positions, prisoners, and guns with small loss. But when they endeavoured to expand their gains, their losses became heavy and the prospect of real success rapidly dwindled.

By the first days of June there was a slowing down. The Battle of

Artois, the first since the end of the "Race to the Sea," had terminated in a check for the French. Not until April, 1917, were the Allies to pass the Vimy Ridge and make good their hold on the plain below. Before Lemberg had fallen, while the Germans were still engaged in clearing Galicia of the Russian invader, the first attempt of the western allies of Russia to relieve the pressure upon their hard-pushed comrade failed completely. This failure left the Germans free to go on, after the Galician episode was completed, to their more considerable undertaking. Their offensive about Ypres and the Allied drive about Lens had shown the Allies unequal to a really dangerous attack for the period of the spring and summer of 1915.

Between June and the last days of September there were various French efforts, all with only local value. An attempt to break down the German salient about St. Mihiel failed, both when attempted south of St. Mihiel and north of Pont-à-Mousson. A slight advance was pushed over the Vosges into the upper valley of the Fecht, west of Colmar, but it had no real value. Actually, from June until autumn, the Allied armies stood still—gave themselves over to preparing a new attack. While Russia perished they were still powerless to save their ally.

### III. THE AUTUMN OFFENSIVE

It was not until September that the Allies were ready to try again. At the moment when the Russians had won clear of the Vilna envelopment and were approaching the line upon which they were to make their final halt, Joffre and French in Artois and Champagne launched the terrific drives which were the Battles of Loos and Champagne. Both battles were German victories, because they did not break the German lines nor compel the Germans to abandon their eastern operations. Yet both marked real progress on the Allied side, and the French captures of prisoners in Champagne was impressive even in a war of the magnitude of the World War.

In many respects the Allied attack recalled the German strategy employed against the Warsaw salient. In France the German line was a salient almost as sharp as that held by the Russians in the last




THE ALLIED WESTERN OFFENSIVE

The scenes of the various operations between the Somme and the sea in the summer and autumn of 1915.

*A*-The second battle of Ypres
*B*-Festubert
*C*-Loos
*D*-Foch's thrust in Artois

days of July. From Loos to Souain the distance is about the same as from Lomza to Lublin. A piercing of the German line both at Lens and Auberive would have produced a situation in a degree like that which existed in the east when the Germans had penetrated both sides of the Polish salient. The Germans at Noyon, the point where the apex of the western salient approaches nearest to Paris, would have been in something of the peril of the Russians in Warsaw in the first days of August.

Thus, speaking broadly, what the Allies endeavoured to do was to attack the great German salient in France at two points well removed from the apex. Had they been able to penetrate at both a general German retirement to the Belgian frontier would have been probable. Had either attack been successful in any but a local way, then the German salient in France would have been materially narrowed and sharpened and German communications would have been considerably, if not fatally, crippled.

In this September attack, the fronts chosen for attack were in Champagne and Artois. Both had been the scene of desperate fighting in the spring. In Champagne, between the Moronviller Heights, which rise a few miles to the east of Rheims and dominate the plain, and the Argonne on a front of rather less than eighteen miles, over ground which presented no great obstacle, the French chose to make their main thrust. It was historic ground. A few miles to the south the Hunnish hordes of Attila had been routed. Valmy, which delivered France from another Prussian invasion, was almost within sight of the new battlefield. In Artois, west of Lens and the Vimy Ridge, the British under Sir John French, the French under Foch, were to make a new effort to get the greatest French coal city. Lens was the immediate object of the Anglo-French attack. Vouziers, behind the German lines and a nodal point for roads and railways alike, was the objective of the Champagne effort.

For the two drives there was an artillery preparation unequalled hitherto in the west. In Champagne railroads had been constructed, roads built, enormous engineering work done to make possible the great bombardment, which was to surpass the Dunajec as the Dunajec had

surpassed the British drum-fire at Neuve Chapelle. All the ammunition manufactured by the newly organized French industrial establishments and husbanded during the summer was now available. The French armies had been reorganized, newly equipped. No French army was ever in better spirits and in a better state of preparation than that




THE ALLIES' AUTUMN OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST, 1915

The arrows show locations of the British operations about Lens, and of the French campaign in Champagne. In many respects the Allied attack recalled the German strategy successfully employed against the Warsaw salient during the previous summer. (See map on page 152.)

which under Pétain, soon to command the attention of the world as the defender of Verdun, made the great venture of September 25, 1915.

Nor was Foch's army less worthy of the best traditions of the French. Its commander had delivered the decisive thrust at the Marne, after having saved the beaten army of Lorraine in the retreat from Morhange. His victory at the Yser had saved Calais—and in the winning of it he had been decisively aided by the British, who remained associated with him in the new campaign. Even the fighting of May and June had disclosed Foch as a great master of trench warfare, although he lacked the

guns and munitions to win a real victory. After three years of war Foch and Pétain were to remain the two great fighters on the French side when Joffre had gone, and it is worthy of note that we see them now at last, one commanding a group of armies, the other the army that made the great drive in Champagne.

By the third week of September the preparations were complete. By September 20 the guns were roaring in the greatest bombardment




MAP OF GERMAN TRENCHES AT CHAMPAGNE—WESTERN HALF

This map and the one opposite are reproduced from one prepared by the French General Staff. They show the system of German trenches assaulted by the French, September 25, 1915

of the war, the fire beginning along the whole front and gradually concentrating in the narrow sectors which were to see the real attack. The guns gave the Germans full warning of what was to come, but there was no need of warning for the Germans were already fully aware of the preparations being made.

### IV. CHAMPAGNE

On the morning of September 25, just as daylight broke, the French left their trenches between Souain and Massiges on a front of more than

fifteen miles and advanced in successive waves against the German lines. On the western flank of the attack, about Souain, they had before them only rolling country, destitute of cover—the familiar sterile and monotonous chalk plain of the "Dusty Champagne." In the centre the ground was broken by bits of woodland and by more considerable hills. On the extreme east the ground before the French was much higher and more difficult and culminated in that oddly shaped elevation




MAP OF GERMAN TRENCHES AT CHAMPAGNE—EASTERN HALF
The curling, twisting, tentacle-like railroads that seem to end nowhere are narrow-gauge lines built by the Germans for the purpose of serving their trenches

called by the soldier the "hand" of Massiges because on the map its outline resembled that of a hand with clearly defined fingers.

The artillery preparation had been so complete that the French crossed the first system of German trenches with small loss in almost all sectors. Only here and there were they held up, chiefly in the centre, by machine guns hidden in underbrush and by concrete defenses of the sort which the British "Tommy" later named "pill-boxes." But the effect of the partial checks along the front was to give the advance a wholly irregular outline. It had started as a great wave, moving in

perfect alignment at a given moment. But by afternoon it resembled the toothed edge of a handsaw.

For a great success it was essential that the weather should be clear and thus the field of observation for the aëroplanes unobstructed. But before noon rain began to fall, transforming the chalk soil into mud, making observation next to impossible at the precise moment when it was essential that the guns should be brought to bear upon the various German defences of the first line and its support trenches which had survived the first drum-fire. At the moment of victory the French advance now began to slow down.

The next day the attack was resumed. The whole of the German first line was methodically reduced, but the Germans had learned their lesson at the Dunajec and behind the first line was a second, not nearly so strong, but strong enough to hold, particularly as the French artillery had to be moved forward to reach it. Yet the French did at some points breach the second line. A Moroccan brigade north of Souain actually won clear of the whole German position, only to be annihilated by the concentrated fire of the guns behind the German trenches.

Meantime the Germans had begun to draw reserves from all portions of their western front. They seem to have had no real strategic reserve for portions of more than fifty different commands were presently identified. Men and guns arrived from all sides and the German second line still held. Moreover, the French, having won their first advance with small loss, were beginning to pay heavy prices for each new foot gained. The old experience of Neuve Chapelle and Artois was being repeated. Already it was clear that the Dunajec triumph was not to be duplicated.

Wherefore, in the first days of October, the French determined to "cut their losses"—to take such profit as they had made and abandon all effort to get more. They had now advanced on a front of fifteen miles on an average above a mile and a half and at points more than two miles. They had taken more than 25,000 prisoners and 150 field and heavy guns, together with an enormous booty of munitions and small arms. It was a bigger bag of guns and prisoners than Napoleon had won at Jena or at Austerlitz and not since 1806 had any Prussian army shown

# GALLIPOLI

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THE LANDING OF THE AUSTRALIANS AT ANZAC BEACH, GALLIPOLI

"The landing was one of the ghastliest incidents of the whole war. For a month the Turks had been preparing. Not only was the shore fortified, but the beaches, the shallows were covered by submerged barbed wires. Against this position the British were sent in open boats, partly but not effectively covered by the fire of the fleet. They made the landing . . . but not less than 15,000 casualties was the price of the effort. As many troops as the United States sent to Cuba in the first Santiago expedition were killed, wounded, or captured on this first day [April 25, 1915] of the Gallipoli fighting."

BRITISH BLUEJACKETS COMING ASHORE AT MUDROS

Sir Ian Hamilton's force for the Gallipoli campaign was mobilized in Egypt and transported to Mudros Bay, on the Island of Lemnos, which lies in the Ægean opposite the entrance to the Dardanelles and about fifty miles away

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AT CAPE HELLAS

View from a British officer's dugout on the cliffs. The splash in the middle distance was made by a Turkish shell which passed over the photographer's head and fell uncomfortably near the transports lying at anchor. The main British force landed near this point—at the toe of the boot—and was never able to advance farther than three miles from here.

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A SANDBAG RAMPART FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE AUSTRALIANS AT ANZAC BEACH

The tragedy of Gallipoli was the hopelessness of it all. "Never in British history was there a more splendid example of the tenacity and the courage which have made the great empire. Nothing in English or world history surpasses this devotion of the men of Britain, of Australia, and of New Zealand, fighting under conditions beyond belief, enduring hardships beyond exaggeration."

A DARDANELLES HEADLAND

"The whole area was a series of confused gullies, steep hills, and deep ravines. . . . The climatic conditions were indescribably bad. In winter the peninsula was swept by the cold blasts from the Black Sea. In summer it was baked by a tropical sun which dried up all the water courses and turned the country into a desert and a furnace. All water for drinking purposes had to be brought from Egypt or Lemnos."



A BRITISH CAMP ON THE SUN-BAKED PENINSULA

"No movement could be made without first advertising its character by preparations carried out under Turkish eyes. A more helpless, hapless position for a great army cannot be imagined, nor is there anything in military history since the Crimea to compare with the hardships of the men of Gallipoli"



A TURKISH STRONGHOLD

The interior of one of the Turkish strongholds during a heavy bombardment. Looking out to sea, the smoke-clouded Allied fleet is just visible

A FRENCH RECONNAISSANCE

A well-aimed Turkish shell has just exploded on the right. Two men are seen crawling toward positions of comparative safety behind a sandy rampart which a third has reached

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THE END, AT GALLIPOLI

Their stores at Suvla Bay were set afire by the British when the hapless enterprise was finally abandoned.

In December German successes in the Balkans opened the road between Turkey and her great ally and insured the speedy arrival of German artillery at Gallipoli. Evacuation became inevitable, and on December 19 the troops were withdrawn from Suvla.

such readiness to surrender in detail. Of course there was no surrender of large units. As to losses, that of each side certainly passed 100,000; the French was approximately 120,000; the German materially greater.

In the moral sense the French were therefore justified in claiming the Champagne as a victory. The sight of the thousands of German prisoners, the parks of Prussian cannon in the courtyard of the Invalides in Paris, the stories of German troops surrendering, all contributed to raise the spirits of the French people and break the long period of depression which had come after the spring efforts had failed and the Russian defeats had demonstrated that France was not to be liberated from the invader during the current year. Artois had been in a measure a cause for optimism in the spring, but the Champagne was in much greater degree a cause for rejoicing.

Yet it is plain that considerable as was the local and tactical success in Champagne, it did not affect the main issue or modify the German purpose. Some German divisions were rushed back from the east. The extreme objectives of the Germans in Russia were not all reached. There was a prompt reduction of pressure upon Russia. But the western offensive came too late to save Russia, now doomed to fall to Revolution and subsequent military powerlessness, and it did not force the Germans to give over their Balkan plans now maturing.

### V. LOOS

The Artois operation was entirely subsidiary. The Allies, unlike the Germans, did not attempt to break the hostile salient on both sides. Their hope was to smash it in Champagne and by pressure in Artois prevent the enemy from sending troops from west to east. Hence there was no large expectation and no adequate preparation, particularly on the part of the British, for a real success. And, as it happened, when the British did break the German line, they were totally unable to turn to permanent advantage a success which, for the moment, promised greater real profit than was attained by the army either of Pétain in Champagne or of Foch in Artois.

The Artois operation was assigned to the northernmost army of the group commanded by Foch and the southernmost army of French, which was commanded by Sir Douglas Haig. The immediate objective of the French was the Vimy Ridge, the last highland of the Artois Plateau, which breaks down sharply into the plain east of the Vimy Hills. The British aimed at the German lines covering the great road which runs north from Lens to La Bassée over high ground. The only considerable village in the British sector was that of Loos, two miles northwest of Lens and situated just at the western slope of Hill No. 70, which dominates Lens from the north. The French attacked upon a front of rather less than ten miles; the operative front of the British was hardly half as wide.

The French attack was successful and on September 25 and the succeeding days they pushed to the top of the Vimy Ridge, but were unable to clear the summit. In some places the Germans held the eastern slope, the French the western, and the crest was a "No-man's land." There was a moment when it seemed that the whole ridge would be won, but the British to the north became involved in difficulties which made it necessary for the French to go to their assistance and abandon their own operation. The result was that Vimy was only half taken and later in the war, when the British took over this sector from the French, a German attack won back much of the lost ground. It was not until Easter Monday, April 9, 1917, that the Canadians were to clear Vimy of its German garrisons.

Turning now to the British attack, the problem was this: The ground rolled gently upward from the British and was seamed with German trenches, two complete systems interposing between the British and the Lens-La Bassée highroad. The main obstacles were found in the coal pits and slag heaps—the characteristic features of the whole Lens district. The northernmost of the British attacks was aimed at the famous Hohenzollern Redoubt, just south of the La Bassée Canal; the southernmost at the village of Loos, with Hill No. 70 behind it as an ultimate objective. Various defensive works between these two points along the highway were the objectives of the centre.

The British attack got away handsomely after the customary bombardment at daylight on September 25. In the early hours the success was complete. The Hohenzollern Redoubt was captured, the works covering the highway were reached and taken, and the highway crossed at various points. But the great triumph was to the south, where the Highlanders took Loos, pushed on and captured the redoubt and slopes of Hill 70, and pressed on over the eastern slope of the hill. A great success was now within sight. The last German trench line had been penetrated. The Germans were hastily moving their heavy guns out of Lens and the evacuation of the town had begun.

But again, at the critical moment, the British staff broke down. The success was out of proportion to the expectation. Such immediate reserves as were available—two divisions of the new army—were pushed up, but under the strain they broke down and fled, repeating the performance of the French Fifteenth Army Corps at Morhange. The Scottish troops had neglected to disarm and send to the rear the garrison of the redoubt on Hill 70 and these troops now took up their arms and reoccupied their old fort. Not until midsummer, 1917, were the British again to occupy this height.

From the afternoon of September 25 until the morning of September 27 there was a chance that the great success might be made permanent, but, just as at Neuve Chapelle and Suvla, the golden opportunity passed. The Scottish troops were either destroyed or pushed back from their vantage points, Hill 70 was retaken by the Germans, who again pushed west of the Lens-La Bassée highroad. By September 27 their line was restored, their counter-attacks were beginning to threaten the safety of the British, and Sir John French had to appeal to Foch for assistance. The lines became stationary again. The thing that happened in Champagne also occurred in Artois. In both places the Germans had lost ground, but had preserved the continuity of their front and parried a deadly thrust.

At Loos the British took 3,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns. They lost rather more than 60,000 men—a loss greater than the combined casualty lists of the Northern and Southern armies at Gettysburg.

Their gain in ground was nowhere much deeper than a mile and over a front of less than four miles. And within a brief time the British realized that another great opportunity had been missed. Neuve Chapelle, Loos, Suvla Bay—these are all illuminating examples of the cost to a nation of unpreparedness and the fallacy of the notion that armies can be improvised or staffs created when the fact of war has surprised a nation totally unready.

Loos sealed the fate of Sir John French. His return to England was there assured, although it did not come for several months. It is probably true that the chief blame rested upon the nation which had failed in peace to prepare for war. The main faults of Loos were the faults incident to just such an army as Britain had been compelled to improvise. Yet it is hard not to believe that a portion of the blame rested with the commander-in-chief in the field. In a few months after Loos, French gave way to his immediate lieutenant, Sir Douglas Haig, while Sir William Robertson became chief of staff and there was a consequent reorganization of the whole British military establishment.

Thus, in a sense, Loos marks the lowest point in British military tide during the first three years of the war, although the evacuation of Gallipoli and the surrender at Kut-el-Amara, which came later, were evidences of the same conditions. On the morrow of Loos the German General Staff could justly calculate that Russia had fallen and Britain had failed. France alone could not pierce the German lines on the offensive. Could she, on the defensive, resist the German attack, still deprived of effective aid from Britain? The German officers decided not and we may see in the result of Loos a strong stimulus toward the Verdun attack that was to come a few months later. At Ypres in April, at Loos in September, Germany had tested British strength; both tests had proven satisfactory to the Teutonic mind. If Germany had failed to dispose of France at the Marne and by a single blow, she had now disposed of Russia and could risk another blow at France, before Britain could arrive. Loos, after all, was the preface to Verdun.

## VI. ITALIAN OFFENSIVES

To complete the story of western offensives during the campaign of 1915 it is now necessary to glance at the Italian operations. When Italy entered the war the Allies promptly expected great results with brief delays. That Italy would take Trieste, break through the narrow gap between the Adriatic and the Julian Alps, and follow the route by




THE ITALIAN FRONTIER

As soon as the Italians entered the war they swarmed over the frontier north of Verona and west of Gorizia, and took Cortina and a few other towns outside the Austrian fortifications. But they nowhere penetrated Austrian territory twenty miles, and as soon as they came within range of heavy artillery, fixed behind permanent trenches, they themselves were forced to take to earth. The Italian campaign of 1915 thenceforward continued to be an affair of trench warfare.

which the young Napoleon in 1797 reached the Semmering Pass and grasped the key to Vienna, seemed assured.

But once more, as so frequently in this fatal year, Paris, London, and Petrograd quite ignored the facts. When the World War began, trench conflict was still unexpected and for the first two months the war moved down into France and then back toward Belgium with such campaigning as had been looked for before the struggle opened. The first battles were analogous to those of 1870. The Marne was still a battle of movement. It was only at the Aisne that war of position began.

In the Italian campaign the war started in the trenches. Austria, long aware of the menace of Italian preparation, began early to construct trenches along her whole western front, from Switzerland to the Adriatic. For months the work went on. Thus when Italy at last struck, she ran her head instantly against long lines of prepared positions, such as those in France and Belgium had become. She was halted, and the third anniversary of the war found her still held between the Julian Alps and the Gulf of Trieste.

In the very first days of their war the Italians swarmed over the frontier north of Verona and west of Gorizia; they took Cortina, Ala, Gradisca, and a few other towns outside the trace of Austrian fortifications. Nowhere did they get twenty miles into Austrian territory; nowhere did they make any real breach in the trenches the Austrians had prepared. Like the French and the British advancing from the Marne to the Aisne, they suddenly came within range of heavy artillery, fixed behind permanent trenches, well prepared. And, like the French and the British, they were forced to take to earth.

This is the story of the Italian campaign of 1915. Along most of the front from Lago di Garda to the lower valley of the Isonzo the Italians were operating in a region of great mountains, some of them rising to 10,000 feet. The summits, the foothills, all the roads and approaches had long been covered by Austrian defences. There was little chance to blast a way through this barrier; there was none to rush it. Slow, steady pressure, the capture of a summit here, a trench there; a difficult and tedious effort—not to break through, but, on this front, merely to dig in so firmly that if the Germans should join the Austrians in a drive into Italy the Italian position would hold. This was, and for two years and a half remained, the Italian campaign. Remember that this frontier was traced by Austrian military engineers intent on keeping for Austria every military vantage point, and the Italian task is comprehensible.

Between the Adriatic and the mountains, along the Isonzo River, there is a district of relatively level character perhaps thirty miles broad. This is the Gorizia front. Here the Italians could undertake precisely the operation the French twice attempted in Champagne.

By concentrating heavy artillery here they might hope to blast a way into Austria. In the month of November they made the greatest of their many attempts, striving to exert a pressure that would prevent the Austrians from detaching troops to help the Germans in Serbia, as the English and French in Champagne and Loos had sought to relieve the Russians.

But, despite the repeated attacks—and the Austrians conceded that both infantry and artillery played a desperate part—Gorizia was not taken, the Austrian line held, the Italians were checked with losses estimated by the Austrians at 150,000. Italy gained trenches, as France did in Champagne, although she took no such bag of guns and prisoners; but the Isonzo line held.

The French and British hopes of victory in the west were shattered at Champagne and Loos. Their expectation of an early and decisive success by the Italians over Austria was soon shown to be futile. Italy did not by her entrance save Russia; she did not immediately endanger Austria; she could not even exert enough pressure to prevent the destruction of Serbia in the autumn. What was far worse, from the Italian point of view, the campaigns of 1915 and 1917 did not clear the Austrians out of Trent and the great salient, which, like an enormous cape, projected into the Venetian plain.

Until this great bastion was taken Italy must always face the danger of a sudden thrust south, either through the valley of the Brenta, the valley of the Adige, or along the shores of Lago di Garda. Such a thrust, if it reached the plain, would envelop all the Italian armies between the Brenta and the Isonza and threaten one of the greatest disasters in military history. Despite all her exertions Italy could not bar this road in 1915, and the spring of 1916 was to bring a grave menace in the Austrian offensive which sought to reach the plain by the Brenta valley and did almost succeed while November and December of 1917 were to bring still deadlier peril from the same direction.

Like Britain and France, then, Italy failed to get forward in 1915. Like France she was now soon to be menaced by a deadly peril already preparing behind the screen of the Dolomites, as the Verdun drive was

being organized in the forests east of the Meuse fortress. In Artois, in Champagne, in Trent, and on the Isonzo, the Central Powers had made good their defensive, while disposing of Russia. They were to maintain their lines successfully now, while Serbia was destroyed and the road to the Golden Horn and the Persian Gulf flung open. Afterward it would be time to come west and strive to win the war.

# CHAPTER TWELVE

## BACK TO THE BALKANS

### I

As early as mid-July, when the Russians still held Warsaw and the real extent of the Dunajec disaster was yet unknown, there began to come from Belgrade, Bucharest, and Athens warnings that the Balkan situation was about to enter a new phase. Hardly had Warsaw fallen when the reports became more ominous, and it was no longer to be doubted that there was being organized north of the Danube and along the Serbian frontier a new Austro-German operation. Actually Mackensen was already laying the foundation for his next great campaign.

German strategy was then hidden from the Allied statesmen and generals, who were still unconscious of the true magnitude of Russian disaster and the real impotence of French and British offensive campaigns on the western front. In July, 1915, the Allied press and publics still expected the fall of Gallipoli and the successful defence of Warsaw; they were still awaiting news that should assure them of the possession of Constantinople and the end of the German blockade of Russia.

German statesmanship and High Command saw things much more clearly. It had become time to move southward. The situation in Turkey was not immediately perilous; German officers in the Sultan's service could assure the Kaiser that the lines of Gallipoli would hold; but the political conditions were such that it was plain to perceive an hour was coming when Germany would need to be represented by real force at Constantinople and at Sofia, when Athens would need a practical example of German power.

In Turkey there was a strong party which still leaned to the Allied cause. Enver had driven the nation into war, but he had not yet won any considerable triumph, apart from the defeat of the British fleet at the Straits. A Turkish army had been heavily defeated in Armenia; a British army was moving up the Tigris toward Bagdad and was still

unchecked, and the British army at the Dardanelles was receiving reinforcements and more guns and munitions. Despite all efforts the flow of munitions from Germany and Austria to Turkey was far from adequate; Turkish losses were mounting rapidly; the suffering of the population of Constantinople was great; the war was becoming unpopular, and Enver was growing weaker, if not immediately in danger.

The situation in Athens, in Sofia, in Bucharest will be examined in detail presently, but it is sufficient now to point out that, while in the Greek and Bulgar capitals the influence of the Thrones still protected German interests, the conditions were such that it was unwise to postpone too long the transformation of the promises made to the Balkan sovereigns into a reality proven by German arms. The situation was favourable, but it was unlikely that it could forever remain favourable, for Allied diplomacy, however inept, was already beginning to pass from the domain of idealism to the region of solid fact, which alone has value in the Balkans.

With the fall of Lemberg and the expulsion of the Russians from all but a corner of the Austrian territory near the Rumanian frontier, the Rumanian problem could be adjourned. Germany could afford to ignore Bucharest since after the Dunajec the chance of an immediate entrance of this small Latin state was slight; but Bulgaria and Greece, having goods to dispose of—armies and ships—and having ambitions which were popular as well as royal, were now pressing their wares, and if their kings were already German possessions the peoples were not. And more than this, these peoples were quite as willing to serve the Entente as the Central Powers, provided the bribe of the former were greater than that of the latter.

In a word, the Balkan situation had now reached a stage at which, both because of diplomatic and political conditions, further German neglect might have fatal consequences. Turkey might crack; Bulgaria, despite its king, might make a bargain with the Allies. Venizelos might prevail over Constantine. Enver might presently fall to an assassin and his successor restore the old situation in which British and French influence was supreme at the Golden Horn.

All this the Germans had foreseen. As early as the days when Lemberg was falling, their attention had been turned to the Danube. On July 17, while Warsaw was still seemingly impregnable, Germany had set her hand to a treaty with the Bulgarian Czarlet whereby, in return for the promise of Bulgarian aid, she had contracted to send an army south before Christmas. Yet, so blind were the Allied diplomatists, that for weeks thereafter they still sought to purchase a Sovereign and a state already visibly marked "sold."

## II. MILITARY ASPECTS

The political aspects of the new Balkan programme of the Germans were hardly less obvious than the military. When the Allies went to the Dardanelles they had embarked upon a "sideshow" not alone foolish because it was beyond their resources, but fatal because it removed many thousands of men from the decisive field, which was the western front, and deprived them of any strategic reserve should they need it elsewhere. The British campaign in Mesopotamia was a similar example of bad strategy, destined to have evil effect in the future no longer distant.

But a German campaign to Constantinople was another affair. Until Serbia was eliminated the Austrians would be compelled to keep large armies along the Danube and the Drina. They were bound to watch over their Serb subjects; they were bound to suffer in the eyes of all their Slav subjects because of the two Serbian victories of Valievo and the Jedar. But if the Germans once crushed Serbia and opened the road to Byzantium, then the mission of watching over a conquered Serbia could be confided to a Bulgar ally. Bulgaria had the men and the material to take over the Balkan front, once Serbia was crushed.

More than this, Turkish troops, once the road to Austria was open, could be brought to the eastern front to fight against Russia, as did actually occur a year later. They could be brought north to the Bulgar frontier to watch Rumania and to join in a general attack upon this state, if it should enter the war. This, too, did occur in the following

year and strong Turkish forces were with Mackensen when he took the Dobrudja and pushed north through Constantza to the mouths of the Danube.

When they sent their troops to the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, the British locked them up in the peninsula, but when the Germans sent their armies to the southward they still kept them in close communication with the main masses in the east and the west. Troops from the Balkans could always be promptly recalled if necessary and sent to Galicia or Champagne with the briefest delay—a thing quite impossible in the case of the British troops at Gallipoli. But more than this, the Germans by crushing Serbia would actually make available for their own purposes both the Bulgar and the Turkish armies. Success would mean not opening a new front, but turning an old front over to new allies and in addition gaining divisions to use on the old fronts. The recruiting officer went with the conquerer on the road to the Near East.

The Bulgarian army was not under 300,000 strong. The Turks still possessed a million men under arms and very large reserves of man-power still awaiting guns and equipment. By the new campaign Germany could hope to abolish the Serbian front, releasing Austrian troops for the Italian campaign; turn over to the Bulgars any problem raised by the sending of an Allied army to Salonica, if this should occur; and still count upon Bulgar and Turkish troops to overawe Rumania, whose real hostility was never doubted in Berlin. Further than this, German guns and ammunition would enable the Turks, fighting at a disadvantage now in Mesopotamia, to turn and save Bagdad.

And beyond all these immediate possibilities loomed the larger horizon. Russia was being crushed. Her collapse was already inevitable in the German mind. Either a separate peace or a revolution would follow the campaign of 1915, the German quite correctly calculated. He would then have to deal with France, but for France he was already preparing the Verdun blow which would put the Republic out of the war, since he was satisfied that France could not successfully resist and he knew that Britain was unready.

With France and Russia out, there was left Britain. But once

German armies had opened the route to Asia Minor, the Bagdad and Hedjaz railroads pointed the way to an immediate invasion of Egypt by Suez and an eventual invasion of India by the route of Alexander the Great. Threatened in Egypt and India, deserted by French and Russian allies who had been forced by the Dunajec and a Verdun defeat separately to make peace, Britain, the Germans could expect, would abandon the battle, or, if she refused, Germany could confront with equanimity the prospect of a war with Britain alone, fought mainly by Turkish troops under German control in remote Asiatic regions, its European phase chiefly noteworthy because of the intensive submarine warfare which Germany was now considering.

And if Britain yielded, then there was left to Germany the most astounding prize of modern history—the mastery of Central Europe and of Western Asia. Indemnified by France, who would bear the costs of the war; assured on her eastern frontier against Russia by the possession of Poland, Ukraine, and the Courland; controlling Bulgaria and Greece through their kings and Turkey by her agents, Germany could adjourn her other purposes until "next time."

Never did the German genius for organization shine more brilliantly than in this Balkan episode. For just this moment Germany had been preparing for years. Her agents in all the Near East had laid the foundations of that German rule which was some day to come south across the Danube and reach Byzantium and Bagdad, Salonica and Smyrna, Suez and Basra.

The moment had now come, but the political and military aspects had both been carefully weighed. Germany had delivered the blow at Russia which was becoming effective and would presently become well-nigh fatal. She was meditating and preparing the blow against France which was to be the Verdun campaign; and in the midst of these colossal operations she was already sketching the blow against Britain, to be delivered at Suez, the Heel of the British Achilles, as German writers had long insisted.

Is it cause for wonder that the German, seeing these things face to face, made no effort to restrain his contempt for the Allied press and public men who, in the summer of 1915, were shouting about

trenches gained in Artois and Champagne, prospective advances in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, and seeking to gloss over Russian disaster by false conclusions drawn from imperfect information?

### III. THE CZAR FERDINAND

It remains now to discuss the actual Balkan facts during the period between the outbreak of the war and the moment when Bulgaria formally allied herself with the Central Powers. We may ignore the Rumanian phase because Russian diplomacy quite foolishly refused to make fair terms with the Rumanians while Russian armies were still advancing victoriously in the Carpathians, believing that Rumanian aid was unnecessary; and Rumanian statesmen, after the Russian defeats, quite wisely decided that neutrality was their only safe course. It remained so even in the subsequent summer, when the great decision was made at Bucharest. But now it is safe to say that the Allies might have had Rumania at any moment before the Dunajec, and through Russian arrogance, lost aid which would have been of incalculable advantage.

In the case of Bulgaria the Allied defeat was due to other causes. At the close of the Second Balkan War, Ferdinand, who had provoked the war at the instigation of Vienna, was saved from exile only by the financial aid given to his country by Germany and Austria. Since he was always the creature of Vienna and of Berlin this did not change his status, but it should have warned the Allies. Here was a mean, cowardly, altogether abhorrent kinglet, whose allegiance to the enemies of the Allies was based alike on fear and on selfishness, who was still the cleverest diplomatist in German pay. He had neither a sincere nor an honest thought. His character was known to all. Yet for a whole year Allied diplomacy continued to deal with this man, basing its action on the theory that he was both a patriot and a friend.

Ferdinand's subservience to the Central Powers was personal, not expressive of the will of his subjects. From the Second Balkan War Bulgaria had emerged shorn of her conquests. She had been plundered by Rumania. She had lost Macedonia to the Serbs, who had taken what, in their ante-bellum treaty, they had pledged to Bulgaria; she

had lost Kavala and Drama to the Greeks after taking them; she had even lost Adrianople to the Turk. The victor of Lule Burgas, the state which had made the greatest sacrifice of all the Balkan nations, had emerged from the war the least benefited.

Now Bulgaria—every man, woman, and child in Bulgaria—was determined to abolish the iniquitous Treaty of Bucharest, to regain what she had lost, and the Bulgarian army was at the service of the Alliance which would offer this restoration. The Bulgar was quite as willing to fight the Turk as the Serb, provided that the reward were equally good, and this willingness was not based upon sordid considerations. Macedonia was his Alsace, Adrianople his Trieste, the Dobrudja a recently amputated Lorraine still bleeding.

But the difficulty within the situation lay in the fact that while the people of Bulgaria were ready to take either side, their Czar was already committed. Hence there never was any chance of winning Bulgaria to the Allied side short of eliminating Ferdinand, and this was beyond the conception, if not beyond the power, of the Allies. Instead they set out to persuade Serbia, Greece, and Rumania to restore the Bulgar's lands. Even had there been no question of bad faith this was a dangerous experiment. Serbia had rendered magnificent service to the Allied cause and in so doing suffered terribly, while the Allies had done nothing for her. It came with bad grace from London and Paris then, this appeal to Serbia to surrender what she had won at the Bregalnitza, while her great allies had still failed to open her road to the Adriatic. Once this road was open, once she had a window on the sea, she was ready to give up Monastir, but even this was not easy, for she still had a treaty with Greece which bound her to keep her contact with the state which had been her ally in the recent conflict.

Serbia, however, was the least difficult of the obstacles. The Serb might yield, but what of Greece? She had once, with bitter anguish, consented to see Kavala remain Bulgar, despite its overwhelming Greek population. But although she had agreed to this, Bulgaria had attacked her; and the atrocities of the Bulgars committed against the Hellenes of the Kavala district had roused all Greece in the Second Balkan War.

Kavala had been won, Drama and Seres had been taken by Constantine after the great victory of Kilkis. Now the Allies, who desired Greek aid and the assistance of Greek armies, began their negotiations by calling upon Greece not to receive territory but to yield it, to surrender what she possessed against a possible future profit, after a bloody and doubtful struggle.

### IV. CONSTANTINE AND VENIZELOS

Such a proposal as the cession of Kavala opened a new situation. The Greek King was as thoroughly committed to the German cause as Ferdinand. His wife is the sister of the German Emperor. He was a German Field Marshal and his military training had been German. He had accepted the Kaiser's mediæval notions of royalty; he shared the Kaiser's hatred of the British and the French. He believed Germany would win; he desired that she should; and he was ready at all times to aid Germany when to do so was physically possible.

All Constantine's natural sympathies were heightened by the fact that his great minister, Venizelos, was pro-Ally. Of all the Balkan figures Venizelos alone is both great and admirable. New Greece had been fashioned by his hands. He had come from Crete in 1909 and saved the Hellenic State and the Danish dynasty. He had planned the Balkan confederation which conquered the Turk. He had organized the armies that defeated both the Osmanli and the Bulgar and gave Athens its first experience as a victorious capital in nearly twenty-five centuries. Inevitably the great minister clashed with the weak king.

Again Allied statesmanship was blind to the fact. Venizelos was deservedly popular in Greece, but he was not an absolute master. The Greek people, having driven Constantine into exile but a few years before, were now loyal and admiring servants. He had brought military victory. He had expunged the shame of the earlier Turkish War. He had defeated Turkish armies and captured Salonica and Janina. He had routed the Bulgar hosts at Kilkis and pursued them into the remote fastnesses of the Upper Struma.

Thus, when the Allies first sent their ships to the Dardanelles, Veni-

THE RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL—I

A big gun used by the Germans in the siege



THE RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL—II

Pioneers of the Austro-German forces building a bridge over the San River near Przemysl.

On March 23, 1915, the city of Przemysl in Galicia surrendered to the Russians after a siege which had lasted 200 days, and 119,000 Austrians were taken prisoners. Ten weeks later, when the Germans had come to the aid of the Austrians, the city was recaptured after a furious assault which lasted about a week. The comparative length of the sieges is significant.

SCENES IN GALICIA AND RUSSIAN POLAND—I

A young officer of the Polish Legion cavalry troop questions a scout who has just returned from a reconnaissance

SCENES IN GALICIA AND RUSSIAN POLAND—II

A German scout finds a mortally wounded sentinel who had crawled to a stream to quench his thirst

THE GRAND DUKE AND THE CZAR

"I hear constant talk of peace," he said. "I hear story after story that the pro-German influences at this Court are having their effects on you. I want to know if these reports are true?" (*See page 386*)

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES, TILL DISASTER OVERTOOK RUSSIA IN THE SUMMER OF 1915

THE GERMAN ARMY ENTERS WARSAW

On August 4, 1915, the army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria entered Warsaw, one year to a day after the British declaration of war had transformed the contest into a World War. The Battle of the Dunajec had been won on May Day; less than a hundred days later the Germans were in Warsaw. Prince Leopold is here shown reviewing his victorious troops

THE RUSSIAN IDEA OF TRANSPORT—

Unexpectedly mild weather melted snow and ice and made hard going for this transport sledge, which finally skidded sidewise into the river

BURNING OF BREST-LITOWSK

After the Russian defeat on the Dunajec, May 1, 1915, disasters came thick and fast. To mention only a few: Warsaw was lost on August 4; Kovno on the 17th; and Brest-Litowsk had to be abandoned on the 25th. This picture shows the burning of the stores, with citizens attempting to make salvage of some of the grain, for their private hoards

AND THE WAY THE GERMANS HANDLED IT

Miles and miles of German transport wagons creeping across the Polish plains

RUSSIAN PRISONERS CROSSING THE VISTULA

These men fought bravely, but they were betrayed by the government. Time and again at the most critical hours during 1915 ammunition failed. Hundreds of thousands of lives were sacrificed, great regions of Russia were devastated and lost, because of German intrigue in Petrograd and German influence among the reactionaries who surrounded the Czar

HORDES OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS PATIENTLY WAITING TO BE FED

"The campaign of 1915 destroyed the monarchy in the eyes of the people of Russia. . . . While the military aspect of the great Russian disaster has hitherto claimed the attention of the world, it is probable that generations to come will see the military events as significant chiefly in that they were the prelude to the political changes, to the Russian Revolution"

zelos was unable to persuade Greece to send an army because the King opposed the project. Had this army been sent in February the Gallipoli Peninsula would have been taken, because it was unfortified, and Greece would have admitted the Allies to Constantinople. But the King vetoed the proposal and the veto received the endorsement of a people who accepted the decision of the soldier Constantine over the advice of the civilian Venizelos. The King said that the operation was a military impossibility. To the Greek the judgment of the victor of Kilkis stood irrefutable.

Once more, when the Allies sent their armies to the peninsula, Venizelos sought to send Greek contingents, as Sardinia had sent troops to the Crimea. But again the King interfered, dissolved the Boulé, forced an election, and in the period before the election the Allied operations had taken such a turn that even Venizelos could no longer confute the military judgment of the Greek sovereign. The Dardanelles campaign was failing as Constantine had forecast.

Unhappily for Venizelos, his worst obstacle was Allied diplomacy. To placate Bulgaria the cession of Kavala was demanded of Greece. To this Venizelos was willing to consent, did consent, accepting in return the promise of Smyrna and the Greek shore of Asia Minor. But the King promptly interposed his veto. He had conquered Kavala once, after Venizelos had signed it away; should it be resigned again after so much sacrifice? Delegations of the Greek populations of the whole Trans-Struma region filled Athens. They gave force to the words of the King. Greece stood with its sovereign against its statesman.

The entrance of Italy brought a new complication. Italy had taken Rhodes and the Dodecaneses in her Libyan War. These islands were as Greek as Athens itself. Italy had vetoed the union of northern Epirus with Greece after the First Balkan War and reserved these districts, also Hellenic by tongue and tradition, for herself, temporarily including them in the patchwork state of Albania, which had now crumbled to ruin. Greek troops were again in northern Epirus, but Rome had insisted that the occupation should be recognized as temporary.

Italy was the one rival of the Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean. Italy sought to rebuild the Venetian Empire of the Ægean and to lay hold upon the cities and provinces of Asia Minor and the islands of the Ægean, which had been Hellenic in their population and their tradition since the remote days when they had provoked a Persian invasion by a resistance to another great and predatory empire. When Italy entered the war Greek sympathy with the Allies naturally and visibly cooled. When the Allies promised the Greeks Smyrna after the war against the cession of Kavala without delay, the Greek public rallied to the side of the King who opposed the cession.

For months this sordid comedy went on. Ferdinand demanded for Bulgaria, as the price of adherence to the Allies, provinces which the Serb hesitated to yield, the Rumanian refused to cede, or the King of Greece roused his subjects to patriotic fury by declining to surrender.

In all this it is impossible not to believe that Ferdinand and Constantine played together, because, when the Germans did come south, Constantine not only abandoned the Kavala district to the Bulgars, but directed the Greek garrison to surrender the forts, the garrisons, and the guns to the invader. Inevitably one is bound to conclude that the mission of Ferdinand and Constantine was to engage the Allies in impossible negotiations until the right moment arrived and then to throw off the mask. And never was a game more skillfully played.

In all this time Allied diplomacy wholly failed to see the truth. It still dreamed of restoring the Balkan League which Sir Edward Grey had allowed to be slain at the Conference of London. While Germany promised Bulgaria and Greece territory not theirs as the reward of service, the Allies besought Greece and Serbia to surrender what they possessed to a Bulgaria known both by the Serbs and the Greeks to be actually bound by promises to the Central Powers and ready at any moment to transform the promises into performances.

And while Allied diplomacy was asking the Balkan States to make sacrifices for its friendship, Allied prospects and prestige were rapidly falling. Bulgar and Greek soldiers alike had fought and conquered the Turk. The victors of Lule Burges and Yenidze-Vardar looked with

amazement upon the failure of French and British troops at Gallipoli, where they confronted armies which had been driven out of Europe, save for Constantinople and Gallipoli, in the few weeks of the opening act of the First Balkan War. In the same fashion Russian disasters in Galicia and Poland made new echoes in Sofia and Athens.

Had the Allies in May, 1915, sent to Salonica some of the troops which they wasted on the Gallipoli Peninsula, Greece would have been stampeded into the war and even Bulgaria might have broken away from its king. Backed by Allied men and fleets Venizelos could have carried Greece with him. At the least Serbia would have been saved and Bulgaria would have remained neutral. And Serbia, the faithful soldier of the Allies, was the only certain element in the situation. Yet to the end Allied diplomacy sought, not to save Serbia, but to compel the Serbs to make sacrifices; and those sacrifices, at last agreed to by Belgrade, were announced almost at the moment when Bulgaria was ready to strike.

### V. THE FINAL FOLLY

But the supreme miscalculation of the Allies was in their estimate of the contemporary value in the Balkans of a treaty made in different circumstances to cover wholly dissimilar conditions. After the Second Balkan War the victors, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece, had framed an alliance not unlike that made by the three states which had partitioned Poland. In case of a Bulgarian attack upon any one of the contracting nations, the other two were bound to make the attack a *casus belli*.

Hence London and Paris at all times remained confident that, if Bulgaria should enter the war and attack Serbia, Rumania and Greece, faithful to their agreement, would spring to the aid of the Serb. To the very end Sir Edward Grey, and presumably Delcassé, clung to this belief. Yet no belief could have been more unwarranted. Germany had torn up her treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. She had done this merely because she needed an avenue of approach to an enemy she sought to strike down. Would Rumania and Greece hesitate to ignore another "scrap of paper" when their existence would be imperilled by fulfilling their commitments?

Bulgaria having definitely committed herself to the Central Powers by the agreement of July 17, began to mobilize within a brief time. Turkey solemnly ceded to her old foe the strip of territory west of the Maritza along which ran the railroad from Sofia and Philippopolis to Dedeagatch, the sole Bulgarian seaport. There was now no question as to Bulgarian purpose. But still the Allies hesitated. A despairing cry came from Belgrade. "Let us attack the Bulgar before he is mobilized," the Serb cried. But the stern moralists of London and Paris, still listening to Ferdinand's soft words, his assurances that he was mobilizing solely for defensive purposes, forbade the Serb and sealed his doom.

While Bulgaria was mobilizing, Constantine and Venizelos alike consented to Greek mobilization. But subsequently, when the mask was off, and Constantine kept Greece neutral, Bulgaria declared war upon Serbia. The situation was this: A great Russian army was, seemingly, on the point of capture about Vilna. All Russian armies were in retreat after a summer of unparalleled disaster. Russia was out of the war for months—Berlin said forever. The victor of the Dunajec was at the Danube with a strong army and a huge park of artillery. Austrian and German troops were at the Rumanian borders and Rumania was powerless.

Accordingly Rumania renounced her obligations—to do otherwise would have been to invite the ruin that came soon enough, as it turned out. There was left Greece. Should she, without Allied assistance—for no Allied troops were immediately available—undertake the task of holding off the whole Bulgar army while Serbia struggled with Mackensen? The end of that struggle was assured from the outset, for the Serbs had no heavy artillery. Granted that the Bulgars were checked for the time, what would happen when Mackensen had disposed of the Serbs, as he was bound to dispose of them in a few short weeks?

The pathway of honour was clear. But Rumania, with a considerable army and a frontier touching Russia, had renounced it. Was it likely that Greece would seek to earn the glory that Belgium had acquired by inviting the fate which Belgium had met, which Serbia was

now about to meet, which Rumania faced one short year later? The Allies believed so to the end. In the closing hours Sir Edward Grey offered Greece Cyprus as compensation for fulfilling her obligations. Venizelos endeavoured to lead his country along the pathway of duty, the duty which he still saw. But with the consent of most of his subjects Constantine intervened, Venizelos fell and went out of power. Greece declared her neutrality and Serbia was left to perish.

Constantine's decision cost him his crown. It was a decision which had been reached long in advance of the fact. His bad faith was soon to become notorious. He had ruined the Allied hopes at the Dardanelles when there was still a chance of victory in February and March. He had kept Greece neutral in later months before Germany was ready to strike, when Greek participation might have been really useful to the Allies and of permanent profit to his country. But when, in September, 1915, he intervened to keep Greece out of the war, he acted in accord with the will of his countrymen. The heavy artillery of Mackensen along the Danube was already making echoes in Athens.

Looking backward it is plain to see the extent of Allied folly. In the Balkans, men, money, and guns alone count. No Balkan state has any reason to trust the Concert of Europe or the component parts thereof. Again and again what has been won by Balkan blood has been returned to the Turk by European statesmanship. From San Stefano to the Conference of London the story is the same. Experience, bitter experience, has made realists of the Balkan peoples, and it was only by recognizing this fact that the Allies could hope to draw profit out of the Near East.

Yet of the four considerable states, three—Serbia, Rumania, and Greece—were always friendly to the Allies. One entered the war in 1914, another in 1916, and the third in 1917. Had they entered at the outset or at any moment before Midsummer, 1915, this fact would have spelled disaster to the Central Powers. All could have been enlisted before the summer of 1915 and even Bulgaria might have been bought by concessions, after the Bulgars saw their neighbours enlisted. The Pro-Russian party at Sofia might have disposed of the Austrian Czarlet, none too popular after the Second Balkan War.

But unless the Allies were willing to send men and guns, armies and fleets to the Near East—troops to Serbia, fleets to Salonica—there was no chance of a favourable outcome in 1915. When the Allies sent their troops to Gallipoli they disposed of their last strategic reserve. Division after division disappeared in the mud and dust of Gallipoli. These divisions would have saved Serbia, enlisted Greece, impressed Bulgaria. But the Allied attention was focussed, not upon the Danube but upon the Dardanelles. The consequence was the Serbian tragedy, with its concomitant circumstances which changed the whole character of the war.

In July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey utterly failed to grasp the European situation. He could not face the facts. He continued to base his action upon his ideals and his aspirations. His failure was inevitable, but it was less to be condemned, perhaps, because all efforts were doomed to fail in the presence of inescapable war. In the Balkans, on the other hand, Grey had every chance. As usual his purposes were honourable, his methods above reproach; but his failure was more complete than anything in recent British history, and few failures have been more expensive in all history.

In the past, British foreign ministers have not infrequently been reproached with having displayed more perspicacity than principle. Sir Edward Grey's Balkan policy combined the maximum of principle with the irreducible minimum of perspicacity. His character and good repute survived the shock of all his defeats. But his country narrowly escaped permanent injury and his administration of British foreign policy made it the jest of the world.

The spectacle of the successor of Disraeli tricked, duped, played with, by a Bulgarian Czarlet must remain as the extreme contrast to the scene at the Congress of Berlin, where Beaconsfield divided with Bismarck the authority of Europe. The Balkan episode finally led to the fall of Grey as it promptly eliminated Delcassé. But, unhappily, opportunity in the east had preceded Sir Edward; he might return, it would not.

# CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# THE SERBIAN TRAGEDY

## I

## SERBIA'S PROBLEM

The story of the Serbian campaign is briefly told. At the outset of the war Serbia had the best army of its size in Europe. It had destroyed the Turkish Macedonian Army at Kumanovo in 1912, winning one of the most decisive victories in the history of war. It had completed its achievement at Monastir in a struggle of real importance although little known to the world, and its aid to the Bulgar had made the capture of Adrianople possible. Indeed, the Turkish commander had surrendered his sword to a Serb, not to a Bulgar.

In the Second Balkan War, the victory of Bregalnitza, won after a treacherous attack by the Bulgarians during a truce, had cleared Macedonia of Ferdinand's troops and decided the issue of the war. At the Jedar Serbia had won the first great victory for the Allies in the World War and again at Valievo had routed and destroyed an Austrian force. Despite the horrors of the typhus epidemic of the winter of 1914-15 the Serb armies still held the line of the Danube and the Save—that of the Dwina had no longer a military value, since two attempts by the Austrians had proven that this was not the road to Nish.

With something like 150,000 veteran troops Marshal Putnik faced the gathering hosts of Mackensen. Behind him the railroad ran clear to Salonica through Nish, and from Salonica he drew his munitions and supplies from Allied ships. As long as this road remained open the escape of the Serb army was assured and the Serbs could calculate that before they had been driven south of the Morava Valley, aid would come to them from the western powers. The sole weakness of the Serb army, of real moment, was its lack of heavy guns. Behind the great Danube and the considerable Save its trench lines were admirable.

They far surpassed those of Radko Dimitrieff at the Dunajec. Yet before such a concentration of artillery as had won the Dunajec it was always clear Serbian defence must crumble.

But if the Serb position against an attack from the north was fairly satisfactory—wholly satisfactory save in the matter of heavy artillery —the menace of a Bulgarian attack from the east was unmistakable. Coming south from Belgrade the Vienna-Salonica railroad, after it leaves Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia, approaches the Bulgarian frontier. It is not a day's march from the border at Vranja. It then turns west again, but below Uskub, in the Vardar Valley, it again draws near to the territory of Ferdinand.

Should the Bulgarians enter the war and push west, as they were bound to do, then the Serbs recognized from the outset that the Salonica railroad would shortly be cut, unless the Allies were able to send aid in time. If the railroad was ut, then the Serbs would lose their line of munitionment and their single avenue of escape to their Allies at Salonica. There would then be left only the mountain tracks from Prisrend down the Drin Valley to Scutari and Durazzo, or up the Black Drin Valley to Ochrida and Monastir. And a Bulgar advance to Monastir would cut this road.

The Balkan winter was in sight and retreat through these regions —utterly lacking in roads, in food supply, inhabited by hostile Albanian tribes—meant the probable destruction of the Serb army under conditions more terrible than those which overwhelmed the Grand Army on its retreat from Moscow. As long as the peril came only from the north the Serb could make head. He could oppose a gallant resistance and by a slow retreat make his way down to the Ægean, where he would find supplies and supports. His fate depended upon the Allied ability to cover his retreat between Nish and Salonica against the Bulgarian attack.

As early as September 19 the first shells of Mackensen fell in Belgrade and the same day Nish reported that Bulgaria was mobilizing. On September 27 came the despairing appeal of the Serbs to be permitted to attack Bulgaria, still mobilizing. But Ferdinand told the Allies and

the Allies told the Serbs that there was nothing to be feared from this mobilization; and since Greece, too, was mobilizing, London and Paris were satisfied that a Greek army would be ready to cover the Serb communications if Bulgaria entered the war.

But on October 11 Bulgarian troops at last crossed the Serbian frontier. Venizelos fell, Constantine proclaimed his neutrality, and Serbia's sole hope now lay in the ability of the Allies to get troops from Gallipoli to the Vardar before the small Serb force in this region was disposed of.

## II. GERMAN AND BULGAR

We have now to examine a twofold operation. Mackensen, with two armies, crossed the Danube between October 7 and 11, east and west of Belgrade. Thereafter his troops pushed south slowly, their heavy artillery preparing the way. His objective was Nish, where he aimed to make junction with the Bulgars, who were coming west out of Sofia and by Pirot.

The Bulgars, in the meantime, were pushing three forces west. They moved along one side of the Serbia square, the eastern, as the Germans moved along the northern. One Bulgar army moved up the Danube to join hands with the Germans who had crossed the river east of Belgrade. When they met the Danube would be cleared and one line of communication between Bulgaria and her Allies—between Berlin and Constantinople—would be open. A second Bulgarian army advanced toward Nish, seeking to cut off the Serbs to the north from their capital and also to cut the Belgrade-Salonica railroad. Finally a third Bulgarian army, the most important, pushed over the low passes from Kustendil and moved at the Salonica railroad in the Varda Valley with Veles as their first and Uskub as their ultimate objective. October 17 saw the Nish-Salonica line cut near Vranja.

Meantime, on October 5, the first Allied troops had landed at Salonica, disregarding the formal protest of the Greek government. By October 12 Sarrail had arrived and taken command and while the British pushed a division out toward the Struma to cover the flank,

the French moved up the Vardar Valley and by October 19 were at Strumnitza station, just across the Serb frontier. Eight days later they were at Kriviolak. Here was the desperate crisis of the campaign.

On October 20, while the French were just passing Strumnitza,

THE DESTRUCTION OF SERBIA

The black area denotes the territory of the Central Powers.
The checkered area shows neutral territory.
Note how Serbia was cut off from Saloniki, whence the Allied relief was to come.

a strong Bulgar army had reached Veles and thus definitely cut the Salonica-Nish railroad. Two days later they were at Uskub; a wedge was thus inserted between the Serbs and their Allies. Unless the wedge could be removed the position of the Serb army to the north was critical. Still, even at this moment, there was left the road south via Prisrend, Dibra, and Ochrida to Monastir, provided that the Serbs—hold-

ing Babuna Pass, the gateway to Monastir from the Vardar valley near Veles—could hang on until Sarrail arrived. And on November 5 the French were less than ten miles from the Serbs at Babuna Pass.

Once more, however, the Allies had come too late. Babuna Pass was now forced, the Serbs flung back upon Monastir, which was indefensible, and the French troops found themselves in deadly peril in their dangerously advanced positions along the Vardar south of the Babuna. There was nothing for it but to retreat rapidly, and in the next few days the French were drawn back to the Greek frontier, while the Bulgars pushed in from Monastir.

Meantime Mackensen's armies had moved slowly. They were awaiting the moment when the Serb retreat should be cut off before seeking a decision. The time had come and German activity was now redoubled. The only roads open to the Serb armies to reach the sea-coast, to escape from the far-flung net, were by the Drin through Prisrend or over the Montenegrin Mountains; and the Bulgarians pushing north from Uskub were forcing the Katchanik Gorge and threatening these remaining roads.

What followed was not war but tragedy. In the next few weeks the wreck of Putnik's army, together with thousands of Serb peasants, fled over the Albanian Mountains down to the Adriatic. Thousands and thousands perished of hunger, of cold. The army which reached the shores of the Adriatic was an army of skeletons, not soldiers. Nor was Scutari a safe halting place, for Austrian troops were pushing south through Montenegro. Still southward the remnant of the Serbs pressed, now attacked by Albanian bands in Austrian pay.

Yet the marvel of this episode is not the number of Serbians that perished, but the number that escaped. Thanks to the Italian navy many thousands actually got away to Corfu and there on that island was presently assembled the Serbian government, the Serbian army, all that was left of independent Serbia. The fate of Belgium had now overtaken another little people and King Peter, like King Albert, had waited in vain for his allies. The loss of Belgium was inevitable, but the Serbian tragedy was the more terrible because it was unnecessary.

### III. THE END OF THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

On November 28 the German Government announced the end of the campaign in the Balkans. The remnant of the Serb army had fled into the mountains of Albania. All of Serbia and Montenegro were either in Bulgarian and German hands or soon would be. More than 100,000 prisoners had been captured and most of the Serb field artillery and equipment. Forty thousand square miles had been occupied besides northern Albania, which was destined to fall to Austrian and Bulgar forces at no distant date.

As for the Anglo-French forces, they were back in Greece, covering Salonica. Their position was not unlike that of Wellington in the lines of Torres Vedras, but with the difference that the Kaiser could leave to his peninsular allies the task of containing this army whereas Napoleon could not assign a similar task to the Spanish.

But the essential fact was that the Germans had now broken down the Serbian barrier between their Turkish ally and themselves. The Danube and the Bulgarian railroads provided an immediate road for men and munitions sent from Germany to Gallipoli. The Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople railroad, temporarily wrecked by the Serbs, would soon be restored. The British position on Gallipoli had long been recognized as hopeless, so far as offensive success was concerned, but it had now become perilous by reason of the arrival of German troops and guns at the Golden Horn. It was no longer a question of taking Constantinople, but of saving the Allied army.

More than this the Salonica problem became daily more pressing. The folly of divergent operations, "side shows," was now apparent and there was an insistent demand to abandon Salonica, since Serbia was lost. But this meant to abandon Serbia permanently and to give Greece over to the Germans, for no one could doubt that the moment the Allies left Salonica, Constantine would welcome his brother-in-law to Athens and Greece would follow Bulgaria into the orbit of the Central Powers.

After long delays the Allies decided to stay—the voice of France was emphatic, although Joffre objected and Kitchener protested. To

abandon Serbia was to kill all chance of Rumanian aid. It was to surrender the Balkans to the Germans. It was also to insure an attack at Suez. But if the decision to stay was sound, it carried with it very obvious disadvantages, not the least of which was that of imposing a real burden upon transport to supply a huge army overseas. It locked up troops which would be needed on the western front. It consumed men and munitions on a minor operation and against Bulgaria, not Germany.

The evacuation of Gallipoli was now assured and the transfer of some of the troops to Salonica would reduce the burden of the Allies in the east, but Britain was at this very moment pushing forward another "side show" far off in Mesopotamia, also doomed to disaster as a result of Germany's successful thrust to the Golden Horn, because at no distant date German officers were to aid Turkish troops in the capture of a British army on the Tigris. Kut-el-Amara in the next spring is a very real consequence of the German success in the Balkans in the autumn of 1915.

The Serbian tragedy is not the last act in the Balkan drama. Another year was to see Rumania destroyed, this time by treachery not folly—by Russian betrayal, not by British or French fatuity. But with the fall of Serbia the Balkans were lost to the Allies. The main purpose of Germany before the war was now achieved in one campaign. The great barrier between Turkey and Germany, erected by the two Balkan Wars to the great satisfaction of Britain, France, and Russia, was in ruins. Austria, backed by Germany, had risked a World War rather than permit this Serbian barrier to endure. It had fallen now; it had fallen at the hour when Russia also lay in ruins; it had fallen in one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, inexpensive as it was short. And the campaign had not committed Germany to new expenditures of men. On the contrary, it had provided Bulgar and Osmanli divisions to serve German ends and released Austrian armies for service against Italy.

In all respects, the Balkan campaign was for the Kaiser a fortunate episode in a fortunate year. It made a happy last act to a drama which quite justly filled Germany with confidence as to the future and complete satisfaction as to the past.

# CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

## I

## THE ACHIEVEMENT

The campaign of 1915 ends with the Balkan operations. Between the campaigns of 1914 and 1915 there is no clear frontier. If in the west the termination of the First Battle of Ypres supplies a dividing line in late November, the operations in the east continued without cessation all through the winter. Austria's peril compelled untiring and incessant German effort. But between the campaigns of 1915 and 1916 there is a distinct break and the end of that campaign which we have now examined is one of the memorable moments of the first three years of the war.

At the close of 1914 the Germans were faced with the fact that on the larger side they had failed. The Marne and its succeeding phases from the Aisne to the Yser had been a defeat, their major purposes had not been realized, and while this was the situation in the west, in the east Austria was unmistakably beaten and threatened with complete collapse. The real as contrasted with the apparent situation at the end of the year 1914 was unfavourable to the Germans.

A year later the change had been almost immeasurable. German armies had marched from victory to victory. More than a hundred thousand square miles of Russian territory, with a population of twenty odd millions, had been occupied. Poland, Courland, Volhynia, were in German hands. Only Riga, of all the towns marked by the Pan-Germans on the eastern marches of Teutonism, had escaped Hindenburg and Mackensen, and Riga was always to be had for a price—was, in fact, to fall ultimately without the payment of any price. Warsaw, Libau, Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Brest, Bielostok, Lomza, Lublin, Ivangorod—who could count the number or tell the names of all the cities taken?

And in addition, thirty thousand square miles of Austrian territory had been rescued. On New Year's Day, 1915, Russian troops were occupying most of Galicia and the Bukovina; they even clung to a material fragment of East Prussia itself. Now all was changed. Only a few thousand square miles—a thin strip about Tarnopol—remained of Russian conquests. And Russia herself was beaten, was doomed to fall the prey, first to as tate of reaction and then of revolution. Time would complete the work begun by Mackensen at the Dunajec, even though Brusiloff was to win a few great battles in Galicia before the ultimate crash came.

Turning southward Germany had broken through the wall that separated her from Turkey. Serbia had fallen and more than forty thousand square miles of Balkan territory were at Germany's command and in the hands of her allies. Bulgaria had enlisted and the Bulgar army was a new weapon in the armoury of the German General Staff. Turkish man-power was now at the service of German drill sergeants. Constantine was but waiting for a German army of deliverance to throw his country into the hands of the master of Central Europe.

In the west the German line had held; the conquests of August and September, 1914, were still intact: the mineral districts of France, of Belgium; the factories of the Latin north. From Antwerp to the Golden Horn, from Scutari to the Gulf of Alexandretta, German railroads bore men and munitions; down the Hedjaz railway from Aleppo were moving the advance guards of the force that was to assail Egypt through Suez when the right moment came. The British army at Gallipoli was condemned to evacuation and might be captured. The Allied force at Salonica was impotent for a long period. The British army in Mesopotamia had already involved itself in ruin and was presently to surrender.

In sum, the eastern situation had been disposed of, while the western perils had been arrested. Germany had eliminated Russia, as she had sought to eliminate France in the campaign of 1914. She was now free to try again. England was unready—could not be ready for six months. Russia was incapable of any effort in this same period. The Balkan situation was satisfactory and would remain so for two years,

finally changing only to a still more favourable aspect with the destruction of Rumania and the onset of the Russian Revolution.

There was left only France, stricken but resolute, mutilated but still opposing strong armies and an unshaken spirit. Between Germany




THE GROWTH OF MIDDLE EUROPE—A
The territory occupied by Germany and her Allies in April, 1915

and supreme victory France was the single remaining obstacle, and German hands were now free to deal with France, far freer than they had been in August and September, 1914.

## II. GERMAN SPIRIT

Despite all Allied calculations, too, the Germans were neither starving nor dejected. The war had turned out longer than they had fore-

seen; the first attempt had not brought the complete victory expected, but it had brought results that endured upon the map; while the campaign against Russia and the march to the Golden Horn had fired the Teutonic mind and set in motion an imagination which is ever active




THE GROWTH OF MIDDLE EUROPE—B
Middle Europe completed: the situation on December 31, 1915

when German progress is in the picture. The British blockade had not brought actual misery. It had only begun to bring moderate privation.

The German people wanted peace, but so did all peoples; and the German people, looking with natural pride upon what had been accomplished, could believe their leaders who declared that one more great effort would bring peace, victorious peace, peace with its subsequent

prosperity already insured by the German expansion from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. Mitteleuropa was a fact. The German place in the sun desired by all Germans was stamped on every map of Europe. It remained only to have a final reckoning with a blind and obstinate France who refused to face facts that were undeniable, which appealed from the map to the imaginations of their statesmen and newspapers.

London, Paris, New York did not see the things as they were and therefore could not grasp the German emotion. They could not perceive, because the British and French press missed the facts; could not realize that Germany had won the war, won her main objectives, not merely so far as the map was concerned, but also in the minds of the German people. These newspapers continued to describe the Germans as dejected and desperate when German optimism was still mounting and German hopes, temporarily shaken in 1914, again taking on vitality.

The German, on his side, believed that the Allies saw things with his eyes, knew themselves defeated and merely uttered vain boasts and idle prophecies to cover chagrin and despair. If the French believed him to be starving, he was convinced that the French were at the point of moral and material exhaustion. For him France was "bled white." As for the British, he was convinced that they would never arrive. And the German still believed that they never meant to arrive. As he thought the Gaul unstable, so he believed the Briton perfidious. He believed that the British nation was incapable and unwilling to pay the price in blood of continental warfare on the new scale.

Through the neutral press and the neutral correspondent the two camps trumpeted forth their conflicting claims. Each saw a part of the truth hidden to the other and affirmed that the other was dealing in wilful mendacity and calculated dishonesty. This was the strangest war ever carried on, but it should have been enlightening to those whose business it was to analyze the evidence that came from opposite camps. Yet German statesmen solemnly informed their fellow countrymen that the French and British people, already knowing themselves beaten, were wickedly driven to slaughter by Briand and Grey (*sic*). While British and French statesmen encouraged the absurd belief that Ger-

many was crumbling to her ruin, her armies despairing, her civilians starving.

Of the two views it is impossible not to believe that the German was more nearly in accordance with contemporary fact. All the actual gain, all the immediate profit in Europe, had been German and it had been colossal. The task was not completed, but much, very much, had been done. The German was right about the map. He was also right about his own will to conquer. His only error was in believing that his foe was both beaten and conscious of defeat. He was ignorant, too, of the terrible consequences of the crimes of his armies. He could not know that his enemies were prepared, and for long would remain prepared, to die in defeat rather than live under conditions imposed by a German victory, because of the deeds of German soldiers.

For the peoples at war with Germany the contest had become a spiritual contest. It remained for the German a material thing and on the material side his victory seemed incontestable. Actually the war was of course still undecided; the Germans had miscalculated the extent of their success; the Allies had underestimated German strength and the capacity of the German nation for organization and endurance. The first campaign had been a German defeat, the second a great German victory, but there were to be a third and a fourth, reducing to dust the calculations of each contestant, making the beliefs of each in 1915 seem ridiculous in 1917. And yet, since out of these mistaken calculations and conceptions grew the subsequent decisions and the later military operations, their value to the student of history is manifest.

### III. A WONDERFUL YEAR

Until the coming of the World War, men had been accustomed to turn to the pages which describe the Napoleonic cycle and read and reread with unfailing wonder the narrative of those mighty campaigns of the young Emperor—Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland—which in three years made him master of Europe. At their close he had surrounded France with subject states. Italy was a dependency, the Confederation of the Rhine a tool, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw a paper creation, subject

to his pleasure. The map of Europe of 1807 is the final demonstration of the magnitude of French achievement.

Yet it seems far from unlikely that when the World War has become as remote as the Napoleonic struggle seemed in the last years of the Nineteenth Century, German achievement of 1915 will have acquired something like the glamour, the marvellous character that the Napoleonic possessed for the generation that was middle-aged when the World War came.

Between May and December German armies marched into Warsaw and Vilna, Belgrade and Constantinople. German domination descended from the Danube to the Morava, from the Morava to the Vardar; it passed the Balkans and tarried briefly at the Golden Horn; it passed over into Asia and arrived at Suez and Bagdad. The victory of the Dunajec had immediate and eventual consequences beyond those of any single Napoleonic victory. What Napoleon failed to do in the Iberian Peninsula, the Kaiser achieved in the Balkan.

Russia, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Serbia were allied against the German with all their great resources and all the great resources of their colonies. The United States became in fact, if not admittedly, the workshop and the granary of the Allies. Yet in the face of the most tremendous coalition known to history, the German in 1915 marched from victory to victory. Though another Leipzig and another Waterloo abolish this empire and the material consequences of this achievement, is it too much to believe that it will endure in legend and history, even though not one evidence survives upon the map to testify to the German conquests of 1915?

New Germany, like the New France born of the Revolution, went forth to fight the world and in 1915 her fight rivalled the struggle of France on the military and material side. Between January and December, 1915, the Germans built an empire comparable only to the creation of Napoleon. They remade the map of Europe and stretched a mailed hand across the Hellespont to Asia Minor. Dreams and aspirations at which Europe had laughed for a quarter of a century became realities.

To the nations and peoples she conquered, Germany did not, like

France a century before, carry any new gospel. Her coming did not free serfs or spread the ideal of personal liberty. Her faith was the sterile faith of force. To those who yielded she brought order of the uncompromising sort; to those who resisted she brought death. Her pathway was indicated by ruin, and peoples as well as rulers fled before her armies. Her progress was marked by slaughter and by ashes. Hers was a conquest like to that of the successors of Mohammed. One idea and one alone possessed her soldiers and her statesmen—she condemned those whom she conquered to become Teutonic or perish; she spared neither the monuments of the past, which came within range of her artillery, nor the women of her enemies whose destruction or dishonour might serve a German end. Wherever her armies passed they sowed hatred and aroused resentment. But in their power, in their force, there was something that inspired awe as does the thunderbolt.

And in 1915 the German might was still unchecked. The confidence of the German people in victory, the belief of the German race in its high destiny and world mission, was unshaken. From Ostend to the environs of Riga, from the Elbe to the Euphrates, German will was absolute, German power unchallenged. One of the mightiest empires of history had been erected and there remained only the task of making its foundations secure against another Napoleonic débâcle.

### IV. CONCLUSION

With the close of the Balkan campaign the second phase of the World War, as I see it, comes to an end. Already German guns were being assembled in the Forest of Gremilly under Verdun for the third act. In the first, Germany had sought to crush western civilization. Her failure at the Marne had been the central episode in the first phase. In the second she had assailed Russia, the east; and her success had been complete, her victory at the Dunajec one of the great victories of human history.

In this second phase Germany had erected her long-contemplated Mitteleuropa upon the ruins of Russian military power and Serbian

independence. It remained to perpetuate this Mitteleuropa by a final victory in a new conflict with the west. The decision of the Marne must be reopened and Germany had already chosen her battle-ground along the Meuse. At the Dunajec, in her Russian campaign and her Balkan promenade, Germany had fashioned a new weapon, a new method of attack. On her experience at the Dunajec she had based a new system of attack which she purposed to employ against France. It was not with any vainglorious words that the Kaiser bade his soldiers endure one more campaign which should be short and bring peace. He believed what he said and his belief was warranted, although his faith was misplaced.

And as the Marne and the Dunajec were the central episodes in the first two phases of the World War, Verdun was to supply the unity for the third. At Verdun Germany was to make her second bid for world supremacy. Failing, she was to lose the offensive and stand at bay, while the superior numbers, resources, and weapons of her enemies at last began to break her lines. She was to be driven to the submarine warfare which would draw the United States into the contest at the moment Russia retired from the battle line, and transform the war from a struggle of Europe with the Teuton to a crusade of the World against the German Empire.

All this belongs to another phase, yet it must be considered in estimating the situation as the second phase closed. On January 1, 1916, Germany was at the highest point in her history, and while she prepared for the final blow—methodically, meticulously, with a clear vision as to the issues—her enemies still chattered about her imaginary ills and their even more imaginary successes. Neither the French nor the British people saw the war as it was—saw Germany as she actually existed. Not until the Kaiser's troops stood on the ruins of Fort Douaumont and approached the last line of Verdun's defences was the truth to be realized in London, to be spoken in Paris. As the second phase ended the most tremendous blow that was ever levelled against a nation was preparing, and one will search in vain through all the Allied press to detect a contemporary appreciation of the real situation.

There is a legend of Napoleon at St. Helena, which describes the great Emperor, after having reviewed all the events of the Waterloo campaign, as breaking forth with the impatient exclamation: "And still I should have won." Looking at the situation as it existed in February, 1916, will there be less reason for the German in the future to make the same observation?

THE END

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volumes

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

"VERDUN"

*From the painting by Rosset-Gra*

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"—VERDUN

*FULLY ILLUSTRATED*

VOLUME THREE

VERDUN AND THE SOMME

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By Frank H. Simonds

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

# CHAPTER ONE

# THE NEW PERIOD

## I

## THE TWO CONTESTS

The third period of the World War, that which is included within the twelve months of 1916, presents a clearer and less complicated picture than the two preceding periods. In it the expectations of a sudden decision, following a tremendous success continue to weaken—have in fact well nigh vanished by the end of the campaign. Even the Germans, who in their attack upon Verdun at least dreamed of a new Sedan, have laid it aside by the coming of winter and are seeking to reinforce military weapons by a peace offensive, while the experience of the Allies—on the defensive at Verdun, on the offensive at the Somme—has dissipated the notions common in all the earlier months of the struggle.

In this period which we are now to examine, the real interest and importance of two contests dwarf all else. Verdun and the Somme are conflicts which in turn held the stage of the world as no two military dramas had fixed the concentrated attention of a world audience since the last phases of the Napoleonic cycle. Unlike the great campaigns of the previous year in the east, they were fought on ground that had, in a measure, been familiar at all times to millions in Allied and neutral nations alike, and in the months of the World War had been studied and re-studied until Arras and Rheims, Amiens and Verdun, were definite circumstances in the minds of the people of all classes in all countries.

The result was unmistakable. While the German armies advanced through Poland and Serbia, while Mitteleuropa was constructed by campaigns along the Vistula, the Dniester and the Danube, the world audience still fixed its attention upon the trenches of Flanders and Champagne. The meaning of the eastern movements escaped it, but

THE WESTERN BATTLEFIELDS IN 1916.




when Germany renewed her assault upon France, when she sought a decision at Verdun, and still later when the Allies in their turn took the offensive along the Somme, the world understood at once the issues of the contests and hung breathlessly on the details of the operations.

And these circumstances gave to the struggles which centred about Verdun and the Somme a hold upon popular imagination which, if not in excess of their real value, was at least disproportionate to their comparative importance, measured beside the later events on the eastern front. The defeat of the Germans at Verdun was one of the great achievements of the war, it was the preservation of that decision of the Marne, which for four years saved western civilization from the immediate threat of German domination. The Somme was the first expression

of the true military power of an organized Britain, but the Somme and Verdun blinded the Allied nations to what was happening in the east and this blindness led to still another bitter awakening, when Russia collapsed and Rumania fell.

The campaign of 1916 is interesting as one more attempt of the two contending forces to break the western deadlock and abolish the war of positions preparatory to crushing the enemy in a new campaign of movement. When it opened, Germany, victorious in the east, her Mitteleuropa all but completed, sought a decision in the west, which should guarantee her position in the east. By midsummer, with the German success at Verdun still postponed, the Allies took the offensive and by concentric attacks at the Somme, before Gorizia, in Galicia, and finally in Transylvania and in Macedonia, endeavoured to overwhelm the Central Powers by equal pressure on all fronts.

But if subsequently German failure at Verdun was complete, incidental Allied successes—at Gorizia, in Galicia, in Macedonia—were rendered of no value, when Russia betrayed Rumania and German, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops occupied Bucharest and Constanza, and completed the clearing of the roadway from Berlin to Constantinople. Hopes of a decision in the campaign of 1917 were thus plainly destroyed, as the defection of Russia became assured, while the German, despite his successes in the east, weighed against these brilliant achievements the terrible death lists of Verdun and the Somme and contemplated an inevitable retreat in the west, made necessary by the British advance over the Albert ridge.

Thus, after a campaign in which first German and then Allied hopes reached a high level, both coalitions were compelled to confess failure in the pursuit of an immediate decision and concede the growing likelihood that complete military decision would be attained, if at all, in years, rather than in months. The logical consequence of this was the German peace offensive of the closing weeks of 1916, which, in a measure, transformed the character of the struggle and introduced a new element, never again to be totally absent, and destined in the following year to increase in importance with each additional month of warfare.

## II. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916

The campaign of 1916 is thus a turning point in the history of the war. In it both coalitions by arms alone, seek a decisive triumph. Thereafter each contending party, while carrying on the military campaign with varying energy, throws more and more attention to diplomacy, to intrigue, and propaganda, and to the effort to capitalize the war weariness in the opposing nations and to break the morale of the enemy by peace proposals, necessarily vague, since on neither side is there yet any real willingness to compromise on the vital questions, but designed to fasten upon the enemy the responsibility for the prolongation of a war, become almost intolerable to both sides.

In the period now under examination, Russia makes her last fight. The victories of Brusiloff in Volhynia and along the Dniester are, in fact, the expiring flicker of that Romanoff régime which, from Peter the Great to the latest Alexander, had carried Russian armies and Slav frontiers onward into Central Europe and Turkish Asia. While the world still marvelled at Russian recovery and the victories before Lemberg seemed again to threaten the very existence of the Hapsburg throne, the court and the Czar were passing under the fatal spell of German influence and the Russian people were moving imperceptibly but rapidly toward the Revolution which was to change all.

To the close of the campaign of 1916 the war is fought along lines which had been laid down in the Nineteenth Century. Whatever variations were introduced, the general scheme was that which had been foreseen by the statesmen, if not by the soldiers, of previous decades. The war, despite the moral issues involved in German actions and German methods, despite the ever-growing evidence that democracy and autocracy were struggling in opposite camps, was a war such as had in some fashion been sketched in all the military writings of the years which followed the creation of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

When one passes from 1916 to 1917 there is almost a sense of crossing a frontier as clearly defined as that which separates the period of the French Revolution from that of the decades before 1789. For the

war that was fought between August, 1914, and December, 1916, Europe had been prepared, and despite the defection of Russia in the second half of the latter year, the struggle was, on the whole, just such a conflict as Europe had feared and foretold for nearly a generation before it came. But with the end of the campaign of 1916 both contestants have to confess a measure of defeat. Neither's strategy has brought a decision, neither group of powers, looking to the immediate future, can convincingly lay claim to a prospective decision.

The consequence of this failure in both camps is the beginning of domestic protest and disorder on either side of the firing lines. Implicit confidence, unquestioning patriotism, ungrudging sacrifice, these begin to disappear. Each government finds itself daily on trial before a public which is both suspicious and unfriendly, and each leader is compelled to defend himself, not merely against charges of incompetence in conducting military operations and diplomatic enterprises, but against the more dangerous allegation that he is actually prolonging the war by a refusal to recognize facts as they are and to accept conditions which he cannot modify.

In a certain measure it is correct to say that the campaign of 1916 marks the end of the period in which unity at home expresses the will to win of each of the peoples at war. The symptoms out of which the Revolution developed in the Slav Empire are discoverable to a degree in all nations, and war weariness grows apace in Britain as in France, in Germany as in Austria, until all governments find themselves upon the defensive before their own peoples and all statesmen are condemned to make pacific gestures across the firing lines and utter proposals of peace which, however impracticable, give a semblance of readiness to end a struggle becoming intolerable for the millions.

And it was the failure of the campaign of 1916, the failure of the Allied campaign, quite as much as the failure of the German, which led to the profound modifications of spirit and purpose in the nations at war in the following year. By January 1, 1917, the rulers and leaders of both coalitions could expect only cynical distrust when they forecast a complete decision in the new year on grounds far less impressive than

the foundations out of which they had based sweeping prophecies in the preceding periods.

### III. OLD AND THE NEW

In the campaign of 1916 those German rulers who promised their subjects to destroy France briefly and completely, not only failed, but paid a price for the failure beyond all previous military calculation. Not only did the attack upon Verdun fail, but the Allied offensive at the Somme slowly but surely wore its way through the strongest German defences, and Allied artillery exacted a toll which brought mourning to all Germany. But, conversely, the Allies, whose offensive was rashly heralded with promises of a break-through and a liberation of France and Belgium, gained little more than six miles of shell-torn soil, on a restricted front, while the collapse of Rumania was a final curtain to all the hopes, dreams, and calculations of the Allies in the Balkans.

The Mitteleuropa which Germany had created in 1915 endured the tests of 1916 and on the Rumanian side was expanded to insure not one but three roads from the Central Powers to their Turkish ally. The delusion that France could be forced to make a separate peace by one more campaign in the west cost the Germans more men than Napoleon sacrificed to reach Moscow. But the Allied belief that the German lines in the west could be broken, was shaken in the long struggle from Albert to the outskirts of Bapaume, and though the subsequent German retreat from the Noyon salient, in March, 1917, established the right of the Allies to claim the Somme as a victory, faith in the Allied ability to break the German lines was once more demolished by the failures of France on the Aisne and Britain in Flanders in the following year.

In a sense, one may say that the Old Europe—the Europe of the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the Second Balkan War, the Europe of Bismarck, of Beaconsfield, the Europe of the Congress of Berlin and all the other convocations down to the Conference of London of 1912, the Europe founded upon the experience and history of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century—fought itself to the point of tem-

porary exhaustion in the first three campaigns of the war, its bankruptcy was a fact, already dimly perceived, when 1916 ended, and bound to be unmistakable before the new year had progressed far.

Issues, conditions, prospects, all submit to violent modifications before 1917 is far advanced. But for the survival of that horror and hatred of the German methods, disclosed in Belgium and France; but for the reassertion of these methods in the new submarine war, declared in January, 1917; above all, but for the intervention of the United States, no man can be sure that the war would not have worn itself out by midsummer and Europe have made another peace like that of Westphalia conceding to Germany profits such as France derived from the earlier settlements.

Always, therefore, in viewing the events of 1916, one must keep in mind the fact that an old world of ideas and of ambitions, of diplomacy and of statesmanship, is crumbling under an ordeal by fire, and giving way for the unknown, which is coming. Had the Allies won at the Somme, or the Germans at Verdun; had 1916 seen a decision of the war, or even, had it seen an old-fashioned settlement, after the German peace proposal, the ancient landmarks would probably have survived; the Europe which emerged from the storm would have been recognizable, in all respects, as the Europe of 1914, and of all times since the unification of Germany and Italy in the previous century.

Unmistakably 1916, owing to the events of this momentous year, represents a final effort of the old order and the old system to save itself, first, by successful military operations; second, by settlement around the green table in advance of the destruction of the existing European hierarchy, incident alike to popular discontent due to its continued failure to save mankind from the greatest of all known afflictions and to the outburst of that Bolshevik storm which was temporarily at least to transform conceptions and conditions in all the Allied countries. Straight through this year the reins of government remain fairly securely in the hands of statesmen well known when the World War opened, public opinion and popular emotion follow well-beaten pathways, but a few months later the Russian Revolution is the signal for a change

which fills the world with confusion and bewilders the contemporary observer as it may puzzle the later historian.

In 1916, as in the two preceding years, the military events claim almost exclusive attention. Verdun, the Somme, the Russian offensive in Galicia, the Italian success at Gorizia, the swift and infinitely sad tragedy of Rumania, these succeed each other with amazing rapidity and give to the military history of these twelve months a variety and a volume of operations and of battles which can hardly be paralleled even in the first brilliant years of the Wars of the French Revolution, while the Battle of Jutland, incomplete as it was, establishes a new standard of measurement in the conflict of modern navies.

### IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMPAIGN

Viewed in retrospect, the campaigns and battles of this year were barren of affirmative result. They were destructive of the foundations of all governmental systems at home, rather than of the armies or will-power of the enemy nations. Verdun may easily survive as the most brilliant single episode in human history, regard being had for the magnitude of the struggle and the miracle of French resistance, yet the Verdun epic ended almost where it began, leaving both contestants almost equally exhausted and the victorious French, again, as at the Marne, unable to turn an undisputed triumph into an offensive which should liberate France much less win the war.

In 1914 the statesmen failed to prevent war. Diplomacy and statesmanship were both bankrupt as machinery to preserve international peace. In 1916 the failure of the soldier to win the war, the incapacity of the generals in their department, was as clearly indicated as had been the earlier ineptitude of the rulers and leaders in their own field, and the consequences were unmistakable before another twelve months had passed. While the masses still preserved a confidence in the ability of their rulers and representatives, or a faith in the skill and efficiency of their generals, the war followed familiar highways, but in 1916 popular distrust in both grew to the point where the failure of the regular instruments of national and international action could be employed as an

argument for the substitution of the orator of the soap-box for the chief minister of the Czar, or the commander of a platoon for the ever-victorious Brusiloff.

All this was hidden from the world of 1916. We lived from day to day upon the reports of the fighting on the Heights of the Meuse or of the thrust upward toward the crest of the Albert ridge. Allied depression in the opening days of Verdun, heightened by the British disaster at Kut-el-Amara, intensified by the earlier narratives of the Battle of Jutland, changed to a full cry of optimism in July and August, when, with Verdun saved, German defeat in France and Austrian disaster in Galicia and on the Isonzo seemed assured.

No one who lived through 1916 in an allied nation can forget the rapidly changing emotions, now of confidence, now of despair, until the final disaster—the destruction of betrayed Rumania—abolished all hopes of swift success and ushered in the German peace proposal, which first bewildered and then angered the Allied world, but even though rejected, profoundly altered all subsequent discussion and opinion. Henceforth, until the return of the German offensive in the west in March, 1918, brought the Allied nations again to the edge of ruin, despite the rejection of the German proposal, the world talked of peace, even when the necessity for more war and greater sacrifice was still perceived on all sides.

And with the close of the campaign of 1916, at least for a time, we cross the frontier between the clarity of Nineteenth Century ideas and conceptions and the confused—and, to the contemporary world, incomprehensible—doctrines and formulæ which the Russian Revolution evolved but the radical elements in many other nations in some degree echoed. Even that statement of democratic war aims and peace terms which satisfied the convictions and conscience of the Allied nations of 1916 was destined in a few months to assume a colour of reaction which would move the Russian Bolsheviki to couple the Kaiser and the President of the United States in the same indictment and American and German governmental systems in one contemptuous death sentence.

Finally, with the campaign of 1916, we come to the end of the period

in which the military events claim first attention or attract most interest. Henceforth, for many months, the soldiers fight and the statesmen talk with equal interest for the world audience, and the audience itself, with ever-growing frequency, takes up the word itself. Up to the very end of the year the battle lines of the Allies survive apparently unshaken, the nations united against Germany seem still bound to each other by enduring bonds and agreed on a common programme—but hardly had the new year come when the whole Allied situation was profoundly modified, first by the external consequences of the Russian Revolution and then by the repercussion of Russian revolutionary doctrines in all other Allied countries. Between August 1, 1914, and January 1, 1917, events move logically and with little departure from the anticipated course, but between January 1, 1917, and New Year, 1918, there is a gulf hardly to be measured.

In every sense, therefore, the Third Phase of the World War is one of commanding interest and, viewed in the contemporary light, one likely to have enduring meaning as marking the frontier between an old world and a new, between the Europe of the Marne and Verdun and the world of the Russian Revolution and of America's entrance into the conflict.

# CHAPTER TWO

# VERDUN—THE GERMAN ATTACK

## I

## THE GRAND STRATEGY

The opening of the new year saw the Germans in a military position not greatly different from that which they had occupied in the first days of the war and in certain respects, more satisfactory. In August, 1914, they had misjudged the Russians, both with respect to the rapidity of Russian mobilization and to Russian ability to destroy the Austrian armies. But now, thanks to the victories of the preceding campaign, there could be no immediate prospect of a Russian offensive, if, indeed, Russia were able again to make any attack. In 1914 Germany had, somewhat rashly, counted upon six weeks of immunity from eastern complications and she had calculated that in this time she could dispose of France. Now, for at least six months, she could hope for a free hand in the west.

As for the British, while the slender numbers which Field-Marshal French was able to concentrate in France for the first struggle had expanded to an army of at least half a million and was rapidly becoming a menace to the German western flank, in Flanders and Artois it was still lacking in guns and training to bring off a successful offensive, and the British failure at Loos was a reassuring circumstance for German High Command. Any British attack before midsummer would be bound to end badly, given the contemporary state of the British army, which was still in the early stages of reconstruction as a volunteer force, in large part officered by, and composed of, men newly withdrawn from civil life and necessarily lacking military training.

Once more, as in the days of the Marne campaign, the Germans had to deal with France, the one enemy inferior in numbers but equal in all else that made a nation strong in war. As in 1914, the German

problem was to dispose of France before Russia could become dangerous, but now the problem was to a degree complicated by the fact that Great Britain, as well as Russia, was bound, in a time which could be calculated, to become a real menace and that, once the first British armies were ready, a well-nigh inexhaustible reservoir of men and munitions would supply them for future campaigns.

Instead of six weeks, the Germans could reckon on well nigh six months in which to dispose of France, but failure to accomplish this would have even more serious consequences than the Marne defeat, for henceforth France was bound to be supported by British numbers, guns, and munitions, and any considerable German superiority in any field of military resources was unlikely ever to return save in the event of a Russian surrender not yet to be counted upon. But if France could be put out, then the British would be unable to be a menace to the Germans on the Continent for the duration of the war.

Germany had created her Mitteleuropa; she had undermined the military power of Russia; she had, in fact—although this was not yet plainly visible—dealt a death blow to the Russian Empire and insured the Revolution and collapse which were to follow. She had opened the road to the East and any peace, following that French defeat which was now to be sought, would confirm her mastery, not alone in the Balkans, not merely in Constantinople, but in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, on the road to India and at the gates of Egypt.

Under one more colossal blow the Germans might expect that France would collapse, or, even if she did not collapse, lose heart and abandon a struggle in which she had to stand alone, for neither of her greater allies could help her, and the cost to invaded France was bound to be tremendous. A great success, even though it were not a complete triumph—a success which should win more territory and at least one of the great fortresses of France—might lead the French to consent to a separate peace, provided that the terms were not made too onerous and that the German military achievement had been sufficiently shining.

All German comment, before it went to the discussion of the strategy of the next campaign, rested upon the declaration that this campaign

was to be a colossal and ultimate attempt to crush France, to break the spirit of the French people, a blow "aimed at the heart of France." To spend half a million casualties in such an undertaking, were it successful, would be a sound investment. That it could fail to succeed never entered the heads of German leaders or the German people, once more intoxicated by the wine of victory in the east and in the Balkans.

Having the initiative, as Germany unmistakably possessed it; having the advantage of men and of guns, since Russia was temporarily out and Britain still unready; it was obviously necessary to strike, to strike hard and successfully before either could enter. And this, to a degree, was the old problem of the Marne campaign of 1914, which had failed —but by only a narrow margin.

## II. WHY VERDUN?

The selection of Verdun as the objective of this great German attack —which was aimed primarily at the heart of France, not at any single military target—was made as a result of many conditions, which were little understood at the time and were long in gaining popular attention. In the first place, despite the strength of the old entrenched camp of Verdun; despite the great defences which had been constructed after 1871 and had made Verdun, alike in the military and in the popular mind, one of the greatest fortresses in the whole world; the actual achievement of German and Austrian artillery in August and September, 1914, had demonstrated that, for the moment, the gun had mastered the fort and the great strongholds, yesterday reckoned impregnable, had become well nigh indefensible.

The French had realized this before the Marne, and Sarrail had moved the mobile defenders of the fortress of Verdun well out beyond the fixed forts and into trenches. But the Marne campaign and the later German operations had combined to make the Verdun position not merely a salient, but a salient with many peculiar defects, viewed from the defender's angle. The successful thrust of the Metz garrison up the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, from Metz in September, 1914, had enabled the Germans to seize St. Mihiel and thus to cut the




Commercy-Verdun railway, one of the two lines serving the fortress. In their retreat from the Marne the Germans had halted about Montfaucon in positions from which their heavy artillery could interrupt the use of the Paris-Châlons-Verdun railroad, the other and more important line of communication.

Actually, Verdun was isolated from the rest of France, so far as railway communication was concerned. The little narrow-gauge line, which wanders up from the valley of the Ornain, near Bar-le-Duc, was quite inadequate for the task of munitioning a great army, if Verdun should be made the objective of a major German attack, and the French Parliament had turned a deaf ear to all the appeals of the army for the construction of a strategic railway to meet the necessities of the situation. Verdun was thus dependent almost entirely upon road communication for its supplies, as it remained dependent until the decisive phase of the attack was over.

In addition, the position itself had obvious defects which held out to the enemy the hope of achieving a great victory. While the trenches

held by the French east of the Meuse were along hills admirably adapted to defence, the force holding them stood with its back to the stream, which in late winter and early spring invariably overflows its banks, and the position of an army with its rearward communications menaced by a river in flood, once its lines were threatened, would be extremely hazardous.

To reinforce an army in this position, with the bridges over the river under artillery fire, to munition it sufficiently, would be a difficult task, and were the troops on the east bank ever defeated, their retreat might degenerate into a rout and into a real disaster. It was to avoid such a possibility that the French had withdrawn from the north bank of the Aisne near Soissons the previous winter, and it was the accidental destruction of a bridge at Leipzig, during Napoleon's retreat, after the battle, which made that defeat so costly to the great Emperor.

Verdun, itself, was without value. Vauban's old citadel was indefensible, although providing a good shellproof cover for certain departments of the defence. To capture Verdun, except as a detail in the defeat and rout of the French armies beyond the Meuse, would be of little permanent meaning, however great the moral effect of the success upon the publics, both German and Allied. But if, following a gigantic thrust, the Germans were able to insert a wedge between the French armies of the right, in Lorraine, and those of the centre, in Champagne, the war of movement might be resumed, the trench deadlock abolished, and the Germans might again take the road for Paris.

A successful wedge thus driven in at Verdun would conceivably compel the French to quit all their positions from Toul to Rheims, enable the Germans to cut the Paris-Nancy railway, and might compel the abandonment of all of northern and eastern Lorraine and the line of fortresses and bases from Châlons right down to Belfort. Actual possession of Verdun meant nothing, all depended upon the circumstances attending its capture, all was conditioned upon the success or failure of the Germans in crushing the French troops beyond the Meuse, for if these troops were able to make an orderly retreat behind the

Meuse, they would still maintain the whole French front intact; there would be no break through, only a local gain.

### III. VERDUN TOPOGRAPHY

Verdun, then, was a weak point in the French line, the weakest probably in the whole stretch from the Somme to Switzerland, and this inevitable weakness had been increased by the neglect of the French to prepare and maintain their defences beyond the Meuse. This circumstance, known to the Germans in advance, almost led to disaster and made the task of defending Verdun infinitely difficult, and perhaps in the long run impossible, for Verdun was actually saved at the Somme, although not until the French defence had been maintained to a point where the fall of the city would have had only moral value.

Having decided to attack the Verdun sector for reasons which are beyond criticism, the German General Staff had to consider the point at which the attack could best be made. It had also to decide the character of the attack; that is, whether it should be, like the French effort in Champagne the previous autumn, a thrust on a wide front, which would have meant an attack upon both sides of the river, or a drive on a narrow front, which involved an assault upon the eastern bank. It might have elected to attack upon both banks at once, but this would have called for a concentration of men and guns now beyond German resource.

To understand the German plans, it is necessary to grasp the salient details of the Verdun country. The town itself lies in a wide valley through which flows the Meuse. Seen from any of the surrounding hills, it rather suggests a lump of sugar in a saucer, and the lump stands for the mass of the town, rising about the slopes of the citadel and crowned by the twin spires of the cathedral, the single conspicuous landmark in the town, while the rim of the saucer represents the surrounding hills occupied by the now useless forts. On the west bank of the river these hills, which draw back from the river, are divided by a deep, open furrow, through which comes the Paris-Verdun railway.

In the old days, Verdun, with its rocky citadel guarding the bridge

across the Meuse, was the key to the main road from Metz to the capital, that is from Germany to France. Taking Verdun, which surrendered without resistance, the Prussians had penetrated through the Argonne into the outskirts of the Plain of Châlons only to be defeated in the Cannonade of Valmy, in the wars of the French Revolution. In 1870, Verdun had held out manfully and German invasion had been deflected southward although the town ultimately fell to German artillery.

But since the Germans had forced the northern gates to France and come south through Belgium, Verdun was no longer an outwork of the capital. About Noyon the Germans were, in fact, little more than fifty miles from Paris, while Verdun was one hundred and forty. It is necessary, therefore, to dismiss all idea that Verdun was a gateway to anything. It was a position back of the French front, a useful base; its dismantled forts served to furnish cover for reinforcements and depots for munitions, but the town itself was no more important than a score of others similarly placed behind the firing line. The Germans did not attack the fortress of Verdun, which had become a figure of speech; they attempted to break the French line before Verdun, the trench line, as the French had endeavoured to break the German line in Champagne in the previous September. And like the French, they came near succeeding.

The real military value of the Verdun position was derived from the range of hills rising sharply from the east bank of the Meuse and marked on all maps as the Heights of the Meuse (côtes de Meuse). This range of hills, some six hundred feet above the river, separated the Meuse from the peculiar Plain of the Woëvre. They were, in fact, a sort of hog's back between two depressions. Both on the Meuse and on the Woëvre side these hills—which, in reality, constitute a plateau upward of six miles wide on the average—break down sharply. Looking out upon the Woëvre, from the crest about Fort de Vaux, in the early morning light, one could imagine oneself standing upon a cliff overlooking the sea, so sharp is the fall to the marshy plain, at that hour, hidden in mist.

While this plateau appears fairly regular upon the map, it is cut and seamed by an endless number of ravines, which descend rapidly, either

to the Meuse or the Woëvre Plain, ravines worn in the clayey soil by little brooks. There is thus an infinite number of hills, not much above the general level, but separated from each other. Each of these hills was the prize of a combat and upon the more important stood the old forts of Verdun. Most of the slopes, too, were covered by little woodlands, all of which were marked with names upon the military maps and all of which, before they disappeared under the avalanche of shells, were the scenes of desperate fighting.

When the German blow fell, the French were holding the crest of the Heights of the Meuse straight across from the Meuse to the Woëvre Plain, some eight or nine miles north of Verdun and about four miles north of the outer circle of old forts. To advance upon Verdun the Germans could only move along the top of this range, that is along the crest of the plateau, because the Woëvre Plain is absolutely impassable for all transport and even for foot soldiers during the winter and spring owing to its marshy character. Thus the German advance was in reality a push south on a front of from six to seven miles, varying in width as the Heights of the Meuse varied, between the Meuse and the Woëvre. The fighting was for the separate hills, which rose a little above the general elevation, and the woods and ravines were obstacles which gave a local character to the entire campaign.

Had the Germans been able to push south as quickly as they had expected to do, they would have cleared the French off all the plateau as far south as the city, driven them into the Meuse valley east of that river and below the hills, and the enforced French retreat across the river, under direct observation and fire, would have been extremely difficult. Here was the one possibility of disaster, which disappeared after the first week. But the main German operation was in this period always southward along the plateau, never westward up out of the Woëvre, and the chief operative front was never much over seven miles wide.

West of the Meuse and north of Verdun there is a considerable ridge running east and west, that is at right angles to the river and the Heights of the Meuse; this ridge marked the line of the old forts on the left

bank, but north of it are several detached hills, of commanding elevation, notably Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme. These hills were held by the French when the battle opened, and after the French line on the east bank had temporarily collapsed the Germans were still held up on the east bank by the flank fire directed across the river at the Germans on the Heights of the Meuse. In the second phase of the battle the Germans were obliged to halt their operations on the east bank, while they pushed the French off these elevations, but having done this, they resumed their advance on the Heights of the Meuse and the fighting on the west bank did not again rise to any magnitude.

### IV. THE GERMAN PLAN

For this Verdun offensive the Germans had begun preparations at least a year before they made the attack. Metz, their chief base, was conveniently near to the point selected for attack; perhaps an additional reason why the Verdun front was selected. New roads and light railways were constructed in a circle about the Verdun salient as far west as Montfaucon, where the Crown Prince had his headquarters, and for many months the accumulation of munitions and material went forward.

For this attack the Germans planned to employ the methods used in the east by themselves and in the west by the French and British, but with certain improvements. The concentration of artillery upon a narrow front, now become familiar in all offensives, was retained. It was indeed expanded and not less than 1,500 guns of large calibre, including German 42-centimetre and Austrian 380's, were solidly emplaced. But, as an additional detail, it was planned to make the major portion of the concentration movable, so that the guns could follow the men.

The French had failed in Champagne because they had been unable to get their guns forward to use upon the German third line after the first and second had been destroyed. The Germans planned to make their infantry little more than a subsidiary arm. The artillery was to destroy the French positions. The infantry, after careful reconnaissance, was to advance and occupy the destroyed positions. Then the guns were

to be moved forward and the second line reduced. Thus, the Germans calculated that in four days, with slight loss, they could reach Verdun itself, covering a distance of little more than eight miles. They calculated that the French losses would far exceed their own, that demoralization such as had occurred at Morhange in the opening days of the war would again occur when the French infantrymen found themselves overwhelmed by enemy fire and unsupported by their own guns.

In addition the Germans counted upon the element of surprise. And in a very large measure they counted justly. Certainly the French were aware of the growing concentration near Verdun; unmistakably their official documents disclose suspicion of a coming thrust in this sector, but no less unmistakable is the fact that the blow far surpassed any expectation; found them without an adequate counter-preparation; temporarily paralyzed their High Command, which, in the opening days, contemplated a retreat across the Meuse and the surrender of Verdun; and brought them within a narrow distance of utter defeat, for Verdun was saved by a margin so narrow as to seem, even now, indefinable.

To make the attack, following the guns, the Germans drew down to the east bank of the Meuse three crack corps, which were put through special training and were fed with a generosity unequalled during the war. These three corps, in addition to two which were regularly attached to the Crown Prince's arm on this sector, supplied the resources for the early phases of the attack; later, when the battle became a siege and the casualties swelled to the hundreds of thousands, many other units were drawn in, but at the outset rather less than three French divisions had to deal with five German army corps. The French troops, too, were territorials, while the Germans were the best that the Kaiser's army possessed and, in certain stages, fought under his eye, as they fought continuously under the observation of the Crown Prince, their nominal commander-in-chief. The real leader, of course, was not the Kaiser's heir, but Count von Haeseler the aged conqueror of Antwerp who planned the whole campaign and went into retirement when it failed, followed presently by Falkenhayn, the Chief of the Great General

# WITH THE FRENCH AT VERDUN

*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

A REVIEW BY GENERAL PÉTAIN

General Pétain, the defender of Verdun, is here seen decorating the flag of one of the heroic French regiments under his command



*From "l'Illustration"*

HENRI PHILIPPE PÉTAIN, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE

"More than all I saw and heard at the front and in Paris, the look of this man convinced me that Verdun would not fall, that France herself would not either weary or weaken."—*Frank H. Simonds*

*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

A SCENE ON DEAD MAN'S HILL ON THE MEUSE RIVER

This hill tragically justified its name in what Mr. Simonds describes as "scientific butchery not equalled before in all the history of war." These French soldiers are triumphantly traversing recently captured German trenches



*From "l'Illustration"*

A VERDUN BATTLEFIELD

In continuous procession the waves of attacking troops passed the Petite Carrière



*From "l'Illustration"*

A WINDOW OF FORT DE VAUX, LOOKING OUT OVER A TRENCH TO THE SOUTH

"Looking out upon the Woëvre, from the crest about Fort de Vaux, in the early morning light, one could imagine oneself standing upon a cliff overlooking the sea, so sharp is the fall to the marshy plain, at that hour hidden in the mist."—*Frank H. Simonds*

French Official from "Pictorial Press"

AN UNDERGROUND HOSPITAL AT VERDUN

Constant and terrific bombardment made it impossible to establish above ground even the most temporary emergency stations. This is a ward in one of the subsidiary chambers of a fort used as a hospital. The little dog in the foreground refused to be separated from his wounded master

*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

A ROADWAY IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF VERDUN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

—"300 officers, 30,000 men, and 3,900 cars were occupied in the automobile service, which was the real transport system. This system saved Verdun; the guns and divisions of the Meuse never ran short of munitions or food, while the regular relief of the troops at the front took place without delay or hindrance."

*—Frank H. Simonds*

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

GERMAN ARTILLERY SUPERIORITY VANISHED WHEN GUNS SUCH AS THIS ONE APPEARED

With the aid of this gun and others of the same calibre the French launched their triumphant counter-offensive which regained Verdun

© Western Newspaper Union

A BATTERY OF THE FAMOUS FRENCH 75's AT VERDUN

This battery is engaged in barrage fire at Douaumont. "On February twenty-sixth the French counter-attacked on the Douaumont Plateau, all but retook the fort, and brought the German flood to a standstill."—*Frank H. Simonds*

Staff, who was responsible for what proved the greatest of German defeats since the Marne.

For several weeks before the main attack the Germans had carried on minor and deceptive operations on many fronts, operations which at once warned the French of a coming blow yet gave them no clue as to the point selected for attack, but rather, since the feints were along the Champagne and Artois fronts, contributed to confuse them as to the enemy's intention.

Finally, as the ultimate incentive to his troops, the Crown Prince, in the order of the day, on February 21, thus addressed his soldiers: "I, William, see the German Fatherland compelled to pass to the attack." And this attack, all the troops who were to participate in it had been told, was to be the brief prelude to peace, the crowning achievement of German arms.

### V. THE FLOOD

At 7:15 on the morning of February 21, the Battle of Verdun began. Unlike the French at Champagne and the British at Loos, the Germans did not preface their attack by a bombardment of many days. On the contrary, they sought to preserve the element of surprise to the latest possible moment and relied upon the destructive effect of the heaviest concentration of artillery yet known in war, to accomplish in a brief period of time that preparation which was essential to permit their infantry to advance. Of this concentration, mainly made about the village of Gremilly and in the Forest of Spincourt, less than two miles from the French lines, French aviators reported, when it had been unmasked, that the number of the guns defied their ability to indicate them upon the map.

At the moment when they were assailed by this artillery deluge, the French were holding a front line straight across the Heights of the Meuse, from a point between the villages of Consenvoye and Brabant on the river to the edge of the Woëvre Plain, some seven miles to the east, whence it ran out into the plain for a few miles and curved back gradually to the edge of the Meuse Heights far below Verdun. But the

German storm was mainly concentrated upon the line between the river and the plain, although there was heavy firing all the way from Montfaucon to St. Mihiel.

Under this avalanche the French first line collapsed and disappeared. Before many hours trenches had practically ceased to exist, yet through this day the French held on in some fashion over most of the front, and the Germans at this stage, still adhering to their original idea of sparing the infantry and making complete artillery preparation in advance of infantry attack, attempted relatively little.

On the following day, however, the real attack began. Thenceforth for four days the struggle is only a confused and confusing attempt of the remnants of three French divisions of territorials—shelled out of their first and second lines, lacking any third line—to keep a front to the Germans and maintain some sort of a line between the river and the edge of the plain. Hills, villages, woods were fought for with a bitterness not yet known in the western war, save for a moment about Ypres.

At this time the weather was very bad, snow and fog crippled the aviation branches of both armies, the men who fell died of cold where they lay. Scenes recalling the fighting in the Wilderness in our own Civil War were enacted in a dozen of the little woodlands and ravines, and all the agonies of the American conflict were accentuated by the rigours of winter.

Under the weight of numbers and artillery the French troops were gradually ground to powder. Save for two brigades, toward the end they were without reinforcements; their mission was to hold to the last and they fulfilled it. Their duty was to exact the greatest possible price for each yard of German advance, and they exacted it. But they were from the outset a forlorn hope; doomed, and knowing they were doomed. After the first two days the fight became a struggle in open country, there were no more trenches, only shell holes, and on both sides the losses were terrific. Verdun thus instantly gained the place it was to hold for many months as the graveyard of the contending armies.

Steadily, however, the Germans pressed forward. They did not keep to their schedule, which should have brought them to Verdun in

four days. It proved impossible for the guns to keep pace with the infantry and little by little the Germans were compelled to lay aside their original conception of an advance, in which the infantry soldier was only an escort to the gun, and throw their troops into the furnace with ever-increasing losses. But for four days the advance did go on remorselessly and irresistibly.

On February 25, therefore, the Germans reached the last line upon which the defenders of Verdun could stand, if they were to make any stand. In these days the Germans had come down along the Heights of the Meuse for more than four miles. They had set foot upon the Douaumont Plateau, looking directly down upon Verdun, four miles away, and they had taken the dismantled hulk of Fort Douaumont, which had earlier deserved the name the Kaiser now bestowed upon it: "The corner-stone of the chief defence of our principal enemy."

Verdun itself was in flames and ashes; it had been hastily evacuated by the civil inhabitants; the town was under ever-increasing fire, and the Germans looking down upon it, on February 25, from the Douaumont Plateau might well have believed that one more thrust, one more day, would tell the story. Already the price paid had far exceeded all German calculation. German preparation in munitions, as in reserves, gigantic as both had been, had not measured the expenditure either in lives or in shells, but not even on the morning of the Marne did German prospect of a supreme victory seem more brilliant than it did on the night of February 25, 1916.

Eastward from Fort Douaumont, which they held with a firm if still challenged grip, German troops were within a few hundred yards of Fort de Vaux and little more than a mile before them was Fort de Souville. If these forts fell, the end would be sure and that end might bring with it a disaster to the whole French army east of the Meuse from Verdun to St. Mihiel. Yet, near as were these last barriers, it was not until the end of the first week in June that the Germans reached the ruined casemates of Vaux, and six months were insufficient to permit them to enter Souville.

On February 26 the French counter-attacked on the Douaumont

THE FLOOD FEB. 21–26, 1916




■ SHOWS GROUND GAINED BY GERMANS.

Plateau, all but retook the fort and brought the German flood to a standstill. In point of fact, although the truth was hidden alike from Germany—still celebrating the preliminary victory and preparing for the fall of Verdun—and from France—at last roused to the full extent of the Verdun danger—the Battle of Verdun was over, the siege was about to begin. Thus February 26, at Verdun, like September 9 at the Marne, is a memorable day in all French history and in all world history. Like Foch's thrust at Fère-Champenoise, Balfourier's counter-attack on the Douaumont Plateau was a determinating circumstance in one of the decisive battles of human history.

## CHAPTER THREE

## VERDUN—THE FRENCH DEFENCE

### I

### THE SUPREME ACHIEVEMENT

The defence of Verdun is, perhaps, the finest achievement in the two thousand years of military history of the French race. It was—like the Marne—a rally, after initial defeat; it was—like the Marne—the flash of the collective genius of the race, after preliminary mistakes and weaknesses which had jeopardized all; but—unlike the Marne—it was not a sudden return to the offensive, followed by a swift and complete victory. The German attack upon Verdun lasted from February 21 to October 23, and during six months of this time the situation of the defenders was always precarious and frequently desperate.

It was the tenacity of the defence which amazed the world; it was the revelation of that obstinate and unyielding spirit which made "They Shall not Pass" the watchword of the soldier, that first amazed and then thrilled the audience, which was the whole civilized world. It was a resistance such as might have been expected of the Anglo-Saxon race whose stubbornness in defence is as proverbial as the *furia francese* in attack, but in the French it was the demonstration of qualities unsuspected even after the Marne.

The description of the actual occurrences, the offensive and the counter-offensive, can be simply told, but no power of description can justly appraise the real achievement of Verdun, because it was the achievement of the French soldier himself, badly led at the outset, plunged into a contest against hopeless odds, without the protection which ordinary care should have given him, superbly commanded in all the later phases, but first and last victor, in the greatest battle in French history, by his own courage, his own innate military genius—above all else, by his character, his capacity for endless endurance and unmeasured sacrifice.

At the Marne there had been a small contingent of British soldiers, who fought gallantly but contributed little to the outcome; at Verdun France stood alone. Hers was the whole achievement and hers the entire sacrifice. Had she failed, Britain would have been beaten before she was ready, Germany would have triumphed while the United States was still unmindful of the real issues at stake on the remote European battlefield. For the second time in the World War, France saved all the western nations. Verdun was, then, an epilogue to the Marne, a preservation of the decision reached on the earlier battlefield, which must forever stand with Marathon, with Poitiers and Châlons, as one of the supreme battles and victories of arrest, which halted barbarism on the point of destroying western civilization.

And almost from the moment that the first German assault struck the French lines upon the Heights of the Meuse, all France felt the greatness of the peril and magnitude of the crisis. Thereafter, all through the long months of agony, when the battle had developed into a siege, when the German troops still slowly but surely pounded their way forward, it was as if the whole French nation had set its shoulder against this ultimate portal by which the Barbarian was seeking to force his way to the heart of France.

All through these long months there was a never-ending sense in Paris, in the provinces, that the life of France was at stake; and not since the days of the incursions of the Teutonic hordes, when Rome was falling, has any great people more consciously confronted the peril of destruction than did the French. To be in France in that great hour was to feel an intensity of emotion combined with a steadfastness of purpose which was unforgettable. In that time France, the nation, was fused into a single purpose and a single thought. Bleeding terribly from the tremendous wounds inflicted by a more numerous and still better-prepared enemy, the French people, at the front and behind it, echoed and re-echoed the words of the first defenders: "They shall not pass."

It is this fundamental fact that must be recognized and cannot be embodied in any description of what took place about the old Lorraine fortress. When Pétain reached the broken lines, Verdun, by every law

of war, was lost; when Douaumont fell, the road to Verdun was all but open, and the Kaiser did not go beyond probability when he forecast the speedy entrance of his troops into the French town. To him, to his army, it must have seemed thereafter as if the very law of gravitation had been arrested to save Verdun. The defence of Verdun, like the victory of the Marne, was a miracle; it was the same miracle—the miracle of France herself, once more revealed to an incredulous world.

### II. FRENCH PREPARATION

Against the storm, dimly suspected in the weeks preceding the German attack, the French had made certain preparations which were wise and far-seeing; by contrast, they had neglected certain essentials which almost brought a deserved disaster and which ultimately ended the military career of more than one French general. Indeed, as Falkenhayn fell when Verdun held out, so Joffre went ultimately into honourable but unmistakable retirement because the French nation, still grateful for his enormous service at the Marne, saw in the circumstances of Verdun evidences of failing energy and defective foresight which could no more be tolerated in him than those faults in his subordinates, which, at an earlier stage, he had punished unpityingly.

Chief among the failures of the French at Verdun had been the neglect to prepare a third line of defence behind the two lines left by Sarrail when he quitted Verdun, after his original defence in the Marne Campaign. Had this third line been constructed before the Douaumont Plateau, as it had been sketched, the worst of the suffering of the later months would have been avoided and the German attack might have been permanently halted at the edge of the old entrenched camp. Because there was no such line; because, in addition, the two lines which existed were not kept in sufficient repair; German advance, in the first flood, reached and passed Douaumont and gave German High Command reason for pushing the operation, despite the larger failure of the opening week.

Exactly the same neglect had brought ruin to the Russians at the Dunajec less than a year before. Prevision on this score had saved

the Germans at the Battle of Champagne in September, 1915, when the French had carried the first line and pierced the second. Equally inexcusable negligence was to lead to one more disaster to the Allies, when Italy was broken at Caporetto on the Upper Isonzo, in 1917.

When the German blow fell, therefore, not only were the existing French lines on the Meuse Heights in bad condition; not merely were their defenders territorials and not first-line troops (a circumstance hardly to be mentioned now, in view of the defence made by these territorials); but there was lacking a solid third line to which to retire when the first two lines were pierced.

The neglect of the railway communications is chargeable to the French politician and not to the French army. But for the preparation made by the General Staff, when the effort to obtain a new railway line failed, Verdun would have been doomed at the outset. But against such an emergency as was now to come, the Staff had completed a plan by which an army of 250,000 men, with all its supplies and material, could be moved by automobile transport to the Verdun sector. It had reconstructed the highways, it had provided the motor transport. In this preparation lay the salvation of the city.

Thus, on the eve of the German assault, the French were holding the Heights of the Meuse, facing the coming tempest with barely three divisions of territorials, occupying trenches no longer in the best state of repair, having behind them a river in flood, supported by little or no heavy artillery, and—whatever the unrest and uneasiness in the mind of the High Command—unwarned, in any adequate measure, of what was to come. They were occupying a sector which had been long quiet and was reckoned impregnable by those who looked at the impressive heights beyond the river and paid too little attention to the actual weaknesses of the position, viewed as a whole.

Despite all these circumstances, long established and no more to be disputed, there grew up—and persists—a legend that, in attacking Verdun, the Germans walked into a trap skilfully set for them by Joffre; that from the beginning to the end of the struggle they were actually the

victims of strategy which had foreseen all and provided against all emergencies. Nothing is further from the truth. The French at Verdun were surprised at least as completely as were the Russians at the Dunajec. They were surprised with insufficient defences, with no proper system of support lines behind them, their existing lines were torn to pieces in the first four days of bombardment, and for most of the first week the French fought in open country far behind the last line of prepared trenches which had belonged to them on February 20.

The French achievement was greater in view of these handicaps at the start, but so was the sacrifice, the sacrifice which began when Balfourier's "Iron Division" was compelled to counter-attack and hold on under annihilating artillery fire, while a new line of trenches was constructed and a defensive position organized. This is the tragedy of the Verdun story, known to all France even in the earliest days, but long hidden from the world.

### III. THE DECISION TO FIGHT

When the first artillery bombardment signalled to the French High Command the new German activity, it was impossible for Joffre and his associates to act immediately. Time must be allowed to find out whether the Verdun operation was a real attack or a mere feint. If it was a feint, then to hurry an army to this point might be to leave the real objective of the enemy unguarded. Thus, while preparations were made to set in motion the transport machinery, which had been prepared, no real steps were taken to relieve the troops defending the Heights of the Meuse until February 24.

By this time there was no longer any mistaking the magnitude of the German thrust. Indeed, the real question had now become whether it would be wise or even safe to defend the east bank of the Meuse at all. Joffre, himself, inclined to the belief that it would be unwise and even perilous. Under pressure from Paris he sent his chief adviser —General de Castelnau, the defender of Nancy—to Verdun to make the great decision. Upon Castelnau devolved the duty of deciding whether a new French army would be thrown across the Meuse to de-

fend the eastern hills, or the whole French line drawn back from the east bank of the river from Verdun straight down to St. Mihiel.

In the latter case Germany would justly claim a very considerable victory. Verdun might fall, the Germans would be solidly established on the line of the Meuse if they should later have to retreat; but the new French position, resting on the western hills, would doubtless hold; the German advance would be halted at the western edge of the river, and the success would be local, not decisive. Given the extent of German advance already achieved, to throw a great army across the flooded river, whose crossings were now under German observation and fire, might be to court disaster. Unmistakably the memory of Sedan and that other political interference were in Joffre's mind when he inclined to refuse the German challenge and retreat.

Paris, the politicians, the Government, on the other hand, recognized the moral value of Verdun. They perceived the degree to which the German public would be elated, the French nation depressed by the loss of a city which, in the minds of both countries, was still the cornerstone of French defence, despite the fact that contemporary war had robbed it of this distinction. There was, then, in these days, a real crisis in Paris as the probability of the fall of Verdun became more and more apparent and the views of the French Generalissimo were more and more widely known.

Once at Verdun, however, Castelnau decided for the defence. He saw both the moral and the military significance, he recognized Verdun to be the same problem which he had solved at Nancy. On his word the decision to defend was made, the French High Command accepted the battle challenge of the German. And as the first step in the defence, Castelnau summoned Pétain—the man who had saved the situation at Soissons in the preceding winter, gained reputation at the Artois fighting, and won real fame in the Battle of Champagne, which had been of his planning. The next day Pétain was on the spot; the new phase was about to open.

But on February 24, when Castelnau advised the defence, there were still no reserves available and Pétain was not yet come. For two days

more the survivors of the territorials, who had met the first rush, were asked to hold on. That they did this may be reckoned for them as well nigh the finest achievement of the whole war. But during these two days their sacrifices were tremendous. And despite all their heroism and devotion, the Germans were able to set foot upon the last defensive line of Verdun, the positions which should have been fortified by the French and were not; and when Pétain at last began to throw his advance guards across the Meuse, Douaumont had fallen, the French line was broken on the Douaumont Plateau, and, for the moment, the road to Verdun was open.

It was this situation—"delicate," to borrow from the official phrase later published—which Pétain restored by throwing the Twentieth Army Corps across the river and against the victorious Brandenburgers, who had taken Douaumont. While the Iron Corps, the most famous in the French Army, counter-attacked, held the German advance, and rewon considerable ground, new trenches were dug behind them, new gun positions were selected and prepared; the men of Lorraine and Brittany, who made up the Iron Corps, opposed their bodies as a living wall to the German artillery and infantry, until the new army arrived and the new positions had been prepared. Magnificent this was, undeniably; but it was a sacrifice made necessary by the negligence which had gone before.

### IV. THE END OF THE BATTLE

The Battle of Verdun may be said to have ended with February 26. To be sure there was no real termination, no pause between the battle and the siege, and by many military observers the great struggles of March 9 and even of April 9 are considered portions of the opening contest. They were, however, variations of the original German plan, modifications of the first scheme, which envisaged a swift, deadly thrust to Verdun through French lines broken by artillery bombardment. By the close of February the German had been compelled to alter his plan, and his alteration was the first step in the protracted siege, which lasted until October.

On Friday, February 25, when the Brandenburgers took Fort Douaumont, the German flood reached its high tide. The fort was not taken by storm, as the Kaiser's sonorous declaration affirmed; it was taken without resistance, and by surprise. In fact, so torn and broken had the French line become, that the few men who occupied this fort, now only a dismantled hulk, believed that they were far behind an existing French line and were surprised by troops which had penetrated a gap in French defence.

By contrast, on February 26, the French counter-attack—Balfourier's thrust out to the Ravine of Death on the edge of the Douaumont Plateau—brought the whole German rush to a dead halt. In fact, the storm had worn itself out. The French territorials, whose mission it was to hold on until the reserves could come up, had just managed to perform their task. They had inflicted losses so tremendous, they had opposed a barrier so obstinate, that the German reserves in men and munitions had been exhausted before the final blow could be delivered.

In a word, the whole German conception had broken down; it had not been possible for the guns to keep pace with the men. It had not been possible, even where the guns did keep up, to destroy the surviving French troops, who had been driven from their ruined trenches. In shell holes, in ditches, in the ruins of villages, they had found shelter and exacted an incredible toll of casualties from their foes. Lacking in heavy artillery they had used their "75's" with fatal effect and sacrificed guns freely that the artillery fire might be maintained to the last possible moment.

French High Command had drawn the thing fine. Had the new forces arrived one day later, Verdun would have been indefensible; had they come a day earlier, Douaumont and all the priceless gun positions toward Louvemont would have been saved. As it was, the last defensive position had been pierced and thenceforth the French were obliged to fight facing uphill, with their backs to the flooded river, while the Germans had direct observation upon Verdun and all the communications and bridges of their foes.

Yet defensible the position the French now occupied manifestly was, as the next months were to prove. Only one of the old forts, but the most important of the outer circle, had been captured, only on a narrow front had the old limits of the entrenched camp of Verdun been passed, and the thin wedge which the Germans had driven in offered no immediate opening for a final push to Verdun. On the contrary, the French flanks on the Charny Ridge and Le Mort Homme west of the Meuse and on the Vaux Plateau south and east of Fort Douaumont offered admirable opportunity to sweep the German centre about Douaumont with a converging artillery fire and forbade any further attempt to break the French centre until the French flanks had been disposed of.

As for the French, moreover, a new army had arrived, an army composed of first-line corps splendidly organized and well commanded. The momentary disorganization which was noted in Verdun in the first days of the attack—when terrified refugees, driven from the city by the bombardment, choked the roads, and every wounded man coming from the battlefield was a messenger bearing evil tidings—had disappeared. Above and beyond all else, for the second time in the war, and in her second great crisis, France had found a man. More and more, in the succeeding months, Pétain was to grow in stature until, with but a brief delay—while his Verdun-trained subordinate, Nivelle, was to have his chance and fail—he was to succeed to the honours and the authority of Joffre. And in history as Joffre will live as the victor of the Marne, Pétain's fame is assured as the defender of Verdun.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THE SIEGE OF VERDUN

## I

## THE GERMAN PROBLEM

On February 24 the French High Command—represented on the spot by General de Castelnau—had to make the momentous decision whether France would accept or decline battle on the Meuse Heights. To decline meant to abandon all of the French positions east of the Meuse, probably to evacuate the ruined town of Verdun itself, and above all else to confess a defeat—and a defeat which would bulk large in the eyes of the world, given the value which time and tradition had earned for Verdun. It meant to risk a disaster in a retreat across a flooded valley, but, all things considered, the chances of great disaster in this retreat were probably small.

On the other hand, to accept battle meant to throw a force of 250,000 piecemeal across the swollen Meuse, to face huge numbers now enthused by great successes and expecting decisive victory. The first French divisions to arrive must face this oncoming flood in the open field, without any but the most summary trenches to shelter them against the most important concentration of heavy artillery yet known in war. This was the challenge which Castelnau accepted on February 24; this was the "delicate" situation which Pétain partially restored on February 26. France deliberately chose to accept battle, to engage Germany until Russian armies should be restored and British armies ready. Once more France bore the burden.

By March 1, the situation had materially changed. The great German advance, the drive down the Meuse Heights on a narrow front and behind a huge artillery fire, had come to an abrupt halt, had indeed in some slight measure recoiled. Further advance was no longer possible in the centre, while from the flanks the French fire swept the com-

munications and rear of the Germans. Until these flank positions of the French on the Vaux Plateau and west of the Meuse were reduced, the main thrust must be postponed, and to postpone this operation in the centre was to give the French time to prepare against any new attack. The element of surprise, the advantage of overwhelming numbers, of incomparably superior artillery would have disappeared, when next the push was resumed on the Douaumont Plateau.

Accordingly, in the first days of March, the German High Command had to make its own decision, hardly less momentous than that of the French, less than ten days earlier. Should it continue the Verdun operation? The possibility of a supreme victory was unquestionably gone. The chance to break the French line, to drive a wedge between the armies of the centre and the right, and resume the march on Paris, between the Oise and the Meuse, had disappeared. Verdun might, now be taken, but it could only be taken after long siege operations, and taking it would have little more than a moral value if it were captured only after weeks or even months of effort. For when it did fall, granted that Germany finally triumphed, the French were sure to have prepared endless lines behind it on the admirably defensible hills that rise to the west of the Meuse Valley.

Puzzling as the problem must have seemed, the Germans, in reality, had no choice. They did not vainly throw away thousands and hundreds of thousands of good troops in obstinacy or blindness, as the contemporary reports loudly asserted. Their failure to win their first and greatest objective was not long in becoming apparent to them, but they had so committed themselves that they now had no real alternative but to continue. An offensive of the proportions of the Verdun attack in this present-day war requires months of preparation, the concentration of guns and munitions is a matter of many, many weeks. Railroads have to be rebuilt, roads constructed, light railways provided. Before the first gun is fired in a great attack, thousands of men may have laboured for six months, for a year, in preparing the way. And in the case of the Verdun operation, German preparation began fifteen months before the battle.



*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM AND PRESIDENT POINCARÉ OF FRANCE DECORATING FRENCH OFFICERS AT VERDUN

If any soldiers ever deserved decorations it was those who in successfully resisting the apparently overwhelming German onslaught had shown not only the brilliance and dash supposed to be typical of the French soldier, but the bulldog tenacity supposed heretofore by most Americans at least to be an Anglo-Saxon specialty

*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

RETURNING AFTER THE RETAKING OF DEAD MAN'S HILL

"The French held on to them (Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304) as long as they could without too great losses and surrendered them finally, when the attack became too fierce and the price exacted satisfied their commander, only to retake them a year later with little cost."—*Frank H. Simonds*



VERDUN BEFORE THE WAR

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

VERDUN AFTER THE BATTLE AND SIEGE

"As for Verdun, itself, it melted into dust and ashes as Arras had, as St. Quentin was to disappear. Yet the cathedral survived and to the very end there were houses, and even quarters, where houses remained standing, in which the troops lived."—*Frank H. Simonds*

*Photograph from Underwood & Underwood*

A NEW USE FOR A CHURCH BELL

This is the famous bell of the Vaux church as used on the Verdun front to give the warning signal, "gas coming." It was captured by the Germans when they took Vaux, but just as they were about to ship it to Germany Vaux was retaken by the French and the historic old bell was recovered

© Western Newspaper Union

THE FRENCH RETAKING A CAPTURED SECTOR AT VERDUN

"In four hours the victors had traversed the ground which it had taken the enemy eight months to cross."
—*Frank H. Simonds*



A PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE BURROWS IN WHICH THE DEFENDERS OF VERDUN WERE OBLIGED TO LIVE

*French Official from "Provincial Press"*

*Photograph from Underwood & Underwood*

TYPICAL SCENES IN VERDUN AFTER THE DEFEATED GERMANS HAD VENTED THEIR IMPOTENT WRATH UPON THE CITY

© *Underwood & Underwood*

A HAND GRENADE ATTACK AT VERDUN

These men volunteered to attack a particularly dangerous angle of German trench. They were running forward, shouting and throwing their grenades, when this picture was snapped.

And once the offence has begun, the attacking High Command has but one of two possibilities before it, it may stop the attack or it may pursue it, but it cannot transfer its attack to any other sector on the battle front, not in weeks, not in months. Thus the Germans, when they could not force the Verdun positions in February and early March, could have abandoned the offensive but they could not have begun a new attack either in Champagne or in Flanders, because all their preparations had been made in Lorraine, and to prepare a new attack on another front would mean postponing all attack, accepting the defensive, sacrificing the initiative for six months at least, perhaps for the whole of the campaign of 1916.

This the Germans could not do, because within six months the British army would be ready to attack, the Russians would have recovered from the effects of their defeats of the previous year. Italy would be on the move, and France, unexhausted by any long campaign about Verdun, would be ready to support the British in the offensive already preparing along the Somme, as the Germans well knew.

Thus, while modifying her expectations, Germany had to continue her Verdun offensive. Her new calculations must be far more modest than her previous reckonings. She could expect, at most, only the capture of Verdun after a defence which would enable the French to assure the connection between their centre and eastern armies. She could expect a victory only at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, now that the French were alert and would soon be prepared. But she might hope that, together with the moral advantage of a victory—a limited victory, which would not pass beyond the possession of the ruins of Verdun—she would be able to inflict such losses upon the French as to preclude their participation in the summer offensive. She might, in fact, as her own statements presently forecast, "bleed France white" while the battle lines remained with little change.

In addition, German High Command might calculate that the sacrifices of France would arouse French protest and that this protest would lead the British to make a premature offensive, against which the Germans were at all times prepared. Such a premature offensive would

end all the peril of a summer attack. The whole scheme of an Anglo-French offensive in Picardy would go off at half cock and Germany would be able to preserve her Mitteleuropa without any other serious threat during 1916, in the latter half of which she might complete her operations against Russia and aid Austria against Italy. Finally, while possession of Verdun would mean little, viewed in the light of the situation as it existed, if Germany were ever compelled to retire behind the line of the Meuse, Verdun in her hands would mean the possession of a valuable bridgehead, while, in French hands, the whole position of the Heights of the Meuse would serve as a French bridgehead, threatening that new line, making it at all times dangerous, if not actually untenable, and preserving a threat to the invaluable Briey iron district only a few miles to the east, from which Germany derived the larger part of the iron ore used in her war industries.

Germany had to go on, she was committed to theVerdun sector, and the general situation imposed upon her the necessity to make some major attack. Her objectives had changed, her hope of a swift and decisive victory had gone by the end of February, but henceforth, on the only line on which she could conduct an offensive at the moment, she sought to cripple her French opponent by the infliction of heavy casualties and to avert a joint attack of her enemies in the summer by inducing Britain to make a premature assault in the early spring. Finally—since her Balkan work was not yet completed and the Salonica army a growing menace—she might calculate by her threat in Lorraine to persuade her enemies to withhold troops from Macedonia.

Of all these objectives the Germans, at the most, realized only the negative purposes. The French blow at the Somme was, probably, less powerful than it would have been had there been no long-drawn-out killing on the Heights of the Meuse. The army at Salonica was not sufficiently reinforced to enable it to coöperate when Rumania entered the war. But for this lessening of future menaces, Germany paid a tremendous immediate price. And it may be questioned whether any victory that would have been possible at the Somme could have had a

greater moral or material consequence than the final French achievement about Verdun in October and December, when the lost forts were retaken and in a few hours the Germans were thrown out of all their conquests, with a loss of prisoners and guns beyond even Napoleonic achievement.

As for the British, they did promptly and gladly volunteer to make the attack, which the Germans hoped for and expected. But Joffre wisely forbade this, and the British, at his direction, were compelled to limit their contribution to the French to taking over one more sector of the French front, which brought the British lines well down toward the Somme and released at least one more French army for service elsewhere on the line, either at Verdun or at some other point, from which other units had been withdrawn to reinforce Pétain.

From February to August the Verdun siege was, first of all, a struggle to inflict losses, not to achieve any local decision or gain any position which had decisive military value. It was a battle fought in Lorraine by the French and by the Germans, the former seeking to give the British time to organize the Somme offensive, the latter endeavouring to make that offensive impossible by wasting French forces and thus forcing British attack. When the Battle of the Somme began, Verdun was in deadly peril, and the peril of Verdun slightly hastened the Somme stroke, but it is hardly to be conceived now, in the face of the evidence we possess, that the Somme could have led to decisive victory had there been no Siege of Verdun or that materially greater results could have been realized at the Somme than were realized along the Meuse had the French refused battle and retreated behind Verdun.

When the French High Command perceived that the Germans were fully committed to the Verdun operation, they deliberately accepted the challenge and all that happened thereafter was in accordance with French calculation. The French High Command very frankly accepted a risk—considerable at the outset, because of the chaotic condition of French defence beyond the Meuse—in the belief that it could ruin German strategic combinations; defend Verdun, which had only moral and local value; inflict upon the Germans a terrific if not a deadly loss

in casualties, and give the British and Russians time to prepare their new offensives.

And in the main the French High Command realized all its objectives. The Germans lost far more heavily than the French, although the losses of both were probably exaggerated at the time. They finally surrendered all the positions which they had gained, together with many guns and prisoners. The world steadily fixed its eyes upon the geographical entity, which was the city and the old forts of Verdun. It measured the situation by the approach of Germany to the Vauban citadel and the French victory by the subsequent expulsion of the Germans from all the area of the entrenched camp. But neither French nor German strategy after the opening days concerned itself with these details, save only in bulletins addressed to the uncomprehending publics.

One more circumstance needs clarification. The world spoke of the Siege of Verdun, but it was merely a figure of speech, for Verdun was never invested. The road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun was open at all times and little troubled by artillery fire, despite occasional barrages. The narrow-gauge line coming up from Bar-le-Duc was also in operation but its capacity was slight. By contrast, 300 officers, 30,000 men, and 3,900 cars were occupied in the automobile service, which was the real transport system. This system saved Verdun; the guns and divisions east of the Meuse never ran short of munitions or food, while the regular relief of the troops at the front took place without delay or hindrance.

In reality the Siege of Verdun was no more a siege than the Battle of the Somme was a siege of Bapaume or Péronne. It was one more incident in trench warfare, differing little, except as the nature of the country differed, from the later battles of the Somme and of the Flanders campaign of 1917. In Champagne in 1915 the French had been able to cut their losses and terminate their offensive whenever the cost became out of proportion to the immediate or prospective profit. They could do this because the general Allied situation did not then require a major offensive at some point in the line. At Verdun the Germans could not follow this course because they were bound to

attack, and thus to prevent, or modify, the weight of attacks which were gathering at the Somme on the Russian front and at Salonica.

### II. THE NEW FIGHTING

In this Siege of Verdun, which lasted with little real interruption from March to the end of August and did not really come to a close until the December offensive of the French had cleared the whole area of the entrenched camp, a new order of fighting was promptly disclosed. In all earlier battles the concentration of artillery had abolished the first and even the second line defences, and thereafter the assailant had either advanced to victory or been halted at a third line, and the struggle had quickly fallen back to the old familiar routine of trench warfare.

At Verdun the bombardment, which had hitherto been merely the prelude to infantry attack, endured for days and even weeks. Eight thousand shells fell daily for nearly three months upon Fort de Vaux. Trenches, dugouts, communication trenches; all these were soon abolished and never could be restored. Men fought in defences supplied by chance, chiefly in shell holes joined by some mere suggestion of a trench. The forest-clad hills of the Meuse Heights were soon swept clear of every vestige of tree or plant. The whole area was pockmarked with shell-craters, until looking down from an aëroplane, one might believe oneself examining the surface of the Sahara.

Organized lines and ways of communication were blotted out and roads reduced to mere trails; to step off one of these was to fall into a shell-crater and many men were drowned in such craters. In the fog and snows of the severe weather of February and March, 1916, the suffering of the troops on either side was indescribable. In France as in Germany, Verdun became a name of evil omen and it is probable that well nigh a quarter of a million of men perished in French and German armies combined, in the first ten months of the fighting; that is, through the period in which the Verdun sector was actively engaged.

No pen can describe and no brush paint the horrors of this siege, whether during the spring, the summer, or the autumn. The misery of those who fought is beyond all realization, the desolation of the coun-

try hardly believable, even for those who have looked out upon it. As for Verdun itself, it melted into dust and ashes as Arras had, as Rheims was to disappear. Yet the cathedral survived, and to the very end there were houses, and even quarters in which houses remained standing, in which the troops lived.

All the romance of the war of movement, the old-fashioned war; all the relative comfort which long months of experience had made possible in the trench-lines elsewhere, were absent from Verdun. Men lived in mud and ruins, they fought without shelter other than the shell-crater half filled with water which was frequently partially frozen. They were shelled for hours and for days without interruption. Ground was won only when it had been pulverized and the men who held it blown to fragments, and the smallest gain was frequently purchased at a cost beyond that paid by the victor in many of the considerable struggles of our own Civil War. In this contest the rifle played a relatively minor part. Apart from the artillery, bombs, liquid fire, asphyxiating gas, machine guns and the bayonet were the chief weapons of defence. In sum, the Siege of Verdun was a scientific butchery not equalled before in all the history of war. It was a butchery by artillery, primarily, but to artillery were added all the weapons that human ingenuity could fashion. And to the horrors of war were added the tortures of a relentless climate and a hostile countryside. Forests, swamps, and marshes—even fogs, rains, and blizzards—were details in the history, the horror, of Verdun.

This long-drawn-out agony was repeated at the Somme; it was at some moments surpassed by the horrors of the British and the French floundering in the mud and muck of the Third Battle of Ypres; but for concentrated agony and misery, for human sacrifice and human endurance, Verdun was, when it occurred—and still remains—a page unchallenged in human records. Indeed Death was perhaps the kindest friend the soldiers of Verdun knew, and that they welcomed it, scores of letters of German and French soldiers alike demonstrate.

And with the Siege of Verdun we enter a new phase of war. The Battle of Champagne, the Battle of the Aisne, these were but transitions from the Nineteenth- to the Twentieth-Century method, while First

Ypres was far more closely related to Waterloo than to the Allied offensive of 1917. But even the war of trenches had well nigh disappeared when the Verdun contest closes and it has become a war of shell holes, with the bomb, the machine gun, and the bayonet as aids to that artillery which now rules all and destroys all.

### III. ON THE LEFT BANK—DEAD MAN'S HILL

By the first of March the German advance on the Heights of the Meuse had definitely halted, and while in the next few days there were spasmodic efforts to gain ground on the Douaumont Plateau, the conflict, after several interludes, shifted from the centre to the flanks, from the Douaumont Plateau to the westward, to the left bank of the river north of Verdun; to the eastward to the Vaux Plateau, south and east of Fort Douaumont.

This second phase of the Verdun contest, which lasted until the last week of May on their left flank and until the end of the first week of June on their right, is called by the French the "Battle of the Wings." For the Germans a shift in operations was made necessary by the position in which they found themselves when the brusque attack had failed to capture Verdun and the first rush had been beaten down. At this moment the French lines were shaped like a crescent, with the horns facing the German lines; and from these horns—formed by Le Mort Homme ("Dead Man's Hill") and by Fort de Vaux, on the Vaux Plateau—the French directed a converging fire upon the enemy's centre within the curve of the crescent.

Before they could push farther forward in the centre, therefore, the Germans had to deal with the French flanks—with the left wing at Dead Man's Hill and the right at Fort de Vaux. In the end they were bound to reach Verdun, if at all, through the breach they had opened in the French centre, because there they were nearest to their objective and there the ground was most favourable to their attack. But French artillery on both wings swept this breach and until it had been silenced and the horns of the crescent seized, no further advance in the centre was possible.

The two operations that make up the Battle of the Wings went on not simultaneously, but alternately, during nearly three months. First on the French left and then on the right the Germans attacked. New artillery concentrations and new infantry divisions and corps were brought up; German losses mounted rapidly, while the French, holding the unessential positions lightly and counter-attacking only when some vital trench or redoubt was temporarily lost, paid a far smaller price for their resistance. In point of fact, there was nothing more costly to the Germans in the whole conflict than the struggles on the west bank of the river during March and April, save possibly the brusque attack upon Vaux—that assault which failed on March 9.

Important as was the place which these struggles for Dead Man's Hill and the adjoining summit, Hill 304, occupied in contemporary reports, they had no direct importance; they did not represent an effort of the Germans to get Verdun by moving up the left bank of the river. The total meaning of their effort was comprehended in the necessity to push the French guns and infantry off two hills on the left bank of the river, from which French fire commanded the western side of the Douaumont Plateau, and held up German advance in the centre.

When the Germans began their attack on the left bank the French there were still holding the line occupied when the Battle of Verdun opened. This line ran westward from the Meuse along the south bank of the little Forges Brook, which enters the Meuse just opposite the village of Samogneux, lost by the French in the first days, the stream which our own Americans crossed in the first stage of their offensive between the Argonne and the Meuse more than two years later. A branch of this brook coming down at right angles to the main stream and parallel to the Meuse, separates Hill 304 from Dead Man's Hill and the various German efforts aimed at taking these two isolated hills, first by frontal attack, then by a push up the south branch of the Forges Brook, and finally by an attack from the west up the slopes of Hill 304, which commanded Dead Man's Hill.

The main French defensive position on the left bank of the river was not along the crest of the two contested hills, but a couple of miles south

of them, along the Charny Ridge, which was higher than either and extended in an unbroken line westward from the Meuse and more than four miles north of Verdun. Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 were far outside the old area of the entrenched camp of Verdun. The French held on to them as long as they could without too great losses and surrendered them finally, when the attack became too fierce and the price exacted satisfied their commander, only to retake them a year later, with little cost, when they had regained the offensive.

This battle on the left wing lasted from the first week of March to the last week of May. When it ended the French had been driven south and off of both hills; they had lost their power to assail the Germans on the Douaumont Plateau by a flanking fire. Thus the Germans obtained the result which they had sought, but at a tremendous cost in casualties and not until after three months of intense fighting. When they had attained their objectives they contented themselves with occupying and fortifying the captured hills, and the fighting on the left bank was over.

### IV. ON THE RIGHT—FORT DE VAUX

The fighting on the right wing attracted more attention, and will probably enjoy more lasting fame, because it had a single, clearly distinguishable objective, Fort de Vaux, and because the defence of this fort—later described in one of the memorable books of the war—constitutes an epitome of the whole Verdun epic and one of the finest and most appealing chapters in the history of warfare.

Vaux itself, stood on a broad, fairly level plateau, facing east over the edge of the Woëvre Plateau and north fronting Fort Douaumont across the deep ravine carrying the brook of Vaux. Little watercourses have here bitten so deeply into the clayey soil that Vaux is really almost surrounded by ravines and thus practically isolated from the mass of the Heights of the Meuse behind it, which bear the inner line of old forts, Tavannes and Souville, among them.

The Germans, who attacked Vaux from the north, advanced out of the valley at its feet, having taken the little village of Vaux-devant-

Damloup, just under the fort. As they advanced the contour of the hills gave them a protected sector right under the fort, the slope being too sharp to permit the guns of the Vaux position to reach them. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the Germans endeavoured to repeat their achievement at Douaumont and on March 9 announced that they had taken Vaux by a brusque attack. This was utterly untrue and compelled them to invent a successful French counter-attack the next day to explain why the French were still in Vaux. Rarely hitherto in war has a combatant been obliged to bestow an imaginary victory upon his foe merely to cover the falsity of his own claims of an earlier success.

From March 9 onward the battle for Vaux went forward with unending severity. Little by little the Germans crept up the Vaux Plateau, more and more closely their trench lines drew about the doomed fort, which was now nothing but a heap of shattered masonry and crumbling brick. By the first of June the investment was complete. Only a little garrison of some 600 men still held out; and this garrison, swollen by the survivors of other units who had taken refuge there, was beyond the resources of the fort to feed or furnish with water.

Immured in the underground passages of the ruined fort, the gallant garrison still hung on. All direct communication with the French forces outside ceased. Carrier pigeons supplied the lack for the moment, but soon the last pigeon was released. Then for a day or two messages were flashed by heliograph. But by June 3 the end was in sight, for the Germans were now pushing up and occupying the ground over the ruins of the fort and the troops of the little garrison had to defend themselves against an attack from above, as the Germans following their bombs down the narrow staircases poured into the underground passages below.

Still Vaux held out, its garrison, defending the passages and the inner stairways from gallery to gallery by bombs, enduring several gas attacks. The Germans poured the gas down into the hideous caverns, in which the atmosphere was already mephitic; even liquid fire failed to tame the spirits of the defenders. It held out until food and water were both gone. Then, and only then, Major Raynal—whose

*THE BATTLE OF THE WINGS, MARCH TO MID-JUNE, 1916*




SHOWS GROUND GAINED BY GERMANS.

*VERDUN IN EXTREMIS, JUNE 15–SEPT. 1, 1916*




GROUND GAINED BY GERMANS.

last message from his commander had been the announcement of his decoration for supreme bravery—yielded his sword to a conqueror, who, for once, honoured himself by honouring the brave man who had defended his post to the final moment of possibility.

The last resistance in the ashes of Vaux ended on June 7 and with this date the Battle of the Wings also ends. For more than a hundred days the Germans had been occupied in preparing the way for a renewal of their advance by the centre. These hundred days had been gained for the Russian preparations, which were already revealing themselves in a new offensive in Volhynia; they had been gained for the British, now approaching the point at which they might take the offensive with a reasonable chance of success.

Now in June the final problem was posed. Verdun had done its real work, its defence had achieved the primary purpose of the French High Command. Its fall now would only mean a moral defeat, the military purpose of the defence had been realized. But could the moral as well as the material victory be achieved? Could Verdun itself be held until that moment, now to be foreseen, when the Russian pressure in the east and the Anglo-French attack in the west would compel the Germans to abandon the struggle on the Meuse and transfer their guns and men to the Somme and the Styr? The Germans had planned to take Verdun in four days, and only now as the fourth month was ending, were they within sight of victory; only now was Verdun at last *in extremis;* could it hold for two months more?

### V. THE ATTACK IN THE CENTRE

While the battle had raged on the flanks, the lines in the centre had changed but little. There had been a slight but immaterial German advance, while the French, on their side, had—by a brilliant counter-attack designed to relieve the pressure upon Vaux—stormed the ruins of Fort Douaumont and held them for one long May day, only to retire in the face of new German concentrations of artillery and men and this counter-offensive was to be the last ray of light for the defenders for many days.

When the final German thrust for Verdun began, the positions of the two contending forces were something like this: No longer facing south, but west, the Germans were endeavouring to advance from the Douaumont Plateau downhill toward the Meuse Valley and Verdun, four miles before them and in plain view. They and the French occupied halves of a gigantic letter "H," one of the sides representing the Douaumont Plateau, the other the parallel ridge which carried Fort Tavannes, and between these two sides ran the German route to Verdun. The cross stroke represents the narrow ridge connecting the two longer ridges and, itself carrying Fort de Souville. On this connecting ridge the French and German lines faced each other with only a few feet separating them and the whole German problem was by frontal attacks to force the French off this ridge, seizing first the Thiaumont redoubt and the village of Fleury in their immediate front and then Fort de Souville. If they could take Souville they would then isolate and capture Tavannes and advance upon Verdun along the three valleys which were followed respectively by (*a*) the light railway coming east from the village of Vaux; (*b*) the main Paris-Verdun-Metz railway, which between Vaux and Tavannes passes from the Meuse Valley to the Woëvre by a tunnel rather more than a mile long, and (*c*) the Metz-Verdun highway which borrows the least considerable of these depressions to cross the Heights of the Meuse.

As they thus advanced, the Germans would drive the French downhill, and, once Souville and Tavannes had fallen, the French would have only St. Michel and Belleville, forts which stand on the first slopes east of the Meuse and which, in the nature of things, could only be held lightly and for a brief time, since the retreat of their garrisons would be practically impossible and their destruction by German batteries on the higher ground to the east was bound to be only a matter of time. Forts, moreover, had long lost their old importance and even Tavannes and Souville were important only because of gun positions about them and the cover their underground galleries gave for reserves and for supplies of munitions and food.

June 8 to August 8 saw the final phase of the Verdun offensive

of the Germans. In this time the German line was pushed forward a little more than a mile, on the right it thrust the French off the Douaumont Plateau altogether and back upon the subsidiary and lower elevation of Froide Terre. Here the German advance was marked by the capture of Thiaumont Farm and redoubt. In the centre the German flood reached and passed the village of Fleury, attained the Chapelle St. Fine beyond, and halted exactly at the ditch of Fort de Souville, the extreme highwater mark. On their left, the Germans advanced from Fort de Vaux rather more than a mile, thus covering half the distance separating Vaux from Tavannes.

On August 8 the German line between the Meuse and the Vaux Plateau curved inward toward Verdun and then bent back to the Vaux Plateau; it was, in fact, a gigantic wedge driven toward Verdun, penetrating most deeply southwest of Douaumont. The Germans were now on the downward slope, less than four miles from the old Vauban citadel. They had flung back both wings of the French army defending Verdun, they had opened a breach in the centre. Souville, nothing but a shapeless mass of blackened ashes, was the single fragile barrier between them and an advance which would carry them to the Meuse.

But this advance was not to come. The Anglo-French offensive in Picardy was now five weeks old and it was no longer possible for the Germans to find reserves and munitions for two great operations. They had, in fact, lost the initiative. Had they been able to reach Fleury in March, there would have been no siege of Verdun, since an immediate French retreat beyond the river would have been inevitable. Had they arrived in May or June, there still would have been time to make the last leap. But in August the opportunity came too late. The Verdun game had been played out; Verdun had served the Allies' purpose; it had performed its full duty. In battle and in siege it had held for nearly six months. The military end had been attained in June, the moral objective was now realized in August; Verdun had not merely held out long enough to serve the purposes of Allied strategy, it had also supplied the moral victory, which was almost beyond calculation, given

the condition which Pétain had found when he came to Verdun on February 25. To the glory of Thermopylæ, Verdun had added the achievement of Platæa. "They shall not pass," the Poilu had said in February, and in August the Germans had not passed—the challenge had become a prophecy and the prophecy was already fulfilled.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## IRELAND AND KUT-EL-AMARA

### I

### BRITISH PERPLEXITIES

While the guns of Verdun were awakening echoes all over the planet and little by little the world was realizing that France was engaged in a desperate duel to the death to hold a new German flood until Britain could at last arrive with her new armies, three events of unequal importance, but in the nature of things achieving equal attention, served to reveal British public life and British public sentiment at the lowest ebb since that hour when the menace of Napoleon had been removed by the victory of Waterloo and the exile to St. Helena.

These three events—the Irish Rebellion, the Surrender of Kut, and the Battle of Jutland—were utterly dissimilar. The Irish Rebellion hardly rose to the level of the draft riots of New York City in the Civil War period. At Kut, Townshend surrendered an army but little larger than Burgoyne surrendered to Gates at Saratoga, and of the entire force not over 2,000 were British. Finally, Jutland was in all its ultimate consequences a British victory, as complete a victory as Gettysburg had been on land for the North in the Civil War, since it left unshaken that superiority out of which victory was bound to flow, if it were not abolished; and at Jutland it was not even shaken.

Yet the immediate consequences of these three episodes were unmistakable. Each, in a sense, revealed a failure; together they disclosed an ineptitude in governmental quarters which shook the nation to its foundations and finally led, with brief delays, to the overthrow of the Asquith Ministry. For, of Ireland, men believed that a supine Cabinet had closed its eyes to the coming of an outbreak already foreshadowed by all competent observers; of Kut it was believed that a new Gallipoli tragedy had been made possible by the same fatuous inex-

# AËROPLANE WARFARE

*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

CAPTAIN GEORGE GUYNEMER

"Dead on the field of honour"

*Photograph by Peter A. Sully*

A BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS

The eagle swoop of this pursuing battleplane on its prey, whose scurrying flight can be felt in every line, vividly illustrates the terrors of aërial warfare

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

ZEPPELIN L-49, BROUGHT DOWN AT BOURBONNE

The air pilots tried to burn their machine but were stopped by a French farmer



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

FRAME OF A ZEPPELIN LYING ACROSS AN ENGLISH ROAD

This Zeppelin, the fourth lost in raids upon England during one month, was brought down in the outskirts of London



OBSERVATION CAR OF A GERMAN AIR RAIDER

This small car, with its one observer, is suspended from the Zeppelin which floats high above it often out of sight above the clouds

Photograph by Central News Photo Service

DROPPING BOMBS FROM AN AEROPLANE

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE

This service is attended by extreme danger

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

WITH THE BRITISH ROYAL FLYING CORPS IN INDIA

Receiving a wireless message from an aëroplane



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

PHOTOGRAPHING THE ENEMY'S TRENCHES

This picture shows one type of aëroplane camera which was used in France



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

VERIFYING HITS WITH BOMBS



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

A BLAZING GERMAN AËROPLANE PLUNGING TO EARTH



*Photograph by Central News Photo Se...*

ALLIED AËROPLANE OFF FOR A RECONNAISSANCE



AN ALLIED AIRDROME

Bird's-eye view of an aviation headquarters close behind the lines, somewhere in France

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

AN AËROPLANE AMBULANCE

The aëroplane ambulance has saved many desperate casualties where a few minutes' time means life or death



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

ITALIAN HYDROAËROPLANE STARTING FOR FLIGHT



*Courtesy of "Flying"*

ONE OF THE 600 HORSEPOWER CAPRONI BOMBING PLANES



*Courtesy of "Flying"*

A CAPRONI TRIPLANE USED FOR BOMBING

perience and folly which had sent so many men to gallant but futile death at the Dardanelles; while in the case of Jutland it was perceived that an engagement—reflecting the highest credit upon British seamanship and ending indecisively only because of the lateness of the hour when the main battle was joined and the poorness of the visibility—had been so presented by the Admiralty that the nation and its allies were at the outset suddenly confronted with an apparent defeat, while the Germans were able to cover a terrible disappointment by false claims finding an apparent confirmation in the first official statements of their enemy.

From the morrow of the defeat of the British at Loos to the opening of the Battle of the Somme, the British nation was passing through one of the least lovely and most depressing periods of democracy. In our own Civil War we had begun the most terrible of all internal struggles with a leader at our hand, one of the great men of all time, who slowly but surely impressed the millions of the nation with his competence; who led a people at first unconscious of his greatness but at the last clearly aware that—however generals blundered, ministers faltered, politicians and editors alike lost hope—a leader, one of themselves, aware of their essential patriotism and loyalty, conscious of their capacity for sacrifice and for steadfastness, directed the administration. The South was not beaten by Grant and Sherman nor conquered by the superior industrial resources of the dominant half of the nation; it was beaten because Abraham Lincoln saw clearly and saw whole the fundamental fact that the country could not be divided, and that the millions of the North and the West would, in the end, stand firmly against disunion and national disintegration. His faith in the nation, his works based on that faith, saved his country.

In its hour of deadly peril Britain had no Lincoln; the very character of parliamentary institutions and the tendencies of recent ministries led directly away from the leadership which democracy demands in war and eschews at all other times. The result was a chaos and a confusion which revealed themselves in contradictions alike of policy and of public statement. The industrial struggles which preceded the war did not end

with its outbreak. War is like disease, it inexorably attacks the weakest portion of the political as well as the physical frame. Ireland was an old infirmity and the onset of the terrible plague of the war instantly assailed the weakened organ. British labour was engaged in a struggle of almost unprecedented bitterness when Germany set out for Paris, and labour remained conscious of the older grievance in the most critical hour of national peril, nor can one fix upon labour a reproach which was deserved equally by its opponent in the industrial struggle of the preceding decade.

### II. THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENTS

To understand the progress of events it is necessary from time to time to arrive at some appreciation of the conditions of the peoples at war, and the condition of the British people at the outset of 1916 is deserving of utmost attention. Magnificent as had been and was the effort of France, it was plain from the outset that France could not, alone, defeat Germany or even with the aid of Russia reach a decisive victory. In the spring of 1916 the war waited upon Britain as, two years later, with Russia gone, it was to wait upon the United States.

And in Britain there was still only a vague perception of the magnitude of the conflict and the reality of the British peril. In a very real sense the German attack upon Verdun at last brought home to London the fact that the war might be lost. It is impossible even now to present accurately the extent of popular misapprehension which existed in Britain as to the main facts of the war. The statesmen had first misled their people in the years before the coming of the struggle by the oft-repeated assertion that all war was unthinkable, and war with Germany totally outside the reckoning.

Surprised, themselves, by the arrival of the war; surprised in circumstances which deprived them temporarily of their nerve and almost led them into the fatal blunder of abandoning France; the statesmen who still controlled British policy never recovered from the original surprise. Having permitted the people to believe that war was impossible, they fell into the far more serious error of long concealing from the people,

alike by their public statements and through their control of the press, the true gravity of the situation. While Germany was erecting a Mitteleuropa from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and sweeping victoriously from the Carpathians to the Pinsk Marshes, British leaders and British journals continued to propagate the legend that Germany was already beaten and approaching that disintegration which was to result from internal revolution and external disaster.

As a consequence the British people had to find out for themselves, and in the depths of agony and suffering, what the World War was. The Colonies, far more alive to the situation than the Mother Country, sent their sons to Flanders and to Gallipoli; and there they perished—as a consequence of mistakes, which were themselves beyond defence and calculated to destroy the confidence of the most loyal. And in the spring of 1916 the Canadians and the Australians saw with a clearness still lacking in Britain, and spoke with a bitterness which not until after Kut, was to appear in London.

It was not that Britain was unwilling to make the sacrifice necessary to win the war. On the contrary, the response of the British nation to the call for volunteers is the finest page in all the history of democracies. It was not that the army was unwilling to bear the burden of the terrible casualties which were imposed upon it in some measure by the mistakes of statesmen and soldiers alike. All that was best in Britain was in khaki or in the pathetic graves which stretch from Anzac Cove to the ever-glorious and ever-saddening marshes about Ypres.

In the spring of 1916 Britain was a nation of men and women—themselves ready to bear anything, to do anything—but a nation which craved leadership, demanded action, was ready to face the grimmest of realities, but was still ruled by men afraid to tell the people the truth; afraid to order conscription, which could only affect a few hundred thousands, after the millions had volunteered; afraid to deal in the awful truths which confronted them and confronted the world, because they lacked confidence in the masses, who were themselves worthy of all confidence.

France with an open frontier and a thousand years of history saw the

facts unmistakably on August 1, 1914. No illusion then or thereafter hid from the millions of French men and women the solid fact that the nation was engaged in a life-and-death struggle and that one of the only two possible outcomes of the conflict would be the destruction of France as a nation and as one of the great people of the world. France saw things as they were, and the completeness of this understanding of the facts explains, in no small degree, the character of French resistance at the Marne in 1914, at Verdun in the long and terrible months of 1916.

### III. THE GREAT AWAKENING

It was only after the Irish rising, the surrender of Kut, and the first terrible belief that a naval battle of vital importance had been lost off Jutland, that the truth came home to the masses of the British Isles. It was only then that it was appreciated how disastrous had been the mistakes, flowing from a lack of central or intelligent direction alike of war policies and of war preparations. The British nation had looked forward to the campaign of 1916 as bound to see the decisive defeat of Germany and the advance of victorious Allied armies to the Rhine, but in February it suddenly beheld German armies rushing forward upon Verdun—beheld France compelled to meet the storm alone for many months, because British armies were still unready.

Not less appalling was the disaster of Kut to that portion of the British public which thought in terms of empire and knew instantly what would be the consequences for British prestige in the East when every bazaar from Bagdad to Bokhara rang with the stories of the Turkish triumph at Gallipoli and the captures of British forces—of an entire British army—at Kut. Egypt, India, the remotest and the most considerable of the non-self-governing colonies, were bound to be impressed by the progress of events; the whole of Asia, with all its immeasurable problems and mysteries, was bound to be stirred—with conquences impossible to measure—if, as at last seemed to be the case, British prestige was become a byword in the market place.

Finally it was with a fury essentially British that the news of the Dublin tragi-comedy—the absurd, ghastly Irish Revolution—was

received from one end of Britain to the other. Not alone in Mesopotamia and at the Dardanelles, in the Near East and on the frontiers of the Far East; not merely on the battlefields of Artois and Flanders was British safety threatened by defeats and disasters; but within the British Isles themselves there had been a rising. A hand was stretched out to the German by those who represented themselves the leaders of the Young Ireland and spoke in the voice which was the voice of the oldest Ireland—that Ireland which, when France was the foe, gave its sons and its heart to France and now offered, or seemed to offer, itself to Germany.

In France, in the spring of 1916, one had the impression of a people dealing, with courage, competence, and complete comprehension, with the most terrible fact in the history of the race. One felt that the people—the generals, the soldiers, and the civilians—had taken a firm grip upon the realities of their world. In France men talked about the strength of Germany at the moment when the readers of the British press, itself controlled by the British censor, were bound to conclude that Germany was starving to death, bankrupt, her people almost at the point of rising in rebellion to expel their Kaiser and adopt that British form of democracy which was revealing itself at the same hour in such unlovely disarray. British defeats were still disguised as British victories, or British heroism—undoubted and beyond praise—emphasized to disguise the fact that the heroism had but resulted in a hopeless slaughter, where men had been thrown against guns, unsupported by artillery (which itself lacked the right kind of ammunition).

The consequences were to be revealed in subsequent events. The fact stands forth, compelling attention. In the first two years of the war the British people lost confidence in their statesmen just as, in the first two years of our own Civil War, we of the North learned to have faith in Abraham Lincoln and in that faith found our ultimate national salvation. Clemenceau in France once swept away a ministry with the lapidary characterization of its head, "He has spoken, he speaks, he will speak." And while beneath the surface the British nation did organize itself and the manhood of that great people transformed itself, the statesmen continued to talk; and each successive speech disclosed

these statesmen as still unwilling—or unable—to bridge the great chasm between the world as they had described it in their speeches preceding the great conflict and as it now existed at the moment when the Germans were throwing their divisions of élite against the devoted but outnumbered and stricken French soldiers on the slopes of Dead Man's Hill and the Vaux Plateau. In England, then, there was the sense of little men, of eternal talk, of words which disguised the truth; the words of men who, when Germany was actually on the march, could see no foe in sight, although the foe was visible not alone from the watch towers but from the streets themselves. But the supreme tragedy lay in the fact that in the hour of grimmest crisis, the people saw their leaders thus, and the perception left them at last awake, but appalled by the revelation.

No people of any race or time did more splendid things than did British men and women in the opening months of the World War. No army ever died as the army of Sir John French—the regular army of Britain—died at First Ypres. The British fleet had taken Germany by the throat when it moved to its battle station on August 3, and that grip, never shaken in the following four years, remained a priceless contribution to the cause of the nations allied against Germany. It was, with the French army, the foundation on which victory was built.

On the material side the British contribution was not to be measured in money, because without it the war had been lost from the outset. Americans, looking back upon our own Civil War, could recall much that was identical with conditions in the bitter days of our own agony and our own disillusionment. Democracy in times of stress reveals the fact that, for the liberty it affords, there is paid a price in inefficiency which must be measured in the best and noblest of a race. Yet the difference was capital; we in America found a man in 1861 as we had found a man in 1776, but in an hour of equal gravity England did not find a man. Conscious of her mighty potentialities, conscious of the plenitude of the spirit of sacrifice, England longed for a Cromwell and found an Asquith.

The period of depression passed, when at last the guns at the Somme

sounded the relief of Verdun; it did not completely return when the terrible slaughter of the Somme resulted not in the expulsion of the German from France but in the gain of some sterile miles of shell-torn Picardy soil. But it was a natural consequence of the mood of the spring that, in the winter, Britain threw herself unconditionally into the hands of Lloyd George; it was a consequence of the convictions stirred by the first two years of the conflict that the Kaiser's peace proposal of 1916 found at least a momentary hearing in Britain—that the terrible disappointments of the campaign of 1917 produced in Britain, as in all the nations allied against Germany, a temporary wavering before the terrible road that had still to be traversed, if victory—decisive victory—was to be attained; even more, roused a passing suspicion that victory of a decisive character could not be won, but that a defeat of incalculable extent might be suffered.

Only the historian of the future who shall deal with events wholly completed, and with results at last established, will be competent to analyze and discuss the true meaning of the domestic events in Britain, in France—or, for that matter, in Germany—during the great struggle. Yet even in a fugitive narrative of events, still recent, it is necessary to set down the facts as contemporaneously revealed. Britain entered upon the World War at a moment when the whole British people was immersed in an historic conflict, certain to modify if not to revolutionize the whole character of British institutions.

In the social fabric there were grave weaknesses and serious evils. To remedy these, British statesmanship was labouring with little thought as to events beyond the narrow seas which were held to be the sure bulwarks to Britain. Between classes within the nation there was a bitter division of feeling which was revealing itself in political struggles of unprecedented acrimony. All of these struggles could not be abandoned in a moment, nor could those engaged in them at once perceive that all for which they contended was lost if Germany should win the war.

Every Frenchman could perceive that German victory meant French ruin; he saw the enemy through the open frontier; and within six weeks of the outbreak of the war Paris heard the guns of a German

army. Yet even in invaded France the extreme champions of social revolution could not permanently forget their cherished dreams of Utopian regeneration despite the fact that German shells were falling upon Rheims Cathedral and French women and children were the victims of brutal and beastly German oppression. It is not strange, therefore, that British labour still clung to the strike as a weapon against a traditional enemy, although the strike itself deprived their fellow countrymen of means of self-defence in the fields of Flanders, nor that capital invited the strike by adherence to what it still held to be its inalienable rights.

Only in Germany was there unity, a subordination of all domestic differences to the common faith in the opportunity for foreign aggression. Britons could not surrender their insular habits, British and French leaders and masses could not forget wholly their Utopian or their political schemes of the ante-bellum period. The result was the revelation of the Allied world in disarray from April, 1916, to March, 1918.

### IV. THE IRISH REBELLION

The Irish Rebellion of Easter Monday, 1916, is at once a tragic and a ridiculous detail in the history of the World War—tragic in its consequences and circumstances, ridiculous in its size and comparative insignificance. Actually, it has no other relation to the war than the fact that it disclosed a condition which did infinite harm to the British cause in the eyes of the neutral world during a period of two years preceding the entrance of America into the conflict, while on the material side it claimed and retained the energies of a number of British divisions at all times necessary on the western front.

The causes of the Rebellion are to be sought not in any single episode of recent times but in the whole bewildering complex of Anglo-Irish relations from the Conquest onward. In three centuries British armies and British navies had circled the globe and laid the foundations of mighty colonies. Conquest had been followed by conciliation; in South Africa at the very outset of the present struggle a new example of

British success was revealed when Botha, who had led the Boers against the British armies less than a decade before, led the Boers against Britain's enemies in German Southwest Africa.

But what has been possible for Englishmen elsewhere on the planet has been beyond their resources at their own door. From Oliver Cromwell to David Lloyd George, sovereigns and statesmen alike have wrestled with the Irish problem and wrestled in vain. England having wronged Ireland in past centuries, noble-minded and generous Englishmen had sought in recent decades to repair the injuries, and Ireland had enjoyed in the years immediately preceding the war a return of prosperity—thanks to beneficent and far-reaching reforms. Nowhere in the British Isles had the land legislation been so just or so generous, and Ireland, at the opening of the Twentieth Century, seemed at last on the point of arresting the stream of emigration which for more than a century had drained the island of the best of its youth.

Unhappily, just and generous legislation did not and could not reach the heart of the Irish people. Through all the years of subjection to a foreign rule Ireland had retained a spirit of her own, a spirit untamed and unconquerable. Between Englishman and Irishman there opened a gulf as wide as that separating the Frenchman of Alsace from the conquering and dominant German. Between the two races there was a barrier of mutual misapprehension, of mutual incapacity to understand the other, hardly to be paralleled in the case of any other races in history. At bottom, the Irishman preserved, with respect of the Englishman, a distrust as profound and as complete as the mind of an intelligent and brilliant race is capable of preserving. And in the presence of that Irish mistrust—suspicion—English effort at reconciliation broke down—not merely in despair but frequently in passionate reprisal. For more than a century Ireland had been faithful to her ancient wrongs, she still remained faithful to them in 1916.

At the moment when the World War broke out, Ireland was on the verge of Civil War. The Asquith Ministry was preparing to carry out the provisions of a new Home Rule system, against which Ulster was in arms and the North of Ireland—led by Sir Edward Carson—was plan-

ning open rebellion, while British officers, whose duty it would be to suppress the insurrection, were resigning their commissions rather than carry out the mandate of the British Government against the North.

With the declaration of war, John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists—who had laboured over a long lifetime to succeed where his old chief, Parnell, had failed, and win for Ireland Home Rule through parliamentary and peaceful methods—made a magnificent gesture. He pledged Ireland, Roman Catholic, Nationalist Ireland unconditionally to the support of the war, which he eloquently described as a war for human liberty. And for the moment Ireland seemed ready to follow Redmond. There was a prompt response of volunteers, the British uniform was tolerated in regions where it had never been before other than a symbol of a thing detested. But the golden moment passed. Instead of applying the Home Rule Act the Asquith Ministry suspended it; Ireland's reward for Redmond's pledge was the postponement of all her hopes and of her just expectations.

The consequences were inevitable. Redmond remained faithful to his pledge until death, hastened by disappointment, came to him; his brother died nobly at the front; but Young Ireland, the new generation, turning its back upon Redmond and that policy of orderly and loyal approach to self-government through parliamentary channels, threw itself into the arms of Sinn Fein, that new movement originally limited to the endeavour to produce an intellectual and spiritual renascence, but now become political and animated by the desire to achieve a complete independence by any possible means.

In Ireland, therefore, treason became rampant. Hands were extended to Germany; German aid was sought as, in remoter times, French aid had been sought. Ireland—Sinn Fein Ireland—armed itself, as Ulster had armed itself in the days preceding the war; and the Government, which had watched the Carson rebellion gathering, now sat still while a new and even more dangerous storm gathered. In all history there could be no more incongruous alliance than that between Irishmen and Germans, yet in the spring of 1916 the extremists of the

Sinn Fein looked to the Kaiser as a champion and saw in Germany the possible liberator.

The charge that the mass of the Irish people shared the Sinn Fein madness before Easter Monday, or even in the days immediately following, was not warranted. It was not until after the rising, with its grim sequence of executions and deportations, that Ireland—roused once more by a new accession to the list of its martyrs—definitively turned its back upon all compromise and conciliation and became a passive but a passionate foe of Britain. Yet in the weeks and months which preceded the outbreak the British lost Ireland. They lost it by a policy as weak as that of Buchanan in the closing days of his administration, when he closed his eyes to the rebellion which was gathering. They lost it by a refusal to apply that Home Rule Act already on the books, which alone could have fortified Redmond and his supporters, who were themselves rapidly losing their hold upon their constituents and upon the confidence of the Irish people.

The story of the actual Rebellion is briefly, all too briefly, told. On April 20, Sir Roger Casement—once a British consular official, who had earned an honourable reputation in foreign service, but was now become a German sympathizer and a German agent in the effort to rouse Ireland against Britain—was landed by a German submarine on the Irish coast. The next day he was arrested by local officials and sent to England to meet a traitor's death. But despite the fate of Casement, the Sinn Feiners of Dublin adhered to their programme, and on Easter Monday seized control of the public buildings and of many quarters of the city, proclaimed the Irish Republic, and began a fight to occupy the remaining quarters of the city and the castle.

The result was inevitable. A few brief days of a warfare of sniping, and the handful of rebels, mostly boys, were crushed on the arrival of British troops and war ships. By May 1, one week after the outbreak, Dublin was in British hands, but smoking ruins and shattered buildings gave to the Irish capital the appearance of Arras or even of Verdun. In the brief period of possession by the rebels, and as a consequence of bombardments, the finest quarters of the city had been

destroyed and its brief glory as the capital of the Irish republic had been fatal.

While Dublin was in arms the rest of Ireland, save in a few isolated districts, remained calm. There was no general insurrection and the local uprising was suppressed too quickly to allow the fire to spread even had there been any possibility of an extension to the south and the west. In the struggle 17 officers and 504 British soldiers had been killed, 800 civilians had been injured, and 180 insurgents and innocent bystanders slain. On the military side the affair was no more costly than a raid between trenches in Flanders, but its consequences were out of all proportion to the extent of the encounter, for in this week and the succeeding days, when fifteen of the leaders of the pathetic and insane affair were shot, the mass of Irish people deliberately gave their sympathy to the rebels, in whose operations they had declined to participate and upon which they had looked with disapproval.

Thenceforth, for the next two years and a half, Ireland was a garrisoned country. The tiny stream of volunteers dried up; the British Government could, in 1918, under the lash of Labour and following the great defeats of March and April, resolve upon conscription for Ireland and order it; but, having ordered it, Lloyd George and his associates did not dare to apply it. As time passed and the struggle with the Germans became more terrific and the prospect of German victory more unmistakable, British resentment at Irish refusal to share in the conflict increased. When the United States entered the war, sent her sons to the European battlefield, and began to bear the blood cost of the war, American sympathy with Ireland—always lively and keen in the first moments of the Rebellion and its tragic aftermath of executions—diminished, disappeared, and gave place to stern reminders that America could not forgive further Irish agitations which weakened British armies in the presence of the common enemy. This, however, was but an accentuation of the tragedy; hopeless and helpless, Ireland now became friendless, since both America and France, ancient friends and sympathizers, alike looked with amazement and then with indignation upon a sullen and self-centred Ireland, who placed her own wrongs

above the dangers to all civilization and, because she hated England, refused to fight Germany.

While the events are still recent it would be useless to endeavour to fix the responsibility for the Irish affair. Indeed, to explain it one must go backward over three centuries of history. What instantly attracted and long held public attention in all free nations was the tragedy of the episode. A people seeking freedom with a passion undiminished by years of disappointment now declined to strike a blow against the greatest enemy of all human liberty. A race which for centuries had deserved the reputation of the most belligerent, which had supplied three nations with its best fighters and some of its most distinguished generals, now declined to share in the greatest of all wars; the most charming and the most brilliant of English-speaking tribes henceforth resolutely turned a sullen and suspicious face toward all overtures and appeals and by this course deprived itself of its natural allies and strengthened the hands of its traditional enemies.

Only in Berlin did the events of Dublin awaken rejoicing. In Irish affairs Germany found an opportunity to denounce alleged British hypocrisy and confute Allied claims to the rôle of champions of small nations and defenders of the rights of self-determination of the weaker races. Thus, in every sense, the Irish Rebellion, insignificant as it was, on the material side was a moral disaster of the first magnitude—a disaster immediately pressing upon the British, eventually weighing upon the Irish themselves. Seeking liberty, the Irish people had made themselves the tools of German tyranny and separated themselves from the sustaining sympathy of all other liberty-loving peoples of the earth.

## V. KUT-EL-AMARA

While the news of the Irish Rebellion was still holding the attention of the whole British Empire there came, on April 29, the brief announcement that the army of General Townshend—long invested in the Mesopotamian town of Kut-el-Amara and equally long forgotten by the British public—had laid down its arms. Once more it was the

moral rather than the military effect which commanded instant attention. A British army had surrendered to a Turkish force; Kut had now become an epilogue of Gallipoli; and as the British public and the British Parliament began to unravel the threads of the Mesopotamian adventure, a new scandal and a new folly were revealed.

The original expedition to Mesopotamia had been a wise and logical step, for the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates—the delta of the stream through which both of the great rivers reach the Persian Gulf—is as much an outpost of India as is Palestine an out work of Egypt. More than that, northeast of Basra are the immense oil fields which were of vital importance to the British navy. Finally, recognizing the German ambition to stretch her domination from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and recalling the advance of the Bagdad Railway, it was essential that neither time nor opportunity be lost to forestall Germany at the mouth of the rivers of Mesopotamia.

Basra was occupied on November 23, 1914, by a small force sent from India. The oil wells were promptly secured, and until such time as a real expedition could be organized and British military resources made adequate to bear the additional strain, this was all that was needful to do. But once more the policy of adventure—which had lain behind the dash to Antwerp, the gamble at Gallipoli—reasserted itself. A nation which in its recent history had made the memorable campaign to Khartum, a campaign in which every element of chance was eliminated and nothing was done until everything was prepared—a nation which had the conqueror of the Sudan in charge of its whole military establishment—now permitted politicians to prevail, while soldiers remained silent or spoke their doubts hesitatingly. The result was a steady expansion of the Mesopotamian horizon with no commensurate expansion of the resources of the army engaged.

As Constantinople beckoned the dreamers, Bagdad held out an irresistible temptation to those who could see clearly the mighty results which success in Mesopotamia might bring, but blindly or obstinately refused to recognize how impossible of attainment was the success desired; indeed, the very failure at the Golden Horn added a new incen-

tive to undertake another gamble in the hope that victory at Bagdad might balance defeat at Constantinople. As a consequence, the insignificant force in Mesopotamia was steadily pushed northward. By October it was far on the road to Bagdad, marching into a hostile country, with only the river as a line of transport for supplies, with only a scant division available with which to conquer a region to which the Turks were able to draw unlimited numbers.

Still the advance went forward until, on November 21, Townshend encountered the Turks on ground of their own choosing at Ctesiphon, barely twenty miles from Bagdad itself. Attacking, the British made a gallant fight for it, but numbers overbore them; of their 15,000 they lost not less than a third in the battle, and after the battle there was nothing for it but to retreat. This retreat carried them back to Kut-el-Amara by December 3, and two days later they were besieged in their lines about this town.

From December to April there is written a new story like that of Gordon at Khartum. There is the same frantic effort, made by the tardily awakened officials, to save the beleaguered army. New reinforcements are hastily sent from India, even from Europe. By January a relieving force has arrived within sixteen miles of Kut; it will advance over half the remaining distance in the next two months. But the effort is in vain; the Turks are too numerous, too well-posted, too ably commanded. The weather is unfavourable and the river rises at the critical moment. So finally, on April 29, Townshend lays down his arms, the Bagdad gamble, like the dash for Constantinople, ends in a disastrous reverse.

The Kut surrender was followed within a relatively brief time by the brilliant and victorious advance of Maude to Bagdad and beyond; British prestige was restored and enhanced when Jerusalem and Bagdad alike were occupied. In the larger sense Kut was but an episode; it came, however, at a moment which gave grim value to its lessons; it represented a useless waste of brave men and valuable material; it had no justification at the time and found no defenders subsequently. A parliamentary investigation presently revealed conditions unhappily

recalling the worst chapters in the history of our invasion of Cuba with an unprepared and inadequately supplied army.

And in comprehending the mood of Britain in May, 1916, it is necessary to recall the various landmarks of a year: Festubert, with its consequent shell scandal; Loos, with its bloody shambles; Gallipoli, with its story of impossible exertion and inevitable failure; and, last of all, Ireland and Kut coming at the moment when Verdun was revealing the true state of Allied fortunes and the real magnitude of the German peril. The policy of the British Government had been summed up by the Prime Minister as a policy of "Wait and see." The British public had waited, they were seeing, and in the revelations of April and May was written the political doom of Mr. Asquith and his immediate associates, who still in the main ruled in the councils of state, despite the substitution of a coalition for a party Cabinet.

# SEA FIGHTING



ADMIRAL BEATTY'S BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON

was here engaging the entire German High Seas Fleet. Some of the ships are seen firing at the enemy, beyond them to the right and not visible in the photograph. The great columns of water are caused by German shells falling amid the British ships. Sir David Beatty said of this phase of the battle: "At 3:30 P. M. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E. S. E., slightly converging on the enemy. . . . At 3:48 P. M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously"

*From "Illustrated London News," courtesy British Bureau of Information*

THESE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN FROM THE DECK OF A BRITISH WAR-SHIP DURING THE FIERCEST FIGHTING IN THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND




*From "Illustrated London News," courtesy British Bureau of Information*

A TURNING MOVEMENT BY THREE BRITISH BATTLE-CRUISERS AND THEIR SCREEN OF DESTROYERS

This drawing was made from data supplied by Petty Officer W. Griffin, Coxswain of H. M. S. *Shark*, a British destroyer which met an heroic end during the battle. Coxswain Griffin was rescued and brought to Hull

*From "Illustrated London News" [illegible] British Bureau of Information*

BRITISH BATTLE-CRUISERS ENCOUNTERING THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET OFF JUTLAND

For the moment the British ships were holding their fire. The misty weather and low visibility across the smooth sea were unfavorable for long-range shooting. To the left are the leading ships of the German High Seas Fleet



© *Western Newspaper Union*

THE SINKING OF THE GERMAN LIGHT CRUISER "NÜRNBERG" OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

This drawing, which appeared in a German illustrated paper, is supposed to represent the incident at the moment when the *Nürnberg*, summoned to surrender by the English flagship, replied, "German warships never surrender"



*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

A NEUTRAL SHIP IN FLAMES IN MID-OCEAN

A German submarine commander showed the customary respect for the property and lives of unoffending neutrals by setting this neutral ship afire



*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

THE BRITISH SHIP "GLOUCESTER CASTLE" SINKING AFTER BEING TORPEDOED BY A GERMAN SUBMARINE

As in a number of similar cases, this vessel, laden with helpless wounded, was sunk without warning

© Western Newspaper Union

WHITE MICE PROTECTING A SUBMARINE

White mice are not noted for their bravery, but they help save the lives of the brave men who man the British submarines. They are the first to smell the fumes of the dreaded "petrol" and give warning by their squeals



*Photograph from Central News Photo Service*

AN ANXIOUS MOMENT ON A BRITISH SUBMARINE

The commander is watching through the periscope for the approach of a momentarily expected enemy ship

© London "Daily Mail"

THE LAST OF A GERMAN CRUISER

The final plunge, stern first, of a German light cruiser sunk by a British salvo in the Battle of Jutland. In the background may be seen British destroyers steaming at full speed after the fleeing German fleet. Some of the British ships exceeded their supposed maximun speed in this battle

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A GERMAN SUBMARINE SURRENDERING TO THE AMERICAN SHIP "FANNING"

The submarine was sometimes caught napping, as was this one. These men were eager to save their lives by surrendering to a chivalrous foe

# CHAPTER SIX

# THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

## I

## "THE DAY" AT LAST

On May 31 there took place in the North Sea and opposite the Danish mainland the first encounter between the British and German battle fleets and the greatest conflict in all marine history. "The Day" which the Kaiser and the German naval officers had toasted and dreamed of, the moment to which the British navy had looked forward for almost two years, became a reality in the Battle of Jutland.

The circumstances of the encounter are simply told. On the preceding day Sir John Jellicoe had put to sea with the British battle fleet and had made a sweep through the North Sea in a broad circle, his armada divided into two fleets; that of the battle cruisers, with certain supporting units, under Sir David Beatty, had turned south and made a round of the broad gulf which is bounded on the east by Denmark and on the south by the flat German coast lying behind Heligoland. Jellicoe had remained to the north and was, in mid-afternoon of May 31, not far from the Norwegian coast at its southernmost point.

The next day Admiral Von Scheer with the German battle fleet had left his base and started northward. He, too, had divided his fleet and sent before him a battle-cruiser squadron under Admiral Von Hipper. As far as Jellicoe was concerned the mission of his fleet was obvious, it was one of the familiar excursions of the British battle fleet, intended to give the fleet a regular airing and to repeat the familiar invitation to the Germans to come out and fight. It was the visible demonstration of naval supremacy, expressed in the proud progress of the greatest fleet in human history through seas which had once borne the name of the German Ocean. As to Scheer's mission, it was—and remains—unknown. It may have been one more of the relatively few and fugitive

ventures of the German fleet, seeking to get its high seas exercise, without any wish or expectation of battle; it may have been a major detail in some larger scheme to break the British blockade and permit fast cruisers to slip through the breach and repeat the exploits of the *Emden* in making war upon merchant ships.

But whatever the mission of Scheer, it is certain that he, like Jellicoe, was engaged in an operation which did not have in its immediate vision a Trafalgar. Scheer had not left his base to challenge British sea supremacy and Jellicoe had not set sail with the purpose or expectation of meeting Scheer. Every circumstance in the engagement indicates that it was a chance encounter on both sides.

The actual meeting took place shortly before three o'clock in the afternoon, when Beatty, his sweep through the North Sea completed, had already swung round and was headed north to rejoin Jellicoe's flag. At this moment one of his light cruisers, *Galatea*, sighted the smoke of Hipper's squadron and a little later a seaplane, sent up from *Engadine*—once the *Campania* of transatlantic memories—reported the proximity of Hipper with five battle cruisers.

What followed was a threefold operation: First, Hipper swinging round immediately on the discovery of Beatty, whose force was overwhelming, sought to draw Beatty after him and back upon the main German battle fleet, which, as he well knew, was coming up behind him. Beatty, on his part, whatever he may have suspected, was ignorant of the fact that Scheer was at hand and was naturally bound to seek to destroy the squadron now within his grasp. We have then the flight of Hipper and the pursuit of Beatty, which constitutes the first phase, lasting from about 3:30 to 5 P. M.

But at five o'clock Beatty suddenly finds himself in the presence of Scheer's battle fleet. He is now hopelessly outnumbered and has no choice but to get away. His purpose becomes what had been the earlier purpose of Hipper. Now it is the British admiral who is seeking to draw the whole German battle fleet—Scheer and Hipper, too—after him and back upon Jellicoe, who has long ago been warned by wireless of the fact that Beatty was engaged, and has been driving

toward the scene with full speed. Hitherto, however, Jellicoe has lost rather than gained distance, because Beatty, in going south after Hipper, has pushed ahead at full speed and thus travelled much faster than Jellicoe's battleships could move, although these were now exceeding their trial-trip records.

The second phase lasts from five o'clock until just before seven, when Scheer and Hipper, in pursuit of Beatty, suddenly run into the British battle fleet, at last come up, and promptly turn and make a desperate effort to escape from an unequal conflict. This flight is the third phase, and in it the battle fleets of the two rivals are at last engaged, but only momentarily.

### II. THE FIGHT

On the scientific side the circumstances of this Battle of Jutland must remain of absorbing interest for all technical and naval men; on the tactical side it has already given rise to controversies without end and without hope of solution. On the practical side both nations claimed a victory and neither could, in the immediate limits of the engagement, support its claim save by a complete reliance upon its own official statements and a complete denial of the similar statements of the enemy.

Yet certain things are at once clear. First of all, we have to deal, not with a Salamis or a Trafalgar, but with a locally indecisive engagement—three indecisive engagements, more accurately—in each of which one of the contesting parties was actually in flight from the other; outnumbered and aiming at escape—not at the immediate destruction of the enemy. Hipper ran away from Beatty; Beatty ran away from Scheer when the German commander had joined his lieutenant bringing up the battle fleet; Scheer fled from Jellicoe when the British commander had arrived on the scene.

In each case the fugitive escaped not alone destruction but fatal injury. The German battle fleet was not destroyed, however it may have been crippled. Neither Beatty nor Jellicoe suffered losses which in the smallest degree crippled their battle and cruiser fleets. The losses of the British were heavy, but frankly conceded. How heavy the

German losses were remains to be established after the close of the war, but even on the face of the German admissions, first and last, they were sufficiently considerable to constitute at least as great a proportionate loss, given the relative strength of the two navies.

In the end the German fleet was able to escape by reason of the lateness of the hour when the main battle was joined and the extreme shortness of the vision—the famous "low visibility" of the official reports. The morning of May 31 had been clear, but the afternoon had brought with it mists and pockets of fog. In the third and last phase of the battle Jellicoe had interposed between the Germans and their bases with his overwhelmingly superior armada, and, had he been able to reap the profits of his superior numbers and advantageous position, it is hardly open to question that the result would have been something approximating another Trafalgar.

But low visibility and night robbed Jellicoe of his prize. The German fleet escaped, disappeared in the mists and the shadows of the night, and were not to be found when morning came. Save for a Zeppelin, which sailed over the British fleet and attracted a brief fusillade, no German ship on sea or in the air was to be found on June 1 and in due course of time Jellicoe sailed away to his base in Scotland, put his injured ships under repairs, and was, in a few days, quite ready to resume his customary watch of the North Sea, his strategy and his methods totally unaffected by the recent battle and his fleet retaining that immense and indisputable superiority which it had possessed from the very outset.

And here, in a narrow compass, is the story of the Battle of Jutland, a story complete when the statement of the losses of the two contestants is added. The British losses were immediately announced, and no question has ever been raised, save in obviously ridiculous German claims, as to the accuracy of the British report. As to the German statement, on the contrary, in its first form it was absolutely false, as a German official confession later admitted, asserting that the falsification was for "strategic reasons." As amended it was still far below the estimates of the British officers, who participated in the contest, but understate-

ment as it may have been, it disclosed nothing to warrant the German assertion that there had been a German victory, or any material inroad on comparative British and German numbers.

The losses as stated by the two official statements were as follows:—

BRITISH LOSSES

| | TONS | | OFFICERS AND MEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Queen Mary* | 27,000 | Battle Cruiser | 1,000 |
| *Indefatigable* | 18,750 | " " | 790 |
| *Invincible* | 17,250 | " " | 780 |
| *Defence* | 14,600 | Armoured " | 850 |
| *Black Prince* | 13,550 | " " | 750 |
| *Warrior* | 13,550 | " " | 750 |
| *Tipperary* | 1,430 | Destroyer | 160 |
| *Ardent* | 935 | " | 100 |
| *Fortune* | 935 | " | 100 |
| *Shark* | 935 | " | 100 |
| *Sparrowhawk* | 935 | " | 100 |
| *Nestor* | 1,000 | " | 100 |
| *Nomad* | 1,000 | " | 100 |
| *Turbulent* | 1,430 | " | ..... |
| | 113,300 | | 5,680 |

GERMAN LOSSES

| | TONS | | OFFICERS AND MEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Lützow* | 28,000 | Battle Cruiser | 1,150 |
| *Pommern* | 13,040 | Battleship | 736 |
| *Wiesbaden* | 3,450 | Light Cruiser | ... |
| *Frauenlob* | 2,657 | " " | 281 |
| *Elbing* | 3,450 | " " | ... |
| *Rostock* | 4,820 | " " | 373 |
| Five Destroyers | 5,303 | | .... |
| | 60,720 | | 2,540 |

The total casualties officially acknowledged by the British were 6,106; by the Germans, 2,414.

It remains to be said that the official estimate by Sir John Jellicoe of German losses was two dreadnoughts, one *Deutschland*, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, six torpedo-boat destroyers, and one submarine; in all 119,200 tons, or 6,000 tons more than the British loss, with a correspondingly larger loss in personnel.

Laying aside all technical discussions, it may be remarked that the loss of the three British battle cruisers, including *Queen Mary*, was due to a structural defect promptly recognized and as swiftly remedied. Neither the torpedo boats nor the submarines justified expectations as weapons of offence directed at the capital ships. It was the common testimony of the British officers engaged that the German gunnery was exceedingly good in the opening stages and equally bad as the engagement progressed.

Such criticisms of the tactical aspects of the engagement as have come, largely from American naval authorities, are comprehended in the somewhat conjectural assertion that since Jellicoe at the close of the engagement lay between the Germans and their bases and the hours of darkness in the northern latitudes were so short, the ultimate escape of Scheer is incomprehensible. Aside from this there is a common agreement that the battle developed nothing new or of real importance; that it was fought in accordance with the conventional ideas of the past and left naval tactics about where it found them, save as it greatly depreciated the valuation hitherto placed upon the submarine as a weapon against the larger ships, for it was a matter of official knowledge that the Germans had their submarines out and they accomplished nothing of importance, despite several favourable opportunities.

### III. THE RESULT

When the British battle fleet left the scene of the conflict and returned to its base it came home conscious and confident that it had won a great victory. Arrived at home it found the nation in the throes of something not far from a panic arising from the belief that a great naval battle, *the* great naval battle, had been lost. More than this, in neutral countries there was heard the whisper of Ægospotami, of a Modern Athens at last the victim of a new Lysander. Far and wide all over the world went forth the impression that Britain had lost the greatest naval battle in human history.

The cause of this amazing report was to be found in the stupidity of the British Admiralty. The first news of the battle that the world

had presented to it, without explanation or adequate comment by the British Admiralty, was the mournful catalogue of the British ships lost. Thus announced the conflict had the appearance of a disaster, and this appearance was intensified when the Kaiser, seizing the opportunity thus offered, congratulated Scheer and his subordinates upon a victory which had at last broken British sea power. Had Nelson survived Trafalgar, he could not have deserved more sweeping praise than was now showered upon the German admiral.

And to some extent this belief in a German victory long survived, as a consequence of the blunder of the Admiralty. Yet what were the facts? The measure of the victory, if victory there had been for the Germans, was necessarily to be sought in the progress of subsequent events. There the answer was simple. On the morrow of the battle the German ships sought their refuge and presently, through neutral channels, there began to come reports of the true extent of the injuries to German ships. A cordon of silence and of mystery was drawn about these ships, but week followed week and months came and went without any new revelation of German sea-power; the "victorious" fleet continued to hide behind its land defence for more than two years, while the fleet the Kaiser described as "defeated" resumed its regular sweeps through the North Sea. On June 1 and thenceforth the situation was exactly what it had been on May 30; nothing was in the smallest degree changed.

Here was the final answer to the claim that Jutland had been a German victory. Only one result could have warranted the Kaiser claiming victory, and that was the infliction of sufficient injury upon the British fleet to destroy the existing superiority of the foe. Unless this could be done any effort was a failure, and the Battle of Jutland was a patent failure because afterward, as before, British sea supremacy remained unquestioned, revealed in ever-increasing efficiency as weeks and months went on.

After Jutland there was a gradual disappearance of the demands by one school of naval thinkers that, to use Winston Churchill's vigorous phrase, the fleet should "dig the rats out." More and more clearly

it was perceived that Britain had won the war on the seas when the battle fleet moved to its station on August 3. Then it had taken Germany by the throat; thereafter—slowly, surely, more completely than Britain had throttled French commerce in the days of Napoleon—she tightened the noose about Germany. It was not the destruction of the German fleet, but the mastery of it, proven by its very stagnation, and the paralysis of it, which constituted the true naval victory of the war.

Seen in its later perspective, Jutland was an incident; it changed nothing, it modified nothing. It was an accidental encounter, brought on by Beatty, who naturally desired to force an engagement, particularly while he had the advantage of numbers; followed up by Scheer when he, in turn, possessed the advantage; broken off by the German when he met the main British battle fleet. We may now accept without qualification the conviction of the British commander that, but for low visibility and darkness, Jutland might have been a Trafalgar. But even had there been a Trafalgar it would not have changed the situation, for all the consequences of Trafalgar would continue to be seen in the later time, while Jutland would soon be forgotten.

The discovery at the close of the war that Germany had sunk one ship or three ships more than her enemy—that the loss to British tonnage was twice as great as to Germany, as the German official figures would indicate—would be of as little consequence as the assertion, equally familiar, that in the Battle of the Marne the French losses exceeded the German. The proof that France had won the Marne was found not in official reports of either contestant, not in the lyric celebrations by the Kaiser's press agents of the German strategic retreat or equally eloquent Allied descriptions of French and British advance. The solid fact was that the Germans had set out to destroy the military power of France and that after the battle was over, the military power of France endured and continued to endure.

We may leave it to the future to disclose the accuracy or exaggeration of the claims of Jellicoe and his subordinates as to the injury done to the German battle fleet at Jutland. But no such postponement is required to demonstrate that the Kaiser's fantastic declarations immedi-

ately following the battle were without basis in fact. If Jutland was only a drawn battle which left both navies as they were before, it was, even then, in a clearly perceptible measure a German defeat, because the purpose of any attack, of any battle joined by the Germans, must have been to reduce if not to abolish the disparity between the two fleets.

Scheer failed and was celebrated; Jellicoe succeeded and was criticized—did, in fact, in a relatively brief period, give way to Beatty; but if the legend of a German victory continued to survive for a long period and with the less thoughtful, there presently came a clearer and saner view as weeks and months passed and it was perceived that what Germany claimed to have been a victory, breaking the grip which Britain had maintained upon sea supremacy since Trafalgar, had left Jellicoe's fleet in unchallenged control of the exits of the North Sea and had not in a single particular lessened the severity of the blockade, which was more and more closely sealing every sea entrance to the Fatherland.

To compare a great battle with a small one, when the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor* met in our own Civil War, a victory by the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads would probably have meant the destruction of our blockade and, conceivably, the loss of the war for the North. But when the *Merrimac* put back to Norfolk, crippled, there to remain until she was blown up, the danger was abolished. In a sense, the fight between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* was a drawn battle, far different from the outcome of the struggle between the *Kearsarge* and the *Alabama*, for example. Neither ship was sunk, both sustained crippling injuries, but the only real significance of the contest for the future, so far as the Civil War was concerned, lay in the fact that the most considerable challenge to the supremacy of the North on water had ended without in the smallest degree impairing that supremacy.

So it was in the case of Jutland, the Germans had had their "Day"; and when that day had ended in fog and mist, their fleet had made good its escape, having inflicted heavy losses and having received rude blows. Ships and men had fought well, as British seamen had come to expect German ships and men to fight, but if Jellicoe had failed to de-

stroy Scheer, as Sturdee had annihilated Spee at the Falklands, Scheer had accomplished nothing save his own escape. Jellicoe occupied the field of battle, which was in the larger sense the whole North Sea; he dominated it and his successor continued to dominate it without challenge, until that day more than two years after Jutland when the German fleet again left its base, and sailed for the British coast, there to strike its flag and intern, thus completing the greatest capitulation in naval history.

A little man may strike a big man a sudden blow which gets home and hurts, but if the little man runs away after the blow is delivered, locks himself up in his own home and stays there, he may congratulate himself upon his success in landing his blow but he can hardly claim the mastery of the field from which he has just fled. Nor can he claim a victory, since the big man remains his master. In the case of Jellicoe and Scheer the analogy holds good, it was Jellicoe's fleet which kept the high seas in all the weeks and months of the next two years, and in this fact lies the proof that Jutland was a British victory and a German defeat, a vindication of Britain's claim to sea-supremacy and a failure of that German challenge made by the Kaiser long years before, when he had said: "Our future lies on the sea."

The real challenge to sea power, the real attack upon British marine supremacy, was to come when the submarine warfare was resumed in its more virulent form ten months after Jutland. But this was not a challenge to the battle fleet; it was an attack upon British seaborne commerce, which, had it prevailed, would have rendered the mastery of Jellicoe's battle fleet useless in the larger sense. Britain would have starved, her Allies succumbed to the lack of material and ultimately yielded because British and American reinforcements could not arrive—in 1917 British naval supremacy was challenged—momentarily threatened—but not by the battle fleet.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

## THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—CONDITIONS OF THE CONTEST

### I

### A SUPREME TRAGEDY

In the first four years of the war on the western front, the great Battle of the Somme—the First Battle of the Somme, as it may now be described, since there was a Second, and even a Third, in the campaign of 1918—constitutes the supreme tragedy. It was alike the graveyard of more men and more hopes than any field of fighting, from Switzerland to the sea, up to the end of July, 1918. The flower of a generation of young British manhood was shrivelled under the fiery blasts of that fearful summer; all that was physically and morally best in British manpower, the first full measure of the magnificent answer of the volunteers to the call to arms, made its great and awful sacrifice between July and November in the hills and valleys between Amiens and Bapaume.

For the British, powerfully aided by the French, the Somme was a victory and a victory in which their effort was by far the greater and their sacrifice several times as heavy as that of their allies, who were paying and had paid their generous share at Verdun and in the first two bloody campaigns which had preceded the Verdun struggle. But although the victory later resulted in the first considerable German retirement on the west front, that of the spring of 1917, and more immediately saved Verdun, all the ground and much of the glory were swept away in five terrible days of March, 1918, when those positions which had cost the British five months of desperate and costly effort were recaptured by the Germans swiftly and cheaply and the battle-line pushed to the environs of Amiens and across the Ancre and the Avre, while the scene of a considerable British victory became the field of the most complete British disaster in more than five centuries of cam-

paigning in France and elsewhere on the Continent of Europe. Four months later the ground was retaken by British armies and the victory expanded beyond the Hindenburg line. Thus the sting of defeat was swiftly removed by the glory of one more triumph at the Somme, but even after the final and complete success of 1918, the sacrifice of 1916 remains a grim and hideous memory.

The supreme tragedy of the First Somme is found not in the later events but in the immediate circumstances of the battle. Not all the splendour of the sacrifice, not all the glory of the spirit revealed by the hundreds of thousands of young men from all corners of the British Isles and from all parts of the British Empire, served to disguise the fact that Britain was paying the full and terrible price for her long years of political and international blindness. The best of the race died or were shattered in what was, after all, a training school and the most costly of all training schools, for the population of a country which had neglected to give to its sons proper preparation in days of peace for the test that was to come with the inevitable war.

Between Mons and the Somme Britain had created a mighty army. Five million Britons had responded to the call of the country with a speed and readiness which establish an enduring record of national devotion. Eight divisions of the old Expeditionary Army had been expanded to eighty; in place of the few field pieces and almost non-existent heavy guns there had been created a supply of heavy artillery far surpassing the German resources on the opposing front, while the old scandals of the preceding year—when Sir John French had vainly clamoured for high explosives—had given way to a time when ammunition of the right sort and without limit was available.

Out of every class of her population, drawing from field and factory, from the far colonies and the most congested of her London districts, Britain had fashioned a citizen army as we, in the United States, had fashioned two armies in the days of the Civil War. But like our armies it was an army in which officers and men were lacking in all of those essentials to victory which are the product of years of preparation and training on the intellectual side. The First Battle of the Somme, so

far as it was a battle between the Briton and the German, was a battle between a still unorganized population—driven forward by dauntless courage and an unconquerable spirit of sacrifice—and a machine, commanded and directed by men who for a generation had been studying the method of war and absorbing the lessons of a system bequeathed to them by their predecessors who for a century and a half had been engaged in that industry of war which Napoleon described as the "Chief of Prussian occupations."

In the shock between these two contending forces it was the British who paid the first and most terrible price. Between the shambles of July 1—when more than 50,000 Britons fell (not a few to their own guns) over half the front before the unreached first lines of the German defence—and the November achievement of Beaumont-Hamel, when the British army and its commanders gave first unmistakable evidence of having learned a portion of the great lesson, there stretches a period of tragic sacrifice and incredible waste of the finest in a nation's human resources, which should serve to all who come hereafter as the ultimate demonstration of the cost of unpreparedness and the eternal refutation of all the theories, once so powerfully held alike in Britain and America, that a peaceful nation, strong in its potential resources for war and confident of the determination of its citizens to defend their liberties, can safely await attack before beginning its preparations for defence.

## II. THE PURPOSE

The main purpose of Anglo-French strategy at the Somme was unmistakable from the outset. The blow had long been maturing; it had been the most important circumstance in the main plan of the campaign of the year, which called for a general pressure upon the Central Empires from all sides. But its immediate objective was to relieve Verdun and compel the Germans to abandon an attack which was approaching the last ditch of the defenders. Because of the Verdun situation it was undertaken a number of weeks earlier than had originally been planned, but despite the German effort to hasten British action before preparations were even reasonably complete, Haig continued to get ready for,

*BRITISH FRONT, JULY 1–NOV. 30, 1916*




BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED.

and Joffre to postpone, the date of the attack, believing alike that Verdun would hold and that to strike before the preparation had been adequate would be to invite defeat if not disaster.

Had there been no Verdun blow the Somme stroke might have had far greater immediate effect, for many French troops consumed in the Lorraine furnace would have been available in Picardy. So far Verdun served to accomplish what Von Falkenhayn had hoped to see it accomplish, but this was a restricted fraction of its grandiose major objective. On the other hand, as the presence of large French forces at the Somme proved, Verdun had not bled France white, nor deprived Joffre of sufficient reserves to undertake a great offensive after a tremendous defensive operation.

For the rest, the Somme was a contest in attrition. It was a wasting

of the reserves of both sides. As such the Allies accepted it, confident that, after the Verdun sacrifice, and in the face of Russian attack and Austrian weakness—with later demands for German aid made as a result of Rumanian intervention and Balkan operations—Germany could not indefinitely continue to match division with division against her western foes.

That the Allies hoped to achieve an immediate rupture of the German line, a break through on a wide front followed by a German retirement out of France; that they even expected such a result before the attack of July 1, is likely; but after that date, and at a time when the Allied world was still discussing the approach of a German disaster, it is clear that the Allied High Command had already put away all such hopes and consented to continue a war of positions, with all its burden of casualties, in the belief that attrition might accomplish what forced attack had failed to do, namely, compel the Germans to shorten their lines in France or run the risk Lee had run, with such fatal results, when, in the spring of 1865, he had sought to hold too extended a front with his shrunken army.

As an effort to penetrate the German lines, to break through, the Somme offensive was an immediate failure, despite the success of the French, which, had it been more immediately followed up, might have had far-reaching consequences. Henceforth we see the slow, grim, monotonous advance, preceded by artillery preparation and limited to the attainment of relatively restricted objectives. In a word, the First Battle of the Somme was one more episode in the war of positions, of sieges, carried out upon a front of more than thirty miles, but carried forward at a pace so slow as to abolish all chance of penetrating the vast network of German defences organized in depth and capable of extension, behind, as rapidly as the enemy could break its front works.

In this siege-battle, which lasted for nearly five months, more than three million men fought and the killed, wounded, and captured numbered at least one million. When it was over the British had pushed forward some six or seven miles on a front of a dozen; the French had made a similar gain on a somewhat wider front. The Germans had lost

the high ground which was the foundation of their defence system, and their whole salient in France between the Scarpe and the Aisne was endangered, but their dike had held sufficiently long and well to satisfy German purposes. While still assured of their western defences the Germans had crushed Rumania, beaten down the Russian offensive, and retained and even extended their eastern conquests.

And this was the larger purpose of German strategy. With the failure at Verdun, to snatch a decision in the west and eliminate France before the British were ready, they lost the initiative in France and Belgium, lost it for a period of months, lost it until Ludendorff on March 21, 1918, won his amazing success and returned to the old Somme battlefield a victor. Thus, while the First Somme was a local success for the Allies—a success for their strategy, since it saved Verdun and regained the initiative; a battlefield success, since it resulted in the temporary gain of considerable valuable ground in Picardy—it was not a defeat of material consequence to the Germans. Even as a contest in attrition its results were not important, because the later collapse of Russia enabled Germany to bring her eastern forces to the west and regain numerical superiority.

In all senses, save one, therefore, the First Somme represents a bitter and a brutal disappointment to the Allies. The courage, the devotion, of the young British troops in this terrible ordeal will remain as enduring a page in Anglo-Saxon history as Verdun supplies in the annals of the French race. Nations describe their glory differently: for the French Verdun was an "epic"; for the British, a battle which cost them twice as dearly was a "Show"; but for both peoples the story of the campaign of 1916 is forever memorable. Apart from the human qualities there revealed, however, the Somme represented the substantial failure of the first great Allied offensive—the first effort of Britain, at last organized for war upon the continental scale.

Had Russia held out, the First Somme might have proved a decisive contribution to German defeat in the following year. While Russia remained, its consequences were disclosed in the Hindenburg retreat from the Somme to the Scheldt. But, Russia gone; the campaign of 1917

A BRITISH SHIP AT THE DARDANELLES AS SEEN FROM A BALLOON

The British use specially equipped ships such as this from which balloons may make ascensions for observing the enemy's positions. The ascensions are made from the deck between the bridge and bow

© Western Newspaper Union

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN DESTROYER "S-126" BY THE ENGLISH SUBMARINE "E-9"

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

A SMOKE SCREEN AT SEA

British destroyers have thrown out this smoke screen to protect some troop ships which they are convoying. This was the first picture illustrating this protective operation to be passed by the British censor



A GERMAN SHELL WHICH HIT NOTHING EXCEPT THE OCEAN

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

This bursting German shell, fired from many miles inland, landed harmlessly between this British torpedo-boat and the transport she was convoying

*Courtesy British Bureau of Information, from "The Illustrated London News"*
*Drawing by Maurice Randall, from material supplied by the "Shark's" Officers*

THE "SHARK" FIRING HER LAST TORPEDO IN THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The story of how this British destroyer's commander, Loftus Jones, with one of his legs shot away, took charge personally of the last gun left in commission and kept firing until his ship went under, the waves is one of the epics of the Battle of Jutland.

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

A NEW KIND OF MOTHER AND CHILD

This is *Le Kanguroo*, a French submarine mother ship. She carries her submarine charge between her pontoon sides. This particular submarine mother ship was torpedoed and sunk in the Bay of Funchal, Madeira Islands

*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

IN THIS CASE THE GERMANS DID NOT SUCCEED IN "SINKING WITHOUT A TRACE"

British destroyers are hurrying to the rescue of the surviving victims of this submarine atrocity



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

AN ITALIAN MINE-LAYER DROPPING MINES WHILE UNDER FULL HEADWAY

The Italian Navy is noted for its efficiency in everything to do with torpedoes, submarines, and mines. The mines are ranged along the sides of the vessel ready to be dropped overboard at carefully charted points




© Western Newspaper Union

A FLOATING MINE

The internal mechanism of this dreaded modern instrument of destruction

a failure, as an immediate consequence; the return of the Germans to Bapaume and Péronne; their arrival in Albert and Montdidier, held by the Allies from 1914 onward, changed the whole perspective of the world as to the struggle of 1916 and added new sadness to the story of the sacrifice of the untold thousands of British soldiers who had died in all the shell-torn and wasted regions between the Somme and the Ancre on either side of the Albert-Bapaume road, along which they had marched to victory and to death and near which they later slept for many months within the lines of a foe who had retaken the positions for which they had paid so high a price in the summer of 1916.

### III. THE NOYON SALIENT

In its local aspect the Anglo-French offensive which precipitated the First Battle of the Somme was an effort to reduce the famous Noyon salient and to reduce it by an attack—not at its apex, south of Noyon, where the German line was but fifty miles from Paris, but by an attack upon one side of this salient, not far from the point where it rejoined the straight line of the general German front between Arras and the still more famous Ypres salient to the north in Belgium.

This Noyon salient was the creation of the fighting of the weeks immediately following the German retreat from the Marne. Von Kluck and Von Bülow had retreated from the Marne to the heights north of the Aisne between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac and the high ground north of Rheims, on which stood the old, dismantled forts anciently constructed to defend the cathedral city. While the German High Command was still attempting to return to the offensive east of the Oise and toward the Marne, Joffre had opened his turning movement west of the Oise, the Germans had been compelled to conform to French strategy, and the line had mounted steadily from the Oise below to the sea at Nieuport, eastward of Rheims, Arras, and Ypres, and westward of Lille, Cambrai, and St. Quentin.

The front from the Oise to the sea was thus created by the hazards of the fighting, and when the campaign was over the Germans held a broad salient pushed out toward Paris, with its nose at Noyon. The

base of this salient was the line between Arras and Berry-au-Bac, an air line distance of some eighty miles, while the extreme depth was some forty miles between St. Quentin and Noyon. Such a salient presented no difficulties to the defender. It was too broad to be exposed to the immediate dangers of the Ypres salient, and between Noyon and Berry-au-Bac, on its south side, it rested upon the St. Gobain Forest and the Chemin des Dames Plateau, positions which were reckoned almost impregnable and did, as the event proved, suffice to arrest a tremendous French offensive in 1917 with disastrous consequences alike to the French commander, Nivelle, and, temporarily, to the morale of the French nation, shaken by the tremendous costs of the Aisne attack.

Within the salient were many railroad lines, both trunk and lateral, enabling the German to transport his troops rapidly from one point to another as emergency demanded, while Douai, Cambrai, and St. Quentin served as bases for concentration alike of men and material. The French railroad systems in this corner of the country were admirably adapted to German purposes, while those on the Allied side of the front were far less satisfactory; in consequence, the German enjoyed, throughout the conflict, the advantage that superiority in communications provided. This was, too, a priceless advantage for an army fighting on the defensive and outnumbered by its foe.

The strategy of the Allies, whose armies were commanded by Haig and Foch, was comprehended in a drive eastward astride the Somme, designed to break in the western side of the salient, move across the flank and rear of the considerable concentrations in the nose of the salient nearest Paris, and compel an immediate or an eventual evacuation of this nose to avoid envelopment as the Allied advance approached and reached the railroads serving the Germans in these sectors. Could the Allies, as a result of their first push, break the German line on the front attacked and, by a rapid and unimpeded advance, reach the line of Cambrai-St. Quentin, they might achieve a Sedan by enveloping the Germans to the south of them. Had their success been as great or as immediate as that of Hindenburg on the same front nearly two years later, this result would have followed.

But while they thought of such a grandiose immediate success, Allied commanders did not reckon upon it; their calculation was, rather, that by their first attack they would break through to Bapaume and Péronne and secure the crossings of the Upper Somme and, from the ground thus gained, continue their advance by the slower process of siege warfare until they reached the point where a wide swinging German retreat would be necessary. In this they anticipated the strategy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, two years later, with the single but all-comprehending difference that what they hoped for the Germans achieved. Even more exactly they anticipated the strategy of Foch in August, 1918, when using the British army as his weapon he compelled the Germans to retire from Albert to the environs of Cambrai in one brief month.

Failing all these things, Foch and Haig purposed to take such advantage as they could of any less considerable immediate success and begin a long campaign of siege and attrition, designed to wear out German man-power and slowly acquire eastward gains which, by the close of the campaign, would make the German position south of St. Quentin and west of the Oise, on the front nearest Paris, precarious and even perilous. This last they accomplished.

The simplest description of the long Battle of the Somme is that it was, after the first attack upon a wide front, a slow, costly wearing through of the western side of the Noyon salient, which in the end partially closed the entrance to the Noyon pocket, between Arras and the Oise, and so compelled the Germans deliberately but unavoidably to retire to the afterward-famous Hindenburg line, in the spring of 1917. There never was a chance, after the first moments of the battle, that the German line would be broken on a wide front or that there would be a swift advance to St. Quentin and Cambrai, the ultimate objectives, or even to Bapaume and Péronne, the local goals.

The choice of the Picardy front for the offensive was doubtless determined by the obvious profit promised from any considerable advance and perhaps by the fact that on this front the British and French lines now met and both armies could participate, while making use of their

own systems of communication. Finally, as the event proved, success, even if only after slow and desperate struggling, would compel the enemy to retire from the point nearest to Paris and thus give better insurance against some later German return to the offensive and a new dash for the French capital. The value of this phase of the Allied purpose was revealed two years later when the German success in Picardy carried the enemy back to and beyond their old line and again placed Paris in danger.

But these larger considerations were promptly lost sight of when the First Battle of the Somme opened and minor villages and inconsiderable strips of forest became the prizes of contests which rivalled Waterloo or Gettysburg in numbers engaged and losses incurred, while advances of a mile represented the fruits of weeks of preparation. In the aggregate the Allies advanced at the rate of little more than a mile a month, and each mile gained represented hardly less than 200,000 casualties. All preceding standards of artillery fighting were distanced; all earlier records in casualties, in the whole history of modern warfare, were exceeded. Beside the First Somme the Champagne offensive was inconsiderable and Loos but a demonstration in force. The first week of the fighting cost the British more in killed, wounded, and captured than the total number they had engaged at Mons or at the Marne.

### IV. THE BATTLE-GROUND

The country over which was fought the First Battle of the Somme has no counterpart in the United States, but is quite like certain English districts. It is a chalk country cut by two considerable streams and many smaller brooks, running in deep valleys. The two larger streams, the Ancre and the Somme, the latter alone deserves the name of river, flow through relatively wide stretches of bottom lands easily transformed into almost impassable marshes.

Actually the Germans north of the Somme and on the whole operative front held the western slopes of a series of ridges which behind them rose slowly to the divide between the waters flowing into the Somme and those which wind northward into the Scarpe and Scheldt.

In its first stages the British advance was northward and eastward up and over these slopes and the culminating point between the Ancre and the Somme—known as "the Ridge"—was the key of the battle in its early phase.

As you travel eastward out of Amiens along the great national highway to Cambrai, which is itself a survival of Roman road planning, you pass slowly and imperceptibly from a country of the plain, first to a region of long, rolling hills and finally to the fairly deep-cut valley of the Ancre, which crosses the national highway at Albert and finds its way to the Somme a few miles east of Amiens. In our own West or South we should call this river a creek and it is at all times an inconsiderable stream.

East of Albert the national highway climbs rapidly into a tangle of hills and finally passes the crest of the ridge above Pozières, a notable centre of fighting in the battle, and begins to descend toward Bapaume on the other side of the divide. This national highway was the main route of communication and the chief objective of the fighting. Along it the British sought to advance to Bapaume and toward Cambrai, and the battlefield of the British phase of the Somme lies on either side of the road for some twelve miles on the north side and rather less than eight to the south. The extreme points of the July fighting are Gommecourt to the north beyond the Ancre and Maricourt to the south, just north of the Somme valley, where the French and the British lines met.

From Gommecourt to Maricourt the German line ran in a series of curves on the forward slopes of the various hills about a number of villages henceforth memorable as the scene of desperate fighting. These villages were, from north to south, Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont-Hamel, St. Pierre Divion—where the lines crossed the Ancre—Thiepval, Ovilliers—just south of which it crossed the national highway—Fricourt, and Mametz. Maricourt was just inside the Allied line. Between Gommecourt and Fricourt the general direction of the line was north and south, but from Fricourt it ran directly east to Maricourt, whence it again turned south.

On this front there had been no fighting since October, 1914, and in

*BRITISH FRONT, JUNE 30–JULY 3, 1916*




*BLACK SHOWS GAIN*

that long period German industry had transformed the German lines into fortresses of unexampled strength. On the map the network of trenches seems inextricable and the experiences of the Champagne fighting had led the enemy to construct in the chalk deep dugouts on a scale unknown before. Electric lights, running water, and all the furnishings stolen from occupied French towns, contributed to the comfort of the garrisons of these strongholds.

Every advantage of elevation and contour was with the German. To the natural advantages he had added defences of the most formidable character; the villages were transformed into fortresses of great resisting power; the woods were wired and fortified, and along the line a number of more elaborate works or redoubts added to the defensibility of the positions. Finally, behind this first line, the strongest single

stretch of line on the western front, the German had constructed a complete second line along the crest of the ridge above Pozières, and had begun to prepare still a third line beyond the ridge and on the last stretch of rising ground in front of Bapaume, which was eight miles northeast of the point where the national highway crossed the firing line.

North of the Ancre the country is more open and rolling than to the south, and this gave the enemy wider outlooks and made Serre and Gommecourt obstacles which proved beyond the resources of the British to take by direct assault. South of the river the hills are more abrupt, although none is 600 feet above the river bottom. Seen at close range, however, these latter hills appear to be far more considerable than the map would indicate and constitute military obstacles of very great value.

South of the Somme and on the French front the German defences were far less elaborate, as the German, quite incorrectly, had not calculated upon any serious French attack, while he had long before the battle learned where the British were to strike. But behind his defence system southwest of Péronne he had the deep and almost impassable valley of the Somme, coming north from Nesle, before it makes its great bend west below Péronne, and this served to hold up permanently all French advance eastward after the first surprising rush of July 1. Even in its first phase, too, the French operation was relatively minor; it was designed to cover the flank of the British operation, which was to be the decisive thrust.

After the first onslaught the British front was narrowed to the region south and east of the Ancre on either side of the national highway, but in the main east of it, between Ovilliers and Maricourt, as Sir Douglas Haig sought by thrusting first northward and then eastward to widen the breach made in the German first line east of the road and turn the Germans out of their impregnable positions from Thiepval to Gommecourt. Actually, therefore, in its earlier and more deadly period, the Somme fighting took place between the Albert-Bapaume stretch of the national highway and the Albert-Péronne road, which passes through Maricourt.

North of the Ancre, although the British made progress in November and took Beaumont-Hamel, the Germans held Gommecourt and Serre to the end, while south of the Somme theFrench, after their first success, made small progress for several months and eventually took over a portion of the front north of the Somme to cover the extended flank of Haig as he continued his forward movement toward Bapaume, designed to turn the Germans out of their positions on either bank of the Ancre. This movement ultimately succeeded in attaining this object, although the retirement did not come until the onset of the campaign of 1917 and was then without more than temporary profit.

In this area in which the battle was fought there were no towns of importance which were the prize of battle, no railroad lines or junctions of strategic importance; from first to last the struggle was for villages, woodlands, and elevations, all of no more than local value. One line taken, the Germans were always able to retire to a new and formidable secondary system of defence.

The meaning of the struggle is hard to explain by the map and the day-to-day fluctuations are obscure and intricate, because the battle itself was a competition in attrition on a narrow front rather than a pursuit of remoter and more considerable objectives to be attained by success on the front as it existed at any given moment. It was a bruising, brutal combat; it had little of the old-fashioned and ever-fascinating circumstances of a war of movement. It was a war of machines; men only fought when the artillery had achieved approximate annihilation in the enemy's lines. It ended in November barely six miles in advance of the old British front line of July 1; while it lasted its fame filled the world, but when it had passed it left no record to rival that of Ypres or Verdun.

Generations hence men will doubtless go to Verdun and to Ypres, attracted by the memories of the tragic splendour of the contests which raged about those ruined cities, but at the Somme not only was a smiling region turned to desert, to a desert which will endure for many decades, but the last semblance of romance and of charm was eliminated from war and it became nothing but murder on a scale hitherto unparalleled in civilized or barbarian warfare.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

# THE SOMME—JULY 1

## I

## THE NEW ARMY

In the phrase of the British army—which, faithful to the tradition of the race, conceals its emotions, like its achievements, in words which by their very inappropriateness arrest attention—the Battle of the Somme was "the first full-dress show" of the New British Army. It was such a test as our own civilian armies of the Civil War period had in 1862, in the Peninsula and at Antietam, but unfortunately for the British they did not, as did our armies, North and South, face opponents equally new to the conditions and trials of modern war.

The Old British Army, the men of Mons and of Ypres, had for the most part disappeared from the line and a majority slept their final sleep in the old "Wipers salient" which they had held by such incredible gallantry and at such terrible costs alike to themselves and to the picked troops of the Kaiser. The German gas attack of April, 1915, the barren sacrifices of Neuve Chapelle and of Loos, had completed the work of destruction, and the army which faced the Germans on the Somme was, in larger part, an army composed of men—and, for that matter, of officers of the lower ranks—who two years before had been without the smallest knowledge of military affairs and without even the latent suspicion that they might ever wear khaki or undertake the task of a soldier.

No such army as the British, which opened the Battle of the Somme, had appeared on the Continent for a century; even the levies of the Third French Republic, in its despairing effort to save the country in 1871, had included a considerable fraction of citizens who had served with the colours. But from top to bottom the British army, apart from a few officers of the highest rank, was a new thing. Its commander-

in-chief had begun the war as a corps commander and where he now directed the operations of a million men, he had then exercised control of rather less than forty thousand.

Sir Henry Rawlinson, who commanded the army actually engaged, had landed in Belgium in October, 1914, at the head of the immortal Seventh Division, which entered the Ypres Campaign 12,000 strong and left it three weeks later 2,500 strong.

Major General Allenby, who, to the north, commanded one corps which had something of an independent rôle, had been a cavalry colonel when the war broke, and, in the defence of Messines and "Whitesheet" ridges, had taken the first step in a career which was to grow with the Somme struggle, to achieve new laurels in the victorious offensive against Vimy Ridge and the Arras front in 1917, and finally to culminate—at least for the first four years of the struggle—in the capture of Jerusalem and the subsequent destruction of the Turkish army in Palestine in the spring and autumn of 1918.

Another rising officer, under whose immediate command some of the most considerable successes of the opening phase were achieved, was Major General Horne, commander of the Fifteenth Corps on July 1, but later commander of the First British Army and the defender of Bethune in the terrible days of April, 1918. Later in the conflict, the Somme forces were reorganized and General Rawlinson, with the Fourth Army, was aided by a Fifth British Army under Major General Sir Hubert Gough, whose services at the Somme seemed for a moment to mark him as one of the coming men, but the promise was not fulfilled and he disappeared from France on the morrow of his terrible defeat in the Battle of Picardy, on March 21, 1918.

The old story of the Civil War is thus being repeated in this new British army; new names are appearing, old faces are vanishing, a new organization is being formed in the terrible testing fire of a great battle. By no means all the reputations made at the Somme were retained in later campaigns, but after a fashion, the men who rise to prominence in this conflict are the men who, in the next two years, are to direct British campaigns. And to the number of these must be

added Major General Sir William Robertson, Chief of Staff and, with Kitchener, the chief maker and moulder of the New Army.

Since the days of Oliver Cromwell no similar British army had taken the field. It represented the hope, the patriotism, the physical and moral pick of more than forty millions of people of the British Isles; and Canada and Australia, as well as New Zealand, were represented alike in effort and in achievement in the terrible days that were to follow. After nearly two years the British race had responded to the challenge of the German upon the battlefield. It had taken two years to bring together this army, two years of bitter disappointment and endless humiliation, but, on July 1, Britain was at last to answer "present" in the roll call of peoples fighting Germany.

## II. HOPES AND FEARS

But what was to be expected of this army? German military authorities affected, and even seemed, to hold it in utter contempt. If on the physical and the moral side it was as fine an army as ever marched to death with cheers on the lips of its countless thousands, it was still, on the professional and the scientific sides, an experiment—and an untried experiment. Experience under fire the various units had known, in the trench training of recent months, but experience of only the most limited sort.

The army which opened the Somme fighting was more than twice as large, three times as great, in fact, as the force Sir John French had commanded at Mons or at the Marne. Artillery, heavy artillery, there was at last in profusion, and ammunition beyond the dreams of the keenest of gunners, but the men who worked the guns were but recently come from civil life. All the machinery of war, which Germany alone possessed in adequate amount when the war came, was at last provided for the British, thanks alike to the miracles of their own workshops and the complementary contributions of America, but could this machinery, could that army—which was itself a new machine, in the hands of inexperienced masters—face the German machine, with its ante-bellum perfection and its two years of war experience?

This was the great problem which faced the British soldier, statesman, and public on the eve of the Somme; and to it no man could return an answer. All that could be done to create and equip an army in less than two years had been done. Alike the response of the British people and the achievement of British industry in the making of this army will remain a landmark for future generations of the race. Yet, for the commanders of the army, great in numbers and in material resources but weak in all that the trained soldier reckons essential, the anxiety must have equalled that of the few experienced fighters who sent the Minute Men and militia of our Revolutionary period against the regiments of "Redcoats," whose flags bore the record of victories all over the world and whose officers had seen fighting in every clime and against the best that Continental warfare could afford.

It is certain that neither the army nor the British public felt any doubt. After long months in the trenches—outnumbered, outgunned, and outmunitioned—the relatively few veterans who were the stiffening of the New Army felt that the bad time was over—that, at last, they had the advantage of numbers, of artillery; that their guns, instead of being rigidly rationed, were able to fire as they chose, while it was the German, now, who gave evidence of growing difficulties alike in manpower and in munitions.

Yet, looking backward to that time of high hopes and only hidden fears, it is necessary to recognize that, of the hopes, many now seem vain. All that courage and devotion could accomplish this New British Army achieved. It died on July 1 as few armies have ever died. In the succeeding weeks, slowly, at a bitter cost, it learned the lessons of war, which can only be learned on the battlefield; it learned the use and mastery of its instruments. But it did not rival, and, in the two years that have followed it has not rivalled, the technical attainment of the German army and of the German High Command.

The real costs of the Somme were long concealed from the public; the visible and considerable progress on large-scale maps aroused the general conviction—first, in the British public and then, at last, in the army—that it had become a machine superior to the German and, a

year later, it entered the campaign of 1917, convinced that it was, to use the "Tommy's" phrase, "top dog." But after bloody failures on the Yser, the defeats of Picardy and of Flanders in 1918 demonstrated again the eternal truth that armies cannot be improvised, even by the richest and most patriotic of peoples—that neither devotion nor the possession of magnificent mechanical resources can avail to enable a nation to overtake an enemy prepared over long years, its staff trained not alone by years of patient and persistent effort, but inheriting a tradition built upon the victorious experience of more than a century.

In a sense the Somme was as tragic an episode as Balaclava and the sacrifice of Haig's magnificent army comparable with that of the Light Brigade. It was not an utter failure; in a sense it was not a failure at all; nor was it unnecessary. On the contrary, the need was imperative. but it was a waste, tragic beyond power of words to describe.

### III. THE SAME OLD PROBLEM

On the technical side the Battle of the Somme was one more effort to solve the same old problem of transforming a war of positions into a war of movement. There had been many previous experiments, all of them failures on the western front, although the Germans had succeeded brilliantly in Galicia in their Dunajec struggle of the preceding year.

Neuve Chapelle, Second Ypres, Champagne, and the still more recent Verdun offensive, yet proceeding furiously, were all efforts to solve the same riddle. Champagne, the most ambitious Allied effort, had failed because the German organization in depth had enabled the Germans to hang on until their reserves arrived, defending second- and even third-line systems, still beyond the reach of effective artillery fire, for France had not yet overtaken Germany in the provision of heavy guns.

Verdun, the great German experiment, after coming far nearer to success, had failed to make an immediate break through chiefly because the attack had been upon too narrow a front and the French—on the flanks of what was, up to that time, the greatest immediate advance of

trench warfare—had been able to hold up the victorious German centre after it had reached the Douaumont Plateau and swept away all the lines of French fixed defence before it and, in addition, seized most of the remaining gun positions on the east bank of the Meuse.

Neuve Chapelle and Loos had failed because of bad staff work after initial success. In all four the element of surprise had played a considerable part, and the experience of the Somme was presently to demonstrate that, without surprise, victory was impossible. But in the Somme campaign the British deliberately laid aside the element of surprise, influenced alike by the Verdun episode, in which surprise had not brought success, and by the enormous task of preparing for the preliminary artillery bombardment, which was relied upon to sweep away the intricate mass of German defences.

We have nearly two years more to cover before at last the Germans solve this problem of penetration and bring to the western front methods which had been devised in the east, by the application of the lessons of Byng's surprise in the Second Battle of Cambrai, methods which resulted in prompt and deep penetration and seemed for the moment to revolutionize the whole war. Yet even these methods failed to restore the old-fashioned war of movement save between positions. At the Somme the emphasis was laid upon artillery preparation, as it had been by the Germans at Verdun and by the French in Champagne.

Unfortunately for the British their artillery was by no means up to its task in the opening phase of the battle. It did not achieve a destruction of the Germans first line comparable with that which had been achieved by French guns, mainly of smaller calibre, in Champagne a year earlier, and by German heavy artillery in the last days of February of the current year. And without the element of surprise and lacking in adequate artillery preparation, the British infantry, launched against the German positions—lined with machine guns brought up from deep dugouts—when the British guns "lifted" for the infantry advance, went not merely to defeat but to annihilation.

In the later phases the British artillery slowly but surely mastered its problem. Before the struggle terminated the balance between the

gun and the fort had been changed and the Germans were driven to abandon their elaborate system of fixed defences for a far different method which rested upon the principle of organization in depth and lightly, rather than upon that principle expressed in their Somme defences which rivalled the fortresses of old-fashioned warfare. After the first fatal attempt to sweep the Germans out of their lines by long-continued artillery preparation, rising to an avalanche of steel and fire in the final hours, the British on their side changed their method to one of slow pounding, concentrating their efforts upon local objectives and gradually reaching the point where they inflicted upon the enemy appalling losses, isolated his front lines from his rear, hampered his communications, and thus contributed to the demoralization of his troops.

In the later phase the dugout became a tomb; the infantry in assault reached the enemy trench before the Germans could emerge from underground, if, indeed, the entrance to the dugout had not been blocked and the occupants buried alive,the whole elaborate system of fixed defences was breached and broken, and the Germans were defending their new line from shallow trenches, from shell holes, and from isolated nests of machine guns, exactly as the French had successfully defended Verdun, after their first lines had given way in the storm of February 26.

On July 1, however, the opening attack was one conforming to the older standards, on a front of twenty miles so far as the British were concerned and rather less than half as much by their French allies on the right flank. It did not differ from the Champagne or the Verdun offensive save that the artillery preparation was more intense, the number of guns employed greater, the duration of the bombardment longer; but, unhappily, the effectiveness of the fire infinitely less than on either of the former occasions.

As a result the British were on this occasion to fail as the French subsequently failed at the Aisne in May of the next year, and as the British again failed in Flanders a few months later in the same year. One more effort to break the deadlock, which had existed on the west

front since the end of the Marne-Ypres campaign, was foredoomed to failure.

### IV. JULY 1

The army of General Rawlinson consisted of five army corps containing a varying number of divisions, while associated with it was a sixth corps under Allenby. All told, the British strength was something like twenty divisions containing around 250,000 bayonets. To the south of Maricourt the French coöperating army was under the command of General Fayolle, henceforth one of the coming men of the French army, while to the south of this was still another army under Micheler, which played a considerable part in the latter phases of the struggle. Two years later and in the same Picardy fields Fayolle was to intervene at the crucial moment, when the Fifth British Army had been destroyed and save Amiens, bar the road to Paris, and close the gap between the British and the French, thus parrying the latest and deadliest German offensive.

Both French armies were under the supreme direction of General Foch, next to Joffre the most famous of French commanders and destined in later time to assume the command of all the Allied armies at a moment of great peril. In all the trying period of the Yser and Ypres struggle Foch had been associated with Sir John French and again in the campaign of 1915 these British and French generals had closely cooperated, as Haig and Foch did again in the new contest. Fayolle's army, which shared in the July fighting, contained three corps, two of which—the famous Twentieth (the Iron Corps, which had recently saved Verdun and at an earlier time preserved Nancy) and the Colonial Corps—were reckoned as the best of the French shock troops. All told, the British and French forces exceeded 400,000 and were able to put more than 300,000 infantry into the opening assault.

The German force facing the Anglo-French line included portions of two armies, one commanded by Otto von Below, hitherto known for achievements in eastern fighting, and the other by Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria. But as the struggle proceeded the various German

# THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT

At the desperate moment in the Battle of Ypres when the decimated British front line was being held against apparently hopeless odds by cooks, hostlers, drivers, and any one who could carry a gun, General Haig, immaculately dressed and accompanied by a small escort of his staff officers, rode along his lines exposed to the full fury of the enemy fire. He was as calm and cool as if on dress parade at home in England. The moral effect upon his hard-pressed troops was magical. It seemed to galvanize them into invincibility

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

STAR ROCKETS ON THE SOMME FRONT AT NIGHT

© Committee on Public Information

THE CURTAINS OF THE WAR ZONE

Miles upon miles of curtained roads like this one stretched throughout the war zone. Note the apertures cut in the drops to admit shafts of light

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

A GERMAN INCENDIARY BARRAGE AT NIGHT

The German incendiary projectiles added still another horror to war and have been responsible for the wanton destruction of much property in Northern France. The barbed-wire entanglements in front of the French trenches are seen in the foreground of this picture



*Photographed by French Pictorial Service*

THE "IMPREGNABLE" HINDENBURG LINE

These fortifications, in the invincibility of which the Germans had placed their confidence, yielded to the first onrush of the French at the Somme

*Courtesy Major A. Radclyffe Dugmore*

BRITISH TROOPS ASSAULTING
This assault was made January 7, 1916, at Boiselle

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS IN FRONT OF HINDENBURG LINE

*Courtesy Major A. Radclyffe Dugmore*

ONE OF THE WILTS REGIMENTS CROSSING SHELL-SWEPT GROUND

*Drawn by F. Martania for "The Sphere," London, copyrighted by The New York Herald Co.*

GERMAN ATTACK ON A BRITISH TANK



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

CANADIANS FIGHTING AT COURCELLETTE ON THE SOMME

*British Official*

THE GREAT BRITISH ADVANCE IN THE WEST

A raiding party getting clear of a sap and racing toward the Boche trenches

*Photograph by Press Illustrating Co.*

SOMME FRONT AT BOUCHAVESNES

A dangerous passage between two trench sections. These men are targets for sharpshooters

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT

This is what the great guns do to France's beautiful countryside



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

GERMAN TRENCHES DESTROYED BY ALLIED ARTILLERY

What the British troops found in the crumbling remains of the enemy's trenches after a terrific bombardment

forces engaged were placed under the supreme command of Rupprecht, and the contest was actually between Haig and Foch on the Allied side and the Crown Prince of Bavaria on the German side. It is well to point out, too, that as the battle progressed new divisions were constantly sent into the furnace from all parts of the front by both sides. Thus in the course of the struggle the Germans employed not less than 133 divisions, although there were probably never more than fifteen or twenty on the line at a given moment, and the Allies used forces only a little less considerable.

At daylight on July 1, after the fiercest final artillery bombardment of the war, the British troops left their trenches on the twenty-mile front from before Gommecourt to Maricourt and advanced against the German lines in successive waves. The great hour for which the New Army and the nation alike had been waiting had come at last. With a heroism beyond praise the assailing waves went forward against defences of known strength whose condition after the long bombardment remained a matter of conjecture.

If the British expected to find the German works destroyed and the German army shaken by the bombardment, they were promptly undeceived. From Gommecourt, through Serre and Thiepval, on either side of the Ancre, and as far south as Fricourt, where the line turned eastward, the advance culminated in swift disaster. On this whole front the German works were still undestroyed; the German machine guns were brought out of the dugouts and opened before the infantry could arrive; in certain instances the infantry passed the first German line only to be taken in the rear by the fire of German troops who had remained concealed underground until the first wave had passed. German barrages prohibited the advance of supporting waves. In all military history there had never been a more prompt or bloody check than that which the British suffered from Gommecourt almost to Fricourt. Even where local gains had been made, the successful troops could not be supported and remained to die or dribbled back in pitiful fragments.

From Fricourt to Maricourt, and for a short distance north of

Fricourt and south of the national highways on the contrary, there had been a measure of success. South and east of Fricourt the German first line had been broken on a front of perhaps four miles and the villages of Mametz and Montauban taken. Owing to the turn in the German line about Fricourt, the fall of Montauban and of Mametz together with the gain north of the town necessitated the retirement of the Germans out of Fricourt and as far westward as La Boissele just south of the Albert-Bapaume stretch of the Amiens-Cambrai national highway. Thus, on July 2, when the German readjustment had taken place, the British were in possession of some seven miles of the old German front line. They had taken 3,500 prisoners and a certain number of machine guns and material.

As for the French army to the south of Maricourt astride the Somme, meeting with far less resistance and operating in conjunction with an artillery trained by long months of war, it had swept forward, attaining all of its objectives with insignificant losses, capturing half a dozen villages and 6,000 prisoners. The Germans had not expected an attack from the French, exhausted as they believed the French army to be as a result of Verdun; for Fayolle's rush they had not made the same preparations which had been so fatal to the British on most of the front; but with all due allowances for these circumstances it is no less clear that greater French success at infinitely smaller cost than to the British was due in part to the fact that a veteran army fought under the Tricolour.

The cost to the British of the first day of the Somme has been variously appraised but by no credible estimate has it been placed at below 50,000 killed, wounded, and captured. It was probably materially greater, and many brigades and divisions were well-nigh destroyed. The dead lay in rows before the unbroken German lines as grain under the scythe of the reaper. The experience of Burnside at Fredericksburg had been repeated in the case of all the British troops north of the Albert-Bapaume road, and the positions which were attacked continued to cover their garrisons for long weeks thereafter. Nor were they ever successfully assailed by frontal attack.

Contrasted with all previous general offensives on the western front the first day of the Somme was a ghastly failure, despite the gain of a mile or two on a seven-mile front before the British and a somewhat deeper penetration by the French. In only one respect had the Allies established immediate and unquestioned superiority: they had seized control of the air and they were to retain it throughout the long months of battle. This success in the end proved of priceless value and was one of the decisive factors in the later advances. But on July 1 it was of less immediate importance, because the German defence had held over so large a fraction of the front.

### V. HAIG MAKES GRANT'S DECISION

On July 2 Haig was called upon to make the decision which is expressed in Grant's memorable words: "I intend to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." His effort to pierce the German lines and compel a general retirement had been an absolute failure. His attempt to break through even to the relatively near centre of Bapaume had come to nothing; the sum of all his profits was disclosed in the seven-mile break east of the national highway and west of Maricourt.

There was, moreover, no possibility of renewing the general attack; the failure had been too complete, the cost too terrible, to permit the commander-in-chief to think of asking more sacrifices from the shattered divisions and corps which had left their best on the slopes before Thiepval and Gommecourt. Like Grant's army after Cold Harbor, Haig's troops could do no more. On the whole, the prospect on the second day was infinitely less promising than on the day following Neuve Chapelle or Loos; the gain, by comparison, insignificant.

It was, however, impossible to abandon the action altogether, since Verdun remained in peril and the necessity of compelling the Germans under pressure in Picardy to abandon their effort in Lorraine was patent. The major thrust had failed and could not be repeated, there was left only the possibility of making use of the meagre gains which had been acquired along the Somme to compel the Germans, by ever-increasing pounding, to relax their efforts along the Meuse. And this was the

decision of Haig. In the days that followed he slowly and methodically mopped up the fragments of the broken German line before him and blasted his way forward to the second line, behind the broken front. He had failed to break the German line from Gommecourt to the Bapaume road, but, having taken that portion of the first defence system east and south of the road and profiting by the curve in the line, he undertook to advance northward behind the unbroken sectors, seeking to reach the crest of the Pozières Ridge from the south instead of from the west, blasting his way from wood to wood and from ruined village to ruined village, reckoning that, as the army moved northward, it would more and more envelop the German line from Gommecourt to the Bapaume road and slowly compel the Germans to retire from the positions before which his frontal attack had been broken.

And with this decision, made on July 2 and disclosed in all the subsequent fighting, the character of the Battle of the Somme changes. Attacks upon a considerable front there were on later occasions, notably on July 14, but never on such an extent of front as had been assailed on July 1, and never with the smallest hope of achieving any break through or anything but purely local advantage. Haig's method henceforth was a process of erosion, and as the British flood slowly ate its way northward behind the still-unbroken sectors of the German front, these positions had to be evacuated and the gap in the German defence system gradually widened until it reached and passed the west bank of the Ancre.

Throughout this period the French armies served as the flank guard. From time to time, as the British moved northward, Foch attacked eastward and widened the area in which the British might operate. The French attacks were invariably more brilliant and more successful than those of the British, but they were subordinate to the British operation. In all ways the British was the main effort and the British paid the greater part of the expense in life and in material. Slowly, painfully slowly, this British wave ate its way northward; we had day after day the story of the struggle over some insignificant wood or farmhouse; five months of fighting were concentrated in little more than

fifty square miles of territory, and casualties greater than those of our own Civil War were inflicted in an area smaller than that of the old City of New York.

Out of the first failure Haig constructed a battlefield success by iron resolution and by the reliance upon those qualities which have always stood British armies in good stead, whether attacking or holding on. But on the evening of July 1 he faced a failure which might well have staggered a less resolute spirit. The British public hailed that first day as a victory, little knowing the cost or the truth; the German High Command reckoned it a victory, as it was, but built upon it the assurance that the Verdun campaign would continue and the army of the Crown Prince suffer no weakening by the transfer of guns and troops to Picardy; but in this it was mistaken. The first moment of the Somme was, for the British, by far the worst.

To use a simple figure, the first break in the German dike had been inconsiderable—was promptly closed from behind—but in the months that followed the water ate slowly through the retaining walls, and swirled behind one shelter after another of still unbroken dikes, eventually penetrated through all of the old systems of dikes, and, as the campaign closed because of the coming of bad weather, was beginning to surpass the powers of the defenders to construct new dikes behind each falling wall. This, after all, was the real Somme success, a success of erosion and of attrition, wearing away both the walls and the numbers, never achieving a decisive success, never developing into anything which could rival the Marne or even Verdun in popular appeal or spectacular circumstance. But always the British flood wore its way onward and upward until the Germans were out of the whole of their original lines of defence from the Ancre to the Somme and the British looked downward from the summit of the Ridge upon their enemies in the lower ground beyond. Verdun, in the meantime, lapsed into a quiet sector, to become active again only when Mangin took the offensive in October and again in December.

The Somme is not less a symbol than Verdun or the Marne, but as it is the expression of a different race, it has a quality all its own. It

left its seal upon the British people, it expressed the British people, and yet it is—on the military side, as a spectacle and as a campaign—quite indescribable, because it was, from the first days onward, a confused and tangled battle for insignificant objects. It contrasted with the Marne, or even with Verdun, as a battle in the open and in line contrasts with a house-to-house advance through a resisting city. The world could see the Verdun fight unroll before its eyes and could understand, if not the local circumstances, the larger issue. "They shall not pass" summed it up and at the same time translated it for millions. The Somme was untranslatable, once it fell to the level of a siege, with no city or fort as the objective but merely a system of successive trench lines stretching backward, for all that the world knew, to the Meuse or even to the Rhine.

All this was an inevitable consequence of the defeat of July 1 and the subsequent decision of Haig to follow the example and apply the words of Grant. Literally and persistently through the summer and autumn he fought his fight on a line which, save on the largest-scale map, must seem the same unchanged and unchanging front from July to November.

# CHAPTER NINE

# THE SOMME—JULY TO NOVEMBER

## I

## TO THE CREST OF THE RIDGE

The Battle of the Somme, following the July 1 attack, naturally and logically divides itself into four phases, as Sir Douglas Haig himself indicated in his terse and soldierly narrative of the conflict contained in an official report which is by all odds the best account of the struggle so far written. These four phases are, in turn, associated with the successive German lines which were broken in the respective periods.

On July 1 the British broke the first line on a front of some six miles east of Fricourt and for rather more than a mile west of it. From July 1 to July 13 Haig was occupied in clearing the way to the second German line, which lay along the forward crest of the henceforth famous Ridge and was indicated on the map by a road running roughly east and west from the Albert-Bapaume national highway at Pozières, through Bazentin-le-Petit and Bazentin-le-Grand to Longueval and thence of Ginchy, touching the notorious Delville or "Devil's Wood" between the last-named towns.

Before he could attack this second line Haig was compelled to fight for nearly two weeks in the restricted area between the original German front line and the new positions. His operations were little more than considerable clearing movements. A number of bits of woodland familiar in the official reports of the time—Bailiff Wood, Mametz Wood, Bernafay Wood, and Trones Wood—outer bastions of the German second line, had to be reduced. Fricourt was taken on July 2, but Contalmaison held out for many days and not until it was taken could the second line be attacked.

On July 14 Haig swung forward on a front from the Bapaume highway near La Boissele straight eastward to Delville Wood and on this

eight-mile front, on the average about two miles north of the front attacked in the July 1 operation, delivered the second considerable blow. This time he was successful on an even more limited front, breaking the German second line only on a three-mile front between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval. This offensive marked the beginning of the second stage in the Battle of the Somme.

*BRITISH FRONT, JULY 14–AUGUST 18, 1916*




*BLACK SHOWS GAIN*

More than a month, from July 14 to August 18, was now occupied in clearing the way for an attack upon the third German line and those portions of the second line which had not been carried in the July 14 offensive and the succeeding operations. In this period the field of operations extended westward across the Bapaume road toward the Ancre. The northward push was gradually weakening the German

positions between the Ancre and the highway, threatening their rear, and compelling a withdrawal which extended the width of the breach in the first line.

In this second phase Ovillers-la-Boiselle, Pozières, and a material fraction of the Delville Wood were taken and the British at last reached the crest of the famous ridge, near the Pozières Windmill, and began to catch glimpses of the lower lands beyond. But holding the Thiepval salient, the Mouquet Farm, and the village of Martinspuich, as well as Flers on the Bapaume-Maricourt road, the Germans were still in possession of most of the high ground. Seven weeks after the first attack the British advance had not exceeded five miles at any point and the operative front had narrowed to less than seven miles, the distance from Thiepval to Flers.

The French on their part of the front had been far more successful. In the first days of July they had driven a wedge through three German lines south of the Somme and reached the river, within a mile of Péronne; a score of villages and 12,000 prisoners had been their bag in the first phase. In the second, moreover, they had extended their successes north of the river and carried their front forward within striking distance of Combles, the single considerable town within the fighting area. But the mission of the French was relatively minor; they held the flank of the real operative force and their successes, still more considerable than the British for several months, were not turned to larger account, as later commentators have believed that they might have been.

Between August 18 and September 10 Sir Douglas Haig, with French help, undertook to widen his field of operations by pushing east, and in successive attacks succeeded in approaching close to the Bapaume-Péronne highway. Powerfully assisted by the French, he extended his lines until they ran from the edge of Combles southward to the Somme at Cléry, and the German position in Péronne began to be uncomfortable in the extreme. This was the situation at the close of the second phase in the early days of September, and by this time the German had lost his second line from Thiepval all the way round to Estrees south of the river and on the Roman road which runs from Amiens

*BRITISH FRONT, AUGUST 18–OCTOBER 1, 1916*




BLACK SHOWS GAIN.

eastward to St. Quentin. This was the road along which Hindenburg's victorious army was to make its tremendous advance less than two years later and the French army in the summer of 1916 occupied the ground on which was also to be fought the Third Battle of the Somme in August, 1918.

### II. THE END OF THE BATTLE.

The third phase of the Somme covers the period from the first days of September to the first day of October. In this time the British at last master the final line of permanent German entrenchments, as these entrenchments existed when the battle began; they take Thiepval and Martinspuich, as well as Courcelette, and begin to get rapidly forward toward Bapaume on the northern slopes of the ridge, while the

Germans are now condemned to fight in the low ground of the headwaters of the Ancre Brook.

Farther to the east the British at last dispose of Delville Wood, take Flers, and approach within less than three miles of Bapaume along the Maricourt road, while still farther to the east the French and British together take Combles, and the French cross the Péronne-Bapaume highway on a front from Rancourt to Bouchavesnes and approach Mont St. Quentin, the key to Péronne itself. In this time there is a manifest weakening of the German resistance. All the old permanent defence systems have been breached and broken on the front from the Ancre east of Hamel to the Somme just north of Péronne and southward of Cléry; on the river the French have made rapid progress all the way down to Chaulnes, where Micheler's French army is beginning to become active on Fayolle's flank.

On October 1 Haig could hope, and did hope, that he was now at the point where his long battle might begin to yield great profits. His process of erosion had worn through the major obstacles which had been before him at the beginning. The Germans were now fighting in hastily constructed trenches, barricaded villages, and in many cases in shell holes and mine craters. They were in the low ground and, since their air service was hopelessly inferior, this was a terrible handicap. There remained, in an ordinary season, at least four more weeks in which to press home the victory.

But again, as happened once more in the following autumn and had happened on many previous occasions, the weather favoured the German. A period of rain and storm winds, of low visibility and heavy communications, intervened. The cumbrous machine, which had at last begun to pound its way forward irresistibly, if slowly, was conquered by mud at the moment when its triumph over the German seemed inevitable. The time when the exploitation of the real successes already achieved might have been possible, passed; the end of the campaign came and the German line was still unbroken; it had been bent, a wedge had been driven in between the Oise and the Scarpe, the original German defences had been pounded to dust, but a line still held.

One final flash of shining achievement there was to lighten the gloom naturally accompanying the great disappointment. On November 14 came a brilliant offensive at the bend of the Ancre and on the west bank of the little stream, about Beaumont-Hamel and near Serre, the scene of the bloodiest repulses of July 1. In a few hours Beaumont-Hamel was taken, the Germans turned out of a valuable joint in their line and a position of great importance in the defence of their front on both sides of the river. Five thousand prisoners and not a few guns, the largest bag of any day in British fighting on the western front up to that moment, were taken.

But Beaumont-Hamel was more than a brilliant incident, it was an evidence of the fashion in which the New Army had learned its trade. It was a thoroughly scientific performance; not so perfect as Plumer's victory at Messines Ridge in the following June, not so immediately fruitful of prisoners and guns captured as Rawlinson's push a little to the south beyond Albert in August, 1918, but it was a workmanlike military operation. There was not again the terrible death list, the sacrifice of countless lives against unbroken wire and unshaken defences. From the end of the First Battle of Ypres to the beginning of the Battle of Arras, Beaumont-Hamel is the most interesting military performance —on the technical side—of the British army, marked by good staff work, sound artillery coördination with infantry, a proof positive that the British army had learned the offensive lessons of modern war.

### III. THE TANKS

Before passing to a summary of the actual situation at the end of the Battle of the Somme, one detail demands notice. In the operations of September 15 there first appeared upon the field that henceforth familiar engine known to the British as "Tank" and to the French as "chariot of assault." With the "Poison Gas" of Second Ypres, the tank shares the dubious honour of being one of two great innovations in all of the first four years of the struggle.

The submarine and the aëroplane—and the Zeppelin, as well—were in existence before August 1, 1914. It is true that, both in the case of

the aëroplane and of the submarine, particularly in the case of the former, the developments, after the war began, so completely transformed and expanded their usefulness that they might be regarded almost as discoveries of the conflict itself. But poison gas and the tank were born after the conflict began and were two natural developments of the form of warfare which, in the larger sense, had been a surprise to all combatants when it arrived and remained.

The tank was an odd combination of the familiar chariot of ancient warfare and the modern battleship; in theory it was as old as the warfare of that period where mythology and history meet; in mechanism it was as modern as the latest agricultural machine of the American Middle West. It was a movable fort; it was capable of breaking through the barbed-wire entanglements, of smashing houses, of breaking walls. It could move, waddling like an obese and clumsy hippopotamus, over the strongest lines of defence and opening gaps in the most solid entrenchments through which infantry could pour.

On its first appearance it contributed to the capture of certain ruined villages which had defied all previous artillery preparation. It produced consternation in the ranks of the enemy, but almost as striking was the sensation of amusement created within British lines. Even in the heat of battle thousands of men fighting for their lives and under deadly fire were seized with uncontrollable laughter as they saw these strange and animal-like engines moving forward over the battle-front, carrying death and destruction before them and about them, but combining a high degree of mechanical efficiency in destruction with a clumsiness of movement which was beyond description.

Like the poison gas at Ypres, the tank at Courcelette and afterward did not win the battle in the larger sense. The element of surprise was promptly exhausted, the Germans learned to mass field guns in the front lines and in other ways to meet the tank attack, while the prompt arrival of bad weather, with mud and inundation, limited the immediate usefulness of the tank, although it played an interesting and useful rôle in the remaining weeks of the battle.

Yet, limited as was its success at the moment and in the next few

months, the tank, once it had come, remained, like the various forms of poison gas, a permanent detail in the new order of warfare. A little more than a year later a massed fleet of tanks enabled the British to achieve, at Cambrai, the first real break-through on a considerable front of the whole western struggle. Unhappily the victory far surpassed the expectation and there were lacking reserves to exploit the success, but the success itself opened the eyes of the British and the French to the possible future use of the tanks, while it turned the German mind toward experiments in restoring the element of surprise in the war by intense artillery preparation over a short period.

The Germans tried their adaptation of the lessons of the tank with great success in the first half of the summer of 1918; the British and French—sticking to the tank but changing its form and improving its mechanism—were able to win their first great western victory of this later year and change the whole current of events in Rawlinson's offensive south of the Somme and less than ten miles from the point at which the tank made its initial appearance in the great Foch counter thrust of August, 1918.

Thus, in a future not greatly distant, the tank revolutionized the Allied method of attack; it supplied the place of the long artillery preparation, once regarded as essential to remove the enemy's wire and fixed defences, but fatal to all possibility of surprise. It contributed mainly to two victories, those of the Second Marne and the Third Somme in the critical hours of the campaign of 1918 and it may be regarded, hereafter, as having been as important an innovation in land warfare as were the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, in our own Civil War, in naval warfare.

But if the tank could be traced on the military side as far back as the Scythian chariot and the Trojan horse; if it was the natural and logical extension of an idea expressed by the Ancient World in its relatively restricted armoury, the actual origin of the tank was both humble and destitute of martial circumstance, for the original tanks, which ground and crunched their way over the last few rods of the Albert Ridge, were but very slightly modified forms of the Holt Tractor, manu-

factured in Peoria, Illinois, propelled on the caterpillar principle, and intended for agricultural purposes and for the crossing of rough ground and the familiar obstacles of the farmer. Of old it had been the fashion to quote the adage as to beating the swords into ploughshares, but in the topsyturvydom of the new era, the farm tractor was transformed into a land battleship.

### IV. THE ACHIEVEMENT

Like the First Battle of Ypres, the First Battle of the Somme did not end abruptly; it simply died out, as both armies little by little surrendered to the elements and sat down in the mud and filth of the bleak Picardy uplands to face another winter. But by December it was plain that the end of the battle had come and there was a prompt effort on both sides to measure its meaning and to translate it into such terms as should satisfy a public looking with frank dismay at the "butcher's bill" and perceiving, on the map, only minor changes as compared with the situation of July 1.

In the period of five months of more or less steady fighting the Allies had advanced at points rather more than seven miles; they had retaken perhaps two hundred square miles of French territory and captured more than 80,000 German prisoners. They had inflicted a loss of at least half a million upon the Germans, but the British alone had suffered even more heavily while the total Anglo-French loss could hardly have been less than three quarters of a million. The enemy's defences had been battered into ruins and his theory of elaborate and grandiose fixed defences had been upset, unfortunately only with the result that the German was to appear in the next year with an elastic system which was to prove equally difficult and equally successful in defying effective penetration.

On the larger side Verdun had been saved; pressure had been taken off the French; the British and the French had seized the initiative on the western front and made possible a bid for a decision in the following year. In the east Brusiloff had been enabled to make the last brilliant and despairing Russian offensive which was to bring Austria once more

to the point of ruin. But great as was the burden which Haig had imposed upon German man-power, the Germans were still able to aid their Austrian allies against the Russians and, a little later, to provide the generals and the troops which were to insure the rapid ruin of Rumania.

Had Russia been able to continue in the war the Somme might, conceivably, have proven—as in the winter of 1916-17 it was thought to be—the beginning of the end. But Russia fell, the whole situation changed, the Somme quickly disappeared from memory, and its importance diminished as it was seen through the new perspective. More and more it came to be recognized as the bloody shambles which were to serve as the training school of the new British army.

When the battle was over the German line was so dented and eroded that a retirement was early seen to be inevitable and the hope was long cherished that the retirement might prove the beginning of a great Allied forward march. But the brutal and indefensible German policy of devastation, which created a desert before that new Hindenburg line to which the foe ultimately retired in the following spring, served its purpose and abolished all chance of an Allied resumption of the campaign in Picardy and prepared the way for the astounding triumph of Ludendorff when the Germans regained the offensive in 1918 and Hutier applied his own method of surprise—itself a derivation from British tactics at Cambrai—in which the tank played so considerable a part.

Moreover, still a new perspective was furnished when in August, 1918, Allied and German armies again faced each other on the identical lines of July, 1916, when British troops once more looked across the Ancre and saw the Ridge occupied by German troops and French and British forces were brought to a halt before the old trenches west of Roye and Chaulnes. And in the future it seems that British, French, and German peoples will all look upon the Somme campaigns as we, North and South—no longer conscious of the emotions, the hopes, and dreams of our fathers and grandfathers—look at the sterile battles fought back and forth through northern Virginia in the first three campaigns of our own Civil War, battles which were marked by ter-



*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

ONE OF GUYNEMER'S VICTORIES

The enemy machine, out of control, drops through the clouds, throwing the observer out as it falls



*Photograph by Paul Thompson*

GUYNEMER'S FORTY-FIFTH VICTORY

"Kill or be killed. It means quick thinking and nerves of steel, added to absolute indifference to personal danger. And even then chance says the last word in all fighting in the air"




*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

AEROPLANE VIEW OF BOMBARDED GERMAN TRENCHES

By the aid of this picture even civilians can form some faint idea of what it would be to burrow in the ground under the hurricane of exploding shells which destroyed these German entrenchments



AN OBSERVATION BALLOON

Shooting down observation balloons such as this was always one of the many extra hazardous occupations of the aviators



*Photographs Central News Photo Service*

RHEIMS FROM ABOVE

This picture shows the crowning infamy of Germany's calculated vandalism. The German idea that to shock and anger civilized peoples past the power of words to express would cow them into quick submission will be one of the hardest things for future students of this war to believe



*Photograph by French Pictorial Service*

THE RUINED VILLAGE OF BEAUMONT ON THE MEUSE AS SEEN FROM AN AËROPLANE

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

DROPPING SAFELY FROM A BALLOON

Five French observation balloons broke loose in a gale and drove rapidly toward the enemy's lines. By means of their parachutes some of the observers dropped safely to earth although the observer here shown unfortunately fell within the enemy's lines



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

THE NIGHT RAIDER

Held in the converging rays of two searchlights the raiding Zeppelin makes a conspicuous target for the anti-aircraft guns. Shrapnel can be seen exploding around it

rific slaughter and indescribable bravery and sacrifice, but produced no decision and brought no permanent occupation of territory.

At the Somme the German hope of a Verdun victory was destroyed. The hope of eliminating France before Britain was ready had been abolished on the Heights of the Meuse, and along the Somme the British intervened, as Joffre had planned they should. Together, the Somme and Verdun defeated the second German bid for a decision in the west. But the Russian collapse in its turn neutralized the consequences of Verdun and the Somme, and it was presently to be the mission of France and of Britain to play the old rôle on the familiar and mournful Picardy and Champagne fields, while America prepared to intervene, as Britain had prepared in 1916 before the July 1 attack.

### V. THE DESERT

To complete the record of the Somme one more circumstance is of more than passing importance. Here at last there was revealed the full power of modern weapons of destruction. Before the Somme there had been havoc beyond anything other wars had known. Before even the storm had broken upon Verdun the devastation on about Ypres had become a phenomenon known to the whole civilized world, and all that had occurred in Flanders was but child's play compared with the first bombardment in Lorraine in February. Yet about Verdun, where the fighting took place in a sparsely populated region of forests, a savage landscape disguised some part of the wounds of modern warfare.

In Picardy it was otherwise; a smiling country, of rolling hills and deep and pleasant valleys cut by chalk streams—a land of prosperous farms and fertile fields, sown with small villages—was suddenly smitten by a storm which did not pass away but endured for weeks and for months. Over an area ten miles wide by twenty long the whole face of the earth was changed; the heart of the hills blown out, the smoothly rounding slopes of other elevations concealed craters, like those of famous volcanoes; all the interior of the hill had been blown out by mines, and in the chasm that remained an ocean liner could be concealed.

Eastward of Albert, itself a shell-wracked town, along the roads by which the flower of young British and Imperial manhood had marched to death and mutilation—roads the sole surviving detail of old order in a world of chaos—roads recalling the Appian Way in the Campagna—stretched a region indescribable in its ruin. Whether one travelled by the northern, eastern, or southern roads one passed suddenly and almost without warning into a land of desolation terrible beyond words. Westward of Albert, in this time—although later devastation returned with the German, and passed to the other bank of the Ancre—was the pleasant landscape of Picardy, a landscape framed by little woodlands, smiling valleys, coquettish villages; eastward was a Sahara, and something more than a Sahara, recalling the fields about Pompeii or Messina, through which have flowed the streams of lava and of ashes which not only engulf but endure.

At the Battle of the Marne and in the opening campaign of the war the destruction was little more complete than that which might have followed the passage of armies in the Napoleonic era. On the field of the Champagne offensive of September, 1915, the villages were, it is true, almost totally destroyed in places and everywhere reduced to hopeless shells; but the fields, the country itself, remained to be reclaimed by the plough and the farmer. The shallow trenches and the inconsiderable dugouts had survived the artillery preparation of the guns of the calibre employed in that opening period of high explosive warfare.

But at the Somme there was nothing more terrible than the mutilation of the surface of the earth itself, the permanent destruction of hills, the everlasting scarring of the hillsides, the creation of new mountains by mine explosions, and the excavation of valleys where once the hills had been. Where the first-line German trenches had extended from the Ancre to the Somme there was left neither trenches nor the semblance of trenches, the dugouts and their inhabitants alike had been buried as beneath an avalanche, the surrounding hills had been worked by shell fire until they resembled nothing so much as the pictures of the surface of the moon, familiar to readers of old-fashioned geographies.

From the slopes of Mametz Hill, at the very starting place of the

British offensive, one might look north and south and east upon the sites of many little villages, which nestled under the crests of the sharply rising hills. At the very foot of Mametz Hill had been Mametz, but of it not a stone, not a fragment, remained. It had not been buried, it had been literally blown from the surface of the earth; it had dissolved in dust and the dust itself had been swept away. Where once had been a well-built little French village, with its solid houses of plaster and stone, old houses which had endured other centuries and survived other wars, there was nothing. There had been the usual church, the familiar square, the invariable fountain; all the slight but permanent details of the French village; and of all these there was left just nothing.

And what was true of Mametz was equally true of Montauban and Fricourt, of scores of villages from Roye below the Somme to Miraumont above it. The villages were gone, the hills about them had disappeared; the woodlands were obliterated; a streak of red dust amidst the chalky white of the roadside was the sole suggestion of what had once been a village—an occasional half-excavated stump beside a shell crater the only reminder of what had been the communal forest; but for the most part the woods of Picardy, like those of Lorraine about Verdun, were gone and there remained neither stumps nor stump holes, only vast pits dug by the heavy artillery, pits into which in the period of rain and fog men and animals fell and were drowned.

It was at the Somme that this new power of destruction first revealed itself in its full malignant power. There it not alone destroyed all that there was of human habitation and of the fields of human effort, but it swept the earth with fire and sowed it, not with salt but with steel, turned it yellow with exhalations of deadly gases, submerged the upper surface of fertile earth with the rocks and gravel, the all-pervading chalk of the under strata, as if seeking to prevent a future return of men to these fields—to create a permanent desert and make it impossible for men to exist or fruits and foods to grow in the soil on which nations had fought.

Such, in some measure, was the destruction of the First Battle of the Somme in 1916. But the same waves of destruction were at least twice

again to cross and even to pass this Somme battle-ground, to approach Amiens and to return to the lines of July 1. And with the advance of the Germans in March, 1918, a wartime legend of Picardy found mournful refutation. In the village square at Albert there stood, through all the First Battle, a wrecked church; across its tower lay the figure of The Virgin, overturned by German shell fire but still clinging to the tower, always seeming as if about to crash downward into the shell-torn ruin beneath it. But the fall did not come in 1916 and there grew up in all the countryside the belief that when the Virgin of Albert did fall, the war would end. Two years later, when the German returned to Albert, the statue crashed down into dust and ruin, but the war went on and a new and Third Battle of the Somme flamed up over all the ruined and ravaged lands between the Ancre and the Avre, and the tides and currents of war continued to ebb and flow over the ruined land as the sea sweeps backward and forward over submerged cities and engulfed shores.

# CHAPTER TEN

# VERDUN—THE EPILOGUE

## I

## THE PAUSE

The fighting before Verdun did not immediately die out following the opening of the Battle of the Somme. The Crown Prince was able to promise his troops, in July, when Haig's first efforts had harvested only inconsiderable profits, that the fight for the Meuse fortress would continue. There were German advances in July and even in August, inconsiderable but unmistakable, and those who lived through the whole siege have supplied testimony that in August and the first days of September the situation seemed to them darkest.

During this period the Germans were in the ditch of Souville and had crept forward to the edge of the Froide-Terre. A further slight advance, the capture of Souville, the single one of the Verdun forts which occupied ground as high as Douaumont, and the defence of the east bank of the Meuse would collapse—the Germans would reach and even pass the river occupying the ruins of the city. The military value of such an achievement would have been small, but the moral value incalculable. In every quarter of the globe Verdun had become a fact and a symbol, to take it now would give the Germans a victory incontestable, and bound to excite world attention.

But the advance was not to come. Slowly, very slowly the furnace of the Somme began to devour German effectives and German resources. Little by little men and guns were shifted from the Meuse to the Ancre, and by September the German effort was over. But enemy resources were still sufficient to hold what had been won and French attacks between Hardaumont Quarries and Souville, directed at Fleury and the Thiaumont works, now only a heap of dust, were savagely repulsed on several occasions.

If the Verdun episode was over for the Germans, and their offensive definitively ended by September, the situation still remained one which the French could not permit to endure. While they held Souville, Verdun was safe, but while the Germans occupied Douaumont, a return to the offensive in the future was always possible for them and Verdun remained in danger—in grave danger. Thus, as early as September, began the preparations for a counter-offensive designed to retake Douaumont and Vaux.

In every circumstance this operation was of purely local importance. For the whole task not more than three divisions were immediately employed, while the Germans continued to employ seven on the front of the coming attack. There was no thought in the minds of the French High Command of launching any general or considerable thrust; their purpose was solely to relieve Verdun from the ever-present menace which would overhang it as long as the enemy held two of the forts of the circle constructed to defend the entrenched camp.

In the whole war, up to this moment, no attack had been so carefully or scientifically planned as the first Verdun counter-offensive. The regiment which had been assigned to retake Douaumont spent a month in a village near Bar-le-Duc, daily making an assault upon a fort exactly like Douaumont and thus familiarizing the men with the details of the objective which they were presently to storm—a training which proved invaluable when Douaumont was finally taken on a day of fog and mist. Meantime, the French had at last obtained artillery of the heaviest type, guns of 400 mm. calibre, which far surpassed the 420 mm. of the Germans in the first days of the war. Their mechanical resources were at last equal to those of their enemy and for their new effort artillery was concentrated about Verdun in enormous quantities, while, as always, French aviators remained masters of the air.

The preparation for the attack was the work of three men, all destined to win new fame in the months that were to come: Pétain, defender of Verdun in the early period, now become chief of a group of armies of which that defending Verdun was but one; Nivelle, a subordinate of Pétain in the early days, now his successor in command of the

Verdun army and presently to succeed Joffre as commander-in-chief of the whole French army and, after a brief tenure, to suffer defeat at the Aisne in the campaign of 1917 and then to disappear, giving way to his old chief; finally, as the immediate commander of the attacking force, General Mangin appears. Little known before, save as a brilliant Colonial, who, commanding a brigade, had retaken Douaumont and held it for brief hours in May, Mangin was to win enduring fame in two Verdun offensives, share the defeat and discredit of Nivelle at the Aisne, but to emerge from brief obscurity as the leader of that army which by its brilliant counter-offensive turned the tide in the campaign of 1918 and won the Second Battle of the Marne. However justly criticised for occasional recklessness and habitual lack of concern for the costs of attack, Mangin earned at Verdun, and thereafter retained, the reputation of being the ablest exponent in the French army of the older qualities of French dash and *élan*.

### II. THE OBJECTIVES

For the first counter-offensive Douaumont, Vaux, and the high ground about each had been fixed as the objectives of the wholly local and strictly limited attack. Both forts occupied high ground rather more than a mile inside the German front, as it now existed, and both were covered by intricate trench systems, winding through the wrecks of famous woodlands and along the sides of ravines which had seen the frightful fighting of the earlier periods. Neither fort was itself a defensive work, although both were still intact below ground, and supplied invaluable cover for munitions, supplies, and for a limited amount of reserves. But beyond all else, Douaumont, with its wide sweep over all the surrounding country, was a post of observation, giving a clear view over the enemy's whole field of operation.

Actually the line now ran from the Meuse, between Vachereauville, which was German, and Bras, which was French, eastward along the downward slope of the Côte de Poivre, mainly held by the Germans, and thence southward, along the little saddle connecting the Froide-Terre with the Douaumont Plateau and bearing the Thiaumont fortification

through the ruins of Fleury to the ditch of Souville; thence it curved eastward again before Souville and Tavannes, across the western end of the Vaux Plateau to the little defensive work of Laufée, at which it turned south along the eastern edge of the Woëvre Plain.

The mission of the three divisions of attack was simple. The First was to move westward taking the Hardaumont Quarries and ultimately reaching and seizing the village of Douaumont, north and west of the fort, and occupying the line on which the French had originally checked the German rush and from which they had momentarily retaken Douaumont fort some weeks later. The Second Division was to advance from Froide Terre, take Thiaumont works, Farm and the fort itself; the Third was to move out from the edge of Fleury and Souville upon Vaux.

The distances to be covered were insignificant but they represented the progress which the enemy had been able to make only after six months of the most desperate fighting; every conceivable means had been employed to improve positions naturally strong, and the Germans held these lines strongly, indeed they outnumbered the assailants two to one.

In the plan of operation there was no new detail. There was an enormous multiplication of the number of guns employed and a concentration of the fire upon a very narrow sector. But this had been the characteristic circumstance of many other operations. This was what the Germans had done in February; this was what Haig had done at the Somme on a wider front in July. At the Somme the British front alone had been twenty miles long, in February the Germans had attacked on a front of more than seven, while in the counter-offensive at Verdun the front assailed was less than four; but aside from this, all was planned in the usual way.

The hour for attack was fixed for eleven-thirty in the morning, instead of at dawn, as at the Somme, but it was now late October and the earlier hours were no longer likely to provide an atmosphere clear enough for air observation. In point of fact, on the morning of the attack the greater part of the operation took place in a dense fog and

if, through the concealment of their columns, the French gained, they suffered through the almost complete paralysis of their air service. Between dawn and the "Zero" hour—as the hour of departure was now described in Allied armies—the German lines were to be swept by a frightful bombardment, to be followed, at the appointed time, by the assault itself, covered by the fire of the guns, which, lengthening their range to keep pace with the infantry advance, was to play upon the rearward lines of the enemy to the last possible moment before the victorious troops arrived.

All this had already become an old story in war methods. The thing that is noteworthy about this Verdun attack is the perfection with which all the familiar methods were employed. The numbers engaged were small on both sides, by comparison with the Somme fighting, the area affected insignificant; but, within its modest limits, the Verdun operation was and long remained one of the finest bits of scientific fighting in the whole of the first four years of the conflict. It had a brilliance always to be expected in a French attack, but it had an exactness and a mechanical perfection unexcelled in French, British, or even in German achievement, and possibly unchallenged.

### III. DOUAUMONT AND VAUX

At the hour fixed and covered by one of the not-infrequent fogs of late autumn in the Meuse region, Mangin's three divisions left their trenches and swept forward into the German lines, which for long hours had been pounded by the French artillery. Never was an artillery preparation more complete nor a surprise more absolute. The enemy's first lines were submerged without opposition; only in the Hardaumont Quarries, a circumstance due to the character of the position, did the resistance long continue; not until the French approached the second and even the third German trench did they meet with the customary machine-gun fire from isolated points of support.

But despite these isolated checks, despite savage fighting in many of the ravines, the wave went forward. Four hours after it had set out, the observers from Souville could see through the mists, which were at

last breaking, the brown uniforms of French Colonials on the tortured slopes and remains of Fort Douaumont itself. In four hours the victors had traversed the ground which it had taken the enemy six months to cross, and the price of the German advance had been measured in hundreds of thousands.

It was on February 25 that the Brandenburgers had taken the fort by surprise and their exploit had been celebrated by the Kaiser in a despatch in which he described Douaumont as the cornerstone of the chief fortress of France. The cornerstone now was once more French, solidly French; so was the village of Douaumont; so were a score of positions, farms, and woodlands which had become familiar names to the newspaper readers of five continents.

Only toward Vaux were the plans of the French commanders imperfectly realized. Even here the assailants reached the remains of the old ditch, but northward the progress was less satisfactory between Douaumont and Vaux and the lines were withdrawn a little to permit a new artillery preparation before the attack was resumed. But even this disappointment was manifestly to be of brief duration, for Vaux had been well-nigh encircled, the noose had fallen about it and it remained only to tighten it. Douaumont was taken on October 24 and the fate of Vaux was sealed on the same day.

Six thousand prisoners, more than six hundred officers, fifteen guns, and a vast booty of minor weapons were the immediate prizes of this astonishing exploit in which French losses were inferior to the captures of prisoners, and the attacking force was, itself, less than half as strong as the enemy divisions it thus thrust out of positions which had been defended by the French for more than six months and lost—foot by foot and yard by yard—only to be retaken in four hours of a single brief autumn day.

But it was not until November 2 that the full measure of the success was disclosed when the Germans sullenly evacuated Vaux and retired beyond the ravine north of the Vaux Plateau and into the Woëvre Plain below, leaving the French the wrecked skeleton of the old fort—above ground nothing but a heap of blackened ashes, but underground

still possessing intact all its bomb-proof and vaulted chambers. Thus in German hands as in French, Vaux had proven sturdier in defence than its far more considerable neighbour, Douaumont.

With the evacuation of Vaux on November 2 the circle of Verdun defences was once more restored. Of all the system of detached forts which had been constructed before the war to serve as the cover for the vast entrenched camp facing Metz and guarding one of the main lines of invasion, not one remained in German hands. After eight months of fighting, after eight months of the most dramatic and terrible conflict in human history, the French had made good their boast. They had said in February: "They shall not pass"; and, having barred the road from February to October, they had struck back in October and deprived their foes of every foot of conquered ground which was in any measure a menace to the maintenance of the Verdun fortress.

Thus, although it was, itself, a relatively insignificant combat, the first French counter-offensive at Verdun, in October, was a memorable thing; it thrilled the whole world; it aroused in Germany a passion and a bitterness which were ill-concealed. It supplied the ultimate refutation of the assertion of the German General Staff, the assertion on which their whole strategy was based, that France was bled white, exhausted morally as well as physically. By contrast it revealed the soul of the French people as that soul had been revealed once before—at the Marne.

### IV. VERDUN ANSWERS THE KAISER

The victory of October 24 had given Verdun security; it remained to give more air to the garrison, still narrowly restrained in the German embrace, which, though partially loosened, was still uncomfortable. From the positions to which they had retired the enemy was still able with his long-range artillery to bombard the town and to cut the lines of communication well behind the town itself. Compared with the situation of the summer, conditions were vastly improved, but the cost of holding the place was still unduly high and might be reduced by another sagacious offensive, also of totally limited character.

Accordingly, all through November and the first half of December there was unceasing preparation for one more thrust, preparation rendered difficult and almost impossible by the character of the country over which the French had to construct new roads and narrow-gauge railways, under German fire and in land torn and scarred by the terrible bombardments, French and German alike, of nine months of unequalled artillery fighting.

But the work was done and on December 15, following closely upon the Kaiser's peace proposal—so closely as to give the appearance that Verdun was itself making historic answer to the German gesture—Mangin again led his troops, this time four divisions instead of three, against the German trenches in another swift surprise attack heralded by another terrific bombardment.

This time the French objectives were north, not east, and they sought, by advancing on the curving front straight across the Heights of the Meuse from below Bras to the Woëvre north of the Vaux ravine, to push them back from the vicinity of Douaumont and enable the French to reëstablish their lines on the positions on which they had made their first stand in the great attack of February, the positions on which it had been expected to meet and break any German offensive.

Once more the attack came in the morning but not in the early hours. It was ten o'clock when the French left their trenches, and in a few brief hours they had swept their enemy out of all the useful ground for several miles northward. Vachreauville on the Meuse, the whole of the Côte de Poivre, Louvemont and Hill 378, Bezonvaux and the Hardaumont position between Douaumont and the Woëvre were taken, the main defensive position beyond the circle of forts was reëstablished; more than eleven thousand prisoners, 115 guns, and the usual wealth of material were captured.

As a surprise, the operation was even more successful than that of October, and as a result not only were the losses utterly insignificant, but for a period of time the enemy disorganization was so great that French patrols crossed the Côte de Talou and pushed northward for

reconnaissances far in advance of the lines on which the thrust was actually halted. But the purpose of this attack was rigidly limited and the resources of the commanders restricted to the minumum necessary for the defence of the positions outlined in advance of the attack as the objectives of the various divisions.

This December attack was the final operation of Nivelle at Verdun, acting under the directions of Pétain. Immediately after it he left to assume the post made vacant by the promotion of Joffre, who became a Marshal of France, but only to disappear from the French High Command. In a very real sense the Verdun campaign had proven his undoing, for despite all the brilliance of the defence he was held responsible for the blunders which had permitted the fortress to remain in so bad a state of preparation and it was further held against him that he had advocated an evacuation of the town after the first days of the German assault.

In the High Command Nivelle's stay was brief and disastrous; he did not realize the hopes which had been founded upon his share in the Verdun campaign. But when he had fallen, France and the world instinctively turned to the man who had defended the town in the early and critical days and it was Pétain, who, by reason of the Verdun achievement, proved the real successor of Joffre—who reorganized the French army and restored its shaken morale after the bitter defeat at the Aisne. As Joffre is the man of the Marne, Pétain was and will remain the central figure of the Verdun campaign, for the qualities which made the defence possible and the victory attainable were his own. Once more a great crisis had produced a great general, ranking with Joffre and Foch in French service, and unrivalled in any other army.

### V. AFTERMATH

With the fighting of December 15, the real Battle of Verdun ends. Of all the ground captured during the nine months of struggle the Germans retained, on the east bank of the Meuse, only the advanced positions held by the French on February 21, 1916. On the west bank, however, they still held firmly the important ground taken in the fighting

of April and May, including Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304. While they held this ground, with observation posts on the Côte de Talou, they were still able to hamper French communications and annoy the garrison within Verdun.

As a consequence, Pétain, when he came to the post of Commander-in-Chief in the following summer, promptly organized a third limited offensive and thrust the Germans off both the dominating hills and, in addition, retook the ground south of the Forges Brook, the Côte de Talou and the villages of Samogneux and Champneuville on the east bank of the river, together with Hill 304, thus entirely reëstablishing the old situation, completing the task of restoring that Verdun position from which the French had been thrust in the grim days of February of the previous year and, as it turned out, laying the foundations for an American offensive in September and October, 1918.

By this time Verdun had ceased to have any value in the immediate fighting and the defeat of the Germans was almost more important on the moral than on the military side, for the interest of the world in the fortunes of this Lorraine town did not decrease. But in the story of the Verdun campaign this third and last counter-offensive has a place. Without it the narrative is incomplete. Eight thousand prisoners and many guns were captured in this third blow, bringing the total for the three operations unblocking the town up to 25,000 prisoners and nearly 200 guns.

In the Verdun operation there are three natural phases. The first phase is occupied by the opening attack and the successive following efforts of the Germans on the flanks to prepare the way for the final assault. This is the great period, which endures from February to July, the time in which Verdun bears the brunt of the full German effort and France, awaiting the coming of the British, once more carries the burden of the war upon her shoulders. It is the fighting between February 21 and the hour when the Somme at last began to paralyze German effort on the Meuse which will endure in the minds of men as long as written history endures.

In the second phase, from July to October, Verdun lies vulnerable to

the enemy, her defensive armour pierced from Douaumont to Vaux, momentarily safe but bound to be in danger the moment the German is able to return to the attack. And in all this period the German expected to return and to realize the profits that his preparations had, at a frightful cost, made almost certain.

Last of all in the third phase, in the epilogue, we have the two brilliant counter-offensives of 1916 and the third, in 1917, which together win back all the lost ground, restore Verdun to its old security, and yield a harvest of prisoners and guns which well-nigh balances the original German profit in this respect in the first days of the attack.

VERDUN DELIVERED.




GROUND GAINED BY THE FRENCH, OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1, 1916

In the military history of the war Verdun stands for the service rendered by France in holding the enemy until Britain could prepare. Had France failed the war would have been lost, as the events of the next two campaigns plainly indicated. In this respect Verdun is only less important than the Marne itself.

On the human side Verdun revealed France as those who had really known the nation had always perceived it to be. The qualities which made the defence possible were not those that the superficial student or observer of France and the French people associate with the race.

There were moments of unsurpassed brilliance, but in the main the struggle was one of endurance and tenacious, solid, sturdy peasant virtues, and won for France what must in many ways be regarded as the greatest battle in her thousand years of military history. It is hardly too much to say that the world view of France changed with Verdun; the earlier view had been inaccurate, a reflection upon those who held it rather than upon the French; yet in a very real sense Verdun was a national epic, only complete when victorious French soldiers again held the last of the lost positions of February, 1916.

# FIGHTING IN ITALY

*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*

AN ITALIAN SENTINEL IN THE ALPS



*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*

A SENTRY AT A MINOR OBSERVATION POST



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ITALIAN SOLDIERS SCALING A MOUNTAIN

This is suggestive of some of the difficulties the Italians had to overcome

© *Western Newspaper Union*

A WRECKED ZEPPELIN FALLING TO EARTH

These lonely sentinels are watching the Zeppelin hurtle through space after having been hit by the Italian airplane

Courtesy of Mr. A. A. Bernardy

MANY OF THE ITALIANS' OBSERVATION POSTS WERE CAVES SUCH AS THIS DUG IN THE ICE

Courtesy of Mr. A. A. Bernardy

A SMALL GUARD OF ITALIAN SOLDIERS PROTECTING THE ENTRANCE TO A MOUNTAIN PASSAGEWAY

*Photograph from Brown Brothers*

AN INGENIOUS TROLLEY DEVISED BY THE ITALIANS TO TRANSPORT THEIR WOUNDED OVER THE MOUNTAINS

*Photograph from Brown Brothers*

AN ICE FORT ON AN ITALIAN MOUNTAIN

These are not boys playing soldiers in a back yard snow fort as one might think at first glance, but men fighting in the world's greatest war. They are the famous Alpini entrenched in the ice near Cadore

*Photograph by Lafayette Brothers*

ARMOUR PROTECTION DEVISED FOR THOSE WHO CRAWL FORWARD TO CUT THE ENEMY'S BARBED WIRE



*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*

ITALIAN INFANTRY ATTACKING

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A NIGHT BOMBARDMENT

© Western Newspaper Union

ST. BERNARD DOGS READY FOR A TRIP THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS

Italy's dogs did their share nobly in helping to win the war. Besides doing their bit for the Red Cross they were invaluable in carrying supplies to troops in the mountains, stationed in places inaccessible to horses and mules

# CHAPTER ELEVEN

## ITALY IN DEFENCE AND OFFENCE

### THE GENERAL ALLIED CONCEPTION

### I

While the German attack upon Verdun was in its second stage, in the middle of May, a terrific Austrian offensive suddenly broke out along the Trentine frontier between the Adige and the Brenta. This offensive was the natural corrollary of the Verdun operation, it had the same purposes, both larger and smaller; that is, its main purpose was, if possible, to inflict such a defeat upon Italy as to compel the Savoy Monarchy to retire from the war, just as Verdun was, at its maximum, to eliminate France. But the secondary purpose was to prevent an Italian offensive on the Isonzo front, as the Lorraine operation aimed at forestalling the Somme offensive.

We have then, in turning now to the operations both in the Italian and Russian fields, to remember what were the major strategic conceptions of the two enemies, for the campaign of 1916. The Allies had planned a general concentric attack upon the Central Powers delivered on all fronts and calculated to place upon Germany and Austria a strain beyond their resources to meet. Britain and France were to attack at the Somme, Russia from the Pripet Marshes to Rumania, Italy along the Isonzo and toward Trieste and Laibach; there was to be a thrust upward from Salonica and finally there was the reserved possibility of still further pressure upon Austria occasioned by the entrance of Rumania into the war at the appropriate moment.

To meet such an attack the Central Powers had to choose between passive waiting and action in advance of their enemies. In the German calculation, the advantages of the so-called preventive-offensive, the defensive-offensive were counted overwhelming. It was assumed that Russia, after her defeats of 1915, would be incapable of making any

serious movement before midsummer; that Britain would be unready even at midsummer, and that the Balkan threat could safely be ignored for the time being. This left Italy and France to be dealt with by the Austrians and Germans, respectively, while the two Latin nations were still without the aid of the Slav or the Anglo-Saxon. Berlin could reckon, too, that if Italy and France were heavily beaten, Rumania would hardly venture into the war on what would then obviously be the losing side.

In this spirit, as we have seen, Germany in February undertook her great attack upon Verdun. She counted upon a swift and colossal victory, but when this became impossible, she continued, partly because she had accumulated her munitions, men, and guns before Verdun and must continue there or else abandon the offensive for a period of time; partly because she was still of the opinion that, even though Verdun were no longer to prove the victory she had expected, it might serve as a furnace in which French man-power would be consumed and that, in consequence, France would be unable to participate largely in the Somme offensive, of the coming of which the German General Staff was well informed.

Now with respect of Italy the situation was equally plain. All Italian preparation was directed toward the delivery of a decisive blow toward Trieste and immediately upon Gorizia in the late summer, which was the earliest date possible, given Italy's lack of the necessary military supplies. Therefore, if Austria struck in May, she might win such a victory as the Germans had sought and missed at Verdun, but failing this she might so cripple Italy, so exhaust her slender stock of munitions, that the Gorizia stroke, when it came, would be easily repulsed.

Verdun and the Somme were such colossal episodes that they entirely fill the stage in the campaign of 1916 and serve to obscure the other circumstances. Yet each was a detail in a general scheme. Both groups of contending powers sought the initiative, both planned to attack, but while the Entente nations were still unequally ready and thus unable to act early and at the same moment, the Central Powers

were ready and could throw their main masses upon France and Italy before either could be supported by Russia and Britain. In their first stages both the German campaign in France and the Austrian in Italy sought a decisive victory, but the secondary purpose of each was to prevent a decisive victory of the enemy, by using up the armies of two nations before these of all four could engage.

We have seen that the Verdun attack failed at once as a decisively victorious action, we have seen that it was a partial failure so far as its secondary purpose was concerned. But it is true that in some measure the French effort at the Somme was lessened by the strain of Verdun, and it is conceivable that, within limits, the Germans did thus lessen the extent of peril which the Somme had for them. In the case of Italy, the calculation of the Germans was more obviously faulty. If they underestimated the French power in preparing their Verdun operation and thus met a heavy defeat, by ignoring the Russian conditions they sent Austria into an Italian campaign which occupied her best troops at a critical moment, permitted Russia to win great victories in the east, and almost brought the Hapsburg edifice down in ruin.

Each of the campaigns—that in France, that in Italy, and that in Russia—is of itself a whole and its unity is best preserved by dealing with it separately, but it is equally vital to keep clearly in mind the relations existing between the several operations. Germany struck France in February; while she was still engaged at Verdun she pushed Austria against Italy in May. In June Russia attacked Austria; in July Britain entered the French campaign and attacked at the Somme; in August Italy struck in the Gorizia; and, finally, in September Rumania entered the war and attacked Austria.

Thus German strategy failed because it neither won a decisive victory in France or in Italy, nor prevented Allied offensives. Allied strategy failed later, not primarily because the German attacks had lessened the force of the Allied blows but mainly because the Germans were better organized, possessed the incalculable advantages of a unified command and the interior position, and lastly. possessed on the eastern fronts an overwhelming advantage in heavy artillery. Of all these ad-

vantages most weight must be laid upon the unity of command. Two years and many bitter disappointments were yet to be required to bring the Entente Powers to the point where national pride was laid aside and —in the hour of gravest peril—a French general called to command all the Allied armies and to turn defeat into victory.

But in May, when Austria struck Italy, the Allied campaign was still in the making; Haig and Brusiloff were unready, French counter-blows at Verdun had been checked, and the Germans were advancing on both of the wings, clearing the way for their final attack by the centre, which never came. The moment was promising, the Italians were unready, and the Allied publics were already becoming anxious and disheartened by the long series of unexpected reverses, which had come instead of the opening of the cycle of successes expected and calculated to prove the prelude to decisive victory in the campaign of 1916.

### II. TRENTINE GEOGRAPHY

The front chosen by the Austrians for their attack was the obvious sector. The great mass of the Trentine Alps projects into the Italian plain like an enormous peninsula. It is flanked on either side by huge mountains, by the familiar Dolomites on the east and the Ortler and Azamello groups on the west. Between these two systems of snow-capped peaks the Adige River descends in the narrow Val Lagarina from the north and beside the river are the railway and the highway. Above Botzen two railway lines meet, one coming down from the Brenner Pass and the other eastward from the Pusterthal and both are protected from Italian observation or attack. At the south, just before this corridor reaches the Italian frontier, it opens out into a series of smaller corridors, each of which bears the same relation to the main corridor as the fingers to the wrist. At this point of separation is the Austrian city of Trent, Italian by population and character but Austrian by virtue of Italy's failure to complete her unification in 1866.

Possessing this corridor, the Austrians could move troops secretly and in large numbers south to Trent—which was itself a fortress covered by a series of detached forts—and from Trent the troops could be

sent southward through these smaller corridors, those of the Adige on the west and the Brenta on the east followed by railways, and those of the Vallarsa, the Val Terragnola, the Val d'Astico, and the Val d'Assa between, each of which was followed by a carriage road. Bringing their masses secretly to Trent, the Austrians could then deploy them by the radiating valleys and highways, munition them from the rear by railways, and hurl them at the Italians at the chosen moment.

Such an attack would be instantly perilous for the Italians, for they stood, facing this danger, on the lower slopes of the Alps and had behind them—and not more than a dozen miles away—the Venetian Plain itself. Thus, if the Italians should be forced to retire over this thin edge of high ground which they held, the Austrians would debouch into the plain by half a dozen valleys and would be within a scant ten miles of Verona and Vicenza and thus of the main railroad by which all the Italian armies, a hundred miles to the east and northeast along the Austrian frontier from Cortina to the Isonzo, were munitioned and supplied.

If the Italians were thus pushed off the high ground into the plain, then, at best, they would be able to get their armies back behind the Adige and the Po and lose only the territory and cities east of these rivers, but, at worst—and the worst would be possible—all of Cadorna's troops would be enveloped, cut off from their bases, and captured in a grandiose Sedan. This was the inherent viciousness of the Italian situation. This was the threat Austria had ever held over Italy's head; this was one of the reasons why Italy had entered the war not merely to redeem her Latin brothers of the Trentino, but also to possess the keys to the doorway which led to the very inmost chamber of her own house.

By this corridor invader after invader had descended into the Venetian Plain; it was the immemorial route of the German barbarians; it had been the road of many Austrian eruptions; Napoleon had fought and won two famous victories—Rivoli and Primolano, at the entrance of two of the lesser corridors. While Venice had held Trent, one of the few gateways to the plain was closed, but when Austria gained and continued to hold this gateway, all of Venetia beyond the Adige was well nigh indefensible and all offensives against Trieste

had to be undertaken with full recognition of the great peril existing far in the rear.

Two of the little villages in this region, Arsiero and Asiago, termini of railroads coming up to the edge of the hills, are of more than passing interest, because both were taken in the Austrian offensive and mark its extreme limit, and both were subsequently retaken by Austro-German forces when, after the disaster of Caporetto, Italy was forced to retire behind the Piave and the Central Powers once more endeavoured to reach the Italian rear by the Trentine route. In 1916 Italy escaped disaster, in 1917 it came, but in both cases the successful defence of the very edge of the high ground, the last ridge north of the plain, prevented a complete rout and a retreat to the Adige. Asiago and its plateau, its high grounds of the Setti Communi, anciently seven German-speaking Comunes, the mountains of Pasubio, Coni Zugna, Cengio and Pau the final strongholds of Italian defence these with Monte Cimone, lost and retaken in the struggle, are the geographical landmarks of the brief Trentine campaign.

### III. THE ATTACK

The Austrian army undertaking the Trentine offensive was commanded by the Archduke Charles, heir to the Austrian throne and destined at no distant date to succeed the aged Francis Joseph. It was of more than passing significance, too, that the heir to the Hohenzollern should have been selected for Verdun and the heir to the Hapsburg throne for the Trentine adventure, in each case the selection was a fair indication of the degree of confidence existing in German and Austrian staffs, for the prestige of such exalted persons is not risked in any doubtful ventures. The Archduke had immediately under his command some fifteen divisions, 225,000 strong, the pick of the Austrian army, but nearly 200,000 other troops were crowded into the narrow corridor and he had also nearly 2,000 guns, many of them of the heaviest calibre—an artillery concentration far in excess of any Italian resource, immediate or eventual.

On May 14 the preliminary bombardment began on the whole

front of the Trentino from Lago di Garda to the heights east of the Brenta. It was a bombardment wholly like that which from the Forest of Gremilly burst upon the Verdun front on February 21 and it had equally devastating effects. Under it the Italian first-line defences disappeared. Once more—as at Verdun, too—the initial phase of an offensive disclosed the defenders unready. Like the French at Verdun, the Italians between the Adige and the Brenta had suspected the coming attack, but they had made inadequate preparation and hopelessly underestimated its violence.

Accordingly what followed in the next few days was a perfect repetition of the Verdun episode. On May 15 the Austrians passed to the offensive and began their attack on the front from the Val Lagarina, through which flows the Adige, to the Val Zugana by which the Brenta comes down to the Venetian Plain. In the next fortnight the enemy advanced rapidly. His progress on the flanks—as at Verdun—was relatively slight, but in the centre he pushed down through Arsiero and Asiago, cleared the Communi Plateau, and arrived within five miles of Schio, which is in the plain and at the same time threatened, by pushing eastward and westward from his advanced centre, to cut off the Italian troops on the flanks still successfully holding the Adige and Brenta valleys. On June 1 there was, then, on the Trentine front, exactly the same crisis which had come somewhat sooner before Verdun, when Douaumont Fort fell and the Germans were at the last line of possible French defence on the east bank of the Meuse.

But, as at Verdun, the defeated and surprised defenders had hung on just long enough to give their general staff time to save the situation. On May 25, Cadorna had prepared his counter-thrust and a fresh army intervened, as Pétain's army had intervened at Verdun. In both cases the situation was desperate by the time assistance came. But in the Italian case the immediate effect of the intervention was more successful. Beginning on June 1, the Italians counter-attacked along the whole front; by June 3, Cadorna could inform the world that the Austrian advance had been checked; during the next ten days most of the lost ground was recovered.

Meantime, on June 4, one day after the Austrian check, the guns of Brusiloff in Volhynia and Galicia sounded the overture to the Russian offensive and in the next few days the terrible Austrian disasters about Lutsk and Dubno and, south, in Bukowina, made an urgent demand upon Austria for those divisions of her best troops concentrated in the Trentine corridor. Thereafter the Austrian effort died out, the Trentine front ceased to be active. Austrian troops hastened eastward to check the Russian advance upon Kovel, Italian troops were moved southward to aid in the preparation of the Gorizia attack.

It is perhaps inaccurate to say that Russia saved Italy, it seems that Cadorna's counter-offensive had already become effective before Brusiloff's attack was launched. Had the Russians not attacked, however, the Italians would have had for a period of time to concentrate their attention upon the Trentine front, and their Gorizia offensive would have had to wait. On the other hand, had the Austrians not embarked upon this costly venture, it may be doubted whether Brusiloff would have won so great a success on June 5 and the succeeding days. In any event, the Trentine gamble was for Austria a costly failure, bringing disaster in the east and having no serious effect upon Italy's main plan which was for her own offensive on the Isonzo. Italy's suffering was not vain—nor was it comparable in extent or duration to French agony at Verdun.

### IV. ON THE ISONZO

In May and the first days of June Italy had been hard put to defend the back door to her own house. The danger had abated when Cadorna's new army had counter-attacked; it passed when Russia began her victorious assault in the east and compelled Austria to turn from the Italian back door, at the Trentino, to her own back door along the Carpathians. Thus saved from all immediate peril, the first task of the Italians was to guard against a return of the danger—to construct railroads and defences that would prove sufficient if the Austrian should knock at the back entrance again, as he might, as he did in fact less than two years later. By the end of July Cadorna could feel that this

work had been well done and that he could now turn his attention to his main task, the forcing of the front door into Austria.

This front door was the Gorizia stronghold, known for many months thereafter as the Gorizia bridgehead. A parallel for this front—thinking of geography rather than history—is found in a smaller scale in the circumstances of Thermopylæ, although it is well to remember that Thermopylæ was lost, while the position, but not the town of Gorizia, was never surrendered by the Austrians in the campaign of either 1916 or 1917, in both of which it was the objective of terrific attacks.

The Gorizia position, as it confronted Cadorna in July, 1916, was simply a strongly defended system of lines between the Julian Alps and the sea; its extent was little more than thirty miles, but this extent was sharply divided into three distinct regions: the last spurs of the Alps, stretching down in the form of the great Bainzizza Plateau with a series of peaks, to achieve world fame in 1917; lower ground in and about the Austrian town of Gorizia, peopled by Slavs and Italians; and, finally, the Carso, a limestone ridge rising between the valley in which Gorizia huddled and the Adriatic.

In front of all three sectors flows the Isonzo River, coming down out of the gorge at the foot of the Bainzizza Plateau, washing the foot of Monte Sabotino on its western bank, Monte Santo on its eastern, and a little to the south touching Podgora Hill, due west of Gorizia and just across the Isonzo, facing the town. Still farther to the south, but on its eastern bank, rises the Carso Plateau, which crowds it westward in a wide curve, beyond which it enters the usual swampy ground found at the mouth of all Venetian rivers and through this reaches the sea below the little town of Monfalcone, also Austrian.

North of Monte Sabotino the country is such that it offers no adequate communications for an army advancing from the Venetian Plain and seeking to burst into Austria. Actually the only available entrance into Austria for an Italian army of invasion is the narrow stretch between the Alps and the sea, between Monte Sabotino and the southern edge of the Carso, which falls abruptly into the sea. Each of the three distinct sectors was defended by a system of trenches and permanent

works, prepared in the long period between the outbreak of the war and Italy's entrance and constructed with a full use of the lessons taught by trench warfare in France. Monte Sabotino to the north, Podgora Hill west of Gorizia, and Monte San Michele on the edge of the Carso were the three bulwarks of the defence system.

Eastward from Podgora and across the Isonzo stood Gorizia, purely Italian in character despite a large Slavic element in its population. Under cover of Podgora several bridges cross the Isonzo, one of them carrying the main railroad from Gorizia to Udine in the north, while at the foot of the Carso the only other important railroad—that from Venice to Trieste—crosses the Isonzo and follows the coast to the Austrian seaport. Holding both ends of the bridge under Podgora, the Austrians were able to send troops at will to the west bank of the river, and this circumstance earned the whole position the name of the Gorizia bridgehead. (The French position of the Hills of the Meuse east of Verdun and across the river was analogous, and the Germans invariably spoke of the French positions as the Verdun bridgehead.)

Against this Gorizia position Italy had stormed in the first days of her own war, while Austria had her main masses occupied against Russia and Serbia. But on the narrow front only a relatively small Italian force could be employed and Austria with fewer troops but superior artillery was able to halt the Italian advance. In 1915 Italy lacked the guns to undertake any serious offensive against Gorizia; she was still inadequately prepared in 1916, when the first real effort was made; in 1917, when fully ready, her preliminary success was annulled by the defeat of Caporetto.

The Italian purpose in the Gorizia offensive was twofold. Cadorna sought to force the main gate into Austria, to open the way eastward to Laibach, to repeat in some degree Napoleon's great campaign of 1797, which reached Leoben and compelled the Treaty of Campo-Formio. But hardly secondary was the purpose to push southward to Trieste, cut its communications with Austria, and, in due course of time, capture that city, which ever since 1866 had beckoned Italian patriots and constituted the chief jewel in Italia Irredenta. Actually

the fate of Trieste was bound up in that of the Gorizia position, not in the fate of the town itself, but of the whole position. If Italy could force the gateway, thrust through and beyond the narrow gap between the sea and the mountains, Trieste was doomed. But it is well to recognize that the operation itself was not directed at Trieste, which lay to the south and well outside the fighting zone.

Again, it is well to recall the three separate elements of the Gorizia position. It was necessary for Italy to gain all three. For, if she merely broke through at the centre and, taking Podgora, occupied Gorizia, her advance would be checked by the converging fire from both Monte Sabotino and Monte San Michele; while even an extension of her success on the Carso, to the south, would be insufficient to open her roadway while the batteries upon Monte Sabotino and the outlying spurs of the Bainzizza Plateau commanded her flank, her rear, and the two essential lines of communication. To final success, moreover, the capture of all three positions would be but a preliminary part, no success could be of more than local value, while the Bainzizza Plateau with its peaks of Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele still held out. Actually the fighting in 1916 did not seriously threaten the Austrians on Bainzizza, but the following year the main campaign of Cadorna was concentrated to the north.

For a whole year Italy had been preparing against the day when her troops would be hurled against the Gorizia bridgehead. What the British army went through before the Somme the Italian army experienced in the months preceding the opening of the Gorizia operation. In both cases the enemy sought by a forestalling attack to prevent the Allied offensive, in both cases the attempt failed. In the case of Italy the failure was complete when Cadorna had slammed to the Trentine back door and, two months later, he was able to strike at the Isonzo.

### V. GORIZIA

On August 6, Cadorna delivered his great blow. At this moment the German advance at Verdun was practically over, the strength of the Germans on the Meuse was rapidly ebbing away, to reinforce the armies

at the Somme. In the latter field the British were at last beginning to make real progress, they were getting their stride. Away to the east Brusiloff's offensive was, in fact, past its crest, but still advancing. East and west alike, the Central Powers were on the defensive and in retreat. The hour was propitious; Allied fortunes were mounting—seemed, in fact, to have reached the highest point since the days immediately following the Battle of the Marne.

The first three days of the Gorizia offensive were days of violent assault, after artillery preparation, against all three sectors. To the north, Sabotino; in the centre, Podgora; and to the south, Monte San Michele were taken and the victorious Italians pushed forward beyond all three. On August 8 they closed in upon Gorizia and took the town. In the next few days they consolidated the conquered ground and pushed the Austrians back off the high ground of which Monte San Michele is the commanding elevation, across a little depression known as the Vallone, and took foot at the base of the main Carso Plateau. Nearly 20,000 prisoners and a vast store of material were captured. The greatest victory of Italian arms had been achieved in a brilliant and inspiring fashion.

Yet, with Gorizia taken, it at once became clear that Italy had only made a beginning. North and south of the valley of the Wippach, at the western end of which Gorizia is situated, the Austrians still held commanding high ground. From Bainzizza, Monte Santo, and Monte San Gabriele they swept Gorizia, which was beneath them, and from the Carso their guns commanded both the Wippach Valley and the narrow shore between the mountains and the sea followed by the railroad and the road to Trieste. Italy had forced the outer door, the vestibule, to the Gorizia gateway, but the Austrians still held their main positions; they had long ago prepared against just what had happened and the Italians, after their first successes, found themselves—like the French after the great preliminary success in Champagne in September, 1915—face to face with new defences manned by rapidly growing reserves.

And—like the French attack in Champagne, like all the many offen-

sives of the past and of the immediate future—the Italian rush at the Isonzo came to a dead halt. There were needed a new artillery preparation, a new concentration of guns, and the creation of an additional system of highways and light railways. Cadorna was where Haig had been after the opening success at the Somme. The success had been vastly greater than that of the British general, but the natural obstacles now confronted were also far greater and Italy lacked both the guns and the munitions for an immediate renewal of the Gorizia campaign.

In point of fact, before the end of August it was clear to all informed observers that Italy had shot her bolt for 1916. She had exhausted her slender stock of munitions. The double strain of the Trentino defensive and the Gorizia offensive had left Cadorna without the material out of which to construct a further successful advance at Gorizia before the end of the fighting season. Costly attacks by brave soldiers lacking in artillery support, there were, but they failed as they had failed in the case of the British and of the French. Only nations like France and Great Britain possessed the resources to transform themselves industrially for a warfare with Germany and her Austrian ally, for a warfare which was mechanical beyond all else.

Thus, exactly at the moment when Brusiloff's campaign in the east was slowing down, and for the same reasons, Cadorna's efforts in the south lessened. The great concentric attack of the Allies lasted little more than a month, it placed a tremendous strain upon the enemy, but the strain could not be kept up for any considerable time. Both in Italy and in Russia the first achievements surprised the Central Powers, who had woefully underrated their foes, but despite the calculations in Allied capitals at the moment, the strain was by no means beyond German resources. It was met promptly and successfully.

Of the balance of the Italian campaign it is necessary to say no more, now. It was a preparation for the larger effort of 1917, which almost achieved success. What is of interest and of importance, however, is the fact that on August 27 the Italian Government declared a state of war to exist between Italy and Germany and thus placed their country

squarely beside the other great powers with which Italy had already made many agreements but in whose enterprise she had hitherto been a partner only in a limited sense.

The reasons for this strange situation were many. With Germany Italy had no quarrel; she had until recently been an ally—and a loyal ally—of the German Empire, despite her age-long hatred of Austria. In her struggle for unity she had fought with the Prussians against the Austrians in 1866; in the industrial development of modern Italy Germany had played a considerable rôle—not without profit to herself but with the result that many influences in the world of finance and commerce in the Italian Peninsula were under German control. No such intense hatred of Germany, as existed in France, was to be found in Italy in the first three years of the war; it was not to protect herself against Germany, but to recover territories held by Austria but rightfully Italian that Italy had declared war; and the necessity of a common battle against Germany was only slowly perceived in Italy.

When Italy did declare war against Germany, her action proved to be the preface to the entrance of Rumania into the conflict and was taken for the express purpose of influencing Bucharest at a critical moment. But although Rumania did promptly imitate the Italian example and declare war alike upon Germany and Austria, her swift fall to complete ruin robbed the Italian action of any vital importance. There was, and there remained until after the terrible Italian defeat at Caporetto, a year later, an unmistakable coldness between Italy and her allies. To some extent Italy suffered thereby, in a certain measure her reasonable demands for aid—for the materials essential to the creation of an adequate war machine—were heard and rejected by those who were still influenced by distrust and resentment that Italy had so long refrained from risking all in a complete commitment to the alliance against Germany.

However just or unjust the feeling, the fact that it existed must be recognized, since it had a certain influence upon the course of the war until the close of the following year. But the declaration of war upon

Germany in August, 1916, was the first step toward a complete understanding between Italy and the nations fighting Germany and, while the immediate effects were unfortunately small, in the larger view it contributed to strengthening the Allied cause and removing what might have proved a later cause of weakness.

# CHAPTER TWELVE

# THE LAST RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

## I

## LOOKING EASTWARD

While the great events which marked the Verdun and Somme operations were unfolding on the western battle-front; while France was standing with her back to the wall in Lorraine; Britain making her final preparations in Picardy, and Italy desperately struggling to hold the Trentine gateway to the Venetian Plains, another great campaign was in progress on the eastern front. In the first days of June Russia was launching what was to prove the last campaign of the Romanoff Empire. The narrative of the western operations has been told as a separate phase of the campaign of 1916, because only in this way can the unity of that campaign be preserved; yet it is essential now, when we look eastward, to recall how considerable was the interdependence between the eastern and western operations and to emphasize the time relations between the larger events on either front.

The Russian campaign opened in the first days of June. It had been preceded by considerable but relatively unimportant operations by Kuropatkin and Evarts northward of Pripet Marshes, which attracted passing attention at the moment but resulted in no real achievement. At the hour when the armies of Brusiloff launched the great assault from Pinsk to the frontiers of Rumania, German troops were mounting the Vaux Plateau in Lorraine, and before the Volhynian offensive had reached its first crisis, Fort de Vaux had fallen and Verdun was palpably *in extremis*. At the same hour Austrian troops were still threatening to pass the last barrier to the Venetian Plains and the new British armies were still unready to begin the Somme offensive.

The Russian blow had, therefore, an important influence upon western events; it produced an immediate interruption of the Austrian of-

# PLAN OF A MODERN BATTLEFIELD




A typical section of trench line of about six miles showing (A) enemy first line, (B) first line, and the supporting and communication trenches behind, with the disposition and numbers of the troops in the first line, in support, and in reserve. A section of front held by one battalion (1,000 men) may be from 250 to 1,000 yards long, or more than half a mile. Half the battalion is in the first line and the other half in support in the other trenches. Behind these are an equal number of reserves at brigade headquarters, and still farther back another force equal to all these to alternate with them.

The contour lines, showing the ground elevation in metres (3.28 feet), are important, as they show the reason for the location of batteries, trenches, hospitals, etc., on this and on maps on succeeding pages. Parallel lines indicate roadways, heavy crossed lines are railroads, and shaded sections are woods



© *American Press Association*

A MODERN BATTLE FRONT

Showing an attack. The men in the foreground leaving their trench, corresponding to "B" on the map on the opposite page, are charging toward the trench line, corresponding to "A," visible in the background of the picture

AN ATTACK—CROSSING "NO MAN'S LAND"

What the trench lines look like in a chalk country. The troops are leaving trench corresponding to "B" on the map and attacking "A." The supporting and communication trenches show plainly




ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND OBSERVATION STATIONS

The light batteries, marked "A," consisting of 3-inch field guns (18-pounder guns and 75-millimetre guns) and howitzers up to 4.5 inches, and the medium batteries, marked "B," of field guns up to 4.5 inches calibre (105-millimetre field guns, 60-pounders, and 155-millimetre howitzers) have their fire directed from observation stations (marked "Obs. sta.") and regulated by airplane observers. The heavy batteries are usually directed by balloon observation and regulated by airplane observation. The batteries are usually placed behind the crest of a hill or under cover of woods and buildings and as often as possible where they can enfilade a part of the enemy's trench, as shown by the second "B" battery from the right, which has the railroad crossing and enemy's trench within range

AN OBSERVATION BALLOON LANDING

The balloons on the map on the opposite page are about two miles from the firing line. In practice they are pushed up as far forward as the control of the air will allow

A HEAVY 6-INCH GUN

The fire of the heavy guns is chiefly directed by balloon observation. The usual position of the guns is from three to six miles from the enemy first line (see "C," on map on facing page). Their duty is to bombard and destroy supporting points, communications, dugouts, and trenches, and headquarters if it can be located. The effective range of a 6-inch gun is about 15,000 yards

*Press Information*

A LISTENING POST

This papier-maché dead horse is a kind of modern Trojan horse. He proved particularly useful as a listening post for engineers



GUN OF A MEDIUM BATTERY

The gunners know the results of their fire only by reports from their observers. Medium batteries ("B" on map, page 219) are located from one to three miles from the enemy, and their task is to help destroy enemy trenches, try to put enemy batteries and captive balloons out of commission, and they are also used in barrage fire to cover attacks

*Courtesy British Bureau of Information*

PREPARATIONS FOR A NIGHT ADVENTURE INTO NO MAN'S LAND

These men are getting ready for the night's work. They are taking bombs from their pockets and putting them into their pouches or into Lewis-gun buckets. On the right is an observation officer signalling with a flashlight captured from the Germans




A DIAGRAM OF AN INTRENCHED HOWITZER

A plan often used to conceal and protect both the batteries and the men from enemy observation and fire. The gun crews live in the dugouts in the rear. In many of the gun positions on the map on page 219 this intrenchment would not be necessary, for the batteries and crews are placed in positions sufficiently concealed to protect them



A HEAVY HOWITZER BEING INTRENCHED

Artillerymen engaged in placing a gun in a position like that in the diagram above. The position of this gun, or more particularly of the one above, will explain why it is difficult to move heavy artillery rapidly either to follow up an attack or to escape an advancing enemy




AN INTRENCHED LIGHT BATTERY

A diagram of the protection of each gun and a map of a battery with dugouts for men and officers and communication trenches between and an observation station near by, as shown in the extreme right-hand light battery ("A") on map on page 219



*French Official from Committee on Public Information*

AN INTRENCHED GUN CONCEALED FROM ENEMY AËRIAL OBSERVATION

fensive, enabling Italy to go eastward to the Isonzo and resume preparations for the later attack which captured Gorizia; it drew divisions from France which reduced the German reserves and hastened the day when Verdun attacks would have to be abandoned. Beyond this it accomplished the hitherto-impossible feat of placing the Central Powers upon the defensive on all fronts, a situation not to recur until Foch should regain the offensive in the west, two years later, at the successful Second Battle of the Marne.

In June, 1916, Russia played a loyal and a vital part in the common task of the nations allied against Germany. Her blow was a mighty one and if it raised hopes which the future was to demonstrate were unfounded and proved to be but the prelude to a Russian desertion of the Allied cause, consequent to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the coming of the Bolshevik madness; we have nevertheless to recognize that the blows delivered by Russia against Austria-Hungary were bound to have consequences in the future and that, even dying, Russia dealt a heavy stroke to the endurance of the already-shaken Hapsburg Empire.

In the examination of the Russian campaign of 1916 we approach a great tragedy, one of the greatest tragedies in all human history. It was hidden completely from contemporary vision. The western Allies saw in the return of Russian armies to the offensive the authentic sign of approaching victories. The early successes—coinciding with the first advances of the British and French at the Somme (advances which were presented in a wholly inaccurate light), coinciding with the decline of German effort before Verdun—aroused an optimism, a confidence in London and in Paris, which was not to return for two long, bitter years.

In these capitals the true situation in Russia was unknown. Confused whispers and warning murmurs were silenced by an efficient censorship or a ready unofficial optimism. While Russian armies were advancing the west saw only a restored Russian military establishment. The canker that was eating at the hearts of the Russian masses, the corruption that was corroding official life, the exhaustion which was swiftly becoming complete, economically and morally, these were things that the west did not suspect and the Germans only partially measured.

Now that the whole truth is known and the bitter disillusionment of the following year is a matter of record, it remains necessary to preserve something of a balance. When Russia abandoned the Allied cause and fell to swift ruin, the deserted Allies found themselves face to face with possible defeat, which, by the spring of 1918, became almost assured disaster. The emotions born of that agony served to eliminate a proper appreciation of what Russia had accomplished on the military side in three campaigns in which Russian armies fought bravely and under a leadership that will continue to command admiration.

Stripped of all detail, Russia in her last offensive literally beat herself to pieces. When the first rush was over she had again, as at the close of the campaign of 1914, exhausted her slender stock of munitions. Her armies sought by the sacrifice of numbers to compensate for the lack of adequate material, for the absence of sufficient guns and munitions. Her victories were won at a price in casualties which could only have been borne by a people in Russia's condition. From the struggle of 1916 Russia sank back exhausted; her generals had served her well, her soldiers had fought in a manner beyond praise, but her rulers had betrayed her, her statesmen had sold her military secrets to the enemy, a corrupt Court gave itself over to the scandals of Rasputin and the intrigues of German coteries. Russian autocracy under the menace of revolution held out its hands to German tyranny. Beyond all else, the unworthy rulers taught the people to hope for defeat as the sure relief from an agony for which there was no other remedy.

The measure of the progressive degeneration of national spirit and national determination is to be found in the fact that the soldiers, who, in the face of untold sacrifice, pressed forward from Volhynia to Rumania in the summer of 1916, fled the same fields, a cowardly and disorganized mob, less than a year later. We have seen in the case of the British Empire how the Irish disaffection led to the tragedy of Easter Week, how a local weakness in the national structure of Britain developed under the strain of war. In the case of Russia the disease was far more deep-seated, far more dangerous. Ever since the domestic disturbances of 1905 had compelled the Russians to make the humiliating Peace of

Portsmouth, the spirit of economic unrest and political revolution had spread and grown. A lost war, a long war; either was bound to be too great a strain upon the shaken edifice of Romanoff power.

Thus, one year after Brusiloff launched his great offensive, Russia collapsed inward. She was incapable of another military effort. This collapse was in some degree due to the strain of the final campaign, to the terrible cost in blood; it was due even more to the strain this campaign put upon the crumbling fabric of economic life. Like a weak bridge under a heavy load, Russia was collapsing when the campaign of 1916 opened, continued to crumble while the campaign progressed, and was in fact a ruin before the campaign had closed, although the fact was still hidden from the western world.

It is with a full recognition of the brutal truths of the Russian situation that we must examine the last Russian offensive. Seen in this light what was at the time recognized to be a fine soldierly achievement becomes something little short of miraculous. Nor should we fail to pay proper tribute to what was accomplished. Had there been no Russian offensive in 1916 the consequences might have been fatal for the Allied cause; had Russia collapsed in this year instead of the next, we might have had the terrible German campaign in the west in 1917 instead of 1918 and the Allies would have been condemned to fight without American help and while Austria was still capable of giving aid and not yet shaken by the long series of disasters which marked the summer months of 1916.

Falling herself, Russia dealt to Austria a blow from which the Hapsburg Monarchy did not recover in the two years and a half of the war.

How different might have been the story if Russian withdrawal in May of 1916 had permitted Austria to send all her strength against Italy, and Germany to concentrate in the west that mighty host which was, two years later, to approach Paris once more and for four months win victory after victory between the Channel and the Marne! Instead, Russia played her part, striking Turkey in Asia Minor and Austria in Galicia and Bukowina, took her high toll of Austrian and

even of German man-power, and fell to anarchy and ruin only when the campaign was over.

Yet, looking backward over the brief time that has elapsed since that summer offensive, it is impossible not to recall mournfully with what high hopes the western world read the daily reports of Russian advances, which approached the gates of Lemberg, reached the slopes of the Carpathians for yet another time, swept through the Bukowina (become the Shenandoah Valley of the Eastern war zone), and finally forced Rumania to the decision which, for a moment, led the west to expect victory and for two years thereafter awakened only sorrow and helpless anger. If one would understand the mood of the western publics in 1917—the confusion, the disillusionment, the temporary halting—it is necessary to recognize how terrible was the fall which between July and December brought Allied hopes from the heights to a Dead Sea level and destroyed confidence and courage alike.

## II. RUSSIAN STRATEGY

When the fatal campaign of 1915 came to a close the beaten Russian armies occupied a front from Riga to Rumania, behind the Dwina and the Styr, stretching across the Pripet Marshes and just touching the Austrian frontier far east of Lemberg. The armies themselves were exhausted. They had preserved a semblance of organization, they had survived by retreat, but they were in terrible need of reorganization—of reinforcement; they lacked alike guns and munitions, the loss of trained officers and soldiers had been enormous. Of man-power there was enough, more than enough; the life of the country had been weakened by the enormous drafts made upon the male population in excess of all immediate need, but for the millions, the guns were lacking. Indeed in the terrible retreats unarmed reserves had waited to take the rifles from their fallen comrades and then fill their places in the line.

That Alexieff should have been able to create out of this chaos, and in a period of six months, great armies—armies which were to win memorable victories—must remain a marvellous achievement. Nor was it less amazing that out of such confusion Brusiloff could fashion instruments

which should beat down Austrian military power and push to the very gates of Lemberg. The speed with which Russian military strength was restored deceived the world, as it surprised the German, who had turned westward to Verdun convinced that Russia was finished as a foe.

Yet long before the campaign of 1916 opened in Europe there came from Asia Minor in February an authentic sign of Russian strength. On February 16 the great Turkish fortress of Erzerum fell to the Grand Duke Nicholas and a few weeks later Russian armies entered Trebizond and completed the conquest of Turkish Armenia. Other Russian troops pressed southward seeking to effect a junction with the doomed British already immured in Kut. Thus early a blow—and a heavy blow—was struck one of Germany's allies and Turkish conditions were unmistakably critical again in this period.

The Erzerum episode was necessarily minor, another side show—cheering but of small value, since the fate of Asia was still to be determined in Europe and on the battle-lines east and west of the solid block of the Central Powers. And, so far as Russia was concerned, the operative front was to be the three hundred miles between the Pripet Marshes at Pinsk and the Rumanian frontier east of Czernowitz. Two groups of Russian armies north of Pripet, commanded by Evarts and Kuropatkin, were to make various feints and even attempt considerable operations of a subordinate character, destined to come to nothing but to hold a certain number of German troops immobilized. The main task was that of Brusiloff to the south.

Russian strategy envisaged three objectives. It was necessary to act in order to remove the pressure now being exerted by the Germans upon the French at Verdun and by the Austrians upon the Italians in Venetia. The whole Russian campaign was to conform to the general Allied conception of a concentric offensive to be delivered by all the Allies upon the Central Powers; by the Anglo-French forces at the Somme, by the Italians at the Isonzo, and by Brusiloff's Russian armies in Volhynia and Galicia. The major strategical purpose of the Russians was, however, to crush the Austro-Hungarian military power, mainly concentrated on the southeastern front.

As the campaign progressed the attention of the world was fixed upon certain geographical points—upon Kovel, Lemberg, and Stanislau, upon the capital of Galicia above all else—but although the possession of these was of utmost value to Brusiloff, their importance lay solely in the extent to which their capture of the towns would contribute to the destruction of the enemy's military establishment, to breaking his morale and his military strength. The campaign of Brusiloff was not conceived in relation to any fixed geographical objectives; his purpose was to attack upon a very wide front, to exploit successes when they had come, and to use the last ounce of power in his grasp to put Austria once and for all out of the war. The fate of Austria once more turned upon a Russian campaign, and once more Austria was to be saved, after deadly peril, only by German intervention. Thus the campaign of 1916 was to recall vividly the issues and circumstances of the earlier operation over much the same territory in 1915; it was to hold out the same promises and to end in even greater disappointments, after preliminary successes rivalling those of the former year.

### III. BATTLEFIELD AND ARMIES

On the front from Pripet to Rumania five Austrian armies faced four Russian. The Austrian armies from north to south were: the First, under Puhallo; the Fourth, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand; the Second, under Boehm-Ermoli; an Austro-German Army, which was mainly Austrian, under Von Bothmer; and the Sixth, under Pflanzer-Baltin. Facing them were: the Eighth Russian Army, under Kaledin; the Eleventh, under Sakharoff; the Seventh, under Scherbachoff; and the Ninth, under Lechitsky. Still another Russian army, under Loesche, was to appear on the north between Pripet and the bend of the Styr, after the first offensive had driven its deep wedge toward Kovel.

Of the five Austrian armies only two were fatally involved in the first phase of the Russian offensive: that of the Archduke facing Rovno, occupying the fortresses of Dubno and Lutsk and covering the vital railroad junction of Kovel, which became the geographical objective of

Kaledin in June; and that of Pflanzer, defending Bukowina from the Dniester to the Rumanian boundary on the Pruth. Both of these armies were substantially destroyed and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was replaced by a German general, Von Linsingen, when German reserves were sent to save the day. It was the steadfast resistance of the army of Bothmer which actually saved the situation in all the critical period of June and July, by covering Lemberg and holding fast when the armies on either flank crumbled.

As to numbers engaged the Austrians, with small German contingents, had, when the battle opened, some forty-one divisions, rather more than 600,000 men. The Russians were at least three times as strong. As the struggle progressed the numbers were somewhat equalized by the arrival of Austrian troops recalled from Italy and German troops sent from France, but throughout the campaign the Russian advantage was very great in numbers, although after the first months this advantage was counterbalanced by the familiar exhaustion of Russian munitions.

The three hundred miles of front on which the campaign was fought extended from the marshes and lowlands about Pripet southward across the higher ground of eastern Galicia and presently to the Carpathian Mountains at Kimpolung. The Russians, advancing from east to west, had to cross a number of considerable rivers, flowing from south to north and from north to south—notably the Styr and the Stakhod in Volhynia and the Sereth and the Strypa in Galicia; they had also to force a passage of the Dniester and the Pruth on the frontiers of Bukowina. They were handicapped at all times by the scarcity of roads and railroads and, in the north, by the marshy nature of much of the country.

On this front, more than half as extensive as that between Switzerland and the sea, the Austrians had not constructed defences rivalling the German systems at the Somme. For these the distances were too great. Over much of the front there were no continuous trenches and behind the first lines were no such switch lines and second and third systems of defences as had been revealed at the Battle of Champagne and were again to be disclosed at the Somme. Yet even on this front

open warfare of the old-fashioned sort was not to take place on any large scale. Driven from one system of defences the Austrians were presently to be found behind hastily constructed trenches, before which the fury of Russian advance was checked in due course of time.

During the Russian advances, the railway junctions of Kovel, Lemberg, and Stanislau came to have an extraordinary value. Could the Russians have taken Kovel they would have broken the connection between German and Austrian armies; could they have taken Lemberg they would have paralyzed all Austrian connections in Galicia; the value of Stanislau was less considerable but it was unmistakable. But while these railway points remained in their hands, the Austrians were able to move reserves from one point to another with the greatest ease, while the Kovel-Brest-Litovsk line insured the arrival of German reinforcements at critical moments. Of these three junctions the more important, Kovel and Lemberg, were never lost during this campaign, and the Austrians were therefore at all times infinitely better off, both in the matter of trunk and lateral communications, and were thus enabled to use a smaller number of men to a far greater advantage than their foes, whose ultimate failure may, in some measure at least, be traced to the poverty of communications. Stanislau was finally captured, but the consequences were slight.

### IV. JUNE 5

Turning now to the actual progress of events: the first warning of the coming storm reached the Austrians on June 4, when the Russians began a deliberate bombardment of their lines from Pripet to Rumania. It was not a concentrated fire like that which struck the French before Verdun or which had overwhelmed the Russians themselves at the Dunajec the previous year. An attack on so wide a front, too, was a novelty in the war, for hitherto the widest front assailed had been the twenty-mile stretch along the Dunajec. By contrast the Russians swept three hundred miles.

The following day all five Austrian armies were assailed by Russian

*THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN JUNE, 1916*




*BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED.*

infantry in one of the greatest battles of the war. The results of this grandiose attack varied along the front, quite as was to be expected. From the Pripet Marshes right down to Kolki in the bend of the Styr there was no marked Russian gain. Below Kolki, on the other hand, as far as the Galician frontier, there was a material gain, which in the centre developed into the piercing of the Austrian front by Kaledin's

army at half a dozen points, notably at Olika, due west of Rovno, and the immediate inrush of the Russian flood.

In the next few days this flood swept forward fifty miles. Dubno and Lutsk—which, with Rovno (never lost by the Russians), constituted the Volhynian triangle of fortresses—were promptly taken; the Styr was passed, and Kaledin's army approached both Kovel and Vladimir-Volynski, road and railroad junctions of utmost importance. By the end of the first week a wedge over forty miles deep, and twice as wide at its base, had been driven into the Austrian front between the bend of the Styr at Kolki and the old Austrian frontier northeast of Brody. More than 70,000 prisoners had been taken from the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, which had been routed and had fled westward toward Kovel.

While the Austrian armies in the centre, those of Boehm-Ermoli and Bothmer, had suffered only local reverses, the fate of the Archduke's army had also overtaken that of Pflanzer and it had been driven in rout southward through Bukowina—which was totally cleared—into the Carpathians and westward along the Dniester upon Stanislau. In its first resistance it had lost more than 40,000 prisoners and had practically ceased to exist as an army.

By the middle of June the situation had become critical. Unless the beaten Austrians were promptly reinforced, a gap was sure to open between Austrian and German armies, when the Russians reached Kovel; the advance of Lechitsky south of the Dniester was threatening Lemberg from the south, while that of Sakharoff was becoming equally menacing from the north along the Lemberg-Rovno railroad toward Brody. Only in the centre and before the army of Bothmer were the Russians checked, and Bothmer's position was becoming perilous, since both his flanks were threatened. On the map his situation had already become impossible, but owing to the character of the country he was able to hold on for many weeks and ultimately make good his retirement.

In this situation German intervention was rapid and efficient. While the Archduke's routed army streamed back to Kovel, German

divisions were hurried down along the railways from Poland and the Russian front; a new army was created, and the defeated Archduke deprived of all but nominal authority. By the third week in June the Germans were counter-attacking on the northern side of the Russian wedge, driven toward Kovel, and in the next few days the counter-attack achieved its purpose. The Russian advance was first checked, then thrown back a small distance. The peril to Kovel was abolished and time was allowed the Germans to reorganize the defences in this quarter. When these reorganizations were completed, ground would be surrendered to a new Russian drive, made to the north of the salient, and the Russian advance would reach the Stakhod from the Pripet Marshes southward; but not again during the campaign would Kovel be in danger.

Rarely has a German stroke been more skilfully delivered or more promptly and completely successful. It did not achieve as much as the Germans had hoped for it; neither Dubno nor Lutsk was retaken; substantially all the ground gained by the Russians was either retained or presently recaptured, but the German counter-offensive did break the force of the Russian thrust in the direction of Kovel. In doing this Linsinger accomplished for the Germans what Ivanoff strove to accomplish at the San in the previous year, when, after the defeat of the Dunajec, he strove to stabilize the whole front at the San River. Had Linsingen failed as Ivanoff had failed, the dislocation of the Austro-German lines would certainly have extended northward into Poland and a general German retirement might have resulted.

### V. THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE

By the end of June the first phase of the Russian offensive was over. More than 200,000 prisoners and 200 cannon had been taken, together with an enormous booty in material and supplies. A large portion of the Russian province of Volhynia had been cleared; all of the Bukowina had been reoccupied or was destined soon to be taken. The German counter-offensive east of Kovel had been halted and was manifestly on the wane. Loesche's army, brought south, was already preparing to advance north of Kaledin's salient, and the ultimate retirement of the Ger-

mans to the line of the Stakhod was plainly forecast. To the south, Sakharoff's army was advancing up the Styr and astride the Lemberg-Rovno railroad; it was almost at the frontier and within striking distance of the considerable frontier town of Brody. Scherbachoff's army was less successful and had made only minor progress against Bothmer, west of Tarnapol; but on both sides of the river Lechitsky was pushing up the Dniester Valley; was approaching Kolomea, had taken Czernowitz, and was threatening Stanislau and—beyond it—the vital railroad communications between Lemberg and Hungary. Actually the Russians were now nearer to Lemberg than they had been to the front which they now held in Volhynia, facing Kovel, when they had begun their great offensive a little more than three weeks earlier.

By comparison with what the British and French were to accomplish in the next four months at the Somme, the Russians' achievement was already colossal. The attack had been a surprise to the foe; this surprise—a factor not to appear effectively on the west front until the great German offensive of 1918—had enabled them to break through at a number of points on the Volhynian front, to break through as no western offensive prior to that of Ludendorff in 1918 was to break through, and, following the initial piercing, the victorious Russians had covered nearly fifty miles before they were checked.

This was assuredly a marvellous reversal of form after the long and terrible months of disaster in the previous year and the retreats that seemed to have no ending. Yet there were signs—which the Germans recognized and promptly reported—signs which should have had a warning for the western powers, but had no meaning. If Russia had inflicted terrible losses upon the Austrians, the method of her generals had imposed upon her troops colossal sacrifices. Long before the campaign had reached its climax German statements fixed the Russian losses in killed alone at 264,000, which was far above the total of captured Austrians and indicated that the total of Russian losses was above a million.

Moreover, great as had been the immediate success, it had not resulted in the sweeping advances of 1914. Bothmer stood on the ground

over which Brusiloff himself had advanced in the first considerable battle of the eastern front, and the result of that earlier battle had been an Austrian defeat and the evacuation of Lemberg. A single defeat in August and September, two years earlier, had sufficed to turn the Austrians out of eastern Galicia as far as the San. But the later Austrian disaster, great as it was, had not produced a general dislocation of the Austrian front. The old story of the warfare of positions had been reproduced on the grand scale of eastern operations. The victorious Russians had outrun their guns and their supplies, the routed Austrians had retired upon guns and German reinforcements; a balance had presently been restored and the Russian advance pinned down—thrown back slightly.

And in point of fact this Russian check was as fatal to the main Russian purposes as the check which Ludendorff suffered—two years later in his Picardy offensive of March—was to the German purpose to seek a decision by a single blow. Brusiloff had borrowed the German strategy, the Napoleonic tradition. He had sought to crush the Austrian armies and he had dealt them a terrific blow, but the blow just lacked the weight which would insure a decision. When next he struck he would find German divisions along his front and German generals in command of the opposing armies.

Thus, while London and Paris were once more acclaiming the Russian "steam roller" marvellously restored to efficiency and this time setting out not for Berlin or Vienna but for the more modest objective of Lemberg, the real opportunity was passing—had, in, fact passed; the Russian offensive was assuming the familiar and the fatal character of so many western offensives which had opened with bright hopes and material initial success only to end in dismal slaughter and unmistakable check when the effort was made to exploit them after the first hours of success.

### VI. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE SLOWS DOWN

We have now briefly to summarize the further phases of the Russian offensive, to narrate how it gradually lost power and slowed down, spent

its resources and its energies. There was no defeat, there was not even a positive check along the whole front. Armies continued to advance, ground was still gained right up to September, when the Rumanian entrance into the struggle transformed the whole situation; but from July onward the larger possibilities had vanished. By this time the German intervention was becoming effective. German generals and German divisions were appearing along the whole front.

In this period German strategy—for it was German strategy that dominated—did not seek an offensive victory. As at the Somme, the Germans sought only to make the price of advance prohibitive and to wear out the force of the still superior opposing numbers, before the Russians should reach Lemberg or Kovel. Between these towns and the front as it existed on July 1 the Germans were prepared to surrender a certain amount of ground; to hold both these railroad centres was, however, a fixed purpose.

Russian strategy had aimed at the destruction of the Austrian armies. But after the first attack this was no longer possible. On the contrary, it became necessary for Brusiloff, before he could resume a general offensive, to reorganize his own front. He had created in the enemy line two enormous pockets—one along the Styr in Volhynia, the other in the Bukowina—two pockets strikingly recalling those which were the consequence of Ludendorff's mighty offensives in Picardy and Champagne two years later. But these pockets or salients were vulnerable to attacks on the flank, as the German counter-offensive from Kovel had demonstrated, and Brusiloff's first task was to straighten his front, to bring it into line with points of the wedges he had driven into the Austrian line in June. In the main, he accomplished this in July and August; but, in doing it, he consumed the time and the resources which were needed for a new general attack. And as a consequence this attack never came; it was attempted one year later, in the pathetic Kerensky offensive which, despite its forlorn failure, began with victory, but, because it was not pressed, promptly collapsed.

The first and most obvious duty was to establish the safety of that great wedge driven toward Kovel, now rather less than twenty-five

miles distant from the Russian front. Its weakness was demonstrated by the German counter-offensive from the north, delivered in June, and again outlined by a second counter-offensive prepared at the south, in front of Sakharoff's army, but never delivered because it was forestalled by a Russian thrust.

Accordingly, in the first days of July, Loesche's army, brought south from the region north of Pripet Marsh, attacked on a front from the bend of the Styr to Kolki, broke down the Austrian defences, crossed the Styr, and carried the whole Russian line forward in a straight line from the point of the Kovel wedge to the marsh. Finally checked at the crossings of the Stakhod River it did not pause until it had accomplished the main purpose. The Lutsk salient was ironed out on the north; the rear and flank of Kaledin was assured against a new thrust from the north. In point of fact, Kaledin was able to get forward and retake the ground lost in mid-June, but was promptly pulled down before he had again threatened Kovel. And with this operation the campaign for Kovel ends. Kaledin and Loesche have done their work, they must wait for the armies to the south to complete theirs, and this work will not be completed when the campaign ends.

Having straightened his front to the north about the Lutsk salient, Brusiloff in mid-July turns to the southern side of the salient along the Upper Styr, where the Germans and Austrians are preparing a new counter-offensive designed to retake Dubno and Lutsk and turn the southern flank of Kaledin. In a series of brilliant offensives Sakharoff pushes down the Rovno-Lemberg railway, defeats the army of Boehm-Ermoli, takes more than fifty thousand prisoners, and presently captures Brody and arrives on the northern flank of Bothmer's army, which is standing like Thomas at Chickamauga, standing behind the Strypa facing Tarnopol—a rock on which all the German strategy in this eastern field is founded. More than this, the Sakharoff advance draws close to the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway, which is vital to the existence of Bothmer's northern wing. In July, however, Bothmer still holds on.

Brusiloff has thus secured his northern positions. Now his line runs practically straight from Pripet to Brody, along the Stakhod and

the Upper Styr. He threatens Bothmer's left flank along the Brody-Lemberg railway, but on this front and southward Bothmer's position is too strong to be forced by frontal attack. Accordingly, it is the turn of Lechitsky, astride the Dniester and already victorious in the Bukowina, to push up the middle Dniester. When he has advanced to Stanislau and approached Halicz, he will have turned Bothmer's southern flank, and Bothmer, with both flanks turned, will have no choice but to retire toward Lemberg, behind the Zlota Lipa or even the Gnila Lipa, where Brusiloff found and routed the Austrian armies in September, 1914. Once Bothmer is in retreat, then the road to Lemberg should be open.

But it is only in August that Lechitsky can get into motion, the heavy rains bringing the rivers up to a flood stage. August 7 Lechitsky sets out. He is in Stanislau on August 10, while Scherbachoff to the north, advancing in line, gives him aid north of the Dniester, and the vital crossings and roads on Bothmer's flank are by this date lost to the general, who has made such a long and gallant fight in his first positions. As a result Bothmer at last gets up and retires behind the Zlota Lipa, in good order, with only a moderate amount of losses in guns and prisoners. By the second week in August he is in his new position, having postponed his withdrawal for ten priceless weeks and thus prevented Brusiloff from reaping immediate rewards for his great successes north and south.

We have then, by the middle of August, this situation: From Pripet right down to the Dniester and thence to the Carpathians the Russian line has been pushed forward from thirty to fifty miles; Kovel is hardly twenty miles away, Lemberg only a little more. Twenty thousand square miles of territory, 300,000 prisoners, and an immense booty in supplies have been gathered in. German divisions have been drawn from France, Austrian divisions from Italy; a terrific strain has been put upon the resources of the Central Powers and it still seems possible, now that the whole Russian front has been brought forward, that another general attack may bring the Czar to Lemberg and insure the reconquest of Eastern Galicia.

*From a painting by Lieut. Henri Farre. Courtesy of the artist*

CAPTAIN BONE DOWNING A BOCHE

A remarkable exploit of Captain Bone, one of the well known British airmen. Perceiving an enemy airplane coming to drop bombs on houses near the shore, he gave chase, overtook it, and sent it plunging down into the sea.

### VII. THE END

After August 15, the story of Brusiloff's offensive is briefly told. For three weeks there is a desperate struggle between Scherbachoff and Bothmer north of the Dniester and the Austrian is pushed back slightly on both flanks, straight in upon Halicz to the south, but manages, with the aid of German divisions, to hold on. The Russian effort wears out and the whole Russian offensive from Pripet to the Dniester is over. Meantime Lechitsky has been diverted from his operations up the Dniester and, in accord with Scherbachoff, by the entrance of Rumania, and the necessity of covering the flank of the Rumanian army along the Carpathians, while that army is still invading Transylvania.

Lechitsky's earlier successes in sweeping the Bukowina had enabled Rumania to concentrate her efforts on the west instead of the north; indeed, without this reconquest of the Bukowina, the Rumanian entrance into the war might not have occurred; but the moment Rumania did enter, Russian attention was diverted from Galicia to the Bukowina and presently Russian divisions were, all too tardily, sent to support an ally, overcome in the first weeks of the war. Had Rumania not entered the war it is conceivable—just conceivable—that Brusiloff, by concentrating all his armies and all his remaining resources upon a final drive at Lemberg, might have taken the city. But this is merest speculation; in any event, after September 1 this was no longer a possibility. His campaign had, moreover, lost its original value.

And thus in September and in October the last Russian offensive eventually wears itself out. Rumanian events fill the newspapers and banish the minor incidents of the Russian offence. All the larger hopes of June and even of July perish. Despite great early victories and continued progress, Russian resources have proven inadequate for the task set by Russian strategy. Austrian armies have been shaken, desperately shaken, but German reserves and German generals have restored the balance. Russia has received even more deadly wounds than she has inflicted, and the territory which has been conquered in

*THE ADVANCE ON LEMBERG, JUNE–SEPTEMBER, 1916*

*BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED*

the brilliant campaign will have no value in the future—will be surrendered to Austria almost without a struggle in the next summer.

Recalling the prompt Austrian collapse in the first days of Kerensky's despairing offensive of the next year, it is not too much to say that had Russia been able to exploit her victories of 1916 by a campaign of 1917, Lemberg would have fallen promptly and Eastern Galicia have been cleared as promptly as it had been in 1914. As he ended his campaign Brusiloff stood in advantageous positions from Pripet

to the Carpathians. Another winter of preparation like the previous one would assure him of sufficient resources to make a new drive as great as that of the preceding June, and such a drive would have carried him, victorious, into Lemberg for a second time.

But all of this was not to be. The Russian army had fought its last campaign. It closed that campaign victoriously and with the prize for which it had contended well within its grasp. After four campaigns Austria was only capable of a limited further resistance, made possible by German aid. In September, 1916, every outward sign pointed to the collapse, not of the Romanoff but of the Hapsburg Empire. Even the disaster to Rumania seemed but a passing incident to be repaired, when Russia was again ready to move in the spring. But at work behind the victorious armies of Brusiloff were treason of the Court and autocracy and the anarchy of the Bolsheviki. We leave the Russian army in the autumn of 1916 still a powerful, organized, disciplined force; we shall find it in the spring of 1917 a mob, destitute of discipline, courage, loyalty. It was destined to disappear, not like Napoleon's Grand Army in a defeat made glorious by the valour and devotion of the vanquished, but in a flight from a field on which it was still actually victorious and from which it had driven its opponents.

For all practical purposes Brusiloff's campaign is over by the middle of September, the operations of Lechitsky in the Carpathians have become a detail in the Rumanian campaign to the south.

# CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# RUMANIA IS SACRIFICED

## I

## THE BATTLE OF EUROPE

On August 27 Rumania declared war upon the Central Powers and her first troops crossed the Austrian frontier. By September 1 her army was at work and the decisive moment arrived in that grandiose struggle, unequalled in extent and numbers engaged, which had already been described on both sides of the firing lines as the Battle of Europe.

Before passing to a discussion of the political and military circumstances of the Rumanian episode, it is necessary to consider for a moment the exact situation as it existed on September 1, 1916. For two years no such season of hope and eager expectation of victory was to come again to the nations allied against Germany. At this precise moment Allied confidence and Allied calculations were at the highest level they had reached since the opening of the conflict. Looking backward now over the grim and bitter days that were soon to come, Allied optimism and blindness in this September period seem almost unbelievable.

Yet they are not inexplicable. The Germans and the Austrian allies had undertaken two great offensives: Verdun in February, and the Trentine adventure in May. Both had long ago been checked. Verdun had now become as patent a failure as the Venetian effort. The German and Austrian failures had been in turn followed by great Allied offensives, and at the moment Rumania entered the war the Somme campaign was developing into a real success; Haig was at last sweeping up and over the Ridge between Albert and Bapaume; Brusiloff was still advancing both in Volhynia and in Galicia; in the Bukowina his troops were forcing the last barriers of the Carpathian passes. Along the Isonzo Italy had taken Gorizia, was still victorious in the present, and

apparently capable of making still further progress in the immediate future.

In the west, Bapaume and Péronne were to all appearances almost within Anglo-French grasp; in the south, Italian hands seemed closing on Trieste; in the east, Lemberg and Kovel were universally regarded as certain fruits of the next Russian harvest—soon to be gathered. Far down in the Balkans Sarrail's army was giving sure signs of an impending offensive. Not only was the Battle of Europe in progress but on all sides Germany and Austria were being assailed—were on the defensive and were threatened by disasters and defeats which seemed certain to arrive at no distant date and bring with them the authentic evidence that the Central Powers had lost the war.

September 1, 1916, was one of the great moments of the war; it was a moment when Paris, London, and Rome were already convinced that decisive victory was at hand. Only in Petrograd was there a suspicion of the truth, and what was going on in Petrograd, vital as it was to the whole Allied cause, was totally unknown in all other Allied capitals. Now as we must understand the Allied mood in September, 1916, when Rumania brought a new front and a new army to the campaign, it is equally essential that we should see facts as contrasted with appearances —the facts out of which was now to develop one of the grimmest tragedies of the war (comparable only with the Belgian episode), namely, the destruction of Rumania and, as a consequence, a decline in Allied confidence and morale, which opened the way to the German peace offensive of December.

The fact, as contrasted with appearances, was this: Despite material gains, the Somme offensive had failed to pierce the German line and was destined in part at least, because of weather conditions, to continue to fail—to remain nothing more than a pounding operation, enormously costly to both contestants but without chance of a decisive issue. The Italian offensive at Gorizia was over. The Russian offensive in the east had already been checked and was now dying out. Brusiloff, like Cadorna, had exhausted his resources and in exhausting them he had missed a decisive victory. The gains on the west, the east, and the Italian

fronts were relatively unimportant; they had no decisive value. On all fronts the enemy armies remained intact, and behind the enemy lines the hostile nations stood with unshaken confidence and unbroken morale.

The Rumanian enlistment was hailed in all Allied quarters as destined to prove the final and decisive action; the intervention of a powerful reserve which, at the moment when the issue of the Battle of Europe was to be determined, would fall upon the exhausted armies of the Central Powers and produce what Napoleon was accustomed to call "the event." But the truth is that Rumania, led into the war by Russian treachery, was already marked as a victim, both by the reactionary elements in control in Russia and by their partners in the conspiracy, the German General Staff.

Actually the Rumanian army was used as the reserve of the Allies. It was thrown in at the moment regarded as likely to be decisive, but it was thrown against an unshaken enemy, still strong in reserves, who was able to break the attacking reserve, throw it back in utter ruin, advance and win the Battle of Europe, and, thus, the military and the moral advantage of the campaign of 1916. We have now come to the decisive moment. It is of utmost importance now to lay aside any limited view of the battlefield, to dismiss any estimate of the relative value of the separate spheres of operations, to see the thing as a unit—as a single battle—and to recognize that it was because the Germans saw the situation in the single and unified fashion that they won the battle, the campaign, and—almost—the war itself.

If one should go back to the Civil War for a parallel—always tempting and always dangerous—the situation in the Battle of Europe in the opening days of September was the situation of Gettysburg on the third day, and the onset of the Rumanians was like the charge of Pickett's troops. In both instances an undefeated enemy was assailed in his chosen positions, precisely as he had hoped to be assailed; and in each case the assault failed. As a consequence, the assailants were compelled to abandon their whole strategy, which sought a decision in the campaign. And in the case of the European struggle, the victors—unlike Meade at Gettysburg—passing to the offensive in their own turn, har-

vested great profits from their victory, in territory, prisoners, and in the moral values which, in the existing situation, were of far greater importance.

The cause of the Rumanian failure is to be found in Russian treachery, in the treason of the ministry of Stuermer and Protopopoff. They deliberately planned that Rumania should attack and be destroyed, that Russia might obtain peace—the peace of the vanquished, but without decisive defeat of her own armies—and that thus the domestic revolution, already visible to them, might be averted and the soldiers at the front be turned against the Russian people in a desperate effort to suppress the insurrection, bound to come if the war were protracted through another winter. Yet, recognizing all this, what is to be said of the blindness of Allied statesmanship, which permitted the terrible tragedy to occur without suspecting a single minor circumstance of it?

## II. THE POLICY OF NATIONAL INSTINCT

The reasons which underlay Rumania's entrance into the war, the larger impelling motives, are easily explained. Rumania enlisted with the nations fighting the Central Powers for precisely the reasons that Sardinia had allied herself with France and then with Prussia in the last century. In both cases the Italians sought to free portions of their own race and areas of territory inhabited by Italians and which belonged by all rights—based upon race, language, and common national aspiration—to a united Italy.

In the same fashion Rumanian patriots pursued a policy which one of the most distinguished Rumanian statesman, M. Take Jonescu, defined as the policy of national instinct. In the Bukowina, Transylvania, and Banat more than 4,000,000 Rumanians lived under the harsh yoke of Austrian and Hungarian rulers. The claim of Italy to Venetia was no more valid than that of Rumania to Transylvania, and just as Italy was indefensible, while Austria held the Venetian passes, Rumania was condemned to exist as a pliant tool of the Central Alliance while the Austrians maintained their sway in the southern half of Bukowina and the Hungarians continued to hold Transylvania.

And in these regions of Rumania Irredenta Austro-Hungarian rule had been consistently brutal and inhuman. All the hideous circumstances of Austrian oppression in Northern Italy in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, which had stirred Europe and even America, were repeated in the unfortunate lands about the Transylvania Alps. It was not mere land hunger or grandiose and selfish ambition that led the Rumanians to enter the war. They sought territorial aggrandizement, yes; but they sought it only to obtain that race unification which was equally desired by the Rumanians of Austrian and Hungarian provinces alike. Left to themselves, the inhabitants of the Bukowina, of Transylvania, and of large sections of the Banat would have chosen the Rumanian nationality. They were held by Austrian and Hungarian bayonets; they were held as the Italians of Lombardy and Venetia had been held more than half a century before, as the people of Trieste and the Trentino were still held when Italy entered the war for reasons wholly comparable to those which later led Rumania to the fatal decision.

The facts of the Rumanian situation were little understood in the west, where the accession of Rumania was hailed merely because the new ally brought half a million bayonets and was believed to bring the decisive aid which would win the victory. When Rumania had failed, after the most shameful betrayal in modern history, the Germans skilfully covered the beaten foe with discredit by alleging that the motives of this little Latin state were selfish, as selfish as the German ambitions. And in a certain measure the western world absorbed this poison. Yet nothing could be more untrue or unjust. Rumania sought to liberate men and women of her own race eager to become fellow citizens; Germany brought the terrible war upon the world to enslave people of alien races whose desire—expressed in gallant and despairing resistance—was to escape the German yoke and preserve their own national liberty.

Rumania was crushed as Sardinia was crushed at Novara; all her patriotic dreams were extinguished, for the time being, in the terrible disasters of the last weeks of 1916. Afterward, the collapse of Russia led to the final betrayal; Rumania, powerless to resist longer, was thrown to her enemies by the Bolsheviki; she had to accept the terms of a new

Treaty of Bucharest which bound her hand and foot to the Central Powers—politically, economically, in all respects save morally. But the very circumstances of her betrayal and surrender were such that a duty was placed upon her western allies—who were powerless to prevent the destruction, who had welcomed an ally already marked for slaughter—to demand and obtain for Rumania (exactly as for Serbia equally unfortunate), not merely liberty and a restoration of the lands seized in the present war, but the realization of the larger but not less valid moral claims upon Rumanian peoples beyond the limits of the political map of 1914.

Belgium, Serbia, Rumania; these are the three small states which were, each in turn, sacrificed to the German power, while their great allies stood helpless and hopeless, unable to foresee the truth as to the situation in each of these countries, unable to aid when the truth became manifest. For the Belgian martyrdom there was, perhaps, no remedy; but it is impossible to believe, now, that both the Serbian and the Rumanian disasters could not have been avoided had western statesmen been capable of perceiving the truth and seeing the battlefield of Europe as a whole.

### III. CONSPIRACY

At the outset of the World War the aged King Carol—to whom Rumania owed much of her prosperous development in previous decades but who was a German and a Hohenzollern by derivation and tradition—sought earnestly to persuade his country to enter the struggle on the side of the Central Powers. In this his failure was absolute. Bound, like Italy, by a defensive alliance with Germany and with Austria, Rumanian statesmen, like Italian, instantly asserted that the war upon which the Central Powers had embarked was offensive, not defensive, and that, as a consequence, Rumania was under no obligation to furnish military aid.

The early death of King Carol removed the one force which might have preserved Rumanian neutrality; no force could have availed to enlist Rumania on the Austrian side. The new sovereign, Ferdinand,

did not share his predecessors' extreme German sympathies and his wife—a daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh and a brilliant and beautiful woman—was wholly devoted to the idea of Rumanian participation on the Allied side. Like the Queen of Greece, who is the Kaiser's only sister, the Rumanian Queen, whose mother was a Russian Grand Duchess, played a powerful part—although in an opposing cause—in all the Balkan intrigues of the first two years of the war.

Yet before the struggle was far advanced it was patent that Rumania did but await the favourable moment to enter the conflict, that Rumanian policy was identical with that of Italy. Both Latin states foresaw the need of temporary neutrality, pending alike the reorganization of their military power and the arrival of the moment when their intervention might be effective. In 1915, when Italy cast her lot with the Allies and declared war upon Austria, Rumania would have followed suit promptly, but the Russian defeat at the Dunajec and the expulsion of Russian armies from the Bukowina and Galicia, together with the far-swinging German invasion of Russia, forbade Rumanian intervention. Not until it was clear that Russia could react after such a series of disasters was a Rumanian declaration conceivable. Moreover, in the period just preceding the Dunajec, Russian statesmen had adopted, with respect of Rumania, a high tone and an uncompromising spirit in the matter of territorial arrangements, which had contributed to delaying any possible Rumanian participation until the Dunajec defeat arrived.

But Brusiloff's victories in June, 1916, had changed the situation. Lechitsky's successful advance through the Bukowina to the Carpathian passes had secured the northern flank of Rumanian forces and insured communications between Russia and Rumania. These victories, too, gave early promise of leading swiftly to a decisive triumph over Austria and the downfall of the Hapsburg Monarchy. In Bucharest and elsewhere it was believed that Rumania's hour had come, and the reports of German and Austrian ministers in the Rumanian capital alike bore testimony to the fact that the entrance of Rumania could no longer be postponed for any considerable time.

It was, however, from Petrograd and not from Bucharest that the

word came. An ultimatum was suddenly despatched from Russia to Rumania demanding that Rumania forthwith enlist or pay the penalty in the surrender of all hopes for territorial and racial unification at the close of the war. In substance the Stuermer Cabinet said to the Rumanian Premier, Bratiano: "Either you now throw Rumania into the struggle on our side or you forfeit all claim upon us for any future benefit when Austria, now on the point of collapse, is finally beaten." To such an ultimatum there could be but one answer.

Yet the purpose of Stuermer and his associates is now clear. Already they realized that Brusiloff's offensive had reached its crest. Treason, corruption, incapacity, added to the natural lack of industrial machinery, had made impossible the task of munitioning and supplying the vast Russian armies sufficiently to permit the continuation of the victorious advance in the southeast. And unless a decisive victory were to be had, only peace could prevent a Russian revolution, fatal to the Crown and to the bureaucracy alike. Since the decisive victory was not to be obtained, peace was to be had only when a new German military victory should establish the fact that no complete or even relatively complete Allied victory was possible. Such a German victory, if won against Russia, would discredit further the already discredited Russian Government, but if Rumania were defeated, instead of Russia, the régime might escape and—peace by negotiation following—its hands might be left free for a campaign of repression within Russia, which would prevent the revolution otherwise inevitable.

This much has already been made clear by the documents which were spread before an astonished Allied world in the early stages of the Russian Revolution. Rumania was ordered by the Russian Cabinet to go to what was expected and even planned to be certain defeat. Not only was all necessary aid refused to Rumania in advance of the opening of her campaign, but she was betrayed into the Transylvania offensive by the express assurance from Petrograd that Bulgaria would remain neutral. Yet as soon as Rumania was deeply committed in Transylvania, Bulgaria—as she had done in the case of Serbia in the previous year—threw off the mask and declared war, and thus opened

the way for the campaign of Mackensen, which led to the fall of Bucharest and the ruin of Rumania.

Such, in their broadest details, are the circumstances of the betrayal of Rumania. The Russian bureaucracy prepared a defeat of the Rumanian armies that the way might be opened for a peace by negotiation. We are left to conjecture how far this conspiracy was based upon utter treason to Russia—procured by German intrigue at the Russian Court—and German corruption in high places, and how far it was the result of the conviction of the reigning bureaucracy that only peace could save Russia from revolution. In any case, it was beyond any conceivable defence. It was the shameful betrayal of a little state, forced by a brutal ultimatum to take up arms in the face of certain ruin. Seeking to escape domestic revolution, the Russian Cabinet invited defeat on the battlefield—but defeat, not for its own armies, but for those of a state, that was powerless to resist the imperative order of Petrograd that it take up arms or forego its legitimate national aspirations.

And when Rumania had fallen, Germany, true to her agreement with Petrograd, made her proposal of peace by negotiation; but the western nations declined the proffer. Russia fell into revolution as a consequence, just as Stuermer had foreseen. One other consequence of the Revolution—satisfactory to all the world which at last knew the truth—was the execution of those ministers and agents who had procured the Rumanian betrayal. Their treason was in vain; neither Russia nor their own régime was saved; but they did not meet their doom until Rumania had been wrecked and their western Allies had lost the Battle of Europe.

### IV. THE RUMANIAN OFFENSIVE

On the morning of her declaration of war Rumania's situation was this: She had 300,000 first-line troops and had added to this number sufficiently to bring the field strength of her army to about half a million. The troops were fairly well equipped in minor details, but were woefully weak in the all-essential departments of heavy artillery, field artillery, and machine guns. There was, also, only a scanty supply of

munitions for such artillery as was available. Tardy but sincere efforts made by France and Britain to equip their prospective ally had been thwarted by the treachery of Russian officials and the inefficiency of Russian transport. Guns intended for Rumania were presently discovered in the Ural Mountains and vast quantities of munitions remained at Archangel.

At the outset of the campaign the Rumanian problem was twofold, Rumania had to face two eventualities represented by an existing army in the Bulgarian frontier regions and by the sure arrival of an Austro-German force on the northern and western frontiers beyond the Transylvanian Alps. But at the moment Transylvania was empty of all but a few divisions of garrison troops. Some effort must be made westward, because there was already gathering on the flank of Lechitsky's forces in the Bukowina a counter-offensive, designed to restore the situation which had been compromised by Brusiloff's series of victories in June and subsequently.

The temptation was to extend this necessary operation into a real invasion of Transylvania, the passage of the mountains, and the occupation of Transylvanian territory until the line should run straight from Dorna Watra, where the Rumanians made contact with the Russians, straight down to the Iron Gates. This would shorten the extended front by a third, give the Rumanians the advantage of lateral communication behind the new front—a thing that was lacking, if they stood at the frontier—and it would instantly liberate a large portion of the territory which all Rumanians looked forward to seeing incorporated in their national domain as a result of the war.

The danger of such a venture—the fatal danger, as it was to develop all too soon—lay in the fact that if Rumania sent her masses northward, the Dobrudja district would be open to immediate invasion from Bulgaria and even Bucharest would be exposed to ultimate peril when the enemy forces south of the Danube reached sufficient strength.

All turned upon the attitude of Bulgaria, and the tactics of Bulgaria, with respect of Serbia a year before, gave a fair indication of what might be expected now. On the other hand, imperious directions came from

Petrograd to Bucharest for the invasion of Transylvania, coupled with the assurance that Bulgaria would remain neutral so far as Rumania was concerned; in fact, it was the identical assurance which, before Mackensen had struck south, had come to Belgrade in 1915, while Bulgaria was still unmobilized and a Serbian army on foot could have struck the Bulgarians down.

Had Bulgaria been actually an enemy, Rumania then would have had no choice but to go south and dispose of the Bulgarian force before she turned north and this was possible, because it was bound to take time for the Austrians and Germans to get together a force to attack Rumania. Moreover, this course would give promise of an eventual junction with the Salonica army, which was bound to advance when once the Bulgarian forces before it were drawn northward to defend Sofia. The result might have been a fairly accurate repetition of the events in the Second Balkan War, three years before.

Advised by Russia, however, that Bulgaria would not take a hand, Rumania sent her armies across the Transylvanian frontier on the first day of the war. This frontier was three hundred miles in extent and followed the crest of the Carpathian Mountains, which made a fairly regular right angle, enclosing Transylvania on two sides and separating it from Wallachia on the south and Moldavia on the east. These mountains were cut by a number of passes, the chief of which on the southern side of the right angle and from west to east were the Vulkan, the Red Tower, and the Predeal, and on the east side, from south to north, the Oitoz, Gyimes, and Bekas.

Rumanian forces were divided into four armies—three of them destined to invade Hungarian territory and the fourth, whose mission it was to defend the Danubian frontier and the Dobrudja district between Silistria on the river and Kavarna on the sea. The mission of the First Army was to pass the mountains by the Vulcan Pass and seize Hermannstadt; of the Second, to penetrate the Predeal Pass and take Kronstadt, while the Army of the North—always preserving its contact with Lechitsky's Russian forces—was to advance through all three of the eastern passes. If the invasion was pushed with sufficient speed




**A-A** *LIMIT OF RUMANIAN ADVANCE.* **B** *FALKENHAYN'S ADVANCE.* **C** *MACKENSEN'S ADVANCE.* ■ ■ ■ *LIMIT OF GERMAN ADVANCE.*

the Rumanians could hope to absorb all of the Transylvanian territory enclosed by the two sides of the right angle, occupy the valley of the middle Maros, and turn to their own uses the very considerable number of railroads in the occupied districts, which were admirably adapted to aid an army that had reached the Maros Valley.

We have, then, the objectives of the invasion clearly defined, and during September they were all, in large part, realized. The Army of the North reached the edge of the Maros Valley at Parajd; the Second Army took Kronstadt; the First Army arrived before Hermannstadt, but was unable to occupy it. Meantime, events to the south were taking

a serious turn. First of all, Bulgaria promptly declared war upon Rumania, so that all the calculations based upon Bulgarian neutrality went into the discard. Secondly, on September 7, Mackensen—taking command of the forces of Bulgarians, Turks, and Germans immediately available—pushed across the Dobrudja frontier, destroyed one Rumanian division about Turtukai on the Danube, and drove the other division of covering troops back toward the vital Constanza-Bucharest railway.

Instantly it became necessary to detach troops from the armies engaged in the invasion of Transylvania and send them southward across the mountains to the Dobrudja. Arrived there they did temporarily arrest Mackensen well south of the Constanza railway, but their departure fatally compromised the Transylvanian campaign. Meantime Mackensen, having accomplished his purpose, halted, and proceeded to organize the reinforcements which were swiftly sent to him from Austria and from Germany. Henceforth, while matters were beginning to go badly in the north, a new menace was gathering in the south. Already Rumania was beginning to be fatally caught between the upper and the lower millstones.

### V. FALKENHAYN AND MACKENSEN

At the outset of the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania there was little resistance; refugees from the invaded districts, which were German and partly Magyar in population, flowed back to Vienna and to Budapest; there was great commotion in the Hungarian Parliament and passionate appeals to Berlin for aid. These appeals were heard. Falkenhayn—who had been succeeded on the General Staff by the great Hindenburg, as a consequence of the Verdun failure—was assigned to command the army that Germany at once began to organize for a counter-offensive.

It was a powerful force, too, which Hindenburg entrusted to his predecessor. First and last, the Central Powers employed not less than thirty-seven divisions against the Rumanians of which twenty were first-line German units. But powerful as was this force, numerically

# IN THE PATH OF WAR

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A SYMBOL OF KULTUR

It was through no will or intention of the Germans that the saints on either side of the cross were spared

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

THIS WAS A VILLAGE

The ruined village of Farbus, captured by the Canadians

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

THIS WAS A FARM

Shelling the ruins of towns and villages seemed to give the Teutons positive pleasure. They kept it up as long as anything remained standing

*Italian Official Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

THIS WAS A HOSPITAL

This is a typical example of Hun inhumanity. The picture shows the interior of the St. John Hospital, Venice, after bombardment by the Germans

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

THIS WAS A CHURCH

The ruins were still under shell-fire when this picture was taken

*Photograph from Central News Photo Service*

THIS WAS A TOWN—BAPAUME

The church in the square at Bapaume, taken while the town was burning

"No blade of grass was ever seen
Where Attila and his hosts had been."—Old Ballad

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

THIS WAS A ROAD

This road, one of the magnificent highways of France, had been all but obliterated by German shells. If any trees were left standing after the bombardment, they were girdled or cut down

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

THIS IS NOT A SCENE IN ANCIENT GREECE, BUT ONE IN MODERN FRANCE

Mesnil-les-Hurlus was destroyed with German thoroughness—especially the church. But what is left standing is still suggestive of beauty

and otherwise—and the German contingent was as strong as the forces which had been thrown against Verdun in the first month of attack—its artillery train was even more imposing. Once more Germany proposed to destroy an enemy—as she had destroyed Belgian, Serbian, and Russian armies—by bringing to bear upon its victim a vast mass of heavy artillery, to meet which the opposing commanders could only employ field pieces.

The German counter-offensive was launched on September 20 and two groups of armies were employed: that directed against the south side of the Transylvania right angle included the Ninth German Army commanded by German generals; the force sent against the eastern side was mainly Austrian and under the direction of the Archduke Joseph; but Falkenhayn was commander-in-chief. On the date of the opening of the counter-offensive the Rumanians were still somewhat east of the valley of the middle Maros, facing west, from Dorna Watra to Orsova, on a line which curved in slightly at the centre.

Falkenhayn's strategy was simple. He would throw his main mass of manœuvre against first one and then another of the Rumanian armies, defeat them in detail, push through the Predeal Pass, and, debouching in the Wallachian Plain, join hands with Mackensen, come north across the Danube, under the walls of Bucharest. This operation, if it achieved maximum success, would cut off all the Rumanian armies west of the Dimbovitza (on which Bucharest stands), prevent their retreat toward the Russians, and capture them.

The opening blow fell upon the First Rumanian Army standing before Hermannstadt; it was heavily beaten, driven south through the Vulcan Pass, one section of its force separated from the main body and driven eastward upon the Second Army, standing about Kronstadt. The next blow fell upon this Second Army, which was now standing with its flank uncovered by the retreat of the First Army. Defeated about Kronstadt the Second Army was compelled to retire upon the Predeal Pass. Meantime the Army of the North, its flank uncovered by the retreat of the Second Army, had no choice but to retire to the Moldavian boundary. The invasion of Transylvania was now a thing

of the past. There remained the question of the defence of Rumanian territory from the threatened invasion of Falkenhayn.

Meantime, the moment had arrived for Mackensen to move again. The Rumanian armies were heavily engaged to the north, desperately seeking to prevent the enemy from coming southward. Accordingly, in the third week of October, Mackensen suddenly took the offensive on the Dobrudja front, pushed northward across the Constanza railway, occupied Constanza on October 22, and thus cut Rumania off from her one seaport, interrupted the main line of water communication between Rumania and Russia, and occupied a considerable portion of the Dobrudja province. His offensive again came to a standstill upon the arrival of two Russian divisions sent by Brusiloff, which arrived too late to save Constanza.

In the same period Falkenhayn had been trying to get through the Predeal Pass, nearest to Bucharest, but had been checked. He had been no more successful at the Red Tower Pass to the west and had suffered a preliminary check at the Vulcan. But Rumania was not capable of presenting equal strength at four points: at the Predeal, the Red Tower, and the Vulcan Passes, and before Mackensen in the Dobrudja. The inevitable weak point was at the Vulcan Pass and in the first fortnight of November the moment had arrived when, with the weak point exposed and the preparations made, Falkenhayn could deal the decisive blow.

This blow was the defeat of Ter Jiu, in the upper reaches of the Jiu River, where this stream emerges from the mountains and enters the Wallachian Plain. November 17 the First Rumanian Army was decisively beaten. The invaders, preceded by a mass of cavalry, swept down into the plain, cutting off the troops defending the frontier toward the Iron Gates and, wheeling into line between the Danube and the mountains, began an irresistible march toward Bucharest. Faced with disaster, the Rumanians retired behind the Alt, which comes down from the mountains through Red Tower Pass and flows straight across the Plain to the Danube.

Before this line could be made good, however, the Germans to the

RUMANIA IN THE LION'S JAWS.




BLACK SHOWS TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE CENTRAL POWERS. A-VULCAN PASS. B-RED TOWER PASS. C-PREDEAL AND TOMOS PASS. D-GYMES PASS E-BEKAS PASS.

north descended through Red Tower Pass and occupied positions east of the Alt and between it and Bucharest. Meantime, while the Rumanians were endeavouring to rally behind the Argelu—another river crossing the plain parallel to the Alt and constituting the last natural defence of the Rumanian capital—Mackensen forced the passage of the Danube, east of the point where the Argelu enters the larger river; his point of passage was at Sistova, where the Russians had crossed in 1877. In the first days of December Mackensen and Falkenhayn had united before Bucharest, and Falkenhayn's northern army was already on the flank of the last position on which Bucharest could be defended.

The last battle—that for the capital, the Battle of the Argelu—was over by December 4. In its last stages three Russian divisions fought, but the aid had come too late. Bucharest was evacuated on December 5 and occupied by the armies of the victorious Central Powers on the following day. In the next few days the Rumanian army, not without grave difficulty, slipped out of the enveloping arms of Mackensen and Falkenhayn and retired upon the lines of Sereth, covering the region between the Danube and the Moldavian stretches of the Carpathians. Two thirds of Rumania was in enemy hands; the Government had fled to Jassy, on the Russian frontier; the Rumanian army had lost more than 300,000 men, two thirds in casualties and the balance in prisoners. In their retreat the Rumanians had fired their great oil wells and burned their wheat crops, but if the booty of the Germans was far less than they had expected, the defeat of Rumania was absolute; she had been temporarily ruined. Once more, as in the last Russo-Turkish War, the intervention of her armies had averted a prospective Russian disaster, for had the forces thrown against Averscu's Rumanian armies been used against Brusiloff, another Dunajec might have resulted. Once more, as after Plevna, Rumania's reward was to be the sacrifice of her own territory—and, this time, of her own political and economic freedom.

# CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# SALONICA AND MONASTIR

## I

## AT SALONICA

In the general scheme of the combined Allied offensives, the Salonica army had been counted upon to act against Bulgaria. When Rumania entered the war the obvious necessity to use every effort to contain Bulgarian troops in Macedonia and prevent their transfer to the Rumanian front gave new value to the Salonica force. But neither before nor after Rumania's entrance could this army accomplish anything of material value.

The reasons were almost innumerable. In the first place, the Army of the Orient had been sent to Salonica to save the Serbs; it arrived too late to accomplish its purpose and, instead of reaching Uskub, it was compelled to retire hastily upon Salonica. Then began a long debate as to whether an army should be maintained in the Orient or the Salonica force be recalled as that of Gallipoli had been. The soldiers argued for recall, the politicians were divided. Briand in France at last exercised the decisive influence and the army stayed. But having decided to maintain an army in the Near East, the politicians who had overborne the soldiers now compromised with them and permitted the soldiers to neglect the army.

To command on the new front France sent Sarrail—an unwise appointment made at the behest of Joffre, who was eager to get out of France a political general who deserved his evil opinion. Sarrail was the friend of Caillaux and of Malvy; he was supported by their political influence, and that influence was at no time exerted for the decisive military victory that the French nation and its allies sought. In Salonica Sarrail did no material harm, but he accomplished no great result. Ultimately, when Clemenceau came to the helm in France, he was re-

called, but until Clemenceau did come, no one dared to disturb the friend of such powerful politicians.

But even had Sarrail been a Foch or a Pétain, his task in the Orient would still have been well-nigh impossible. Such troops as were sent him were in the main of the least tactical value. They were a strange assortment of the colonials of all the nations at war, and to them were added Russians and Italians. The best single unit was the Serbian army, which was presently reorganized by France and sent back from Corfu; but this was long in coming.

Meantime, with the relatively weak force at his immediate call, Sarrail had to transform Salonica into an entrenched camp capable of resisting the assault of a German army if the Kaiser should presently decide to complete his domination of the Balkans by driving into the sea the intruders at Salonica. This involved the construction of railways, roads, and innumerable trenches and fortifications; it involved, also, the transformation of the harbour of Salonica, destitute of all the machinery of a modern port.

Difficult in itself, the task was rendered even more burdensome by the political circumstances. The Allies were on Greek soil, whither they had come at the invitation of the Greek Premier, Venizelos, who had sought to throw his country into the alliance against Germany. But Venizelos had failed and fallen. King Constantine was now in complete control and his sympathies and his influence were all with his brother-in-law, the Kaiser. Unable to compel the Allied army to quit Salonica, he used every possible means to impede it. His garrisons were hostile, his civil officials were invariably obstructive.

Even more grotesque were certain other circumstances. As Salonica was a Greek city and Greece nominally a neutral nation, representatives of the Central Powers, consular and diplomatic, continued to live in it and to serve their governments. Every ship that entered the port bringing men or munitions was duly reported; every movement of troops promptly described to hostile general staffs. And while every instrumentality of the Greek Government was employed to impede the Allies, it was with equal industry serving the interests of the Central

Powers. Actually Sarrail occupied a hostile city, with none of the powers which usually accrue to a general commanding an army in similar circumstances.

Worst of all was the ever-present possibility, destined to increase with the months, that, in addition to an attack from the avowed enemy on the north, Sarrail might have to face an onslaught from the rear by the Greek army and made in close coördination with a German offensive launched from the Vardar Valley. In this situation the Allied statesmen shuffled and the Allied army suffered. The situation was impossible and intolerable, and yet it was not cleared up satisfactorily during all of 1916.

## II. INCIDENTS

At the outset of the year the condition of the Allies in Salonica was almost incredible. They had constructed landward defences, still inadequate but now considerable. But the forts at the entrance to the harbour—Karaburnu, in particular—were in Greek hands and the guns and the garrison were ready, at the slightest pretext, to fire upon Allied shipping and Allied troops. Not until German air raids had roused Sarrail was any step taken to abolish a situation which was as dangerous as it was absurd. But on January 28, after amusing preliminary performances, Karaburnu was taken over by the Allies. Somewhat later the consular and other agents of the enemy powers were sent away, but before this there occurred a new incident.

Greece was at peace with Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian army had halted at the Greek frontier in its pursuit of the French and British troops who had sought to rescue the Serbs at the Greek frontier. But on May 26 the Greek garrison, holding Fort Ruppel—which commanded the outlet of the Struma Valley and thus the direct road from Sofia to the Ægean—surrendered to a Bulgarian force. The surrender was at the direct command of the Greek King, who negotiated a loan of $15,000,000 from Germany as a payment. Its consequences were serious for the Salonica army.

Hitherto there had only been a northern front, but now the Bulgars

came south and occupied all of the Kavala-Drama district, all of the Greek territory east of the Struma, seized the Adrianople-Salonica railway east of the Struma, and thus possessed themselves of a valuable line of communication. Henceforth their troops could be munitioned and supplied by this railway line and the difficulties incident to the transport of men and material over the mountain trails of the Struma Valley was abolished. Sarrail had now to watch the Struma and to be on his guard against an attack from the east as well as from the north.

The campaign of 1916 for the Salonica army was to be a push up the Vardar Valley, but the push never was made for the Bulgarians anticipated Sarrail and thrust southward, across the Greek frontier at Florina and along the Monastir-Salonica railway. They began their attack on August 17 and in the next few days came south as far as Ostrovo Lake, driving the Serbs before them. Again there was Greek treachery and the Greek frontier guards discreetly retired in advance of the Bulgarian attack.

As a result of this new thrust Salonica was now threatened from the east, along the Adrianople-Salonica railway; from the north, down the Vardar Valley along the Salonica-Belgrade railway; and from the west, along the Monastir-Salonica railway. Always, too, there was the possibility that the Greek army would strike from the south and join hands with the Bulgars at Lake Ostrovo. The Bulgarian offensive, however, was checked and the danger from the west temporarily abolished, but the invaders continued to hold their conquests.

Meantime, events in Greece were taking a favourable turn at last. The Greeks of Macedonia—seeing Kavala and Drama surrendered to the hereditary enemy, seeing the Bulgars advancing from the west, knowing that the entrance of a Bulgarian force into Salonica would mean the extinction of Hellenic rule in this portion of Macedonia—suddenly rose against their king and, in the last days of August, Sarrail recognized the revolutionists. A little later, on October 9, Venizelos came to Salonica and assumed direction of the new government, which had the support of the Greeks in the islands and in Macedonia. This new government declared war upon the Central Alliance and began

to enlist troops for service against the Bulgars, but Constantine still ruled in Athens and controlled the mainland as far as the immediate environs of Salonica itself.

All this time negotiating and bickering were going forward between Constantine and the Allies. Greece was blockaded and then the blockade was raised, as a result of a paper concession of the King, never realized in fact. All the time the hostility of the King grew, the activity of the German agents increased. In December, eighty-three French sailors were murdered in Athens and there was a general killing of the Venizellist leaders by the King's adherents. Short of the removal of the King no solution of the problem was possible, but to the very last moment Allied governments could not make up their mind to take this step. The result was the constant hampering of Sarrail's plans, for he had ever to guard against an attack from the rear and by the Greeks, while facing the open enemy in the field.

### III. MONASTIR

It was not until September 13 that the Army of the Orient was at last able to take the field. The plans for an offensive up the Vardar Valley had been upset by the Bulgarian thrust south from Monastir, the possibility of using the army as a whole in any offensive had been thwarted by the Greek surrender of Fort Ruppel, which had opened the flank toward the Struma to an enemy attack and the very menacing attitude of the Greek army in the rear, which seemed always about to assail the Allies.

With a relatively restricted force, consisting of Serbs, French, and Russians, Sarrail began his operation at the close of the second week in September by driving the Bulgarians back from Ostrovo Lake. He advanced astride the roads and railway leading to Monastir. As he advanced he forced the Bulgarians back upon their final positions, covering Monastir, and stretched across the lower end of the Plain of Monastir to the mountains on either side of the Cerna River, where it makes its great northward bend.

In all the fighting of this campaign the greater task belonged to the

Serbs and the most distinguished generalship was revealed by their commander, Marshal Mishitch. In the first days of November the Serbs at last stood on their own soil again. In the next few days they drove northward along the high mountains in the bend of the Cerna, which command the plain and the defences of Monastir. On November 17 and 18 the Serbs cleared the eastern hills and the defence of the place was no longer possible. On November 19—the fourth anniversary of their capture of the town in the First Balkan War—the Serbs again controlled Monastir, although the town was actually occupied by French troops, whose advance along the plain had been made possible by the Serbian successes on the heights.

Unhappily the victory could have no considerable consequences. Rumania was already beaten, and no pressure upon Bulgaria in this quarter could be of use to the stricken ally. Winter had come to the Balkans; the mountains were covered with snow; and, worst of all, new activities of the Greek army to the south and in the rear of the troops at Salonica compelled Sarrail to send French troops south to guard against a hostile move on the part of Constantine.

As a consequence, it was not even possible to clear the hills north of Monastir, much less push northward over Babuna Pass to the Vardar Valley or by Resna to Ochrida and the Drin Valley. Accordingly, enemy artillery on the heights continued to pound the troops in Monastir and the town itself had to be evacuated by its civil population. The Allies had taken Monastir, they continued to hold it, but the possession had no military value; and, as long as they held the hills above the city, the Bulgars suffered no material loss by their defeat.

With the taking of Monastir the Balkan campaign ends. Nearly two years were to pass before the city reappeared in the official reports of battles or the country in the bend of the Cerna saw severe and sustained fighting. Henceforth the Salonica adventure steadily lost value in the eyes of Allied general staffs. With the fall of Rumania Germany had acquired new avenues from her own and Austrian soil to Bulgarian and Turkish territory. The Danube was open from the head of navigation to its mouth. The Rumanian railways were available. A thrust

up the Vardar Valley to Nish, thus cutting the Belgrade-Sofia link in the Vienna-Constantinople railway, could no longer sever the single life line between the northern and central members of the Central Alliance.

The great opportunity for the Allies in the Balkans had been lost in 1915 when Serbia had been suffered to go to disaster while British and French forces waged their futile fight at Gallipoli. If Rumania could have struck down Bulgaria at the outset of her campaign in 1916 it might have been possible for Sarrail to join hands with Averescu across Bulgaria, as the Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians were on the point of doing when Bulgaria gave up the struggle in 1913. But with the collapse of Rumania, the Allies lost their last immediate hope in the Balkans and for two years Salonica was to lose interest for the world, and its army be forgotten in the rush of events on the western front. When it did reappear, however, the consequences of a single victory were destined to justify all the efforts, realize all the hopes, anden dorse all the claims of the champions of the Army of the Orient.

# CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

## I

### THE EFFECT OF BUCHAREST

With the fall of Bucharest the campaign of 1916 ends. It had been, all things considered, the bloodiest and most terrible campaign of the first three years of the war. Verdun, the Somme, and Brusiloff's offensive had involved the sacrifice of more human lives than had been exacted as the price of any single campaign in human history. And with the fall of Bucharest all the hopes and aspirations of the western powers and the western publics went instantly to dust and ashes; in place of optimism, little warranted by the facts, there now succeeded a period of gloom and despondency which the enemy was to turn to his own advantage.

Looking backward over the progress of the campaign of 1916 we can now see that there was not the smallest chance that either contestant could achieve a decision in it. The larger strategy of both groups of nations was equally based upon misconceptions. The Germans had attacked Verdun in the late winter, convinced that France was bled white and that the moment was ripe for the final thrust. Nothing could have been more absurd. France had suffered, but she had reserves; she had not merely divisions and corps, but armies—available for attack as well as defence—and the French spirit in and out of the army was, in 1916, unshaken. The result was the unmistakable defeat of the Crown Prince before Verdun and the German loss of the offensive in the west.

In the same fashion Austria had attacked Italy, convinced that heavy artillery, massed in the Trentino, would repeat the success achieved in Serbia the previous autumn against troops at least as good as the Italian but similarly destitute of heavy artillery. Moreover, Berlin and Vienna were equally convinced that Russia had been so

heavily beaten in the previous year that any new Russian offensive, while the Verdun and Italian operations were in progress, was unthinkable. Here, again, was a singular misconception. Russia was capable of another great effort—her last, to be sure—but this effort was to tax Austria-Hungary to the uttermost and make demands upon Germany which were at least awkward to meet.

On the other hand, Allied estimates of the conditions existing in enemy countries were even more grotesque. The firm conviction that Germany and Austria were starving, that the people of these countries believed themselves beaten, that German man-power was failing, a child-like faith in the resources of Russia imagined to be without limit, a blindness to the growing exhaustion of the Russian nation, moral as well as economic; above all, an inability to see the struggle as a whole or to perceive the western struggles in their true perspective; all these errors of judgment and calculation led to bitter disappointment following severe military defeats.

There was still an absence of unity of thought, interest, or strategy in the Allied countries. In France the necessities of the situation imposed a certain coördination of military operations, but even this was restricted. Actually not one but half a dozen wars were being conducted against Germany and Austria, against Bulgaria and Turkey, by the nations of the opposing group and each of the nations striking at the Central Powers was conducting its operations in conformity with its own strategy, its own policy, and its own theory of the necessary political and economic readjustments of the period after the war.

The result was chaos, only a little modified by occasional crises when the very greatness of some immediate peril imposed upon all concerned the necessity for some momentary harmonizing of activities. The result of this lack of central, directing authority and vision was to be seen in the disaster in Mesopotamia, the failure to turn to any profitable end the enormous investment of men and material at Salonica, in the shuffling policy with respect to Bulgaria in 1915, and with respect of Greece all through 1916. As a consequence, so utterly inconsiderable and personally insignificant a personage as King Constantine was able,

in the presence of his amazed and bewildered subjects, to flout the Great Powers of Europe and thwart their plans, murder their soldiers, and, with long-continuing impunity, wage war under their noses, while still preserving his highly placed champions in London and in Petrograd.

By contrast Austro-German policy—the policy of the whole group of Central Powers—was made in Germany. The Turks in Mesopotamia, the Austrians in Volhynia, the Bulgarians in the Dobrudja and Macedonia, quite as much as the Germans at Verdun and the Somme, marched to the same orders and responded to a single impulse. Germany fought one war; her foes, a dozen. She sought one objective at a time, her foes pursued innumerable ends simultaneously. For her single purpose Germany mobilized an immense army and a vast train of artillery; she never had more than one major operation in view at a given moment, and, for this, she had ever the necessary resources. Thus it was that, with an inferior population, an infinitely smaller reservoir of men, material, and money, the Central Powers were constantly able to thwart the undertakings of foes who, in all fields, were now becoming the superiors of their enemies in all that material and man-power could mean.

The Rumanian campaign was the best example of the German method. Rumania was coerced into her declaration of war by a Russian Ministry already dominated by defeatist sentiments; Rumania was to be the sacrifice by which Stuermer was to save Brusiloff and the prestige of the Russian army; but with the defeat of Rumania, peace by negotiation was to come. Yet Russia's allies, oblivious of the conditions within the Slav nation and to the influences dominating the Government, joined with the Stuermer Cabinet in exerting pressure upon Rumania, which could only result in throwing a Rumanian army, without heavy artillery or any of the vital equipment of war, against the German veterans, who were supplied with unlimited resources in guns and in munitions.

All through 1916, as in the previous campaign, the Allies were hypnotized by the western front. London and Paris could not perceive the fact that Russia was sinking, would not listen to the few informed

voices which uttered warnings deserving at least of passing attention. While Haig and Foch were taking a few hectares of Picardy, Russia was swiftly, surely, sinking into hopeless weakness. Another year was to disclose Russia gone; German victory in the east, as in the Balkans, established; German armies in the west preparing for the final campaign, which should abolish the last danger to Mitteleuropa and place William II in a grander and more secure position than Napoleon had ever occupied.

Three great western powers were conducting a World War as if it were for each of them a separate war; they were conducting it with a vision as limited as that of a provincial or colonial public. Britain did not understand France; French impatience at the delay in British preparations; Anglo-French misapprehension of Italy and blindness to Italian problems; the complete ignorance on the part of Britain, France, and Italy as to the truth about Russia—these were circumstances that must puzzle future generations. They led to mistakes which almost lost the war; they were mistakes which were not remedied until Ludendorff had well-nigh won the war in Picardy in March, 1918, and impending ruin at last imposed upon the western allies that essential unity of command and of purposes which alone could be the foundation of victory.

By contrast, Germany's mistakes were less obvious and, in a sense, less culpable. The German saw the smaller facts as they were. He knew always what objective he sought and he bent the will of his allies until they joined in the pursuit of his objective, or he modified his objectives in such fashion as to embrace operations dear to the hearts of his allies and which might contribute to his own ends. He was not led into any error because he overestimated the value of the west or ascribed to a minor operation the value of a major campaign. His miscalculations had a sound basis; he knew what was going on in Russia, but his conclusion that, as a result of domestic conditions, Russia was already out of the war in June, was a premature conclusion; he perceived the terrible difficulties of the Italian situation, but in sending Austrian troops to the Trentino, he anticipated the hour when a great blow might

do almost incalculable harm. In 1917 he accomplished, in respect of Russia and Italy, what he had failed to achieve in 1916.

Only one mistake of the German was capital, colossal; he continued to think solely in material terms. He could not understand the spiritual forces which he had enlisted against him; he could not estimate the material importance of the moral indignation he had roused all over the world; he could not understand the spirit of France—revealed at the Marne and again, in even greater splendour, at Verdun. He could not understand that, having sought the life of the several nations at war with him, he must expect that these nations—however stupid and clumsy their leadership, however faulty their military commanders—would fight for their lives, refusing all accommodations possible between rivals contending for some prize in territory or trade, but inconceivable between men fighting—on the one hand, at least—for their lives, the existence of their country, the permanence of their civilization; every one of which had been placed in jeopardy by the German attack fighting in very truth for all that men hold worth while.

## II. THE RESULT

Looked at from the largest possible perspective, there can be no questioning the fact that Germany had won the campaign of 1916. She had not taken Verdun or occupied Venetia; she had suffered local reverses at the Somme, and Austria had endured approximate disasters in Galicia, Bukowina, and Volhynia; even Bulgaria had lost Monastir; but never was the relative unimportance of geographical incidents more clearly emphasized.

The central purpose of German strategy in 1916 had been based upon the assumption that in 1915 Germany had won the war, provided that what had been gained could be held. Frederick the Great had seized Silesia in the first hours of his initial campaign. Thereafter he had held it through long years of war—years in which his strategy and his ambition had been comprehended in the determination to retain what he had seized. The case of William II was wholly analogous, although the stakes were immeasurably greater.



*From a painting by Lieut. Henri Farre. Courte[illegible]*

AN AËRIAL COLLISION

Between a Baby Nieuport and a Germ n Rumpler. The German plane had been in the habit of coming over the French trenches for photographs and had always returned safely to its lines. On this day three French airplanes attacked the Boche on his return. Quartermaster de Ferline, arriving at the proper altitude, noticed that his two companions had been forced to abandon the pursuit from motor trouble as it happened. Ferline, thinking his two comrades wounded, dashed at his adversary 3,500 feet above the earth and sent the German machine crashing to the ground.

At the opening of the campaign of 1916 Germany had in her hands the framework of that Mitteleuropa which had been the dream of her patriots and her statesmen for at least half a century. From the Baltic to the lower Euphrates, from the Pripet Marshes to the Belgian Coast, one will reigned and one purpose prevailed. More than 150,000,000 people were gathered within the firing lines, which had become the frontiers of Europe; if Germany could preserve this colossal creation throughout the war—as Frederick the Great had retained Silesia in the face of all Europe—a few years of peaceful organization under German direction would make this solid block of territory the seat of the greatest empire since the days of Rome, and give to the German Emperor the right to speak in the tone of the Cæsars.

The sole object of German military strategy, now, was to preserve this magnificent edifice, to repel the attacks from without, to seek to shorten the period of strain by counter-offensives. Two dangers and two alone threatened: the one was a military defeat, such as Leipsic, which should compel the Germans to quit their conquered districts, as Napoleon had been compelled in 1813 to retire from Germany, leaving his allies and subject nationalities to fall the willing or reluctant prey of his conquerors. The other peril was that too great prolongation of the war might so exhaust Germany as to render her incapable of harvesting where she had sown.

But of the two dangers only one was immediate. The German was still fascinated by the splendour of his achievement and enthralled by the brilliance of the prospect while his morale, his will to win, was unbroken. It was only necessary to repel the enemy at the gates of Mitteleuropa. It was only essential to preserve the edifice by campaigns which, whether defensive or offensive, should bring to nothing the efforts of the enemy to burst into the territory of the Central Powers, to isolate Bulgaria and Turkey from Austria and Germany, to bring Austria to her knees by invasion and defeat, to compel the German armies to retire from France and eastern Belgium, as a prelude to a retreat to the Rhine and to German territory.

And this danger had been fully met. More than this, the campaign

against Rumania had completed the task of rounding out the frontiers of Mitteleuropa. While Rumania was neutral and preserved her economic and political independence, the corridor from Austria to Bulgaria was narrow, the single railway passing through it from Vienna by Belgrade to Sofia and Constantinople was within striking distance of the Salonica army, while the Danube, the true artery of the Central European group, was commanded by Rumanian guns from the Iron Gate to the Black Sea.

But with Rumania crushed, the Danube—in Lincoln's vigorous phrase applied to the Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg—"flowed unvexed to the sea." All the Rumanian railways were in German hands, and the interruption of traffic upon the Belgrade-Sofia route would have not the smallest effect upon German communications with her Balkan and Asiatic allies. Moreover, in taking Constanza, Germany had laid the foundation for future domination of the Black Sea. Once Russia should fall, the Black Sea would become—like the Baltic—a "closed sea," and the main trunk line descending from Germany to Constanza would be the route by which German troops would descend to pass the Black Sea and take foot upon its eastern shores, where the Caucasus railway begins its march to the frontiers of India.

Rumania, too, with its great oil resources and its wheat fields, was an important item in Pan-German calculations. It had escaped the German influence because the Rumanian Government and the Rumanian people alike had cherished ambitions which could be gratified only by the mutilation of Austrian and Hungarian frontiers. But these dreams had been extinguished in the defeats of the autumn, which had cost Rumania all but a shadow of her old independence and of her former territory. By contrast with the occupation of Rumania to the Sereth, the loss of territory in Bukowina, in Galicia, in Picardy, in the Isonzo region, was nothing. Not a foot of territory vital to the Mitteleuropa conception had been lost. When the campaign of 1916 came to its dismal close Germany had achieved all that was necessary for her to achieve, she had defended her conquests, she had increased the area of her empire at the single vulnerable point. In exchange,

she had sold to Russia, to Britain, and to France, certain territories of minor value at prices which were prohibitive—territories which she would in the east presently regain without cost to herself.

In point of fact, Germany had done more; she had substantially broken the Russian power for war; she had furnished to Austria the men, the guns, and the generals, with which the great Brusiloff offensive had been slowly beaten down. Had Rumania remained neutral the force thrown against that state might have been used against Russia and the result would have been equally disastrous, but in this field Germany could afford to wait. Events were ripening, Russia was disintegrating so rapidly that an attack, which might have encountered sharp preliminary resistance in 1916, would bring down the whole military edifice in swift ruin a year later.

The campaign of 1916 is, then, the final operation in the east. By it Germany at last accomplished the purpose she had undertaken in the autumn of 1914, when affairs in Galicia had recalled her from the still undecided conflict beside the Yser. In 1915 she had sought to crush Russia while holding firm on the west, and thus to preserve the opportunity to resume her offensive in France when the eastern campaign should be terminated. At the outset of 1916, misjudging the extent to which Russia had been crippled, she tried at Verdun, again seeking a western decision. Recalled to the east by Russia's victories and again condemned to the defensive in the west, she held her western positions with only minor losses of ground, while she disposed of Rumania and dealt to the Russian military power blows from which it was not to recover.

The Allied strategy had envisaged a concentric attack, that "encirclement," so much in German mouths, before the war and now translated into military terms. But when this strategy had been put into operation, Germany, while holding the western Allies, turned east and crushed Russia. At last her hands were becoming freed for the decisive campaign in the west. The next time she struck in France she would have no anxieties on her frontiers from the Baltic to the Black Sea. From the outset of the war Germany had said: "I must hold my west-

ern enemies while I defeat the eastern foe"; or, as at the Marne: "I must crush France before Russia can become dangerous." It had taken more time than the Germans had calculated upon, the effort and strain had been far more considerable, but in December, 1916, the end was at last in sight. The circle of steel and fire, so frequently described in Allied discussions of the war, was become—on one side at least, for half the circumference—little more than a ring of smoke which was destined to dissolve before another year had ended and leave Germany free to deal with France and with Britain. Unhappily for herself, while getting rid of an old enemy, Germany was to arouse a new antagonist and the United States was to appear in Russia's place before Germany could exploit the advantage gained by the elimination of the Slav.

As to the moral advantage of the 1916 campaign no one who recalls the effect upon the western world of the announcement of the fall of Bucharest can question that it belonged to Germany. The emotion was like that excited by the fall of Antwerp; neither event had great immediate military importance, but each was symbolical. The fall of Antwerp heralded the arrival of German armies at the coast, witnessed the extinction of Belgian independence, and testified to the complete falsity of the western view that Germany was beaten and in retreat. The fall of Bucharest was a decisive demonstration that German manpower and military strength had not been broken at Verdun or the Somme, that the Russian victories in Galicia had been inconclusive, that the war was no nearer a victorious conclusion. On the contrary, for the first time, whispers were heard in London and Paris that the war might, after all, be lost. The promises of victory immediate and decisive, vainly based upon the Verdun, Somme, and Russian campaigns, had raised hopes which, falling, gave place to fears destined to have grave substantiation in the next year.

But the fall of Bucharest had more than a moral value. For the first time the people of the western nations were able to gather something of a notion of the facts of the war. At last they were able to perceive that one nation and only one, their enemy, had a clear and ordered purpose. They saw in the results of two years and a half of war the

revelation of a guiding intelligence and an approximate appreciation of the material facts, but they saw it in their foe. They became acutely conscious of what they had hitherto only vaguely felt, namely, that neither their political leaders nor their military chiefs, not even their press and their pulpit, had seen facts as they were or pursued a definite objective with any singleness of purpose.

The public men had been deceived and had communicated their misapprehensions to their followers in statements which were grotesquely inexact. The soldiers had seen only their own little corners of a world strife and translated the taking of trenches or the retention of positions into the language of victors. The press had been muzzled; the censor had eliminated fact, and the more pliable organs had readily substituted fiction, pleasing alike to the censor and to the Government, but destitute of justification.

While Kaiser, Field Marshal, newspaper, and pulpit in Germany—in complete accord and with a single objective in mind—had marched in perfect unison, even in their lies and their mistakes carrying the German people with them—for a new victory invariably covered a previous miscalculation—the Allied statesmen quarrelled alike with themselves and with their generals; the pulpit was dumb, and the press blind or blindfolded, yet it was impossible that the masses should forever fail to see what was written on the map, what no press censorship could suppress or journalistic pen camouflage. In December, 1916, the Allied publics lost confidence in their leadership, civil and military alike. In their press they fell into a confusion which was to endure until the enemy's return to their very doors should, by arousing the instinct of self-preservation, restore determination and, by threatening military triumph, impose military unity upon his enemies. Thus, in every respect, the end of the campaign of 1916 was the passing of one phase and the opening of another.

### III. EXEUNT OMNES

As the year closed the signs of impending transformations were unmistakably revealed in the removal both of allied politicians and soldiers.

After three campaigns neither the ministers nor the generals had won the war; they had, on the whole, revealed no such competence as suggested that they could win the war. Popular judgment ran against them and popular sentiment demanded a change.

Thus in December Asquith fell. In the previous year his party government had been replaced by a coalition ministry assembled from all parties and momentarily regarded as combining "all the talents." But in fact it combined nothing. Mr. Asquith remained master of phrase, and—assured of the loyalty of his great following in the House, where his personal popularity was enormous—Sir Edward Grey continued in the Foreign Office the personification of high-minded purpose and lofty principle; unaccompanied by the slightest grasp of essential facts. Neither Asquith nor Grey gave any evidence of appreciating, after two years of struggle, the European conditions out of which, without their smallest effective suspicion, a world war had developed.

For many months Britain had been looking to Lloyd George as the one man who might win the war in public office. His past mistakes and older animosities stood in his pathway; it was not willingly that a majority of the Unionists turned to the man whose name had been anathema but a few brief years before. Mr. Asquith suited English ideas precisely as he fitted into the dignity and tradition of the House of Commons; he was a typical Englishman; of his own class, he was an ideal party and parliamentary leader; but his strength in Parliament and in peace was his fatal weakness in war. He lacked decision, breadth of vision, force of character. His fatal phrase—"Wait and see"—became the epitome of a policy which permitted blunder after blunder until national confidence was shaken and the apprehension of defeat was abroad.

It was by a political shifting that Lloyd George at last overset his former chief and took his place as the leader of the British Empire in one of the most critical hours of its history. The men who gave him their votes begrudged them. Popularity among the members of Parliament, such as Mr. Asquith retained even in defeat, Lloyd George never possessed; he was not trusted by those who saw in his force, his

energy, his imagination, qualities without which victory now seemed impossible. But Lloyd George had the supreme merit of having been right when Asquith was wrong in recent instances; he had solved the munition problem, when British armies were fighting with shrapnel against high explosives. He was not a safe man, as England understood safety, but the "safe" men had brought her to the edge of defeat.

In France the Briand Ministry endured one more storm but its end was marked. A far abler man than Mr. Asquith and with a wholly different tradition, M. Briand had much of his charm and many of his weaknesses. In the great international conferences he had presided with dignity and grace, he was regarded as the one available man, by French politicians and publics, who still shrank from Clemenceau yet saw no other premier. In his political career Briand was nearer to Lloyd George; like the new British chief, he had risen from the ranks, and his pathway was marked by many conflicting courses and abrupt changes. But, though he was to outlast the winter storm, the defeats of 1916 had made his ultimate retirement inevitable. Prime Ministers, like generals, cannot survive defeat indefinitely.

In Russia a far more sordid struggle was going on. Early in the year Stuermer had come with his sinister purpose. By August, Sazonoff—the ablest of the foreign ministers of the Allied governments, the most loyal and earnest champion alike of his nation's interests and of Allied solidarity—had been forced out. The treason which was abroad was openly denounced in the Duma. Stuermer and his associates were deprived of their offices but their work was done, and the patriotic ministers who succeeded them were able to accomplish little before the Russian Revolution first overthrew them and then ruined the nation which Stuermer had betrayed.

On the military side the changes were even more considerable. Kitchener was dead. On the morrow of the Battle of Jutland he had set sail for Russia, and, in a stormy night, his ship, *Hampshire*, had touched a mine and sunk. In the manner of his death and the moment of his disappearance Lord Kitchener was fortunate. His great work had been done. About him had been built the new British army, and his

name and the glamour of his personality had contributed mightily to the construction. He had been a pillar upon which the British public had rested in the early days of defeat and anxiety. He had been for the English a symbol, and if, as Clemenceau once grimly remarked, "A symbol is a man about whom some people still believe what was never true," it was at least true that the value of Kitchener as a symbol in 1914 and 1915 could hardly be exaggerated.

It would be impossible to maintain that he had been equal to his opportunities or his previous reputation. The task was beyond him and his mistakes were many. The shell scandal had grown out of his blundering. He had lacked the courage to forbid the Gallipoli expedition, which he opposed. Had he lived, he would have been bound to share the retirement of other soldiers and statesmen, whose failure was not more undeniable. All this he escaped. Still, loved, admired, trusted, a figure unique in all British public life, he perished upon a mission of danger and of duty and, thus dying, remained a symbol, his hold upon public affection and confidence unshaken.

In France, December saw Joffre lay down the great burden which he had carried for three campaigns. In becoming Marshal of France the victor of the Marne became a memory, while still living. Verdun explained his removal, although there was added to Verdun the belief that the generalissimo was growing weary. Political influence played its part, for Joffre had never been popular with the Deputies, and Chantilly, where his headquarters were, had become a word of derision in the Chambre. But at bottom the demand for victory explained the retirement of a general whose services had been great and to whom the gratitude of the whole civilized world will always be due. In the gravest crisis of the whole war Joffre had saved France; he had turned back the German flood. He had sent his staff officers to prepare for a retirement behind the Loire before the Battle of the Marne was joined, resolved to continue the struggle and unshaken in his confidence in the destiny of his country and the devotion of his army.

To succeed Joffre, Nivelle was chosen, largely through the influence of the politicians. Nivelle came to his new post with the fame of the

latest Verdun success in everyone's eyes. He was hailed as the exponent of the offensive; he and not Pétain had been chosen because there was a feeling that, like Joffre, Pétain was too cautious. Nivelle's stay was short; it led to the cruel disappointment of the Aisne; but what was lost there was retrieved when Pétain succeeded Nivelle. Neither Pétain nor Nivelle captured the imagination of the world as did the heavy, awkward figure of "Papa" Joffre—a peasant of the peasants, sturdy, solid, with a clear brain and not a few other qualities of our own Grant. Like Kitchener he left a place that was not to be filled, although, unlike Kitchener, he had earned enduring fame upon the battlefield by winning one of the decisive struggles of human history.

In Germany the changes were military. Falkenhayn fell as a consequence of failure at Verdun; Hindenburg came west, bringing with him the mysterious Ludendorff who was henceforth to grow upon the imagination of friend and foe until the day would come that he would appear to be Hindenburg, in fact. The arrival of Hindenburg was the signal for popular rejoicing in Germany, for no other soldier had won the same popularity; even the Kaiser's hold upon the admiration of his subjects was overborne by that of the victor of the Masurian Lakes and the conqueror of Tannenberg, and at this very moment a novel, describing the invasion of Britain by the old Field Marshal and his entrance into London, was selling by the million copies.

### IV. FRANCIS JOSEPH DIES

And as if to give final emphasis to the transformation which was coming on November 22, Francis Joseph, the aged Emperor of Austria, died. Sixty-eight years had passed since the Countess Karolyi, whose son had been one of the victims of the executions following the Hungarian revolt, thus cursed the young Emperor, Francis Joseph:

"May Heaven and Hell blast his happiness! May his family be exterminated! May he be smitten in the persons of those he loves! May his life be wrecked! May his children be brought to ruin!"

Rarely in human history has a curse been more completely fulfilled than in the case of the dead Emperor. His brother, Maximilian, died

before a firing squad in Mexico; his sister-in-law lost her reason as a consequence. His only son perished in the shameful tragedy of Meyerling. His wife was murdered at Geneva. As for his other relatives, the tragedies and follies of the archdukes had long been a European byword, and the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, at Serajevo, two years earlier, had been but the last in the long series of family and dynastic tragedies as well as the signal for the world catastrophe.

Louis XIV covered the span between the Thirty Years' War and the emergence of Modern Europe living under the new system of the balance of power. Francis Joseph, when he came to Schönbrunn as master, found about him the memories of a Napoleonic occupation not yet remote; he lived to the hour when a new Napoleonic struggle had convulsed the world.

Francis Joseph was thus the last remaining monarchic link with the Nineteenth Century. When he was young Metternich still ruled in Vienna and maintained his losing fight against the ideas and principles of the French Revolution. The great figures of the fight against Napoleon were many of them alive. When he came to power the revolution of 1848 was still in progress and men were striving to restore and to preserve the liberties of the earlier and greater French Revolution. He was still young when Cavour won Italian unity, when Bismarck created modern Germany, and both achievements were the consequences of Austrian defeats. William I, Victoria, Louis Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel; these had been his contemporaries but had now all become shades. The world he had known had also vanished. Republican institutions had returned to France and the ideas of the French Revolution, hateful to all his world, still continued to march triumphantly forward.

In the threescore and eight years during which he had reigned Francis Joseph saw all of Europe, save only his own realm, made over. The war with Napoleon III drove him out of Italy as far as Venetia; the war with Prussia expelled him from Germany and from Venetia. From that moment onward Austria declined visibly; hers was no longer

one of the dominating voices in the European councils; she became more and more the vassal of that Prussia whose rise she had opposed so long in the Eighteenth Century. For a full generation Europe had a phrase to describe the future, to express the conviction of the time when the inevitable European catastrophe was to come: "When Francis Joseph dies," men had said wisely and sadly for many, many years. But now Francis Joseph's life flickered out after the Great War had shaken the Continent for more than two years and while the future remained still obscure and the fate of his ancient empire still in doubt.

Francis Joseph was not a great emperor like Napoleon, nor yet a great king like Louis XIV. He had no wide outlook upon world affairs. He was a typical product of the Hapsburg Family, whose reactionary ideas he shared and served. When he was young the theories of Metternich ruled, and he accepted them. He fought to prevent the unity of Italy and the rise of Modern Germany. He sought to enslave the Balkans as his predecessors had endeavoured to enslave Italy. Yet Francis Joseph resembled Louis XIV in his fidelity to the task that had come to him unsought. "Farewell to my youth," he is said to have exclaimed when he was suddenly summoned to mount the Hapsburg throne as the last hope of an ancient race fallen upon evil days. No man ever worked harder, no man ever devoted himself more unsparingly to the business of ruling. He did not create, he did not transform, but he did preserve; he did ultimately, by dint of his devotion to what he conceived to be the welfare of his people, build up a tradition and construct a legend.

The time came when the Emperor himself was the real unifying element in the disintegrating structure of his empire. The Hungarians forgave him and respected him. He found affection even among the Slavs, whose unhappy lot he did not much mitigate, whose racial ambitions he opposed at all times. When he took the throne the executioner was busy over all Austria and in his name; yet, as the years passed, he came to be loved, reverenced, honoured by his people as the sole barrier against revolution and anarchy and as a sovereign who was literally the father of his people, however narrow his vision and limited his ideas.

When death at last overtook him, the first thought in all minds was for the future. Francis Joseph was the centre about which gathered all that was national and independent in Austrian life. His family was older than the Hohenzollern, and there clung to it a dignity not yet acquired by the latest ruler of a house which was but a small German affair two centuries ago, when the Hapsburg princes mounted the throne of the Holy Roman Empire in regular rotation.

Would the passing of Francis Joseph be followed by the permanent subordination of the Hapsburg to the Hohenzollern? Would Berlin, joining hands with Budapest, reduce Vienna to a place of relative unimportance? Would an Allied victory in the future bring about that dissolution of the Austrian Empire so many times threatened, so often imminent? Already the meaning of an Allied victory was not hidden. Galicia, Bukowina, Transylvania, Temesvar, Croatia, and Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Istria and the Trentino; these had been marked by the foes of Austria and beyond them lay the ever-present threat of Hungarian secession.

Like Louis XIV, Francis Joseph passed at a dark hour, leaving a plain heritage of danger and suffering for his people. But his own suffering had perhaps surpassed that of any of his subjects. "Fate is not kind to old men," Louis XIV said to one of his marshals returning after a disaster; and Fate had been singularly unkind to Francis Joseph. Yet through all the storm and stress of national and personal grief he had lived on. There was a legend that in all his last months his active mind had followed on the map the progress of the war, but that memory had so far failed him that he had continued to believe that it was the Prussians, and not the Russians, that his armies were fighting.

In his later days Sieyès was once asked what he did during The Terror, and his answer was: "*Mon Dieu! j'ai vécu.*" And if one should seek to sum up in a phrase the life work of Francis Joseph, one would say of his empire that, through him and under him, it had lived; for sixty-eight years it had survived a ruin that seemed imminent when he mounted the throne and certainly seemed no nearer on his

death than at his accession. The old Emperor was not a thinker; he was not a leader; but he had become an institution. And in later days he had come to seem the immortal emperor of a dying empire.

Men the world over asked whether the passing of Francis Joseph made for peace or for war. Actually, it was hard to see how his death could affect the situation. The flames which were still mounting higher and higher were beyond the control of one man or of many men; it might be doubted whether William II himself could influence the course of the gigantic struggle now. In truth, the event to which the world had looked forward with apprehension so long—the death of Francis Joseph—seemed now, when at last death had come to him, to be but a minor detail in the tragic history of his country and of all European countries.

As for the young archduke who succeeded to the Dual Monarchy, he did not find its fortunes more desperate than had Francis Joseph. About him the world knew next to nothing—less than it knew of that other archduke who had perished at Serajevo; but now that races and nations were struggling, with a full consciousness of the issues at stake, it was hard to believe that this sovereign could, in any large way, shape the course of human history. As for Francis Joseph, it would seem that the story was told in the fact that an old and tired King had at last laid down a burden beyond the strength of any man, after having borne it bravely and with dignity, if never with supreme skill or enlightened statesmanship.

# CHAPTER SIXTEEN

## THE FIRST GERMAN PEACE OFFENSIVE

### I

### GERMANY'S PROPOSAL

On December 12, six days after the fall of Bucharest, the German Government—with a dramatic suddenness which took all the Allied statesmen and peoples by surprise—proposed a conference for the exchange of views and the formulation of conditions on which might be terminated the world conflagration. The text of the German Note addressed by Germany and her allies to all the hostile nations was as follows:

The most terrific war ever experienced in history has been raging for the last two years and a half over a large part of the world—a catastrophe which thousands of years of common civilization were unable to prevent, and which injures the most precious achievements of humanity.

Our aims are not to shatter or annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us) until the bitter end, if necessary; at the same time prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end to the atrocities of war, the four allied powers propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations.

The propositions which they bring forward for such negotiations—and which have for their object a guarantee of the existence, the honour, and the liberty of evolution for their nations—are, according to their firm belief, an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace.

The four allied powers have been obliged to take up arms to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution. The glorious deeds of our armies have in no way altered their purpose. We always maintained the firm belief that our own rights and justified claims in no way controvert the rights of these nations.

The spiritual and material progress which was the pride of Europe at the beginning of the Twentieth Century is threatened with ruin. Germany and her allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—have given proof of their unconquerable strength in this struggle. They have gained gigantic advantages over adversaries superior in number and war material. Our lines stand unshaken against ever-repeated attempts made by armies.

The last attack in the Balkans has been rapidly and victoriously overcome. The most recent events have demonstrated that further continuance of the war will not result in breaking the resistance of our forces, and the whole situation with regard to our troops justifies our expectation of further successes.

If in spite of this offer of peace and reconciliation the struggle should go on, the four allied powers are resolved to continue to a victorious end, but they disclaim responsibility for this before humanity and history. The Imperial Government of —— [here is inserted the name of the neutral power addressed in each instance] is requested to bring this communication to the knowledge of the Government of —— [here are inserted the names of the belligerents].

On this same day, in a crowded Chamber, the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, explained the German peace proposal to the Reichstag, in this memorable speech. He said (in part):

In a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace.

His majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our allies, decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter into peace negotiations. This morning I transmitted a note to this effect to all the hostile powers, through the representatives of those powers which are watching over our interests and rights in the hostile states. I asked the representatives of Spain, the United States, and Switzerland to forward this note.

The same procedure has been adopted to-day in Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia. Other neutral states and His Holiness the Pope have been similarly informed.

After reading the note addressed to the Entente Allies the Chancellor said further:

Gentlemen: in August, 1914, our enemies challenged the superiority of our power in the World War. To-day we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity. We await the answer of our enemies with that serenity of mind which is guaranteed to us by our exterior and interior strength and by our clear conscience.

If our enemies decline to end the war, if they wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of all these terrors which hereafter will follow them even in the least and smallest homes, every German heart will burn in scared wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter that their plans of conquest may continue.

In a fateful hour we took a fateful decision. It has been saturated with the blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers who gave their lives for the safety of their homes.

Human wits and human understanding are unable to reach to the extreme and last questions in the struggle of nations, which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life but also the grandeur of human courage and human will in ways never seen before.

God will be the judge. We can proceed upon our way without fear and unashamed. We are ready for fighting and we are ready for peace.

Finally, the Kaiser notified his commanding generals of the German peace offer, while informing them that it was still uncertain what reception it would meet. The Emperor's order was addressed also "To

my navy which, in the common fight, has staked all its strength, loyally and effectively." The order follows:

"Soldiers: In agreement with the sovereigns of my allies and with consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that hour arrives, you must fight on."

## II. PRESIDENT WILSON INTERVENES

On December 18 the President of the United States, after some obvious hesitation, addressed to each of the belligerents a Note, which, in effect, asked for a restatement—by each—of its purposes. Written in part before the German Note, although not without a measure of information as to the imminence of this proposal, the President's communication gave obvious strength to the German manœuvre and as such was hailed in Germany and viewed with a measure of resentment in Allied capitals. Nor was this resentment lessened by the speech made by the President to the Senate, on January 22, in which he uttered the phrase, "peace without victory," which at once astounded and angered the nations fighting Germany, who had already found cause for grief in the fact that, in his original note, the President had seemed to imply that both groups of nations were seeking the same objects—thus placing the Germans and their opponents on common ground.

An examination of the President's document belongs to the next volume, where America's own relation to the war will be discussed. The President's Note was an American affair, it had relation to American conditions, and its international aspects were of relatively less importance. But it is significant as marking the extreme point of the divorce between American and Allied sympathies as represented by official utterance. From January, 1917, onward, the course of American policy and purpose was to run rapidly toward a parallel direction with that of Allied policy and interest, and what was said in December and January was quickly forgotten in the enthusiasm excited by what was done in February, April, and June.

Yet we have now to look at things as they then appeared to the world. Germany had made a peace gesture, promptly supported in



Photographers Western Newspaper Union

STATUES SAVED FROM ARRAS CATHEDRAL

Stored in a tiny church far behind the Canadian lines, works of art that could be removed from the cathedral were saved from the enemy's shells

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

ONE OF THE MIRACLES OF THE WAR

Interior of a church, showing how the statue of the Blessed Virgin and a saint escaped destruction though tons of débris fell all around them

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

THE MIRACLE OF MONTAUBAN

"Let me tell you of a miracle. We came upon it suddenly and the roots of my hair stirred coldly with a sense of the unseen Presence. The Virgin of Montauban stood amidst a chaos of destruction, serene, benign, the only thing that the shells had spared."—Private letter from a soldier

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

THE FALLEN BELL AT NEUVE CHAPELLE

All observers of the war have reported case after case of what could only be deliberate destruction of French and Belgian churches, even when there was no possible pretext of "military necessity"

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A TRIUMPH OF GERMAN GUNNERY

The crucifix was thrown down by a shell, but the figure remained intact

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

AN AMAZING OVERSIGHT

A bell was left behind in the wreck of a church in a small village near Lens. Every other bit of fine metal had been sacked even to stew-pans and fastenings of doors. One official loot gatherer must have been winged at his work



THE PUBLIC SQUARE AND CATHEDRAL AT YPRES

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

Ypres has suffered much. In the vortex of the fighting for several years, it was captured and recaptured by both sides. But its framework still stands, and it can be repaired

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

KING ALBERT'S CASTLE NEAR YPERN IN RUINS

**Castle Hollbecke**, one of the residences of King Albert of Belgium, partially wrecked. Some of the most stubbornly fought battles of the war took place here

fact, although neither in intention nor language, by the course of the President of the United States. As in war, so in diplomacy, the initiative is of priceless value and the Germans had secured the offensive by a surprise attack, supported at the critical moment by the recently reëlected President of the most powerful neutral state in the world.

To accept the German peace proposal did not for a moment enter the heads of the men charged with the direction of Allied policies, but to reject it was to run obvious risks—the risk of giving to the German the appearance of moderation, as contrasted with his opponents, and the peril of flouting the President of the United States and at once driving American sympathy and American influence to the German side. The moment, therefore, was critical, and although the larger perils were avoided, certain other hardly less serious dangers were not —and perhaps could not be—avoided. Since the German peace offensive could only be repulsed, it was inevitable that the Allies should be condemned to bear the responsibility for the prolongation of the war in the eyes of the German people and in those of a certain section of their own peoples.

### III. WHAT IT MEANT

We come now to the necessary analysis of the German manœuvre. What were the purposes of the Kaiser and his advisers in proposing peace negotiations at the moment when the taking of Bucharest had restored their military prestige and placed them in the strongest position they had occupied since the Verdun defeat—and the Somme offensive had shaken their hopes and ruined their plans for a military decision?

Wise, after the fact, we may at once exclude the interpretation immediately placed upon the German move by many contemporary observers. It was not fear of impending defeat, excited by recent events upon the west front, which led the Kaiser to take his momentous step. No idea of defeat entered the head of the German rulers and soldiers in 1916 or in the following year. The west—unable to perceive the eastern situation as it was, incapable of judging Russian facts and Ger-

man truths—saw in the peace proposal the obvious attempt of a starving and beaten Germany to transfer the struggle from the battle field to the green table and seek to win by other weapons the victory already lost in the military sphere.

Nothing could have been more inexact. It was the settled conviction of the German Government and the German people that the war had been won, and history will not adjudge this conviction half as absurd as the views held by Allied publics and voiced by Allied statesmen, concerning German prospects. Abroad, German arms were still strong and Germany had just won a shining victory. At home, despite discomforts and real hardships, the morale of the German people was stronger than that of the people of Britain or France, as the events of the next year were to disclose. It was not to avoid defeat that the Kaiser proposed peace by negotiation; this much is unmistakable.

Was it with the idea of seeking, in a negotiation conducted in some neutral capital, to separate the Allies? Did the German, in fact, expect, or actually much desire, an international conference? Again the answer must be in the negative. The German knew the sentiments of those who directed the policies of France and Britain. He realized, as every one in the world then realized, that neither the French nor the British Government would or could consent to peace negotiations at that moment. The replies which ultimately came from all enemy nations were clearly anticipated. On the morrow of the German peace proposal, despite the temporary disarray of Allied statesmanship, there was no doubt anywhere expressed as to what the response would be.

We may then at once dismiss the notion that the German manœuvre had in it any intent to bring peace by negotiation. The German did not expect this result, he did not desire this result. He now possessed all that he had hoped to acquire by the war—save the decisive victory itself; but he still regarded the decisive victory as not impossible, provided that he could destroy the morale of the peoples with whom he was fighting. And between a decisive victory and a long-drawn-out negotiation in which he would be overborne by numbers if not by brains, the German had every reason to prefer to stick to the pursuit of a decision by arms.

In analyzing the German motives we have to examine both the domestic conditions and the foreign circumstances that were in the mind of the Kaiser and his advisers in December. As far as the domestic conditions were concerned the German people believed themselves victorious, as they still believed themselves the victims of a European conspiracy. But, after so many victories, they could not understand the prolongation of the war and they saw, in the fact that their armies were everywhere fighting on foreign soil, a strange contradiction to the German Government's repeated assertion that the war was one of defence.

It was essential to demonstrate to the German people, if it could be done without damage, that the responsibility for the continuation of the struggle was not Germany's. If a proposal of peace, too vague, too impalpable to lead to anything, could be put forth by German statesmen and rejected by the representatives of Allied nations; if the rejection were accompanied by bitter words and fresh denunciation or by the formulation of terms incompatible with the views of the German people (who believed themselves victorious and, while eager for peace, had not the smallest intention of accepting anything but a victorious peace), then there would result an immediate hardening of the resolution of the German people; the Government would gain new support; it would absolve itself from the single reproach now beginning to be directed at it, namely, that it was responsible, not for the war, but for the failure of the war to reach a logical conclusion.

This was the home manœuvre—important, but not controlling.

### IV. THE RUSSIAN MANŒUVRE

But it is to the foreign field that we must look to gather any accurate notion of German designs. First of all, the German proposal envisaged the Russian situation. In the Muscovite Empire the Germans had corrupted the bureaucracy and subsidized the revolutionists. Russian affairs were marching to complete and inescapable ruin. The bureaucracy had made its bargain with the Germans. The fall of Rumania—betrayed by Russia, by Stuermer—was the price the Russian Cabinet had paid in advance for a German peace proposal, recognizing

that only by obtaining peace abroad could it resort to repression at home and save the system by which it lived.

True a new ministry, patriotic in its purposes, had succeeded Stuermer; but the harm had been done. And even though the new ministry should, as it did, repulse the peace proposal, it was only necessary for the Germans to redouble their efforts to stimulate into action their subsidized agents of revolution. Russia was exhausted; she had neither the moral, the military, nor the material resources out of which to build another campaign. If the bureaucracy could not provide peace, the Revolution would. Peace—peace at any price, on any terms—this was the desire of the people.

And Germany offered peace. Therefore, nothing was more inevitable than that the Revolution, passing rapidly from the control of the relatively restricted patriotic group, should fall into the hands of those extremists, many of them Germany's tools, who undertook to give the people what they desired most. The patriotic ministry which took command at the first stage of the Revolution, and Kerensky, who succeeded, might seek to preserve the solidarity of the Alliance with the western nations, but the mass of the people cared only for an end of the struggle, and since the Czar had allied himself with France, with Britain, and with Italy, and as these nations insisted upon war, the Russian extremists turned without hesitation or compunction to Germany, who had offered peace and continued to offer peace.

The main concern of Germany at all times in the first three campaigns had been to dispose of one of her larger foes, to win, in the east or in the west, a decision which would permit her to concentrate all her energies and all her resources in a single field. Three campaigns had passed without the attainment of this object, but it could be obtained without a fourth campaign if Russian military power were overthrown by revolution or if the Russian Government should, of its own will, decide to save itself at home by giving its subjects what they desired, even at the cost of breaking faith with the western nations. This was what the Stuermer Ministry had sought to do It had fallen, after performing only half its task, after having merely supplied. by the

betrayal of Rumania, a basis for peace by negotiation. Since the ministry that succeeded was patriotic and loyal, Germany would now turn to the other end of the line; she would go from the Cabinet to the *canaille*, from the palace to the gutter.

We shall see, in the analysis of the events of 1917, how completely the Germans subordinated military to diplomatic operations on its eastern front; how they substituted intrigue for heavy artillery; how they lured Russia, one step at a time, to ultimate ruin, and their purpose accomplished—they were at last free to turn westward, having destroyed the Russian nation and written at Brest-Litovsk a treaty more sweeping than that which Napoleon formulated with respect of Prussia at Tilsit. But until the Russian ruin was achieved, Germany steadfastly adhered to the peace offensive, and it is by the methods and by the result of this campaign, as they were later disclosed, that we must analyze the German peace manœuvre that began in December, 1916.

In sum, and looking for the moment at Russia, alone, Germany employed her peace operations exactly as she was accustomed to use her heavy artillery, to prepare the way for her infantry attack. She was not seeking peace but victory; she was not striving for an arrangement by mutual accommodation because she was still in the mood of a conqueror. A gesture of peace would placate certain elements at home, but it was not necessary, yet, to placate them. A peace gesture would serve to deceive the weary Russian people, to beguile the mad extremists, it would aid the revolutionists, an influential element of whom were in German pay. But it would be but a prelude; the infantry would advance exactly as after artillery preparation. And this is precisely what did happen at Brest-Litovsk, when a disarmed and helpless Russia confronted the essential Prussian, at last drawing his "good German sword" from beneath the white mantle of Peace, where it had been hidden but ready at all times.

### V. THE AMERICAN ASPECT

If the Russian objective was more obvious, it was not less clear that Germany also aimed at achieving certain results in America. In

recent months there had been a superficial improvement in German-American relations. The tense situation following the *Sussex* outrage in the winter had given way to a relative calm when Germany had accepted the terms insisted upon by the United States Government with respect of submarine operations. There had been an interruption in the incidents which had been so frequent in the previous year and the danger of a break with America seemed past.

But the German Government was already completing its preparations for that unlimited submarine warfare that was to be the opening move in the campaign of 1917. The submarine weapon had not been abandoned because of the success of the British navy in dealing with the U-boat. Nor had it been abandoned out of fear of American complications. In fact, it had not been abandoned at all but simply interrupted. When the Germans had made their concessions to the United States, they had made them because, at the moment, they did not have a sufficient fleet of U-boats to make a persistence in the campaign—with the probable entrance of the United States into the war as a consequence—profitable.

From that moment onward, however, the German leaders had concentrated their energies upon the construction of a fleet which should be adequate; the moment was approaching when the fleet would be ready; and Germany was prepared to lay aside the mask when that moment came. But even though she was willing to risk involving herself in war with the United States, Germany was still eager to avoid this increase in the number of her foes, if possible. Her strategy with the United States at all times had been to postpone to the last moment the entrance of that nation, but there had been a perception in Berlin that the postponement could not be indefinite.

In the peace offensive Germany saw a chance to gain a further postponement. While she exaggerated the American desire to remain outside the area of conflict; while she underestimated popular sentiment and Presidential firmness once a direct issue should be made, she still calculated—not overblindly—that, should she make a peace proffer and should this proffer be rejected by her enemies, then the

consequence might be to turn American sentiment against the Allies; saddle upon them, in American eyes, the responsibility for the prolongation of the struggle; and thus lead the American people and the American Government to tolerate a new submarine campaign as the last resort of a German people, pacifically inclined but fighting for its life with implacable enemies resolved to resist all overtures for peace.

The course of the President, in calling upon the belligerent nations for a restatement of purposes, after the German Note had been issued, unquestionably contributed to convincing the German Government that its manœuvre had been successful in America. In this it was mistaken. American opinion was taking form and the American Government, despite the President's clear determination to leave no step unturned to avoid war if it could be avoided, was getting on to firm ground. There was no chance now that the American people would submit to German prescriptions as to how and when they should use the sea. The long nightmare of German intrigue and German outrage in the United States was about at an end.

Yet the facts, as they afterward disclosed themselves, must not blind us to the motives of the Germans, motives which were the natural result of a reasonable interpretation of the American attitude. The German was making his best bid to keep America out of the war, just as he was making his best effort to eliminate Russia. To accomplish both these things would be to prepare the way for military victory; to postpone American entrance would, not impossibly, lead to the same result. There was no other appeal which could be made to America, and the peace offensive was bound to have a profound effect; it was bound to deceive, it was bound to confuse; it might—there was a chance—arouse American resentment at Allied persistence, at British and French obstinacy, which would give Germany the free hand she wanted for her submarine campaign. The explanation of the purpose is revealed in the direction of German intrigue and German propaganda in America at the time.

In its American phase the German peace offensive was a failure;

America did enter the war on the Allied side, but the American aspect of the German operation is none the less interesting and important.

### VI. IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE

The peace offensive, in its British and French aspects, was, however, more serious immediately and eventually than in America. In American politics the old alliance between "the Puritan and the Blackleg" was not unfamiliar; in Russia the German had sought to achieve his purpose by harnessing the Court and the gutter to his car; in Great Britain and in France his tactics were similar; he made allies alike out of idealism and selfishness, his ends were served by those who sought peace for reasons which were above suspicion or reproach and by those who were seeking to advance or preserve selfish interests at the sacrifice of all else.

In the first three years of the war the people of the Allied nations believed, and their leaders and press told them, that there was a gulf between the people and the rulers of Germany. The legend, eagerly seized upon and steadily accepted, pictured the German people as ever on the point of throwing off its masters and seeking peace through the medium of that form of democracy familiar to the western nations. The truth was quite different. The German people were not in revolt against their masters nor was there as yet any cleavage between people and government, between parties and the Kaiser.

But the situation in the Allied countries was not the same. There was discord, there was lack of common purpose and equal determination. In England and France there was an element—made up of men of commanding integrity and unquestioned ability and intelligence—who opposed war as such, who had opposed the entrance of their country into the present war, who saw in their own nation's cause, its war aims, and its international policies, faults as grave as those disclosed by the German programme. Some of these believed any peace better than every form of war; more of them believed that the war was unnecessary and that, but for the chauvinism in Allied quarters, it could have been avoided. All of them accepted the German peace proposal as

made in good faith and began an industrious campaign to force their governments to meet the German suggestion.

The result was an instant outburst of criticism and denunciation, not of the enemy, but of the governments of the men who uttered the condemnation and—which was worse for Allied solidarity—of the purposes of Allied nations. Distrust of Russia was a long-standing British tradition and, while Russia still stood, Russian ambitions toward the Near East were a target for attack. French claims upon Alsace-Lorraine were assailed, Italian ambitions along the Adriatic were denounced. The assertion was made, repeated, proclaimed, that all nations were equally selfish and all war aims coloured by the same international selfishness. The demand for a restatement of Allied war aims, coupled with an insistence upon the elimination from these war aims of all territorial claims, however just, was heard on all sides, and the Allied cause was weakened in the eyes of those who were bearing the burdens of the defence of that cause—not by the enemy abroad, but by the friend at home or the ally in a friendly nation.

For the first time there was a palpable decline in the moral vitality of the Allied publics. And this was what the German had sought. He had framed his peace proposals to catch the emotion and the sentiment of the pacifist and of the idealist; he transferred the discussion from the area of his own actual misdeeds to the real or imaginary purpose of the Allies to imitate in some lesser degree, not his crimes but his territorial aspirations; and, in doing this, he temporarily deprived his opponents of that moral initiative that they had possessed from the moment when his invasion of Belgium had aroused the moral indignation of all non-Teutonic civilization.

At the other end of the rope he appealed to the selfish, to the rich and the powerful, who saw the war undermining the existing social system, eating up their fortunes in war taxes, levelling all the barriers of class, transferring from Capital to Labour the real control of industry and of nations. His statesmen and his propaganda artfully emphasized the approaching destruction of wealth and of "Kultur"—the ruin of European civilization. Nor did his appeals have less attraction for

the labouring classes, whose war with the capitalists had been halted by the world struggle, who feared for the privileges and rights which they had newly acquired and saw in each governmental requirement a new invasion of their recently acquired powers.

Lastly, and this is of capital importance, the German peace proposal fell upon a war-weary world. The agonies and sacrifices of three campaigns had been beyond description; for millions in the trenches and in the factories, and for the other millions who suffered in the persons of those they loved, the strain had been terrific. And for this strain there was no apparent relief in any immediate future. Victory no longer seemed at hand; it was to seem more and more remote in the next eighteen months. In invaded France, in blockaded Britain, human endurance had its limits; men and women were approaching the point where, if honourable peace could be obtained, prolongation of the war, for any purpose, seemed a crime.

It was the mission of the German propaganda to create in the minds of the pacifists and the idealists the notion that peace—with all their ideals and dreams assured—was to be had; that the obstacle was not the German Government but their own statesmen. It was the purpose of German propaganda to convince Capital that an escape from impending perils was available, if only the leaders of Allied countries would lay aside a mad pursuit of impossible military triumphs and listen to the voice of reason. It was the mission of German propaganda to shake the confidence of Allied publics in their governments—of Allied peoples in the honesty of purpose of their statesmen. It was the mission of German propaganda to play upon the agony, the credulity, the selfishness, and the idealism of men of enemy nations, to the end that the spirits of these peoples should weaken, that the desire for peace should overwhelm the determination to achieve victory.

And while Germany's manœuvres seduced the idealism it satisfied the selfishness and purchased the venality of the nations at war with her. A huge defeatist manœuvre was carried on in France coincident with the idealistic campaign conducted in Britain. This was to be the true campaign of 1917 and it was to bring the Allies, in

whose number America would be included, to the very edge of ruin, before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk revealed the German as he was and disclosed the weak, the wicked, and the unfortunate elements of the Russian Revolution in circumstances which the western world could not mistake.

### VII. REJECTED

Such, in substance, was the first German peace offensive. The German proposal was promptly rejected, its rejection was contained in speeches by British, French, and Italian prime ministers; even the Russian Government, now brought to the edge of ruin, repulsed the offer for which its predecessor had striven. In due course of time the Allies returned to the President of the United States an adequate but not unambiguous explanation of their war aims, which he accepted with the good grace which was required. Meanwhile, the German press and the German statesmen signalized the rejection of their peace proposal by declarations intended to convince their own public and the publics of the enemy nations that their sincerity had been beyond question and the responsibility for the prolongation of the struggle rested with the nations whose determination to destroy the German people was revealed in their brusque rejection of Germany's generous offer to lay aside the rights of a victor and treat with her enemies as with equals.

But with the speeches of the statesmen, German or Allied, we need have little concern. The Germans spoke wisely and for a purpose, the Allied orators foolishly, because they only partly fathomed the meaning of the German manœuvre and were as blind to conditions within their own countries as they were misled as to conditions within Germany. With the rejection of the German proposal the Allied press celebrated the repulse of an enemy attack, convinced that such danger as there had been was abolished by the incantations of the orators in the several parliaments.

The truth was otherwise. The German peace offensive had not failed; on the contrary, it had undermined Allied solidarity and shaken

the morale of Allied publics; it had loosed centrifugal forces which were to operate with ever-increasing energy. It was a beginning, not an end; it was the artillery preparation before the infantry attack, and the infantry attack would not only come, but would temporarily break the home front. Had the German been as successful in America as he was in Europe, the Allies would have lost the war. It was the failure of the German peace offensive in America, the failure to prevent or postpone American entrance, which saved the compromised situation, when Russia had collapsed, France been beaten at the Aisne, Britain's splendid young army decimated in the Flanders bogs, when defeatism and war weariness had swept over the western nations and the German peace offensive had at last prepared the way for the resumption of the military offensive by Ludendorff in March, 1918.

"Germany must squeeze her enemies with a pair of pincers. The German armies must continue to fight vigorously, while the German Socialists encourage and stimulate pacifism among Germany's enemies." This was the programme of a German Socialist. This is the epitome of the first and of all other German offensives. Germany was seeking to win the war by all means available. The Peace offensive was a method. December, 1916, was an appropriate moment to invoke this method. Nations which could not at once be conquered by German ruthlessness might be disarmed by their own idealism.

And with the launching of the German peace offensive the history of the year 1916 ends. In a sense this German manœuvre belongs rather to 1917 than to the preceding year. It was the first step in a new campaign rather than the last one in an old. It was the preface to the Russian collapse, to the Italian defeat at Caporetto, to the German victories of the spring of 1918. It was an attack upon the "home front" after two great repulses upon the battle front. But it was a logical and natural climax to the campaign of 1916, in which both contending parties had failed to achieve a decision and in which the Allies were left without a policy or a purpose, aghast at the Rumanian disaster, humiliated at the sacrifice of another little state whose doom they had not been able to foresee or to avert.

The German had regained the military initiative at Bucharest; by his peace offensive he had now, for the moment, grasped the moral initiative. Both had been won in 1916, both were the results of his successes. He would make effective use of both advantages. He could hope and did hope that, combined, they would enable him to win the war. In this he was mistaken; but again the Allies would escape utter defeat by a narrow margin and once more their blindness would bring bitter disappointment and deadly peril. They were still failing; the German was still winning, and, as the year closed, had shifted the attack to a new field and taken his enemy unprepared and unawares. For eighteen months he would be able to exploit this new triumph and it would bring him again to the Marne, before France rallied and America arrived, before British and French idealism and pacifism were silenced by Brest-Litovsk and a common peril restored the home front in the Allied countries and thus laid the foundations for victory in the field.

The German peace offensive was the third German attack upon the western nations. It was repulsed, but not before it had once more brought the Allied cause to the brink of ruin. And it did complete the work of Hindenburg and Mackensen in the east. It opened a campaign longer than that at Verdun, and, all things considered, more costly to the Allies than that at the Somme. With these two great operations it divides the interest in the history of 1916. With the rejection by the Allies of the German proposal there ends, not a campaign, but a period. With the new year were to appear new leaders, new soldiers, new issues, and new problems. And yet, in December, 1916, only Germany detected signs of the impending change. She saw only the material side, but such vision as she had was to permit her to go forward far on the road to victory before she encountered at the Marne and for the second time, a spiritual rebirth beyond her power to conquer.

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volumes

Editor

# MY TRIP TO VERDUN

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

# I

# MY TRIP TO VERDUN*

## GENERAL PÉTAIN FACE TO FACE

### THE MEN WHO HOLD THE LINE—WHAT THEIR FACES TOLD OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF FRANCE

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

My road to Verdun ran through the Elysée Palace, and it was to the courtesy and interest of the President of the French Republic that I owed my opportunity to see the battle for the Meuse city at close range. Already through the kindness of the French General Staff I had seen the Lorraine and Marne battlegrounds and had been guided over these fields by officers who had shared in the opening battles that saved France. But Verdun was more difficult; there is little time for caring for the wandering correspondent when a decisive contest is going forward, and quite naturally the General Staff turned a deaf ear to my request.

Through the kindness of one of the many Frenchmen who gave time and effort to make my pilgrimage a success I was at last able to see M. Poincaré. Like our own American President, the French Chief Magistrate is never interviewed, and I mention this audience simply because it was one more and in a sense the final proof for me of the friendliness, the courtesy, the interest that the American will find to-day in France. I had gone to Paris, my ears filled with the warnings of those who told me that it was hard to be an American in Europe, in France, in the present hour. I had gone expecting, or at least fearing, that I should find it so.

Instead, from peasant to President I found only kindness, only gratitude, only a profound appreciation for all that Americans had individually done for France in the hour of her great trial. These things and one thing more I found: a very intense desire that Americans should be able to see for themselves; the Frenchman will not talk to you of what France has done, is doing; he shrinks from anything that might suggest imitation of the German method of propaganda. In so far as it is humanly possible he would have you see the thing for yourself and testify out of your own mouth.

Thus it came about that all my difficulties vanished when I had been permitted to express to the President my desire to see Verdun and to go back to America—I was sailing within the week—able to report what I had seen with

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my own eyes of the decisive battle still going forward around the Lorraine city. Without further delay or discussion, it was promised that I should go to Verdun by motor, that I should go cared for by the French military authorities, and that I should be permitted to see all that one could see at the moment of the contest.

We left Paris in the early afternoon; my companions were M. Henri Ponsot, chief of the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Hugues le Roux, a distinguished Frenchman of letters well known to many Americans. To start for the battlefield from a busy, peaceful city, to run for miles through suburbs as quiet and lacking in martial aspect as the regions beyond the Harlem, at home, was a thing that seemed almost unreal; but only for a brief moment, for war has come very near to Paris, and one may not travel far in Eastern France without seeing its signs.

In less than an hour we were passing the rear of the line held by the British at the Battle of the Marne, and barely sixty minutes after we had passed out through the Vincennes gate we met at Courtacon the first of the ruined villages that for two hundred miles line the roadways that lead from the capital to Lorraine and Champagne. Suddenly in the midst of a peaceful countryside, after passing a score of undisturbed villages, villages so like one to another, you come to one upon which the storm has burst, and instead of snug houses, smiling faces, the air of contentment and happiness that was France, there is only a heap of ruins, houses with their roofs gone, their walls torn by shell fire, villages abandoned partially or wholly, contemporary Pompeiis, overtaken by the Vesuvius of Krupp.

Coincidentally there appear along the roadside, in the fields, among the plough furrows, on every side, the crosses that mark the graves of those who died for France—or for Germany. Along the slope you may mark the passage of a charge by these crosses; those who fell were buried as they lay, French and Germans with equal care. Indeed, there is a certain pride visible in all that the French do for their dead foes. Alongside a hamlet wantonly burned, burned by careful labour and with German thoroughness, in villages where you will be told of nameless atrocities and shameful killings, you will see the German graves, marked by neat crosses, surrounded by sod embankments, with plaques of black and white; the French graves are marked by plaques of red, white, and blue, and are invariably decorated with a flag and flowers.

Once you have seen these graves by the roadside going east you will hardly go a mile in two hundred which has not its graves. From the environs of Meaux, a scant twenty miles from Paris, to the frontier at the Seille, beyond Nancy, there are graves and more graves, now scattered, now crowded together where men fought hand to hand. Passing them in a swift-moving auto, they seem to march by you; there is the illusion of an army advancing on the hillside, until at last, beyond Nancy, where the fighting was so terrible, about

little villages such as Corbessaux, you come to the great common graves, where a hundred or two hundred men have been gathered, where the trenches now levelled are but long graves, and you read, "Here rest 179 French soldiers," or across the road, "Here 196 Germans."

Take a map of France and from a point just south of Paris draw a straight line to the Vosges; twenty or thirty miles to the north draw another. Between the two is the black district of the Marne and Nancy battles. It is the district of ruined villages, destroyed farms; it is the region where every hillside—so it will seem to the traveller—is marked by these pathetic crosses. It is a region in which the sense of death and destruction is abroad. Go forty miles north again and draw two more lines, and this is the region not of the death and destruction of yesterday, but of to-day; this is the front, where the graves are still in the making, the region of the Oise to the Meuse, from Noyon to Verdun.

On this day our route led eastward through the villages which in September, 1914, woke from at least a century of oblivion, from the forgetting that followed Napoleon's last campaign in France, to a splendid but terrible ten days: Courtacon, Sézanne, La-Fère Champenoise, Vitry-le-François, the region where Franchet d'Esperey and Foch fought, where the "Miracle of the Marne" was performed. Mile after mile the countryside files by, the never-changing impression of a huge cemetery, the hugest in the world, the stricken villages, now and then striving to begin again, a red roof here and there telling of the first counter-offensive of peace, of construction made against the whirlwind that had come and gone.

Always, too, nothing but old men and women, these and children, working in the broad fields, still partially cultivated, but no longer the fields of that perfectly cared for France of the other peace days. Women and children at the plough, old men bent double by age still spending such strength as is left in the tasks that war has set for them. This is the France behind the front, and, aside from the ruined villages and graves, the France that stretches from the Pyrenees to the Marne, a France from which youth and manhood are gone, in which age and childhood remain with the women. Yet in this land we were passing how much of the youth and manhood of France and Germany was buried the crosses indicated at every kilometre.

But a hundred miles east of Paris there begins a new world. The graves, the shell-cursed villages, remain, but this is no longer the France of the Marne fighting and of the war of two years ago. At Vitry-le-François you pass almost without warning into the region which is the back of the front to-day, the base of all the line of fire from Rheims to the Meuse, and suddenly along the road appear the canvas guideposts which bear the terse warning, "Verdun." You pass suddenly from ancient to contemporary history, from the killing of other years to the killing that is of to-day—the killing and the wounding—and along

the hills where there are still graves there begin to appear Red Cross tents and signs, and ambulances pass you bearing the latest harvest.

And now every village is a garrison town. For a hundred miles there have been only women and old men, but now there are only soldiers; they fill the streets; they crowd the doorways of the houses. The fields are filled with tents, with horses, with all the impedimenta of an army. The whole countryside is a place of arms. Every branch of French service is about you—Tunisians, Turcos, cavalry, the black, the brown, and the white—the men who yesterday or last week were in the first line, who rest and will return tomorrow or next day to fight again.

Unmistakably, too, you feel that this is the business of war; you are in a factory, a machine shop; if the product is death and destruction, it is no less a matter of machinery, not of romance, of glamour. The back of the front is a place of work and of rest for more work, but of parade, of the brilliant, of the fascinating there is just nothing. Men with bright but plainly weary faces, not young men, but men of thirty and above, hard bitten by their experience, patently fit, fed, but somehow related to the ruins and the destruction around them, they are all about you, and wherever now you see a grave you will discover a knot of men standing about it talking soberly. Wherever you see the vestiges of an old trench, a hill that was fought for at this time twenty months ago, you will see new practice trenches and probably the recruits, the "Class of 1917," the boys that are waiting for the call, listening to an officer explaining to them what has been done here, the mistake or the good judgment revealed by the event. For France is training the youth that remains to her on the still recent battlefields and in the presence of those who died to keep the ground.

Just as the darkness came we passed St. Dizier and entered at last upon the road to Verdun, the one road that is the life line of the city. For to understand the real problem of the defence of Verdun you must realize that there is lacking to the city any railroad. In September, 1914, the Germans took St. Mihiel and cut the railway coming north along the Meuse. On their retreat from the Marne the soldiers of the Crown Prince halted at Montfaucon and Varennes, and their cannon have commanded the Paris-Verdun-Metz Railroad ever since. Save for a crazy narrow-gauge line wandering along the hill slopes, climbing by impossible grades, Verdun is without rail communication.

It was this that made the defence of the town next to impossible. Partially to remedy the defect the French had reconstructed a local highway running from St. Dizier by Bar-le-Duc to Verdun beyond the reach of German artillery. To-day an army of a quarter of a million of men, the enormous parks of heavy artillery and field guns—everything is supplied by this one road and by motor transport.

Coming north from St. Dizier we entered this vast procession. Mile after mile the caravan stretched on, fifty miles with hardly a break of a hundred feet between trucks. Paris 'buses, turned into vehicles to bear fresh meat new motor trucks built to carry thirty-five men and travelling in companies, regiments, brigades; wagons from the hood of which soldiers, bound to replace the killed and wounded of yesterday, looked down upon you calmly but unsmilingly. From St. Dizier to Verdun the impression was that of the machinery by which logs are carried to the saw in a mill. You felt unconsciously, yet unmistakably, that you were looking, not upon automobiles, not upon separate trucks, but upon some vast and intricate system of belts and benches that were steadily, swiftly, surely carrying all this vast material, carrying men and munitions and supplies, everything human and inanimate, to that vast grinding mill which was beyond the hills, the crushing machine which worked with equal remorselessness upon men and upon things.

Now and again, too, over the hills came the Red Cross ambulances; they passed you returning from the front and bringing within their carefully closed walls the finished product, the fruits of the day's grinding, or a fraction thereof. And about the whole thing there was a sense of the mechanical rather than the human, something that suggested an automatic, a machine-driven, movement; it was as if an unseen system of belts and engines and levers guided, moved, propelled this long procession upward and ever toward the mysterious front where the knives or the axes or the grinding stones did their work.

Night came down upon us along the road and brought a new impression. Mile on mile over the hills and round the curves, disappearing in the woods, reappearing on the distant summits of the hills, each showing a rear light that wagged crazily on the horizon, this huge caravan flowed onward, while in the villages and on the hillsides campfires flashed up and the faces or the figures of the soldiers could be seen now clearly and now dimly. But all else was subordinated to the line of moving transports. Somewhere far off at one end of the procession there was battle; somewhere down below at the other end there was peace. There all the resources, the life blood, the treasure in men and in riches of France were concentrating and collecting, were being fed into this motor fleet, which like baskets on ropes was carrying it forward to the end of the line and then bringing back what remained, or for the most part coming back empty, for more—for more lives and more treasure.

It was fullnight when our car came down the curved grades into Bar-le-Duc, halted at the corner, where soldiers performed the work of traffic policemen and steadily guided the caravan toward the road marked by a canvas sign lighted within by a single candle and bearing the one word, "Verdun." All night, too, the rumble of the passing transport filled the air and the little hotel shook with the jar of the heavy trucks, for neither by day nor by night

is there a halt in the motor transport, and the sound of this grinding is never low.

It was little more than daylight when we took the road again, with a thirty-mile drive to Verdun before us. Almost immediately we turned into the Verdun route we met again the caravan of automobiles, of camions, as the French say. It still flowed on without break. Now, too, we entered the main road, the one road to Verdun, the road that had been built by the French army against just such an attack as was now in progress. The road was as wide as Fifth Avenue, as smooth as asphalt—a road that, when peace comes, if it ever does, will delight the motorist. Despite the traffic it had to bear, it was in perfect repair, and soldiers in uniform sat by the side breaking stone and preparing metal to keep it so.

The character of the country had now changed. We were entering the region of the hills between the Aisne and the Meuse, a country reminiscent of New England. Those hills are the barriers which beyond the Meuse, under the name of the Côte de Meuse, have been the scene of so much desperate fighting. The roads that sidled off to the east bore battle names, St. Mihiel, Troyon, and the road that we followed was still marked at every turn with the magic word "Verdun." Our immediate objective was Souilly, the obscure hill town twenty miles, perhaps, south of the front, from which Sarrail had defended Verdun in the Marne days and from which Pétain was now defending Verdun against a still more terrible attack.

And in France to-day one speaks only of Verdun and Pétain. Soldiers have their day; Joffre, Castelnau, Foch, all retain much of the affection and admiration they have deserved, but at the moment it is the man who has held Verdun that France thinks of, and there was the promise for us that at Souilly we should see the man whose fame had filled the world in the recent great and terrible weeks. Upward and downward over the hills, through more ruined villages, more hospitals, more camps, our march took us until after a short hour we came to Souilly, general headquarters of the Army of Verdun, of Pétain, the centre of the world for the moment

Few towns have done less to prepare for greatness than Souilly. It boasts a single street three inches deep in the clay mud of the spring—a single street through which the Verdun route marches almost contemptuously, the same nest of stone and plaster houses, one story high, houses from which the owners had departed to make room for generals and staff officers. This and one thing more, the Mairie, the town hall, as usual the one pretentious edifice of the French hamlet, and before the stairway of this we stopped and got out.

We were at headquarters. From this little building, devoted for perhaps a century to the business of governing the commune of Souilly, with its scant thousand of people, Pétain was defending Verdun and the fate of an army of 250,000 men at the least. In the upstairs room, where the town councillors

had once debated parochial questions, Joffre and Castelnau and Pétain in the terrible days of the opening conflict had consulted, argued, decided—decided the fate of France, so the Germans had said, for they had made the fall of Verdun the assurance of French collapse.

Unconsciously, too, you felt the change in the character of the population of this village. There were still the soldiers, the eternal gray-blue uniforms, but there were also men of a different type, men of authority. In the street your guides pointed out to you General Herr, the man who had designed and planned and accomplished the miracle of the motor transport that had saved Verdun—with the aid of the brave men fighting somewhere not far beyond the nearest hills. He had commanded at Verdun when the attack came, and without hesitation he had turned over his command to Pétain, his junior in service and rank before the war, given up the glory and become the superintendent of transport. Men spoke to you of the fine loyalty of that action with unconcealed admiration.

And then out of the remoteness of Souilly there came a voice familiar to an American. Bunau-Varilla, the man of Panama, wearing the uniform of a commandant and the Croix de Guerre newly bestowed for some wonderful engineering achievement, stepped forward to ask for his friends and yours of the old "*Sun* paper." I had seen him last in the *Sun* office in the days when the war had just broken out and he was about to sail for home; in the days when the Marne was still unfought and he had breathed hope then as he spoke with confidence now.

Presently there arrive the two officers whose duty it was to take me to Verdun, Captain Henri Bordeaux, a man of letters known to all Frenchmen; Captain Madelin, an historian, already documented in the history of the war making under his own eyes. To these gentlemen and their colleagues who perform this task that can hardly be agreeable, who risk their lives and give over their time with unfailing courtesy and consideration that the American newspaper correspondent may see, may report, it is impossible to return sufficient thanks, and every American newspaper reader who finds on his breakfast table the journal that tells him of the progress of the war owes something to some officer.

"Were we to see Verdun?" This was the first problem. I had been warned two days before that the bombardment was raging and that it was quite possible that it would be unsafe to go farther. But the news was reassuring; Verdun was tranquil. "And Pétain?" One could not yet say.

Even as we spoke there was a stirring in the crowd, general saluting, and I caught a glimpse of the commander-in-chief as he went quickly up the staircase. For the rest we must wait. But not for very long; in a few minutes there came the welcome word that General Pétain would see us, would see the stray American correspondent.

Since I saw Pétain in the little Mairie at Souilly I have seen many photographs of him, but none in any real measure give the true picture of the defender of Verdun. He saw us in his office, the bare upstairs room, two years ago the office of the Mayor of Souilly. Think of the Selectmen's office in any New England village and the picture will be accurate: a bare room, a desk, one chair, a telephone, nothing on the walls but two maps, one of the military zone, one of the actual front and positions of the Verdun fighting. A bleak room, barely heated by the most primitive of stoves. From the single window one looked down on the cheerless street along which lumbered the caravan of autos. On the pegs against the wall hung the General's hat and coat, weather-stained, faded, the clothes of a man who worked in all weathers. Of staff officers, of uniforms, of colour there was just nothing; of war there was hardly a hint.

At the door the commander-in-chief met us, shook hands, and murmured clearly and slowly, with incisive distinctness, the formal words of French greeting; he spoke no English. Instantly there was the suggestion of Kitchener, not of Kitchener as you see him in flesh, but in photographs, the same coldness, decision. The smile that accompanied the words of welcome vanished and the face was utterly motionless, expressionless. You saw a tall, broad-shouldered man, with every appearance of physical strength, a clear blue eye, looking straight forward and beyond.

My French companion, M. Le Roux, spoke with Pétain. He had just come from Joffre and he told an interesting circumstance. Pétain listened. He said now and then "yes" or "no." Nothing more. Watching him narrowly you saw that occasionally his eyes twitched a little, the single sign of fatigue that the long strain of weeks of responsibility had brought.

It was hard to believe, looking at this quiet, calm, silent man, that you were in the presence of the soldier who had won the Battle of Champagne, the man whom the war had surprised in the last of his fifties, a Colonel, a teacher of war rather than a soldier, a professor like Foch.

No one of Napoleon's marshals had commanded as many men as obeyed this Frenchman, who was as lacking in the distinction of military circumstance as our own Grant. Napoleon had won all his famous victories with far fewer troops than were directed from the telephone on the table yonder.

Every impression of modern war that comes to one actually in touch with it is a destruction of illusion: this thing is a thing of mechanism rather than of brilliance; perhaps Pétain has led a regiment, a brigade, or a division to the charge. You knew instinctively in seeing the man that you would go or come, as he said, but there was neither dash nor fire, nothing of the suggestion of élan; rather there was the suggestion of the commander of a great ocean liner, the man responsible for the lives, this time of hundreds of thousands, not scores, for the safety of France, not of a ship, but the man of ma-

chinery and the master of the wisdom of the tides and the weather, not the Ney, or the Murat, not the Napoleon of Arcola. The impression was of a strong man whose life was a life beaten upon by storms; the man on the bridge, to keep to the rather ridiculously inadequate figure, but not by any chance the man on horseback.

My talk, our talk with Pétain, was the matter of perhaps five minutes. The time was consumed by the words of M. Le Roux, who spoke very earnestly, urging that more American correspondents be permitted to visit Verdun, and Pétain heard him patiently, but said just nothing. Once he had greeted us his face settled into that grim expression that never changed until he smiled his word of good wishes as we left. Yet I have since found that apart from one circumstance which I shall mention in a moment I have remembered those minutes most clearly of all of my Verdun experience. Just as the photograph does not reveal the face of the man, the word does not describe the sense of strength, of responsibility, that he gives.

In a childish sort of way, exactly as one thinks of war as a matter of dash and colour and motion, one thinks of the French general as the leader of a cavalry charge or of a forlorn hope of infantry. And the French soldier of this war has not been the man of charge or of dash—not that he has not charged as well as ever in his history, a little more bravely, perhaps, for machine guns are new and something worse than other wars have had. What the French soldier has done has been to stand, to hold, to die not in the onrush but on the spot.

And Pétain in some curious way has fixed in my mind the impression of the new Frenchman, if there be a new one, or perhaps better of the French soldier of to-day, whether he wear the stars of the general or undecorated "horizon" blue of the *poilu*. The look that I saw in his eyes, the calm, steady, utterly emotionless looking straight forward, I saw everywhere at the front and at the back of the front. It embodied for me an enduring impression of the spirit and the poise of the French soldier of the latest and most terrible of French struggles. And I confess that, more than all I saw and heard at the front and in Paris, the look of this man convinced me that Verdun would not fall, that France herself would not either weary or weaken.

In Paris, where one may hear anything, there are those that will tell you that Joffre's work is done and that France waits for the man who will complete the task; that the strain of the terrible months has wearied the general who won the Battle of the Marne and saved France. They will tell you, perhaps, that Pétain is the man; they will certainly tell you that they hope that the man has been found in Pétain. As to the truth of all this I do not pretend to know. I did not see Joffre, but all that I have read of Joffre suggests that Pétain is of his sort, the same quiet, silent man, with a certain coldness of the North, a grimness of manner that is lacking in his chief.

There was a Kitchener legend in Europe, and I do not think it survives save a little perhaps in corners of England. There was a legend of a man of ice and of iron, a man who made victory out of human material as a man makes a wall of mortar and stone, a man to whom his material was only mortar and stone, even though it were human. This legend has perished so far as Kitchener is concerned, gone with so much that England trusted and believed two years ago, but I find myself thinking now of Pétain as we all thought of Kitchener in his great day.

If I were an officer I should not like to come to the defender of Verdun with the confession of failure. I think I should rather meet the Bavarians in the first-line trenches, but I should like to know that when I was obeying orders I was carrying out a minor detail of something Pétain had planned; I should expect it to happen, the thing that he had arranged, and I should feel that those clear, steel-blue eyes had foreseen all that could occur, foreseen calmly and utterly, whether it entailed the death of one or a thousand men, of ten thousand men if necessary, and had willed that it should happen. I do not believe Napoleon's Old Guard would have followed Pétain as they followed Ney. I cannot fancy him in the Imperial uniform, and yet, now that war is a thing of machines, of telephones, of indirect fire and destruction from unseen weapons at remote ranges, now that the whole manner and circumstance of conflict have changed, it is but natural that the General should change, too. Patently Pétain is of the new, not the old, but no less patently he was the master of it.

We left the little Mairie, entered our machines, and slid out swiftly for the last miles, climbed and curved over the final hill and suddenly looked down on a deep, trenchlike valley marching from east to west and carrying the Paris-Verdun-Metz Railroad, no longer available for traffic. And as we coasted down the hill we heard the guns at last, not steadily, but only from time to time, a distant boom, a faint billowing up of musketry fire. Some three or four miles straight ahead there were the lines of fire beyond the brown hills that flanked the valley.

At the bottom of the valley we turned east, moved on for a mile, and stopped abruptly. The guns were sounding more clearly, and suddenly there was a sense not of soldiers, but of an army. On one side of the road a column was coming toward us, a column of men who were leaving the trenches for a rest, the men who for the recent days had held the first line. Wearily but steadily they streamed by; the mud of the trenches covered their tunics; here and there a man had lost his steel helmet and wore a handkerchief about his head, probably to conceal a slight wound that but for the helmet had killed him.

These men were smiling as they marched; they carried their full equipment and it rattled and tinkled; they carried their guns at all angles, they wore their uniforms in the strangest of disorders; they seemed almost like miners

coming from the depths of the earth rather than soldiers returning from a decisive battle, from the hell of modern shell fire.

But it was the line on the other side of the road that held the eye. Here were the troops that were going toward the fire, toward the trenches, that were marching to the sound of the guns, and as one saw them the artillery rumble took on a new distinctness.

Involuntarily I searched the faces of these men as they passed. They were hardly ten feet from me. Platoon after platoon, company after company, whole regiments in columns of fours. And seeing the faces brought an instant shock; they all wore the same calm, steady, slightly weary expression, but there was in the whole line scarcely a young man. Here were men of the thirties, not the twenties; men still in the prime of strength, of health, but the fathers of families, the men of full manhood.

Almost in a flash the fact came home. This was what all the graves along the road had meant. This was what the battlefields and the glories of the twenty months had spelled—France had sent her youth and it was spent; she was sending her manhood now.

In the line no man smiled and no man straggled; the ranks were closed up and there were neither commands nor any visible sign of authority. These men who were marching to the sound of the guns had been there before. They knew precisely what it meant. Yet you could not but feel that as they went a little wearily, sadly, they marched willingly. They would not have it otherwise. Their faces were the faces of men who had taken the full measure of their own fate.

You had a sense of the loathing, the horror, above all the sadness that was in their hearts that this thing, this war, this destruction had to be. They had come back here through all the waste of ruined villages and shell-torn hillsides; all the men that you saw would not measure the cost of a single hour of trench fighting if the real attack began. This these men knew, and the message of the artillery fire, which was only one of unknown terrors for you, was intelligible to the utmost to each of them.

And yet with the weariness there was a certain resignation, a certain patience, a certain sense of comprehending sacrifice that more than all else is France to-day, the true France. This, and not the empty forts, not even the busy guns, was the wall that defended France, this line of men. If it broke there would come thundering down again out of the north all the tornado of destruction that had turned northeastern France into a waste place and wrecked so much of the world's store of the beautiful and the inspiring.

Somehow you felt that this was in the minds of all these men. They had willed to die that France might live. They were going to a death that sounded ever more clearly as they marched. This death had eaten up all that was young, most of what was young at the least, of France; it might yet consume

France, and so these men marched to the sound of the guns, not to martial music, not with any suggestion of dash, of enthusiasm, but quietly, steadily, all with the same look upon their faces—the look of men who had seen death and are to see it again. Instinctively I thought of what Kipling had said to me in London:

"Somewhere over there," he had said, "the thing will suddenly grip your throat and your heart; it will take hold of you as nothing in your life has ever done or ever will." And I know that I never shall forget those lines of quiet, patient, middle-aged men marching to the sound of the guns, leaving at their backs the countless graves that hold the youth of France, the men who had known the Marne, the Yser, Champagne, who had known death for nearly two years, night and day, almost constantly. Yet during the fifteen minutes I watched there was not one order, not one straggler; there was a sense of the regularity with which the blood flows through the human arteries in this tide, and it was the blood of France.

So many people have asked me, I had asked myself, the question before I went to France: "Are they not weary of it? Will the French not give up from sheer exhaustion of strength?" I do not think so, now that I have seen the faces of these hundreds of men as they marched to the trenches beyond Verdun. France may bleed to death, but I do not think that while there are men there will be an end of the sacrifice. No pen or voice can express the horror that these men, that all Frenchmen, have of this war, of all war, the weariness. They hate it; you cannot mistake this; but France marches to the frontier in the spirit that men manned the walls against the barbarians in the other days; there is no other way; it must be.

Over and over again there has come the invariable answer; it would have come from scores and hundreds of these men who passed so near me I could have touched their faded uniforms if I had asked—"It is for France, for civilization; it must be, for there is no other way; we shall die, but with us, with our sacrifice, perhaps this thing will end." You cannot put it in words quite, I do not think even any Frenchman has quite said it, but you can see it, you can feel it, you can understand it, when you see a regiment, a brigade, a division of these men of thirty, some perhaps of forty, going forward to the war they hate and will never quit until that which they love is safe or they and all of their race are swallowed up in the storm that now was audibly beating beyond the human walls on the near-by hillsides.

Presently we moved again, we slipped through the column, topped the last incline, shot under the crumbling gate of the Verdun fortress, and as we entered a shell burst just behind us and the roar drowned out all else in its sudden and paralyzing crash. It had fallen, so we learned a little later, just where we had been watching the passing troops; it had fallen among them and killed. But an hour or two later, when we repassed the point where it fell, men were still

marching by. Other regiments of men were still marching to the sound of the guns, and those who had passed were already over the hills and beyond the river, filing into the trenches in time, so it turned out, to meet the new attack that came with the later afternoon.

I went to Verdun to see the forts, the city, the hills, and the topography of a great battle; I went in the hope of describing with a little of clarity what the operation meant as a military affair. I saw, and I shall hereafter try to describe this. But I shall never be able to describe this thing which was the true Verdun for me—these men, their faces, seen as one heard the shell fire and the musketry rolling, not steadily but intermittently, the men who had marched over the roads that are lined with graves, through villages that are destroyed, who had come of their own will and in calm determination and marched unhurryingly and yet unshrinkingly, the men who were no longer young, who had left behind them all that men hold dear in life, home, wives, children, because they knew that there was no other way.

I can only say to all those who have asked me, "What of France?" this simple thing, that I do not believe the French will ever stop. I do not believe, as the Germans have said, that French courage is weakening, that French determination is abating. I do not believe the Kaiser himself would think this if he had seen these men's faces as they marched *toward* his guns. I think he would feel as I felt, as one must feel, that these men went willingly, hating war with their whole soul, destitute of passion or anger. I never heard a passionate word in France, because there had entered into their minds, into the mind and heart of a whole race, the belief that what was at stake was the thing that for two thousand years of history had been France.

## A DYING, SHELL-RIDDEN CITY

THE VAUBAN CITADEL, IN THE SHELTER OF WHICH FALLING SHELLS CANNOT FIND YOU—HOUSES AND BLOCKS THAT ARE VANISHING HOURLY—"BUT WILLIAM WILL NOT COME"—WAR THAT IS INVISIBLE—A LUNCHEON UNDERGROUND WITH A TOAST TO AMERICA—THE LAST COURTESY FROM A GENERAL AND A HOST—NOTHING THAT WAS NOT BEAUTIFUL

THE citadel of Verdun, the bulwark of the eastern frontier in ancient days, rises out of the meadows of the Meuse with something of the abruptness of the skyscraper, and still preserves that aspect which led the writers of other wars to describe all forts as "frowning." It was built for Louis XIV by Vauban. He took a solid rock and blasted out redoubts and battlements The generations that followed him dug into the living rock and created within it a whole city of catacombs, a vast labyrinth of passages and chambers and halls; even an elevator was added by the latest engineers, so that one can go from floor to

floor, from the level of the meadow to the level of the summit of the rock, possibly a hundred feet above.

By reason of the fact that many correspondents have visited this fortress since the war began the world has come to know of the underground life in Verdun, to think of the city as defended by some wonderful system of subterranean works; to think of Verdun, in fact, as a city or citadel that is defensible either by walls or by forts. But the truth is far different; even the old citadel is but a deserted cave; its massive walls of natural rock resist the shells as they would repulse an avalanche; but the guns that were once on its parapets are gone, the garrison is gone, gone far out on the trench lines beyond the hills. The Vauban citadel is now a place where bread is baked, where wounded men are occasionally brought, where live the soldiers and officers whose important but unromantic mission it is to keep the roads through the town open, to police the ashes of the city, to do what remains of the work that once fell to the lot of the civil authorities.

To glide swiftly to the shelter of this rock from a region in which a falling shell has served to remind you of the real meaning of Verdun of the moment, to leave the automobile and plunge into the welcome obscurity of this cavern —this was perhaps the most comfortable personal incident of the day. The mere shadow of the rock gave a sense of security; to penetrate it was to pass to safety.

Some moments of wandering by corridors and stairways into the very heart of the rock brought us to the quarters of our host, General Dubois; to his kind attention I was to owe all my good fortune in seeing his dying city; to him, at the end, I was to owe the ultimate evidence of courtesy, which I shall never forget.

Unlike Pétain or Joffre, General Dubois is a little man, possibly a trifle older than either. A white-haired, bright-eyed, vigorous soldier, who made his real fame in Madagascar with Joffre and with Gallieni, and when the storm broke was sent to Verdun by these men, who knew him, to do the difficult work that there was to be performed behind the battle line. There is about General Dubois a suggestion of the old, as well as the new, of the French general. The private soldiers to whom he spoke as he went his rounds responded with a "Oui, mon General," that had a note of affection as well as of discipline; he was rather as one fancied were the soldiers of the Revolution, of the Empire, of the Algerian days of Père Bugeaud whose memory is still green.

Our salutations made, we returned through the winding corridors to inspect the bakeries, the water and light plant, the unsuspected resources of this rock. In one huge cavern we saw the men who provided 30,000 men with bread each day, men working as the stokers in an ocean steamer labour amidst the glare of fires; we tasted the bread and found it good, as good as all French bread is, and that means a little better than all other bread.

Then we slipped back into daylight and wandered along the face of the fortress. We inspected shell holes of yesterday and of last month; we inspected them as one inspects the best blossoms in a garden; we studied the angle at which they dropped; we measured the miniature avalanche that they brought with them. But always, so far, there was the subconscious sense of the rock between us and the enemy. I never before understood the full meaning of that phrase "a rock in a weary land."

All this was but preliminary, however. Other automobiles arrived; the General entered one. I followed in the next and we set out to visit Verdun, to visit the ruins, or, rather, to see not a city that was dead, but a city that was visibly, hourly dying—a city that was vanishing by blocks and by squares—but was not yet fallen to the estate of Ypres or Arras; a city that in corners, where there were gardens behind the walls, still smiled; a city where some few brave old buildings still stood four square and solid, but only waiting what was to come.

Before I visited Verdun I had seen many cities and towns which had been wholly or partially destroyed, either by shell fire or by the German soldiers in their great invasion before the Marne. One shelled town is much like another, and there is no thrill quite like that you experience when you see the first. But these towns had died nearly two years ago; indeed, in most the resurrection had begun; little red roofs were beginning to shine through the brown trees and stark ruins. Children played again in the squares. It was like the sense you have when you see an old peasant ploughing among the cross-marked graves of a hard-fought battle corner—the sense of a beginning as well as of death and destruction.

But at Verdun it was utterly different. Of life, or people, of activity beginning again or surviving there was nothing. Some time in the recent past all the little people who lived in these houses had put upon wagons what could be quickly moved and had slipped out of their home that was already under sentence of death. They were gone into the distance, and they had left behind them no stragglers. The city was empty save for a few soldiers who passed rapidly along the streets, as one marches in a heavy snowstorm.

Yet Verdun was not wholly dead. Shell fire is the most inexplicable of all things that carry destruction. As you passed down one street the mark of destruction varied with each house. Here the blast had come and cut the building squarely; it had carried with it into ruin behind in the courtyard all that the house contained, but against the wall the telephone rested undisturbed; pictures—possibly even a looking glass—hung as the inhabitants had left it, hung as perhaps it had hung when the last woman had taken her ultimate hurried glance at her hat before she departed into the outer darkness.

But the next house had lost only the front walls; it stood before you as if it had been opened for your inspection by the removal of the façade. Chairs,

beds—all the domestic economy of the house—sagged visibly outward toward the street, or stood still firm, but open to the four winds. It was as if the scene were prepared for a stage and you sat before the footlights looking into the interior. Again, the next house and that beyond were utterly gone—side walls, front walls, everything swallowed up and vanished—the iron work twisted into heaps, the stone work crumbled to dust; the whole mass of ruin still smoked, for it was a shell of yesterday that had done this work.

Down on the Riviera, where the mistral blows—all the pine trees lean away from the invariable track of this storm wind—you have the sense, even in the summer months, of a whole countryside bent by the gales. In the same fashion you felt in Verdun, felt rather than saw, a whole town not bent, but crumbled, crushed—and the line of fall was always apparent; you could tell the direction from which each storm of shells had come, you could almost feel that the storm was but suspended, not over, that at any moment it might begin again.

Yet even in the midst of destruction there were enclaves of unshaken structures. On the Rue Mazel, "Main Street," the chief clothing store rose immune amid ashes on all sides. Its huge plate-glass window was not even cracked. And behind the window a little mannikin, one of the familiar images that wear clothes to tempt the purchaser, stood erect. A French soldier had crept in and raised the stiff arm of the mannikin to the salute, pushed back the hat to a rakish angle. The mannikin seemed alive and more than alive, the embodiment of the spirit of the place. Facing northward toward the German guns it seemed to respond to them with a "*morituri salutamus.*" "The last civilian in Verdun," the soldiers called him, but his manner was rather that of the Poilu.

We crossed the river and the canal and stopped by the ruin of what had once been a big factory or warehouse. We crawled through an open shell-made breach in the brick wall and stood in the interior. The ashes were still hot, and in corners there were smoking fires. Two days ago, at just this time, your guides told you, men had been working here; making bread, I think. At the same time we had come to the ruins—the same time of day, that is—the Germans had dropped a half-dozen incendiary shells into the building and it had burned in ten minutes. Most of the men who had been there then were still there, under the smoking mass of wreckage; the smell of burned human flesh was in the air.

A few steps away there was a little house standing intact. On the floor there were stretched four rolls of white cloth. The General and those with him took off their hats as they entered. He opened one of the packages and you saw only a charred black mass, something that looked like a half-burned log taken from the fireplace. But two days ago it had been a man, and the metal disk of identification had already been found and had served to disclose

the victim's name. These were the first bodies that had been removed from the ruins.

Taking our cars again we drove back and stopped before the Mairie, and passing under the arch entered the courtyard. The building had fared better than most, but there were many shell marks. In the courtyard were four guns. Forty-six years before another German army had come down from the North, another whirlwind of artillery had struck the town and laid it in ashes, but even under the ashes the town had held out for three weeks. Afterward the Republic of France had given these guns to the people of Verdun in recognition of their heroism.

In the courtyard I was presented to a man wearing the uniform and helmet of a fireman. He was the chief of the Verdun fire department. His mission, his perilous duty, it was to help extinguish the fires that flamed up after every shell. In all my life I have never seen a man at once so crushed and so patently courageous. He was not young, but his blue Lorraine eyes were still clear. Yet he looked at you, he looked out upon the world with undisguised amazement. For a generation his business had been to fight fires. He had protected his little town from conflagrations that might sometimes, perhaps once, possibly twice, have risen to the dignity of a "three alarm." For the rest he had dealt with blazes.

Now out of the skies and the darkness and out of the daylight, too, fire had descended upon his town. Under an avalanche of incendiary shells, under a landslide of fire, his city was melting visibly into ashes. He had lived fire and dreamed fire for half a century, but now the world had turned to fire—his world—and he looked out upon it in dazed wonder. He could no longer fight this fire, restrain it, conquer it; he could only go out under the bursting shells and strive to minimize by some fraction the destruction; but it was only child's play, this work of his which had been a man's business. And there was no mistaking the fact that this world was now too much for him. He was a brave man; they told me of things he had done; but his little cosmos had gone to chaos utterly.

We entered our cars again and went to another quarter of the city. Everywhere were ashes and ruin, but everywhere the sense of a destruction that was progressive, not complete: it still marched. It was as Arras had been, they told me, before the last wall had tumbled and the Artois capital had become nothing but a memory. We climbed the slope toward the cathedral and stopped in a little square still unscathed, the Place d'Armes, the most historic acre of the town. After a moment I realized what my friends were telling me. It was in this square that the Crown Prince was to receive the surrender of the town. Along the road we had climbed he was to lead his victorious army through the town and out the Porte de France beyond. In this square the Kaiser was to stand and review the army, to greet his victorious son. The

scene as it had been arranged was almost rehearsed for you in the gestures of the French officers.

"But William has not come," they said, "and he will not come now." This last was not spoken as a boast, but as a faith, a conviction.

Still climbing we came to the cathedral. It is seated on the very top pinnacle of the rock of Verdun, suggesting the French cities of Provence. Its two towers, severe and lacking ornamentation, are the landmarks of the countryside for miles around. When I came back to America I read the story of an American correspondent whom the Germans had brought down from Berlin to see the destruction of Verdun. They had brought him to the edge of the hills and then thrown some incendiary shells into the town, the very shells that killed the men whose bodies I had seen. The black smoke and flames rushed up around these towers and then the Germans brought the correspondent over the hills and showed him the destruction of Verdun. He described it vividly and concluded that the condition of the town must be desperate.

They are a wonderful people, these Germans, in their stage management. Of course this was precisely the thing that they desired that he should feel. They had sent their shells at the right moment, the whole performance had gone off like clockwork. Those poor blackened masses of humanity in the house below were the cost that was represented in the performance. And since there is much still left to burn in Verdun, the Germans may repeat this thing whenever they desire.

But somewhere three or four miles from here, and between Verdun and the Germans, are many thousands of Frenchmen, with guns and cannon, and hearts of even finer metal. They cannot even know that Verdun is being shelled or is burning, and if it burns to ultimate ashes it will not affect them or their lines. This is the fallacy of all the talk of the destruction of Verdun city and the desperate condition of its defenders. The army left Verdun for the hills when the war began; the people left when the present drive began in February. Even the dogs and cats, which were seen by correspondents in earlier visits, have been rescued and sent away. Verdun is dead, it is almost as dead as are Arras and Ypres; but neither of these towns after a year and a half bombardment has fallen.

The correspondent who was taken up on a hill by the Germans to see Verdun burn, after it had been carefully set on fire by shell fire, was discovered by French gunners and shelled. He went away taking with him an impression of a doomed city. This picture was duly transmitted to America. But two days later, when I visited the city, there was no evidence of desperation, because there was no one left to be desperate. Doubtless on occasion we shall have many more descriptions of the destruction of this town, descriptions meant to impress Americans or encourage Germans. The material for such

fires is not exhausted. The cathedral on the top of the hill is hardly shell-marked at all, and it will make a famous display when it is fired as was Rheims, as were the churches of Champagne and Artois. But there is something novel in the thought of a city burned, not to make a Roman or even German holiday, but burned to make the world believe that the Battle of Verdun had been a German victory.

For two hours we wandered about the town exploring and estimating the effect of heavy gunfire, for the Germans are too far from the city to use anything but heavy guns effectively. The impressions of such a visit are too numerous to recall. I shall mention but one more. Behind the cathedral are cloisters that the guide books mention; they inclose a courtyard that was once decorated with statues of saints. By some accident or miracle—there are always miracles in shelled towns—one of these images, perhaps that of the Madonna, has been lifted from its pedestal and thrown into the branches of a tree, which seems almost to hold it with outstretched arms.

At length we left the town, going out by the Porte de France, which cuts the old Vauban ramparts, now as deserted as those of Paris, ramparts that had been covered with trees and were now strewn with the débris of the trees that had fallen under the shell fire. In all this time not a shell had fallen in Verdun; it was the first completely tranquil morning in weeks; but there was always the sense of impending destruction, there was always the sense of the approaching shell. There was an odd subconscious curiosity, and something more than curiosity, about the mental processes of some men, not far away, who were beside guns pointed toward you, guns which yesterday or the day before had sent their destruction to the very spot where you stood.

Yet, oddly enough, in the town there was a wholly absurd sense of security, derived from the fact that there were still buildings between you and those guns. You saw that the buildings went to dust and ashes whenever the guns were fired; you saw that each explosion might turn a city block into ashes, and yet you were glad of the buildings and there was reassurance in their shadows. Now we travelled in the open country; we began to climb across the face of a bare hill, and it was the face that fronted the Germans.

Presently the General's car stuck in the mud and we halted, for a minute perhaps; then we went on; we passed a dead horse lying in the road, then of a sudden came that same terrible grinding, metallic crash. I have never seen any description of a heavy shell explosion that fitted it. Behind us we could see the black smoke rising from the ground in a suburb through which we had just come. I saw three explosions. A moment later we were at the gate of Fort de la Chaume, and we were warned not to stop, but to hasten in, for the Germans, whenever they see cars at this point, suspect that Joffre has arrived, or President Poincaré, and act accordingly. We did not delay.

Fort de la Chaume is one of the many fortifications built since the Franco-

Prussian War and intended to defend the city. Like all the rest, it ceased to have value when the German artillery had shown at Liège and at Namur that it was the master of the fort. Then the French left their forts and went out to trenches beyond and took with them the heavy guns that the fort once boasted. To-day Fort de la Chaume is just an empty shell, as empty as the old Vauban citadel in the valley below. And what is true of this fort is true of all the other forts of that famous fortress of Verdun, which is no longer a fortress, but a sector in the trench line that runs from the North Sea to Switzerland.

From the walls of the fort staff officers showed me the surrounding country. I looked down on the city of Verdun, hiding under the shadow of its cathedral. I looked across the level Meuse Valley, with its little river; I studied the wall of hills beyond. Somewhere in the tangle on the horizon was Douaumont, which the Germans held. Down the valley of the river in the haze was the town of Bras, which was French; beyond it the village of Vachereauville, which was German. Beyond the hills in the centre of the picture, but hidden by them, were Le Mort Homme and Hill 304.

Verdun is like a lump of sugar in a finger bowl, and I was standing on the rim. It seemed utterly impossible that any one should even think of this town as a fortress or count its ashes as of meaning in the conflict.

Somewhere in the background a French battery of heavy guns was firing, and the sound was clear; but it did not suggest war, rather a blasting operation. The German guns were still again. There was a faint billowing roll of gunfire across the river toward Douaumont, but very faint. As for trenches, soldiers, evidences of battle, they did not exist. I thought of Ralph Pulitzer's vivid story of riding to the Rheims front in a military aëroplane and seeing, of war, just nothing.

The geography of the Verdun country unrolled before us with absolute clarity; the whole relation of hills and river and railroads was unmistakable. But despite the faint sound of musketry, the occasional roar of a French gun, I might have been in the Berkshires looking down on the Housatonic. Six miles to the north around Le Mort Homme that battle which has not stopped for two months was still going on. Around Douaumont the overture was just starting, the overture to a stiff fight in the afternoon, but of all the circumstances of battle that one has read of, that one still vaguely expects to see, there was not a sign. If it suited their fancy the Germans could turn the hill on which I stood into a crater of ruin, as they did with Fort Loncin at Liège. We were well within range, easy range; we lived because they had no object to serve by such shooting, but we were without even a hint of their whereabouts.

I have already described the military geography of Verdun. I shall not attempt to repeat it here, but it is the invisibility of warfare, whether examined from the earth or the air, which impresses the civilian. If you go to the

trenches you creep through tunnels and cavities until you are permitted to peer through a peephole, and you see yellow dirt some yards away. You may hear bullets over your head, you may hear shells passing, but what you see is a hillside with some slashings. That is the enemy. If you go to an observation post back of the trenches, then you will see a whole range of country, but not even the trenches of your own side.

From the Grand Mont east of Nancy I watched some French batteries shell the German line. I didn't see the French guns, I didn't see the German trenches, I didn't see the French line. I did see some black smoke rising a little above the underbrush, and I was told that the shells were striking behind the German lines and that the gunners were searching for a German battery. But I might as well have been observing a gang of Italians at blasting operations in the Montclair Mountains. And the officer with me said: "Our children are just amusing themselves."

From Fort de la Chaume we rode back to the citadel; and there I was the guest of the General and the officers of the town garrison; their guest because I was an American who came to see their town. I shall always remember that luncheon down in the very depths of this rock in a dimly lighted room. I sat at the General's right, and all around me were the men whose day's work it was to keep the roads open, the machinery running in the shell-cursed city. Every time they went out into daylight they knew that they might not return. For two months the storm had beaten about this rock, it had written its mark upon all these faces, and yet it had neither extinguished the light nor the laughter; the sense of strength and of calmness was inescapable, and never have I known such charming, such thoughtful hosts.

When the champagne came the old General rose and made me a little speech. He spoke in English, with absolute correctness, but as one who spoke it with difficulty. He welcomed me as an American to Verdun, he thanked me for coming, he raised his glass to drink to my country and the hope that in the right time she would be standing with France—in the cause of civilization. Always in his heart, in his thought, in his speech, the Frenchman is thinking of that cause of civilization; always this is what the terrible conflict that is eating up all France means to him.

Afterward we went out of this cavern into daylight, and the officers came and shook hands with me and said good-bye. One does not say *au revoir* at the front; one says *bonne chance*—"good luck; it may and it may not—we hope not." We entered our cars and were about to start, when suddenly, with a blinding, stunning crash, a whole salvo landed in the meadow just beyond the road, we could not see where, because some houses hid the field. It was the most suddenly appalling crash I have ever heard.

Instantly the General ordered our drivers to halt. He explained that it might be the beginning of a bombardment or only a single trial, a detail in the

intermittent firing to cut the road that we were to take. We sat waiting for several moments and no more shots came. Then the General turned and gave an order to his car to follow, bade our drivers go fast, and climbed into my car and sat down. The wandering American correspondent was his guest. He could not protect him from the shell fire. He could not prevent it. But he could share the danger. He could share the risk, and so he rode with me the mile until we passed beyond the danger zone. There he gave me another *bonne chance* and left me, went back to his shell-cursed town with its ruins and its agonies.

I hope I shall see General Dubois again. I hope it will be on the day when he is made Governor of Strassburg.

As we left Verdun the firing was increasing; it was rolling up like a rising gale; the infantry fire was becoming pronounced; the Germans were beginning an attack upon Le Mort Homme. Just before sunset we passed through the Argonne Forest and came out beyond. On a hill to the north against the sky the monument of Valmy stood out in clear relief, marking the hill where Kellerman had turned back another Prussian army. Then we slipped down into the Plain of Châlons, where other Frenchmen had met and conquered Attila. At dark we halted in Montmirail, where Napoleon won his last victory before his empire fell. The sound of the guns we had left behind was still in our ears and the meaning of these names in our minds. Presently my French companion said to me: "It is a long time, isn't it?" He meant all the years since the first storm came out of the north, and I think the same thought is in every Frenchman's mind. Then he told me his story.

"I had two boys," he said; "one was taken from me years ago in an accident; he was killed and it was terrible. But the other I gave.

"He was shot, my last boy, up near Verdun, in the beginning of the war. He did not die at once and I went to him. For twenty days I sat beside him in a cellar waiting for him to die. I bought the last coffin in the village, that he might be buried in it, and kept it under my bed. We talked many times before he died, and he told me all he knew of the fight, of the men about him and how they fell.

"My name is finished, but I say to you now that in all that experience there was nothing that was not beautiful." And as far as I can analyze or put in words the impression that I have brought away from France, from the ruin and the suffering and the destruction, I think it is expressed in those words. I have seen nothing that was not beautiful, too, because through all the spirit of France shone clear and bright.

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

*From the painting by Edwin Howland Blashfield*

"CARRY ON!"

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"—VERDUN

*FULLY ILLUSTRATED*

VOLUME FOUR

AMERICA AND RUSSIA

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

# CHAPTER ONE

## THE FOURTH PHASE

### I

### ON THE MILITARY SIDE

Between January, 1917, and March, 1918, that is, between the failure of the first German peace offensive in the west and the promulgation of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bukharest in the east, the old Triple Entente of France, Great Britain, and Russia—which had in 1915 been reinforced by Italy—suffered disastrous defeat. While British, French, and Italian armies were checked or routed in the field, Russia collapsed and quit the war and her allies, and, but for the entrance of the United States into the struggle in April, 1917, before Russia had yet vanished, Germany would have won a measurable if not a decisive victory. She would at the very least have been able to preserve Mittel-Europa and the mastery of the East.

The period of fourteen months which we are now to examine began on the military side with that stupendous and terrible German retreat from the Somme to the Scheldt—from the battlefields of 1916 to the Hindenburg Line—which not alone defeated Allied strategy but transformed a thousand square miles of fertile fields and scores of busy industrial towns into the saddest and most terrible desert in all the world. This retreat, on the human side, was one of the most gigantic crimes in all the long list of German offences against civilization and humanity, but on the military side it was a success which postponed Allied victory in the west and allowed Germany time to transfer from the Dwina and the Vistula the divisions which in 1918 were to win the memorable battle of March 21st.

The German retreat began in February. When it was over in April the British army flung itself upon the new and the old German positions from Vimy Ridge to the Somme and Sensée, won a brief and brilliant

victory and then, in the swamps and mud of Passchendaele, submitted to a grinding, gruelling struggle which broke the spirit and the heart of the finest and mightiest force that had ever assembled under the flag of Britain. Day by day in the storm and carnage of the campaign, hopeless at the outset, a monument alike to stupidity and folly, in the mud and mire of the swamps—the man-made swamps that lie between Ypres and Passchendaele—British regiments and British divisions were flung ruthlessly and obstinately against German artillery and German entrenchments under conditions of weather which made movement almost impossible, until the British army lost confidence in its commanders, faith in victory, and declined in morale to that danger point which made the German triumph of the following spring not only possible, but inevitable.

Even more disastrous was the history of the French army. Under its new commander, leaving its entrenchments at the Aisne in the third week of April, that army which had won the Marne and Verdun, which had demonstrated alike the qualities of brilliant offensive and tenacious defence unsurpassed in all its splendid history, went to heart-breaking defeat between the Aisne and the Vesle. For the first time the morale of the *poilu* began to crumble. Some of the best divisions in the French army refused to attack, and at the close of a few brief days of brilliant fighting on the Craonne Plateau, the offensive value of that army had temporarily disappeared. Thenceforth for more than a year there was no hope of another Allied offensive which should include the French. Succeeding Nivelle, who had failed and disappeared, the single and gigantic task of Petain was to restore the confidence of the soldiers, at first, in their officers, and, then, in themselves. For all practical purposes the French army disappeared from the calculations of offensive warfare from May to the following March.

While the British and the French armies thus endured defeats which, on the moral if not on the military side, were disasters, the Russian army, after a final despairing offensive, melted into flight on the field of victory and Russia as a military force disappeared; and to Russian desertion in June there was added Italian disaster in October.

At Caporetto an Austro-German offensive in one brief day swept away all the gains of the Italian armies in two years of desperate and sustained fighting, transferred the conflict from the banks of the Isonzo to the Piave, removed Trieste from Italian menace, and brought the Hapsburg shadow back over Venice. Almost half Venetia, after fifty years of deliverance, was once more in Austrian hands when this brief campaign ended. Under the threat of an impending ruin as great as that which had overtaken the Russian armies, the Italian forces rallied at the Piave, but escaped only with the aid of French and British divisions drawn from the western front where already Ludendorff was preparing the most gigantic assault in all human history.

Thus on the military side the French offensive was broken in Champagne, the British attack foundered in Flanders, the Russian army ceased to exist after a brief Galician operation, and the Italian army suffered the greatest disaster on the Allied side in four years of war. And with these defeats and disasters the hope of success practically disappeared from the minds of the soldiers, and of three nations, each of whose armies had won victories, earned glory and honour, and each of which now, at last, was convinced that all possibility of victory by offensives, directed at an enemy entrenched and provided with all the instruments of modern warfare and all the advantages of well-selected positions, had vanished. And while the Russian army disappeared in the east, the western Allies began dimly to perceive that with their own armies sadly lessened by the butcheries of Champagne and Passchendaele they had to expect a new attack made by opposing armies now reinforced by a full hundred divisions brought from the east.

Thus on the military side the period that we are to examine is the gloomiest and the most terrible of the whole war. While the armies of the nations allied against Germany, in Europe, were thus crumbling, America, the new ally, was incapable of sending men or armies to fill the gap. A few battalions marching through Paris, to rouse the enthusiasm of the people who were beginning to know the truth, was the sole military contribution of which the United States was capable in the campaign of 1917. Russia disappeared; Italy fell; the spirit of

the French army was impaired, the confidence of the British army shaken; and, to balance this, there was on the military side only that hope for the future, still distant, supplied by the presence of a handful of American troops in Europe.

### II. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE

In this same time, while the military fortunes of the Allies declined, what of the political circumstances?

In Russia, revolution marched in a few short months from the deliverance of the great Slav people from Romanoff tyranny to the complete destruction of national life and order in the Bolshevist terror of Lenin and Trotsky. In less than a year Russia disappeared from the number of nations in Europe and became a vast assemblage of chaotic fragments, as one after another the peoples of the western fringes who had been annexed as the Russian wave of expansion had swept westward, passed from the Russian to the German orbit or sank into a state of parochial anarchy which has no parallel in modern history.

In France, defeat at the front, the deflection of the morale of the army, coincided with an enormous expansion of treason and "defeatism" behind the line. While the soldiers flatly declined to advance against the impregnable positions of the enemy, politicians even more frankly demanded peace—negotiated, surrender-peace—with the Germans. Before this double menace became too great to check, Clemenceau came and Caillaux exchanged the rôle of traitor for the condition of prisoner. But neither Petain in the army nor Clemenceau in the Cabinet could promptly or utterly redeem France before the supreme test of 1918 came. France, tried beyond her resources of endurance, having made greater sacrifices than any other nation in all history, at last began visibly to crumble. She would be capable of one more renaissance which would save the war, but this last miracle was hidden from all eyes before the March offensive of Ludendorff.

As for England, her condition also had undergone a dangerous change. At the Somme and at Passchendaele a million casualties had failed to win a single substantial reward. The horror of the Somme

and the butchery of Passchendaele had already begun to effect a lodgment in the minds of the people of the British Isles who were no longer to be deluded by promises of victory just beyond the horizon. And for the British there was one more circumstance more terrible than all others. When the Germans in February, 1917, opened their gigantic submarine campaign, all the illusions of sea power and impregnability, which had filled the English brain for five hundred years, fell away. Week by week the British saw their merchant marine decline and knew the approach, the actual approach, of famine. England was at last becoming beleaguered in her narrow islands, and it required but a simple calculation—the division of the tonnage of the world by the monthly harvest of the submarines—to indicate at what point she would be forced to surrender if the undersea warfare continued unchecked.

And from London, as from Paris, there was heard the voice of those who advised negotiations to close the horrors and the agonies of a war which no longer could be won; and these views gained new authority and new weight as the additional terror of Bolshevism burst forth in Russia and gave fresh apprehension to the conservatives of the world, who read in the excesses of Petrograd and the crimes of Moscow the lesson of what defeat following too-great national strain might bring even to western nations. The counsels of cowardice and weakness, disguising themselves as the voice of reason, called from London for that peace which the whispers of treason urged in Paris, while in Italy half a dozen influences, mysterious and strengthened by a supreme national disaster—itself procured by their intervention—demanded peace.

In sum, while the armies of the Allies for the first time faltered in the presence of the enemy, the politicians behind the lines lost heart.

In midsummer, 1917, Germany had already effected a moral conquest of Europe. Could she have followed that moral achievement by a military triumph, swift and sure; could Ludendorff have struck in August, 1917, instead of March, 1918, the war would infallibly have been lost. From this terrible catastrophe the world was saved—not by the skill, the courage, the foresight of the politicians or the generals of

the Allied armies; not even by the entrance of the United States into the war; but by the unutterable folly of the Germans, who, intoxicated by the extent of the actual and the prospective gains of the war, wrote —at Brest-Litovsk and at Bukharest—treaties of peace which served notice upon all mankind that no tolerable arrangement would be made with the enemy, that nothing but death or national dismemberment awaited western Europe after German victory. And out of this realization was born a final resolution, a new and ultimate courage of desperation, which just availed to man the lines and delay, if not halt, the enemy until millions of American troops became available in Europe and the tide of hope, as of numbers, turned.

### III. THREE CURRENTS

In the sombre period which we are now to examine we have, then, several clearly separate currents of events to analyze. We have to note the collapse of Allied hopes on the military side with the concomitant degeneration of public opinion and political courage behind the line. We have to study the entrance of America, reviewing not merely the history of American effort from the moment of her declaration of war, but also that long, slow process by which America was transformed from a neutral into a belligerent, and from a belligerent unarmed and untrained into the greatest single potential force in the alliance against Germany. Finally we have to examine, at least in passing, the rise and progress of revolution in Russia, the transition from an autocracy of tradition to the most stupendous and destructive anarchy of which there is any record. And we shall perceive that as Germanism—the German idea of conquest by force alone, directed by military dynasty—reaches its apex and takes decisions which foreshadow its ultimate collapse, there arises a new menace and a new enemy to Western civilization and democracy, a force which will challenge the conquerors of Germany in a future not distant, and before they have completed the formulation of their terms of peace to be served upon their fallen enemies.

For the period covered by the present volume, anarchy in Russia

remains hidden behind the fogs of censorship, lost in the distance which separates Petrograd and Moscow from London, Paris, and Washington, and disguised by the natural but mistaken illusions of Western liberalism awake to the iniquity of the ancient Russian régime but blind to the fury of the new. In this period the Western world is conscious only of the desertion of a great ally, which has imperilled the whole future of the war. It is conscious of strange, incomprehensible words uttered by new and unknown Russian leaders—words seized upon by the radicals of the West as the first authentic sign of a new democratic gospel, seized upon by the leaders of Germany as the basis for propaganda and disintegrating manœuvres amidst the enemy publics.

Not even the immediate significance of the Russian Revolution was clear to mankind fighting above the Aisne and about Ypres, contemplating with horror German strategy which created a desert in Artois and Picardy, and beholding, with acute anxiety, that disaster which brought Italy almost to the edge of surrender. In 1917 military disasters and submarine terrors filled the minds of statesmen and soldiers of the west. The great new social and political problems presented by the Russian Revolution were seen only in terms of the loss to the Entente of their strongest ally. The alliance between Germanism and Bolshevism was recognized; the possibility of the victory of these combined forces was at least dimly perceived; but the chance that, after Germanism had fallen, Bolshevism might erect itself as a new and greater peril was undreamed of.

Between the rejection by the Allies of the German peace proposal of January, 1917, and the promulgation of the peace of Brest-Litovsk and that of Bukharest in 1918, the cause of that Western civilization which we call representative democracy marched from disaster to disaster until, with the coming of the spring of 1918, it stood on the brink of complete ruin, its one real chance of salvation depending upon effective American intervention. By the latter date Germany had destroyed the balance of power in Europe, eliminated Russia from the war, broken Italian military strength almost fatally, put England and France upon a defensive which was in itself doomed to failure and

collapse unless American reinforcements could arrive in time. The European contestants had fought their war out, and Germany would have won it had she not, in the hour of victory, been guilty of two blunders, each of which in future history will rank with Napoleon's adventure to Moscow: the one, the submarine campaign, brought America to Europe with all the untouched resources of one hundred millions of people at last roused to the truth; the other, at Brest-Litovsk, gave to the people of France and England and Italy that courage of despair which only comes to those threatened with defeat who perceive that their enemy seeks to annihilate them, and that surrender will compel them to accept a condition so unbearable that death seems the more tolerable.

## CHAPTER TWO

## THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE WAR

### I

### THE FIRST DAYS

On January 31, 1917, the German Ambassador at Washington presented to the United States Government formal notification that the Imperial German Government purposed on the following day to begin a ruthless submarine warfare directed against all ships—neutral and belligerent alike—found in European waters. On February 3rd, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany, recalling its own ambassador from Berlin and presenting the German Ambassador in Washington with his passports. A little more than two months later, on April 6th, Congress declared that a state of war existed between the United States and the Imperial German Government.

We have now briefly to review the steps by which the United States, remote from the scene of the European struggle, its neutrality fortified alike by its oldest tradition and by the most earnest desire of the majority of its people, was dragged into a world war by a series of aggressions and injuries unparalleled in history. Such an examination necessarily divides itself into three distinct phases. It is essential to review the state of American feeling with respect to the European conflict from the outset to the moment when we entered the war; the progress of events themselves; and the meaning of American entrance immediate and eventual in view of the situation that then existed in Europe.

Even after the passage of so brief a time it is almost impossible to re-constitute the real emotion of America at the moment when the World War broke. For the millions there was almost literally no warning. The assassination of the Archduke in June claimed only a passing notice in the press. The suppressed tension and the surcharged atmos-

phere of European chancelleries revealed themselves only in curious stock-exchange variations, unnoted save in financial quarters and even there misunderstood.

When the Austro-Hungarian Government served its ultimatum upon the Serbian Government in the closing days of June, American public opinion became vaguely aware that Europe was entering into another one of those crises which had become familiar in the previous ten years, but neither then nor in the next few days was there any real belief in the United States that the events in Europe indicated anything more dangerous than another such crisis as that of Tangier or Agadir. While Europe marched inescapably to the catastrophe, America continued on its daily routine; in the press the events of the baseball field claimed equal attention with those of the European crisis, and more Americans were interested in the Caillaux murder trial than in the Austrian aggression against Serbia. To the very end the American public remained good-naturedly sceptical, unconquerably incredulous. For them the very idea of war seemed preposterous, and on the day before the first declaration of war—that of Germany against Russia which precipitated the deluge—the conviction that the storm would pass remained unshaken from New York to San Francisco.

When the war did break, the initial American emotion was one of mingled consternation and indignation. For the mass of the American people it seemed as if Europe had suddenly gone mad. No single one of the real causes of the war was in the slightest degree understood or appreciated. The very idea of war between civilized countries seemed to the Americans to convict those nations of essential barbarism. In the first hours, in the first weeks, the American people as a whole interpreted the war as a struggle for power and for plunder between nations equally guilty of sacrificing right and justice to ambition and selfishness. America as a whole, in the first phase, in the opening hours of the struggle, was not merely neutral. It felt a sense of moral superiority combined with a deep-seated satisfaction that not only the Atlantic but also American tradition separated the United States from Europe. Between the two forces arrayed against each other American public

# AMERICA MOBILIZES



Sixty-fifth Congress of the United States of America;

At the First Session,

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the second day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventeen.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Champ Clark

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

Thos. R. Marshall

*Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.*

Approved 6 April, 1917

Woodrow Wilson

THE DECLARATION OF WAR

Signed by Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by Thos. R. Marshall, President of the Senate; and approved 6th of April, 1917, by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States.

# PREPAREDNESS PARADES

# PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATIONS



THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSES CONGRESS

"The world must be made safe for democracy. . . . We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. . . . We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nations can make them."



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A PREPAREDNESS PARADE

New York business men, one hundred and fifty thousand strong, march up Fifth Avenue, demonstrating for preparedness



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TURNING CITIZENS INTO SOLDIERS

*Above*—The students of Princeton University, already in khaki, prepare for the call to the colors by vigorous calisthenics on the university campus.

*Below*—Candidates for commissions at Plattsburg, N. Y., take their first lesson in the "I.D.R." (Infantry Drill Regulations).

OFF FOR THE MOBILIZATION CAMP

Wisconsin infantry marching through Milwaukee on their way to the railroad station



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PROVISIONING THE FLEET IN PREPARATION FOR ACTIVE SERVICE

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THE CAMPAIGN FOR NAVAL RECRUITS

A dummy fleet consisting of battleship, submarine chaser, etc., was manœuvred over the tracks of Chicago's elevated railroad



CALLING LANDSMEN TO THE SEA

A recruiting rally around a wooden battleship "moored" near Broadway in Union Square, New York City

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"THE AVENUE OF THE ALLIES"

Looking north from Forty-Second Street, along Fifth Avenue, New York City, during the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan. The "Haiti block" is in the foreground

opinion in the first hours neither could nor did discriminate. For the American the spectacle of Europe rushing to arms and to battle was a revelation of collective madness still incomprehensible, still inexplicable, and no single thought of American participation was roused anywhere. It would be difficult to describe for the future the paralysis alike of thought and of conscience which was the first resulting circumstance, in the United States, of the outbreak of the world explosion.

## II. THE SPECTACLE

Thereafter, in the days while Europe was proceeding through mobilization to action, American attention was concentrated on two relatively trivial details: on the Atlantic seaboard, German ships—fleeing westward—arrived, landing their passengers at Bar Harbor and at Boston; excited ocean travellers related tales of imaginary adventures with phantom fleets, while from Europe came the ridiculous but absorbing reports of thousands of American tourists surprised at every watering place and at every tourist centre by the sudden outbreak of the conflict. The adventures and agonies of the rich and the locally famous, the tales of besieged embassies and stranded fellow-countrymen divided interest for the American public with the stupendous events which the censorship hid and American unfamiliarity with Europe made unfathomable. Even when there was a consciousness that millions of men were on the march the whole drama remained unreal, unbelievable, for the United States. It was like a gigantic nightmare, a nightmare in which all the inevitable horror was scarcely realized, a dream in which the sleeper, while perceiving a mirage of fantastic outlines, preserves a subconscious sense that it is a dream and not a reality.

Then suddenly the opening engagement of the war aroused a new emotion. While the newspapers day by day announced in enormous headlines incredible millions of men advancing to conflict, the people of the United States settled back to observe what was still for them little more than a spectacle. When Belgian neutrality was violated, when the French armies were broken in the first offensive, when the German hordes rushed downward on Paris, the press spoke little of

moral issues but continued day by day to forecast a Trafalgar at sea and to expect a Waterloo on land not far indeed from the field where Napoleon had fought his last battle. The defence of Liége, the fall of Brussels, the invasion of France; these were events which more and more concentrated and absorbed the attention of the American people, who awaited with an excitement hardly to be described the onrush of the German wave as it engulfed northern France and approached Paris.

It was not until the Marne had been fought and won, it was not until the German invasion had been turned back and the line began to stabilize itself along the Aisne, that there crept into American comment and arrived in the American mind and conscience a new sense of appreciation, vague but beginning, that moral issues were involved in what had been hitherto, from the day of the declaration of war to that hour, a wonderful, terrible, ineffaceable spectacle. It was not until France had saved herself and the world and it became clear that the decision had been adjourned and the first German bid for victory had failed, that the American people, getting their perspective, began slowly to estimate, to consider, to appraise the meaning of the struggle—not in terms of American self-interest, for not even then was American responsibility touched—but the meaning for the world of victory or defeat for either group of nations involved.

Long after the event many public men protested that they had favoured intervention in the war on the day that Belgium was invaded. The truth is otherwise. Long after the event men criticized the President of the United States because he proclaimed American neutrality rather than announced American championship of Belgium. But the fact is that neither the President of the United States, nor any public men of prominence, nor any newspaper of influence, conceived of American intervention then or for long months thereafter. America at the outbreak of the World War was neutral. America as a nation remained neutral—not alone in word, but in thought, for many, many months. President Wilson in the opening phase merely spoke the will of his country. It was not that Americans were essentially blind to moral appeal, to justice or to right; it was that there existed in the

United States not the smallest conception of the truth of the European conflict. For the mass of the people it was as if two groups of men in the public street had suddenly fallen into a terrific quarrel and begun to beat each other with fists and sticks. What the origin of the quarrel was, the observers could not see. If one is to understand American emotion between the Austrian ultimatum and the Battle of the Marne, it is essential to recognize that there was no comprehension of issues, no understanding of moral considerations involved—nothing but amazement, horror, and indignation, all of which were subordinated in a brief time to the realization that, from her remote point of observation, America was perceiving a conflict greater than the wars of Napoleon, more absorbing in its dramatic intensity than anything known in human experience. Such was the first reaction of America in the World War.

### III. THE CLASH OF OPINION

With the arrival of that military deadlock which followed the Marne, the Aisne, and the Yser, Americans suddenly found themselves plunged into a battle of words, rival sympathies, and propaganda, unparalleled in all their history. The mass of the American nation remained steadily neutral, obeying easily and loyally the advice of the President, but throughout the country three currents of opinion were nevertheless strongly developing. The first was a thoroughly spontaneous national American view. It was an opinion which interpreted events in Europe in the terms of American ideals. It saw in the German invasion of Belgium, it saw in each German act which had been disclosed since the very opening of the struggle, the revelation of a spirit totally contrary to American conceptions. The invasion of Belgium became, as week followed week, more and more a fatal comment on German purpose and German ambitions.

As between England and Germany in August, 1914, the sympathy of America was at least equally divided. In point of fact, there was nowhere in America the same long-standing if ill-founded suspicion and dislike for the Germans which from the very time of the Revolution had

survived in Eastern America with respect of the English. At the outset of the struggle not a few Americans were prepared to sympathize with Germany, recognizing, whatever else might be in the case, that Germany had become a great commercial rival of the English and that in past centuries a similar rise of any Continental State had been inevitably followed by the appearance of the English on the Continent as an ally of the enemies of the more prosperous State. Americans did not accept, and Americans were not as a mass profoundly impressed by the British assertions that their entrance into the war was an act of unparalleled devotion to the cause of justice and in defence of the sacred obligations of a treaty and the inalienable rights of a small people.

As between England and Germany the mass of the American people were prepared to be neutral, and had Germany neither attacked France nor invaded Belgium, American sympathy would never have been enlisted in any phase of the war. Even the invasion of Belgium was an act which only slowly appealed to the American conscience. Germany's explanation—that she was threatened, encircled, compelled to strike first to save herself, menaced primarily by the Russian peril—found sympathetic hearing in a country where Russia was the symbol of tyranny and the Jewish faction of the population influential and necessarily anti-Slav.

It was not until the first whispers of Louvain were heard in the world; it was not until men and women began dimly to be conscious of the fact that the German armies in invading Belgium had not merely transformed a solemn obligation into a scrap of paper, but had been guilty of crimes against women and children—had been guilty of deeds of wanton destruction unparalleled in a thousand years of European history, that there was a real if only a premonitory movement of American opinion; and this movement was stimulated by the German bombardment of Rheims Cathedral, which, in its turn, all over America stirred passionate protests from that relatively small but influential section of the population for whom beautiful things were sacred because they were beautiful.

### IV. AMERICAN JUDGMENT

Thus, underneath the surface and following the first weeks of the war, the tide of American judgment almost imperceptibly, but no less surely, began to run against Germany and her allies. This tide was not influenced by the fact that one of the opponents of Germany spoke the language and held measurably the same political faith as America. It was not set in motion by any clear perception that one side was right and the other wrong in the war, which still remained for the mass of the American people primarily a contest between two commercial rivals. With the millions who were prepared to sympathize as much with Germany as with England, Germany lost a decided advantage when her armies, having invaded Belgium and northern France, added to the still debatable offence of unwarranted invasion, real and enduring wrongs of rapine and violence. Again; in America, divided on the question of England or Germany, the unanimity of sympathy with France was almost unbelievable. From the opening weeks of the war to the day of the armistice a renaissance of affection for France, an ever-mounting emphasis on the memories of Franco-American association in the Revolution, the glorification of successful French achievement in the war, more than any other circumstance influenced the American people in the direction of the alliance against Germany. The victory of the Marne, by its splendour, by its almost miraculous character, unloosed the tongues of thousands of those who loved France and believed in her, and silenced the slanders of those who misunderstood or despised her.

As time advanced, at first dozens, then scores, and at last hundreds of American boys crossed the ocean, following the example of Lafayette, and enlisted either in the armies or in the hospital service of France (although it is worth recording that there was a very considerable movement of the same sort in the direction of Canada and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, while not a few Americans entered the British army directly). The presence of France in the alliance against Germany more and more made impossible any thought of American

entrance into the war save as an opponent of the Kaiser. Two forces even in this early time thus combined to lead American sympathies toward the Entente: (1) the German method and German manner in conducting the war, and (2) the glory and the peril of France which combined to re-awaken a friendship which was the oldest in American history and possessed a vitality which no one had suspected. Between the victory of the Marne and the sinking of the *Lusitania* even both these circumstances were, however, little perceived, and equally incapable of disturbing the resolute neutrality of the majority of Americans.

### V. PROPAGANDA

Much more conspicuous and much more impressive in all this time was the battle fought between European propagandists upon American soil. At the first moment of the war, sympathy was silenced in both camps while American partisans of both alliances watched the fate of the world as it was being decided upon the battlefields of France and Belgium. Expression of sympathy with contesting forces was restrained by the very tenseness of the hour and by the magnitude of the events which were unrolled. But when it became clear that the circumstances of the Hundred Days and of 1870 were not to be repeated and that Europe was involved in a long struggle, not in a single, brief, decisive conflict, the American public suddenly beheld the outburst of a battle between the sympathizers of the two forces which left it bewildered, amazed, and in no small degree indignant.

The difference between the two camps of propaganda was day by day more clearly disclosed. While Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Belgians by individual word and letter, without organization, without even efficient method, laid before the American people the statement of the Allied case and found—fortunately for themselves and their cause—even abler advocates among Americans who knew or sympathized with the enemies of Germany, German propaganda more and more took on exactly the same character as German military attack in western Europe.

Of a sudden all the German-American press in America began to

goose-step to the command of some unseen master. The same arguments, the same insinuations, the same charges were heard from Maine to California. The attack upon England was conducted by German agents in America with every possible appeal to ancient American prejudice and every conceivable incitation to Irish antipathies. In the nature of things this German-American outburst had to take the defensive as well as the offensive. It had to explain the invasion of Belgium, to deny with ever-increasing violence the charges and the evidence of German atrocities. And yet it was not unsuccessful in this first period. It was not without its sympathetic hearing. It might have availed to confuse American thinking and paralyze American conscience, had it been able to escape the constant necessity of explaining the inexplicable course of the German Government.

The American reaction to this sudden violent outburst of conflict of alien propaganda on American soil was on the whole clear in this period. There was a great and growing irritation alike with the champions of Germany and of England. The attacks of both conflicting forces upon American neutrality were equally resented and while along the Atlantic seaboard, where association and sympathy with England and with France was greatest, a slow but sure drift toward even more pronounced sympathies revealed itself, a compensating tide in the rest of the country disclosed alike an impatience with the propagandists of the opposing camps and with the growing partisanship of one section of the country for the Allied cause. The mass of the country resented at least equally, sectional American sympathy with the Allies and German-American championship of the German cause in America. All over the country there began to appear in offices and public places signs inviting the visitor in homely American phrase to avoid the discussion of the issues of the war and to refrain from support of a foreign cause at the expense of national peace of mind.

### VI. THE WILL FOR NEUTRALITY

In the time between the Marne and the *Lusitania* Massacre, while the cause of the Allies rather than that of the Germans gained ground,

that development was personal, not public, and the national will was unmistakably a will for neutrality. The Middle West viewed with contempt and hostility the patent sympathy of the Far East of America for the Allies. It did not itself indulge in profoundly pro-German sentiments but it continued to hold the balance even between the two, and more and more emphatically declared that real Americanism could only be expressed in neutrality—that the claims of the propagandists on either side of the firing line were equally unfounded. It refused to believe that Germans would commit atrocities; it declined to accept the eastern view of Allied moral superiority. It more and more gave itself up to an intense, if parochial, Americanism which asserted that, in the world in which two sets of European nations were fighting for old European aims and ambitions, America had alone remained faithful to the ideals of liberty and democracy and that the true American point of view could not be sympathetic with either of the camps but could only have unlimited condemnation for both.

Thus, during the first months of the war, American public opinion more and more firmly entrenched itself behind a breast-work of traditional isolation and more and more rigidly insisted upon unqualified neutrality. There was no chance then of American participation in the war on the German side. There was unmistakable and considerable sympathy with France; actual, if comparatively passive, condemnation of the German invasion of Belgium. But these latent currents were on the whole slight and there never was at any time the smallest possibility that the United States would, of its own volition and because of its approval of either of the alliances, enter the war.

The single problem posed on the day on which the war broke out and enduring long thereafter was whether one or the other of the alliances would, by its course, compel the United States to take up arms—not in the championship of a European cause but in the maintenance of American neutrality. But up to the sinking of the *Lusitania* there was nowhere in America any real conception that the United States could be involved in the struggle, just as there was nowhere any considerable

"LAFAYETTE, NOUS VOICI!"

Soon after the arrival of the American troops in France, General Pershing was invited to speak at the grave of Lafayette. The gallant Frenchman had fought to win freedom for America, and the Americans now were come to repay the debt by standing shoulder to shoulder with the men of France in the hour of their need. The delight of Marshal Joffre, Pershing's most conspicuous auditor, is very evident.

The laconic phrase, "Lafayette, we are here!" which the occasion spontaneously evoked, was uttered some say by General Pershing, some say by Colonel Stanton, and some say by neither speaker.

or influential body of opinion—that is, of purely American opinion—which advocated such an entrance.

Sympathy on the whole tended in the Allied direction, but the resolution to remain outside the area of struggle gained ground much more rapidly. By the time the war had been in progress for six months the neutrality of America seemed to be founded upon a rock, and there can be no more astonishing or impressive page in history than that which reveals the manner in which the Imperial German Government, by its folly, its essential blindness, its total surrender to the gospel of Force, literally drove a hundred millions of people—almost unanimous in their desire for neutrality—into an active and decisive participation in the European struggle.

Realizing that the United States did ultimately become a participant in the war on the Allied side, it is no less essential to recognize that, on the outbreak of the war, before and after the Battle of the Marne, up to the time of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and even for a long period thereafter, public opinion in America remained faithful to the tradition that the United States should avoid entanglement in a European conflict; and the majority of Americans refused to believe that there was a preponderance of right on one side rather than on the other sufficient to demand American intervention. Like the President the mass of his countrymen refused to believe that America could have any other rôle than that of precise neutrality until such time as she was able to act as the peace-maker, and intervene, not as a belligerent but as an arbitrator, to restore peace—not to expand the area of conflict or the number of combatants by sending Americans to the fighting line. When German folly sank the *Lusitania* on the 7th of May, 1915, such was the state of American opinion and purpose and so strongly entrenched was American neutrality that it required a supreme madness on the part of German leadership to dislodge it.

### VII. INCIDENTS

Between January and May the exasperation of the Government and of the people of the United States over unwarranted interference with

American commerce both by British and German sea power aroused emotions strangely reminiscent of American public opinion in the Napoleonic wars. The English blockade, not alone of German ports but of neutral harbours; the English refusal to accept the principles laid down in the Declaration of London largely by British representatives, led the Government to protest after protest which were only in part answered by British citation of Northern precedents during the Civil War. On the other hand, proclamation by the Germans of their submarine blockade—illegal from every point of view, and, in addition, indefensibly inhuman—aroused similar indignation. In this time the American Government essayed, as a great and powerful neutral, to compel both contesting alliances to live under international law, and this rôle seemed, to the larger part of intelligent Americans, the proper one for their own government.

In fact, the English, as the dominating sea power of the Entente, and the Germans, as the similar element among the Central Powers—both faced with new necessities and new conditions—imitated the precedents of a century before and tore up all existing guarantees of international law. Each blamed the other; each pointed to the illegal acts of the other as the justification of its own transgressions; yet each continued in a course disastrous to American interests, with a persistence only limited by a certain degree of caution.

But it is essential to recognize that in this period there was a clear governmental policy in the United States and that this policy had the substantial and adequate support of the American people. The United States Government undertook by moral suasion to compel the nations at war to conduct their struggle within the limits of international law. It spoke for the rights of its own citizens but it no less plainly spoke as the one great neutral for the rights of all the smaller neutral powers—rights which were equally unjustifiably violated by the Entente and by the Central Powers. Without considering yet the possibility of armed interference on behalf of the principles championed by official declaration, the United States began to build up for itself a position which, could it have been maintained to the end, would have been fatal to the Entente.

The state of international law at the moment of the outbreak of the war was such that, had it been observed, Germany would have continued to receive that food and those raw materials necessary to her, and in the very nature of things American championship of the principles of neutrality led to a defence of the right to trade with Germany. Ineluctably, if imperceptibly, American policy prior to the 7th of May, 1915, was drifting in the direction of the use of the most powerful weapon in American hands to enforce neutral rights on the sea against all who challenged it. It is not difficult to believe that an embargo upon the export of food and material alike to England and to France, on the one hand, and to Germany, on the other, would have followed British persistence in interfering with American trade with Germany through neutral ports and in non-contraband had Germany permitted the dispute with Great Britain, which was becoming steadily more acrimonious, to continue uninterrupted.

For the United States to have employed the embargo in 1915, or in any other year of the war, would have been in effect to give Germany the victory. For the Allies to have permitted the United States to trade with Germany in the exercise of its indisputable rights under international law would have been almost as certain to give Germany the victory. That the United States would have pursued a policy based upon the assertion and defence of these rights by the embargo seems almost certain. That we should have gone to war with Great Britain was always unlikely, just as it was equally unlikely that anything but slaughter of Americans would lead us into conflict with Germany. But that we should have employed the embargo at no distant date seems a reasonable and sound conclusion.

### VIII. THE "LUSITANIA" MASSACRE

But while these discussions of interference with American sea-borne trade were more and more exasperating the American people, and more and more profoundly stirring resentment against Europe, without regard to the war or the alliances, there came suddenly the news of the supreme tragedy of the *Lusitania*, which

must be reckoned as the turning point in American opinion in the World War.

Only a few years before the whole civilized world had waited and watched while the first fugitive splutters of the wireless told the story of the sinking of the *Titanic*. Hundreds of millions of people waited and watched for the final truth of the sinking of the greatest ship in the world, and the memory of that horror in the American mind still survived the reports of more recent battles. But the *Titanic* was an accident. Now, all the circumstances of the earlier tragedy were repeated as the result of a wanton act of man.

Few of the people who were alive in America on the day and night when the first reports of the *Lusitania* Massacre began to arrive will ever forget the horror, the indignation, the stupefaction produced by that crime. For twenty-four hours the country refused to believe that a civilized nation, presumably holding to the same ideals and the same conceptions of humanity, could permit its sailors to launch against a passenger ship, laden with women and children and carrying neutrals as well as belligerents, a torpedo which would inevitably result in the slaughter of innocent and helpless human beings.

When the truth was no longer to be doubted there swept from one end of the United States to the other an emotion which destroyed sympathy with Germany everywhere except among people of German origin or politicians dependent upon hyphenated votes for their political existence. The cause of Germany, so far as it had an appeal to the sympathy, the intelligence, and the conscience of the United States, went down with the *Lusitania*. Thereafter there could be but one issue: Should the United States remain neutral?—or should she enter the war on the Allied side? The brand on Cain's forehead was not more conspicuous or more fatal than the mark left upon the German cause by the *Lusitania* Massacre.

On the morrow of this massacre it would have been possible for the President of the United States to have carried a majority of his fellow-countrymen into the war against Germany. But it is not less certain that, even after this crime, a majority of the American people still

believed that the duty of America was still to remain outside the conflict. It was clear instantly that, unless Germany renounced a policy of murder, the American people would demand of their government a declaration of war. It was no less clear that the inherent, the traditional antipathy to participation in a European struggle endured. American public opinion demanded that, once and for all—emphatically, definitively—the President should warn Germany. Even at this hour, in the presence of their dead, the American people faintly hoped that the German Government would disavow the act of a German officer—so naïvely did they still cling to the notion of German humanity.

The summer of the *Lusitania* Massacre sees the beginning of that national sentiment which pushed the Government into ultimate conflict with Germany. When Germany, instead of disavowing, quibbled, evaded, dodged; when the President of the United States, instead of speaking firmly, blundered in his "too-proud-to-fight" speech and argued in his long-continued notes, American restiveness increased with every hour. Still determined to remain neutral if possible there was not—except amongst those controlled by their sympathy with that foreign country from which they had come—the smallest willingness permanently to bow before German terrorism. The country asked of its government that, either by firmness in policy or by force in action, it should compel Germany to abandon murder.

### IX. THE FIRST RESULT

With the sinking of the *Lusitania*, too, all chance of the equal application of the principles of international law, to both alliances, perished. From that hour onward the factories, the fields, and the workmen of the United States and the vast industrial and agricultural machinery of the country were mobilized on the Allied side. The campaign to compel Great Britain to permit America to trade with Germany and Austria died. We became in fact; on the days following the tragedy off the Old Head of Kinsale, the economic ally of the Entente. With ever-increasing volume our machines and our arms, our

food and our raw material, flowed to western Europe, depriving Germany of the advantages of superior preparation and better organization.

This aid was not to prove adequate without the addition of American soldiers, but between May 7, 1915, and the spring of 1918, it was an indispensable contribution to Allied survival. Between the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the promulgation of the final German campaign of submarine ruthlessness, almost two years later, American public opinion marched surely to an acceptation of the Allied view of Germany; and the publication of the Bryce report upon the Belgian atrocities in Belgium, which almost coincided with the sinking of the *Lusitania*, reached a people at last prepared to believe those German crimes which hitherto had passed the credulity of a civilized nation. Retrospectively, and in the light of a crime which could not be denied, the American people interpreted the invasion of Belgium, the burning of Louvain, the campaign of rape and violence, murder and destruction over all of Belgium and northern France.

While our government continued in its official documents to talk of German regard for humanity; while the President pursued a policy founded on a determination to remain neutral, and buttressed on the faith that words could have power unsupported by arms in dealing with a nation which had given itself over utterly to a gospel of force; the American people, with ever-growing clarity, grasped the real meaning of Germany in the world. Morally, materially, in all ways that it is possible to measure, the German cause was lost in America with the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the single question that remained to be answered was whether Germany would renounce a policy of which the *Lusitania* was an everlasting evidence, or accept an inevitable war with the greatest of the neutrals.

Between May 7, 1915, and January, 1917, Germany hesitated. For a long time she pursued a course of modified defiance. New "incidents", new attacks, came with relative frequency. The series culminated with the attack upon the *Sussex* in February, 1916, which would have led to war had it not been promptly followed by a German surrender in the matter of submarine warfare. Thereafter, so long as Germany observed

her obligations, American neutrality endured; but while that neutrality endured, American abhorrence of German methods increased so that it was inevitable that if Germany ever departed from her pledges American entrance into the war would become almost automatic.

The *Lusitania* Massacre is one of the great landmarks in history, not alone in American history but in human history, because it ensured German defeat in the World War. Looking to the terrible crisis of 1918 it is unmistakable that, had America been neutral in that hour, the victory of the alliance against Germany would have been unthinkable, nor is it less probable that Allied consent to peace by negotiation would have followed the defeats of the year which we are now to examine, had not the entrance of the United States served to create new hopes and restore shaken confidence. American decision in the World War was finally made on the basis of the *Lusitania*. Between the *Lusitania* Massacre and the entrance of American troops into the line at Château-Thierry a little more than three years were to elapse; but while, on the surface, America continued long after the earlier event to seem blind to the truth, deaf to the appeals of honour and safety alike, the forces released by this crime continued to march—continued to extend the area of their influence—until a united country ultimately entered the European war. And, as a final detail, it is at least one of the most striking coincidences of which we have any knowledge that those terms of peace which imposed the sentence of the victorious nations upon a defeated Germany were delivered into German hands on the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

### X. THEODORE ROOSEVELT

No discussion of the development of American opinion in respect of the war would be complete without a mention of the contribution of Theodore Roosevelt to the illumination of the minds of his fellow-countrymen.

There was no American who saw more promptly the fundamental issues and principles involved in the German assault upon our Western civilization than Colonel Roosevelt, nor was there any other American

who displayed so much force or exerted so great an influence in awakening people of the nation to the facts of the situation.

The war found Colonel Roosevelt at the close of a brilliant political career which had ended summarily. The break with his own party in 1912 was not healed. The campaign for the nomination of 1916 revealed the enormous popularity still retained by Colonel Roosevelt, but it was not sufficient to win for him the nomination, and that last defeat ended all hope of a return to public office. Physically a broken man, politically without a future, separated from most of those conspicuous figures of his own party who had been his associates and his subordinates in his own Administration, a lonely figure, he was yet able, by the sheer force of his personality, to rouse thousands and even millions of his countrymen to a perception of the meaning in America of the colossal crime in Europe.

Speaking; writing; constantly brushing aside, with impatient energy, theories, emotions, parochial and utopian conceptions; taking his stand firmly on that platform of virile Americanism of which he had been the greatest exponent in his own generation, Colonel Roosevelt inveighed against each German aggression, each German crime, with ever-growing force and effect.

Without Colonel Roosevelt it is conceivable that American neutrality might have been maintained to the end, with all its terrible consequences—first to Europe and ultimately to this country. Certainly no other man did so much to arouse his countrymen—to prepare them intellectually and morally for the great strain that was coming—as the man who, having twice occupied the White House and having been the conspicuous figure of his own generation in American public life, sat now almost in exile from his party councils and from his public associates.

Historians of the future will find it difficult to estimate and to appraise exactly the extent of the influence exerted by Theodore Roosevelt in a time of confused counsels, national blindness, political expediency. He saw the war as it was. He saw the Belgian crime in its full meaning. He saw the cause of the western Allies as the cause

# THE AMERICAN DRAFT

THE RAW MATERIAL

Black and white, fat and lean, jolly and sober was the grist drawn into the draft-hopper. But Negro and Latin and Slav and Anglo-Saxon were Americans all, and gave a good account of themselves on the battle-fields of France

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

FIFTY-TWO TONGUES REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT

This is a group of Spaniards. The interpreter is a young Spaniard who is already in khaki



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DRAWING THE FIRST NUMBER

After he had been blindfolded, Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, plunged his hand into the large glass jar containing the 13,500 numbers inclosed in capsules. He drew one forth and passed it to a clerk who opened it and announced the number "258." Thus the drawing began. The date was July 20, 1917



DRAFT REGISTRATION AT HONOLULU

In the far islands of the Pacific long lines of yellow and brown Americans awaited their turn to register

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DRAFT REGISTRATION IN CHINATOWN, NEW YORK CITY

It would have been a hopeless task, but for the help of the keen young civilian interpreter

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EVEN THE TENDERLOIN FURNISHED ITS QUOTA

Registrars at work in the Tenderloin district, New York City



IT WAS A *SELECTIVE* DRAFT:

ONLY THE PHYSICALLY FIT WERE WANTED

PHILADELPHIA DRAFT ARMY PARADE

Twenty-five thousand men were drafted in Philadelphia. Before leaving for the training camp they paraded before a cheering crowd of relatives and friends

of the United States, and he saw plainly that there could be no escape from American entrance—that each halting, conciliating action, in the face of German menace, invited new aggression. He understood force. He understood the German conception. He saw that a victorious Germany would set its foot triumphantly upon that whole democratic doctrine which represented the political faith of the western powers.

Upon his head, during the long controversial period which preceded the actual entrance of the United States into the war, there burst a passion of denunciation. He carried in his body the bullet of a would-be assassin who bore a German name. Democratic politicians combined with German propagandists to assail the man whose services to his country should have placed him outside of the range of such attack. When at last his fight had roused an American public opinion which met the final German menace with a declaration of war, Colonel Roosevelt was denied the opportunity to lead troops against the enemy. His physical condition probably warranted the decision of the Government, but no one who knew him in those days could mistake the fact that this was the crowning disappointment of a life equally replete with great successes and corroding defeats. He lived to see three of his sons wounded in the firing line. He lived to give one of his boys to his country upon the battlefield. He did not die until the German had surrendered. At the very time when death came suddenly to him his voice was powerfully heard attacking, as a policy for making peace, precisely those conceptions which he had fought when they pointed the way to American neutrality. No living American of that time—with the possible exception of Elihu Root—knew his Europe, his world, or his history as did Theodore Roosevelt. Had he lived he would have been a potent foe of precisely those principles which were championed by the United States at the Paris Conference. What his influence might have been no man can say, but one thing is clear beyond all question, and that is, that from the outbreak of the war until the entrance of the United States into it, Colonel Roosevelt fought his last, his greatest, and on the whole his most successful battle. When he began to appeal to his fellow-countrymen they were alike blind and

deaf to the truth. Without the support of a political party, of a friendly press, of an organized body of adherents, single-handed, physically broken, he waged war in defence of the Americanism of which he had ever been the embodiment, and in the end his country adopted the ideas which he had championed and took that action which he had advocated almost from the beginning of the war.

When the United States at last entered the world conflict, the press of events, the magnitude of the effort, the tenseness of the interest, combined to efface from contemporary memory appreciation of the rôle which had been played by Colonel Roosevelt in arousing the conscience and the patriotism of the nation in days which every American will strive to forget. That this period of national humiliation proved to be but the prelude to a national awakening of unrivalled splendour, was due more to Roosevelt than to any other living man. Whatever he might have accomplished had he been in the White House, it is hard to believe that he could have exercised a more potent or a more valuable influence than that which he exerted as a private citizen—as an American who, seeing his country's duty and seeing it clearly, did not rest until he had communicated his vision to millions.

## CHAPTER THREE

## THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS

To trace in detail the progress of events between August 1, 1914, and April, 1917, could be no part of the present work, which is concerned with the narrative of the struggle itself. It is essential, however, to review, at least in a cursory fashion, the several phases which marked the transition of the United States from a remote and unconcerned witness to a united and powerful participant in the conflict. Nowhere else can the true meaning of German policy and German method be more perfectly grasped than by a brief examination of Germany's course with respect to the American people. Nowhere else can one see as simply and as clearly the essential fallacy which underlay the whole German conception of the world and of other peoples as in the story of how by use of force, by the resort to one illegal and immoral act after another, Germany destroyed such friendship as existed in America, aroused in its stead an indignation and a determination not surpassed in nations which had long recognized her as their hereditary enemy, and in the end brought two millions of American soldiers to Europe at the moment when their presence was a decisive factor in German defeat.

The morality or the immorality of German principles and German methods may perhaps be long debated. They may find champions in later generations, but what defence could ever be possible on the practical side for the policy which persuaded the greatest single neutral power in the world to lay aside a neutrality satisfactory to the mass of its people and, in exchange, adopt a hostility which endured even after Germany's arms had been struck from her hand and she lay prostrate before her conquerors

The phases in the education of the American people to the meaning of Germany in the world may be comprehended in three periods extending from August, 1914, to April, 1917, the first of which ran from the out-

break of the war to the *Lusitania* Massacre; the second, from the *Lusitania* Massacre to the German compliance with that ultimatum which followed the sinking of the *Sussex;* and the third, from that acceptance to the moment when the Germans gave public warnings of their purpose to reverse their policy and return to unrestricted sinking.

### I. THE FIRST PHASE—"INCIDENTS"

President Wilson's proclamation of neutrality in the opening hours of the war was followed slowly by an ever-increasing interference with American commerce, both by British and by German sea power. The parallel with the course of France and Great Britain during the Napoleonic wars, which led to our war with Great Britain in 1812, must impress every student of history; nor is it less plain, from any examination of the evidence, that, during the first months of the war, it was toward a conflict with Great Britain and not with Germany that events were shaping. Admiral Mahan had written that in the next war the dominant sea power would make sea law to suit itself. The course of Great Britain in the early days of the war clearly demonstrated the accuracy of this prophecy. The British did not instantly take full and effective measure of the possibilities of the use of their historic weapon. Little by little, however, deliberately experimenting with American patience, they invaded one right after another and more and more abandoned the observation of the principles expressed in the Declaration of London of 1909, which was, to be sure, voluntary since that code of naval warfare had never been officially accepted by the British Government. The detention of American ships; the interference with American cargoes consigned to neutral states because those neutral states had not forbidden the re-export of articles contained in those cargoes; the ultimate prohibition of the export of food stuffs, consigned not merely to German ports but to neutral ports, constituted grievances which led as early as December, 1914, to a formal protest by the United States.

To this and other protests the British Government made answers, beginning on January 7, 1915, which could not be considered by any fair-minded observer as satisfactory or candid.

These interferences with American interests and rights, naturally seized upon by every German agent and sympathizer in America, culminated on March 1st in a declaration on the part of Great Britain and of France that they held themselves free to detain, and take into port, ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, which amounted to a declaration of purpose to prevent commodities of any sort from reaching the Germans.

It is true that this course was explained as retaliation for a German proclamation of a war zone about Great Britain and the first relatively restricted but no less unmistakable use of the submarine to sink on sight not neutral but belligerent ships. A further pretext was furnished the Allied Governments by the fact that on January 31st the German Government undertook something approaching a seizure of grain stocks; not primarily, as the events proved, for military purposes, but to regulate the supplies of the nation and thus early make preparation against waste and famine. Moreover, a third shadow of warrant for the Allied purpose, frankly asserted to be one of reprisal, was found in the policy of the German Government in indiscriminately sowing mines in the high seas. But the Germans on their part could as vehemently defend their war-zone policy as retaliation for the illegal acts of Great Britain and her allies, culminating in that proposed blockade, accepted and described by the Germans as an effort to starve them into submission.

On February 20th the American Secretary of State had addressed an Identic Note suggesting agreement on some reasonable basis which would restrict naval warfare within limits that would prevent injury to neutrals. In this Note it was advocated that mines should not be sown in the open seas, or submarines used to attack merchantmen, save in the old-fashioned way of exercising the right of visit and search; and that use of neutral flags, to which the British had frequently resorted, should be abandoned. Great Britain was called upon to abandon her purpose of making food and food-stuffs absolute contraband, provided that America ensured that these commodities should not be delivered in Germany for military use; and Germany was asked to give satisfactory guarantees.

On this basis Germany was willing to talk, as her reply of February 28th indicated, but the Allied Note of March 1st destroyed all chance of compromise and further exchanges elicited from the Allied Governments only a polite but unmistakable declaration that, in view of German practices, the British purposed to proceed with their blockade. Meantime the Germans had already complicated the situation by sinking, wantonly, in the Pacific, an American ship carrying wheat consigned to Liverpool.

The result of these several exchanges and debates between the United States Government and the belligerents left the situation utterly unsatisfactory. American exports were subjected to every sort of illegal interference and restraint. Because the Germans had resorted to inhuman and barbarous methods of making war at sea, the British and the French justified a policy which invaded American rights. Because the British and the French had resorted to illegal methods, and the United States had not taken up arms to defend those rights, Germany asserted her freedom to employ a weapon new to war which could only be effective in so far as it not merely interfered with the rights of neutrals but also involved the destruction of their property and even of their lives.

The British on their part were more fortunate in the fact that, in the nature of things, they could limit the extent of their interference with abstract rights. They could, as they purposed to do, stop neutral ships without destroying them, take their cargoes, pay for them, and thus avoid inflicting any financial loss upon neutral owners. The German with his submarine could only sink the neutral ship with its cargo and its crew. His weapon was obviously bound to be of utmost importance to him, his sole answer to superior sea power, but the use of it was fraught with incalculable peril because, while neutrals might submit indefinitely to interference with their rights, particularly if this interference carried with it no property injury, it was inconceivable that any neutral as powerful as was the United States would consent to suffer its citizens to be murdered while they used the seas in accordance with international law and with principles which had never before been challenged.

German statesmanship in this time was faced with an obvious dilemma.

It had either to pursue the policy enunciated in its proclamation of February 18th, wherein it proclaimed a war-zone and a policy of sinking on sight—which had been promptly answered by an American assertion of an intention to hold the Imperial German Government to strict accountability if American ships or citizens were the victims of this policy—or to refrain from any pursuance of the policy which could conceivably arouse the United States Government and await a time when the multiplication of British interferences with American ships and rights would lead, if not to hostilities between the United States and the enemies of Germany, at least to the proclamation of an embargo which would prevent the export of war materials to Great Britain and France, and thus almost inevitably ensure their defeat.

The Germans chose the former course. As early as February 28th a German cruiser sank the *William P. Frye* in the Pacific. On March 28th the British passenger ship *Falaba* was torpedoed and sunk, and among others an American citizen lost his life. Conversations between the United States and the German Government over the *Frye* and the *Falaba* led to nothing. On April 28th the American S.S. *Cushing* was bombed by a German airplane, while on the 1st of May the American *Gulflight* was sunk off the Scilly Islands, and as a consequence the captain and ten of the crew lost their lives.

This campaign culminated on May 7th when the *Lusitania* was sunk off the Old Head of Kinsale and 1,153 of the 1,918 people on board were drowned, including 114 men, women, and children of American citizenship. This crime had been preceded by the insertion in American newspapers of the following warning:

*NOTICE!*

Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters, and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 22, 1915.

With the sinking of the *Lusitania* the policy of the United States—manifestly based upon a purpose to endeavour to constrain both belligerents to conduct their naval operations, if not in accordance with international law, as written before the days of the submarine, at least to follow such a course as would obviate intolerable interference with neutral commerce—fell to the ground. The United States had been arguing with the Germans against murder, with the British against forcible invasion of liberties and rights. While the discussion was proceeding the Germans had resorted to a murder which startled and horrified the American people. Until the policy of murder was abandoned by the Germans there could no longer be any possibility of further debates with the British. If the Germans hoped, by resorting to assassination, to drive the United States into a forcible vindication of those rights which had been invaded by the British, this infantile conception was promptly abolished. German agents, German sympathizers, the German-American press, might and did continue to assail England as responsible, but whatever was the American resentment over British policy at this time, now and henceforth the first business and the first concern of the American people must be to persuade or to compel the German Government alike to abandon a policy of murder and to disavow a crime committed in defiance of all the laws of humanity as well as of nations and at the expense of the lives of its citizens.

### II. SECOND PHASE—NOTES

On the morning following the *Lusitania* Massacre there was in every American mind the recollection that the Secretary of State had warned the Imperial German Government that it would be held to "strict accountability" for any use of the submarine weapon which might result in the loss of American lives. The nation expected the President of the United States to fulfil the obligation implied in this warning. There had been and there remained a division of opinion as to the extent of responsibility incurred by American citizens who embarked upon a British ship in the hour of war. The very fact that the *Lusitania* was a British ship, built for auxiliary service, complicated the question,

and the record was further obscured by the false charges made by the Germans that the *Lusitania* had carried ammunition and had sunk as a consequence of the explosives in her cargo. Even amidst the horror over the crime there were not lacking those who felt, however intolerable a stain the *Lusitania* Massacre was upon German honour, it was not of itself a sufficient basis to enter the war.

The expectation of a clear-cut statement on the part of the President of the United States was not fulfilled. At first retiring to his study when the news of the deed reached him, and separating himself from all his associates, the President finally broke a silence, which had become almost intolerable for his fellow-countrymen, in a speech delivered on May 10th, in Philadelphia, which contained no direct reference to Germany or to the *Lusitania* but which derived its subsequent importance from the following paragraph:

> The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be an example, not of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a man being so right that he does not need to convince others by force that he is right.

Three days later the State Department published the first of that series of notes addressed to the Imperial German Government which were all written by the President of the United States and were the continuing expression of that spirit expressed in the Philadelphia utterance. The United States, said this first note, had "observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement" that series of events of which the *Lusitania* was a culmination. It was "loath to believe—it cannot now bring itself to believe—that these acts so contrary" to the rules, practice, and spirit of modern warfare could be sanctioned or approved by the German Government. There followed a recitation of the facts; a biting reference to the irregularity incident to the publication in the American press by the German Embassy of that warning to the passengers of the *Lusitania*, and the final statement: "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty

to maintain the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment." Throughout the country it was felt that this note was an anticlimax, after the "strict-accountability" warning, while abroad the note itself attracted only minor interest while the major attention was reserved for the "too-proud-to-fight" speech. In Germany and out of it this was assumed to be the assertion of a purpose to adhere to a policy of "peace at any price." As a consequence there was small occasion for surprise when the *Nebraskan*, an American steamer, was torpedoed off Fastnet on May 23rd. Public indignation, aroused at this new outrage, was intensified by the reception, one week later, of the German answer to the *Lusitania* note, which, instead of disavowing the act or repudiating the policy, quibbled, argued, attacked British policy, and fixed upon the British Government the responsibility for the whole episode, since it had "attempted deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition aboard, and acted against the clear provisions of the American law which expressly prohibits the forwarding of passengers on ships carrying ammunition, and provides a penalty therefor. The company, therefore, is wantonly guilty of the death of so many passengers." There could be no doubt that the quick sinking of the *Lusitania* was "primarily attributable to the explosion of the ammunition shipment caused by the torpedo. The *Lusitania's* passengers would otherwise in all probability have been saved."

The German response in no sense satisfying American demands, a new note was framed, but, in the drafting of it, Mr. Wilson and his Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, came at last to open disagreement. Mr. Bryan was a frank advocate of a peace-at-any-price policy. The President was not. Mr. Bryan believed that a continuation of notes would lead to an ever-worsening situation, with war as the logical result. Mr. Wilson believed that by notes he could ultimately persuade the German Government and the German people. The President did not regard war as a possibility. Mr. Bryan saw clearly that it was inevitable unless the American Government were prepared to tolerate the murder of its fellow-citizens. His horror of war

would permit him such toleration. Accordingly, Mr. Bryan resigned, was succeeded by Mr. Lansing, and in the meantime the exchange of notes progressed.

The new Secretary of State demolished the several German arguments presented in their reply and took position on the unassailable ground that the question of the *Lusitania* was not one of law but of humanity and that the United States was contending for nothing less high and sacred than the "rights of humanity which every government honours itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority." The final words of this second note were as follows: "The Government of the United States, therefore, deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done."

But between asking for assurances and asserting a determination to hold Germany to "strict accountability" and to "omit no word or act . . ." it was plain that there was a wide gulf. The country felt very clearly that, with the massacre still lacking a German disavowal and a policy of assassination unrepudiated by the Germans, the United States Government was rapidly allowing itself to drift into dialectics. Impatience was everywhere on the increase, and this impatience was not lessened when the next German note, instead of giving the required assurances, shifted the discussion to a suggestion that American citizens should travel only on neutral ships, and further offered the impudent intimation that these neutral ships should be conspicuously marked and their sailing advertised to the German Government. Once more a German outrage contributed to aggravating the situation. On July 9th the *Orduna*, like the *Lusitania*, a British passenger ship in the Atlantic service, was attacked by a German submarine, not far from the scene of the *Lusitania* Massacre, and followed by the submarine, which shelled her until she was out of range.

Still once more the President had recourse to a note in which he rejected the preposterous German suggestion as to restricting American

travel to neutral ships, and this time warned Germany yet again in the following words: "Friendship itself prompts the United States to say to the Imperial German Government that repetition, by the commanders of German naval vessels, of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly." Four days later a German submarine sank the American ship *Leelaw*, but this time the crew was allowed time to quit the ship; and the cargo was contraband. Any thought that the Germans had changed their policy was destroyed on August 30th, when a German submarine attacked and sank the *Arabic*, again near the scene of the *Lusitania* Massacre. Of the 423 persons on the *Arabic*, 44, including two Americans, lost their lives. This was the "deliberately unfriendly" action which the President had indicated in his last note.

What could be left to discuss? What further use was there of discussing the question with the German Government? This was the demand of the American press and a large fraction of the American people. The German Government itself seemed to understand the gravity of the new crisis, because, through its ambassador at Washington, it asked that the United States Government should take no action until it was able to investigate the *Arabic* incident, and asserted that if it should be proved that Americans had actually lost their lives, this would be something contrary to German intentions. On August 26th the German Ambassador, following a conversation with the President, gave him the following pledge on behalf of the German Government: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the rights of non-combatants, provided the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This looked like a victory for the American contention, but three days later the *Hesperian*, with 650 passengers and crew aboard, was torpedoed off Fastnet. As there were Canadian soldiers aboard, and the ship mounted at least one gun, there was a general agreement to suffer this incident to pass without challenge.

Meantime, the activity in the Mediterranean of submarines, flying the Austrian flag but widely believed to be German, precipitated new

complications. On November 7th the Italian passenger ship *Ancona* was torpedoed off the coast of Tunis by submarines which flew first the German and then the Austrian flag. On December 6th the American State Department demanded disavowal and reparation in terms more explicit and emphatic than had yet been employed in any previous note. To this the Austrian Government replied, after long delay, in tones which were insolent and contemptuous, refusing to comply with the Američan demand. The State Department responded to this with a somewhat curt repetition of the demand for disavowal and reparation and to this second note the Austrian Government yielded. One day after the Austrian surrender became known, the British S.S. *Persia* was torpedoed in the eastern Mediterranean and 392 passengers and crew were lost. Among these was an American consul on his way to his post. When the Austrian Government was approached in this matter it suggested that the crime might have been the work of a Turkish submarine.

The controversy continued to drag with no further grave incidents for two months more, during the course of which Germany, in a further communication, offered to modify its submarine campaign provided that the British would disarm their merchant ships. An enquiry, by the American Secretary of State, of the Allies as to their position in this question was met with a courteous but emphatic refusal.

Finally, on March 24th, a French channel boat plying between Folkestone and Dieppe was torpedoed, and although the vessel remained afloat, some 80 persons were wounded, including Americans.

The sinking of the *Sussex* was the last straw. Utterly derisory German justification was brushed aside, and on April 19th the President of the United States laid before Congress the whole history of the submarine debate, having on the day previously addressed to the German Government yet one more note, which closed with the following sentence: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present method of submarine warfare against passenger- and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no other choice but to sever diplomatic

relations with the German Empire altogether." On May 4th the German Government responded in a long note reviewing all the countercharges against the British, plainly intimating that the United States Government was not pursuing, in respect of the British, the same course as in the case of Germany, but containing the all-important statement: "German naval forces have received the following orders: 'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human life unless those ships attempt to escape or offer resistance'."

This was all the United States had contended for. So far it was a complete victory for Mr. Wilson's method. There was, however, appended to the note this following minatory condition: "But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rights of international law." The German Government further expressed its confidence that the United States should now resume its debates with Great Britain and force that nation to comply with its contentions. Should the United States fail to do this the German note indicated that "the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision." This was no more than Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, had already promised on behalf of his government before the *Sussex* episode, but a subsequent German statement conceded Germany's failure to fulfil its promises in the matter of the *Sussex*, and expressed its sincere regret therefor and its readiness to meet claims for reparation.

So ended the great submarine debate. When, a little less than a year later, Germany withdrew her pledge and announced her intention to resume unrestricted sinking, the United States promptly severed diplomatic relations and shortly thereafter entered the war. Doubtless it would have entered it a year earlier but for the German surrender. That the episode itself injured American prestige abroad, humiliated

American pride at home, was and is unmistakable. Mr. Wilson's notes were the topic of derisory humour in the press and on the stages of all the European capitals. Europe did not derive the impression that Americans were in fact "too proud to fight"—but too cowardly. Such unworthy and inaccurate suspicions were dissipated when America did come into the war and the character of her participation forever destroyed the misunderstanding due to the incidents of 1915.

In point of fact, Germany did not cease her submarine warfare until Mr. Wilson laid aside arguments and resorted to the familiar ultimatum. Had he consented to continue his notes Germany unquestionably would have continued her sinkings. She was neither convinced by his logic nor impressed by his idealism, but in April, 1916, she confronted a situation in which she lacked the necessary submarines to make her campaign effective and was at last aware that to continue the campaign meant to ensure American belligerence. Mr. Wilson and his fellow-countrymen were not alone in misunderstanding the German surrender. The English Government and the English navy, like the American Government and the American people, believed Germany had abandoned the submarine, and in this colossal misapprehension both failed to make those preparations against a resumption of ruthless sinking for which Germany was already preparing. For the moment German surrender was of material advantage to the Allies, but in the end it was of questionable profit since it lulled them to sleep while the greatest danger which was to threaten the Allied cause in the whole war slowly matured.

While the State Department and the President had been occupied for nearly two years with the conduct of negotiations growing out of submarine outrages there had been conducted in Congress—ostensibly with the purpose of keeping the United States out of the war, but in many instances by Congressmen whose sympathies with Germany or whose truckling to constituencies in which the German-American vote was large—campaigns which sought in the first instance to place an embargo on the exportation of arms to the Allies, and subsequently, when the submarine debate had reached its most acute stage, to forbid Americans to travel upon armed merchantmen, and to deny clearance

papers to such vessels. Since the British and the French had now adopted the practice of arming all their merchantmen against the submarine, this latter course would in effect have paralyzed Allied transport, while an embargo would unquestionably have deprived the Allies of precisely those materials and weapons essential to defend themselves against the German assault.

In the matter of the embargo, the course of the President from the beginning was clear, definite, and correct. The United States, having always pursued a policy of unpreparedness for war, depended more than any other country upon its ability to import arms and war materials from other countries in case of conflict. To set up a precedent now in the matter of an embargo would be to establish a rule which might prove fatal to the United States at some future crisis. In the days of the Civil War the Union armies had been equipped almost exclusively from British and French sources and without such assistance the Confederacy would almost unquestionably have won the war. To put an embargo on the export, not merely of arms, but of food and food stuffs and raw materials generally, would have been not merely to break with American policy in the past and establish a precedent of incalculable peril to the country itself, but it would also have been a clear breach of neutrality, a deliberate change of the rules of war during the progress of the struggle, which could only inure to the benefit of one of the parties contesting. Moreover, the beneficiary of such a policy—Germany—had herself employed the unquestioned right of export of arms in the period of the Boer War and to the advantage of the opponents of Great Britain.

There were not a few Americans, whose sincerity and unselfishness were above question, who saw with disgust and humiliation a vast tide of wealth rolling in upon their nation as a consequence of its contributions of arms and munitions to a struggle in which its own sons did not participate. To grow rich out of the agonies of other nations was a thing repugnant to them. Yet, with small exception, their ultimate judgment sustained the policy of the President.

Again, those for selfish reasons interested in an embargo, the producers of cotton and of such other commodities as were momentarily

THE "FIGHTING SIXTY-NINTH" OFF TO CAMP

A last good-bye to sweethearts and wives as the train pulls out of the station

*Copyright by G. V. Buck*

THOSE WERE STIRRING DAYS

When even the President of the United States led the parade, through the flag-decked sunny streets of the nation's capital

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

"GOOD-BYE, DEAR OLD MANHATTAN ISLE!"

New York boys, waiting for the train which is to take them to Camp Upton

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

"ARE WE DOWNHEARTED? NO!"

Men of the second draft leaving Long Island City for Camp Upton. A big German drive was on just then, but these men do not seem to be afraid



*Copyright by Clinedinst*

PHILADELPHIA "DRAFTEES" ARRIVING AT CAMP MEADE

It's a strange, new life which lies before them, and they regard the men already wearing khaki with much curiosity and some awe

THE ROOKIE IS A BIT BEWILDERED WHEN REVEILLÉ SOUNDS

BUT HE ATTACKS HIS "CHOW" WITH GOOD APPETITE



FIRST STEPS IN MILITARY TRAINING

The day after their arrival at Camp Sherman these men settled down to work in a sober and determined spirit



THERE WAS TRAINING FOR BOTH MUSCLE AND BRAINS AT THE CANTONMENTS



WRITING LETTERS

After strenuous days, crammed with new experiences, there was much to tell the people at home



THE NEW UNIFORMS

Their apparel was neither neat nor gaudy, but the sidewalks of Fifth Avenue were packed with their friends as the New York conscripts marched along

affected by the closing of the German markets, were gradually appeased as the expansion of the Allied imports, consequent upon the ever-growing fraction of Allied population removed from industry to the firing line, absorbed their products. As the volume of the export trade of the United States grew to figures unprecedented in all past history the considerations which led to the advocacy of an embargo totally disappeared and were replaced by a far greater but not less selfish reason for opposing any embargo.

The question of forbidding Americans to travel upon belligerent ships, on the contrary, continued, during the whole period of the submarine warfare, to provoke protests and to attract legislative proposals. At the moment when the *Lusitania* was sunk there was throughout the Middle West a marked sentiment expressed in the statement that the American citizens who had embarked upon a British ship were themselves not alone responsible for the tragedy which overtook them but were also guilty of an unpatriotic act in risking the peace of their own country by their temerity. The right of Germany to commit murder was seldom asserted in any American quarter, but the duty of American citizens to refrain from travel upon British and French ships was often proclaimed.

When the British armed all their merchantmen against submarine attack, as they were entitled to do under international law, the controversy took a new shape. Many resolutions were introduced in Congress, the sum of all of which was to forbid Americans to travel on armed merchantmen and to prohibit the sailing of such armed merchantmen from American ports. Germany herself, at the height of the submarine controversy, offered to abandon ruthless attacks upon passenger ships provided the United States could procure from the British an abandonment of the policy of arming merchantmen. The Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, made such a request to the British; the President himself for the moment wavered and seemed willing to accept the German suggestion.

Happily, however, Mr. Wilson's doubts were speedily cleared up. He recognized clearly that in arming their merchantmen the British

were acting within international law. He perceived, as in the case of the embargo, that to undertake to change international law in the course of the conflict, in such way as to benefit but one of the contestants, would constitute a breach of neutrality and he squarely and courageously took his stand against such a course in the face of a campaign in Congress and in the public press which at moments seemed likely to overwhelm his policy but in the end came to nothing.

### III. THIRD PHASE—TREASON AND SEDITION

While there had been going forward, from the moment Germany proclaimed her submarine campaign to the agreement on a *modus vivendi* in April, 1916, a campaign of domestic agitation unparalleled in American history, it was only when this submarine peril seemed removed that the country at last appreciated clearly the extent to which its peace had been destroyed by the representatives of alien countries seeking to mobilize American public opinion against the Government of the United States and in support of the policies of other countries. Because President Wilson had declined to submit to a German policy of murder on the high seas, German agents and German sympathizers conducted against him and his Administration in the United States and through the medium of the press and certain public men, a campaign of utmost hostility.

Because the President and the Congress of the United States had declined to place an embargo upon the export of arms and munitions, both were assailed, and while the German influence still sought to force Congress to adopt an embargo, an ever-increasing campaign of ruthless violence was directed against the munition plants, the shipping, and the communications within the country. The investigations of this period and of these activities, conducted in New York State at a later time under the brilliant direction of a Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Alfred L. Becker, revealed the extent to which money had been employed in the purchase of American newspapers and in the corruption of men engaged in publicity work.

All this campaign centred in the German Embassy, where the Ger-

man Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, at one time conducted within the United States an ever-growing attack upon the President and the Government, and posed before the people of the United States as a friend of their country, seeking at all times to prevent his own government from taking extreme measures and precipitating a conflict.

Rarely, if ever, in history, has there been such a spectacle as Bernstorff presented. He knew the American press, its machinery, its weaknesses, and its strength. He made his embassy a gathering-place of newspaper correspondents; he talked to them frequently and with frankness. Through them he conducted a campaign of publicity of almost unrivalled extent. Day by day the German side of each controversy was set forth in all the papers of the United States, frequently in advance of any statement of the Government itself. He made war upon the President and he mobilized not alone the German-American press animated by sympathies with Germany; not alone that section of the American press, like the journals of Mr. William R. Hearst—whose hostility to Great Britain and sympathy with Germany led him to transform his vast and influential newspapers into organs and agents of the German cause; but also newspapers whose policy was unquestionably pro-Ally, since he provided their correspondents with news valuable to the paper and took his pay in the publicity his own views thereby acquired.

Nor did the German Ambassador stop with mere manipulation of the press. In his embassy the destruction of munition plants was plotted. A paralysis of American industry by strikes and disorders was prepared, and the murder of American citizens, alike in factories and on the high seas, was arranged. No single circumstance in all Mr. Wilson's policy of long-suffering, of patience in the hope of avoiding participation in the World War, was at once more striking, or for fractions of the American people, more humiliating than his toleration of Bernstorff, whose insolence knew no bounds, whose interference in American domestic affairs was beyond belief. In no other country in the world could Bernstorff have conducted a campaign against the Government and the peace of the nation to which he was accredited

as the Ambassador of a friendly nation. Evil he was, unscrupulous, an intriguer whose whole career in America was ultimately exposed but what all the country finally learned must have been long known to the Government which permitted him to continue his operations.

The Austrian Ambassador, by contrast a harmless and well-intentioned diplomat, was less fortunate and was obliged to leave the country at the request of the State Department after having been involved in the German campaign against munition plants. Several of Bernstorff's agents shared a similar fate, after disclosures which rendered their stay in the United States impossible, but Bernstorff himself remained, until the action of his own government led to the severing of diplomatic relations, and in the period between the interruption and the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare—that is, between April, 1916, and February, 1917—Bernstorff's activities rose to almost unbelievable heights.

In this same period President Wilson gave one more illustration of the fashion in which he held to the view that his own and his country's mission was to restore peace in the world. When the German Chancellor, following the German victories in Roumania, made his first proffer of peace in December, 1916, President Wilson was himself preparing to make a gesture which might contribute to an ending of the conflict. He knew, moreover, that Germany contemplated a resumption of her unrestricted submarine warfare if the Allies did not accept this peace proposal, which was in its very nature unacceptable, since he had been directly warned by our Ambassador in Berlin.

It was unfortunate in the extreme that the President's own peace note followed so closely upon the German as to give it at least the colour of an attempt designed to strengthen Germany's hands; nor was it less humiliating to Americans in later times that this note had also the appearance of having been dictated by a desire to prevent a new submarine campaign. In Paris and Berlin the President was held to have openly aided Germany. In America it was felt that he had been coerced into uttering his peace note by a German threat to resume submarine warfare if he did not support Germany's peace movement.

The President's peace note was issued on December 18th. To the governments of the Central Powers the following communication was sent:

The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also contains the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

The note to the Allies was slightly different in respect of the paragraph quoted above but otherwise similar. In both the President suggested a re-statement on the part of each contestant of its war aims and its peace terms, which, he pointed out—in language that excited heart-burnings alike in London and Paris—were identical in statement.

Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war.

Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggressions of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amid multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion; lest the situation of neutral nations,

now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable; and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

Short of such a re-statement of war aims, short of some composition of the differences

. . . the contest must continue to proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition until one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted. If million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

Coincident with this utterance of the President there was an interview with the Secretary of State, in which Mr. Lansing, in explaining the President's statement, said:

I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks in order that we may negotiate our conduct in the future.

The President's intervention, as we have seen in the previous volume, came to nothing, and a final German comment upon the failure contained the minatory declaration:

Germany and her allies have made an honest attempt to terminate the war and open the road for an understanding among the belligerents. The Imperial Government asserts the fact that it merely depended upon the decision of our adversaries whether the road toward peace should be entered upon or not. The hostile governments declined to accept this road. Upon them falls the full responsibility for the continuation of the bloodshed.

Most significant of all perhaps in the President's note, and in the discussions of this moment, was the first general publicity given to the idea of the League of Nations contained in an address before the Senate on January 22nd, which was at the moment memorable not because of its extended reference to the League-of-Nations idea but because it contained an astounding assertion that one of the prerequisites was "peace without victory." No single phrase—since "too proud to fight"—produced such an unfortunate impression abroad or created such far-reaching criticism at home. In London and in Paris it was

once more felt that the President had failed utterly to discriminate between the moral status of the Allies and of their assailants; and, viewed in the light of this utterance, the President's whole action with respect to peace was wrongly and invariably interpreted as a championship of a German manœuvre which was at once dishonest and dangerous, while for the President's League of Nations there was little but derision to be heard at this time.

But whatever the President hoped or believed possible or probable in the world situation, he was called upon to lay aside both his hopes and his expectations when, on the last day of January, 1917, the Imperial German Government proclaimed a resumption of ruthless submarine warfare. This course was defended as the inevitable consequence of the British and French refusal to accept the German peace proffer. The "new situation," mentioned in the German pledge to the United States nearly a year before, had arrived, and Germany now resumed her freedom of action. She fixed barred zones about the British Isles and in the Mediterranean and announced that all ships, neutral and belligerent alike, found in those waters would be sunk. One regular American passenger ship a week was to be permitted to sail to and from Falmouth, provided that it complied with an intricate system of regulations as to course, cargo, and markings.

On February 3rd the President appeared before Congress and in an extended address containing a review of the whole history of the submarine campaign, closed with this momentous statement:

> I think you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honour of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the 18th of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.
>
> I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to his Excellency his passports.

If the German Government should now be guilty of "an overt act" the President advised Congress that he would appear again before it to recommend further steps.

Severance of diplomatic relations did not, of itself, mean war; but in Europe, as in America, it was recognized as only a preliminary step. Meantime, whatever popular emotion was aroused anew against American participation in the war was definitively destroyed when, on the last day of February, the people of the United States learned from an official publication in their newspapers the astounding fact that, more than six weeks before, Germany had begun to prepare for war with the United States by seeking alliances with Japan and with Mexico, and that the German Foreign Minister, Zimmermann, had instructed the German Minister at Mexico City to undertake to procure an alliance with Mexico and induce Mexico to approach Japan with the same object. Mexico's reward for an attack upon the United States was to be the reconquest of her lost provinces of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The full text of Zimmermann's note is as follows:

Berlin, Jan. 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavour to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to his plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMANN.

Since the *Lusitania* Massacre nothing had happened which had so profoundly aroused American indignation. The last possibility of

effective opposition to American entrance into the war disappeared. A filibuster in the Senate in the closing days of the session—designed to prevent the passage of a resolution empowering the President to arm American merchant vessels—was in itself the last stand of the opponents of war, and while exciting momentary passion, was of minor importance. When President Wilson again took office on March 4th he had the support of the nation in a policy which was universally recognized as bound to lead to war with Germany within the briefest possible time. The Zimmermann note had demonstrated beyond all question the impossibility of avoiding conflict with a nation which, having asserted the right to bar our ships and citizens from the sea and to murder Americans who undertook to exercise their unquestioned right to travel on the ocean, was now inciting America's neighbours to attack her by promises of American territory if the United States ventured to protect the lives of its own citizens.

When, on April 2nd, Congress assembled in pursuance of a call of the President to Extraordinary Session, Mr. Wilson spoke to it the words for which the country was now waiting with impatience. This address reviewed at length the long list of injuries suffered by the American Government and people at the hands of the Germans and recognized at last that the German submarine warfare was a warfare against mankind and against all nations. If American ships had been sunk the challenge was after all not merely to America but to all mankind. The President advised Congress that in his judgment it should declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be war against the Government and people of the United States; that it accept it as such, and that it take steps to exert all the country's power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms.

Concerning American purpose the President said:

> Our purpose now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. . . .
>
> We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval.

It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellowmen as pawns and tools.

Commenting upon the recent experience of the Mexican intrigue, which he described as a challenge of hostile purpose which his own country was about to accept, he said:

We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretentions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German people included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.

We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nations can make them.

The President closed his address thus:

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war—into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.

But the Right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

Following the President's address a resolution declaring that war existed with Germany was introduced both in the Senate and the House. On April 5th the resolution was adopted by the Senate and passed by the House by a vote of 373 to 50 and the following day the President

issued a proclamation that a state of war existed between the Imperial German Government and the United States.

### IV. THE EFFECT

The announcement that the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Germany reached London and Paris at the moment when the populations of both cities were suffering from the consequences of the most severe winter since the siege of Paris. The news was read to soldiers in the trenches, whose sufferings in this same tragic winter were almost indescribable. To the French and the British armies, still expecting a short and victorious campaign, the news of American participation was still one more evidence of the approach of victory.

The American declaration of war preceded by only three days the British offensive at Arras, and at least one American flag was carried by the victorious Canadian troops who climbed Vimy Ridge. When the British operation had ceased and the French attack had failed, when the morale of the Allied armies and Allied populations was beginning to decline dangerously, the arrival of General Pershing in Paris, with that small vanguard of the American hosts that were to come, served as a counter-weight to all the influences that made for pessimism and urged surrender. As the Russian Revolution continued to disorganize the great eastern ally until it fell first into chaos and then into a powerlessness which ended in the capitulation to Bolshevism, the coming of America served more and more to encourage those who saw, in the defection of Russia, Allied disaster and defeat.

Faithful to his ideal of preserving for his country, untarnished by any military effort, the rule of arbitrator and peacemaker, Mr. Wilson had kept America unarmed from August, 1914, to April, 1917. It was therefore impossible now for American divisions to march. It was necessary to arm the country. It was necessary first of all to invoke the draft and send the male population of the nation to training camps. If valuable service could be rendered by the Navy in combating the submarine peril, on the military side a full year must pass before anything was possible. The war became thus, as Mr. Lloyd George said

at a later time, a race between the Kaiser and Wilson, although in 1917 the real gravity of the situation was not revealed. Still it was transparent to all the well-informed that America was the last hope of the Allies, and this in substance was the message brought by Balfour and Viviani, and by Marshal Joffre himself, when they came to the United States immediately after the declaration of war.

During 1917, save on the naval side, American contribution to the common cause was on the moral rather than on the military side. The German continued to believe, and certain portions of the Allied public still cherished the fear, that Germany would win before America could arrive. Both contending parties saw that if America could prepare before Germany attained a decisive victory, the latter's defeat was inevitable, and in that hope the Allied governments continued.

Meantime that gulf which had opened between the people of America and those of France and Britain was closed. For two years Englishmen and Frenchmen had seen with amazement American persistence in a neutrality which to both could but seem immoral selfishness, proof that the American democracy was in fact corrupt. More and more bitterly France and Great Britain criticized American blindness and inactivity in the presence of a moral duty. Had the war finished without American participation, even though the Allies had won, many years must have passed before America's course could have been forgotten. As it was, America's decision in a single hour abolished all misunderstandings. The hesitations, the haltings, the incomprehensible twistings and turnings of American policy were forgotten. Between the three great Western democracies not only was old friendship restored, but a new sense of nearness and association was aroused. The American flag flew over the Houses of Parliament, where no foreign flag had ever before waved, and General Pershing and his scanty companies of American troops were welcomed as no foreign troops had ever been welcomed in Great Britain or in France.

All this the German witnessed, not without misgivings. All through the summer of 1917 German and Austrian intrigues to procure peace went forward. They were thwarted by German military power, which

was still confident of victory, and, with Russia in its grasp, was preparing to dispose of western armies before America arrived. Yet it is hardly too much to say that before America was able to put a single regiment or even a full company upon the firing line in France, American participation in the war had contributed decisively to repulsing the peace offensive of 1917, as American troops, in July of the following year, were to supply the necessary reserves to enable Foch to launch that counter-offensive which broke the "peace storm" of Ludendorff's hitherto unbeaten armies.

If America came late, came ill-prepared, came incapable immediately of more than a moral contribution, this contribution was hardly less decisive in averting a peace which must have preserved for Germany many of the fruits of her conquest than was the force of our man-power in ensuring German military defeat one year later. Had we lingered but a few more months; had the country, when it entered the war, continued a policy of hesitation and half measures, the campaign of 1918 would unquestionably have ended in a decisive German victory. The fact that, however late our entrance, we came as a united nation —prepared for every sacrifice, ready to make every effort—atoned in no small measure for previous delay and enabled us, by a very narrow margin, to perform a sufficient portion of the task which had devolved upon us to win the war. Napoleon's decision to go to Moscow and the Kaiser's resolution to resume ruthless submarine warfare must remain, in history, two of the most colossal mistakes of which there is any record, since each of them resulted in the fall of an empire and the ruin of a grandiose conception of world denomination.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THE GREAT RETREAT

## I

## THE TWO STRATEGIC CONCEPTIONS

Allied strategy in the campaign of 1916 had been comprehended in a grand concentric attack upon the Central Powers in which British, French, Italian, and Russian armies, together with the Allied forces at Salonica and the British forces in Mesopotamia and Egypt, sought by coördinated and combined attack to exhaust the man-power of Germany and her allies, break through the circle of defences and win the war.

This plan had, on the whole, met with general failure despite local successes. The German offensive at Verdun, beginning in February, while unsuccessful in itself, had materially diminished French man-power and contributed to lessening the weight of the blow at the Somme. The Anglo-French offensive at the Somme had failed to achieve any immediate sweeping victory and had degenerated into a fight from trench to trench. Italy's blow at Gorizia had been no more successful, while the Russian offensive, after tremendous opening victories, had been beaten down.

Having thus checked her foes on all her fronts, Germany was able, in the closing months of 1916, to pass to the offensive, crush Roumania, and win a victory unquestioned on the military side and hardly to be exaggerated in its moral effect.

Nevertheless on all the fronts the Allies could point to local gains, to brilliant tactical achievements. Verdun had been saved, the British army had been trained on a battlefield on which material progress had been made, Russian armies had returned triumphantly to the scenes of their victories of 1914, even the Salonica army had reached Monastir. Therefore, though these results had been inconclusive in the larger

sense, it was plain that Allied strategy for the campaign of 1917 would seek to follow that of the preceding year—to attempt, following the example of Grant in the Civil War, to exert pressure over the whole vast expanse of front until, if by no other means, at least by attrition, the enemy should be exhausted.

General Nivelle, when he succeeded Joffre in December, found awaiting him plans of his predecessor calling for an immediate and general offensive all along the line. The general scheme he adopted; the details of the attack he modified to suit his own peculiar conceptions. Under Nivelle, as under Joffre—at the beginning of 1917, as at the outset of the campaign of the previous year—Allied strategy was comprehended in the general attack of all the armies of the Allies. It was an essential condition to success that all the Allied armies should be ready to move at the same time, that the movement should be coördinated and that each of the greater Allies should be capable of as considerable an effort as that of the preceding year. The elimination of a single one of the great European Powers allied against Germany was bound to be fatal to the whole plan since it would give to Germany and her allies superiority in numbers, and since they occupied the central position, would enable them to beat down any attack swiftly and surely.

Allied strategy in 1917 was, therefore, conditioned upon the persistence of Russia. When Russia fell to revolution and chaos in the first months of the campaign, their entire conception fell also, and Germany was able to win considerable victories alike from France, Britain, and Italy. In point of fact, Russia was so nearly gone at the moment when the campaign opened that it seems impossible not to believe that history will deal severely with those who were responsible for sending French and British armies to inevitable defeat at the Craonne Plateau and Passchendaele against an enemy strongly entrenched and capable of matching division against division.

But Allied High Command—like Allied statesmanship—from the beginning to the end of the campaign of 1917, was blind to the truth so far as Russia was concerned. It continued to believe in effective Russian participation when there was no basis for such belief. It

continued to hope when hope itself had become patently illusory. The result was that the campaign of 1917 developed into a series of fruitless separate attacks which successively exhausted the morale of the French, the British, and the Italian armies, and prepared the way for the Italian disaster of Caporetto and the crushing British defeat in the Battle of Picardy in the following year. To understand the campaign, however, it is essential to bear in mind the Allied conception of coördinated and concomitant attacks on all fronts, seeking victory as the result of equal pressure exerted at many points and putting a strain upon German man-power beyond its capacity.

German strategy, on the other hand, was solidly based upon an accurate knowledge of the facts. The German could calculate—and did—that the Russian conditions would, before the end of the year, practically, if not absolutely, eliminate the Russian foe. He could continue to follow the strategy of the past from which he had departed only in his attack upon Verdun and, holding fast in the west, finish with Russia. Thereafter, with his hands free, he would be able to concentrate his entire strength in a colossal and final effort to wrest a decision from the armies of France and Britain.

Therefore the German campaign of 1917 resolves itself into the story of a successful defensive in the west combined with such activity as was necessary in the east, activity of propaganda even more than of arms, to complete the destruction of the military power of Russia. The German at the opening of 1917 said: "This year I shall hold France and Britain, so far as my armies are concerned, while I dispose of Russia. But coincident with the defensive on land in the west I shall use my submarine warfare so to harry Allied commerce as to bring famine to Britain and exhaustion to the factories of France. Almost certainty in submarine campaign will bring Britain to surrender. Even if it does not I shall be able next year to dispose of both, and finally win the war."

The submarine was an essential element in the calculation. The German believed that relentless submarine warfare would effectively blockade Britain and equally effectively prevent the transport of Amer-

# THE RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE

*From a French Official Photograph*

THE CATHEDRAL OF ARRAS AS THE GERMANS LEFT IT

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ON THE BRITISH FRONT

*Above*—Cavalry resting near the Pol-Arras road.
*Centre*—Cavalry awaiting orders to advance.
*Below*—German prisoners helping to bring in the wounded to an advanced dressing-station.



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AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS OF ROAD AND TRENCH SYSTEMS ON THE WESTERN FRONT



THE FIRST BRITISH SOLDIER WARILY ENTERS PERONNE

*Copyright by Underwood & Underwood*

As the Germans evacuated the town they barricaded the streets and wrought all the damage which their hurried retreat permitted

*From a British Official Photograph*

A DISABLED GERMAN GUN NEAR BUISSY

A direct hit scored by the Canadian artillery put this gun out of commission. It had been in action beside the Arras-Cambrai road

*From a British Official Photograph*

A BRITISH WIRING PARTY

They are passing one of their own monster guns just outside Arras

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

SHELL-HOLES AS GUN EMPLACEMENTS

New Zealand artillery preparing to go into action in new positions

GENERAL MADOLON INSPECTS SOME NEW DUGOUTS WITH GENERAL WOOD

ican troops to the Continent. He did not reckon with America as a military force. He did not conceive of the possibility of the transport of vast American armies to Europe. He saw only the European factors in the game, and, seeing them alone, he saw victory. In this he reasoned not inaccurately, since only the arrival of American numbers ensured his ultimate defeat.

### II. THE GERMAN PLAN

Having deliberately adopted the defensive on the western front, the German had to face immediate conditions which were unfavourable in the extreme. As a consequence of the Battle of the Somme, a broad, deep salient had been driven into his old line. At the outset, when the armies dug in between the Aisne and the Channel, he had had the advantage of time in the selection of his positions, and in the months that followed he had transformed these positions into a fortress. At the opening of the Battle of the Somme he held practically every vantage point from the Lys to Champagne.

But in the Battle of the Somme he had been pushed off the high ground; that portion of his force about Noyon nearest Paris found its rear and communications menaced by Allied gains from Péronne to Roye. The other section of his armies north of the Somme as far as Arras was equally menaced by the ever-growing British wedge driven toward Bapaume. British artillery had now gained the upper hand along the whole front and in inferior positions the German was compelled to take the medicine that had been the portion of the Allies for two years.

More than this, it was apparent from the beginning of the year that Allied attacks would be delivered from all the vantage points gained in the Battle of the Somme, and the enemy knew that during the winter British and French engineers had been busy constructing railroads and highways up to that new front and preparing for the attack of the coming campaign.

Given his experience at the Somme, given the advantage of the position the enemy now occupied, it was clear to the German that he was doomed to suffer at least considerable local defeats if he maintained the

position in which he stood when the operations of the previous year terminated. He had therefore to choose between accepting battle on unfavourable ground, with the certainty of suffering local defeats, and of being compelled to make local retreats during the progress of the campaign, or solving all his difficulties by declining battle and retiring, in advance of attack, to new positions on more favourable ground.

On the military side the advantages of a general retirement were patent. The territory occupied had no value; it contained no cities of size, no industrial plants of value to the invader; much of it had been torn by shell fire, wasted by two and a half years of military occupation; the vantage points had been lost in the campaign of 1916, and were now securely in enemy hands. Allied success at the Somme had removed the chance of any push toward Paris from the Noyon salient. A retirement which would shorten and straighten his line, iron out the bulging and dangerous salients, releasing a certain number of troops, would be of obvious profit to the German.

On the other hand, a retreat, and a considerable retreat, the first in the west since the Marne campaign, would unquestionably bestow a great moral advantage upon the Allies. Following the repulse at Verdun and the considerable if gradual retirement at the Somme, it was bound to be interpreted in Allied quarters not merely as proof of victory in a past campaign but as the beginning of the end in the war itself. Coming at the opening of a new campaign it was bound to awaken new hopes and inspire greater efforts in Allied armies.

Notwithstanding the moral consequences of retreat, however, the German decision was quickly made. Hindenburg who, at the close of 1916 had risen to supreme command, had now come west and, what was of more importance, he had brought with him Ludendorff, henceforth the great figure on the German side and certainly one of the great figures in military history. The prestige of Hindenburg, now at its apex, was sufficient to deprive a retirement of any sting for the German public, while the confidence of the German people alike in their military idol and in their victorious prospects was sufficient to avoid any dangerous depression at home.

Therefore, by the 1st of January, German High Command had resolved upon the wide swinging retreat to new lines and by the first week in February this great operation began.

### III. THE GREAT RETREAT

The German retirement in the late winter and early spring of 1917 is one of the great strategic conceptions of the whole war. It transformed the entire character of the campaign of 1917, it totally dislocated all Allied strategy in the west. By shortening the German line and by creating on nearly a hundred miles of front a desert without roads or communications it released many German divisions whose presence in Flanders and about the Aisne sufficed to defeat British and French offensives. At the moment when it developed, Allied plans and preparations were complete for a gigantic offensive extending from Arras to Soissons. By it all these plans and preparations were rendered useless and, instead of attacking on the ground they had chosen, the Allies were forced to decide between assault on narrow fronts, precisely where the enemy had made his great counter-preparations, and abandoning the offensive altogether.

It would be difficult to find in all history, certainly in all records of modern warfare, a more simple or more brutal policy than that which was expressed in the German retreat. Stripped of all disguise of euphemism German strategy was to turn a thousand square miles of fertile fields, smiling villages, busy towns into an absolute desert. Retiring to new positions selected in advance, prepared with every art of military science, the German willed to leave between himself and his enemies an indescribable region of bridgeless rivers, broken cities, destroyed railways. He reasoned—and he reasoned correctly—that with such a destruction any great Allied offensive on a wide front in the west would be impossible in 1917, and he calculated that in the respite gained he would be able to deal finally with Russia and then, turning westward, try again—as he had tried at the Marne and once more at Verdun—for decisive victory.

The story of German devastation between Arras and Soissons is one




THE DEVASTATED AREA

The solid black from Lens to Craonne shows the country ravaged by the Germans in their great retreat to the Hindenburg Line or in the construction of this line. The small bit of black south of Ypres shows territory re-conquered by the British in the June attack on the Messines-"Whitesheet" Ridge.

which almost taxes imagination to believe. Rivers were dammed and wide areas flooded; towns and villages were razed to the ground; fruit trees and shade trees were methodically felled and lay in prostrate rows; every vestige of human habitation and human occupation was removed with meticulous care. Standing on one of the hills of Picardy when the German had gone, and looking eastward toward his new position, one might fancy oneself in the midst of the Sahara with nothing but the shifting sand lacking to complete the picture of utter desolation.

On the military side this was sound policy. It was the ultimate example of the German idea of war making. To serve German military needs it was advantageous to create a desert, to remove the means of communication by which the foe might ap-

proach his own lines, to remove the habitations in which this foe might find shelter in the coming winter. To make observation of his airmen easy, it was important to eliminate every possible means of cover. And since these were the facts the German did not hesitate. From the villages, from towns, he evicted the miserable remnant of the population which had failed to escape in the first weeks of the war and had lived in ever-growing wretchedness thereafter. Herding these people in a few scattered villages, sweeping off the able-bodied men and women to become his labourers or worse, he applied the torch, the bomb, the mine; for weeks after his retreat began the nights were lurid with the flames of burning villages and the earth shook with the explosions which destroyed towns and villages; while behind him he left every form of hellish device—delayed mine, booby trap—to slay his pursuers.

When he had completed his task of destruction and was within his own lines the German looked westward upon a waste hardly to be paralleled in Europe. Not a tree, not a wall, not a sign of human residence was to be seen from his front, and there were miles and miles of what had once been the garden land of France in which the only things left intact were those colossal cemeteries which the German had constructed on conquered territory and the huge, barbaric monuments he had erected to his own dead. And even as he honoured his own dead he dragged bodies of French men and women from their cemeteries, scattered their bones, defaced and defiled their monuments, as if to demonstrate that not even the dead themselves were to be spared in his rage of destruction.

### IV. HOW IT WAS DONE

The actual details of the German retreat are simply told. The winter of 1917 was one of almost unprecedented cold. Much snow fell in northern France and for several weeks in January and February the temperature fell to zero Fahrenheit. The ground was frozen, military operations were impossible, aërial observations inaccurate and unsatisfactory, and in this time the German slowly and steadily moved his heavy artillery backward. In the words of Sir Douglas Haig—"The task of obtaining the amount of railway material to meet the demands of

our armies, and of carrying out the work of construction at the rate rendered necessary by our plans, in addition to providing labour and materials for the necessary repair of roads, was one of the very greatest difficulty." On February 6th the British reported a German retirement out of Grandcourt on the arc facing Beaumont Hamel, the scene of desperate fighting in the last campaign. Through February there were multiplying reports of slight German retreats, retreats which

THE THREE FRONTS IN FRANCE

The solid black shows territory occupied by the Allies at the close of the Hindenburg retreat in 1918. The white line from Arras to Soissons shows the front at the opening of the Battle of the Somme in July, 1916. Both Arras and Soissons were then in Allied hands. The white line from La Bassée through Beauvais, Meaux, Esternay, Vitry, to Verdun and south of Verdun shows the limit of German advance in the Marne campaign of 1914.

seemed at the moment rather rectifications of the front, and this impression was confirmed by frequent German newspaper and official communications trumpeting the impregnability of the main German position while conceding and thus minimizing slight retirements.

It was not until the middle of March that the real movement began. Then as the winter broke the weather became misty, the ground soft.

Of a sudden, on the whole front from Arras to Soissons, the German began to go back. Day by day the retirement spread and grew. Allied newspapers were filled with the account of the occupation of town after town and village after village which had been the unattained objectives of two years of fighting. Bapaume, Ham, Péronne, Noyon, were successively evacuated and occupied. Allied advance guards lost touch with the German rear guards and, for the first time in nearly three years of war, troops advanced in the open again and for the moment trenches disappeared.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the momentary burst of enthusiasm and joy which was evoked by the news of this German retreat. British and French publics alike, fired with the idea of the Somme as a decisive victory and Verdun as a colossal disaster, interpreted the German retirement as a confession of final defeat. The progress of the submarine campaign, the ever-deepening anxieties about Russia, were forgotten in the few days when Allied troops moved forward from the Scarpe to the Aisne over territory which had been lost since August, 1914.

Yet very early in the retreat it became patent that the German was drawing back deliberately, without disorder, in accordance with methodical, well-conceived plans. He left behind him neither prisoners nor guns. He took with him everything of the smallest value in all the country he had occupied, and what he did not move, he destroyed. Even the enthusiasm of the French soldiers pushing forward over a regained province could hardly dispel the agony of the whole French nation as it began to learn the extent of devastation and desolation which the German was leaving behind him.

At the moment when the retreat disclosed itself, Allied capitals were filled with speculation as to the extent of the withdrawal. Would it be to the frontier, as had long been forecast by military writers? If the German was actually hard pushed for numbers, if his man-power was in fact failing as the Allied critics asserted, no lesser retirement would suffice, and in the middle of March, Allied publics looked confidently forward to the swift arrival of French and British armies at the Belgian frontier from the Scheldt to the Meuse. The liberation of

northern France, even the invasion of Germany, seemed at hand in that brief but joyous interlude between the hour when the German left his old battle-line and the moment when he was disclosed standing again behind those positions which henceforth for more than a year were to be known as the Hindenburg Line. That the German still felt himself victorious and certain to win the war was perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the ruthlessness of this retreat. Such destruction as he left behind him would have been unthinkable had he conceived for a single moment that he might lose the war and be compelled to restore the regions he had devastated, or had he thought that an hour might come when Allied armies would be able to enter German territory and, if they chose, imitate in the Rhine lands that policy which had turned so much of northern France into a waste.

On the merely statistical side the German destruction totally obliterated 264 villages, 225 churches, and more than 38,000 houses. On the artistic side, some of the most beautiful monuments of Europe were reduced to cinders; the splendid castle of Coucy-le-Château, hardly matched in the world, was transformed by dynamite into a shapeless pile; famous châteaux, churches, public buildings shared the same fate; the statues of the great Frenchmen of the past were torn from their pedestals; wells were filled or poisoned; the British army, entering the smoking ruins of Bapaume, saw before it a huge sign on which was painted the legend: "Show not wrath but wonder."

The German newspapers themselves frankly described the work of German hands. "All the country is but an immense and sad desert," said the *Berliner Tageblatt*, "without a tree, a bush, or a house. Our pioneers have sawed and cut the trees which for days have fallen until the whole surface of the earth is swept clear; the wells are filled up, the villages abolished. Dynamite cartridges explode on all sides; the atmosphere is obscured by dust and smoke."

Since the days of Attila, Europe has seen no such wanton and terrible waste of a country, and no modern people has ever accumulated such a debt as did the German people by this supreme offence against civilization.

### V. THE HINDENBURG LINE

It remains now to describe the line on which the German retired, which instantly became famous as the Hindenburg Line, while for its various ramifications it borrowed names from German legend.

The German retreat had swung inward from two fixed points, which were in a sense the hinges. These fixed points were Vimy Ridge, north of Arras, and the Craonne Plateau, north of Soissons. Each was a commanding position fortified by all the art of the German military engineers, each was regarded by the Germans as itself impregnable and as a guarantee against any flank attack.

Between these two anchorages the Hindenburg Line hung like a cable. From Vimy Ridge it ran straight across the Douai Plain, covering Douai and Cambrai. Thence it turned south on the high ground between the Scheldt and the Somme, covered St. Quentin, crossed to the Oise, and followed the east bank of the flooded river until it reached the enormous bulwark of St. Gobain Forest, which was like a central support, an impregnable barrier of forest and hill. Beyond the St. Gobain Forest it passed south of Laon across the region between the Ailette and the Aisne, touched the Aisne east of Soissons, and then followed the course of the famous Craonne Plateau where Napoleon and Blücher had fought, crossing the famous Chemin-des-Dames which ran along the crest of the plateau. Beyond Craonne it turned southward, following the old trace to those dismantled forts from which for more than two and a half years the German artillery had continued to pour shells into the city and cathedral of Rheims.

To defend this Hindenburg Line the German had constructed not one or several trench lines but a great fortified zone some ten or twelve miles deep in places. This zone was lined with immense concrete machine-gun positions; it was covered by vast meshes of barbed wire.

Between the Scarpe below Vimy Ridge and the Oise south of St. Quentin, where it crossed open, rolling country, the German defence borrowed the swells, cunningly constructed dug-outs and concrete pill-boxes behind each upward curve of the ground; while behind the main

fortified zone he constructed support or switch lines which served the purpose of compartments in an ocean liner and enabled him to hold the major part of his main fortified zone even though it were penetrated at some point.

To the eye the Hindenburg Line was not impressive, it was not a mass of great forts. It lacked those redoubts and "works" famous in the Battle of the Somme which offered such admirable targets to enemy artillery. It was organization in depth, and the German coined the phrase "elastic defence" to describe his tactics. Holding the outer fringe of the fortified zone lightly, but with picked troops and a wealth of machine guns, the German permitted his assailants to enmesh themselves and, when they advanced and became entangled in the outer series of lines, German reserves counter-attacked the exhausted and heavily punished troops.

The main elements in this new defence line were the concrete works so camouflaged as to escape the observation of the airmen, so spaced as to deliver deadly cross fire upon attacking troops, and sufficiently strong to offer protection to the three or four men who constituted the garrison, alike against artillery and against tanks. In this system positions such as had been contested in previous campaigns counted for little. Even when he had lost Vimy Ridge, the German retired to a switch line running across the plain and easily halted further advance of victorious British troops.

The natural obstacles in the pathway of the assailants of the Hindenburg Line were of two sorts. The Douai Plain is cut with many canals; the rivers are inconsiderable, but the canals, doubling the rivers in many places, constitute a protection against tanks and a difficult barrier for infantry to negotiate. Of these waterways the unfinished Canal du Nord, going northward from Péronne to the Douai Plain, and the Scheldt Canal going up from St. Quentin to Cambrai, played the most considerable part both in 1917 and 1918. The Oise River, from the point where the line touched it south of St. Quentin to La Fère, was transformed into an impassable lake. In addition to the water obstacles, Havrincourt Wood, where the Canal du Nord reaches the Douai Plain,

and Bourlon Woods looking down on Cambrai and the St. Gobain Forest, were the most considerable; and the first two were scenes of desperate fighting.

Yet in the main, from the Scarpe to the Oise the country was open, rolling, a country of far views with hills little above the general level, a country admirably suited for artillery, and, when the German had swept it clear of villages and cover of every sort, a country in which every movement of the Allies could be promptly discovered and every infantry attack terribly punished.

And German purpose expressed in this system of defence was not to hold any given point but rather to exact such a price from the assailant as to break the spirit of the army and exhaust the man-power of the nation. The German calculated, and calculated correctly, that given the devastation before his line and the long months of labour that must ensue before the Allied troops could attack his new front, he could with relatively restricted numbers hold out in the west until the task in the east was completed. He further reasoned that by retiring from the old front, now dominated by the enemy from positions which he had lost, to a line of his own choosing, he would regain strategic freedom; and if the hour arrived to return to the offensive he would be able to strike with every advantage of position and communication in his own favour.

In sum, then, the great German retreat resulted: first, in giving the German a shorter front and thus releasing many divisions for service at other points; secondly, the devastation, demonstrating as it did what German tactics would be if German armies were compelled to make further retirement, insensibly but unmistakably affected French morale. While French armies were still fresh, with the great offensive still in preparation, a burning passion of anger fired the French nation; but when the French army had broken against the Hindenburg Line, when the spring offensive had come and failed, the effect of this terrible destruction was more and more potent for peace in a war-weary people. Thirdly, by his retirement, the German totally disarranged the Allied plan of attack. Instead of a colossal drive upon a great front the French and

the British were condemned to attack upon narrow fronts; and the German, immune from assault for many months along the whole stretch of his main front, was able to mass his reserves on those narrow sectors left to his enemy to attack. Finally, as the German commentators affirmed at the time, thereby exciting Allied derision, the German regained strategic liberty of action. The Hindenburg Line was not merely a defensive position; it was to prove a most admirable point of departure for that stupendous attack of the following year which so nearly won the war.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## THE BATTLE OF ARRAS—BAGDAD

### I

### VIMY RIDGE

The honour of opening the campaign in the west fell to the British. For the first time in the history of the war the British had consented to place their armies under the direction of a French generalissimo. Yielding to the representations of the French Government and of the new French Commander-in-Chief, the British had agreed that, for the period of the first great attack, British troops should obey the orders of General Nivelle, although it was carefully specified that it should be for Field Marshal Haig to determine when the opening battle had ended, and thus terminate the period in which he served as a subordinate.

Originally the British had expected to open the spring operations by a renewal of the Battle of the Somme, launching converging attacks upon the German troops in the salient between the Ancre and the Scarpe rivers, but their main stroke for the year was to be delivered in the region of Ypres and to have, for its larger purpose, piercing the German line on the Passchendaele Ridge, driving a wedge between the Kaiser's troops along the Belgian seacoast and in France, and compelling a withdrawal from that narrow strip of sea-front, become so important in the new German submarine operations.

The great German retreat eliminated the necessity of a new Battle of the Somme; but the weather was not suitable, nor were the preparations completed, for opening the Flanders campaign in April. Therefore, since the French scheme called for an immediate attack, it was necessary for the British to strike at once, and there was left to them as an available front only that narrow strip of German line between La Bassée and Arras where the German still stood in the positions he occupied from the moment when the western battle became stationary.

Moreover, on that portion of this front facing Arras, Haig had planned one of his two converging attacks before the general retreat and had made the necessary preparations.

The central feature of this available front was the great Vimy Ridge, the northern pivot or hinge of the recent German retreat, one of the commanding landmarks of the whole western front, which had already been the objective of two terrible but unsuccessful offensives. Like the Craonne Plateau to the south and the St. Gobain Forest east of the Oise, Vimy Ridge was one of the essential bulwarks in the German defensive plan.

Starting at the Straits of Dover, about Calais, there is a great chalk ridge which rises in gradual folds from the sea and breaks down abruptly into the northern plain of France and Belgium. Down its eastern slopes come all the little rivers tributary to the Scheldt, while the valley of the Somme marks its southern limit. When, in the fall of 1914, the German dug in after his failure to reach the Channel, he occupied the easternmost crests of this highland. Behind him the land sloped rapidly down to the plain. All the fighting of the various Allied offensives from Loos to the Somme had been attempts to drive the German off the high ground down into the plain. His retirement, under pressure, at the Somme and his great retreat had carried him down into the plain from the southern outskirts of Arras to the country south of Cambrai, but at Vimy he was still on high ground from which he commanded the country in all directions.

Vimy Ridge itself is a long isolated hill nearly five hundred feet above sea-level and more than two hundred feet above the plain. Approaching it from the westward the ascent is gradual and long, but on the eastern side it falls down abruptly into the plain. To the northward it is separated from the heights of Notre-Dame de Lorette and the plateau above Lens, on which the Battle of Loos was fought, by the little muddy brook of Carency, which at Lens takes on the name and dignity of the Souchez River. To the south it touches the Scarpe River just after that stream, also insignificant, emerges from the eastern suburbs of Arras.




THE ANGLO-FRENCH OFFENSIVES OF APRIL AND MAY, 1917

The solid black from Lens to Croisilles shows the front of the British offensive of April 9th and the territory conquered between April 9th and May 5th in the Battle of Arras. The solid black north of Soissons and north of Rheims indicates the territory gained by the French in their offensive of April 16th and the front of attack extending from just north of Soissons to Rheims.

From Vimy the Germans looked down upon Arras as they surveyed Soissons from the western edge of the Craonne Plateau and dominated Rheims from the old forts of Brimont and Nogent-l'Abbesse. As their line stood on the first days of April, 1917, they occupied all of Vimy Ridge save a little of the northwest forward slope and thence their front descended southward until it reached the suburbs of Arras at Blangy and St. Laurent on the Scarpe.

In the spring of 1915 the French, under Foch, in their first considerable offensive, which coincided with the brief and disappointing British effort at Festubert, had struck at Vimy and at the heights of Notre-Dame de Lorette, then in German hands. They had pushed down the little valley of the Carency Brook, carried Notre-Dame de Lorette, the villages of Carency and of Souchez, and pushed upward along the western slopes of Vimy Ridge itself. But they had failed to get through the gap between Notre-Dame de Lorette and Vimy, and their attack had been beaten down with terrific losses along the western face of the ridge.

In the autumn of that year when the Allies launched their offensive at Loos and in Champagne, the French had tried again to get Vimy, had actually mastered a portion of the summit, but were unable to clear the crest of Hill 145. A few months later, when the British took over this portion of the French line, a successful German counter-attack pushed the British off that portion of the high ground won by the French back into the swamp which had been the scene of the 1915 battles. Thenceforward the British held the low ground in the little valley between Vimy Ridge and Mont St. Eloi, a dominating and isolated hill crowned by the ruined church tower which is a landmark for many miles around.

Apart from its immediate value as a strong point, Vimy Ridge was important as the last barrier to the Douai Plain. While the Germans held it, their communications were covered from all direct observation by the enemy. If it passed to British hands, all the country from Lens to Cambrai would be spread out like a map for British observers; Lens itself would be almost untenable, and the Germans at last would find

themselves where the French and British had been for so long—in the low ground dominated by enemy positions on high. Moreover, once Vimy Ridge was in British hands, its steep eastern slopes would be an almost impregnable barrier to any new German offensive—wholly impregnable as the events of exactly a year later were to prove. Seated on Vimy, the German had been for more than two years reducing Arras to ruins as he had similarly destroyed Soissons and Rheims. Southward his lines actually touched the suburbs, but his real control of Arras lay in his occupation of Telegraph Hill, the southern crest of the ridge.

Vimy Ridge itself had been fortified with the utmost care. Here, as in all places where he occupied heights, the German had tunnelled; and vast galleries honeycombed the chalk cliff, giving his troops shelter, warm and dry cover from the elements, and equally complete protection against enemy artillery. On the whole extent of the western front no single position surpassed Vimy Ridge alike in natural strength and in the extent of its fortifications.

## II. THE BRITISH ARMY

The armies that were selected to make the British attack upon Vimy Ridge were those of General Horne, who henceforth commanded the British First Army to the end of the war, and of General Allenby, who had won distinction as commander of the cavalry in the British retreat from Mons to the Marne and achieved justified reputation by his defence of the Messines Ridge in the critical days of the Ypres campaign. He was, moreover, at a later time to win still greater renown as the conqueror of Jerusalem and as the victor at Samaria.

The British army, as it entered the campaign of 1917, had reached a high point alike in training and in morale. It had suffered terrible losses at the Somme. The early expectations of swift victory had disappeared. It was comparable with the army of which Grant took command when he came East in 1864. It was no longer a civilian army but it was not yet merely a professional army. Despite the losses of the Somme it still contained much of the best of British manhood.

Moreover, the victories in the last phase of the Somme, the natural exultation excited by the recent German retreat, had created an atmosphere of confidence impossible to exaggerate, while, for the first time, the British troops found themselves, not only superior in artillery and all the other mechanical appliances of war as they had been at the Somme, but also saw all this machinery in the hands of men trained by battle experience to its use.

All through the long, hard winter the British army had felt with ever-growing certainty a sense of superiority over the enemy. They had seen him retire from the almost impregnable fortress of Bapaume Ridge; they had captured thousands of his best troops; during the winter months not a few deserters had come through the lines bringing stories of depression. In April, 1917, the British soldier felt himself to be "top dog," and for him the adequate proof of this superiority was found alike in the success at the Somme and the recent wide-swinging advance which had carried him over all the immediate objectives of the previous campaign.

Whatever doubts the High Command may have felt as they saw the Russian Revolution marching unmistakably toward the destruction of Russian military power—as they saw the German retreat, permitting a safe escape from the dangerous positions to new lines whose strength was suspected if not fully appraised—the British soldier had no misgiving. For him the campaign of victory was just beginning.

There can be no greater tragedy than the fashion in which this British army and this British spirit, closely rivalled by the French army, were to be shaken and all but broken by the terrible experiences that were now to come. Between the British army that marched to the victories of Arras, of Messines, and the terrible conflict of Passchendaele and the British armies that staggered and all but broke under the German offensive one year later, there can be no comparison. After those defeats of 1918 the British army rallied, reorganized, won great and far-shining victories; but after Passchendaele it was never again what it had been in the spring offensive which began at Vimy. During the winter the British army, which now numbered fifty-two divisions, as contrasted

with thirty in the Somme time and seven during the First Battle of Ypres, had taken over a new sector of the front from the French, and their line was now nearly one hundred and twenty miles long as contrasted with less than twenty held in the first days of 1915. Under the efficient direction of Sir Eric Geddes the whole system of communications had been reorganized. Old local railroads had been rebuilt and double-tracked. Lines in England and even in Canada had been moved to France and the organization of the British rear had become, as it remained till the end the best on either side.

### III. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PURPOSE

The British operation had for its main purpose occupying and attracting as large a number of German divisions as possible to the British sector. The main attack of the spring offensive was to be delivered by the French between the Somme and Rheims. In the larger conception the British offensive had no more considerable objective than that of occupying German reserves and placing a strain upon German manpower precisely at the moment when the main thrust was delivered by the French.

In this wholly subordinate operation the main British objective, geographically, was Vimy Ridge. It was remotely possible that having taken Vimy Ridge, the victorious British troops might be able to press eastward along the Douai road, southeastward along the Cambrai road, breaking the whole Hindenburg system of defences, and reach Douai and Cambrai—vital points in the enemy's railroad communications. But this was an utterly remote possibility. At the moment when the blow was delivered it was interpreted as an effort to break through, to penetrate the German defensive system and reach the great railroad bases; but this was inaccurate. Nivelle asked of Haig that he should keep German divisions occupied, thus lessening the resisting power of the Germans on the French front. This service Haig performed. In proportion as the French attack became more and more unsuccessful, greater and greater demands were made upon the British. The attack of April 9th reached its logical conclusion on April 14th. Because of the French

situation, however, the British were asked to attack again, and still later a third time. Neither of these later attacks had any chance of larger success. They were costly in the extreme. Their explanation must be found in the French situation, not in any condition growing out of the original blow. As a battle, Arras was over on the 14th of April. The operations that followed were local.

In the initial attack only the British Third Army, commanded by Allenby, and the Canadian Corps of the First Army, were directly involved. The Fourth and Fifth armies to the south, under Rawlinson and Gough respectively, demonstrated during the first stages of the battle, and in the later phases participated to a certain extent; but the actual front of attack was not more than fifteen miles in width, more than half was covered by Vimy Ridge, and the Third Army and the Canadian Corps were alone engaged. In advance of the battle the British had concentrated some four thousand pieces of artillery on their front. The Germans, on their side, had massed not less than three thousand, and the artillery bombardment, which began on Easter Sunday, was one of the most terrific of the whole war. As usual, in the British offensives, the weather was bad. When the troops left the trenches on Easter Monday it was raining heavily. Before the day had advanced far, the rain turned into snow and the whole of the first day's operations went forward in weather inclement in the extreme, making aërial observation impossible.

Facing Vimy Ridge the main attack was delivered by the Canadians. For nearly a year they had held the sector opposite this barrier. Early in their tenancy they had been driven out of positions held by the French, from whom they had taken over, and this reverse had been a bitter blow to the pride of the troops who had won for Canada enduring fame at Ypres and were now to achieve the greatest success for them in the whole war. Southward of the Canadian front, Scottish troops also participated in the Vimy Ridge phase, while away down to the south, around the town of Bullecourt, henceforth to have almost as glorious and as bitter memories for Australia as Gallipoli—Anzac troops were in line. In the centre, where the English troops were brought up

to the outskirts of Arras, they made use of a tunnel dug for the attack and passing under the city for more than a mile.

### IV. THE ATTACK

After more than twenty-four hours of intense bombardment the attack was launched at 5.30 on the morning of Easter Monday. In the midst of rain and snow thousands and thousands of Canadian, Scottish, and English troops left their trenches and swept forward. The enemy was not surprised at the point of attack. It was clear that he had expected some effort on this front and had made a counter-concentration of guns and reserves. His surprise was, in the




THE GERMAN DEFENCE SYSTEMS ATTACKED BY THE BRITISH ON APRIL 9TH

main, the result of the intensity and accuracy of the artillery preparation. At the Somme, the year before, French artillery preparation had been complete; British, largely a failure. In the offensive of 1917 the circumstances were now to be exactly reversed. The essential circumstance in the attack was an advance, to be carried out by a succession of comparatively short rushes, corresponding approximately with the enemy's various systems of defence; and this manœuvre required the closest sort of coördination between the infantry and their artillery barrages. In the first part of the attack the Canadians pushed up almost to the crest of Vimy Ridge, the Scottish and English troops to the southward broke out of the City of Arras, taking the suburbs of St. Laurent and Blangy. Within forty minutes of the "zero hour" practically the whole of the German front-line system had been stormed and taken. By noon the Canadians were in many places up and over the summit of Vimy Ridge. With the single exception of the railway triangle due east of Arras, all the second objectives were in British hands as far north as La Folie Farm on Vimy Ridge itself; and by three o'clock in the afternoon they occupied the entire crest, save for the northernmost summit, Hill 145, where the Germans maintained a desperate and successful resistance until late into the night, when they were compelled to abandon this final hold upon Vimy Ridge. Southward, astride the Scarpe, English troops were pushing through the gap between the hills where the river enters the Douai Plain, following the railroad and the highways which run parallel all the way to Douai; and still further south also gains were made. In this sector the Third German defence system had been crossed at many points and the gun positions reached.

By the morning of Tuesday, April 10th, Vimy Ridge was solidly in Canadian hands and the German troops had been driven into the plain. Thousands of prisoners and guns had already been captured, and up to this point British losses had been inconsiderable. On this Tuesday—following the Canadian success to the north, which deprived the Germans of their flanking position—the British centre began to push out rapidly along the Scarpe toward Douai and was as far east as Fampoux, and the whole of the enemy's third-line system south of the Scarpe was




THE FIRST BLOW

Solid black indicates the territory gained by the British in the first days of their attack and shows how they penetrated the first German system and the Oppy Line.




HOW THE LINE WAS STRAIGHTENED OUT

The solid black indicates the territory conquered between April 9th and May 5th and shows how the British were checked at or near the Oppy Line.

passed. On Wednesday, April 11th, Monchy-le-Preux, next to Vimy the most valuable position in this sector, was in British hands as the result of a daring cavalry charge; from the Souchez River straight south to the Arras-Cambrai road the Germans had been driven off the high ground; while still to the south, beyond the tiny Cojeul and Sensée rivers where they still clung to the heights, they were rapidly being enveloped from the north and the south alike.

The loss of Monchy was capital. Projecting out into the Douai Plain like a cape, this high ground not only commands a wide view eastward toward Douai, but northward and southward sweeps the country actually behind the lines on which the Germans were attempting to rally.

On Thursday, April 12th, the German had obviously abandoned all hope of regaining the ground which he had lost; northward and southward he was beginning his retirement to his new positions of defence. This gradual retirement continued all through Friday, the 13th; by Saturday, April 14th, British troops had passed Lievin, one of the suburbs of Lens, and were actually in the outskirts of the coal town itself; while farther to the south, Bailleul, Vimy, Givenchy, and Arleux were in British hands. The British front, which earlier in the week had been indicated by a convex bulge on either side of the Scarpe, now came down straight from the outskirts of Lens to the Scarpe, then southward to Croisilles. Fourteen thousand prisoners, including 285 officers and more than 200 guns, many of them of high calibre, were among the fruits of victory; while Vimy Ridge had passed permanently out of German possession and was to become a pillar in British hands when at last the Germans should come westward again.

But successful as were the British attacks, there had been no break through. There had never been the smallest chance of piercing the Hindenburg defensive system. At the very moment when Allied journals were incorrectly reporting the fall of Lens, the British advance had been definitely stayed on the first German "switch line," thenceforth notorious in the military reports of the day as the "Oppy switch." This line, constructed by the Germans against just such an emergency as had now come, ran down southward from Lens, crossed the Douai Plain, rejoining the old line near Bullecourt. On this line the first phase of the battle ended. German reserves, which were rushed up, counter-attacked and broke the weight of British pressure; and, moreover, halted at the "Oppy line," the British quickly learned that behind this defence was still a third and even more formidable barrier the Drocourt-Quéant "switch," which paralleled the "Oppy line" several miles to the east.

### V. THE END OF THE BATTLE

Checked at the "Oppy line" after a week which was unmistakably the most successful in British military history during the whole war up

to this point, the British reinforced and reorganized their front preparatory to a new attack. They had advanced rather more than four miles on a front of some twelve miles. They were on the outskirts of Lens. From Vimy Ridge and Monchy they looked out upon Douai and Cambrai, and between them and these cities, both of which were vital to the German communication system, there were no great natural obstacles.

Yet the experience of recent days had clearly demonstrated the practical impossibility of repeating the preliminary success, precisely as the history of the Champagne offensive in 1915 and the German attack on Verdun in 1916 had emphasized the same lesson. The British had advanced beyond the effective support of their heavy artillery and it was a matter of many days to move these guns forward. New communications had to be constructed over difficult country and, what was of even greater importance, the German was able to match division against division and his organization in depth had provided him with many more lines of defence. Moreover, beginning with April 14th, he changed his tactics and thereafter counter-attacked with a fury almost unexampled. There was no more of that waiting to be attacked which had contributed so much to British confidence in the closing days of the Somme. From Bullecourt straight up to Lens the German thrust back again and again. Arleux, Oppy, Gavrelle, Greenland Hill, Roeux, Guémappe, and half a dozen other insignificant but henceforth memorable hamlets were taken and retaken innumerable times.

Left to himself there can be no question that Field Marshal Haig would have broken off the Battle of Arras on the 14th of April, as he himself stated in his official report, but in the week that followed, the French offensive had begun—and begun badly. Therefore, since he was under Nivelle's orders, Haig was compelled against his better judgment to renew the Battle of Arras on the 23rd of April by an attack on a nine-mile front from Croisilles to Gavrelle. In this renewed offensive local gains were registered but in every case strong enemy counter-attacks quickly beat down the assailants. Still the battle continued; on May 5th the front was further extended and there was terrific fighting about

Bullecourt where the Fifth Army attacked. Thereafter the battle slowly died out. Haig himself fixed May 5th as the final day, and British interest and effort were transferred from Artois to Flanders. In sum, in less than a month of fighting the British occupied rather more ground than they had captured in the Somme offensive which had extended from July to December. In Vimy Ridge they took a position vastly stronger than anything which had confronted them on July 1, 1916. They captured 257 guns, including 98 heavy pieces, 19,500 prisoners, 464 machine guns, and 227 trench mortars. They had engaged not less than forty divisions, twenty-three of which had been withdrawn exhausted from the line.

Viewed in its proper perspective—as no more than a holding operation designed to aid the French in their major offensive to the south—it is plain that the Battle of Arras was for the British not only a great success in itself, but also a far more considerable achievement than might have been expected, given the limited objectives.

Unfortunately, although the British performed their part in the Allied plan completely and accurately, the sacrifice was in the larger sense useless, since, in spite of it, Nivelle failed at the Craonne Plateau. Moreover, the later phases of the battle were exceedingly costly in men, and the prolongation made necessary by the French failure fatally delayed the main British thrust in Flanders.

The consequences were not long in unfolding. It had been a great concession on the part of the British to place their vast armies under the control of the French commander. Having made this sacrifice, and having loyally fulfilled the task assigned to them, the British saw the French fail, saw their own troops compelled to make desperate and hopeless assaults, saw their own campaign postponed until its failure was inevitable. As a result, they resolved against another experiment with a unity of command; and this resolution endured, with evil consequences, up to the moment when the great German victory of March 21st of the following year brought the whole Allied cause to the edge of ruin. Then, and only then, the British yielded; and Foch became generalissimo.

Viewed by itself, the Battle of Arras was a brilliant victory, which revealed the British army at its best. The taking of Vimy Ridge was one of the finest achievements of the whole war and, as the second act in the campaign of 1917 following closely upon the German retreat, it awakened hopes which were not warranted and led to disappointments which had far-reaching effects.

### VI. BAGDAD

Four weeks before the British had opened the campaign in Europe with the victory at Vimy, another British army, far out in Mesopotamia, had achieved a success which retrieved the British position in the East and restored a prestige shaken at Gallipoli and well nigh destroyed at Kut-el-Amara. On March 11th General Maude's victorious troops entered Bagdad, henceforth to remain in British hands, after one of the most brilliant of the colonial campaigns of which the history of the British Empire is so full. Indeed only Kitchener's advance to Khartum along the Nile rivalled the new river campaign of Maude along the Tigris to Bagdad.

The failure of the army of relief to reach General Townshend's army, beleaguered in Kut-el-Amara, after the disastrous and reckless dash for Bagdad which had failed at Ctesiphon, had resulted in April, 1916, in the surrender of Townshend and the collapse of the Mesopotamian campaign. Thereafter, the British situation in the east remained difficult. The Turk had failed in his effort to cross the Sinai desert, pass the Suez Canal, and burst into Egypt. The Russian victory in Armenia and the capture of Erzerum had brought to an end all possibility of a successful invasion of Russian territory south of the Caucasus Mountains so long as Russia remained a fighting nation. On the other hand, the conquest of Serbia and the crushing of Roumania had eliminated the European front for the Turk, although several of his divisions were with Mackensen's army along the Danube.

Since he was able without any great effort to beat down an ill-conceived British counter-offensive seeking to enter Palestine by Gaza, the Turk was now able to concentrate a considerable army in Bagdad;

and his efforts, not wholly unsuccessful, were directed alike at holding the British forces on the Lower Tigris obtaining control of Persia, and raising the Moslem tribes along the frontiers of India.

It was the Indian phase of the situation that dictated British action in Mesopotamia. Indian troops had shared in the disastrous campaign which had terminated at Kut-el-Amara. All India knew of the breakdown of the British army and the British military system, which had resulted not alone in the disaster which included the surrender of the British army but also in the ghastly tragedy disclosed in subsequent Parliamentary investigation, which set forth the terrible sufferings due to inadequate medical supplies and insufficient communications. It was essential, therefore, as a matter of prestige and as a matter of safety for India, that the British should retrieve their position in the East and, having once set out for Bagdad, should arrive victoriously in that town.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Mesopotamian Army was one of the great figures of British colonial warfare. Had he long survived his victorious entry into Bagdad, General Maude might not impossibly have succeeded Haig himself when the failure of the British at Passchendaele gravely compromised the Commander-in-Chief of the European army. As it was, dying almost immediately after his triumph, Maude will divide with Plumer the honour of being the most successful British army commander in the whole of the war. In the second venture toward Bagdad, none of the mistakes of the first was repeated. River transport in abundance, boats specially adapted to the peculiar conditions of the Tigris, railway lines with all the material necessary for a campaign along the banks of a desert river—recalling the Khartum campaign vividly—were provided in abundance.

There was no longer any political motive leading the Government to press the military commander to take hopeless risks on the chance that he might provide some shining success which might offset failures in other fields. Two years before, the Asquith Ministry had hoped that the failure to get Constantinople, resulting from the defeat at Gallipoli, might be covered by the capture of Bagdad. Accordingly, Maude moved with utmost deliberation. At the outset of the campaign the

Turkish army occupied the locally famous lines at Sanna-i-Yat, a few miles below Kut-el-Amara on the Tigris River. The position was strong, the nature of the country advantageous to the Turks. The fighting began in January, but notwithstanding initial successes the first effort at Sanna-i-Yat did not succeed. It was not until February 17th, following a brilliantly successful crossing of the river, that the Sanna-i-Yat system was stormed. On the following day it was in British hands. Thus at last fell a position which for more than a year had balked all British efforts and had successfully held up the relieving army seeking to save Townshend at Kut. Kut itself fell immediately afterward and the river was opened to British gunboats. One week later the Turkish army was in full retreat and already Maude was able to report the capture of 4,000 prisoners, 39 guns, 22 trench mortars, and 11 machine guns, together with the re-capture of several British boats and much other war material.

In the first days of March the pursuit of the Turkish army, whose retreat was now degenerating into a rout, paused at Azizieh. After a week of reorganization and accumulation of supplies, the British advance was resumed on March 5th and continued until the Turks were standing in their last line along the Diala River, which enters the Tigris eight miles below Bagdad. On this line there was severe but relatively brief fighting and on March 10th the Turks again retired, permitting the British to enter Bagdad on the following morning.

The capture of Bagdad was an event of world importance. The news arrived in Europe at the very moment when the German retreat was in progress and when Allied publics were expecting swift and sweeping success. It therefore contributed to Allied confidence and optimism, the more as it represented final success in a field where there had been temporary disaster. But in the East the capture of Bagdad was bound to have a more far-reaching importance. Hitherto, although his empire had shrunk in Europe and in Africa, the Turk had clung to his Asiatic provinces. He had preserved his control over the Arab world, important alike on the religious and the political side; but with a British army established in Bagdad and pressing northward toward Mosul,

it was clear that in no long time the Turk would lose control of the valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris. He would lose touch with Persia, and if Russian armies should continue their operations, he would have to face converging attacks coming from Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Nor was it less probable, as the events showed, that the Arabs themselves would go over to the enemy and the day of Turkish domination in Arab lands south of the Cilician Gate would be at an end.

For the British Empire the capture of Bagdad meant, not alone a restoration of prestige but an insurance for India. The German had planned to make the Bagdad Railroad and the Turkish Empire weapons directed alike against India and Egypt. He had hoped to follow the pathway of Alexander the Great and arrive both at Cairo and the plains of India. The Turkish failure at the Suez Canal had ended the German's African dream. The fall of Bagdad now alike terminated German imperial ambitions and dispelled the Turkish pan-Turanian mirage.

With the fall of Bagdad, British armies pressed northward rapidly toward Mosul, and on April 2nd for the moment joined hands with Russian cavalry coming down out of Persia; but the Russian coöperation was only brief since the Asiatic armies shared in the general collapse of the military power of the great Slav state. Nor was the advance beyond Bagdad pushed far. The campaigning season was over and, henceforth, with the prize for which it had striven safely in its hands, the Mesopotamian Army sat down in Bagdad. The fighting in the valley of the great rivers was over. The decisive defeat of the Turkish armies would be achieved by Allenby, who was just launching his Vimy battle when the Bagdad operation came to a glorious end, while with the death of Maude, only a little later, there disappeared one of the figures which in the British history of the war must continue to hold a commanding place.

It was Bagdad and not Vimy which really lifted the curtain in the campaign of 1917. Coming so closely together their moral effect was tremendous; while alike on the military and the political sides, the capture of Bagdad from the Turks was an event of far greater importance—not impossibly the beginning of a new era in Western Asia.

# CHAPTER SIX

## THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE

### I

### NIVELLE

The Battle of Arras was a relatively subordinate detail in the spring offensive. The main blow was to be struck by the French army. In examining the plans of the French General Staff, it is necessary now to consider in detail the man who, for a few brief months, dominated the military situation, so far as the French army was concerned, as absolutely as had his great predecessor, and, in addition, exercised a complete control over the British army for that limited period of time necessary for the great battle which had opened at Vimy Ridge.

The circumstances of the selection of General Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief were unusual. When it became clear that Joffre must go, when the Briand Cabinet, after hesitating and vacillating, at last reached the decision which removed the victor of the Marne from the active control of the French army, it was a cause of surprise to the whole world that the victor of the Marne was not replaced by the saviour of Verdun. As Joffre's prestige began to diminish, that of Petain had grown apace.

Unhappily for the French and for the Allied cause, the rise of Petain to world prominence in the Verdun defence had had, as a concomitant circumstance, irritation and jealousy at Chantilly. French High Command, Joffre and those associated with him, had seen—with natural if censurable heart-burning—the unmistakable arrival of a new man. It had not been an easy thing to reach the decision which eliminated the chief who counted to his credit the greatest victory of modern military history and who, despite obvious limitations, had preserved an unbroken front to the great enemy, superior both in resources and numbers, for more than two years. Joffre and his friends were the more

easily to be reconciled to this decision if it did not carry with it the selection, to replace the retiring chief, of the man whose success had made him unpopular at French headquarters.

In addition Petain himself was, despite his great qualities both as a soldier and a man, not unlike our own General Sherman, difficult to deal with, cold, with a gift of bitter speech, and, however considerate and careful with subordinates, overbearing with equals and contemptuous of politicians. He did not conceal his contempt for the latter and his biting phrases—applied equally to French politicians and Allied generals—contributed materially to produce a natural if unfortunate unpopularity, which led to the temporary substitution for a really great man and a supreme soldier, of a little man with strictly limited gifts who was as successful in the art of cultivating friends in public life as he was incapable of achieving victory on the battlefield.

Petain being thus out of the question, there remained Foch, the victor of the Yser, Joffre's most brilliant lieutenant in the Battle of the Marne and the commander of the group of French armies which, with the British, had fought the Battle of the Somme. But Foch at this time was regarded as exhausted. He had continuously held high rank and conducted great operations since August, 1914. The campaign of the Somme, regarded in Great Britain as a great victory, was held in France to be, on the whole, a check. Particularly in the closing days of 1916—when the German retreat had not yet begun and Allied armies were still faced by formidable German defences with only minor gains of territory to show for tremendous casualties—the French considered the Somme more critically than did the British.

As a consequence, Foch was, in the French military argot, "*Limogés*"; his group of armies was broken up in the last days of 1916, and on December 20th there was assigned him a task which was in reality a disguised disgrace. The general who had on the whole displayed the greatest brilliance in action of any commander in the war, on either side—and was, one brief year later, first to halt and then to turn back the German flood, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, to win the greatest military campaign in all human history—found himself

BELGIAN INFANTRY BREAKING THROUGH GERMAN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

*From the picture by C. R. W. Nevinson*

THE ROAD FROM ARRAS TO BAPAUME

A grisly highway through a land made ghastly by the hate of man. The trees to right and left of the road have not been wrecked by casual shells, but were systematically felled by German axes

*From the picture by Major Sir William Orpen, A.R.A.*

THE THINKER ON THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT

*From the picture by Major Sir William Orpen, A.R.A.*

THE GIRLS' COLLEGE, PERONNE

*From the picture by Major Sir William Orpen, A.R.A.*

ADAM AND EVE AT PERONNE

*From the picture by C. R. W. Nevinson*

"THAT CURSED WOOD"

Loathsome birds, startled by the drone of the aeroplanes, rise and fly screaming over a land of desolation and death

*From the picture by C. R. W. Nevinson*

"SHELL HOLES"

This abomination of desolation makes one think of the third day of creation, before "God said 'Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together in one place'"

FRENCH ARTILLERYMEN GROUPED AROUND A FAVOURITE GUN



"A NASTY BIT OF GROUND"

British artillerists trying to work a big gun into satisfactory position

in the opening months of 1917 exercising only a nominal command and actually engaged in making plans against a hypothetical German invasion of France through Switzerland. In that period both in France and England, men said, not without regret, that Foch was finished.

Aside from Petain and Foch, Nivelle was perhaps a logical selection. He had served with distinction under Petain at Verdun. When, as a consequence of his great achievements in defending the Lorraine fortress, Petain was promoted to command a group of armies, Nivelle, as his most conspicuous lieutenant, was named to succeed him in command of the Verdun Army. Under Nivelle's immediate command, although the supreme direction was Petain's, there had been organized that brilliant and amazing counter-offensive of October which had retaken Douaumont and Vaux and swept the Germans out of the area of the entrenched camp of Verdun. The last act of Nivelle before he departed to take over the supreme command was to direct the second Verdun counter-offensive, completing the liberation of the town from the German menace which for ten months had threatened it.

There was in addition the belief, wholly correct, that the coming of Nivelle to the supreme command would mean aggressive action. Joffre had on the whole advocated limited offensives; Petain was known to be hostile to great ventures which, if they failed, meant alike exhaustion of the man-power and the weakening of the morale of the French army; Nivelle was a champion of the attack. And a war-weary Allied world—and a France whose hopes for the liberation of her soil had been greatly deferred—longed for decisive action.

## II. THE GREAT PLAN

Nivelle, as the subordinate of Petain and his successor in the command of the army at Verdun, shared in the closing phase of that campaign and shared disproportionately the reputation of his great chief. He was a man of charm and force, and must be considered one of the most amazing military figures of the entire war. To the statesmen of Britain as well as of France, he outlined stupendous conceptions with a coldness of manner and a calmness which captivated his auditors. He

had executed Petain's conceptions in the retaking of Douaumont and Vaux, using Mangin as his instrument, and his orders to Mangin were so artfully written that if Mangin succeeded, the glory would be Nivelle's; if he failed, the responsibility would be Mangin's.

Nivelle thus came to the High Command with a great reputation. He came also with a colossal plan. Having seen Petain's success on a narrow front in the Verdun offensive—a success which was the result of carefully calculated estimates of the relations between the forces available and the possibilities of the situation—he conceived that if one multiplied the forces one could extend the front indefinitely. Joffre had planned in November a great offensive between the Somme and the Oise, and between Craonne and Rheims, to manœuvre the Germans off the Craonne Plateau. Nivelle proposed to attack from Arras to Rheims, to attack through and over the Craonne Plateau, and to break the German front. When he came to Paris to explain his plans, he told his amazed listeners that the problem was not one of short distances; that if his plans were put in operation, the question would be whether the German retreat would halt at the Meuse or at the Rhine. Accordingly when he came to Headquarters in December he totally transformed Joffre's plan.

Nivelle's statements fell upon willing ears. The Somme offensive had failed to break through because it had been an attack upon too narrow a front. The German submarine campaign, in the opening months of 1917, grew steadily to the point where it threatened to become a decisive factor and win the war for the Germans. Before the Allied spring offensive was launched, British naval authorities confronted the future with grave apprehension, if with unshaken courage. British policy therefore, quite as much as French, recognized the necessity of a decision, of a conclusive land victory before the end of 1917, of an absolute success in the spring offensive. All this Nivelle promised.

The Germans had made their attack upon Verdun in the latter part of February of the previous year and Nivelle promptly borrowed their time-table. In fact, he set the clock ahead and planned to attack

in the early days of the month where the Germans had attacked at the beginning of the final week. Joffre's last plan, before his departure, had been to attack on New Year's Day.

Nivelle's plan contemplated confidently a gigantic Sedan. One group of French armies under Franchet d'Esperey—victor of Montmirail in the Marne campaign, and at a later time to be the conqueror of the Balkans—was to attack south of Amiens, advancing from west to east. Another group of armies, including the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth—commanded by Mazel, Mangin, and Duchesne, respectively, and under the supreme direction of Micheler—was to advance from south to north on a front extending from Soissons to Rheims, but mainly straight over the great Craonne Plateau to Laon. Hundreds of thousands of Germans, innumerable cannon, and almost incalculable amounts of material, were to be captured as the two groups of armies closed behind the German rear, as on a far more modest scale Pershing's troops enveloped the St. Mihiel salient eighteen months later.

In Nivelle's conception the whole western front was thus to be ruptured; the war was to be won. In his opening conversations, Nivelle told the amazed and fascinated public men who were his audience not merely that his armies would arrive at Laon on the morning of the second day at dawn precisely but that he had prepared a timetable of the advance to the Meuse. Twenty-four hours after the first attack had been launched, the intensive exploitation of the initial success was to begin and, by the third day, war of movement—war in the open—was to commence.

As this great operation, which was to liberate northern France, could not succeed without full coöperation of the British army, Haig consented that Nivelle should exercise supreme command over the British and French armies with the single limitation that when the battle—Nivelle's gigantic battle—had terminated, full freedom in command was to return to Haig, while it was to be for Haig to decide when that battle had terminated. In the first hours of the exercise of this command, Nivelle was involved in difficulties with the British by the brusqueness of his orders, but the incident was politely forgotten. Upon the British,

quite as much as the French, Nivelle made a great impression. It is not true that British influence had contributed to his appointment. The selection was entirely a French matter. Still his mother had been English and he spoke the language with a certain fluency, much exaggerated at the time. His success with the British was due rather to his manner, to the distinction of his bearing, to the plausibility of his statements. Thus he carried the British with him; and Haig, after preliminary objections, willingly and loyally enlisted as a subordinate in Nivelle's campaign. Moreover, for Nivelle himself Haig acquired a real admiration, and to those who talked with him in this period, he spoke of Nivelle's fighting spirit in words of unqualified praise.

### III. THE FIRST MISTAKES

No sooner had Nivelle taken command than the very firmness of his faith in the success of his plan led him to amazing and fatal indiscretions. By January his orders outlining his great strategic conception had been issued and transmitted down to the very commanders of companies. By February every village in France, no matter how small, knew of the coming of the spring offensive and knew that it would be directed against the Craonne Plateau, and what the French knew the Germans were equally prompt to discover. Preserving a certain element of common sense, Nivelle first invited Petain to command a group of armies whose mission it was to storm the Craonne Plateau. Petain promptly pointed out the disproportion between the task and the resources. He did not believe the great plan would succeed; he said so, and, as a result, one of his three armies was taken from his command and given to Micheler. Petain was thenceforth ignored.

Meantime, conditions changed. The Russian Revolution broke out. It became clear that Russia was out of the war for the time being. This collapse brought paralysis to the Italian offensive which was planned to coincide with the attack on the western front, since it was plain that Italy would now have to bear the weight of Austrian troops which would be transferred from the Russian to the Venetian front. Joffre's original conception—which fixed November 16, 1916, as the day for

launching his offensive—included, as an essential condition, attacks by the Russians and by the Italians. Nivelle's plan had pre-supposed the same element, but now the Russians and the Italians were out of the reckoning.

More than this, in the first days of February the Germans suddenly began their great retreat. Slowly at first, rapidly later, they drew out of their positions on the Somme. They evacuated precisely those lines against which a great offensive might have been launched with some hope of success.

On March 4th, before the German retreat had become general or considerable, Franchet d'Esperey appealed to Nivelle for permission to attack at once as the enemy was about to retreat. Nivelle answered on March 7th—after a three-days' delay—that a German retreat was inconceivable since the Germans had so strongly fortified their positions surrounding Roye; but on the day after the Nivelle despatch reached Franchet d'Esperey, the Germans were out of Roye. Thereafter followed the retreat and pursuit until the Germans were well behind the Hindenburg Line.

Instead of an attack on lines Nivelle had foreseen, Franchet d'Esperey's armies now found themselves confronting beyond the glacis of desert twenty-five miles in width which was destitute of all means of communication, a position to attack which would involve months of preliminary preparation and the employment of formidable artillery which could not be brought up for many weeks owing to the destruction of the roads.

The great Nivelle plan had been comprehended in two formidable thrusts across the rear of the Germans in positions from the Somme near Péronne to Rheims, but the Germans, by retiring, had thus avoided one of the two converging thrusts. Nivelle had envisaged attacks from two sides of a square and on one side an attack was henceforth impossible.

This was not all. In addition, the Germans had reinforced their positions on the Craonne Plateau so that where there had been two lines in December there were four in February, as Micheler had reported.

They had concentrated their artillery, elaborated caverns and grottos on the Aisne heights, multiplied their concrete works, and created an almost impregnable position. At the same time they were working on their Hindenburg Line. Thus, by the middle of March, such chance of success as there had been for the Nivelle plan had vanished. The broad front had been narrowed by at least half; the remaining half had been sown with new defences, and German reserves released by the Russian Revolution were already beginning to pour westward. Meantime, while the chances of success were thus rapidly disappearing, circumstances had combined to create expectations out of all proportion to the remaining possibilities. The retreat of the Germans, actually one of the most skilful pieces of strategy in the whole war, was represented to the French army and the French public as a flight—as the beginning of the end—and the French soldiers were in a white heat of excitement. At the precise moment when the High Command, save for Nivelle and his immediate following, was unanimously assured of the impossibility of the great plan, the army was filled with an optimism as dangerous as it was tremendous. Nivelle and the common soldiers saw victory within easy grasp, but Nivelle's lieutenants, outside of a handful of subordinates at General Headquarters, saw the situation as it was. These generals recognized the impossibility of a supreme and crushing victory. They recognized the probability of a check after even greater losses than those at the Somme, with consequences to the army morale beyond calculation.

From all these officers protests now began to flow, and at this precise moment the Briand Cabinet fell. A new Ribot Cabinet arrived with Monsieur Painlevé as Minister of War, and no sooner had he come to office than Painlevé discovered the chaos that now existed. The relations between Nivelle and his subordinates were strained. The confidence of these subordinates in their chief was gone; yet, in the midst of all this anarchy, Nivelle's confidence had grown beyond belief. To those who questioned the possibility of success under changed conditions and asked him if he recognized the strength of the new German defences on the Craonne Plateau, he answered calmly that

he already had the Craonne Plateau in his pocket, that the only question in his mind was whether he would have temporarily to halt his advance at the Serre or at the Oise, on account of the difficulty of moving up his supplies before he resumed the main thrust to the Dutch frontier.

For the new Ministry, there was then raised the acute question: Should there be an offensive? But here again was a new circumstance, for if the collapse of Russia had made a new offensive in the west difficult in the extreme; if it had removed a large fraction of the remaining chance of success; it had, on the other hand, certainly made such an offensive imperative alike to save Russia and to prevent the possible arrival of German troops on the Italian frontier—to prevent in the spring what actually happened in the autumn and produced the great disaster of Caporetto. Added to this were British anxiety and apprehension over the submarine peril, which was at this moment becoming terribly acute. The German submarine campaign was achieving inconceivable success. For the moment the British navy was frankly incapable of coping with the danger.

That Nivelle's grandiose plan could now succeed seemed impossible, both to his subordinates and to the French Ministry; but a lesser offensive, with limited objectives, carefully prepared and calling for small losses—an attack carrying with it the possibility of inflicting heavy casualties and achieving local and useful gains—still held out attractions. If the initial attack should result not in these modest gains but in that actual break which Nivelle foresaw, then the operations might be continued and expanded. This was the view of the Government and this was the extent of its consent to the Nivelle programme. As for Nivelle himself, he heard the words of warning of his subordinates and the words of advice of the civilian officials with a contempt born of supreme optimism. He still believed in a complete victory. At the moment of attack, he laid before the Government maps which showed an initial advance of twelve kilometres and this optimism did not desert him when 25,000 French dead and five hundred yards of gain were the total harvest of the first day of the offensive.

### IV. THE CRAONNE PLATEAU

In Nivelle's original conception, his great offensive was to be on a front from Arras to Rheims, the British attacking in the sector above the Somme. The German retreat narrowed the British operative front to some twelve miles immediately east of Arras. Up to the very last moment, Nivelle hoped to employ Franchet d'Esperey's armies west of the Oise despite the German retreat, but a preliminary effort made by this group of armies on April 14th failed completely, and thereafter the fighting was restricted to the country between the southeast corner of the St. Gobain Forest and the heights to the north of Rheims. Across two thirds of this front stretched the famous Craonne Plateau which had seen desperate fighting in the days following the Marne, when Allied pursuit culminated in the First Battle of the Aisne, and one year later was to see the greatest French disaster of the war in the Battle of Chemin-des-Dames.

Resembling Vimy Ridge in certain respects, the Craonne Plateau is both higher and longer. It is actually the outermost rampart of Paris. Northward the ground slopes to the great northern plain, and invaders approaching Paris from the northeast encounter this great obstacle as the first barrier after passing the frontier of France. On the northern side, the Craonne Plateau drops down sharply for more than two hundred feet into the narrow, swampy valley of the tiny Ailette River. Seen from this northern side, it resembles a huge wall, its summit level against the horizon, with precipitous approaches—a military obstacle deemed impregnable until that subsequent May day when the German troops scaled it and pressed southward to the Marne again.

But on the southern side the Craonne Plateau descends more gently and slowly to the Aisne. Whereas the northern side is substantially a straight and solid wall, the southern side is cut by many deep ravines or glens through which brooks pass to the Aisne. On a relief map, the Craonne Plateau suggests a comb with the teeth pointed southward, the spaces between the teeth representing the little valleys. These valleys were of enormous importance in the battle of 1917 because they

supplied admirable cover for machine-gun nests—cover which rendered machine-gun positions practically undiscoverable because the valleys were themselves filled with small woods and underbrush. Across the actual summit, following the crest from end to end—that is from the Laon-Soissons road to the village of Craonne—ran the famous Chemin-des-Dames, the scene of some of the most intense fighting of the whole World War.

In 1914 when Kluck retired, after the Battle of the Ourcq, he had halted his armies on the first slopes of the Craonne Plateau just across the river from Soissons. In the Battle of the Aisne the British had successfully passed the river, east of Soissons, and pushed part way toward the crest of the ridge. The French to the eastward had actually reached the crest at certain points and almost, but not quite, reached the outskirts of the village of Craonne. In January, 1915, during a period of high water on the Aisne, the Germans had vigorously attacked the French—who occupied the lines originally taken by the British—sharply defeated them, and forced them southward so that practically all the high ground remained in German hands. From this high ground the Germans were able to bombard Soissons at will, the city itself being less than a mile from their front at Crouy.

In the great retreat of March, the Germans again evacuated ground which they had taken in 1915, but continued to hold a bridge-head south of the Aisne near Vailly which constituted a sharp southerly salient dominated by the high ground on which stood the dismantled fort of Condé; then their line bent back sharply almost to the crest which it then followed to Craonne.

A more difficult military obstacle than the Craonne Plateau, as the Germans had organized it, would be impossible to imagine. The assailants were obliged to advance over open country in plain view of the Germans with an unfordable river behind them, and in places they had to cross the river itself under fire. For centuries this plateau had been worked for building-stone and was filled with immense caves and grottos which the Germans had organized for defensive warfare. The ravines were lined with machine guns which swept the flanks of the French waves

as they advanced; the German trenches ran line on line backward up the gentle slopes to the summit, while the German heavy artillery was in position safely covered on the reverse slopes. Nor had the Germans relied simply upon natural defences. They had filled the whole zone with concrete machine-gun emplacements until it constituted a vast defensive zone from six to ten miles deep.

The traveller who hereafter passes over the Soissons-Laon road—reminiscent of the stretch of the Albert-Bapaume road, as it ascends to the summit of the Pozières Ridge, rising slowly to the plateau and following the highway as it marches between fields which for many years must retain traces of the terrible artillery destruction—will marvel at the courage or temerity which was responsible for an offensive against a position naturally as strong as that he sees about him.

Where it left the Craonne Plateau, at the point where the hill on the flank of which Craonne itself stands, towers above the plain in gaunt impressiveness—recalling Douaumont as seen from the plain of the Woëvre—the German line bent sharply southward crossing the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and extending to the dismantled forts above Rheims. Here the nature of the country was less favourable for the defence. For a stretch of ten miles on either side of the Aisne, the line ran across flat country covering a gap between the Craonne Plateau and the mountain of Rheims. Could the French penetrate this gap, they would cut the German armies in France in halves and take in the rear both the Craonne Plateau and the German positions eastward of Rheims. Through this gap Nivelle planned to throw Duchesne's armies once the Craonne Plateau and Fort Brimont had fallen.

But recognizing the natural weakness of this position the Germans had worked for nearly three years with characteristic energy and industry. Nowhere on the western front were so many concrete works to be found. The little hill near Ville-aux-Bois to the south of Craonne had been tunnelled, galleries had been constructed, every conceivable device had been employed to render impregnable a position which of itself was vulnerable. Southward from the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac to the heights about Rheims, the Germans had used the high ground east

of the Aisne Canal and parallel to the Rheims-Laon highway; the keystone of their fortified system was the old fort of Brimont.

Against a surprise attack, neither the Craonne Plateau nor the position between Craonne and Rheims was perhaps invulnerable. Certainly the Germans were able to smash through on this entire front a year later—when the French occupied all the Craonne Plateau and many of the strongest positions to the south, which were in German hands in April, 1917; but the element of surprise restored by the Germans in the campaign of 1918 did not exist for the French. Nivelle himself had set the example of contemptuous publicity, and all the world, German and Allied alike, was aware of the front on which the French were to attack. Not only that, but the several postponements of the assault from January to April had permitted the Germans to construct four lines where they had had but two, and to multiply their concrete defences, their machine-gun nests, and their battery positions. To defend what was unmistakably the strongest single stretch of western front, the Germans had amassed forty divisions where the French sought —unsuccessfully, to be sure—to defend the same ground with six a year later.

The strength of the Craonne Plateau must be manifest to the merest civilian who looks up at the heights from the shallow valley through which flows the considerable Aisne, yet two successive struggles over these slopes have served largely to obliterate the innumerable trench lines which seamed the hillside. Strong as was the Vimy position itself it was incomparably less imposing and less considerable than that on which the armies of the German Crown Prince now awaited their French opponent, prepared to take full revenge for their own defeat at Verdun. So strong indeed was the Craonne position that Joffre himself, in planning an offensive over the same ground, had calculated to turn it from the north and from the south. Yet in Nivelle's great plan the essential circumstance was the advance of Mangin's Sixth French army straight over the Craonne Plateau. So complete was his confidence, he calculated that, by the dawn of the second day, his cavalry would be under the walls of Laon, whose cathedral, from a

rocky eminence recalling the Acropolis at Athens, looks southward at the Craonne Plateau, and northward and eastward over the vast plain of northern France.

In the operation which we are now to examine, the main French attacks were made on the Craonne Plateau and Fort Brimont by the armies of Mangin and Mazel, respectively. In the latest phase of the offensive still a third attack was launched east of Rheims against the isolated Moronvillers Hills which dominate the whole of Champagne and constitute military obstacles hardly inferior to the Craonne Plateau itself. On this third field where the organization of the attack fell to Petain, the French were to win a considerable but useless success on the very ground which was to see the failure of the final German offensive —that of July 15, 1918. But despite the brilliance of this local operation, it had no effect upon the main battle. Actually, the decision was had in the sector between the Soissons-Laon road and the heights of Sapigneul around Fort Brimont. On this line the French attempted, by a brusque offensive extending over the widest front yet assailed in a single operation, to smash their way through the German lines as the Germans had endeavoured to hack their way first through Ypres to the Channel and, second, through Verdun to the heart of France.

### V. THE BATTLE

Before the Battle of Craonne was joined, the chance of a wide-swinging success had utterly vanished. Almost without exception Nivelle's subordinates, aware of this fact, had advised him and the Government against the attack, and the Government itself had sought to limit the grandiose scheme to a modest local offensive—necessary both because of the Russian and the submarine situations.

But there were other conditions which made unlikely even a local success. Petain in his two Verdun counter-offensives—delivered on a three- and a five-mile front respectively—had calculated accurately and methodically the relation between the forces at his disposal and the artillery with which he could prepare the way. Before he launched Mangin in October he had spent weeks and months in the




THE BATTLE OF CRAONNE

The solid line shows the French front at the opening of the attack of April 14th. The broken lines show approximately the extent of the French gains

preparation of communications and the organization of the rear. Nivelle had dreamed of expanding the Petain method from a three- to a sixty-mile front, but he was incapable of making the preparations keep pace with the expansion.

Cannon, munitions, armament of all sorts, collected for the armies which were to deliver the attack, were woefully insufficient; but had they been adequate, the armies were insufficiently prepared both as to ways of communication and as to the professional training of the combatants. The medical service left much to be desired, as was subsequently established in official reports. Three other circumstances combined to abolish all possibility of the local success, which was now, in the minds of all reasonable and informed observers, a maximum of expectation. These three circumstances were: the bad weather; the stupidity, folly, and imprudence of the command in the Fifth Army;

and finally, the failure of the artillery preparation, due in some measure to the weather.

After one of the roughest winters in half a century, the month of April, 1917, was a time of snow and storm. The great British attack of Easter Monday, one week preceding the opening of the Craonne engagement, had been made in rain and snow and all April was marked with this inclemency. Because of weather conditions the offensive had to be delayed many times at the request of General Mangin himself. In March the newspapers had printed the precautionary warning: "Given the state of the ground, and recognizing that winter still lasts, all prospect of a rapid advance is Utopian." As the event showed the weather was so bad that it was impossible for the infantry to follow the barrage of the artillery. The rapid-fire guns, machine guns, and even the arms of the soldiers were completely put out of service. The infantry threw away all of its burdens and supplies. The black troops, which had demonstrated their value as shock units on half a score of fields, lost three quarters of their fighting efficiency because of the temperature. The assault was necessarily slowed down. All real observation and regulation of artillery fire was impossible. Transport failed. Testimony to these facts is found and re-found in the journals of operations of all the armies that took part in the attack. These show the mistake, now committed for a second time, of fixing a general offensive for the equinoctial period, as had already been done in the Battle of Champagne of September 25, 1915.

The second mistake grew out of an imprudence in the Fifth Army. Three days before the attack a sergeant—carrying the order of operations which indicated in detail the disposition of the attacks to be made by the 7th, 32nd, and 38th Corps and the Russians—was killed, and his despatch bag captured by the enemy. The order contained a synthesis of the attack on Fort Brimont. There the principal blow was to be delivered from the north to the south and it pre-supposed the capture of the heights of Sapigneul. Thus warned, the enemy reinforced the threatened sector promptly and the French advance here was nil, while the losses of the Seventh Corps alone in four days exceeded fifteen

thousand men. For the officer responsible for the imprudence there was, however, this palliating circumstance. He had promptly and frankly confessed his fault in permitting a non-commissioned officer to carry a plan of operations, and the French High Command was aware that its offensive plan was known by the enemy down to its last detail, so far as three army corps were concerned. But, knowing this, what possible justification remained for risking the attack?

Finally, the artillery preparation was badly done. Ten days of bombardment were as unsuccessful in reducing the enemy works as had been the preliminary artillery preparation of the British at the Somme. Weather conditions, which prevented aërial observations, partially explained this failure, but beyond and above this was the fact that Nivelle lacked artillery in sufficient quantities and munitions in adequate volume to reduce the enemy works over so vast a front, particularly when for the larger portion of that front the enemy position rested upon magnificent natural obstacles reinforced by skilful military engineers.

In the face of all these circumstances; with doubts and hesitations amounting almost to insubordination among his lieutenants—interesting proof of which may be found in a letter of February 13th written by Nivelle to Micheler, commander of the group of armies which was to make the attack and containing unmistakable evidence of the lack of harmony and the almost unbelievable anarchy existing in the High Command—but with an army fired by the recent German retreats, knowing that their commander expected to break the German line, Nivelle, still unshaken, announced that he expected to succeed on the Craonne Plateau. This announcement was made to the Government after the first attack—that on St. Quentin—had been made on April 14th and had completely failed, thus dooming the whole enterprise. Nevertheless, fixing his attack for the morning of the 16th, Nivelle repeated his familiar forecast that he would arrive in Laon at dawn on the 17th, and that his cavalry would reach La Fère by sunset on the same day. Brimont was to be taken in five hours by that envelopment from the north of which the Germans had been so completely forewarned.

Therefore, just one week after the British had brilliantly delivered their offensive on Vimy Ridge, but at the precise moment when their advance had been pinned down, Nivelle launched his waiting armies. The armies of Mangin and Mazel left their trenches at six o'clock in the morning in the midst of a tempest of snow, rain, and wind. The aviation could not function; the artillery was dependent entirely upon ground observation. It was in vain that the trench mortars destroyed practically everywhere the enemy first line. An actual telescoping occurred on this first position with the mass of the German army which had received and executed the order to die on its first line rather than yield.

Warned long in advance, the Germans had no less than four lines, in a depth of eight miles. These lines were literally stuffed with light machine guns, hidden in the innumerable grottos and caverns of the porous cliffs. The French artillery did not completely dominate the situation as all the instructions of the High Command had expected. The tanks, in a gallant attack near Pontavert—which was designed to clear the gap between the Craonne Plateau and Brimont and open the way for the cavalry exploitation to Laon behind the Craonne Plateau—nowhere reached the third line, which had been their objective. The French armies were compelled to halt after the first hours, and the unforeseen pause jammed and blocked everything behind—organized for a great forward leap. This congestion and confusion of every sort still further aggravated the disappointment and disillusionment consequent upon a sharp check. All official records of the operations of the 16th and 17th of April, in both armies alike, reveal with truly tragic monotony the essential fact that the complete check of the French attack was everywhere due to the multiplied use of enemy machine guns which had survived inadequate artillery preparations.

The machine guns had not been completely destroyed anywhere by artillery preparation, and precisely this machine-gun fire, after the first hours, stopped the advance and broke the spirit of the best fighting forces of the French army. Some thousands of these guns, well placed and well served, were sufficient to stop in full cry the forward sweep

of many thousands of veteran infantry soldiers confident of victory, and Americans will find food for reflection when they recall that a little more than a year later, in the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne, their own soldiers, with even less adequate artillery support, wrestled with these same machine-gun problems and suffered casualties well in excess of those which sufficed to destroy the French offensive of 1917.

On the morning of April 17th, when Nivelle's victorious troops should have arrived at dawn under the walls of Laon, they were actually only a few hundred yards from their starting place, holding with difficulty the second line of the Germans. All the plan for later intensive exploitation by Duchesne's Army pressing through the gap between Craonne and Brimont had crumbled into dust. Gains had been made, certainly not negligible; yet, given the glowing forecasts of the Commander-in-Chief, it is easy to understand the extent of the disillusionment alike of the Government and of the French people. And public opinion held responsible for this disillusionment that commander who had produced it, by the exaggerated grandeur of his conception.

### VI. THE CONSEQUENCES

As to the offensive itself. Having failed to attain the expected rupture, Nivelle on the 17th, although he subsequently declared that he had stopped it absolutely at noon, directed Mangin and Mazel to shift their attack to the northeast and go on, and in accordance with the original plan Anthoine's Fourth Army was launched against Moronvillers. Severe fighting continued over the next four days, fighting which increased the casualties, already great, and resulted only in small rectifications of the line, the most considerable of which was the reduction of the Vailly salient and the elimination both of the German bridgehead south of the Aisne and the position about the dismantled Fort of Condé, from which the Germans had swept the valley of the Aisne east and west with enfilading fire. On April 21st Micheler informed Nivelle that it was now necessary to give up the fight. In this letter Micheler pointed out that there were only four divisions of infantry available, in the reserves of the three armies combined, to deliver the attack which would achieve

that prospective rupture which Nivelle still expected. This letter is an interesting document in view of the later statement of Nivelle's champions that new French armies were ready to enter the fight. Micheler in his letter proposed also that local operations should be resumed on April 30th, which should include an attack upon Brimont still later on. In accordance with this suggestion of Micheler, on April 22nd there was considered, and decided in principle, the question of an energetic resumption of the general battle in the form of partial offensives—designed to gain both the Craonne Plateau, in order to uncover Laon, and the height of Moronvillers, to unblock Rheims. In point of fact, despite the later fighting, which included the taking of the Moronvillers Heights but was marked by a new failure at Brimont, the Battle of Craonne was over on April 25th. In ten days of terrible struggle the French army had been checked after a slight advance inconsiderable by comparison with the British progress before Arras; its fighting spirit had been broken; the soldiers recognized that they had been thrown against positions unshaken by artillery preparation; their confidence in their Commander-in-Chief was gone. They were defeated troops; no camouflage in reports of ground gained could disguise from these veterans the fact that, having set out for Laon and La Fère, they had actually arrived only at the second and third lines of their foe.

As to losses. On May 13th Nivelle made a remarkable statement to the Minister of War of his casualties between April 16th and 25th. Therein he cited the number of the dead—whose deaths had been witnessed by at least two people—as 15,500 and gave as missing 20,000, but only 5,000 of these 20,000 were afterward reported as prisoners; so in fact the killed in the ten days' fighting amounted to 30,000 while the other casualties approximated 70,000. The total loss was thus close to 100,000.

Against this terrible butcher's bill Nivelle could show only minor gains, which nowhere imperilled the main fighting position of his foe, and the capture of 23,000 prisoners, 175 cannon, 412 machine guns, and 119 trench mortars.

Nivelle's grand offensive, then, had failed and it was necessary for the

British to prolong their costly and useless battle for many days to relieve the strain upon the beaten French army, in which now, for the first time, certain signs of demoralization began to appear. Meantime, the Government in Paris had been more and more alarmed by the size of the casualty lists; by the ever-increasing protests from the officers; by the unmistakable demoralization in the fighting forces which was shown when veteran regiments, which had participated victoriously and gloriously in a score of struggles, declined to advance; and the Minister of War was called upon to sign death warrants of French soldiers who refused to be murdered in the hopeless gamble of Nivelle.

We have, then, in the first two weeks of May, a real crisis, in which Nivelle, having lost the confidence of the Government, his lieutenants, his soldiers, still continued on the hopeless enterprise of breaking the German line, until at last, on May 15th, he is summarily removed and Petain is called upon to undertake the task of restoring the French army, a task hardly more difficult or more doubtful of success than that which had fallen upon his shoulders a little more than a year before when he arrived at Verdun, after the mistakes of those who had preceded him had permitted Douaumont to fall undefended into German hands. At the same moment Foch succeeded Petain as Chief of the General Staff of the French army, a position which Petain had occupied only since April 30th, when the Government took its first step to limit Nivelle's authority.

About all this Nivelle episode there raged and continues to rage a great controversy. It is asserted that the politicians interfered to check a victorious offensive in the full cry of victory. Nivelle's champions, few but ardent, continue to declare that the Germans were on the point of retiring to the Meuse when Nivelle was removed and the French offensive stopped; but competent and universal testimony of French officers is directly in conflict with this. There is a common agreement, confirmed by the testimony of Micheler himself in the letter above cited, that on the 21st of April the offensive had so completely failed that it was necessary to abandon it. In the few months of his supreme control Nivelle had suffered a bloody defeat, shaken the con-

fidence of the army and of the country. Thereafter he departed from active service, leaving to Petain and to Foch, whom he had displaced, the gigantic task of repairing his errors; and Petain's first warning to his British allies when he undertook his task was that many weeks must pass before the French army would be capable of another offensive. In point of fact, it was late October before they struck again at Craonne.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

# ITALY AND GREECE

## I

## THE MAY OFFENSIVE

It had been the original conception of Allied High Command that all the armies about the circle which encompassed Germany should attack the Central Powers at one time, exerting equal pressure on many sides, and, by virtue of superior numbers, exhaust German and Austrian reserves and either penetrate through some weak point or, by attrition, produce collapse.

We have seen that various circumstances combined to postpone Nivelle's Anglo-French offensive on the French front from February until April. By this time the Russian Revolution had so far paralyzed Russian military strength that even the last fatal Kerensky offensive was postponed until July. A similar delay had attended Italian preparations. Instead of being able to attack in April, combining their blow not merely with that of Nivelle but that of Brusiloff also, the Italians found themselves unable to depend upon Russian coöperation, compelled to postpone their attack from week to week, and finally to deliver it, not merely without Russian aid but against an enemy who was already reinforcing his imperilled front by divisions drawn from Russia.

The Italian campaign of 1917, between May and November, amounted to a gallantly sustained, terrifically costly endeavour—the third—to burst through that gap between the Julian Alps and the head of the Adriatic, and advance behind Trieste into Austrian territory.

By this time the world was as familiar with the Isonzo front as with the various sectors of British and French activity. When Italy entered the war the Austrians had stood between the Julian Alps and the sea on a front of a little less than forty miles, with the Isonzo as a deep and

almost impassable moat from Tolmino straight down almost to Gorizia, where their lines crossed the river and held the height of Podgora covering the town. Thence their line recrossed the river and drew back from it across the Carso Plateau to the Adriatic.

This front had three contrasting geographical features. From Tolmino almost to Gorizia there was high ground, with crests passing 2,000 feet in elevation. This high ground was divided into two plateaux by the valley and depression of Chiaponavo, the northern half bearing the name, henceforth memorable, of Bainsizza. The southern half was known to the Italians as the Selva di Ternova. Both these plateaux were tilted up on their western rims so that their highest ground rose straight from the Isonzo Valley and the peaks or hills which were now to acquire battle fame—Kuk, Vodice, Santo, San Gabriele, and San Daniele—confronting the Italians.

ITALY'S BATTLEFIELD

South of these two plateaux was the valley of the Vippacco stream, which comes down from the east and joins the Isonzo below Gorizia. Still farther to the south was the Carso Plateau, culminating not far from the Adriatic in the peak of Hermada.

In 1916 the Italians had taken Gorizia and pushed a wedge eastward up the Vippacco Valley between the northern plateau and Hermada, but they were unable to advance this wedge further

because it was a narrow salient in low ground commanded by Austrian artillery on the northern and southern elevations. It was plain that no further advance eastward could be made until both Hermada and the two northern plateaux, Bainsizza and Ternova, were reduced. Even if Hermada should fall, the distance between Ternova and the sea was too short to give Cadorna elbow room, while the Austrians remained on Ternova and Bainsizza.

The Italian plan, therefore, consisted in a series of movements which had for their objectives the reduction of Hermada and the occupation of Ternova and Bainsizza plateaux. On May 14th, just one month lacking two days after Nivelle had launched his unsuccessful attack in Champagne, Cadorna opened his battle by an attack directed against the southern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau and the western extremity of the Selva di Ternova. The peaks of Kuk, Vodice, Santo, and San Gabriele were the immediate objectives of this preliminary movement. Lodgments were effected on Kuk and Vodice; Monte Santo was taken and lost. There followed in the next few days furious Austrian counter-attacks, but the Italians hung on to their foothold on the Bainsizza Plateau.

A little more than a week later, on May 23rd, a second assault was directed at the Carso, the southern buttress of the Isonzo position. In a week of desperate fighting the Italians reached the western edge of Hermada, but by May 30th they were again held by a new series of Austrian counter-offensives, in which troops brought from the Russian front participated.

Cadorna had now tried to seize both the northern and the southern anchorages of the Austrian position by brusque attacks. Despite material progress two weeks of fighting had resulted in the failure to attain either end. Twenty-four thousand Austrian prisoners, thirty-eight cannon, and a number of positions of vast strength were the rewards of the effort, but Austrian official statements claimed nearly an equal number of prisoners and proclaimed a victory, since their lines still held. The whole month of June was consumed in beating off the Austrian counter-offensives, which made no considerable gain but precluded any renewal of Italian attack.

We now touch upon one of the contested questions of the war. Cadorna found himself unable to make further advance with such artillery and munitions as he possessed. Accordingly he and his government appealed to the Allies for guns and munitions, giving assurances that, were these provided, Italy could win a decisive victory which would put Austria out of the war. His request fell upon deaf ears. The British had launched their unfortunate Flanders venture; the French army was only just beginning to recover from the consequences of Nivelle's failure. Neither Petain nor Haig felt himself able to go beyond the despatch of a limited number of guns. In a word, while a certain restricted assistance was forthcoming, Cadorna and Italy met with a substantial rebuff from Britain and from France, and to this rebuff the Italians lay subsequent failure of their offensive and the supreme disaster which presently overtook their armies.

By the time he was ready to move again, Cadorna's situation had fearfully worsened. Russia had completely collapsed, Austrian divisions had streamed westward from Galicia to the frontiers of Venetia, while there was more than a hint that German divisions would also presently appear on the Isonzo front. Counsels of caution now would seem to have advised that the Italians, like the French, should renounce the offensive and gather up their resources for a storm which was bound to break. On the other hand, pressure, alike from the Allies and from the Italian Government and people, combined to drive Cadorna forward into precisely the sort of blunder which the British were making in Flanders, with equally disastrous results, though the British defeat at the Somme was not to come until March, 1918, while the Italian reverse at Caporetto was far closer at hand.

## II. BAINSIZZA

Beginning on August 18th the Italians shifted their operations back to the Bainsizza Plateau. They sought to complete the clearance of the eastern bank of the Isonzo; to seize and hold all of the Bainsizza Plateau; to push southward, encircling first the plateau of Ternova with its dominating height of Monte San Gabriele and then all the Austrian positions east and south of Gorizia.

For a whole month thereafter the Italians slowly but successfully mounted the slopes of Bainsizza, cleared all the higher summits from Monte Santo to Kuk, and began to threaten the plateau of Ternova by an enveloping movement from the north.

It would be difficult to describe, and impossible to exaggerate, the greatness of Italian labour in this terrible month. They had to cross an unfordable river flowing in a valley almost comparable to a western canyon. They had to transport munitions and supplies over the eastern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau, here amounting to a precipice, and to maintain an army on the sterile plateau above.

The achievement of Italy on the Bainsizza Plateau was beyond praise. It must rank with the successful military operations of the war, but before it could result in decisive success Cadorna's munitions failed. His losses had been tremendous, amounting, even in the last phase of Bainsizza alone, to twice the cost to France of Nivelle's failure at Craonne. Moreover, he found himself daily confronted with new divisions drawn from the Russian front, and, at last, conducting an offensive with numbers only equal, if not actually inferior, to those with which the Austrians held positions beside which Craonne and Vimy were but insignificant ant-hills.

By the month of September the Bainsizza operation was over. It was a failure in all but local circumstances, a failure which had shaken the morale of the Italian army and the Italian people precisely as Nivelle's unsuccessful offensive had weakened his army and shaken the confidence of the French nation. The best of Italian shock troops had been sacrificed to gain a few miles of shell-torn slopes. A new offensive, designed to produce decisive results, had been beaten down without any penetration—without a break through of the enemy lines. Moreover, the ground which the Italians had now gained, if advantageous for a resumption of an offensive at a future time, was unmistakably dangerous to hold were the initiative suddenly to pass to the enemy. Having thrust forward on to the Bainsizza Plateau the Italians had materially lengthened their lines of communication by which the advancing troops were to be supplied and the Italian Second Army was

THE BAINSIZZA PLATEAU

now pushed forward in a dangerous salient exposed to a fatal disaster could the enemy to the northward break through the covering troops and, flowing southward, reach Udine in advance of the Italians on Bainsizza.

The Ypres salient—so costly to the British to hold, so perilous at all times during the war—had been born of an unsuccessful and uncompleted British offensive in October, 1914. More than once since that time the British troops in "the salient" had been in grave danger. Now the Italian offensive across the Isonzo had created a new salient far more dangerous. Having to choose between abandoning all his gains in a bloody campaign and running the obvious risks incident to holding them, Cadorna chose the latter course. The result was one of the greatest disasters of the war, but it is essential to see that, before the disaster came, Cadorna had fought his army beyond the limit of endurance—precisely as Nivelle had over-strained his troops at the Craonne Plateau and as Haig all but demoralized his armies in the bloody, useless Passchendaele offensive which had the disaster of the Somme for its consequence, as Cadorna's errors were paid for at Caporetto.

In many ways the Austrian defence of the Gorizia gateway, in not less than twelve battles of the Isonzo, was the most brilliant and successful of all Austrian campaigns during the war. The general who held this gap, Field Marshal Boroevic, must rank with the great commanders of the Central Powers. A still further circumstance, deserving of notice now because of its later bearing, was that while Austrian troops frequently proved themselves helpless in the presence of the Russians, and divisions from the Slav provinces displayed disloyalty even more than cowardice in the presence of Slav troops on the eastern front, Boroevic's armies, made up almost exclusively of Southern Slavs, fought the Italians with unflinching determination. The explanation is simple. However much the Slovenes, the Croatians, the Dalmatians hated the Hapsburg Monarchy and their Austrian and Hungarian masters, they preferred to remain under the rule of the rapidly decaying Dual Monarchy—until such time as they could realize their own aspirations of

independence and association with the Serbs—to accepting a new partition which would give to a victorious Italy hundreds of thousands of Slovenes and Serbs and deprive the Southern Slavs of the Trieste and Fiume outlets upon the sea essential to the new state already existing in their dreams. This hostility between the Southern Slav and the Italian, always latent, was intensified by the years of struggle upon the Isonzo, in which Italy's great sacrifices and tremendous efforts were blocked by Southern Slav armies under a general of their own race.

Actually the spring and summer campaign of Italy had been fought for the possession of two hills, the northern and southern bastions of the Isonzo position—San Gabriele and Hermada. When the fighting, which began in May, terminated in September, half of San Gabriele was in Italian hands and the western slopes of Hermada were in no man's land, but Italian casualties in battle and as a result of disease had amounted to nearly three quarters of a million, and—precisely as French armies had set out for Laon and the frontier, to arrive only at the Craonne Plateau—Italian troops (who had confidently mounted to the assault with a vision of an arrival at Laibach and a successful reappearance along the pathway by which Napoleon in 1797 had led his army to the point where Vienna was in his grasp and Austrian surrender inevitable) were halted before the immediate objective had been attained.

### III. CONSTANTINE

At the moment when Italy was opening her spring offensive and Russia preparing the last despairing Kerensky offensive, there terminated in Athens the sordid and ridiculous drama which for two years had continued to humiliate Allied statesmen and soldiers and undermine Allied prestige in the Near East. On June 12th King Constantine abdicated in favour of his second son, Alexander, and, with the Crown Prince and his family, embarked for Switzerland, henceforth an exile.

When the whole story of the Greek episode can be told it will be a tragi-comedy unbelievable, so unreal and so preposterous were many of its circumstances. King Constantine himself was a field marshal of

the German army and a brother-in-law of the Kaiser; a vain, stupid, obstinate man; dominated by his wife, and controlled by two passions: admiration for Germany, and hatred for Venizelos, the great Greek statesman.

We have seen how Constantine in 1916—having a year previous kept Greece neutral when Serbia was destroyed—continued by every conceivable act to aid the Central Powers. His agents warned the Germans of each projected operation of Sarrail's Salonica army. His officers had surrendered Greek troops and Greek fortresses to the hereditary enemy, Bulgaria, when Germany's allies had attempted a southward push in the spring and summer of 1916. In December, French and British sailors who had landed in Athens in one of those brief moments when Allied indecision gave way to ineffective Allied action, had been murdered and their murder had been accompanied by a pogrom of the political associates of Venizelos.

Constantine believed Germany would win the war. His confidence in the ultimate success of German arms was never shaken, and his comrades in the Greek army shared his admiration and worship for the German military machine. He was confident that the Kaiser would presently realize the grandiose scheme of Mittel-Europa; and, in that scheme, he saw Greece a secure and prosperous unit in a German system, and saw himself a great figure in this new Europe. He did not betray his country to an enemy. On the contrary, he was convinced that the salvation of Greece could be found only in alliance with Germany. However stupid and short-sighted the King was, he acted in the conviction that his own and his country's prosperity were equally menaced by the Allies and would be advanced by German victory.

Yet despite all Constantine's open and covert services to the Central Powers; despite the fact that the Allies knew that at a propitious moment the Greek army would be flung in the rear of Sarrail's forces at Salonica, and saw that Greek harbours offered ports of call for German submarines, Constantine remained master of Greece.

The reasons for this extraordinary persistence were manifold. In Britain, the Court and the Tory party set their faces stubbornly against

the removal of the King. In Italy the overthrow of Constantine and the return of Venizelos were correctly analyzed as certain alike to restore Greece and intensify Hellenic rivalry to Italy from Valona to Smyrna. In Russia, to the natural opposition of the Czar to the dethronement of a brother monarch there was added the selfish consideration that Greece claimed Constantinople, the prize of Russian wars for more than a century, and that if Greece regained Venizelos this claim might become annoying if not dangerous. Only the French were neither concerned with respect for royalty nor by immediate selfish interests, but not until the Czar had fallen, the Revolution renounced Constantinople, and Italy's various claims satisfied in a degree by Allied pledges, were the French able to prevail upon their allies to take a step as logical as it was necessary.

As late as the last days of May and the first of June the new French premier, Ribot, and his most influential minister, Painlevé, soon to succeed him, found in London the familiar opposition to the removal of Constantine. Long debates terminated in apparent deadlock, removed only by a private contract, between Painlevé and Lloyd George, in which it was agreed that France should undertake the responsibility for the ultimate disposition of Constantine with the understanding that Britain would disavow any failure. What Lloyd George agreed to was that England would look the other way while France was removing a nuisance, but he warned that unless the thing were done swiftly, quietly, with respect for those decencies so dear to the British mind, Great Britain might be compelled to protest against the action which she consented, in advance, temporarily to ignore.

Happily the situation found the man. To Athens the French Government sent Jonnart, Governor General of Algeria for many years, a man of firmness and decision. Arrived in Athens, with the full authority of the French Cabinet behind him, in the decisive moment aided by the presence of warships and troops, he procured from Constantine the necessary abdication without using either. At the very moment when Constantine set his signature to the document which ended his reign, the British Government was preparing to protest against the course of

Jonnart in Greece. The news of success silenced this protest. Great Britain acquiesced in an accomplished fact. Henceforth the situation in the Near East was to improve alike in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Macedonia, while Constantine was to prove only the first of the kings and princes reigning in Central European states to lose his throne because he misinterpreted the course of events. Seventeen months later his illustrious brother-in-law was to flee his empire with far less grace and on infinitely worse terms than the man who had won for Greece greater victories than Hellenic history had known since the fall of the Byzantine Empire, and lost all by his fatal inability to perceive ultimate German defeat, or to make use of the services of a supremely great minister, who now returned to resume his task as the architect of a restored Hellenic state.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

# THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

## I

## CAUSES AND CHARACTER

We have seen that the French offensive had failed, that the British campaign for the year in Flanders had been delayed by the necessity of supporting the French by the Arras operation until all hope of decisive or even considerable success had vanished. The opening Italian attacks had been productive of no more than local or relatively inconsiderable successes. Meantime, the submarine campaign of the Germans, with its harvest of destruction, had assumed proportions which seemed to forecast complete triumph for this weapon and a consequent loss of the war by the Allies. While this situation was developing on the western front, Russia had entered upon that long, obscure, and bloody chapter of her history which led straight toward domestic anarchy and external impotence.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 is one of those great human convulsions whose causes are so mingled both with the history and with the psychology of a people that its origin, development, and meaning remain for long a sealed book to other peoples. Certainly the first three years of this tremendous convulsion were totally misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Western world, which knew little of Russia at the outset, and, so far from understanding the Russian causes, sought with ever-increasing folly to invest the Slavonic upheaval with the nobler and greater qualities of the French Revolution.

For the purpose of this history the Russian Revolution must be examined primarily to determine what its effect was upon the progress of the World War. It is not inconceivable, however unlikely, that out of this great convulsion new ideas and new forces may yet develop which will make it even more important than the world struggle itself in its

# RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION

RUSSIAN SHOCK TROOPS CHARGING THE GERMANS

Russian soldiers were brave enough. But they had much of the helplessness and ignorance of children and the simple-hearted fellows were again and again betrayed by pretended friends

WHEN HOPE WAS THE ORDER OF THE DAY

Soldiers marching to the Duma with banner inscribed: "Down with Monarchy! Long live the Democratic Republic!"

THE REDOUBTABLE COSSACKS

These splendid horsemen were Russia's stanchest defenders. When the Bolshevist blight fell upon the armies, most of the Cossacks stood fast. It is said that the Germans would have been troubled with no Russian Front at all in 1917 had it not been for the Cossacks and the famous Battalions of Death.

THE BATTALIONS OF DEATH

*Above*—Maria Botchkareva, organizer and commander of the Russian women's Battalions of Death, receives a dispatch from the hand of a respectful subordinate, while Mrs. Pankhurst, a sister militant but not military, is an interested spectator.

*Below*—The "march past" of the women recruits. Only those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-seven were permitted to enlist.

REVOLUTION'S HARVEST OF DEATH BEGINS

A deputation bearing wreaths of mourning to deck the graves of the first victims of the new struggle for liberty in Russia

FIGURES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—I

**For a time** Kerensky, as here, held the centre of the stage. It is a sign of ill-omen that the crowd appears to have pushed him off the curbstone as he stands ready to salute a Cossack regiment which is marching by

FIGURES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—II

Catherine Breshkovskaya, "Little Grandmother of the Revolution," returns in triumph from exile in Siberia

FIGURES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—III

The sinister monk Rasputin was assassinated before the outbreak of the Revolution. Yet no figure was more prominent during the evil days which preceded it, among the pro-German traitors at the court of the Czar. He is here shown drinking tea with a characteristic group of women admirers.

AMERICANS IN RUSSIA

*Above*—Ambassador David R. Francis stands uncovered as the bodies of soldiers who have died for Russia are carried through a street of the capital.

*Below*—Chief Surgeon Egbert with the American Red Cross unit at Kief. He was troubled to find that two of the physicians on his staff were Russian pro-Germans, while one of the Russian nurses in the picture was an active spy.

THE END OF IT ALL

Many Russian soldiers dully, hopelessly surrendered to the enemy; while a faithful remnant, betrayed by their brethren, died a horrible death in a vain attempt to storm the German's defences

relation to human development. It is equally possible that it may continue, as it seems to Western civilization now, a supreme expression of anarchy, chaos—a mad, passionate boiling up from the depths of all the dark, incoherent, bestial passions and emotions of a race, or rather of many races, Asiatic rather than European.

The causes of the Russian Revolution are many, remote, and immediate. When Russia entered into the World War, that fabric of government which held together one hundred and eighty millions of human beings was already devoid both of vitality and of force. If a victory might conceivably have contributed to restore the machinery, to give it a new hold alike upon the respect and the obedience of the subjects of the Czar, it was inevitable that defeat, failure, disaster, easily traceable to the corrupt inefficiency of the ruling classes, would lead to the ultimate collapse of a system.

Moreover, as in the case of the House of Bourbon in the period preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution, scandal attached to the Court. The story of the influence exercised by that vile creature, Gregory Rasputin, upon the mind of the Czarina, upon the Russian Court, upon the Russian Church—constituted a chapter Byzantine in character, incomprehensible to the Western world, calculated to destroy —as it did destroy—the last vestige of reverence and respect among the Muscovite millions. Rasputin was finally murdered—"executed" perhaps is the better word—by a member of the Imperial Family jealous alike of the honour of the House of Romanoff and of that nobility daily smirched by the existence of this vile creature. But Rasputin did not die until his contribution to the general ruin of the fortunes of Nicholas had been made.

When the Russian Revolution broke, the Western world turned instantly to the parallels of the French Revolution, and particularly in Great Britain—that nation which had fought the French Revolution because of principles which Time has approved—sought to invest this new upheaval with virtues which Englishmen had rejected in that other earthquake a century and a quarter before. Moreover, the whole Western world recalled that the French Revolution, once it had been attacked

by Europe, was roused to a sense of nationalism, of patriotism, to a military effort begun in self-defence which did not end until the French armies had occupied Moscow and Madrid and for more than twenty years victoriously traversed Europe and even penetrated into Asia and North Africa. Accordingly, Great Britain and France—recognizing that the Russian Monarchy in the closing months of 1916 and the opening weeks of 1917 had been disloyal to the Allied cause, that the creatures of the impotent Czar had betrayed both Roumania and Russia—hailed the coming of a liberal government and a new group of leaders as a sign that Russia would resume her place on the firing line of Europe, that Russian millions in arms would become imbued with the spirit which had moved the masses of the French Republic, still undisciplined, to march to the frontiers in 1792.

A more colossal misapprehension it would be difficult to imagine. France, at the moment of her revolution, was inhabited by a people whom centuries of association in battle and in common history had taught a sense of nationality and a spirit of patriotism. The orderly inheritance of Latin peoples, retaining the Roman conception of law and discipline, expressed itself promptly when the Ancient Régime fell. But Russia had never been fused into a national consciousness. It was a geographical expression, not a political nor even a racial fact. From Peter the Great to the last and microscopic Nicholas, Russian autocracy directing a huge army, had acquired province after province. The Pole, the Lett, the Lithuanian, the Armenian, the innumerable peoples of Asia, retained either a consciousness of a racial independence which had persisted under Russian rule or an allegiance to that state of semi-barbarism which had been interrupted by the arrival of Russian divisions.

Not only were the people of the fringes from the Arctic to the Caspian, from the Dniester to the Pacific, unassimilated, but the Russian family itself was divided, and the Ukranians of the South sought separation, not fusion. All this vast assemblage of peoples was held together by the double forces of bureaucracy and the army. It was held together by abnormal forces, by forces which had no roots in the separate races, and nothing was more certain than, when once this double pressure was

removed, that Russia would resolve itself into its innumerable fractions and natural chaos succeed artificial unity.

There was a still further centrifugal force. The small but influential industrial element inhabiting the cities—which, as in the case of the French Revolution, rapidly laid hands upon the whole fabric of the Revolution—was not itself affected by the issues of the World War, but, so far as its leaders at least were concerned, was animated by the principles and dominated by the passions of that Marxian socialism whose essential doctrine is class war waged internationally. It was Capitalism, not Germanism, that the mass of the men and women who possessed even a shadow of intellectual illumination believed to be the enemy. The autocracy and the army, with a declining zeal and intensity to be sure, had accepted the challenge and made war upon Germany, but this very fact discredited the war itself in the eyes of Russian socialism. Moreover, other elements in the vast Russian population which had suffered from the iniquities, the oppression, the abuse of the bureaucracy which was the instrument of the Romanoff Dynasty, not only felt toward the Czar and his associates an inextinguishable hatred but were hostile to the war upon Germany itself because it had been made by the Czar and his government.

If in the first moment of the Revolution there was—or if there seemed to be—a re-birth of national spirit, and the men who took office and held power were alike moved by the influence of liberal ideas of the sort the West describes as democratic, and stirred by this patriotic emotion comprehensible equally to the American, the Frenchman, and the Briton, this was but a brief and transitory phase. It did not represent the fact in Russia and it totally deceived the western Alliance which welcomed the Revolution because it removed that reproach—ever present, ever felt—incident to an alliance between the three great democracies of the west and a reactionary Czaristic Russia. America, on the brink of entrance into the World War, was profoundly influenced toward her final action by the performance in Russia. For the moment critical voices were silenced in Britain and in France. Yet there never was a grosser deception, nor a more terrible awakening.

### II. WESTERN MISUNDERSTANDINGS

When the news of the Russian Revolution, with its relatively peaceful opening act, reached London and Paris and Washington, there was a rejoicing difficult now to describe. In every Allied capital the passing of another tyranny was celebrated as a victory for human liberty by those who were soon to recognize that, whatever else the effect of the Russian Revolution might be, its immediate consequences threatened to ensure the triumph of German arms. There was an easy assumption that revolution in Russia would be the preliminary step to the entrance of Russia into that family of democratic nations whose institutions were on the whole of a similar sort, founded upon a common conception of social and economic principles. There was not the smallest suspicion that, when the smoke and dust of the first weeks and months of the Russian upheaval had passed away, the terrible fact would be discovered that those who dominated Russian affairs were animated by a spirit of hostility to Western democracy far more intense than their opposition to German autocracy. There was not a suspicion that when the Revolution found its man, as revolutions do, Lenin would preach a doctrine of class warfare and direct all the great latent forces of Russia, not against the German foe, but against that whole system of political and economic life which prevailed in the Western nations.

The fact, as contrasted with the pleasant fiction long cherished in the West, was this: The war had found Russia ripe, not only for the overthrow of the autocracy and the elimination of the futile Czar, but ready to burst into a thousand fragments as the unassimilated races and tribes, relieved of the constraint of Russian imperial military power, undertook once more to take up their ancient pathways. Russia had become a geographical expression, a vast blot of colour upon the map, but it had never been a nation in the western sense; and now, like so many empires built by Asiatic conquerors whose swords enforced unity while they lived, it was ready to return to the chaos from which it had been called by a genius not long surviving to enforce his will.

In addition, the war itself had brought to the Russian masses inde-

scribable agonies. Millions of Russian soldiers had perished because of the corruption and the treason of the civil government. The vast resources of the Russian Empire had been inadequate not alone to munition but to clothe and to feed the hosts collected at the call to the colours. The armies had been defeated; disasters in the field had followed one another with regular succession. The morale of the army had been weakened as the common soldier was called upon to face artillery and machine guns and offer himself as a consequence of the failure of his superiors and of his government to provide the necessary machinery of war. And great as was the suffering of the army, the misery behind the lines far surpassed it. All the machinery of national existence had broken down under the strain of the war; starvation reigned in provinces whose frontiers marched with the greatest wheat-producing regions of the world. In one section of the Russian Empire foodstuffs rotted, while, in another, women and children died of hunger.

In all the nations at war the progressive degeneration of national life and national industry was taking place. A sense of exhaustion, due to supreme suffering in consequence of the prolongation of the contest, was making itself manifest in every combatant nation, but in the western countries—however unmistakable the decline, the wearing-out alike of the human and the mechanical instruments of production, of transportation—there was still a functioning. The decay moved with slow if certain pace. Highly organized countries with disciplined populations submitted only slowly to the dislocation entailed by the conflict, but in Russia the organization was too elementary, the machinery in too woefully inefficient hands. Therefore that disease which was attacking the existence of the other peoples at war swept over the Russian Empire with the rapidity and the deadliness of some new scourge, while in the west it merely sapped the strength with the slow but steady march of a constitutional disease.

If the men who for the moment controlled the destinies of Russia, when the Czar and his régime had fallen, proclaimed their will, and the will of the nation to be, that Russia should continue the struggle against the German until her own territories were liberated and

she and her allies had abolished the German threat, this was but the expression of now unrepresentative if noble patriots. The millions of Russia desired peace. There was no national consciousness which moved them to continue in the struggle while Austrian troops held Bessarabia or German divisions were in Poland. The people of France might continue, and did continue, to endure the agonies of the World War because even those agonies seemed less intolerable than the permanent surrender of Flanders, Artois, Picardy, and northern Champagne with the consequent enslavement of three millions of French men and women. But no corresponding sense of national pride or national sympathy induced a similar willingness to endure pain on the part of Russia.

The absence of a sense of nationality excluded the possibility of a real patriotic revival following the revolution, such as made the French Revolution one of the most splendid pages in the history of any people. What the Russian millions demanded was not national integrity but peace at any price, an ending of the now intolerable agonies incident to the struggle; and if the price of such a cessation of suffering was the surrender of provinces remote and won by military conquests of the now-fallen Czardom, it was a matter of no concern to them.

Nor were they more troubled by the fact that peace between Russia and Germany, a separate peace, meant the betrayal of the western Alliance, meant the possible victory of Germany, meant a supreme breach of national honour. France and Great Britain were not the allies of Russia, of the Russian people—in the eyes of those men who were rising to power. Rather they were the allies of that Czar and that autocracy to which the Russian people owed their centuries of suffering, owed their present misery. French gold had fortified the Romanoff power; British capital had supported the beginnings of an industrial system hateful to the men who were shortly to be the masters of the revolution. The obligations of Russia to the nations in the west were, in the eyes of these men, no national commitment but the pledges of a régime now banished. Moreover, since this was itself anathema, all its undertakings were suspect and the allies of the Czar were to be regarded as the enemies of the Revolution.

The first demand of the Revolution, when at last it found its voice, was peace. It was not concerned with the fate of France nor the fortunes of Britain. It was not influenced by appeals to the sense of national honour. It looked upon the western nations neither with sympathy nor friendliness. It regarded their appeals to Russia to stand firm in the fight against Germany as an invitation to Russians to pay a still further tax of blood and misery that the western Allies might realize imperialistic ambitions, and that capitalistic governments might fortify themselves at home by conquests abroad.

Become articulate, the Russian Revolution demanded that the west should lay aside every claim formulated in the progress of the war and now become an obstacle to peace. It renounced for Russia the possession of Constantinople and the acquisition of Turkish lands in Asia Minor. It demanded that France should surrender her aspirations to Alsace Lorraine. It proclaimed that Russia would accept a peace without annexation and without indemnity which would have left France and Belgium ruined by German devastation. Nor was it profoundly concerned if Germany achieved its ultimate objectives in the west. The millions of Russia desired peace at any cost. The men who rose to power in the Russian Revolution by promising the Russian millions peace were seeking a total overthrow of the economic and national systems which prevailed in Europe and in the world. The gospel preached by Lenin was a gospel destructive quite as much of British and of American governments and social orders as of German. American democracy was, in the eyes of Lenin, as evil a thing as Hohenzollern monarchy. Capitalism was the foe. Lenin was prepared to make peace with Germany, no matter how much it cost Russia in territory, that on such lands as remained he might organize Russia to become the agent of destruction directed against the governments and the systems of all civilized and industrialized nations.

In such a situation there could be but one consequence. When those men—moderates, who were collectively possessed of all the knowledge, understanding, and sympathy with the democracies of the west and with western civilization existing in Russia—had enjoyed their

brief hour of power and had fallen because they were not representative of a Russia which knew not patriotism, knew not nationality, and was dominated by a desire for peace; when they were succeeded by Kerensky—a fugitive figure, representative in his understanding of the masses but for ever chained by his comprehension of the western situation—and he had equally failed; then at last power fell into the hands of a great man, prepared to give the Russian people that peace which they demanded that he might obtain the power that he sought to destroy the social order of the western world. With the fall of the first provisional government all chance of a Russian patriotic revival perished. With the fall of Kerensky the last bond between Russia and her former western allies dissolved. When Lenin came there was no more a Russia. All that remained was a certain machinery of government, hopelessly dislocated but still capable of a degree of motion, and this machinery was thereafter operated, without regard to the war, to serve the purposes of a man who conceived of overthrowing not alone German tyranny but also Allied democracy—who looked upon the German system of government and rulers and the Allied executives and parliaments as equally hateful, equally subversive of the principles he had preached and practised during his lifetime.

Thenceforth Russia was in the hands of a man who saw the World War not as a conflict between two principles, one right and one wrong, but as a conflict between two sets of powers, each dominated by men and representative of principles which it was his mission to destroy. The more the war undermined and sapped the fabric of governments; the more the several peoples engaged in the conflict murmured and complained at the intolerable pangs of the struggle; the more confidently Lenin looked forward to that day when these several peoples should adopt his ideas, and Bolshevist anarchy and destruction which had seized upon Russia and was transforming that country into a wilderness and an economic ruin, should obtain equal sway in France, in Britain, and in the United States.

All this was long hid from the Western world. In the first hours the west rejoiced that Russia had been converted to the religion of Western

democracy, just as it had clung, through all the revelations of the war, to the equally puerile notion that the German people were the victims of a government which by force, and by force alone, prevented them from adopting the beneficent systems of democracy of their western neighbours. Mission after mission of eminent statesmen, ranging from Lord Milner to Arthur Henderson, from Elihu Root to Albert Thomas, visited Petrograd and returned with varying reports, were themselves bewildered by what they saw and heard, or even in a small but unmistakable degree impressed and influenced by the gospel which they heard preached. But the masses and the governments of the peoples of the west remained impervious to the truth. Not until Russia had made a separate peace and quit the firing line; not until they were aware not merely that Russia had deserted her old allies but that the men in control of Russian affairs were as hostile to the governments and statesmen of the west as they were to those of Germany and Austria—that in fact a new force or a new disease was abroad in the world; did the western powers at last in any measure comprehend Russian events.

In sum: between February and August the Russian Revolution ran the whole gamut from a protest of enlightened patriotism and moderate democracy to the anti-patriotic, anti-social Bolshevist fury of Lenin. In that period Russian unity was destroyed; such machinery of government and production as remained was abolished. The Russian army was first disorganized from within and then—after a brief, successful offensive—revealed, fleeing from a field of victory, no longer a force or a factor in the war. Long before August arrived Russia had ceased to be an ally, had become a problem and even a peril. Thereafter it was to continue an ever-growing menace, the doctrines of its leaders undermining and destroying national unity in Allied countries, while, freed from Russian danger, Germany was to bring her vast hosts to Picardy, and Austria and Germany to transfer still other divisions to the Venetian front, so that while Allied capacity for resistance behind the line diminished, actual defeat upon the battlefield and new onrushes of German and Austrian troops were still further to test the already war-tried temper of the French, the Italian, and the British peoples.

### III. THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ROMANOFF

It remains now to trace rapidly the several steps in the Revolution. In January and February Russia was in the hands of the reactionary influences whose conspicuous representative was Protopopov. The assassination of Rasputin on December 30th, celebrated by the nation as a deliverance but viewed by the Czarina as a personal affliction, had been the signal for the loosing of the influences of reactionary tyranny. All through the first two months of the new year, while Petrograd had been filled with machine guns and with troops, one provocation after another had been resorted to in the hope of driving a hungry and exasperated populace to throw itself upon the prepared weapons of the agents of reaction. When at last the Duma assembled on the 27th of February, more than a month after the date set for its meeting, the atmosphere was tense, the signs of the coming storm were on all sides. Prior to the 8th of March there were bread riots. On this day there was a disturbance provoked by the Cossacks, which in the next day expanded to a real revolt. Almost spontaneously, with little sign of direction, the people of the Russian capital flowed into the streets; meetings of protest were held; and finally—sure concomitant of every revolution—the soldiers of tyranny fraternized with the people. Out of the fraternizing there developed a general and complete extermination of the police who had been the chosen tools of the bureaucracy and of tyranny for so many years. These wretched creatures were hunted down and slain wherever found. They were in fact almost the sole victims of the first phase of the Russian Revolution, which in every other aspect was orderly, and impressed the world with the absence of precisely those circumstances which one associates with revolutions even in their initial phases.

Between the 8th and 12th of March the Revolution had achieved complete success. The later date was marked by an assault upon the great prison fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, comparable in many respects with that attack upon the Bastille which was the decisive act of the French Revolution. Ordered to fire upon the masses, even the

chosen Guard troops fired upon their own officers, and before noon of March 12th the old Russian order had fallen.

Meantime, the Duma held aloof. Messages were sent to the Czar warning him of the crisis. One message was ignored; another, answered by the futile statement that the feeble Nicholas was coming to the capital. He never reached Petrograd. On this March 12th the Duma named a provisional government of twelve of its members, while at the same moment a Committee of Workmen, Soldiers, and Sailors was formed—an executive body destined to supplant the Duma in due course of time.

This First Provisional Government contained among others Rodzianko, Prince Lvov, Miliukov, and Kerensky. Two days later such government as was left in Russia consisted of the twelve named by the Duma and the Council of Workmen and Soldiers Delegates—that Council of the Soviets, destined in a few months to rival and even to surpass that Committee of Public Safety which, in the Terror of the French Revolution, established a record of violence till then unparalleled.

Meantime the armies and their commanders, Russky and Brusiloff, had accepted the Revolution, and on March 15th even the Grand Duke Nicholas advised the Czar that he must abdicate. To this decision Nicholas bowed and on that day abdicated in favour of the Grand Duke Michael. On this same day the Duma announced a new government. Already there was a clash between the Soviets, who sought a republic, and the Duma, which still advocated a constitutional monarchy. One day later the Grand Duke Michael, in his turn, was forced to renounce the throne. The House of Romanoff had fallen, in seven days. Still another week and Nicholas Alexandrovitch Romanoff was a prisoner at the Palace of Tsarkoe Selo, entering upon that long agony which was to end as tragically and even more sordidly than the similar experience of Louis XVI. This phase of the drama was complete.

### IV. THE DUMA

The second act was marked by the effort of the Duma, through its provisional government, to carry on orderly administration, to reform

Russia by degrees, to preserve Russia's association with the Western powers and to fulfil her obligations as a partner in the war against Germany. But while the Duma and the Provisional Government were seeking to ensure the peaceful evolution of Russia, the Soviets, assembling in congress, gave instant evidence of a totally different purpose. Renouncing for Russia all previous agreements by which Constantinople and other rewards were assured to the Czar, the Soviets demanded similar sacrifices from the western Allies as the sole condition on which Russia should continue in the war. Already in this initial assembly the voice of Lenin was heard preaching the gospel of class warfare, demanding not a continuation of the war against Germany but an expansion of the war to a crusade against all capitalistic governments, Allied and German alike, an appeal to the masses of the population of all the countries to rise against their own governments, and throwing off the bondage of nationalism and racial patriotism, to share in the common cause which had for its object the obliteration of national frontiers and the elimination of the bourgeoisie everywhere.

Lenin had long been the apostle of this gospel of class warfare and Marxian socialism. Exiled from Russia he had found asylum in Switzerland. When the Revolution came, German assistance had made possible his return to his own country, and, arrived at home, he served the German cause by assailing every influence in Russia which made for the continuation of Russia in the war against Germany. From the very outset of the later phase the Russian Revolution became a battle between Kerensky—himself a Socialist, too, but the champion of more moderate policies and of continued alliance with the western powers—and Lenin, a consistent and uncompromising advocate of the universal war against Capital, preceded by an immediate peace with Germany. Kerensky was compelled to urge the Russian people to new effort in a war which had become intolerable. Lenin promised immediate relief from this conflict. Kerensky appealed to the sense of duty; Lenin, to the selfishness and weakness of his fellow-countrymen.

In all this period Kerensky sought on the one hand to persuade the western powers to modify their war purposes and bring their policies

into accord with the Russian formula of peace without annexation and without indemnity, while he endeavoured to hold the Russian people fixed to their alliance with the west. It was an impossible task for a man whose sole qualifications lay in a brilliant imagination and an unrivalled eloquence. Kerensky was able to sway every audience which he addressed, and when he was an exile in England he captured hearers who did not even understand the language which he spoke, but he had not the power of organization nor the iron will which the situation required. His task was probably beyond human strength at best but it was beyond all question hopeless when his ultimate resource was words.

Lenin's game was steadily played by the Central Powers. In April Austria made a proffer of peace and in the same month the calling of a Socialist conference at Stockholm was seized upon by Berlin to tempt the Russians and confuse the Allies. By the 16th of May the Provisional Government had broken down and the new government represented an attempted coalition between the Duma and the Soviets, although Prince Lvov, who had headed the first government, still retained his post, and Kerensky exchanged the Ministry of Justice for that of War and Marine. In this time a first effort of Lenin to seize control of the Government failed. For a single hour it seemed as if Kerensky had at least measured up to his task and would be able to control with an iron hand the elements of disorder within while he directed Russian armies into conflict with the foes without. In this period, yielding to the ever-growing insistence of the western Allies, already gravely compromised by Russian military quiescence, he agreed to an offensive, but the anarchy which had wrecked the domestic machinery had already permeated the army. The death penalty had been abolished; a discipline severer and more terrible than that which had prevailed in the German army now gave way to a method of control under which soldiers chose their own officers and debated obedience to or rejection of their orders.

### V. THE FINAL OFFENSIVE

We have now to examine the final Russian offensive, which in its brief hour of success aroused hopes among western nations which would

not stir again until American millions had replaced Russian and the final German western offensive, the "peace storm" of July, 1918, had ended in decisive defeat.

To understand the actual history of the Russian attack in Galicia it is necessary to recall certain facts familiar in 1916 but now forgotten. When in August Brusiloff's great offensive came to an end the Austrian armies in Galicia were standing in a wide semicircle about Lemberg and from forty to sixty miles east of that city. To the north, in Volhynia, the Russian advance had stopped along the line of the Stokhod River, some twenty miles east of the vital railroad centre of Kovel. Had the Russians reached Kovel a great Austro-German retreat from the Gulf of Riga to the Carpathians would have been inevitable.

In Galicia the Austrians were standing behind the upper stream of the Styr, which flows northward out of Galicia; their centre was along the Zlota Lipa, which rises near the Styr but flows southward into the Dniester, with their extreme right centre bent back north of the Dniester to the point where the Gnila Lipa enters it. South of the Dniester their line ran behind the Bystritza, just west of Stanislau, straight down to the Carpathians. They were actually in a temporary position, were on the point of drawing back their centre behind the Gnila Lipa, when the Russian offensive stopped. After the pause the Austrian and German troops held on.

The main mission of the Austro-German forces in Galicia was to cover Lemberg. Originally they had stood along the line of the Strypa, which parallels the Zlota Lipa to the eastward. They had fallen back to the Zlota Lipa, and the Russians had succeeded in passing the lower stretch of this river, thus turning the Zlota Lipa position. Actually, the Austrians had left to them the Gnila Lipa position; that is, the position behind this river which rises in the hills east of Lemberg and flows fairly straight down to the Dniester, which it enters opposite Halicz. This is the natural covering position of an army defending Lemberg, itself an open town; it is the position from which the Austrians had defended the town in August, 1914, and when they were defeated here they evacuated Lemberg.

The Bug River, rising in the hills that also see the birth of the Gnila Lipa and at one point coming within half a dozen miles of this stream, turns northward and flows across eastern Galicia into Russia and this makes a natural extension to the northward of the Gnila Lipa position, and together the lines of the Bug and the Gnila Lipa constitute the last and best defensive position before Lemberg. South of the Dniester the Bystritza, and behind it the Lomnica, serve as extensions of this Gnila Lipa-Bug Line.

In August, 1916, the world believed that the Austro-Germans would be compelled to draw back to the Gnila Lipa position. But they stood; their centre still advanced along the Zlota Lipa; and it was against this centre, and about the town of Brzezany, that the first Russian attack of 1917 was delivered on a wide front from north of the Lemberg-Brody railroad to the ground south of Brzezany.

This attack met with local successes. The town of Koniuchy, northeast of Brzezany, was taken; Brzezany itself was threatened; some 20,000 prisoners were captured, together with many guns. But these local successes were all that resulted. The Austrian line was reinforced and held on. Fresh Russian attacks were met by stiff resistance and brought heavy losses. The attack had begun on June 30th. By July 4th it was beginning to flicker out and there was no longer immediate promise of any renewal of the achievement of 1914 or of 1916.

The most that could be said for this first attack was that it had surprised the world by showing that Russia, apparently, was resolved to fight on; had revealed the Russian army as better prepared in artillery and other munitions than had been expected, and disclosed the soldiers as having a fighting spirit once more.

But had it ended with the Brzezany episode the Russian offensive would have had little real military value, measured by actual achievement. As it turned out this was only a beginning. After a few days' pause the Russians renewed the attack, this time south of the Dniester and along the Bystritza, west of Stanislau. Here their success was immediate and considerable. The Austrian lines were pierced and there

began a drive momentarily quite like those of 1916. This victory was achieved by the army of Korniloff.

Recall again the relation of the various rivers to Lemberg. The Austrians still held a portion of the Zlota Lipa line. They could still retire to the line of the Gnila Lipa, as far as pressure north of the Dniester was concerned. But the Russians had passed both the Bystritza and the Lomnica, which are the natural extensions of the Gnila Lipa line south of the Dniester; they had crossed the Dniester from the south, opposite Halicz, which they had captured; and were thus west of the Gnila Lipa, north of the Dniester.

The situation south of the Dniester was perhaps more serious, for the Russians had passed both the Bystritza and the Lomnica, and having taken Kalusz were moving westward between the Dniester and the Carpathian foothills, driving a wedge between the Austrians north of the Dniester and those to the south, and threatening to open a wide gap through which their troops would pour in from north and west and threaten Lemberg. The real test of the Russian success was now their ability to reach the city of Stryj, thirty-odd miles northwest of Lemberg and an important railroad junction. If they got to Stryj, then the evacuation of Lemberg would be well-nigh inevitable.

It was possible that the passing of the river at Halicz might compel the abandonment of the Gnila Lipa River line by the Austrians and the eventual retirement west of Lemberg. It did in 1914, but it was less likely that this success would be decisive than that the fall of Lemberg would be determined by operations to the south of the Dniester, where there were more evidences of Austrian collapse.

Before there could be any determination of this battle, the whole Russian line north of the Dniester before Tarnopol and northward to the Lemberg-Brody railroad suddenly collapsed. There was no considerable German attack; there was no great engagement, but a panic—a rout—ensued. German spies, German agents, anarchists, and war-weary, deluded soldiers united in the destruction of discipline, and the army which had taken Koniuchy and threatened Brzezany two weeks earlier was suddenly transformed into a fleeing horde, comparable

to that army which set out from the battlefield of First Bull Run for Washington.

And the effect of this collapse of the Russian centre in Galicia was to leave Korniloff's victorious army south of the Dniester in the air. It had no choice but to fall rapidly back for a hundred miles through Bukowina to the Russian boundary, surrendering all of Bukowina and all of Galicia held since the opening of the campaign of 1916. When the rearrangement was complete the Austrians once more could boast a soil practically freed of the invader and this had not been the case since the very opening days of the war.

In men the Russians lost surprisingly few by this wretched performance. Official German figures placed the captures—up to mid-August, from Roumania to the Bug—at only 42,000 men and 257 guns. In their offensives in April the British and the French together had captured over 55,000 German prisoners and more than 400 guns. The Russians in their first two weeks this year, while the armies still fought, had taken 36,000 prisoners, and captures in Roumania brought the balance even for the two forces on the southeastern front. Compare this with 150,000 Austrian prisoners taken by the Russians after Lemberg in 1914 or 120,000 prisoners after the capture of Lutsk in 1916. The loss of guns was more serious, but the real disaster was the destruction of the cohesion of the Russian armies.

At a critical moment the inevitable effect of the domestic agitations had been felt and Germany had been saved from deadly peril, the peril flowing from the opening of a joint attack in the east and in the west. Ludendorff himself subsequently declared in a military conference in Berlin that had this Russian offensive coincided with the Anglo-French attacks before Arras and at the Craonne Plateau the consequences might have been fatal to Germany. Now she could concentrate her attention upon Belgium and Artois, for even if Russian armies could be reorganized and restored before the end of the campaigning season it was beyond possibility that they could conduct a new offensive.

In point of fact Russia had collapsed. If Korniloff, who had planned the victorious offensive which ended so ignominiously, could in associa-

tion with Kerensky make one more effort to restore discipline in the army, this association was destined to live but a brief time, and while Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd accompanied mutiny and desertion on the field of victory, Russia was slipping inescapably into the bog of anarchy. The break between Korniloff and Kerensky, a few weeks later, was to shatter the last power of resistance in the Provisional Government, in which Lvov had already given place to Kerensky.

Henceforth Russia is no more than a cauldron in which boil up all sorts of bubbles. It is no longer a nation or a state. It is no more capable of conducting war, of making peace, of manning the machinery of production and communication. Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian separatist movements destroy a physical unity already shaken by domestic anarchy.

The fall of Russia well-nigh lost the war for the western Allies. Had the Germans refrained from their submarine attack, which enlisted the United States, it is inconceivable that victory could finally have escaped the Kaiser. With the failure of the Russian offensive the whole Allied campaign of 1917 was doomed. The French had failed outright at the Craonne Plateau; the Italians, mounting with difficulty the Bainsizza Plateau, were condemned to find complete disaster after transient success; British armies were already floundering in the morass of Flanders in their tragically abortive campaign; while, with ever-increasing insistence, demands for peace—formulated by the honest but weak and the corrupt but influential—sounded in Allied capitals and countries.

In July, 1917, and in the succeeding months up to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk we touch the dead low-water mark of Allied hopes, Allied prospects, Allied courage. Every calculation of victory had been predicated upon the participation of Russia. Again and again the western publics had been solaced for failure on their own front by promises of the arrival of the Russian steam roller in Berlin and Vienna. Such promises could be made no longer. The last illusion was disappearing; even the American hope lost appeal in the light of Russian deception.

There is another side to the Russian Revolution. The next two years

were to show that the Russian collapse had not merely imperilled Allied prospects of military triumph immediately and greatly but that the disease which had seized upon Russia was destined to invade the west. Germany, which had procured the return of Russian anarchists following the Revolution—which had profited greatly by the disorganization in Russia—the work, if not primarily of its agents, at least the result in no small degree of its manœuvres; Germany herself was to suffer from the scourge, and no western power was to go unscathed. Henceforth, for the period of the war, for the period of the Armistice, when at last peace had been signed, Russia was to remain outside the circle of nations—outside the bonds of international association—suffering miseries unequalled in modern history, but, under the leadership of Lenin, despite indescribable weakness, to continue an immeasurable peril to the west—to Germany, as to France and Great Britain—a phenomenon as inexplicable to contemporary mankind as was the French Revolution a century and a quarter before.

## CHAPTER NINE

## THE SUBMARINE

### I

### THE GRAVER MENACE

Grave as were the military circumstances for the western Allies even before Russia had collapsed, the naval prospects were infinitely worse. In April and May Germany was winning the war with the submarine. In the former month upward of a million tons of shipping had been sunk, and Admiral Sims, going to London to establish relations between the American and Allied navies, was met by the appalling statement—made by Jellicoe and by civil officials alike—that, unless some new weapon or some new method could be discovered to deal with the submarine, and could be discovered promptly, then, not later than November, Great Britain would be starved into surrender, the war lost, the German victory on land and on sea inescapable. Mr. Balfour, when he came to the United States immediately after American entrance into the war, brought a similar message, and delivered it at the moment the American military authorities were learning from Marshal Joffre that the Nivelle offensive had failed and that the immediate presence of American soldiers in Europe, and in large numbers, was necessary.

We have now briefly to consider the submarine aspect of the war. It is plain that had the Germans, before the outbreak of the war, recognized the value of the weapon they possessed in the submarine; had they, instead of following the example of the British navy and embarking upon a pursuit race to overtake British sea power by the construction of capital ships, concentrated their energy and attention upon the construction of a really considerable submarine fleet; they might have won the war in the first three years, before the British navy had at last learned to cope with the new form of sea warfare. Nothing seems more clear than that the German submarine operations were the

result of an appreciation, after the outbreak of hostilities, of the possibilities of this new arm directed against merchant shipping, rather than the consequence of marvellous prevision—just as the German mobile heavy artillery, which had been designed speedily to reduce French fortifications and open the way to swift victory, proved of incalculable value in unforeseen trench warfare, after having failed to procure the military decision which had been planned.

When the Germans abandoned their first campaign—which had nearly brought the United States into the war in 1915 and the first weeks of 1916—they then possessed an insufficient undersea fleet to accomplish their purpose; but thereafter, and particularly after Jutland, they concentrated their energies upon the construction of submarines, and were able to complete not less than three a week. When they resumed their ruthless sinkings in February they were able, thanks to new construction, to keep not less than eight or ten undersea boats at work at all times, and—contrary to all the reports of that period, official and otherwise—their loss was inconsiderable and far too insignificant to defeat the campaign itself.

Against a possible resumption of this campaign the British navy had neither fortified itself by the construction of destroyers—the sole type of craft capable of dealing with the submarine—nor had it formulated plans against such an emergency. Such destroyers as it had were almost all occupied in protecting the Grand Fleet. The few that were left for sea patrol were so ridiculously inadequate as to make hopeless the task assigned to them. Nor had the British Government foreseen the coming crisis and provisioned the British Isles in advance. In April, when the Germans put nearly a million tons of shipping under, Britain had six weeks of foodstuffs on hand, so that a continuation of the rate of sinkings for that month made surrender by November 1st inevitable.

It is essential to see the submarine element in the war accurately. The Germans did not risk involving the United States in the world conflict merely to make a hazardous gamble. They had calculated correctly, that as the British navy was fighting the submarine in February,

1917, and as it continued to fight it for months thereafter, the success of the new campaign was mathematically certain. They assumed that they would sink more than a million tons a month—perhaps two millions. They calculated that three months of this campaign would bring Britain to her knees; British calculations differed only as they doubled the period of grace. The German saw victory before America could be a real participant. He refrained from any attack upon American shores and from any considerable violence to American shipping in the belief that the war would be over before America could much affect its course, and with the thought that, in such circumstances, there would not be in America any such permanent hostility, dangerous to the after-war prosperity and commerce of Germany, as now existed all over Europe.

Conceivably, although the German hardly reckoned upon it, the submarine campaign might only prepare the way for one more western offensive. This was a possibility foreseen when Hindenburg devastated northern France and retired to his own front while German armies and German agents completed the demoralization of Russia. The mission of the western front was to hold fast until Russia had fallen and the submarine had either won the war, or so weakened British powers of resistance at home by the sure process of starvation, that an initial victory in the west, in 1918, would bring a collapse in Britain comparable with that in Russia.

It was the ever-mounting danger of the submarine that led the British to place their armies under the control of Nivelle, and welcome that alluring if disastrous strategy which envisaged a grandiose attack and the achievement of decisive military victory. It was the hope of the British and French governments alike, in the spring of 1917, that the Anglo-French armies might save the British navy. The Flanders offensive had, for its primary object, the sweeping of the Germans from the Belgian coast, and thus abolishing the main submarine base at Bruges, and laying hands on Zeebrügge and Ostend, the twin outlets of this hornet's nest.

### II. IN APRIL

Admiral Sims has given the world a luminous description of the situation which he found when he reached London in the spring of 1917. For the moment Great Britain had lost, not the control of the seas by her navy, for the Grand Fleet still maintained a superiority vindicated at Jutland, but the use of the waters she dominated. Actually the British Isles were blockaded, and daily the harvest of submarine sinkings marched inexorably toward that point at which shipping would be so reduced that starvation would compel surrender. Such were the reports sent by Admiral Sims to the American Government. Such was the condition which confronted the Allies during all the period when their military efforts were failing and the collapse of Russia was resulting in the transfer to the western front of German and Austrian divisions sufficient to check Allied attacks in 1917 and compel British, French, and Italian armies to resign the initiative and await the attacks of victorious German armies, while German submarines cut their lines of communication, interrupted their supplies, destroyed the cargoes of foodstuffs and raw material essential alike for the maintenance of the armies and the civil population, and for the manufacture of munitions and guns.

It was only in June that the British Government at last, in a counsel of desperation, had recourse to the system of convoys, and even this ultimate expedient would have been impossible had it not been for the transfer to European waters of the Destroyer Fleet of the United States and a further contribution of a similar sort from the Japanese Navy. From February to September it was touch and go, and it was only in November that at last the convoy system, together with other methods, produced results which assured the Allies that—great and continuing as would be the injury of the submarine, difficult as would be the maintenance of sufficient shipping—the German could not win the war by this means alone. Slowly but surely the rate of sinkings fell; it was reduced by two thirds between April, 1917, and April, 1918. But once more the German victories in March and April of 1918 induced a


CURVE OF MERCHANT TONNAGE LOST OR DAMAGED BY SUBMARINES, MINES AND RAIDERS, FROM AUG. 1914 TO PRESENT DATE.
(THIS TONNAGE DOES NOT INCLUDE VESSELS LOST BY MARINE RISKS)
LEGEND
TOTAL TONNAGE (FRENCH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL) LOST BY ACTS OF WAR (SUBMARINES, MINES AND RAIDERS).
FRENCH TONNAGE LOST BY ACTS OF WAR
TOTAL TONNAGE DAMAGED (NOT SUNK).
COMPILED IN THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE NOV. 1918.
Sec. C-3 A & L.
900,000
800,000
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
1914 AUG.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.
1915 JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUN.
JUL.
AUG.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV
DEC.
1916 JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUN.
JUL.
AUG.
SEPT.
62,494
84,093
90,922
19,215
2183
5183
43,971
7010
49,684
4391
59,660
14,226
80,614
4569
55,574
2647
118,117
2026
128,243
1420
109,784
7406
182,741
2212
151,588
18,296
88,145
20,215
153,449
17,138
121,147
6389
88,505
775
116,795
11,903
164,865
20,609
191,175
6128
126,387
12,583
116,458
9496
117,473
5695
159,439
9876
229,616




IOWING THE COURSE OF SUBMARINE LOSSES DURING THE WAR

crisis when the necessity for the transfer of two millions of American troops to Europe suddenly removed an enormous tonnage from the service of supplies; in 1918, even more than in 1917, the British public suffered from a lack of food, and only the most rigorous system of rationing actually prevented famine. From the summer of 1917, onward, Great Britain was hungry, and even after the war had ended many months passed before the British or the French public could resume its former nourishment.

All things considered, the submarine campaign of 1917, in its early months, came nearer to winning the war for Germany than the first campaign to the Marne or the colossal March offensive of 1918. For a period of months the British Government lost control of the sea for the first time in more than a century. The submarine success, unlike a victory in the field, did not merely defeat or destroy an army; it attacked every individual in the nation. It brought Great Britain to the edge of starvation. It threatened British and French munition factories alike with the lack of the raw materials out of which armies were equipped and munitioned.

The gravity of the crisis was long hidden from the Allied publics. How near Germany was to victory by midsummer 1917, as a result of her submarine campaign, was not appreciated at the time, and can hardly be understood now, since no visible evidence to indicate the crisis of that time exists. Never in all her long history had Great Britain been so near to ultimate ruin, and until America could come, Britain was the last stronghold of resistance. To understand the progress of political as well as military events; to understand why the morale of the domestic as well as the military fronts weakened dangerously in 1917; to comprehend why the faint-hearted cried out for peace at any price, why treason flourished, why all through the summer and autumn back-stairs negotiations between the Allies and the Germans went forward in one fashion or another, it is necessary to grasp the actual achievements of the German submarine campaign, the success of which was carefully eliminated from the press and replaced by optimistic if mendacious appeals of statesmen designed to deceive the peoples

of the Allied nations, and thus persuade them to continue in the struggle.

The German submarine campaign, in the end, failed. Its failure damns it, precisely as Napoleon's failure in his Moscow campaign made that venture a landmark in failure for successive generations. Moreover, the failure involved Germany in war with the United States and brought American troops to France in time to supply the western Allies with the necessary numbers to regain the initiative and win decisive victory. Exactly as the incursion into Belgium roused the world and gave a moral impetus to the Allied cause, in neutral as well as in combatant nations, without enabling the German armies to reach Paris or win the war, resumption of ruthless submarine warfare in February, 1917, without achieving its object, enlisted new enemies and ultimately ensured German defeat. Yet they were not mad, the Germans who risked contingencies that to human eyes seemed remote, in the pursuit of results which, if they seemed certain to German leaders in January—before the campaign was launched—appeared almost equally sure to British, French, and American statesmen, soldiers, and sailors in April and May—when the campaign was in full swing.

Like the devastation of northern France and the Hindenburg retreat, the use of the submarine for unrestricted sinking could only be the resort of a nation that was either desperate or certain of success. In 1917 the German was hardly desperate. He was by contrast still confident, not alone of victory but of swift triumph. By October, when conquest by the submarine arm alone had become impossible, his military prospects had so improved that he still had reason to believe that the submarine, plus the victorious armies now summoned from the Russian front, would gain the decision the forthcoming spring. But in using the submarine, as in transforming northern France into a desert, the Kaiser and his advisers invited terrible retribution if defeat should come. Nothing was more certain than that, if Germany lost the war, her shipping—one of the chief instruments by which the great development of German prosperity in world trade had been achieved—would be taken from her. Thus in 1917, on land and on sea, the German took

irrevocable steps, whose consequences were to be written into the Treaty of Versailles two years later. He sank hospital ships, laden with the wounded of the battlefield, to summon Allied destroyers from submarine patrol to the protection of these vessels of mercy, precisely as he bombed hospitals and peaceful cities far behind the battle-front, to recall Allied airplanes from active service. He used all his weapons, and he exhausted the possibilities of all his machinery of destruction—not in savage rage, but in calculated ferocity. The submarine campaign was the ultimate expression in the World War of the meaning of the German will for victory. It came within an ace of winning the war. It would have won the war if the British navy, aided by American destroyer fleets, had not turned to the convoy system, impossible till then because of the lack of destroyers. This exposed the British navy as having failed, in the respite between 1916 and 1917, to devise adequate methods for meeting the submarine, and the British Government as having failed to provide in advance against a possible onset of famine.

To analyze the various elements that contribute to making victory or defeat in a nation is almost impossible either during or after the war. Yet it seems hardly an exaggeration to say that in 1917, disastrous as were Allied defeats upon the battlefield, they alone would not explain the decline of Allied morale among the peoples engaged. It was the submarine campaign; it was the element of actual deprivation and proximate famine that gave secret strength to those successive peace offensives which so nearly gained the German his victory. The armies had failed, but of themselves they could still fight on; but the governments and the peoples behind the armies were assailed by an enemy whose advance long seemed irresistible and whose attack unnerved and weakened the whole population.

We shall see how at last, in 1918, the submarine campaign was defeated—the peril well-nigh abolished. In 1917 it was only halted. It was not until autumn that there was at least a reasonable basis for belief that the submarine would not win the war, and in all the strain of military and political events during this long, grim

period the influence of the submarine campaign must be recognized and appreciated.

### III. THE STATISTICS

The following figures show the total tonnage lost during the war owing to the German submarine campaign, as compiled from American official reports:

SUBMARINE SINKINGS

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1914 | | | 1917 | |
| August | 62,495 tons | | January | 351,491 tons | |
| September | 98,093 | | February | 540,344 | |
| October | 90,922 | | March | 585,253 | |
| November | 19,213 | | April | 874,576 | |
| December | 43,971 | | May | 591,318 | |
| | | 314,694 | June | 695,444 | |
| | 1915 | | July | 550,874 | |
| January | 49,684 | | August | 506,695 | |
| February | 59,660 | | September | 351,105 | |
| March | 80,614 | | October | 455,096 | |
| April | 55,574 | | November | 288,558 | |
| May | 118,117 | | December | 396,946 | |
| June | 128,243 | | | | 6,187,700 |
| July | 109,786 | | | | |
| August | 182,741 | | | | |
| September | 151,588 | | | | |
| October | 88,145 | | | | |
| November | 153,449 | | | | |
| December | 121,147 | | | | |
| | | 1,298,748 | | | |
| | 1916 | | | 1918 | |
| January | 88,505 | | January | 304,427 | |
| February | 116,745 | | February | 332,522 | |
| March | 164,865 | | March | 358,360 | |
| April | 191,175 | | April | 281,255 | |
| May | 126,387 | | May | 304,749 | |
| June | 116,638 | | June | 261,958 | |
| July | 117,473 | | July | 275,164 | |
| August | 159,439 | | August | 259,400 | |
| September | 229,616 | | September | 176,500 | |
| October | 320,974 | | October | 116,314 | |
| November | 303,559 | | November | 4,871 | |
| December | 356,061 | | | | 2,675,520 |
| | | 2,291,437 | | | |
| | | Total | | | 12,768,099 |

### IV. SIMS AND LUDENDORFF

At the moment in which I am completing this volume there are being published two documents which must for the future have great

value in any analysis of the last phase of the submarine conflict. One is the narrative of Admiral Sims of the American Navy, setting forth the story of the fight against the submarine, and the other is General Ludendorff's account of the last two years of the war, which includes an explanation of the reasons which led the Germans to embark upon their fatal venture. These two documents are of unequal value because, while the truthfulness of Sims is not to be questioned, Ludendorff's book is plainly propaganda, designed to absolve the German military leaders from the responsibility of defeat. Nevertheless, it has real value.

Moreover, setting the two narratives side by side one perceives first, what the German calculations were, from Ludendorff, and second, how nearly the calculations were correct, from Sims.

The explanation of Ludendorff is probably one of the most cold-blooded statements which the war has produced. It shows no regard whatever for moral considerations. It discloses the German Government and the German Staff concerned solely with the question as to whether the use of the submarine would be more profitable, despite its effect upon neutrals, or not. Ludendorff explains that the campaign was not resolved upon until President Wilson's peace proposals of December, 1916, had failed and the success of German armies in Roumania had relieved the Central Powers of one source of anxiety and provided the necessary troops against the remote possibility that Holland and Denmark, and even more distant neutrals like Sweden and Norway, might enter the war as a consequence of a resumption of ruthless sinkings.

The most interesting single assertion of Ludendorff on the military side is that the German High Command saw the beginning of the year 1917 with grave anxiety, because they did not then suspect a Russian collapse such as took place, and he declares that since it was impossible to forecast the collapse of Russia, the Central Powers saw in the submarine the sole weapon which could avert defeat, and might produce victory. The German calculation was that the submarine would bring Britain to her knees in six months. Ludendorff himself doubled

the period but accepted the statement of the naval authorities that the extent of the allied losses would preclude the passing of American troops to Europe in time or in numbers to affect the situation in 1918 even if the submarine campaign proved less immediately successful than was hoped for.

This amounts to a confession that if Germany had known of the forthcoming collapse of Russia in January, 1917, she would not have resorted to the submarine weapon, thus inviting American entrance into the war, and, as the event proved, insuring German defeat. In July, 1914, German High Command calculated that in six weeks, by violating the neutrality of Belgium, it could dispose of France whether Great Britain entered the war or not, and therefore the profit would be out of all proportion to the loss even if Britain should enter. In January, 1917, the Germans calculated that they could win the war in twelve months if they resorted to the submarine weapon, and that, for twelve months at least, America would be unable to intervene effectively. Both calculations very nearly proved correct, but failure by a narrow margin in each case led to fatal consequences. German military leaders were correct in calculating that not more than five or six American divisions need be reckoned with in Europe during the first year of American participation in the war, just as they were correct in assuming that the British Expeditionary Army would be small and play a relatively minor part in the first six weeks in the 1914 campaign. But in both cases there is disclosed that amazing German psychology which led to the taking of unheard-of risks without making any allowance for the intellectual and moral forces to be arrayed against them.

Ludendorff says that in January, 1917, expecting a renewal of attack on all fronts, not yet perceiving the approach of Russian collapse, having failed to procure peace by negotiation on terms which would have perpetuated the European condition created by Germany's opening victories, the Kaiser, the civil government, and the military leaders agreed upon a recourse to the submarine weapon without regard to the rights of neutrals, without concern for America, because it promised a decision within six months in the opinion of German naval officers, within a

year according to the more conservative judgment of Ludendorff himself, and he concedes that the course would not have been adopted had German leaders perceived that Russia would soon collapse and the way would be clear to seek a military decision in the west in 1918.

As to Sims, he reports that when he reached London in April, after less than three months of unrestricted sinkings, he was bluntly told that Great Britain would have to give up the war by November if the submarine campaign were not checked and then he reported to Washington: "Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are losing the war." He tells us that after spending his first four days in London and collecting all possible data, he wrote a four-page cable despatch setting forth the situation in its full gravity, and when he submitted it to the American Ambassador, Mr. Page declared that it was not strong enough, and wrote a much stronger despatch of his own. Thus are revealed the calculations of Berlin and the conviction of London in the first stages of the submarine campaign of 1917.

# THE GERMAN SUBMARINE MENACE

THE LETTER "Z"

## AND

## HOW IT WAS MET BY THE ALLIED NAVIES



R LINE
Screw Steamships
to GLASGOW
May 1, Noon
rom Pier 64, N. R.
A, May 7, 5p.m.
Liverpool.
Foot W. 14th St.
21-24 State St., N. Y.
All-the-Way
by-Water
LINE. Steamships
Star. Lve. Pier 19,
St., 5 P. M. Tues.,
lightful 390-mile, 22-
the CITY BEAUTI-
so Tourist and N. Y.
Phone: 8080—Cort.
IP CORPORATION.
LINE
thern Route
ours from Paris.
ES & MARSEILLES
Sant' Anna..June 5
Lisbon & Marseilles
Roma.....Aug. 3
A., 17 State St., N. Y.
ALIANO
11 DAYS.
Caserta.....June 26
ates, $65 & $90 up.
.. 31 B'way. N. Y.
FLORIDA
points South.
01 Fifth Ave., N. Y.
orthern Cruise $60.
Line. New York.
CHUNK.

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NOTICE!

TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 22, 1915.

BANKRUPTCY NOTICES.

COURT FOR

Open June 1st. Se
S. B. MANWARING.
NEW ENGLAND—Massa
HEATON H
Stockbridge, Massa
in the Berkshire H
WILL OPEN JUNE
This Modern Hotel is Finely A
Delightfully Located. The Man
Havill, will be at the Hotel Fla
47th St., New York, from April
10th. Information regarding rat
be promptly attended to.
Marblehead, Ma
THE ROCK-M
Hotel de Luxe Opens
Faces all the Yac
BOOKLETS G. H. BRA
EARLY GO
AT
STOCKBRIDGE, M
RED LION I
NOW OPEN.
MICHIGAN.
Mount Cler
OPEN ALL

THE WARNING

On Saturday, May 1, 1915, the day the *Lusitania* left New York on her last voyage, the above advertisement appeared among the steamship notices in the leading American newspapers



ONE OF THE BRITISH NAVY'S LAIRS

The *Lusitania* warning attracted wide attention, but few people took it seriously. Americans were unable to believe that the Germans would go so far in frightfulness, and Britons were proudly confident of the Royal Navy's ability to protect what was perhaps the finest ship in the British merchant marine



THE *LUSITANIA* SAILS FROM NEW YORK HARBOUR

The *Lusitania* sailed from New York Harbour on May 1, 1915. Despite the German warning her owners relied upon President Wilson's note of February 10th, which declared that the United States would hold the Imperial German Government "to a strict accountability" for such acts as were threatened

"SPURLOS VERSENKT

Many and revolting are the crimes for which the German officials must answer at the bar of civilization. But none is more dastardly than this which Mr. Dougherty has so strikingly portrayed—the sinking of an Allied hospital ship by a German submarine.

*From a drawing by Louis Raemaekers*

THE SURVIVORS

A *Lusitania* survivor stated that when the ship sank a submarine rose to the surface: "The crew stood stolidly on the deck and surveyed the scene. I could distinguish the German flag, but it was impossible to see the number of the submarine, which disappeared after a few minutes."



THE *LUSITANIA* MEDAL

This medal was struck by the Germans to commemorate their navy's "glorious" achievement. One side shows Death selling tickets at the Cunard Line's ticket-window, under the motto "Business before Everything"; the other shows the ship engulfed by the waves. It is noteworthy that the date stamped on the medal is two days earlier than that of the actual occurrence.



THE GERMAN SUBMARINE *U C* 5

In drydock after her capture by the British

A CONVOY IN THE DANGER ZONE

By steering a zig-zag course the food ships greatly increased the difficulty of the submarine's aim. This device helped them to answer the heartfelt prayer of British children, "Give us this day our daily bread"



THE "RATS" IN THEIR HOLE

A group of German submarines lying in their base at Wilhelmshaven



ONE MORE ENEMY ACCOUNTED FOR

H. M. S. *Tempest* drops a depth charge as she dashes at full speed over the spot where a German submarine has just submerged

# CHAPTER TEN

## THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES—PASSCHENDAELE

### I

### HAIG AND GRANT

The operations in Artois—following the Battle of Arras, and designed to aid the French on the Craonne Plateau by occupying German divisions—died out toward the end of May, after having been prolonged for rather more than a month beyond the time Sir Douglas Haig had fixed for this subsidiary operation. By June 1st he was at last free to turn his attention toward that campaign which from the winter onward he had designed to be the principal British effort, in case Nivelle's offensive fell short of its far-reaching mission.

The campaign which we are now to examine was the bloodiest, on the Allied side, of the western front, comparable with the German attack at Verdun, and, like that stupendous German effort, destined to fall short of any larger objective and to be followed by a resignation of all the ground purchased at such an enormous price in human life and human effort. For American readers the Third Battle of Ypres, the new campaign in Flanders, has a striking parallel in Grant's operations in 1864 from the Rapidan to Cold Harbour and to Petersburg. The British army and the British public saw the opening of the campaign of 1917 with precisely the same confidence and hope with which the Northern public surveyed the beginning of Grant's first campaign with the Army of the Potomac.

The conditions were in many respects similar. Three years of war had in both cases seen the transformation of a civilian population into well-equipped and well-trained armies. The disappointments, the failures of three years of war had, on the whole, been without any disastrous consequences. The British army had suffered no considerable defeat. The Expeditionary Army, after it had at last found itself in the latter

stages of the Battle of the Marne, had fought with distinction at the Aisne and won enduring glory at Ypres.

The gas attack of 1915, which was the striking circumstance in the Second Battle of Ypres, had resulted in loss of ground but had been without other serious consequences. If the British offensives at Neuve-Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos in 1915 and the far greater effort at the Somme in 1916 had resulted in no decisive victory; if they had indeed in the earlier cases ended in decisive checks and inexpressible disappointments, nevertheless, looking at the western front and marking the changes between November, 1914, and January, 1917, there had been a forward push almost everywhere along the British sector; the Somme had seen a considerable advance, and it had as one of its consequences a wide-swinging German retreat, a reoccupation of a thousand square miles of French territory, followed almost immediately by a brilliant success in the Battle of Arras.

The British public might well feel, as did the public of the North, fifty-three years earlier, that at last their army had reached the point where victory was in its hands, and their commanders had received the training essential to success, while the political generals, the incompetents, the failures, had been eliminated. "On to Richmond" was the confident watchword of the North in the next-to-the-last campaign of the Civil War, precisely as British soldiers and British civilians now expressed their confidence in forecasts that the autumn of 1917 would see Belgium liberated and the Germans behind the Meuse, if not behind the Rhine.

In the American case the high hopes of springtime faded in the terrible summer slaughter of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and the crowning tragedy of Cold Harbour. More than half of the army that Grant led across the Rapidan at the outset of the campaign were casualties by the time Cold Harbour had been fought. In that period the terrible costs, the sterile gains, shook the confidence of the public in its army, and of the army in its general. Grant, who had been hailed as the saviour of the Republic in May, was denounced as a butcher in September, and his achievements at Vicksburg and Chatta-

nooga were tarnished by his failures in northern Virginia. The army which he finally took into trenches south of Petersburg was an army that was fought out and incapable of a new offensive for many months.

Fortunately for the Union cause, Grant's policy of attrition, his strategy of slaughter, was directed against an enemy whose last reserves were in the firing line. As a consequence, the very strategy which the North denounced in the autumn of 1864 demonstrated its efficacy in April of the following year. But had some change of circumstances wiped out the armies of Sherman and Thomas and permitted all the Southern armies of the West to flow to Lee's assistance, the closing act of Appomattox would not have occurred. Instead, Grant's opening attack in March, 1865, would have led to new repulses since it would have been directed against an enemy equal in numbers and resources.

Precisely this thing was what now happened in Flanders. The army of Sir Douglas Haig, with the proud consciousness of recent successes, with the confident hope of immediate victory, set its face once more toward those fields on which British soldiers had in 1914 won enduring fame. On those fields, after one brief flash of brilliant success, they were checked, halted with tremendous casualties, condemned to contest the shell-wrecked earth foot by foot. Time, so long proclaimed as the ally of the western powers, fought steadily against them; week by week and month by month, fresh divisions from the German front entered the conflict in the face of the ever-wearying British divisions.

To this circumstance were added two others. The weather, which had been unfriendly in the latter phases of the Somme, once more gave the Germans incalculable assistance. In the bogs and morasses, which extend over a large area about Ypres, the British armies floundered and suffered. German resistance was tenfold strengthened by the floods and the storms. One might speculate as to whether the British defeat of the Third Battle of Ypres was due more to weather or to German arms. Conceivably in the first days of August, had the weather held, there might have been a real success. Thereafter, weather conditions were almost sufficient to explain the failure, and the British soldier might well claim that his offensive had been drowned rather than defeated.

The second circumstance was the inefficiency disclosed in the general selected to conduct the army operations. The preliminary attack of June, under the direction of General Sir Herbert Plumer, was the high-water mark in technical efficiency on the British side throughout the war. In that opening battle Plumer displayed those qualities which presently earned for him, first the unchallenged title of the best battle commander in the British army and later, recognition as field marshal by his nation. When Plumer had struck the first blow with his Second Army it was Gough of the Fifth Army who was designated to direct the major attack, and this major attack failed. It failed so completely and at such a cost that Haig was presently compelled to call upon Plumer again. When Plumer came there was an immediate change. He mastered the "elastic" defence of Von Arnim, who had faced the British at the Somme and now confronted them along the Lys. But the hour when real success was possible had passed. As for Gough, his failure should have resulted in his recall. Instead, he was continued in command of his Fifth Army until the supreme disaster of the following March destroyed it and at last resulted in his elimination from the front.

Gough's failure, and the circumstances of that failure, shook the confidence of the soldiers in their High Command. They were sent against unbroken defences, as Nivelle had sent his troops against similar obstacles on the Craonne Plateau. They failed in the larger sense, as Nivelle's men had failed, and their spirit was broken to a degree as was the spirit of the finest fighting divisions of France a few months before. Men murmured for the first time against the useless sacrifice, as Grant's soldiers murmured even before Cold Harbour. This lack of confidence in commanders was also a factor in the disaster of March, 1918, while behind the army the British public daily became more impatient, more critical, more resentful, as each returning ship brought its terrible harvest from the battlefield and the official lists of casualties mounted higher and higher.

Here, too, begins a break between the Government, the Ministry, and the Army. There is political interference, marked difference of

opinion, leading to an insistence in the close of the year on an extension of the British front at the moment when there is denied to Sir Douglas Haig those reinforcements necessary to re-build his shattered divisions. The spring campaign of 1918 will find the British holding a long front with thin lines, while hundreds of thousands of troops are held in England, others scattered from Salonica to Jerusalem, and the confidence of the army itself is shaken. These are the facts which one must consider in watching the development of the Third Battle of Ypres and the second British campaign in Flanders. They are more important than the local successes or failures of the day-by-day fighting.

### II. THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE

The purpose of the campaign in Flanders in 1917 changed radically during the progress of the battle. It was the conception of Sir Douglas Haig at the outset that a brusque attack, a great offensive, breaking out of the Ypres salient and flowing down the Lys Valley, would shatter the western flank of the German armies between Lille and the sea; compel an evacuation of the Belgian coast, and particularly of the Bruges-Zeebrügge-Ostend triangle, whence came the greater portion of the submarine scourge; and force a general German retirement at least behind the Scheldt, with a consequent liberation of the great French industrial towns of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.

For the British the elimination of the submarine base of Bruges was of utmost importance. We have seen the extent to which the submarine attack had scored preliminary successes in March, in April, and in May. When Sir Douglas Haig began his offensive there was still more than a reasonable expectation that by winter the submarine would bring Britain to her knees. The liberation of French soil was bound to have a tremendous moral effect upon the people of France, but the expulsion of the Germans from the Belgian sea coast had become almost a matter of life and death for the British.

In a sense Sir Douglas Haig took up that offensive begun by Sir John French in October, 1914, and speedily transformed into a desperate defensive when Antwerp fell and the Kaiser set out for Calais. An ad-

vance of ten or fifteen miles down the Lys Valley westward toward Roulers and Courtrai would cut the main line of communication between the coast and the German armies in France; a slight further advance would bring the railroad from Ghent to Bruges under the fire of the Allied long-range artillery, while the seizure of the crossings of the Lys at Menin and Courtrai would ensure the German evacuation of Lille and of their whole front southward to St. Quentin.

Such, in substance, were the larger possibilities and purposes of British strategy in 1917. The British army, advancing out of the Ypres salient, transforming it into a great sally port, was first to penetrate between the German forces on the Belgian coast and in France, driving a wedge which would compel a retreat from the coast and the surrender of the submarine bases. So far it was an effort to do on land what the Navy had failed to do on water, namely, to suppress the submarine weapon. In addition it was designed, by cutting the anchorage of the western flank of the German armies from the sea to Switzerland, to open a turning, an enveloping movement around the new Western flank, compelling the Germans to retire until this flank again found safe anchorage upon the forts of Antwerp. Conforming to this retirement all the German armies in France would be compelled to withdraw until they stood at the French frontier. Nivelle had sought to break the German centre. Haig now undertook to turn the German flank.

One year later exactly, this strategy was again put into operation, this time under the direction of Plumer in association with King Albert of Belgium, and in a few brief weeks supreme success was achieved. Advancing over the Passchendaele Ridge, victorious British and Belgian troops, presently reinforced by French and even by Americans, compelled, first the evacuation of Ostend, Bruges, and Zeebrügge; then the abandonment of Lille; and, finally, a retreat to the line of the Scheldt. At the moment when the Armistice came, this line had been forced and British troops were in Mons.

It is plain, then, that the strategy was sound, that the calculations were exact, and that, had British armies been able to accomplish in 1917 what they did a year later, the results would have been what the

British public and the British High Command looked forward to in 1917. But the chance of success had practically disappeared before the battle opened. The Germans were not compelled to hold the Flanders front with a limited number of troops. On the contrary, they were able to bring division after division from the Russian front, with the result that not infrequently the troops that attacked were weary, while those that received the attack were fresh; nor was there any limit to German numbers which allowed the British any decisive advantage.

The supreme blunder of the Flanders campaign lay in undertaking it at all, after the events of June and July had demonstrated how completely the Russian Revolution had eliminated Russian armies and transformed the military situation. To persist—in the face of preliminary checks and in the face of the inescapable fact that each day German resources and numbers were mounting—was a blunder equally great. The British army was put to a task that no army could accomplish. It was kept at the task under conditions both military and climatic which could only result in the depression of morale and in the multiplication of losses due alike to the enemy's fire and to weather.

Haig and Sir William Robertson, following Grant's phrase, set out to "fight it out on this line if it took all summer"; but, unlike Grant, they were in the presence of an enemy who could replace men and material as rapidly as they themselves, so that to invoke attrition was as foolish as Mrs. Partington's celebrated attempt to dispose of the Atlantic with a mop. The ultimate failure led to the removal of Sir William Robertson and gravely compromised Haig. He survived both this decline in popularity and the subsequent further decline incident to his terrible defeats in the spring. His brilliant operation which began in August, 1918, regained for him no small share of his lost laurels, as Grant revived his shrunken fame between Five Forks and Appomattox; but in both cases, although with unequal justice, the campaign of attrition led to personal unpopularity and national depression.

As the struggle progressed, the objectives changed. The reduction of the Bruges submarine base, the approach to Ghent, the arrival at Roulers and Courtrai, became as remote possibilities as the taking of

Cambrai and Douai in the Somme time. By October a British army which had set out to turn the western flank of the German armies in the west was painfully struggling up the slopes of the Passchendaele Ridge. Its single purpose now was to finish the campaign in possession of that high ground to clear which had been its programme for the opening days of the offensive.

This much was achieved. When winter came, by the anniversary of the repulse of the final German effort in 1914, British troops looked down upon all the broad stretch of the plain of Flanders exactly as, the year before, they had passed the crest of the ridge south of Bapaume. They had won the ground for which they had striven. They had driven the Germans from positions that had seemed impregnable. The achievement of the British soldier was beyond praise, but it was a victory that yielded no fruits and opened up no horizons. Not only was it too late to push forward, but already the accession of German strength in the west had condemned the British, like the French, to the defensive, and only a few months after British, Canadian, and Australian troops had mounted gloriously to the crest of Passchendaele Ridge, they were compelled to evacuate it ignominiously and fall back into the old shell-cast area of the original salient exactly as the French a little later had to surrender in a single day the whole of the Craonne Plateau, won by months of effort and untold sacrifices.

### III. MESSINES-"WHITESHEET"

Before Sir Douglas Haig could launch his major offensive at the Ypres salient, a preliminary operation was necessary. The salient itself had been born as a consequence of an incomplete British turning movement in October, 1914, followed by an unsuccessful German enveloping thrust later in October and in November. To understand the situation it is necessary to glance again at the topography of the Ypres salient. Two ranges of hills—one coming from the west eastward, and the other from the north, southward—make a right angle due south of the town of Ypres, which stands in the flats. Still a third and lower ridge, proceeding from west to east, north of Ypres, gives the




THE YPRES FRONT

The left-hand black line shows the front of the Ypres Salient at the beginning of the Third Battle of Ypres. The right-hand line shows the ground gained in June when Plumer captured the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and in August and September in Gough's two attacks. The shaded portions show the high ground, practically all of which, north of the Menin Road from Gheluvelt to Passchendaele, was captured in the last stage of the offensive.

impression, on the contour map, of three sides of a square enclosing Ypres itself. The southern ridge from west to east rises to the heights of Scherpenburg and Kemmel, memorable in the fighting of 1918, but until that time well behind the battle-line, and supplying the best British observation post in the whole salient. Where this Kemmel Ridge intersects the northern and the southern ridges there were situated the small towns of Messines and Wytschaete—the latter of which, in the argot of

the "Tommy," was "Whitesheet." The northern side of the square takes its name from the town of Pilkem and appears in all the battle reports as the Pilkem Ridge. On November 1, 1914, the Germans had advanced over the Messines-"Whitesheet" Ridge and driven the British and Indian Cavalry into the flats south and east of Ypres. . In April and May, 1915, they had taken the Pilkem Ridge. They thus gripped the British in Ypres as one might hold an object between the thumb and the forefinger, the thumb representing the "Whitesheet" Ridge; the forefinger, the Pilkem Ridge; the object being Ypres. From the Pilkem Ridge the Germans looked down on Ypres itself, but from the "Whitesheet" Ridge they looked behind Ypres and had under their vision all the roads by which British troops and British supplies approached the ruined city. Entering Ypres by daylight was a hazardous feat and automobiles speeded over the road under shell fire, while even at night the highways were systematically "watered."

Actually this German position has been accurately described as resembling a stadium from the benches of which an audience looks out upon a football game. Like the players the British were far down, but, unlike the football players, their operations were greeted, not by cheers, but by shells. Nothing could move by day into or out of Ypres without inviting shell fire.

So bad was this position, the worst on the whole western front, that ever since November, 1914, a bitter controversy had gone forward in the British army as to whether Ypres should be held or evacuated. To evacuate it and fall back to the Kemmel-Scherpenburg Ridge and the still higher summits of the same range to the westward would have been to surrender ground of little value, costing many casualties each week to hold, and it would have brought the Germans down in to the plain under direct observation as they now held the British.

But as in the case of Verdun, the moral value outweighed the military. Because they had paid so much to hold Ypres, the British recognized the moral victory the Germans would win by laying hands upon the ashes of the old Belgian town of which there was nothing left intact save the lower walls of the old town jail. In addition, to surrender

Ypres meant to abandon the last remnant of Belgian soil and thus enable the Germans to complete their conquest of King Albert's nation.

So, week after week and month after month the British had held on to Ypres. The "Wipers" salient was held and the expense in life, which was great, was borne by the successors of that Regular Army, the flower of which slept on the forward slopes of those hills now just within the German lines. In April and May, 1918, when the German victory to the south brought the enemy even to the summit of Kemmel and the salient became ten times as bad, the British still held on.

But if there was to be an offensive out of the Ypres salient—if it were to be transformed into a sally-port—the first step must necessarily be the re-conquest of the "Whitesheet" Ridge, since no preparations within the salient could be made without German direct observation and except under direct German artillery fire as long as the Germans sat on the crest of the ridge marked by the ruined villages of Messines and Wytschaete. Therefore—precisely as Pershing, in the following year, before he advanced out of the Verdun salient in the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne, seized the St. Mihiel salient as a necessary preliminary—Sir Douglas Haig gave now his first attention to the Messines-"Whitesheet" Ridge.

Once more it is necessary to recall the fact that, in the level country of northern France and western Belgium, hills which elsewhere would hardly achieve a name are "mountains" and the merest swells decorated by the name of ridges. Messines Ridge at its highest point near Wytschaete was barely 200 feet high, while it was nowhere 150 feet above the walls of Ypres, some three miles due north. The British soldiers did not scale the heights nor even climb obstacles comparable with Vimy or with Craonne. They advanced over a gently rising slope, the upward pitch of which was hardly discernible to the eye from Kemmel or from Scherpenburg. By contrast they advanced over a country which for nearly three years had been in German hands and on which the Germans had lavished all their wealth of material and expended all their military ingenuity and skill in fortifications. If "Whitesheet"

Ridge was not a natural obstacle of forbidding strength it had been transformed into an extraordinarily difficult military obstacle.

The preparations for the attack had been under the immediate direction of General Plumer, whose Second Army had held the salient from the time of the Second Battle of Ypres onward. Plumer's Chief Intelligence Officer, Colonel (afterward General) Harrington to whom no small part of the credit for the achievement is due—had by skilful observation located all the German batteries, strong points, and "pill boxes." The position had been studied with every possible care; railroads had been built; roads had been pushed forward; material had been brought up; water had been piped with such great skill that eight days after the Messines-"Whitesheet" Ridge had fallen half a million gallons of water was daily reaching points which had been within the German lines at the opening of the attack.

A striking circumstance of the Messines-"Whitesheet" affair, unique not only in previous warfare but in the World War as well, was the explosion of nineteen mines which gave the signal for the departure of the troops. Twenty-four of these mines had been constructed; the work had begun as early as July, 1915, and greatly extended after January, 1916. A total of 8,000 yards of galleries were driven and over a million pounds of explosives were used in them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, at his house in Downing Street, London, on the morning of June 7th, heard the boom of these mines when they were fired. Favoured for once with good weather in the days preceding the attack, and thanks to the skilful preparations and observations of Harrington, the British guns were able to take all the German works under their fire, precisely as, on the morning of attack, they were able to smother dugouts and trenches alike with their fire, which surpassed in intensity even the gigantic bombardment accompanying the attack at Vimy.

At 3.10 on the morning of June 7th the nineteen mines were exploded simultaneously, the British artillery opened, and the infantry left their trenches. English, Irish, Australians, and New Zealanders were represented in the shock troops, while Ulster and South-of-Ireland troops

competed for the honour of being the first to reach their objectives, and Major William Redmond, brother of the leader of the Irish party in Parliament, was one of the distinguished victims of German fire.

Two and a half hours after the British troops left their trenches, "Whitesheet" Ridge was in the hands of Ulster regiments; New Zealand troops reached Messines by seven o'clock, and before noon Plumer's victorious troops were moving down the eastern slopes of the Messines-"Whitesheet" Ridge. In the afternoon they penetrated battery positions and captured German field guns. Before sunset every single objective had been taken. The Ypres salient had been abolished, the eastern flank of Haig's forthcoming offensive had been established. On the previous day the enemy, as usual, stood on the "Whitesheet" Ridge looking downward upon all the roads leading into Ypres. The following morning the British stood on the same ridge looking downward over the plain toward Lille, toward Tourcoing, toward the whole valley of the Lys. From "Plug Street" to Hill 60 the high ground was British; 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, and 294 machine guns, were the harvest of material garnered in this battle, while the British losses were hardly more than double the total of prisoners, counting less than 16,000—an ultimate demonstration of the supreme skill with which the guns had been handled, while for once the Germans attempted no counter-attack.

Plumer's feat at the "Whitesheet" Ridge must be compared with Petain's two offensives at Verdun in 1916, and with his later operations at Verdun and Malmaison in the year we are now examining. In that comparison the British achievement loses nothing. On the technical side it would be difficult to imagine anything more perfect than this Messines-"Whitesheet" operation. It had no grandiose purpose. Its objectives were rigidly limited. There was no more thought of an effort to reach Lille than there was an idea to take Metz when Pershing abolished the St. Mihiel salient. The operation is not to be compared with the Somme or the later Flanders fighting to which it was the prelude. It was even less far-looking than the Vimy attack, but, within its limits, it was beyond praise; following the victory of the Third Army at Arras

it thrilled the British public, gave new confidence to the army, and aroused hopes and expectations, the withering of which was bound to bring grievous disappointment and dangerous depression.

### IV. THE ATTACK OF JULY 31ST

Having cleared his eastern flank, Haig planned to begin the main operation in Flanders early in July. But again unavoidable delays, in part at least due to conditions in the French army, compelled several postponements, and it was not until July 31st that he was able to begin. In this attack even the semblance of surprise was absent. The Germans knew long in advance where the blow was to fall and were able to make counter preparation. It was only after Cambrai and Riga that the element of surprise was restored. In this opening battle the British commander had under his direction and actually engaged three armies, whose positions from east to west were as follows: The French First Army, under Anthoine; the British Fifth Army, commanded by Gough; and the British Second Army, which, under Plumer's direction, had already captured the Messines Ridge while in later operations the Belgian army participated. The front on which he made his attack was some fifteen miles in extent, stretching from the Lys River east of Wytschaete to the Yser Canal at Steenstraat, some three or four miles north of Ypres.

It is necessary now to look once more at the topography of this country which had became familiar to British and French publics as the scene of two desperate battles in 1914 and 1915. From the ruined city of Ypres to the north and the east a number of highways radiate like the spokes of a wheel. Two of them, one leading due north and the other practically straight east, form a right angle. Between the two arms of this angle lies the battlefield of Third "Wipers," while the roads themselves —the Pilkem to the north and the Menin to the east—were the central circumstance in the Second and the First Battle of Ypres, respectively. It was the Pilkem road to Ypres which was opened for hours in April, 1915, after the first German "poison-gas" attack had broken the French Colonial troops. The Menin road shares with the Albert-Bapaume highway at the Somme, and the Bar-le-Duc national route to Verdun,

the sombre distinction of being one of the three bloodiest highways in history. Down this road toward the Lys Sir John French's first regiments had marched in October, 1914; and up this road, a few days later, from the valley had come German hosts, crowding on the way to Calais. The Pilkem Ridge, north of the town which gives it its name, reaches the southern fringe of the forest of Houthulst, the most considerable woodland in western Belgium, while the Menin road four miles out of Ypres and just west of Gheluvelt reaches the crest of the high ground and begins its descent to the Lys Valley. Houthulst Forest and the high ground near Gheluvelt were the two anchorages of the German position, which rested like an arch on these two abutments and between them curved inward following the high ground, with Passchendaele as the keystone of the arch.

Between the Pilkem and the Menin roads three other highways lead northward and eastward. Just east of the Pilkem road is the Langemarck highway, on which Sir Douglas Haig had met the Germans in the 1914 battle. East of the Langemarck road is that of Poelcappelle, also the scene of desperate fighting in October, 1914. Eastward again is the Zonnebeke highway which intersects the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt road just east of Zonnebeke. This last road extends from the Menin road at Gheluvelt to the Poelcappelle road at Westroosebeke along the crest of that Passchendaele Ridge which was now to become the chief objective of the new battle of Flanders. It also marks fairly accurately the limit of British advance. It was the purpose of British strategy, advancing on a front between the Pilkem and the Menin roads, to break the German arch between the Houthulst Forest and the high ground at Gheluvelt, and, driving northward through Roulers, reach Ghent. The distance to be covered was less than that which the Allies had gained on the Somme front as a result of the Battle of the Somme and the subsequent German retreat, but the shorter advance would suffice to compel the Germans to abandon the Belgian coast.

The first blow, delivered on July 1st, was designed to penetrate the first, second, and—in places—the third series of German defences. Its

general front was marked, for the French army, by the town of Bixschoote—rather more than a mile from their starting place at the Yser Canal at Steenstraat in the low ground touching the inundated districts surrounding Dixmude—and for the British, by the western bank of the little muddy brook flowing north across their front from the high ground on the Menin road just north of Westhoek and crossing the Langemarck road half a mile south of Langemarck, the St. Julien road at St. Julien, and the Zonnebeke road just east of Verlorenhoek. The objectives along the Menin road were Hooge and the tangle of woodlands and ruins to which the British soldier had given such picturesque names as Shrewsbury Forest, Stirling Castle, Clapham Junction, Inverness Copse, Glencorse Wood. The muddy brook, so important a detail in the battle despite its insignificance, is known along its course as the Hannebeek, Steenbeck, St. Jansbeek, and finally in the French sector as Martje Vaart.

At 3.50 on the morning of July 31st, after a long period of artillery preparation, the first phase in the major offensive developed. The chief work in this stage was to be performed by Gough's Fifth Army, which was in the centre. It was the mission of the French on the right and of Plumer on the left, to keep pace with the progress of Gough in the centre, and by their pressure upon the Germans, lessen the resisting power that Von Arnim could exert against Gough. The French share was the more interesting, minor as it was, because their objective was the ground lost by French Colonials in April, 1915, as a result of the gas attack.

The attack was, on the whole, a striking success. The French speedily reached all their objectives, and thereafter passed the little brook which comes down from Pilkem, and took Bixschoote. The British took and passed Pilkem; entered—but were unable to hold—St. Julien, although they captured it finally three days later; passed through Verlorenhoek and reached Frezenberg on the Zonnebeke road, while they took Hooge and reached "Clapham Junction" on the Menin road.

At the end of the first day, therefore, the Fifth Army had carried

HEAVY WEATHER IN THE NORTH SEA

The bow of this cruiser is drowned in a smother of foam, as she drives ahead through the big seas. The three round caps in the foreground are covers of the observation posts used by the turret captain and the gun captain of the bow-chasers

PIRACY PHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE AIR—I

A cargo steamer, with a deckload of barrels, has been struck by a torpedo. She lists so heavily to starboard that many of the barrels are thrown into the water

PIRACY PHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE AIR—II

The breaking up of a torpedoed merchantman. A few minutes after this photograph was taken she disappeared. But for the presence of the hovering airship this would have been another case of "*spurlos versenkt*"



*From the painting by Wilhelm Ritschel*

NO RESPECT FOR AGE OR SEX

On the *Lusitania* were women and little children by the score. Small wonder then that the sea viper had no pity for this hoary and majestic relic of the sea's more chivalrous days

THIS WAS FOUR HUNDRED POUNDS OF T. N. T.

This egg of a German mine-laying submarine was smashed by a rifle bullet, fired from the quarter-deck of an Allied destroyer

A COLD VIGIL IN THE NORTH SEA

A striking silhouette showing the forepart of an airship and two members of the crew. The U-boats feared aircraft no less than destroyers, for the airmen could spy out a submarine from afar and quietly let fall a bomb upon her, with little or no danger to themselves.



AFTER TWISTING THE DRAGON'S TAIL

H.M.S. *Vindictive*, back in port after the successful raid on Zeebrugge, was the proudest if not the nattiest ship in the British Navy. Her funnels were riddled with holes, part of her bridge was blown away and she was battered and scarred in dozens of places



MAKING ASSURANCE DOUBLY SURE

As she passed over a spot where a submarine had submerged, this destroyer evidently hurled depth charges to starboard and port from the "Y" howitzer on her stern



MANNING THE RAIL

This picture was taken from the fire-control station on the foremast of a battleship, as the King of England was reviewing the victorious Anglo-American fleet. After the review he inspected our *New York* and decorated our Rear-Admiral Rodman

all of the German first system between the Menin road and the Zonnebeke road. North of the Zonnebeke road they had also taken the German second system as far as St. Julien. North of St. Julien on the Poelcappelle road they and the French had passed the German second line, the British being close to Langemarck, the French in Bixschoote, while the British Second Army south of the Menin road had fulfilled its mission perfectly. The British alone took 6,100 prisoners and 2,500 guns while the French also took prisoners.

It had been the purpose of Haig to follow up the preliminary success at once and push the Germans off the Pilkem Ridge, thus depriving them of this second line of observation, as they had already been deprived of the first on "Whitesheet" Ridge in June, by a prompt general attack. Unhappily the weather now changed and there began that long period of almost incessant rains which was as fatal to the hopes and prospects of the British army in Flanders as the early onset of winter in Russia had been to the Napoleonic army a little more than a century before. Of the consequences of this rain Sir Douglas Haig said in his official report:

> The weather had been threatening throughout the day [of July 31], and had rendered the work of our aeroplanes very difficult from the commencement of the battle. During the afternoon, while fighting was still in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without cessation, and for several days afterward the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting on several occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this way. In these conditions operations of any magnitude became impossible, and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to recover.
>
> As had been the case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the disorganization produced by our first attack, and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.

Meantime two local offensives, one by the Germans and one by the British, attracted attention without materially changing the general situation. From 1914 onward the Allies had maintained a bridge-




BRITISH BATTLEFIELDS IN MAY, JUNE, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1917

The solid black line indicates the front in September. The broken line in the upper right-hand corner shows the Dutch frontier. One of the chief objectives of this campaign was to drive a wedge between the German submarine bases at Zeebrügge, Ostend, and Bruges and the German positions in France and thus compel an evacuation of the Belgian coast and the submarine nests.

head beyond the Yser north of Nieuport and looking toward Ostend and the dunes that front the sea. On the morning of July 10th, almost immediately after the British had taken over this sector from the French, the German suddenly attacked on this two-mile front, destroyed two British battalions, and took the northern half of the bridge-head. His success in the southern half was less complete but to all intents and purposes this Lombartzyde affair abolished any menace at his extreme northern flank, while it scored for him a brilliant if relatively slight triumph.

To counterbalance this, on the 15th of August, the Canadians—who had already taken Vimy Ridge—moved up again over the barren plateau which had seen the costly failure of Loos; mounted the gradual slope to the summit of Hill 70, taken and lost by the Scottish on September 25, 1915; and consolidated their position looking down into the doomed coal town of Lens—already partially destroyed by the Germans at the Vimy time and now destined to become the most conspicuous of the many mournful ruined cities of northern France. One thousand prisoners and possession of one of the most valuable observation points along the British front were the gains of this brilliant little affair.

### V. THE SECOND ATTACK

On the the 16th of August a slight improvement in the weather enabled Haig to deal his second blow. Meantime St. Julien, on the Poelcappelle road, and Westhoek, above the Menin road, had fallen. In this second phase the Allied objectives included the bridge-head of Drie Grachten on the Martje Vaart for the French, the town of Langemarck and thence southward to the German third line, which crossed the Menin road just east of Gheluvelt.

In this attack Gough's Fifth Army, which again bore the brunt of the contest, failed almost completely. On the north, Langemarck was taken and held, but southward from the Poelcappelle to the Menin roads the gains were insignificant and the losses terrific. Von Arnim's system of "elastic" defence sufficed to break the force of British attack, while German reserves, pouring in at the critical moment,

compelled the British to surrender practically all their gains south of St. Julien. Two thousand one hundred prisoners and thirty guns, with Langemarck on the British front and Drie Grachten on the French, were insignificant rewards for tremendous efforts and long casualty lists. The consequences of this failure were the revision of the method of British attack and the extension of the front of Plumer's Second Army so that thenceforth the major work fell on this army and its commander, whose new front now comprised practically all the major objectives, including the Passchendaele Ridge. Gough had failed and should have been recalled. Instead, he was permitted to continue—in a subordinate rôle.

Again it is essential to recognize the element of time. The Flanders offensive—which was to have begun in the first days of July and, before the middle of the month, to have ended in the clearing out of the Germans from all the high ground from the Houthulst Forest to the southern end of the "Whitesheet" Ridge—had by mid-August only reached the western slopes of the main Passchendaele Ridge and still fell short of the forest of Houthulst.

### VI. THE END OF THE BATTLE

Following the attack of the 17th of August the weather turned bad again and it was not until September 20th that a new thrust was possible. On this day, under Plumer's direction, the British succeeded where in August they had failed. Before the skilful methods of the commander of the British Second Army the German's "elastic" defence crumbled. British artillery was trained, first, to deal with the "pill boxes," machine-gun nests and strong points, and second, to abolish the peril of German counter-attacks. Three thousand prisoners and the possession of that high ground along the Menin road west of Gheluvelt—which was one foundation of the German defensive arch—were taken, while desperate fighting on the following days in Polygon Woods at last yielded to the Australians the forward slopes of the final crest of Passchendaele Ridge itself.

On the 4th of October a new blow brought the British into Poelcappelle,

through Zonnebeke, and to the outskirts of Gheluvelt, while the Australians, crossing the Gheluvelt-Passchendaele road at Broodseinde on the Zonnebeke road actually mounted the crest of the final ridge itself. Subsequent attacks stretching through the whole of this month brought the British and the French to the edge of Houthulst Forest, to the north of Pilkem and to the outskirts of Passchendaele itself. Finally, on November 6th, Passchendaele fell—a new achievement for Canada, whose sons had already planted their maple-leaf standard on Vimy Ridge and Hill 70. Four days later the capture of Goudberg Spur north of Passchendaele completed the mastery of the ridge and ended the Third Battle of Ypres.

Meantime, however, the Italian disaster at Caporetto had called British troops and General Plumer to the Venetian front. The Flanders success could therefore have no morrow. The British had won the ridge; they had taken Passchendaele, an "island in a sea of mud"; but an exploitation of their success—an advance down the valley of the Lys, the expulsion of the German troops from the Belgian coast—these things were no longer possible. Twenty-four thousand prisoners, 74 guns, 941 machine guns, and 138 trench mortars were captured by the British in three and a half months of fighting, and the smallness of these captures in men and even more so in guns is perhaps the best evidence alike of the stubbornness and skill of the German resistance and of the wholly limited character of British triumph.

Such, in its larger aspects, was the Third Battle of "Wipers." In it the British regained practically all of the ground lost in the two earlier battles. They took possession of positions which were in fact the keys to the Belgian coast and to the German front in Belgium. If, in the following spring, they could have attacked from the lines thus wrested from the foe, a German retreat would have been inevitable. When they were able in September of the following year to advance over Passchendaele Ridge, exactly the things that Haig had hoped to accomplish in the previous year were achieved, but unhappily with the opening of the campaign of 1918 the initiative passed to the Germans, and the successes of Ludendorff at the Somme and at the Lys in the following

March and April were to result in the entire negation of the hard-won British gain in the preceding campaign.

But for the Russian Revolution—perhaps in spite of the Russian Revolution—had the weather been the ally of the British rather than of the Germans, a far greater success might have resulted. As it was, the British had gained a position of great importance which they were subsequently unable to make use of, and the colossal losses which they had suffered had weakened the spirit of the army and shaken the confidence of the British public. Whatever one may say of the Somme there can be no real dispute of the fact that, despite the slight battle-field gain, the Third Battle of Ypres was, from all the larger strategic aspects of the war, a German victory which had consequences of utmost gravity in the following year. The German had held British and French armies off during the period necessary to realize the advantages gained by Russian collapse—henceforth for six months the superiority in numbers on the western front would be his—would remain his until America arrived.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN

## CAMBRAI—JERUSALEM

### I

### NEW METHODS

On November 20th, while the Flanders offensive was expiring in mud and misery, the joy bells of London were set in motion by a military success which opened one of the most extraordinary conflicts of the war. The Battle of Cambrai must, for Americans, not in its tactical circumstances but in its course, suggest that Civil War struggle known both as Shiloh and as Pittsburgh Landing. In that fight the army of Albert Sidney Johnston totally surprised Grant's force, and pushed forward until it became a matter of the closest calculation whether the Confederates would drive the Union forces into the river before night fell, or the Union forces would just hold out.

In the Battle of Cambrai, by the most successful single surprise attack up to that moment on the western front, the British broke through three of the four German defence systems, penetrated the fourth, and very nearly reached the open country beyond. A little more luck and the British cavalry would have been in Cambrai, but as the Union troops stood at Shiloh until night, when reinforcements arrived, and then turned and drove the Confederates from the field of victory, so the Germans held on and, receiving reinforcements, organized their counter-offensive with skill and deliberation, drove the British from every position of importance which they had captured, and in addition—within a week after they had themselves been the surprised—surprised and overran a long section of the British front.

Cambrai is important, however, not because of the outcome of the battle that was fought within sight of it, but because in that battle two methods of offensive were both effectively tried out and these two methods were both to be applied the following year and to revolutionize the

character of the war: in the case of Germany to win stupendous successes which just fell short of a decision, and, in the case of the Allies, to turn the tide, after four years of strain and disaster. Different as were both methods of attack, each of them achieved the same result by restoring the element of surprise.

The three years which extended from the First Battle of Ypres to the fight before Cambrai are marked by many efforts to bring off a surprise attack, some of which, like the German gas attack at Ypres and their artillery avalanche at Verdun, scored partial successes. At Verdun the Germans actually got through all the permanent lines of French defence, but on a front too narrow to enable them to exploit their gains before French reserves arrived. At the Second Battle of Ypres the German progress distanced the expectations of the victors by so much that they were unprepared to take advantage of the opportunity during the hours when the Pilkem road to Ypres was open. At the Somme there was still an effort at a surprise, but the German was not taken unawares. In the Third Battle of Ypres no surprise was even contemplated. It had been accepted as axiomatic that the very vastness of the preparations necessary for commencing all but strictly local offensives precluded concealment, and German and British newspapers, with equal frankness, indicated that the British effort of 1917 would be in Flanders.

The elimination of the element of surprise had abolished any real hope of penetration to the extent of a "break through" on the western front, and the very belief that no surprise was possible was the foundation of the widespread conviction that the war would end with no great change in the position of the opposing lines. One set of staff officers after another had wrestled with the problem of restoring the element of surprise—of bringing off a surprise sufficiently great to enable large forces to break through all the lines in a given sector and begin that march to victory which would follow the shattering of the enemy's systems of defence. At the Somme the British had introduced the tank, but the tank had achieved only local and restricted success. By moving their field artillery forward the Germans were able to bring off many direct hits, disabling the new engines, while by mines they were

similarly successful. Moreover, a tank was able to operate to advantage on relatively level ground only, and, once a battlefield had been torn up by the tremendous cannonades which were a detail in contemporary warfare, the tank became ineffective. The very size of the first tanks had been a further handicap, alike because of the target they offered the enemy guns, and the unwieldiness they displayed in operation.

At the Somme, despite local success in penetrating uncut wire and reducing machine-gun nests in ruined villages, in their first day, the tanks had fallen far short of the expectations their appearance had raised. In Flanders a year later they had proven a total failure, as a result of the character of the country, but in the Battle of Cambrai, in which tanks were tried again—with the foregone conclusion that a further failure would send them to the scrap heap—they demonstrated possibilities which had been unsuspected. In the first place, their field of operation was practically virgin territory, which had seen no considerable fighting and little artillery destruction. It was level country, but with sufficient elevation to escape the bogs and morasses of Flanders. In addition the tanks were used in huge numbers and handled with consummate skill. As a result, the Battle of Cambrai demonstrated that the tank would take the place of the long artillery preparation, which in itself could only be made after such an enormous concentration of guns and munitions as inevitably betrayed to the enemy the direction of the coming attack. The tanks themselves could be brought up secretly in the night; they could be launched without warning, and they could be counted upon to cut the enemy's wires and smash his strong points far mor esuccessfully than the old-fashioned artillery preparation, while the enemy would have no hint of what was coming.

Only the size of the tank proved a handicap. Already this had been perceived, and the French and the British—but particularly the French —were engaged in constructing in large numbers that "whippet" tank which was to play such an important rôle in the offensives of the following year. Thus while the tank attack at Cambrai, despite its initial success, just missed making possible complete victory, it disclosed possibilities which led to the reorganization of Allied offensive tactics,

based upon a coördination of the infantry with the tanks, which in turn led straight to the completely successful surprise attacks of the French and Americans on July 18th, and of the British on August 8th in the 1918 battles of the Second Marne and the Third Somme—battles which together wrecked all German hopes of victory and at last prepared the way for the liberation of France and the defeat of Germany.

By contrast the German surprise tactics relied rather upon human than mechanical means. At Riga, in September, Von Hutier had completely overwhelmed the Russians by suddenly throwing against the rapidly disintegrating Slav forces large bodies of troops secretly assembled. The method of bringing these troops to the operative front was extremely ingenious. They were concentrated three or four days' march in rear of the front—so far back that, though their presence might be signalled by air observers, there was nothing to show where they would be put in. They were then moved up by night, concealed in villages and forests during the day, so that they arrived on the battlefield without having awakened the enemy's suspicions, and then they were put in, after a brief artillery preparation deriving its efficacy from the use of gas and smoke shells, which deluged the back areas, paralyzed the hostile artillery, and prevented the rapid approach of reserves.

Successful at Riga the Hutier tactics were then employed against the Italians at Caporetto, where they brought off one of the greatest successes of the war. They were then tried against the British in the final phase of Cambrai, where they transformed what had been a considerable British victory into a sterile venture, and finally, in the following year—in March in Picardy, in April in Flanders, and in May on the Chemin-des-Dames—they resulted in hitherto unparalleled successes, which almost won the war.

Thus, while its results were unimportant, the Battle of Cambrai is of utmost interest on the military side because in it were employed two offensive methods new in themselves, each of which restored the element of surprise without which victory was impossible, and the deadlock of trench warfare destined to be permanent. And yet, oddly

enough, neither side sufficiently recognized the threat in the new enemy tactics to prepare against it. Since the Germans possessed the initiative at the opening of the next campaign they were able to employ their method first, and the circumstances of the British disaster of March 21st, on ground not far distant from the battlefield of Cambrai itself, exactly recalled their experience of November, 1917.

### II. PURPOSE AND TOPOGRAPHY

British strategy at Cambrai was based upon the following calculations. The operation in Flanders had been drowned. It was no longer possible to move about Ypres, and the armies engaged in the conflict on the British side were exhausted by their efforts and shaken by their losses. Nevertheless, it was essential to do something before the campaign closed, if only to prevent the Germans from sending troops to that Italian front on which there had now occurred the disaster of Caporetto, which threatened to put Italy out of the war.

Sir Douglas Haig, and all Allied military authorities, had recognized that, as a result of the Russian collapse, the Germans would be able to pass to the offensive in the following year. But it seemed possible to strike one more blow, achieve a local success which might restore Allied morale, aid the Italians by diverting German divisions, and not impossibly improve the front on which the Allies would have to meet the storm that was soon to break.

Such an offensive could have no far-looking objectives. Sir Douglas Haig lacked the reserves to begin a new operation of the magnitude of either the Somme or of Flanders, while the season of the year precluded any long continuation of the battle. In point of fact, he lacked the troops necessary to venture upon any offensive. Such forces as he was able to muster were, as the events proved, incapable of exploiting a really great gain when it was made; were insufficient to continue the battle when the apparent approach of decisive victory again tempted the Commander-in-Chief to pursue the engagement; and were unable, in the last phase, to prevent the Germans in their turn from surprising British divisions, breaking the old British front, and coming within an ace

of achieving as great a success as the British themselves missed by an equally small margin. The Battle of Cambrai, then, belongs to that considerable number of gambles of which Gallipoli and the first dash to Bagdad were even more unfortunate examples. Like them it had its brilliant opening phase, which aroused hopes incapable of realization, and in the end brought a depression dangerous in the extreme.

The country selected by Sir Douglas Haig for this offensive was a seven-mile front mainly included between two great national highways: the Amiens-Cambrai road coming up from Albert across the battlefield of the Somme and from Bapaume to Cambrai across the country devastated by the great German retreat, and the Péronne-Cambrai road coming up from the south and joining the St. Quentin road at the Scheldt Canal, a few miles south of Cambrai. This country is level with low swells, affording wide views. On the Bapaume road, where the British attack began, it is possible to see Cambrai, with its spires and chimneys, some eight miles away, with Bourlon Woods, one of the main circumstances of the battle, to the west of it. In the same way, standing on the Péronne road, one has an equally far-swinging view, although Cambrai itself is hidden behind the low hills north of the Scheldt Canal. The generally level nature of the country offered an admirable field of operations for the tanks. Nor were there any such elaborate systems of defences based upon natural obstacles as the British armies had met on Vimy Ridge and the French on the Craonne Plateau. The only considerable obstacle was the double barrier of the Scheldt River and the Scheldt Canal, which crossed the route of the British advance diagonally but behind three of the four German defensive systems. The Canal du Nord at the other end of the battlefield, while more considerable, was successfully turned.

It was the purpose of Haig, using the British Third Army—which Allenby had led to victory at Arras, and Sir Julian Byng, who had commanded the Canadians in the Vimy attack, now directed—to surprise the Germans in positions between the Bapaume and Péronne roads, break through their various systems of defence, push across the Scheldt

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

Canal, take Bourlon Woods on the west and the high ground beyond the Scheldt Canal on the east.

The capture of this high ground behind the Scheldt Canal would so establish the British flank as to render it secure against German counter-attacks, while the possession of Bourlon would give Byng a position behind the Hindenburg Line, facing Arras, comparable with that the Germans occupied with respect of Ypres as long as they held the Messines-

"Whitesheet" Ridge. Cambrai itself might fall but would certainly be at the mercy of British guns once Bourlon Woods, which dominated it, were taken, and the Germans would lose effective possession of one of the most vital railroad centres along the whole western front. In Haig's plan he calculated that the British would have forty-eight hours, gained by their surprise, before the Germans could concentrate reserves in sufficient numbers. In that time, and mainly in the first twenty-four hours, he hoped to seize Bourlon, cross the Scheldt Canal, and establish his flank on the heights to the north and to the east of this barrier, and, through the gap which he had opened in the German lines, pour in his cavalry exactly as Nivelle had expected to exploit his victory on the Craonne Plateau by launching his cavalry toward Laon and La Fère. A retreat of the Germans from all the stretch of the Hindenburg Line from Lens to Cambrai would thus be inevitable.

But the whole strategy of the British commander depended, first, upon a complete surprise; second, on a swift passage of the Scheldt and conquest of the high ground above it; and third, on an equally prompt occupation of Bourlon Woods. Unless the close of the first forty-eight hours brought these things, together with the effective breaking of all of the German systems of defence and the successful penetration of the cavalry, it was inevitable that the Germans, who had more divisions available, would be able to smother the British resistance.

### III. THE BATTLE

At 5 o'clock on the morning of November 20th the British guns opened on a 20-mile front from Bullecourt, which had been at the southwest extremity of the Battle of Arras, to Epehy in the St. Quentin sector. The artillery fire was of the briefest duration, of the sort subsequently described as a "crash" bombardment and a familiar circumstance in later offensives. A little more than an hour after the brief bombardment, British tanks, followed by British infantry, left their trenches on the front from just north of the Bapaume road south of the town of Moeuvres, which is on the Canal du Nord and was held by the Germans, to the village of Gonnelieu, just south of the Péronne road, which was

held by the British. The distance between these points was rather more than six miles.

The surprise was complete. Favoured by mist and helped by smoke the tanks reached the advance line of the Germans before they were discovered, and overran it without difficulty. There then began an extraordinary forward sweep hardly paralleled before on the western front. The German troops bolted, the German defence collapsed, and all through the morning of November 20th the British had every reason to believe that the long-anticipated "break-through" had at last arrived. All through that morning the infantry continued to press forward. By noon Anneux, just south of the Bapaume road and almost half way between the British front and Cambrai, had been taken. In the centre the British had reached the town of Flesquières, while to the south Ribecourt had been taken and Marcoing approached. Still farther to the south the British had advanced along the Péronne road beyond the point where it is intersected by the St. Quentin highway. During the afternoon the gains were expanded, but along with much progress there came certain disappointments. Largely owing to the courage of a German artillery officer, who, single-handed, worked his guns in Flesquières, the British tank attack was long checked and many tanks put out of operation, while the Germans were able to destroy several of the important bridges across the Scheldt Canal from Masnières to Crèvecœur. The result of the resistance at Flesquières and the failure to get the bridges intact had fatal consequences. The British were unable on this first day to establish their right flank above the Scheldt Canal or overrun the fourth and final German positions. They were equally unable to reach Bourlon Woods. They had advanced four and a half miles in places; they had captured many thousands of prisoners and over a hundred guns, but the great cavalry operation had been impossible owing to the destruction of the bridges, and on the morning of the 21st the British found themselves in a salient quite as narrow as that which had persisted so long at Ypres. The enemy was still in Bourlon Woods and on the heights about Crèvecœur occupying vantage points entirely comparable with those held by the Germans about Ypres on the Pilkem and "White-

sheet" ridges before Plumer's June battle. Moreover, twenty-four hours of the forty-eight in which the surprise ensured superiority in numbers to the assailants had now passed and already German reserves were beginning to arrive. On November 21st the battle was resumed. This time a brief success carried the British into Bourlon Woods through the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, three miles from the centre of Cambrai itself, but it did not enable them to establish their right flank by the occupation of Rumilly and Crèvecœur which from the beginning had been recognized as essential.

By night of the 21st the forty-eight hours of grace had expired. No further profit could be derived as a consequence of the surprise. The German reserves were arriving from all directions and would at no distant date outnumber the British. Only the now weary troops of the Third Army were available, since proffered French reserves were to have been used only in case of the maximum gain which had been foreseen but not realized. As the situation now stood, the British must either go forward or back. They had thrust their neck into a vise, the jaws of which were represented by Bourlon Woods and the high ground about Crèvecœur, and they must either break at least one of the jaws or retire before the vise closed.

Sir Douglas Haig chose to risk a further attempt to advance, defending himself subsequently by the following summary of the situation:

> . . . It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless this ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the Flesquières Ridge would be necessary, and would have to be carried out at once.
>
> On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move eastward. The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy's defensive lines south of the Scarpe and Sensée rivers would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this sector jeopardized. In short, so great was the importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would

# BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE EAST

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IN MESOPOTAMIA

"A close one which held us up a bit"

THE BRITISH IN THE HOLY LAND—I

The Camel Corps near Beersheba, the city where Abraham dwelt and "planted a grove." General Allenby began his active campaign for Jerusalem by the capture of Beersheba, October 31, 1917

Copyright by Brown Brothers

THE BRITISH IN THE HOLY LAND—II

Troops resting before their attack on Gaza. Its capture on November 7 was the second step on their road to Jerusalem. It will be remembered that Samson once carried off the gates of Gaza, and afterward met his death there by pulling down the pillars of the house wherein he was held captive. "So the dead which he slew at his death were more than they which he slew in his life."

THE BRITISH IN THE HOLY LAND—III

General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem, December 11, 1917. "Then the city was broken up and all the men of war fled, and went forth out of the city by night." Seven times in its long history has Jerusalem fallen, before the besieger. Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Christians, and Turks have held it. Before its latest capitulation it had been out of Christian hands for nearly seven centuries.



A TALKATIVE PRISONER

This Arab sheik volubly protests his innocence with oriental plenitude of word and gesture, but his British captor pays no heed at all and stands so stolidly that only proof of the authenticity of the photograph convinced us that he was not a stuffed lay figure.

THE ARRIVAL OF RATIONS AT A BRITISH OUTPOST IN THE SINAI PENINSULA

This ship of the desert had journeyed 130 miles



THE WAR IN WEST AFRICA

Germans in a border fortress firing on a reconnoitring British cavalry patrol



THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA

These men of the King's African Rifles have encountered a hostile patrol in the jungle and are having a brush with them

probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of it.

The successive days of constant marching and fighting had placed a very severe strain upon the endurance of the troops, and, before a further advance could be undertaken, some time would have to be spent in resting and relieving them. This need for delay was regrettable, as the enemy's forces were increasing, and fresh German divisions were known to be arriving, but, with the limited number of troops at my command, it was unavoidable.

It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no more than enough to replace the enemy's losses: and although the right of our advance had definitely been stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northward and northwestward, and this part of my task had been to a great extent achieved.

An additional and very important argument in favour of proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what measure of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of strength, the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good.

After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position.

The 22nd November was spent in organizing the captured ground, in carrying out certain reliefs, and in giving other troops the rest they greatly needed. Soon after midday the enemy regained Fontaine-Notre-Dame; but, with our troops already on the outskirts of Bourlon Wood, and Cantaing held by us, it was thought that the re-capture of Fontaine should not prove very difficult. The necessary arrangements for renewing the attack were therefore pushed on, and our plans were extended to include the recapture of Fontaine-Notre-Dame.

Meantime, early in the night of the 22nd November, a battalion of the Queen's Westminsters stormed a commanding tactical point in the Hindenburg Line west of Moeuvres known as Tadpole Copse, the possession of which would be of value in connection with the left flank of the Bourlon position when the latter had been secured.

That this decision to go on was unwise, every subsequent circumstance seems to indicate. Haig had now taken 10,500 prisoners, nearly 150 guns, and his losses were still inconsiderable by comparison with

those of the Germans. He grossly underestimated German resources and reserves and he unmistakably exaggerated the further fighting strength of certain units in the Third Army, at least one division of which had been practically annihilated in Flanders, and now, with green troops, was in position in a vital sector.

Having made the decision Haig put the Third Army at work again and in the following days acquired and despite certain fluctuations, maintained, a firm hold on Bourlon Woods, but he was not able to make any considerable change or improvement along his right flank nor did this brief tenure in Bourlon Woods lead to any German retirement on the Arras front. Continuing their counter-attacks on Bourlon the Germans hung on elsewhere.

Meantime, the news of the success at Cambrai, reaching Britain not long after the crushing tidings of Italian disaster and the not-less-manifest evidence of failure in Flanders, roused widespread enthusiasm and for the first time in the war the bells of St. Paul's were rung. English and Allied publics continued to look hopefully ahead to the arrival of British troops in Cambrai long after Cambrai had become as far removed from British reach as Berlin itself.

Meantime, once the temporary disarray incident to the surprise was over, the enemy—under the command of that General Marwitz, who, as a cavalry leader, had already checked the British at the decisive moment at the Marne and a year later was unsuccessfully to strive to check the Americans in the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne—took his measures. His strategy was simple, the strategy invariably employed in dealing with an enemy salient. He sought to pinch it out by attacks from the sides similar to those successfully made by Pershing at St. Mihiel, and he hoped, by breaking in the sides behind the nose of the salient, to capture large numbers of British troops and guns, as Pershing captured German soldiers and guns at St. Mihiel in September, 1918.

To accomplish this task he assembled an overwhelming force secretly, the actual arrival of which in battle was the first clear evidence to the Allies of the extent to which the Russian collapse had released German divisions for western service. These troops were brought in

by the Hutier method so successfully that while the British knew a counter-attack was coming, and knew, as every soldier would know, where the blow must fall, they were in the end totally surprised along a vital section of the front. On November 30th, ten days after the British attack, sixteen fresh German divisions were thrown against the British, the main masses being used on the north and south sides of the salient the British advance had created, that is against Bourlon Woods, and against that portion of the British lines where the new front of the salient rejoined the old front.

It is the attack on this latter sector which is more interesting, as it was more successful. Preceded by a bombardment of gas and smoke shells, aided by the fogs of morning, and carried out by overwhelming masses of shock troops, several details of this attack recall with unfortunate exactitude the circumstances of that far vaster and more disastrous assault on a forty-mile front on March 21st of the next year.

Before the British were aware of the peril, German infantry had overrun their lines. The division immediately assailed—which had been cut to pieces in Flanders and was now occupying a supposedly quiet sector training its replacements—gave way, opening a wide gap in the British front through which the victorious German troops pressed rapidly forward, occupying the villages of Gonnelieu, Villers-Guislain and Gouzeaucourt on the Péronne road itself. In these first morning hours it seemed inevitable that the Germans would be able to advance behind the whole Cambrai salient and make a vast capture in men and material.

While the Germans on the southern side of the salient were thus making their successful advance, following their astonishing surprise, other German divisions were pounding with terrific energy on the northern side of the salient about Bourlon Woods, and thence eastward and southward along the whole salient. Fortunately for the British no such collapse took place on their left and centre as had resulted through the German advance on their right. By afternoon the Guards Division, which was in reserve, together with certain cavalry units, had been pushed into action and had re-captured Gouzeaucourt and reëstablished

the imperilled flank. The Germans had no longer any real chance of bringing off a huge success.

Nevertheless, there was no further possibility of holding the Cambrai salient or maintaining a grip on the all-important position of Bourlon Woods. The effort to transform the local and considerable momentary success into a permanent advantage had not only failed but had invited a German counter-thrust which had resulted in gains by the Germans both in prisoners and guns totally counterbalancing the original British profit. Moreover, such elation as had been excited by the initial success inevitably gave way now to a depression the more intense because this failure coincided with equally depressing situations elsewhere.

Such, in its brief form, was the Battle of Cambrai. "The Cambrai Fright" as Ludendorff later described the tank surprise. The British, when they had with skill and success re-organized their line, were still able to point to a certain number of square miles of territory permanently gained and to the possession of the ruins of a few villages which had been inside of the German lines when the attack of November 20th opened. They had released some hundreds of French inhabitants of these villages. They had for a moment threatened to achieve a complete rupture of the German front, but actually in casualties and prisoners the gains of the two armies were at least even, while to the man in the street it seemed that the British had completely missed a great opportunity—while the Germans had extricated themselves from a dangerous position with consummate skill and turned temporary defeat into incontestable success.

Cambrai, then, was no counterweight for the Flanders failure. It contributed nothing to restore the confidence of Allied publics, shaken alike by the Italian disaster and the Russian collapse; and, what was of even greater importance, the successful employment by the Germans of their new Hutier tactics did not open the eyes of the British to the perils this new method had for their own troops, untrained to defensive warfare. Finally there was discoverable, in the collapse of a British division, symptoms of a decline in morale and in fighting capacity not hitherto disclosed in all the terrible tests of more than three years. Cambrai

should have been a warning. However much Sir Douglas Haig and his associate commanders may have blundered in risking the offensive with inadequate resources, in persisting in it when all real chance of further gain had vanished, the real indictment must be found in the fact that from this failure, from the German success, they were unable to derive lessons which, if learned, might have prevented, four months later, what was to prove the greatest military disaster in all British history, for what happened to a division on November 30th happened to a whole army on March 21st.

### IV. JERUSALEM

As the year closed British success in a far distant field served in some small degree to relieve the depression arising from the unbroken list of losses and failures elsewhere. On Tuesday, December 11th, Sir Edmund Allenby, who at the opening of the year had commanded the British Third Army at Arras, entered Jerusalem after a brief but brilliant campaign which was to prove but the prelude to that far greater success in the following year. This later triumph would in its turn drive the Turk out of Syria as well as Palestine, destroy three of his armies, and after long centuries avenge the failures of the Crusaders, while for the victor it would earn the reward of promotion to the rank of field marshal.

When Allenby came to the Holy Land the British forces, under General Murray, had suffered a severe check at Gaza on the edge of the Egyptian frontier and all further advance seemed forbidden, but under Allenby's direction a railroad had been pushed across the desert from the Suez Canal, the waters of the Nile had been piped into the wastes of Palestine, not only quenching the thirst of thousands of British soldiers, but, in the minds of the superstitious Turk, now presaging defeat—since there was a legend that the Turks would stay in Jerusalem until the waters of the Nile arrived in Palestine. By the last of October Allenby was ready. His first operations cleared Beersheba and his advance thereafter followed the sea coast and the Hebron road. By November 16th he had occupied Jaffa, the port of Jerusalem, and by November 21st his troops looked down on the Holy City from the west. On December 9th other British troops, following the Hebron road, were

north and east of the city and across the Jericho road. All German efforts to prevent the disaster arrived at nothing. Falkenhayn, the engineer of the Verdun offensive, visited the front and returned convinced that nothing could be done. Finally, on December 9th, on the day of the festival celebrating the recapture of the Temple by Judas Maccabeus in 165 B. C., the Turkish garrison of Jerusalem capitulated. Two days later, on foot, through the Jaffa Gate. Allenby entered the town.

In the subsequent weeks, the British advance pushed forward until the new front was well beyond the range of the city and there the campaign paused, while the British began those preparations which, in the following autumn, were to lead to one of the most amazing victories in military history won on the Plain of Armageddon. Thus two British successes, both against the Turk, one of which carried Bagdad and the other resulted in the capture of Jerusalem, supplied bright spots in the darkness of this year of unmistakable depression, and disclosed two British generals whose achievements in the eastern theatre won enduring glory and were rivalled in British armies on the western front only by those of Sir Herbert Plumer. Maude, Allenby, and Plumer were thenceforth recognized as the great British army commanders of the war, and but for Maude's untimely death it is hardly doubtful that he would have been called to higher command on the western front.

In his report of military operations for the year 1917 Sir Douglas Haig announced that British armies had captured 114,544 prisoners, of which 73,131 were taken on the French front, and 761 guns, 530 of which were taken in France, while the losses in prisoners were 28,279 and in guns 166, practically all on the French front. This was a better showing in men captured than in the previous year but worse in guns, most of which were lost at Cambrai. These figures were, however, to seem insignificant as compared with the German and Allied captures in the coming campaign.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

## CAPORETTO—AND PETAIN'S ACHIEVEMENT

### I

### THE DISASTER

On October 24th Italy was overtaken by the first of that series of military disasters which destroyed, successively, an Italian, a British, and a French army; in each case resulted in far-swinging advance on the part of the enemy, and placed the whole military establishment of the nation assailed in gravest jeopardy.

Two years after the great disaster of Caporetto an Italian military commission reported that there had been three causes for the collapse of the Italian Second Army. These causes were: first, the failure of Cadorna and his subordinate generals to provide necessary reserves and adequate second and third positions; second, the successful progress of enemy and socialistic propaganda in the Italian army, and third, the new German tactics.

The destruction of the British Fifth Army in March of the following year was to recall in many details the Caporetto disaster, while the British and French collapse on the Chemin-des-Dames in May was to reproduce still others. In the case of the British there was no propaganda but there was an army wearied by its exertions and strained by its losses in Flanders, without adequate reserves and with insufficient support lines. In the case of the French and the British on the Chemin-des-Dames there was again no propaganda, while there were an infinite number of support and secondary defence systems and two considerable rivers behind to serve as defence lines.

As a consequence of these later experiences of the armies of Italy's allies, there has been a revision of the judgment passed upon Cadorna and the Italian troops at the time. The fact seems to be that the Germans had now devised a system of offensive—used at Riga and sub-

sequently employed at Cambrai—which was destined to bring them victories and to prove irresistible until a successful answer was discovered and developed by General Gouraud and by him employed to break the last German offensive of the war on July 15, 1918, in Champagne. Perhaps the best analysis of this German method was supplied by Gouraud himself in an interview which he gave to the press after his great victory. In this—having pointed out that, with slight modifications, the tactics which had failed against him were precisely those that succeeded at Caporetto against the Italians, in Picardy against the British, and on the Chemin-des-Dames against the British and French—he said:

> The Von Hutier system broke the trench warfare deadlock in the German favour by two factors: First, the element of surprise—that is, development of unexpected strength both of men and guns at a given point—and secondly, by neutralizing the land—or trench—defences by a brief bombardment of tremendous volume, followed by a smoke screen against which the defenders that escaped destruction were virtually powerless.
>
> Beginning usually four hours before the zero hour, fixed around dawn, the enemy would open fire with four or five times as many guns as the defender thought he possessed in that sector. During the preceding weeks they had been "registering" on every worth-while objective, but taking care to space the registering shots so as to conceal their great strength. The bombardment would contain a fixed proportion of gas and high explosive calculated to render the defence positions untenable for a considerable depth. During the final hour smoke shells, at the rate of about two to one, would be added. Then at the zero hour the infantry, masked and lightly equipped, would charge forward at full speed through the gas and smoke, literally swamping the defenders and often penetrating right to the artillery positions before the isolated groups in the front-line defences realized that they were surrounded.

General Gouraud also pointed out at this time that the infantry divisions employed in these operations had been carefully trained in readiness, and brought up at the last moment by forced marches at night, during which every precaution was taken, and taken successfully in all cases, to avoid detection by airplanes. Not until the Battle of Champagne was the element of surprise eliminated but on this occasion Gouraud not only knew where the attack was coming, but the precise hour of the very morning on which it would be launched. For the at-

tack upon the Italians, in late October, preparations had been made over a long period. Not only were German troops sent to the Italian front for the first time during the war but the whole Austrian military forces were placed directly under the German General Staff, and Ludendorff himself assumed charge of operations.

As a consequence of the Italian local successes through the spring and summer, the Italians occupied in October a situation satisfying if they were going to continue an offensive but perilous in the extreme if, as was now the case, they were to be attacked. Their Third Army continued to hold the positions between the Adriatic and the foot of the hills above Gorizia—positions which had in the main been held for a long period of time and were properly organized alike for defence and for further offensive operations. Far different was the situation of the Second Army. In the operations against the Bainsizza Plateau it had




THE ITALIAN DISASTER

Solid black shows territory occupied by the Austrians on the day following Caporetto. The white arrow indicates the point at which the Germans broke through and their line of advance through Cividale to Udine cutting off the retreat of the Italians.

pushed across the deep canyon of the Isonzo, climbed up to the mountain rim of the Bainsizza Plateau itself, and then attempted to envelop Monte San Gabriele which was the final barrier to a forward advance to Trieste. This fighting for Monte San Gabriele had as completely exhausted the Second Army as the Flanders operations had used up the offensive qualities of the British troops. Along with this exhaustion, due to too greatly prolonged strain, was a decline in morale resulting from the use made of the Pope's recent Peace Note by German, socialist, and clerical propagandists, the generally bad economic condition of Italy; and the growing unrest in the civil population.

Thus the Second Army, on the morning of October 24th, was an army already shaken in spirit, weakened by losses, fought-out in a campaign in which too much had been asked of it, and it occupied a perilous position with its centre and one flank thrown across an unfordable river, having at its rear only such communications as it had been possible to construct during battle, while the northern flank, parts of which were on opposite sides of the river, was composed of second- and third-line troops without adequate reserves or sufficient second-line defences.

A glance at the map discloses the full extent of the peril. Could the Germans break the northern flank of the Second Army and seize the crossings of the Isonzo at Caporetto, they would have a straight road to Udine and it might be possible for them, pressing southward to and through this town, to cut off all of the Italian Second Army as well as the Third and achieve that colossal Sedan which they had sought in France in the opening days of the war.

Moreover, in choosing their time for this attack, the Germans followed a system which by this time had become familiar. In 1915 they had closed a year of alternating success and failure by crushing Serbia and opening the road to the Golden Horn. They had terminated the campaign of the following year by entering Bukharest and crushing Roumania. It was of utmost importance to them to end the campaign of 1917 by a shining success which would serve alike to depress the morale of their enemies, raise the spirits of their own civil population, and supply the basis for further propaganda and pacifist operations.

The position occupied by the Italian Second Army, on the Bainsizza Plateau, was a pronounced and perilous salient. Now, as at Cambrai, the Germans undertook to "pinch out" this Bainsizza salient by a surprise attack. In the case of Cambrai they attacked from both sides of the British salient and were successful on only one. In the case of Bainsizza they attacked on only one side, but with extraordinary success. The operation which followed is perhaps most closely reminiscent of that at the Dunajec. In April, 1915, the main Russian armies were across the Carpathians about the Dukla Pass and were pushing onward into Hungary, while their flanks were covered by the armies of Dimitrieff along the Dunajec River and of Lechitsky on the crest of the Carpathians south and west of the Dukla. When Mackensen attacked Dimitrieff and destroyed his army the position of the main Russian masses under Ivanoff was critical; there were some days before it was clear whether the Russians would escape or suffer a Sedan. They got away, but they left prisoners, guns, and flags in German possession, and so great was the dislocation of their front that they were unable to make a successful stand until early autumn; and in point of fact neither the army nor the Government ever recovered from the effects of the disaster.

Now the German blow of October, 1917, was similar to the thrust at the Dunajec in May, 1915. It was levelled at that portion of the Italian forces guarding the flank of the Second Army on both sides of the Isonzo from Tolmino to Flitsch, and particularly at those troops occupying the bridge-head of Caporetto on the road to Udine. Once this force had been crushed the Germans would be able to advance southwestward upon Udine by the Cividale Valley, and a few hours after the Italian lines collapsed they were actually nearer to Cadorna's headquarters in this town than much of the Italian Second and all of the Third Army, and were approaching the line of communications by which the Second and Third armies must retire. Favoured again by mist, by driving rain, and even by snow in the upper mountains, six German divisions under Otto von Below fell upon the flank of the Italian Second Army, after a brief bombardment on the whole extent of their front from Zaga

on the north to the edge of the Bainsizza Plateau. The attack was immediately successful, the surprise was complete. Certain units made no resistance whatever, some even laid down their arms in advance of the arrival of the assailants, and in the briefest possible time the left or north flank of the Second Army had ceased to exist. In a subsequent official statement Cadorna himself charged those responsible, officers and men alike, with treason. This declaration was softened by the substitution of the term "insufficient resistance" for the allegation of treason, but otherwise the statement was permitted to issue and was as follows:

> The violence of the attack and an insufficient resistance on the part of certain units of the Second Army have permitted the Austro-German forces to break through our defence on the left wing of the Julian sector. The valiant behaviour of the other troops did not suffice to prevent the enemy from penetrating to the sacred soil of our fatherland. Our line retires according to plan. The depots and munition stores of the territory evacuated have all been destroyed. The splendid courage of our soldiers in so many famous battles fought and won during the two and a half years of war encourages the High Command to hope that on this occasion the Army, to which is entrusted the honour and the safety of Italy, will know how to do its duty.

## II. TO THE PIAVE

The consequences of the collapse of the left flank of the Second Army were of utmost gravity. Below's German troops were now behind the Second Army, sweeping over the Julian Alps across its rear to Udine. In the following days this army broke up, ceased to exist. Its artillery, its vast stores of munitions, by far the greater part of its troops—officers and men alike—were captured. The fate of the Second Army was sealed once Below had passed the Isonzo at Caporetto and the Italian troops had failed to react on their own side of the river. The destruction of the Second Army was more complete than that of Gough's British Fifth Army in the offensive of March 21st of the following year. Its resistance was incomparably less determined, yet in both cases, although with different preliminary resistance, an army collapsed and left a great gap on a whole front through which the enemy poured in.

The single problem that remained after the first few hours following the Caporetto disaster was whether the Italian Third Army, commanded by the Duke of Aosta and occupying the Isonzo front from Gorizia to the sea, would be able to get back before it was enveloped by the German armies coming from the north and cutting its roads and railroads. Could it make such a retreat and escape envelopment there was a chance that the Italians might be able to rally at the Tagliamento, on the east side of which the Austrians had temporarily held up Napoleon in his great campaign of 1797.

By the narrowest possible margin the Italian Third Army succeeded in passing the Tagliamento in advance of the German and Austrian troops which were seeking to envelop it, but it only escaped by sacrificing all of its material and most of its artillery. But precisely as in the Dunajec time the Russians were able to halt but not to hold at the line of the San, the Italians rallied but were unable to remain at the Tagliamento. On October 29th the enemy was in Udine; on October 31st he had reached the Tagliamento, and three days later he passed the river north of the Treviso-Udine railroad.

The next position on which an Italian stand was possible was behind the Livenza, a smaller river which parallels the Tagliamento, but the fighting at this stream was less considerable than at the Tagliamento. By November 6th the enemy was across this river, still following the Treviso-Udine railroad, and by November 9th he was on the east bank of the Piave, the last position from which the Italians could cover Venice. By this time they had evacuated not merely all of the Venetian plain east of the Piave but all of the upper valley of this stream from Feltre to Cadore including the eastern slopes of the Dolomites, familiar to all alpinists. The Fourth Army had been brought back from the Carnic and Cadore fronts which it had held with such great distinction from the outset of the war, and the Italian front now stood from Lago di Garda along the mountains, followed by the old frontier as far as the Piave, at the point where it leaves the mountains, and thence behind that stream to the sea hardly twenty miles east of Venice. If the Italians were turned or forced out of the Piave position they would have

to go behind the Adige, abandoning Venice, Vicenza, and Padua to the enemy, bringing the Austrians and Germans close to the forts of Verona and surrendering to the Austrians practically all of the province of Venetia.

Moreover, the Italian situation behind the Piave, while strong in the plain where the river offered a considerable barrier to direct advance, was weak on the hills, as had been disclosed in the Austrian offensive of 1916 when the Italians had been driven off the Asiago Plateau and the Austrians had almost reached the plain. On their north flank the Italians were now open to an attack down the Astico and Brenta valleys which, if successful, would have precisely the same peril for them as the recent German advance down the Cividale Valley. In other words, it was impossible for the Italians to stand at the Piave if their troops to the north failed to hold the foothills of the Alps between the Adige and the Piave, and if they were unable to hold the Piave line they would have to give up Venice and go back of the Adige and the Po, while any disaster in the hills would infallibly ruin all the remaining Italian armies, carry the victors to Milan, and force the Italians to make a separate peace. Already French troops, commanded by Fayolle—Petain's ablest lieutenant, who had fought with the British at the Somme—were on their way to the Italian front, and the British, after momentary hesitation, were sending Plumer with other troops; but considerable time must elapse before this aid could arrive and in this time Italy must still rely upon herself. Unless she could save herself, no aid from her allies could be of any value. In the immediate presence of Foch, however, she found assistance, and the great French soldier now appeared upon an Italian field of disaster and played something of that rôle which four months later he was to play in the presence of a British disaster even more perilous to the whole Allied cause.

Fortunately Italy measured up to the supreme test. The country rose behind the army; the whole national spirit of the people was touched; "defeatism" gave way to patriotism; political intrigues collapsed; the nation from the king to the peasant echoed Petain's immortal words at Verdun—"They shall not pass"—which proved the watchword of vic-




ITALY'S STAND AT THE PIAVE

The three arrows indicate the valleys by which the Austro-Germans attempted to descend to the plain behind the Italian front. The severest fighting was at Mt. Grappa and on the Asiago Plateau.

tory at the Piave as it had at the Meuse. Through December the Austrians, with gradually declining German aid, strove to transform a victory into one more decisive battle of the world. The main attacks were delivered not on the Piave front but in the mountains, although the Austrians succeeded in crossing at several places notably in the lagoons nearest to Venice. They gained ground but they fell short of their objectives, and snow and winter came together with French and British troops, while the Italian lines still stood fast at the Piave. The greatest victory on the western front during the whole war—with the possible exception of Ludendorff's supreme success in March of the

next year—had no morrow. In the following year the Italians were to endure and defeat one more offensive at the Piave, and then at last, passing to the offensive, see the Austrian armies dissolve before them between the Piave and the Isonzo in that same country which had beheld the heroic and successful retreat of the Italian Third Army.

But if the German victory at Caporetto missed decisive results by a narrow margin its moral effect was tremendous. While the Italian armies were still struggling to escape destruction, the British offensive in Flanders came to its mournful end. Cambrai was won, and lost, and the French armies, despite successful local offensives, were still under the shadow of the Aisne defeat.

Moreover, Russia in this same time finally vanished as a factor in the war and the realization was brought home to the Allied publics of Britain, France, and Italy, not only that their campaign of 1917 had been a failure, but, provided with a new system of attack and enabled to bring all their best troops from the east to the west, the Germans now possessed the initiative, and the sole chance of winning the war rested henceforth upon the size of American armies to be sent to Europe and the rapidity with which they would arrive.

Almost on the same day that the Italian Second Army had collapsed, the first American contingent had appeared on the French front facing Alsace-Lorraine, but American forces in Europe were still insignificant, and if the submarine menace had been countered to a degree it did not yet seem possible that ships could be found to move to Europe those millions of American troops without which victory was impossible and defeat might yet become inevitable. As a consequence of Caporetto, Cadorna joined the considerable number of generals—Allied, German, and Austrian alike—whose failures had led to their disappearance from active command. He was succeeded by General Diaz, one of his ablest lieutenants, whose victory in the Second Battle of the Piave the following summer marked the turn of the tide in Allied fortunes.

Even more important was the first step taken toward unification of command on the Allied side as a direct consequence of the successive

THE MARSHAL'S BATON

Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, receives his marshal's baton from the hands of Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, while Premier Clemenceau looks on. After the ceremony the Marshal is saluted by the President in true Gallic fashion.

failures of the several armies under divided leadership. It was a halting step. It produced only that Versailles Conference which in fact was little more than an abstraction, since it had no actual authority. Out of the Versailles Conference four months later Foch emerged as generalissimo of all the Allied armies, and in the final campaign Italian troops fought in France as British troops shared Italian success in Venetia. But if this first step toward unified command carried with it the promise of victory in the future, at the moment when it was made it was an insignificant circumstance in the minds of the Allied publics, which saw in Caporetto an unparalleled disaster, which had cost the Italians 250,000 prisoners, more than 2,000 guns, most of their military material—the whole accumulation of two and a half years—and enriched the Austrians not merely by these military prizes, but by considerable foodstuffs as well, and enabled them to occupy more than 2,000 square miles of Italian soil, while depriving the Italians of almost every foot of Italia Irredenta which had been gained in three campaigns and at appalling sacrifice.

### III. PETAIN'S ACHIEVEMENT

While the British army was failing in Flanders, the Italian army going to disaster at Caporetto, the Russian army dissolving, what was the position of the French? When Petain had succeeded Nivelle in May he took over an army shaken in morale, no longer responsive to that discipline which for more than three years had been a circumstance alike in heroic defence and in splendid offence.

Following his accession to the High Command, Petain promptly informed his British allies that they could expect from the French nothing in the way of offensive operation for at least two months to come. In fact, it was not until August, when the Flanders offensive had already touched approximate failure, that the first French blow could be delivered.

Meantime, the immediate task of Petain was hardly less considerable than that which confronted him when he was called to save the compromised situation at Verdun. He had to restore the confidence of the soldiers in their commanders. He had to satisfy certain of their legiti-

mate demands. He had in many cases to find new generals and await the construction of new staffs. All of these things he did with consummate success. The French army which entered the campaign of 1918 was incomparably superior to the British. If it was no longer capable of such efforts as had marked the French forces in 1914 and 1915 it was to demonstrate in the crucial hours of March and April the old Verdun capacity for holding and in the counter-offensive of July to disclose at least a flash of that *élan* which had made the French infantry famous for centuries.

The first military problem faced by Petain was left over from the abortive Nivelle operation on the Chemin-des-Dames. When the French abandoned the offensive here the Germans seized it and eagerly sought to take advantage of the temporary disorganization within the French ranks. All through June and July the German showered terrific attacks along the whole of the Chemin-des-Dames position and particularly on the eastern half from Heurtebrise Farm to Craonne. Just above the little ruined village of Craonne, the eastern end of the Craonne Plateau culminates in two relatively narrow level plateaux, while the ridge itself, seen either from the north, the east, or the south, assumes a dominating character reminiscent of Douaumont, and one of the most impressive landmarks of the whole front.

The French had cleared this eastern end with its two little plateaux of Californie and Casemates in the May attacks. Now the Germans sought, by repeated assaults, coming up the steep slopes out of the marshy valley of the Ailette, to regain those crests which in all the German military reports are known as the "Winterberg"—the same crests from which the Kaiser on May 27th, of the following year, surveyed a field of victory. Time and again they mounted to the attack, effected a lodgment, lingered for a few hours, and were driven off. Eight weeks of almost continuous fighting gained them no permanent hold anywhere along the lines the French had established in the April offensive. Any hope that deflection in French morale would open the way to a victory such as was subsequently achieved at Caporetto proved illusory. If the French veterans would no longer attack impregnable positions,

would no longer consent to be led against unbroken wire and undestroyed machine-gun nests, they still retained the spirit and the strength necessary to convince their German opponents of the folly of similar ventures. The fighting of this June and July, largely filling the press of the time, had no permanent value.

While the French lines thus held at Craonne, Petain reorganized his armies. Late July saw a French army despatched to the Flanders front to share with the British in the Third Battle of Ypres and perform there a useful if subsidiary service wholly comparable with that performed by the French armies in the Battle of the Somme. But it was not until August 20th that Petain was at last ready, and his first blow coincided almost exactly with that second phase of the British opera-




THE VERDUN SECTOR

The shaded portion shows the ground captured by the Germans between February and July, 1916. The circle indicates the area of the entrenched camp of Verdun. The broken line marked the front attained by the French after Petain's successful offensive in August, 1917.

tions at Ypres which resulted in the capture of Langemarck but was nevertheless, over most of the front, a failure which doomed the whole enterprise.

For his first operation Petain chose the Verdun front, where he had achieved enduring fame in defence and subsequently demonstrated his supreme ability in the organization of a local offensive by those two attacks, one of which wrested Douaumont and Vaux from the Germans and the other released Verdun from the fatal German embrace which for many months had threatened it with strangulation. At the close of these two offensives Verdun was unblocked. Practically all the vital positions on the heights of the Meuse were retaken, but the Germans still clung to Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill on the western bank, the fruits of their second attack in 1916. Possession of these western hills would give the Allies ground from which they might in the future operate out of the Verdun salient, as the British were now attacking out of the Ypres salient. Actually the Petain offensive of August, 1917, made possible the American attack of September and October a year later, which carried the victorious American troops to Sedan and cut the vital German railroad lines connecting Metz with Lille and the Alsace-Lorraine front with that of Belgium. From the ground that Petain took from the Germans in the third and fourth weeks of August Pershing's armies advanced to their successful opening attack on September 26, 1918.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of August 20th the French troops on both banks of the Meuse left their trenches, supported by a tremendous artillery fire, and almost without resistance seized the Côte de Talou in the bend of the Meuse on the east bank, from which the Germans had direct observation up the Meuse Valley to Verdun, Hills 344 and 240 north of the line established in December of the previous year, and on this front occupied all the ground from which they had retired on the second day of the First Battle of Verdun, including the town of Samogneux on the Meuse itself. On the west bank the progress was less considerable. Dead Man's Hill was taken, but 304 held out. Two days later it fell and the French line was restored all the way westward

from the river south of the little Forges Brook, across which Pershing's troops moved to battle thirteen months later. In the first action 8,000 prisoners were captured, while the number was increased to 10,000 in the next few days. Subsequent German counter-offensives led to nothing. The French position at Verdun was now completely reëstablished within sight of the line on which the German flood of February, 1916, had broken, and Verdun, having been for three years a bulwark against German attack, was now to be the sally port from which America emerged in the final campaign of the war.

While the victory at Verdun was primarily due to Petain it reflected credit upon the new commander of the Verdun army, Guillaumat, who had succeeded Nivelle and was presently to replace Sarrail at Salonica and plan that victorious operation executed by Franchet d'Esperey after Guillaumat had returned to Paris to participate brilliantly in the last phase of the war. Guillaumat at Verdun, Gouraud in Champagne, De Maistre at the Chemin-des-Dames, were three of the new names which were to be heard with increasing frequency in the next few months, together with those of Fayolle and of Mangin, who, despite disgrace due to his share of the Nivelle failure, was to return as an army commander to the same field in 1918 and achieve a still greater reputation.

Two months after the Verdun operation, at the precise moment when the Italians were collapsing at Caporetto, Petain launched his second blow. This time he selected the front on which Nivelle had failed in the spring. He sought no grandiose objective. His purpose was limited to clearing that western end of the Craonne Plateau on either side of the Soissons-Laon road which, in German hands, imperilled the whole French position on the Craonne Plateau and was in fact a wedge driven into the centre of the entire Allied front. The key to this position was the high ground just off the Laon road, the ground occupied by the dismantled fort of Malmaison, which looked across the Ailette Valley squarely at the spires and walls of Laon. On this position Nivelle's great offensive had broken with tremendous casualties. It was one of the strongest sectors on the whole German front, recalling in its im-

mediate circumstances the crest of that Pozières Ridge held for so long by the Germans in the Battle of the Somme. On the west the German lines touched the Ailette and ran along the Vauxillon Plateau to the ridge where once the mill of Laffaux had stood. This point was "the Laffaux Corner" of Ludendorff and other German commentators. Thence they followed the high ground south of the Chemin-des-Dames eastward for several miles. The position had been fortified with utmost skill and care before the attack of April 16th. In the succeeding months its fortifications had been still more largely increased. Nevertheless, on the 23rd of October—after a six-day bombardment, which succeeded where Nivelle's had failed, smashed and wrecked the German defences and shook the morale of the German forces—the French left their trenches on an eight-mile front and in a few hours had cleared the Germans from all the high ground and taken possession of Fort Malmaison itself. The following day there were further local advances, as a result of which, on November 2nd,

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE WESTERN FRONT IN 1917

The solid black indicates the territory occupied by the Anglo-French armies at the close of the campaign. The white line, the front at the opening of the year.

the Germans evacuated all the ground still held by them on the south bank of the Ailette and for the first time since August, 1914, all of the Craonne Plateau was in French hands. More than 11,000 prisoners and 200 guns were captured, and the effect was a real if small counterweight to the Italian disaster which gave the French armies and the French people still further confidence in Petain and won for De Maistre, who commanded the army actually engaged, a place among the successful generals of the war.

The German victory on this ground in May of the following year robbed the 1917 victory of all its permanent value and much of its real importance. Nevertheless, it was a brilliant and a final example of a successful employment of the tactics which aimed at local objectives and restricted successes. It was in a sense the perfection of the strategy which Joffre had described as "nibbling" two years before, but it did not and could not produce decisive results and it gave way to the new strategy in which the element of surprise was restored both on the German and on the Allied side. As Cambrai is significant as disclosing the methods of restoring surprise and achieving at least a measure of a break through, Malmaison is worthy of note as the final appearance of that earlier method which for three years achieved the most considerable successes on the western front. By his defence at Craonne in June and July and by his victorious attacks in August and October, Petain demonstrated that the French army was not yet conquered and by the opening of the next campaign would be able to make new and great contributions to the common cause. This, after all, was the real significance of the French operations between May and the end of the year.

# CHAPTER THIRTEEN

## POLITICAL EVENTS

### I

### 1864 AND 1917

In the political even more than in the military events of 1917 students of American history will find a parallel in the year 1864. In the earlier year the prolongation of the Civil War, the long postponement of victory, the never-ending cycle of bright hopes in the spring and disappointments in the summer and autumn, had produced an atmosphere out of which there came many direct and indirect demands for peace, and more than one effort to compromise the difficulties which war had so far failed to settle.

The year 1864 was a year in which the courage of the weaker failed; faint-hearts, feeble spirits, counselled and even clamoured for an end to the struggle which had now resulted in the slaughter of a large fraction of the best manhood of America. Horace Greeley could demand peace at any price; President Lincoln himself, clearly as he saw the impossibility of compromise, was forced by public agitation to consent to that abortive Fortress Monroe conference which half a century later finds its counterpart in the mission of Smuts to Switzerland, in the activities of the British Minister at the Vatican, while in 1917, as all through this period of the Civil War, there were back-stairs negotiations, intrigues, manœuvres, important at the time, forgotten afterward, and buried now in the vast accumulation of official and unofficial papers defying the patience of later generations to examine.

In 1917, as in 1864, there arrived one of those hours in which the spirit of nations and of men began to falter—in which the clear vision, the gallant challenge to death and privation which marked the opening period of the war, had begun to give way. The very best of the manhood of France and of Britain, the spirits which knew no thought of

surrender or of compromise, were buried in all the mournful graves which stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland. There was a decline in morale everywhere. Human nature itself began to revolt against the protraction of an agony daily becoming more intolerable and daily seeming more utterly beyond remedy.

The similar period in the Civil War commands little attention and less comment now. Those Americans who know the military history of the great struggle are infinitely less well acquainted with the grimmer and less attractive phase which reveals human nature on its weaker side precisely as the battlefield discloses it in its most splendid phase. By common consent, when war has ended, men of all nations combine to dismiss from memory and from history those circumstances which detract from the glory of the unselfish sacrifice. Thus it is that, although only two years have passed since 1917, the record of the intrigues, the falterings, the weakness, is already blurred and will in no long time disappear almost completely, and later generations will think of the men and women who lived and dared and suffered in the period of the World War rather as demigods than as human beings. We shall have one more legend which, by doing utmost violence to the facts, vindicates anew the claim of fallible human nature to possession of those qualities with which the ancient Greeks decorated their gods in Homeric legend.

But if one is to understand 1917 on the military side it is essential to know it from the political angle. The intrigue, the treachery, the treason of this year, these circumstances are inextricably linked with the deeds on the battlefield. Treason behind the lines, domestic disorder, suffering of the civil population, selfishness on the part of the politicians, these things went far to explain the collapse of the Italian army at Caporetto, while, before the French tried and failed at Craonne, Caillaux had forecast a surrender peace for his country in which he should play the rôle of the supreme dastard. And as the year closed, Lord Lansdowne, former Secretary for Foreign Affairs—under whose direction Anglo-French association had hardened into military understanding, under whose immediate direction France had been encouraged in the Tangier time to challenge Germany—uttered a document, which,

however moderate in tone and reasonable in character, could have and did have no other meaning than to urge that Great Britain should make a negotiated peace with her great enemy, while that enemy was still victorious on the battlefield and confident in the possession of a continental empire greater than that of Napoleon. In the very opening weeks of the year President Wilson had spoken of "peace without victory," and when the President of the United States had so modified his views as to lead his nation into the World War these earlier sentiments remained to give courage to those weaker if not less honest spirits for whom the supreme tragedy of the war had become so intolerable that peace at any price—the "white peace" of contemporary euphemism—seemed preferable to war under any circumstances. The voices of selfishness, in class and in mass, alike, were joined with those of cowardice and treachery. All over the world there was beginning a dim perception that the destruction incident to the struggle had gone so far that there was now little chance of restoring much that had seemed an essential part of orderly government and methodical existence. As revolution in Russia more and more fiercely flamed up and the forces of anarchy attacked institutions and obliterated systems, there spread a growing consciousness, a mounting apprehension, that while armies still faced each other in the trench deadlock, Bolshevism might conquer Western civilization as it had mastered Russia, and civilization itself would disappear.

Day by day it became clear that the war had strained human institutions, governmental systems, the endurance of men and women themselves, so much that even peace when it came could not bring that immediate or possibly that eventual restoration of the world of 1914 to which the peoples of the nations at war had hitherto looked forward confidently.

There was an ever-increasing appreciation of the fact that, whatever the issues of the war, there was now little reason to question the old German assertion that civilization itself was committing suicide and, that, without the settlement of those questions which had provoked the war, the nations in arms were becoming bankrupt—were more and

more sacrificing not merely the flower, but the larger fraction of their male population. Hunger, misery, forebodings of actual starvation, these were in the minds of millions. The submarine at sea, the bombing airplane in the clouds, the ceaseless roar of the artillery, all combined to break the morale of the civil populations quite as much as it attacked the military resources of the nation.

All of this the German turned to his own advantage, while Bolshevism, which he encouraged and fostered, destroyed Russia as a military force; and as a nation, at the precise moment when Bolshevist leaders were uttering words which were interpreted by western dreamers and idealists as a new gospel, as a further revelation comparable with the doctrines of the French Revolution, German politicians and leaders gave lying echoes to those principles and those utterances. "Peace without annexation and without indemnity," demanded by Russia, which had renounced every Romanoff claim, was now championed in the German Reichstag by politicians who never for a single moment contemplated the evacuation of Belgium, the surrender of Poland, or even the restoration of the invaded districts of France. And in this period there was faltering in the statesmanship of all the Allied countries. In Britain those Liberal elements which had opposed British entrance into the war at all, now acting in the name of humanity, urged a settlement which could not come except by the surrender of Britain's allies to Germany. Lloyd George himself publicly suggested that Germany might find compensation in Russia with Allied consent, while Smuts and other British representatives journeyed to Switzerland and Spain and elsewhere in vain efforts to find in secret conference with the enemy some basis for negotiated peace which would leave to the Allies a degree of security, if only a small fraction of honour.

In France there was even more faltering. There was even more treachery. Between the spring and the winter the Republic had four cabinets. In that time treason flourished openly, peace was preached almost publicly. German agents passed through Paris, French newspapers were purchased by German gold, and the trail of intrigue led from the banks of the Seine to those of the Hudson and La Plata.

Defeatism flourished; cowardice, disguising itself as liberalism and as humanity, now appeared from the dark corners in which it had hidden. France was at the point of moral collapse when in despair she turned to Clemenceau, finding once more—as so frequently in her long history—a supremely great spirit who was to lead her out of despair, through fortitude, to victory.

But of the three European allies the plight of Italy was worst. On the economic side her condition was incomparably inferior to that of her two associates. The German submarine campaign in the Mediterranean deprived her of the coal, the raw materials, and the food essential alike to her industry, her war making, and the existence of her population. The old breach between the Clerical party and the Monarchy reasserted itself and the appeal of the Pope to the belligerents to make peace was seized upon by at least a section of the Clerical element to undermine the morale of the army. Moreover, socialism and anarchy responded in Italy even more than in France to the pronouncements of Bolshevism in Russia. In losing Russia the Allies were not merely deprived of millions of soldiers, whose departure permitted Germany to move innumerable divisions to the western front; almost more deadly was the effect of Bolshevist propaganda. It was a madness which could not have assailed the minds of men and women had the way not been prepared by the endless torture of the war. But to those in despair it held out a promise of relief as unreal as the mirage that thirsty travellers see in the desert, but to be pursued with the same frantic zeal.

In this period the appeal of President Wilson for peace at the opening of the year; the bid of Socialism, advocated in Russia, propagated by Germany, expressed in the Stockholm Conference; the appeal of the Pope; and, finally, the counsel of Conservative selfishness voiced by Lord Lansdowne, combined to unite the most diverse elements and the most inimical classes. Mankind was attacked at once on the side of humanity and of selfishness, of reason and of passion. The peace offensive broke lines hitherto unshaken. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the degree to which the whole Allied cause was imperilled in this

time and by these various factors. Not even the military defeats of the next year—which once more put Paris in jeopardy and again seemed destined to open a road to the Channel—were actually as deadly menaces as those other dangers which filled 1917.

And yet, since in the main these perils attacked the spirit—since they were in their very nature imponderable, not to be disclosed by battle maps, not to be explained by the citation of debates in the Reichstag, or Parliament, of speeches in the market place—since the whole phenomenon was, after all, a product of the emotions, the passions, the agonies of the hour—it is almost impossible even now to describe or to preserve the facts which made up the inner history of 1917.

Yet, out of the turmoil and welter there does emerge the one clear and unmistakable truth. The belligerent world was rapidly approaching the moment of complete exhaustion. The bonds of discipline, of government, of civilization itself, were loosening. Conditions hardly paralleled since the days of the Thirty Years' War were appearing in western Europe, and men and women everywhere, aghast at the abyss which was opening at their feet, turned to the thought of peace without victory, without decision, even without honour, as holding out the single promise that the world could be saved from that chaos into which Russia had already disappeared and toward which the rest of the world was drifting headlong.

The circumstances of the political history in this period are of relatively minor importance. All the scheming and the treachery of the selfish, the seduced, the corrupt, led to nothing. All the back-stairs negotiations, the secret exchanges, the international conclaves, arrived nowhere. The appeal of the Pope, like the proposal of the President, did not shorten the war by a single hour. In the end the struggle went forward because the German—perceiving his public as yet less shaken behind the firing line and his army not only more successful than the opposing armies but now in a position which held out the promise of speedy and supreme victory—declined to abate by one degree those claims, or moderate in one particular those ambitions which he had held when he set out to achieve world power. Had Germany been wise, clear-

sighted, possessed of a statesman like Bismarck, she could have made a peace in 1917 which would have left her far forward on that imperial road which she had deliberately entered three years before. But her mood was the mood of Napoleon in 1813. The blindness, the overweening self-confidence, which made that great soldier refuse the advice of friends, disregard the warnings of statesmen, invite the ruin which overtook him, now afflicted the German war lords. By contrast, despite all the weakness, there was still left in Allied manhood the strength for one final struggle. Western civilization was in its last ditch, but when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk revealed that all the smooth and appealing words so recently and frequently in German mouths had meant nothing, and that still, as always, the choice was slavery or resistance, western Europe rallied; and there was left to it just sufficient strength to hold the line until American millions should transform the whole situation and demonstrate that German victory was henceforth and forever impossible.

## II. IN GERMANY

The summer of 1917 was marked by the first direct break in the political solidarity of Germany. Before the British failure in Flanders, in advance of the Italian disaster, and while Russia was still maintaining armies in the field, there was in the Reichstag a sudden outburst which for a moment seemed to promise that the German people and a controlling faction of German statesmen would be able to throw off the control of the military and the Junker elements. All through the summer debates in the Reichstag, changes in the Chancellorship, a multiplicity of circumstances combined to create the impression that Germany was at last ready to abandon the old ideas and the old ideals which had provoked the war—prepared to renounce those ambitions which made a peace of understanding impossible—and there was a widespread belief among the Allied publics that the war might be terminated by negotiation rather than by battle, since Germany was at last yielding to more liberal ideas and the control of German affairs was passing from the hands of the soldiers to those of reasonable statesmen.

In July, Erzberger, one of the leaders of the Roman Catholic party,

precipitated a political crisis by a sudden attack upon the Government for its failure alike in the diplomatic field and in the department of domestic affairs. Bethmann-Hollweg's halting efforts to answer the charge were of no avail. The Emperor himself, after a conversation with the military chiefs, issued a decree granting immediate and equal suffrage to Prussia, a step recalling concessions of a similar sort made by one of his predecessors in the face of similar conditions and thereafter repudiated when the conditions changed. The Emperor's concessions roused violent protest from the Prussian Junkers, but, so far from satisfying the Reichstag element, now in revolt, it merely provoked a demand on the part of Erzberger and his associates for a statement of the war aims of Germany.

As a consequence of his failure to check the political uprising Bethmann-Hollweg resigned and disappeared. He was not a great men. The distance between him and Bismarck was incalculable Yet the circumstances of his position had made him one of the most conspicuous figures throughout the conflict. His declaration that the invasion of Belgium was wrong created a profound sensation in the world. That, left to himself, he would have followed a wiser course seems at least possible, but in fact the critical decisions were made by the military element and he was compelled to defend policies which he did not originate and of which he frequently did not approve. It is not impossible, therefore, that time will deal more gently with the first German War Chancellor than did contemporary criticism.

The departure of Bethmann-Hollweg did not silence the political tumult. On the contrary, it encouraged still further uproar, which culminated on July 19th in a declaration adopted by a decisive majority in the Reichstag advocating peace, endorsing a peace of conciliation, and adopting the Russian phrase of "No annexation and no indemnity." This action made a great stir over the world. It made a profound impression upon Liberal and Radical elements in Great Britain, France, and the United States. Germany seemed to be yielding to democratic ideas. The influence of Russian revolution upon Hohenzollern policies seemed only less great than upon those of the Romanoffs. In-

fluenced by military failures, affected by the growing conviction that military decision was impossible, many elements in the Allied publics welcomed the events in the Reichstag as a sign and a promise.

Unfortunately, whatever may have been the sincerity and the reality of this movement in Germany at the outset, any chance of success was speedily destroyed by the complete transformation of the military situation. Had German armies continued unsuccessful, threatened alike on the east and the west; had Russia endured a potential enemy, it is conceivable that the beginning made in the Reichstag might have been followed by still further progress toward a liberation of the German people from the control of the soldiers—a deliverance accomplished by Germans alone. But while this protest was still in its initial stage Russia collapsed and ceased to be a factor in the war, and the military party was able again to point to the possibility that, with Russia out, decisive victory, with all its unlimited rewards, might be achieved.

With this change in the circumstances the military party resumed its control, but resuming its control it undertook to use what had happened as propaganda. In other words, it made the ideas and the principles which had been voiced in the Reichstag the cover for its own campaign. It did not repudiate what had been said; rather it sought at one time to delude Allied publics with the impression that Germany had become liberal, and prepared the way for the old-fashioned military decision with all its attendant circumstances of forcible annexations and enormous indemnities.

The Pope's appeal for peace came at a fortunate moment to supply the German leaders with new material. The Kaiser had selected as his new Chancellor an old bureaucrat, Dr. George Michaelis—an unknown man of no particular ability, responsive only to the old autocracy—and the new Foreign Secretary, Kuhlmann, an adroit and skilful intriguer, undertook to deceive the world by new protestations of German fidelity to ideas acceptable to the western Allies, momentarily advocated by the Reichstag and now abandoned when the promise of victory had reappeared. Kuhlmann endeavoured, not without success, to foment unrest and division in Allied countries by using publicly that formula

BURSTING SHELL

This remarkable painting of a bursting shell is the work of Christopher Richard Wynne Nevinson, who received his honourable discharge from the British army, with the Mons star, in 1916. The following year he was appointed Official Artist with the British Armies.



"TANKS"

From a painting by Major Sir William Orpen, A.R.A., representing two of the clumsy monsters about to wallow across a ditch

FRENCH INFANTRY CREEPING FORWARD TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK

SERBIAN BOMBS

*Above*—A bomb-throwing attachment for the rifle, used by Serbian troops.
*Below*—A rifle-thrown bomb barrage on the Serbian front.

ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE WAR

Allied aviators have managed to set fire to this German's observation balloon. So he has hooked on his parachute harness and jumped clear. The parachute is just breaking away from the balloon. The aviator who took this photograph does not know whether the balloonist reached the ground in safety or not.

ON THE BRITISH FRONT

German shell breaking near a British battery. One of the "Nissen huts," invented by Lt. Col. Peter Norman Nissen, may be seen at the left

BRITISH FIELD DRESSING STATION NEAR MONCHY

These stretcher-bearing Tommies seem rather heedless of Fritz's shooting, though his shells are bursting not far away



RIGHT THROUGH THE ROOF OF THE BAKERY

Lawrence Scanlon, an American aviator, lost control of his machine 500 feet above the French aviation school at Avord. It crashed down through the roof of this building and when Scanlon scrambled unaided out from among the débris, he was astonished to find that he was without a scratch.

MACHINE GUNNERS ADVANCING

These French troops are going forward as their artillery prepares the way



IN THE WAKE OF THE HUNS

The retreating Germans concealed a quantity of explosives in a corner of this building and then built a fire in the opposite corner. The explosion occurred some time after their departure, as was intended

which he and his associates had privately rejected and were, at Brest-Litovsk a few months later, to repudiate altogether.

German diplomatic, German political leadership, having been forced to submit momentarily to a revolt in the Reichstag, predicated upon liberal ideas, now endeavoured to make the fact of this revolt produce disarray in Allied countries and cover that period in which Germany was making the necessary preparations for the great Ludendorff offensive of the next year. How successful she was the Italian disaster at Caporetto presently disclosed. Thus the German conducted a new peace offensive pending the time when he should be ready to make one more stupendous bid for military conquest, and used as ammunition the precise words urging peace and conciliation which his own fellow-countrymen had uttered in the Reichstag in July. The Devil was no longer sick, but well he still retained the monk's garb.

All through the late summer and autumn these manœuvres went on. Kuhlmann's deliberate effort to create a "peace atmosphere" was echoed and seconded by peace speeches of Count Czernin, the Austrian Prime Minister. In October a naval mutiny was seized upon in the Reichstag as a pretext to refuse to vote a war credit. But before October had ended Caporetto had been won; the last semblance of sincerity in the protestations of German liberals had vanished. The Kaiser now called Count Hertling to replace Michaelis, and Hertling was frankly and unmistakably the tool of the military party. Moreover, the military situation was such that he was now able to resume where Bethmann-Hollweg had left off. The movement for peace in Germany had collapsed in the presence of a promise of victory. The words spoken in the Reichstag in July of 1917 and the terms written into the Peace of Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918, measure the distance between the two states of mind.

Had the German movement of July continued, had the spirit which it had expressed prevailed, nothing seems more certain now than that a negotiated peace would have followed. The mass of facts which are today becoming public property indicate how willing Allied statesmen were to listen to any reasonable overtures coming from Berlin. General

Smuts journeyed to Switzerland; the British Minister to the Vatican received, if he did not make, preliminary proposals. No Allied government could have continued had its people been convinced that it had rejected a sincere or moderate German proposal of peace. That Bismarck would have seized the opportunity to assure for Germany reasonable profit for her great sacrifices cannot be doubted, but such Allied interrogations as were made, directed inevitably at ascertaining Germany's position on the all-important question of the liberation of Belgium, were met by evasive or defiant answers. Germany was not willing to give any assurances that she would evacuate Belgium and her refusal destroyed all chance of a negotiated peace.

Napoleon after Dresden and before Leipzig made a similar blunder, with consequences which were less disastrous on the whole to his country but equally fatal to himself. He chose to fight—and lost his throne. The Kaiser and his advisers now decided to risk all on a similar venture and their decision took the Kaiser to Amerongen as Napoleon's decision carried him to St. Helena. Germany, all through this fateful summer, remained faithful to the Bernhardi gospel of "World power, or downfall."

The explanation for the success of the military party in Germany in repulsing a peace movement in their own country before they skilfully turned it to their own use abroad must be found in the circumstances of the Russian Revolution. Had Kerensky been able to prevail upon revolutionary Russia to continue in the trenches Germany might have consented to a negotiated peace by the end of 1917, but the collapse of Russia served to reanimate all the old appetites and all the early ambitions of the German people. The postponement of victory for three years led to the incipient German revolt of July just as similar and even greater disappointments had led to larger protests in Allied nations. But the new promise that plunder and power could be had silenced all protests. Even though sinking into anarchy herself Russia did a final and incalculable injury to Germany. Her helplessness invited Germans to a new revelation of their purpose, and this revelation led straight to that Armistice of November 11, 1918, which deprived Germany not merely of the fruits of her earlier victories in the World War

but of her conquests in all the wars of aggression since Frederick the Great started Prussia on her predatory pathway.

### III. AUSTRIA

Following the declaration that war existed between the Imperial German Government and the United States, the Austrian representative in the United States—who was acting in place of Dr. Dumba until Count Tarnowski, Dr. Dumba's successor, arrived—demanded his passports. Diplomatic relations with Austria were thus severed although actual war was not recognized to exist until December 7th. So far as the United States was concerned then, Austria continued in a relation which was neither war nor peace and supplied an opportunity for various peace manœuvres. In point of fact, the Austrian Government not merely "played up" to the German peace campaign, but various gestures were made, the most famous of which—a letter of the new Emperor to his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus, under the date of March 31, 1917—contained the startling statement: "I beg you to convey secretly and unofficially to Poincaré, President of the French Republic, that I shall support by every means, and using of my personal influence with my Allies, the French just claim regarding Alsace-Lorraine." The publication of this letter a year later by Clemenceau, following a debate carried on between the statesmen of the warring countries, produced a real sensation and was followed by the resignation of Count Czernin.

It may be assumed that this letter was an unmistakable evidence that the Austrian Emperor and the Austrian Court were eager for peace. This fact was common knowledge all through the summer and autumn of 1917. It was the explanation of several conferences in Switzerland, conferences in which both British and French representatives sought a common ground on which to base real peace negotiations. Unquestionably Austria was sinking. The complete collapse of the Dual Monarchy in the autumn of 1918 was the result of too long and too great a strain, which shattered the relatively slender bonds uniting the several races and populations of the Hapsburg Empire. Badly

organized, lacking alike the German genius for organization and the German solidarity, Austria-Hungary suffered infinitely more during the war, and in 1917 the approach of a collapse was revealed by many circumstances. That the young emperor, eager to save his throne, had earnestly and honestly struggled to free himself from German control, seemed unmistakable. It was this situation which led to the transfer of German troops to the Italian front, and the victory of Caporetto, following the collapse of Russia, gave Austria a respite and for the moment served to save the Empire from impending ruin. It is worthy of note that all through this period the Allies, who in the early days of the war had formulated a programme which amounted to nothing less than dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, more or less publicly renounced this ambitious prospectus. Like Germany, Austria could have saved herself by making peace any time in 1917.

Like Germany, moreover, Austria made many preliminary movements in that direction. She was prepared to, and she did renounce for herself any war gains. The destruction of Russia had eliminated the great menace which for a generation had hung over the Monarchy. Russia had disappeared, Serbia had been crushed, Italy had been checked and was presently defeated. Peace on the basis of the *status quo ante* would have given that security which Austria had long sought. The defeats of Serbia, Roumania, Russia, and finally of Italy, combined to achieve the real war ends of the Hapsburg Empire. Unhappily for her, despite many efforts—some of which were revealed in public statements which made a stir all over the world—Austria-Hungary could not regain her freedom of action. Compelled to share German successes, which were now without profit for herself, she was equally compelled in the end to share in a ruin which for herself was complete.

### IV. THE POPE'S APPEAL

The most significant of the various Austrian efforts in the direction of peace was disclosed in that series of political operations in which the Austrian Parliament, the Roman Catholic party of the Centre in Germany, and various Roman Catholic elements all over the world, rallied

to the support of that peace proposal made by the Pope himself on the 15th of August.

The appeal of the Holy Father to the several warring nations suggested in many respects that document which President Wilson had uttered a little more than six months before. Like the President, the Pope in the nature of things was compelled to address both sets of contestants in words which were equally courteous and similarly devoid of content which might indicate sympathy with one set of contestants as contrasted with the other. He was obliged, like the President, to deal only in generalities, and since the President's note to the belligerents had been frankly only a preliminary, Mr. Wilson had been able to escape the necessity faced by the Pope of suggesting some basis for settlement. The basis suggested by the Holy Father—the only basis which could be suggested, given the circumstances of the conflict—included the waiving of all claims for indemnity and "entire and reciprocal condonation." Belgium was to be evacuated; her independence restored. German colonies were to be returned to her and she was to restore the occupied districts of France. The vexed questions of which Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta were the most conspicuous examples, were to be referred to peaceful negotiators, while similar disposition of the problems of the Balkans, of Poland, and of Turkey was suggested.

The rejection of this Papal appeal by Great Britain, by France, by Italy, was a foregone conclusion. "Reciprocal condonation" was in itself nothing more than a confession of equal guilt and responsibility for the war by the Allies, who had been attacked. For three years Germany had conducted a war of aggression in the manner of a barbarian. She had attacked her neighbours without justification. She had taken their territory, enslaved their peoples. She had assailed neutrals as well as belligerents. She had defied every convention, she had outraged every doctrine of humanity. Moreover—in effect, though not in intent—the Pope's peace message now asked of these Allied peoples who had been the victims of Germany's iniquities that they should condone the crime, confess to guilt not less great, and put aside all hope of German reparation.

This spelled moral ruin and economic destruction. In substance it denied to the small peoples that liberty the western powers had promised. It perpetuated the Austrian and German rule over subject nationalities. It continued the European anarchy out of which the World War had come. Above all, it continued in power the men, the parties, and the principles which had precipitated the struggle. As a consequence, to listen to the words of the Pope—which were inspired by the same desire to end the conflict, by the same concern for humanity and civilization as those of the President half a year before—was not merely to resign the war itself, but to submit to these very evils against which the Allies had been fighting for three years. It was not merely to betray the future but it was also to abandon those who had died to prevent that which would be established if peace on the Pope's terms should now arrive.

It was fitting, therefore, in view of his own gesture, that Mr. Wilson should make answer for all nations at war against Germany, and his response was in fact adopted by all the Allied governments and chancelleries. On August 27th the President's answer was sent. That response, which was signed by Mr. Lansing, was as follows:

In acknowledgment of the communication of your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of his Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts, and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the *status quo ante bellum* and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be

possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

It is manifest that no part of this programme can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment, controlled by an irresponsible government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honour; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier, either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood —not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world.

Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments—the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation, upon fair terms, in the economic opportunities of the world—the German people, of course, included—if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world—to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damage, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient, and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man. no nation, could now depend on.

We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

ROBERT LANSING.

Thus ended the second of the memorable attempts to restore peace. The Pope had failed as the President had failed before him. Precisely as the President's words were used by German agents and German propagandists, both the words and the fact of the Pope's appeal were employed all over the world in Allied countries and most effectively in Italy to serve Germany. The bitterness of temporary emotions not unnaturally led to the charge that the Pope had himself been a party to German and Austrian intrigue and the charge was sustained by the evidence that his words had been employed effectively to aid the Ger-

man cause. But the same charge was made on the same basis and with no less justice when President Wilson had made his proposal. Indubitably the Pope helped Germany and Austria momentarily, as did the President. The object of the Pope and the President alike was to restore peace, and both may perhaps be fairly acquitted of any partisan sympathy to which their words and actions were turned.

### V. STOCKHOLM

While the President in December and January and the Pope in the following August sought to restore peace, a third and hardly less significant effort was made by socialism. The Russian Revolution presented to the various socialist, labour, and radical elements of the warring countries an opportunity to speak which had long been denied them. Socialism itself had temporarily disappeared as a world power and as an international influence, when, in the first days of the war, the masses of the peoples of the several nations cast aside all political alignments and rallied to the support of their respective governments. The theory that the mass of French and of German workingmen would refuse to fire upon each other when war came was instantly disclosed to be moonshine. The millions of the various countries demonstrated that they were Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians, before they were socialists, and newer political doctrines were submerged in the flood of secular patriotism.

From this revelation socialism did not recover until that moment when the failure of governments to procure victory or restore peace finally led alike to a decline of the governments in prestige and a movement away from the political systems these governments represented. The Russian Revolution roused socialism all over the world and it became henceforth a dangerous and a potent factor. It, too, demanded peace. It, too, worked for peace, and in Allied countries, where political liberty was far more firmly established than in Germany, it was able to do infinite harm to the governments which were conducting the struggle.

The first manifestation that socialism had recognized the new opportunity came in April when a call was issued from The Hague for a

socialist conference at Stockholm. The conference itself, from a relatively unimportant gathering, was transformed to a centre of world interest through the demand of the Russian revolutionary leaders that it should be made something approximating a peace conference; that the representatives of socialist parties and of the masses of the European populations should send to the Swedish capital delegates who were in fact to decide the rights and wrongs of the war itself and thereafter to bring about a restoration of peace. In all this the German hand was patiently disclosed coöperating with the Russian revolutionist.

Socialism in France and Italy, Labour in Great Britain and the United States, divided over the wisdom or folly of sending representatives to Stockholm. Conservative instinct everywhere in Allied countries was against such a course, but largely owing to the influence of Arthur Henderson in Great Britain and Albert Thomas in France—both of whom had been in Russia, both of whom had been impressed by the Russian Revolution and by the gravity of that situation which Russian defection would produce—advocated the sending of representatives to Stockholm.

Henderson represented Labour in the British Cabinet, Albert Thomas was the successor of Jaurès as the leader of the French socialists and was also a cabinet minister. The urgings of both these men, each of whom believed that tactical advantage would be gained by going to Stockholm and presenting the Allied cause, aroused debate, but the Ribot Cabinet refused to permit French socialists to go. The British Ministry refused and then changed its mind, but, after the Cabinet had acquiesced, the British Seamen's and Firemen's Union, having the submarine issue in mind, refused to man ships to carry the delegates.

Still the Stockholm Conference went on. Presently Henderson, finding it impossible to convince the British Cabinet, resigned. Albert Thomas similarly left the French Chamber. Germany, on the contary, sent Scheidemann, and Scheidemann turned to German profit such opportunities as he could find.

The Stockholm Conference, of itself, accomplished nothing of im-

portance. Indirectly, however, it contributed materially to breaking up the union of the socialists and radicals in France, Britain, and the United States with members of the other political parties, all of whom had hitherto been closely associated in the effort to win the war. As a contribution to Germany's campaign to break down the morale of the Allied countries, as a circumstance in the peace offensive, it was successful. A break between the radical and socialist portions of the American, British, and French publics and the rest of the nation was achieved. This break did infinite harm. It was followed by a flood of so-called liberal and progressive utterances and writings which assailed the Allied governments at home, accused them of blundering and of offences similar to those which had been charged against the German Government. It built up a body of suspicion that Allied governments were responsible for the prolongation of the war. It cast doubt upon the sincerity of purpose and the justice of the war aims of the various nations in arms against Germany.

The same division continued after the war had terminated in the Armistice. It reached new heights of denunciation when the terms of the Peace of Versailles were at last presented to the world. This was not mainly, perhaps not largely, a consequence of the struggle over the Stockholm Conference. That was, after all, only an incident. The fact was that three years of war had produced a profound change in all the nations engaged, and that only in Germany—and there solely because of a sudden return of the prospect of victory—was the Government capable of preserving union or preventing discussions, which, however honestly intended, unmistakably contributed to break down the will, not alone for victory, but the will to continue and to escape defeat.

Henceforth, ever growing in numbers and in vehemence, one faction in each of the Allied countries insisted that the Allies should restate their war aims and demanded that a restatement should include an acceptation of the Russian formula of peace without annexations or indemnities. This faction denounced their own governments and ministries as reactionary, imperialistic, Prussian; insisted that peace without victory—"a white peace" following Mr. Wilson's phrase, which

the President had now discarded—was the only possible solution of the world conflict which would make peace for the future permanent.

The Russian Revolution became for this group a symbol of democracy and of progress, which the excesses of Lenin and Trotsky and the terrible tragedies of the Revolution were unable to destroy. The Allied course toward Russia was consistently denounced. The feeble and futile efforts of Allied governments to support the elements of order and to restrain the forces of anarchy in the Slav nation were assailed without limit as examples of an effort to restore the Romanoff régime.

The summer and autumn of 1917, then, sees the development of a totally new frame of mind. Many men intellectually and morally prominent in their communities and in their countries now openly and definitively broke with the doctrine that all personal opinions must be laid aside—all independence including that of thought itself must be sacrificed—in the name of national unity and to the end of achieving military victory. This group was largely made up of pacifists and of extreme radicals, to whom nationalism itself was hateful. Within its ranks traitors and cowards found safe intellectual asylum and did infinite harm to the Allied cause. But recognizing these circumstances it is still impossible to dismiss this ferment of 1917 summarily, if only because it exerted great influence thenceforth, during the war and after the war, during the peace negotiations and thereafter endured as a living force.

The majority of the Allied publics continued, though not without some perplexity and hesitation, to support their governments, to stand fast to the belief that unconditional peace was the only possible end of a war with Germany. In no small degree the Germans themselves were responsible for this. Circumstances in Allied countries, the progress of events and of thought in the world, everything combined to give the Germans an opportunity to make a profitable peace in 1917. Their own peace offensive, their use of the Pope's appeal, of the President's note, of the socialist upheaval, cleared the way for precisely this outcome. Fortunately for mankind the German General Staff, the Kaiser and his generals, in the supreme crisis were incapable of laying aside the dream of a complete military victory. The reaction from the Peace

of Brest-Litovsk temporarily checked and even silenced the voices that were heard in 1917 with ever-increasing willingness by Allied publics. Liberalism and radicalism were compelled to stand aside once more as they had in the opening days of the war in the presence of Prussianism displaying the old spirit in a new revelation. But the moment the German had lost the war, before even the Allied victory had become absolute, these voices were raised again and have been heard ever since in growing volume.

### VI. IN FRANCE

More interesting, and in a sense more significant, since they produced the supremely great war minister of the conflict, were the political disturbances in France in 1917. Before the year had yet begun, the weakness of the Briand Ministry was unmistakable. Briand himself had been a useful factor in the general Allied cause. He was not a man of deep principles or of profound convictions; least of all was he a statesman of the energy or the force of Clemenceau. Like Lloyd George he had been in many camps. He was a clever, adroit politician, a man of personal charm and political instinct, not without patriotic emotion, but beyond all else a politician. He had staked his fortunes in the previous year on the success of Joffre. In many ways his support of the first French Commander-in-Chief was creditable to him. The intrigues directed against the victor of the Marne both by jealous generals and by even more jealous politicians—whose efforts to interfere in military affairs encountered an absolute obstacle at Chantilly—had largely failed through the constancy of Briand's support. Unfortunately, criticism of Joffre was not exclusively due to meaner and baser motives. On the whole, his later course had been a failure, beginning with the terrible costly ventures which he described as "nibbling." At Les Éparges, in Champagne and in Alsace in 1915, Joffre had sacrificed great numbers of French soldiers for insignificant gains. Verdun in 1916 had been a tremendous blow to his remaining prestige and there was necessary a great victory at the Somme to save him. Briand gambled on that victory and lost. He then, after many hesitations, finally consented to

the substitution of Nivelle for Joffre, a compromise which avoided bitter assaults from the friends of Joffre, but satisfied neither the nation nor the army. The wrangles in Greece, in which it was felt Briand had shown too great tenderness to the Greek Royal Family, were equally injurious to the Premier.

The truth was that in the winter of 1916-17 the Briand Ministry, from a variety of causes, was sinking. Briand was tired, and not unwilling to go in advance of some event which might preclude a subsequent recall. Accordingly there was little surprise when, on March 17th, as a consequence of a sharp quarrel between General Lyautey and the French Chamber, Briand resigned. Lyautey, as Governor-General of Morocco, had won and held for France a vast empire and revealed himself as the greatest pro-consul in all French history. He had been brought to Paris as Minister of War following Joffre's resignation, but his imperious methods, his unfamiliarity and impatience with politics and politicians had led to one incident after another, and finally to a resignation several times before threatened.

Briand was followed by Ribot, an old man, a notable figure in French politics, a conspicuous member of the Briand Cabinet, but not a man of the force necessary for the situation. He was faced at once by the consequences of the failure of the French offensive at the Aisne, followed almost immediately by an epidemic of strikes, and culminating in that socialist revolt which grew out of his refusal to permit French socialists to go to Stockholm. As domestic disorder increased, as campaigns of treasons and defeatism developed, Ribot more and more showed himself incapable of dealing firmly with mounting perils. As a consequence there was little surprise when, in September, Ribot resigned and President Poincaré called upon M. Paul Painlevé to form a Ministry. Painlevé is one of the interesting figures of the war. He and Henri Poincaré, the President's brother, were the greatest mathematicians of their generation in France. Painlevé had enjoyed a distinguished career as a professor. He was a man of high character and of great intellect. As Minister of Inventions and as Minister of War in the Briand and Ribot cabinets respectively he had rendered great service to

France. Two momentous decisions, one to remove Nivelle and the other to dispose of King Constantine, were due almost exclusively to him.

But on the political side Painlevé was weak precisely where Lloyd George and Briand were strong. Unlike both of them he was a poor speaker. Unlike both of them he was incapable of building up a following in Parliament. He had no dexterity in intrigue or manipulation. Men did not follow him even when they respected him. He was a singularly noble type, rare in the politics of any country. He had courage; his honesty was beyond question; but he could not make friends as could Briand or Lloyd George, nor could he kill his enemies as did Clemenceau.

The result was inevitable. French conditions were approaching a crisis. In a sense the political situation of France was desperate, and Painlevé—with all his honesty, with all his earnestness, with all his great ability in certain directions—was not the man to face the storm. Accordingly, on November 16th, he was succeeded by Clemenceau. The decision of Poincaré to call Clemenceau was interesting. In the Versailles sessions at which Poincaré had been elected President of the French Republic, his most determined enemy had been Clemenceau, who saw in Poincaré a peril to the Republic. In addition to violent opposition in the sessions themselves Clemenceau had finally made a personal appeal, which was in itself almost a menace, to Poincaré to refuse the election. At all times Clemenceau in his newspaper had been a savage critic of the President. Yet there was left to Poincaré no real choice. He had to go to Clemenceau or recognize that the war was lost.

The coming of Clemenceau is one of the great moments of the war. He was the last hope of France, and the measure of his service is not to be found in France alone. This old man, 76 years of age when he took office, had been in the rough-and-tumble of political fights ever since the days when, as a boy, he was sent into exile by the Third Empire. He was one of those who, at Bordeaux, protested against the cession of Alsace-Lorraine. He went through the Commune with all its terrible experiences. Several times in his political career he had been dismissed as

finished, notably in the time of the Panama scandal, but it had never been possible to eliminate a man who combined so many of those qualities which the French admire.

As a journalist Clemenceau wielded the deadliest pen in France. All through the war Paris had waited for the publication of his newspaper—frequently interrupted by the Censor—to read the brilliant, fatally caustic phrases of the man who was known to his fellow countrymen as "The Tiger." In politics and in political life he had destroyed one ministry after another by the sheer force of his attack and the fatal exactness of his phrases. He made enemies where most politicians endeavoured to make friends, and then compelled his enemies to do his bidding by the sheer terror which he inspired.

For three years Clemenceau had been regarded as impossible in France because no man could calculate what direction his phrases would take. His criticism of allies might easily be more severe than his denunciation of enemies. His fondness for the perfect phrase frequently led him into excesses which might have fatal effect for the whole French cause in a world crisis. It was always inconceivable that France would appeal to Clemenceau in advance of an ultimate crisis, but that crisis had now come.

Moreover, all through the war Clemenceau's voice had been the one clear note. From the first moment when masses of French reserves arrived in advance of equipment, in the period of inefficient hospital administration, in the days of military failure, Clemenceau had never hesitated to tell the truth. As chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate he had visited every front. The common soldier was known to him in the trenches, and with the passion of an old man, near the end of a great career, his mind turned upon the salvation of his country. Whatever his faults, his limitations, his weaknesses on the human side; whatever his past, Clemenceau in the years of the war has concentrated himself upon the battle and dedicated himself to the winning of the victory.

In the summer of 1917, in the early autumn when treason flourished, when defeatism was rampant in France and out of it, this marvellous

A BAD CORNER ON A MOUNTAIN ROAD

Four camouflaged tractors hauling a monster gun up a rocky pass

ON THE MARNE FRONT

French infantry starting on a raid

EXPLODING AMMUNITION

Beyond this village was an ammunition dump. This was the first of a series of explosions which soon shattered the whole village

THE BATTLE OF MENIN ROAD

Some captured ground on the British front

CYCLE ORDERLIES UNDER FIRE

The enemy's artillery evidently has the range of this road. It seems a poor place to tinker damaged bicycles



LARGE SHELL BURSTING AMONG THE SAND DUNES OF THE BELGIAN COAST

A LIQUID FIRE BARRAGE

The Germans were the first to use this terrible weapon, but the French soon learned to pay them back in their own coin

A LITTLE BIT OF A MODERN BATTLE

**It is a German shell** which is bursting on the right. The crouching figures on the left are Germans who have been driven within range of their own artillery. A moment ago they yelled "Kamerad." Now they are eagerly awaiting the direction to go back to the Allies' rear

ARTILLERY IN ACTION ON A WOODLAND ROAD

old man day by day thundered his denunciations. France knew that if he became Prime Minister such mistakes as he would make would not be in the direction of caution, compromise, hesitation. Reluctantly, unwillingly, but ineluctably, Poincaré, the French nation—like the commander putting in his last reserves—turned to Clemenceau; and with his coming we enter into one more of those far-shining hours of French history which have meant so much to all mankind.

The achievement of Clemenceau was spiritual before it was material. The army at the front felt, when Clemenceau went to the Quai d'Orsay, that there was no more of weakness and faltering behind it. In fact, in the months that followed, the soldiers in the trenches saw more of the French Premier than did the people in the streets of Paris. Day after day he came to the Chamber with the dust of Champagne or Artois still on his clothes. To every criticism, to every effort to renew discussions as to war issues, peace terms, he returned the single answer: "I make war." "Victory"—he told the French people at the very moment of approximate despair—"belongs to him who lasts through the final quarter of an hour." And the world knew, the French knew, that Clemenceau might die but that he would not surrender. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which this one man transformed the situation. Facing treason at home he sent a former prime minister of France, Caillaux—still the master of the greatest single following in the Chamber—to prison. Malvy, who had been in a dozen cabinets and who possessed enormous political influence, he sent into exile. Bolo Pasha, and smaller men whose guilt was unmistakable, he sent to the firing squad. Sarrail, a political general whose influence in the Chamber had been sufficiently great to save him from the consequences of a dozen intrigues, Clemenceau promptly recalled from Salonica and retired to private life. Of a sudden a clear, strong wind—like that mistral which descends the Rhone Valley—rushed through French political life. France called to Clemenceau and Clemenceau responded with an appeal which the French people could understand and obey.

Nor did Clemenceau merely work at home. From November until April he fought the British to procure that unity of command which

was at last achieved after the March disaster, and, by bringing Foch into complete control of Allied armies, first avoided final defeat, and then achieved supreme victory. The energy of this old man is beyond description. He had the physical characteristics of Roosevelt in his most vigorous days. His presence in the Government was almost as valuable as that of Napoleon had been to his armies on the battlefield. He came to power at the most desperate moment in the war. Almost exactly a year later he was able to announce to the French Chamber that the enemy had been beaten, that victory was achieved, and Alsace-Lorraine restored to France. Then France gave to him the title by which he will perhaps be best remembered, that of "Father of Victory."

As a youth Clemenceau had been associated with Gambetta in that despairing resistance of France after Sedan and Gravelotte. He had signed the Bordeaux memorial against the cession of a foot of French soil or a stone of a French fortress. He was almost the sole survivor of that group. Every illusion, every human affection, every dream, save one, had been burned up. A cynical, world-weary old man, his love of his country, his devotion to France, still remained. In war, and in the peace-making that followed war, he had but a single thought. He brushed aside impatiently all those aspirations and theories which were based upon the re-making of the world just as he swept aside all the whisperings and whimperings of those who advocated a "white peace" when he took office. His whole life was dedicated to a single object. Perhaps he would have been more fortunate to have died when the bullet of an assassin reached him in the early days of the Peace Conference. Conceivably he lived too long after the realization of the end he had sought. But no Frenchman in all the long history of the race deserved better of his country than the statesman who, in November, 1917, took into his firm hands the control of that ship of state whose destruction seemed imminent.

### VII. IN THE UNITED STATES

America had entered the war in April. Following the arrival at the great decision the country gave evidence of a unity of purpose and of thought as amazing as had been the spectacle of its apparent disunion in

the period preceding entrance into the conflict. Of a sudden a single national purpose was disclosed in every branch of life and in the most varied and mutually hostile elements of society. When the war was declared soldiers appeared along the railroads guarding the bridges and tunnels, reproducing a familiar circumstance of Europe at war. Measures were taken to guard against that uprising of German-Americans long forecast and widely feared, but there was neither revolt nor disorder. The very spirit in which the United States entered the war overawed those elements which might have caused trouble. The German-American press became silent. German intrigue went underground. In political life there was only one party and one purpose.

The progress of military preparations belongs to another volume, in which America's campaign will be discussed. On the political side the utterances of the President and the revelation of German intrigue provide the main interest. American missions visited Russia, and Elihu Root, a former Secretary of State, sought, in the Russian capital, to contribute to limiting the extent of anarchy. The mission was a failure. Nor was the American public able then or later to understand the Russian phenomenon. The message which the President sent to Russia might have produced some effect had it been reform rather than peace that Russia sought. As it was, like all other Allied missions, that from America spoke to deaf ears. The Russian offensive began and failed while our representatives were still in Russia, and their return was not unaccompanied by danger.

The President's response to the Pope's note evoked nation-wide approval, and this approval was heightened by the fact that there was published at the same time a German document, henceforth memorable, namely an intercepted despatch from Count Luxburg, the German representative at Buenos Aires to his own government sent through the medium of the Swedish Legation. Argentina at that time was going through a political crisis, partly occasioned by the Government's attitude in the matter of the German submarine campaign. The message in question contained the following sentence: "As regards Argentine steamships I recommend either compelling them to turn back, sink-

ing them without leaving a trace (*spurlos versenkt*), or letting them through. They are quite small."

"*Spurlos versenkt*" became, thenceforth a characterization of German methods, and the American people found in this example of duplicity and essential violence further proof of the meaning of German procedure which had already been partially disclosed to them in the Zimmermann Note. There followed a long series of disclosures of a similar character affecting the United States more directly but they were in truth only new appeals to the converted. The mass of the American people had made up their minds on the German subject.

As a consequence, the political history of the United States during the first year of the war between the declaration and the peace of Brest-Litovsk is merely the history of a nation setting itself resolutely to the unfamiliar task of creating armies, reorganizing its resources, harnessing its gigantic strength for the new task. Memorable because of its later bearing upon the peace negotiations but notable at the time merely as a statement of America's view of the bases of peace and the President's conception of a League of Nations, was a declaration of Mr. Wilson on January 8th and known thereafter as the Fourteen Points. These Fourteen Points were as follows:

1. Open covenants of peace and no secret diplomacy in the future.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation in peace and war outside territorial waters, except when seas may be closed by international action.
3. Removal as far as possible of all economic barriers.
4. Adequate guarantees for the reduction of national armaments.
5. An absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims, the interests of the peoples concerned having equal weight with the claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
6. All Russian territory to be evacuated, and Russia given full opportunity for self-development, the Powers aiding.
7. Complete restoration of Belgium in full and free sovereignty.
8. All French territory freed, and the wrong done by Prussia in 1871, in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, righted.
9. Readjustment of Italian frontiers on lines of nationality.
10. Peoples of Austria-Hungary accorded an opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro evacuated; Serbia given access to the sea; and relations of Balkan States settled on lines of allegiance and nationality.

12. Non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire assured of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles to be permanently free to all ships.

13. An independent Polish State.

14. A general association of the nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

German and Austrian efforts to twist these and succeeding declarations of the President to their own uses failed completely since almost immediately Germany, by her terms of peace imposed upon Russia at Brest-Litovsk, showed her real self and demonstrated how impossible peace on any basis was in advance of German defeat.

The true significance of the Fourteen Points was lost upon the American and Allied publics alike at the moment. The world was at war and had its eyes fixed upon those material issues out of which the war had grown. It did not comprehend, nor could it comprehend, that the President of the United States in his utterance was placing emphasis not upon Alsace-Lorraine, the Trentino, and the liberation of subject peoples, but upon the formation of a league of nations. It did not understand that for him all else was minor and subsidiary; failure to understand had strange consequences a year later, but at the moment, with only the material aspects of the declaration in mind the people of France, Great Britain, and Italy, quite as much as the United States, hailed this speech and, by their very enthusiasm, contributed to convincing Mr. Wilson that his hearers found in a league of nations the same promise which he had there discovered.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

## BREST-LITOVSK—*Conclusion*

### I

### THE RUSSIAN SURRENDER

It remains now to trace the last phases of the Russian episode so far as it immediately concerns the World War. The domestic circumstances of this supreme catastrophe must await that future time when they may be intelligible to a historian able to deal dispassionately with the complete record. For the western Allies, for the men and women who were giving their best in life and treasure, the Russian defection became immediately and remained an act of treason, not early to be forgiven and not at all to be understood.

We have seen how the collapse of the Russian military power in July had for its consequence the appearance of German reserves in Flanders and at Cambrai in sufficient numbers to defeat the British offensives. We have similarly seen that the arrival of German divisions on the Venetian front precipitated an Italian disaster at Caporetto which only by a narrow margin missed putting Italy out of the war.

In the same fashion, the Russian Revolution had on the political side at one time divided the Allied publics, set in motion domestic protests and rebellion against Allied policy, and destroyed an incipient German movement toward a peace of understanding; thus democracy in Allied countries was weakened, in the Central Powers crushed, Allied military power was checked on the French front and broken on the Italian front: such were the outward circumstances of the Russian Revolution.

In this same time there persisted a total misapprehension in the west as to the purposes of the Russian revolutionists themselves. For the west the supreme concern was to pursue the war to victory. For Russia the sole and overshadowing interest was to achieve peace without delay. The west appealed to Russia to continue in the battle. Russia appealed

to the west to lay down its arms. The truth, long hid from the west, was that Russia was already out of the war, that no Russian statesman or leader was capable of reanimating the Russian spirit. The Lvov Ministry, which was moderate and liberal, had failed because it endeavoured to preserve Russian faith with the west. Kerensky was doomed from the beginning because, while he understood conditions better, he lacked the iron necessary to become a dictator and, short of a dictatorship, there was no remedy left.

In July Russian armies had fled a field of victory in Galicia. Frantic and gallant efforts of Korniloff, the new Russian commander, to rally his broken armies, failed. In August a great national Congress at Moscow listened to Kerensky and Korniloff, to all that remained of the voice of reason and patriotism, with little enthusiasm and no permanent result.

In early September a new German offensive resulted in the fall of Riga. This offensive was memorable on the military side as the first appearance of that Hutier tactic which reappeared at Caporetto and Cambrai and then burst forth in deadly menace in the German attacks of 1918. The fall of Riga was for the Allies final proof of that fact that Russia, in Kerensky's hands, could not help itself or them. For the enemy Riga was the last detail in Mittel Europa. The German *ante-bellum* maps, outlining the German place in the sun of Europe, had stretched from Antwerp to Riga, and the fall of the latter city carried with it a death warrant to new German democratic movements. In addition, it restored German influence in those Baltic Provinces where the Teutonic knights had once ruled and where the German minority still preserved the legend of Prussian return. The whole pan-German conception was galvanized once more by a victory which, on the military side, was cheaply won and of no greater permanent consequences than the capture of Antwerp three years earlier.

The fall of Riga had immediate consequences in Russia. Korniloff, seeing his armies slipping from him, military discipline collapsing, conceived that the sole chance now remaining lay in a dictatorship. His supporters claimed that Kerensky consented to such a solution and

agreed to associate himself with such a dictatorship. Kerensky and his friends maintained that no such consent was ever given, but the fact is unmistakable that Korniloff now set out to proclaim a military dictatorship and that in the west he found support among the governments and the military leaders who saw in him the sole chance of keeping Russia in the war. It was at least with the tacit consent of the western governments that Korniloff set out for Petrograd.

But the decay of the army and of the nation had gone too far to leave either the discipline or the patriotism necessary to rally to authority in this critical hour. Russian sentiment mobilized against Korniloff. Kerensky, if he had made any promises, repudiated them and threw himself into the arms of the Bolsheviki, into the arms of the extreme Left. Hitherto he had sought to unite the moderates on both sides. In this impossible task he had failed. Now, called upon to decide between the two, he threw himself at the feet of those who had been his opponents at all times hitherto and now for the moment supported him only because they saw the ruin both of Kerensky and the national cause within their grasp.

Proclaiming himself Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies and denouncing Korniloff as a traitor, Kerensky now enlisted a force of Red Guards, arrested Korniloff, evicted such patriotic moderates as had hitherto been his associates, and proclaimed Russia to be a Republic.

Meantime, the German armies continued slowly and deliberately to exploit their success at Riga. Seizing the islands of the Baltic and the ports in the Baltic Provinces they menaced Petrograd itself, and on the 19th of October the Russian Government fled to Moscow. Three weeks later, on the 7th of November, the extreme radicals, under the lead of Lenin and Trotsky, seized Petrograd, gained control of the Government itself, and laid hands upon the control of the bleeding body of Russia. Kerensky was a fugitive, and the last remaining chance of orderly reform in Russia was eliminated.

The two men who now gained mastery upon Russian power were singularly unlike. Lenin must remain one of the great figures of his time. In exile, proscribed, subject to every known oppression, he had pre-

served his ideal, which was to reorganize Russia and then the world on the Marxian doctrine of class warfare, giving to the proletariat supreme control, abolishing national boundaries, and associating the workingmen of the world in an international federation.

A great man Lenin was, if only because of the fixity with which he pursued his purpose. Unlike his associate Trotsky, his personal character was above reproach. Unlike Kerensky accession to great power did not turn his head or lead him away from his principles. If Russia as a nation perished, if the whole world system of order was torn to pieces, he was unconcerned so long as there was left to himself the chance of applying his principles. He saw, in the destruction of order in the world, the necessary first step in the direction of that order which he was seeking to establish. He was a narrow-minded, intense fanatic, a visionary, prepared to sacrifice human life without limit, prepared to use force without measure to attain his object. But he was consistent, however insane, and he was faithful to his principles, mad as they were.

Trotsky, on the other hand, was a politician in spirit. He shared Lenin's purposes, but he was ready to compromise, manœuvre, manipulate. He was one of the many revolutionists who had found asylum in America and had slipped back to Russia with the coming of the Revolution. In the United States his reputation had not been of the best and he carried away from that country a hostility to the economic system quite as intense as he had cherished for the Russian governmental system.

The policy of Lenin and Trotsky was simple. They had to do two things to insure a continuation of power and they were prepared to do these two things promptly. These were: first, to destroy the Russian army that there might be no renaissance of national spirit, no military dictatorship such as Korniloff had conceived of, and, second, to conclude peace with Germany. These two things accomplished, Russia was in their hands as completely as a chloroformed patient is helpless under the knife of a surgeon. Thereafter they were free to undertake such experiments as they chose. To gain this freedom they were prepared to pay whatever price was necessary, although they did not perceive in advance how great the German price would be.

Having captured Petrograd on November 7th, and in the following fortnight consolidated their power, Lenin and Trotsky on November 21st, proposed an immediate armistice, and matched this venture in foreign politics by the abolition of private property in the domestic field. Meantime, the destruction of the army was assured by the transfer of the command to an ensign, Krylenko, on December 7th. One of the loyal old generals was assassinated; headquarters were abolished; the military and diplomatic secrets of Russia, including the various treaties with Russia's western Allies, were published, to the supreme delight of the Germans.

### II. ARMISTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATION

Finally, in mid-December, Lenin and Trotsky concluded an armistice with the Germans, which provided for a peace Conference at Brest-Litovsk. This Conference opened its sessions on December 22nd in the presence of representatives of all the Central Powers and of Russia. Russia's allies had in the meantime protested against an armistice which was a clear violation of the treaty of September 5, 1914, between Russia, France, and Great Britain—subsequently signed by Italy—which had pledged all four to make no separate peace. As for Roumania, when the Russian armies had collapsed in Galicia, her own troops, reorganized by a French general, had made a gallant but hopeless stand, and now Roumania, too, was compelled on December 6th to join in the truce. On this same date Trotsky, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to the Bolshevist Government, invited Russia's allies to define their peace terms and solemnly stated that if they refused, the responsibility for the prolongation of the war must be borne by them. This, too, was playing the German game with a vengeance. When the Brest-Litovsk Conference assembled, Russia, through Trotsky, presented her basis for world peace to a Germany now completely under the domination of the military element, already making preparations for her great western offensive, designed to crush France and England before America could arrive, and enable Germany to dominate the world. The basis of peace was to be the already famous Russian programme of no annexations and no in-

demnities; subject nationalities were to determine their allegiance by referendum; territories taken in the course of the war were to be restored; armies of occupation withdrawn; all belligerents were to unite in providing for the compensation of the sufferers of the war; colonies were to be restored, and economic boycotts after the war prohibited.

The Germans were of course unwilling to agree that there should be no forcible appropriation of territory, that armies of occupation should be promptly withdrawn, and complete political independence thus be restored to the Belgians, the Poles, and the Serbians, or that the right of self-determination should be conceded to German Poles or Austrian Latins and Slavs. But the opportunity for manœuvre was obvious, and Kuhlmann, who represented Germany with great skill and adroitness, at once seized the opportunity. On Christmas Day Germany and her allies, through the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, announced that Germany was prepared to agree to Russian terms, provided Germany's enemies, who had been Russia's allies, would agree to the same terms and associate themselves with the Brest-Litovsk Conference, which now took a recess until January 4th pending a response.

The trick was plain. Germany had not the smallest intention of agreeing to the Russian terms, but for her own purpose, both with respect of the German people, the Russian Revolutionists, and the Allied publics, it was important to place the responsibility for a failure upon the Allied governments. The Allies could not agree to terms such as these without abandoning the war. They knew, moreover, that Germany had no intention of evacuating Belgium or Poland, because in the secret negotiations and exchanges of views which had taken place during the war Germany had at all times declined to give any indication of her future attitude toward Belgium. They were compelled, therefore, to accept the situation which had been created and decline to make answer, notwithstanding the consequences.

Meantime, Germany gave a foretaste of her real purposes on December 28th when she responded to the Russian peace terms with the hypocritical assertion that neither she nor her allies proposed to appropriate any territory by force, but the right of self-determination had already

been exercised by the people of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and portions of Esthonia and Livonia; while General Hoffman, a little later speaking for the military element which was becoming impatient at the farce of Brest, informed the Russians that German High Command, for reasons of its own, was compelled to decline to evacuate Courland, Lithuania, Riga, and the Baltic Islands. while the Polish question was deliberately excluded.

In this situation Trotsky and Lenin sought for a moment to escape the inevitable by a public appeal to the masses of the German people, whom they seemed to believe would rise against their government. Passionate denunciations of the German course were uttered by Trotsky, but the Russian military power had now been completely abolished. Russia was helpless and words had no appeal to the German masses, who now at last saw the age-long Russian menace on the point of disappearance and perceived victory and plunder within their grasp. Moreover, disorder and anarchy were spreading all over the vast Russian Empire. Separatist movements were on foot in a dozen border regions, Finland and the Ukraine were seeking independence with German assistance. In Ukrainia, Bolshevist doctrine found no lodgment and the peasant proprietor turned to the Central Powers as the lesser of two evils, and asked Berlin and Vienna to protect them against Trotsky and Lenin. In Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, and Courland similar movements were discovered. Everywhere the elements of order, forced to choose between the German and anarchy, inevitably set their faces toward Berlin, and on February 9th Ukrainia formally made peace with the Central Powers and German and Austrian armies were assigned to the congenial task of protecting the granary of Russia from Bolshevism. Thus at a single stroke Russia was deprived of more than 30,000,000 people of her southern provinces from the Pripet Marshes to the Black Sea, while the Central Powers acquired, through alliance and by occupation, resources in foodstuff and minerals which, could they be made available in time, would once for all defeat the blockade of sea power. The value of the Ukraine was disclosed a few months later when in October, with defeat and even collapse threatening in the west, the German

High Command steadfastly declined to withdraw German divisions and thus surrender Ukrainian food supplies and other contributions.

The separate Treaty with Ukrainia was the death blow to the Lenin-Trotsky policy. For nearly two months the sessions at Brest-Litovsk had been prolonged by the interminable protests, denunciations, and temporary withdrawals of the Russians. Germany had endured these delays with complacency because in this time the last semblance of Russian military power was disappearing. But now the end was in sight.




MITTEL-EUROPA IN 1917

The solid black shows the territory occupied by the Central Powers after the fall of Riga and before the capture of Jerusalem. This is the celebrated war map frequently mentioned by Bethmann-Hollweg and other German statesmen as the basis of Germany's peace claims.

The day after the Peace with Ukrainia was signed Trotsky quit Brest-Litovsk announcing that he would refuse to sign the German peace but that the war was over. He refused to recognize German peace conditions but announced to the whole world, "At to-day's session" [that is February 10th] "the President of the Russian delegation announced that Russia abstains from signing the actual treaty of peace but declares that she considers the state of war with Germany is terminated and has issued the order for the complete demobilization of the Russian armies on all fronts."

But Germany was by no means contented to let the situation rest here, and on February 16th announced a resumption of hostilities. On February 19th German armies were again in motion, while Russian armies fled before them. Appeals from Lenin and Trotsky were of no avail. German armies flowed on toward Petrograd until at last, on Sunday, March 3rd, Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, while Roumania, now completely abandoned, signed an armistice two weeks later and a definitive treaty at Bukharest on March 26th.

So ended the war on the eastern front. Less than three weeks before Ludendorff launched his great offensive Germany at last found herself with her hands free. From the Baltic to the Black Sea the Russian and Roumanian fronts had been abolished, while far beyond the limits of the old firing lines German and Austrian armies advanced at will, occupying Kieff and Odessa and commandeering for their own purposes such provisions and war material as they chose.

### III. THE TREATIES OF BREST-LITOVSK

While the settlement of Brest-Litovsk was expressed in three separate treaties—with Ukrainia, with Russia, and with Roumania, they constitute a unit, and can best be examined together. The purposes achieved in the three documents were these: (1) to deprive Russia of all of her western accessions since the time of the period of Peter the Great, and to build up between the Slav mass and Germany a series of states dependent upon Germany and bearing the same relation to her as those

creations of Napoleon on the eastern bank of the Rhine a little more than a century before; (2) to divide what remained of Russia in such fashion as to preclude any reappearance of Russia as a great and menacing neighbour; (3) to place all of what had been Russia, and particularly what was left outside the German sphere of influence, in complete economic subjection to Germany; (4) to foment and encourage differences between the various border tribes, making them mutually hostile and thus incapable of union.

The treaty with Ukrainia defined the boundaries of the new state which included all of Russia extending from the Austrian boundary to the lands of the Don Cossacks and from the Pripet Marshes to the Black Sea including the Crimean Peninsula and the great port of Odessa, while from the old Polish estate there was taken a portion of the provvince of Cholm, thus perpetuating a feud between the Poles and the Ukrainians. Germany and Austria obtained the right of free transit across the new Ukrainian State and agreed to defend it against the Bolsheviki.

The treaty with Russia abolished Russian control in Poland, the Courland, Lithuania, and the two Baltic provinces of Livonia and Esthonia, whose future condition was to be determined by Austria and by Germany. Russian delegates agreed not merely to evacuate the portion of the Turkish Empire which her troops had occupied as a result of successes in the war, but also to return to Turkey Batoum and Kars and the balance of the territory taken as a result of the successful Russo-Turkish war in the last century. Russia agreed to make peace with Ukrainia, evacute that country, and also to withdraw from Finland and the Baltic provinces. The economic provisions of the Ukrainian treaty contained a stipulation for a colossal payment of foodstuffs, while the economic provisions of the treaty with Russia went even further. The policy here was obvious. Germany had, by her course in the war, lost her markets among Allied countries and she sought to make good this loss by creating a monopoly in the vast Russian territories.

Finally the Treaty of Bukharest with Roumania complemented and completed those with the Russians and the Ukrainians. This

treaty compelled the cession of the whole of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, thus depriving Roumania of access to the sea; provided for "rectifications" of the Austro-Roumanian frontier, which gave the Hapsburg Monarchy control of the passes leading into Russia and possession of the Petroseny coal mines; for the demobilization of the Roumanian army under the direction of Germany; for the free passage of troops of the Central Powers across Roumanian frontiers; for the occupation of the Roumanian railroads, a monopoly in the export of wheat, and the control of the oil wells of the kingdom. So far as Roumania was concerned she received, as a sop, possession of certain small areas in the Russian province of Bessarabia, which, with a measure of consent of the Central Powers, was presently stretched to the occupation of the whole of this Russian province.

By the terms of this settlement Russia actually lost 55,000,000 of people. Two states immediately hostile to her, Finland and Ukrainia, were erected on her own soil; the Baltic Provinces, which represent the conquests of Peter the Great, the window of the Slav giving on western Europe, together with Poland, were taken, while the Bolshevist hope of using what remained to them of Russia as a headquarters from which to utter propaganda directed at the German masses, was abolished by a provision in the treaty pledging the Lenin-Trotsky Government to abstain from all such manœuvres. Russia was deprived of all her conquests of 250 years, her unity was shattered, while on the eastern frontiers of Germany and Austria, and of the Mittel Europa that the German had now created, there was sketched a series of helpless states extending from Finland to Roumania, all of them promptly occupied by German and Austrian armies, all of them transformed into economic and military creatures of the Central Powers, and many of them arrayed against each other by skilfully manipulated boundary decisions.

Since Napoleon's Peace of Tilsit, Europe had seen nothing to compare with the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. It upset the balance of power in Europe. It abolished the Russian state. It opened the granaries of Russia and of Roumania, the mines, the railroads, and the rivers to immediate German use and to subsequent exploitation when economic

war succeeded the military operations. Save for the helpless Army of the Orient interned in Salonica, there was nothing left in the east, while the consequences of Caporetto had abolished for Austria the long-standing menace of Italian attack. German mastery of the Continent of Europe, with a subsequent sweep into Asia and even into Africa, was assured if only time were left to organize the victory and perpetuate the system which had been created. Between Germany and the realization of her colossal dream in its fullest extent there now interposed only the British and the French armies, shaken by the disasters and failures of 1917 and sustained largely by the hope of the ultimate arrival of American millions. Freed as it seemed for ever from the eastern danger, the German people were now invited to turn westward and witness the triumphant progress of their armies, swollen by accessions from the eastern front thus abolished. No people in all European history ever looked out upon more alluring prospects of immediate conquest and permanent triumph than had the German people in March of 1918.

The termination of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk marks the end of one more period in the World War. Once more, as in each of the preceding acts, Allied expectations and hopes had been brought to nothing and now at last Germany had achieved a success which could not be denied or mistaken. If her submarine attack in the west had by a narrow margin failed and was no longer a deadly peril, her military successes in the east had created an even deadlier menace.

Moreover, the last lingering hope that democracy could triumph in Germany, that the war could be ended by negotiations based upon mutual understanding, the final hope that reason and the dictates of civilization might penetrate the German darkness, had vanished.

In the paragraphs of the Brest-Litovsk treaties the world, after momentary hesitations, doubts, self-questionings, saw Germany again as she had been seen in the opening moments of the war, sweeping through Belgium and carrying fire and sword to the gates of Paris—as she had been revealed in the *Lusitania* Massacre, in the horrors of the Great Retreat of the preceding spring. The mass of reasonable men and women in the western nations were now forced to face the truth, to

recognize that only by the sword could there be a settlement, that compromise was impossible, that the essentially Prussian spirit, however much it had hidden itself in the spring and summer, in the smooth words of Reichstag debates, no longer even cared to hide itself.

There was no longer a question of attacking this Germany. There was no longer an immediate possibility of depriving her of any portion of the vast booty newly acquired or liberating any of the fresh conquered captives. In their western trenches the Allied armies had now only to await the storm they knew was coming, a storm the extent of which they did not calculate, the fury of which they under-estimated, nor had they long to wait, for the ink upon the treaties of Brest-Litovsk was hardly dry before Ludendorff began his march and the guns between the Oise and the Scarpe announced the opening of the final act in the World War. Having lived through the moral crisis of the war in 1917 the Allies had now to survive the military crisis, which, if briefer, was to prove not less terrible.

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volume.

Editor

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


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

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FRANK H. SIMONDS

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# PART ONE
# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
BY
FRANK H. SIMONDS

# CHAPTER ONE

## THE FINAL PHASE

### I

### THE LAST CAMPAIGN

The last campaign of the World War was a fitting climax to a struggle which had endured already for more than three years and had surpassed all previous contests recorded in human history. In the final phase more than six millions of men, representing seven nations, fought for 235 days on a front of 250 miles from the North Sea to the Moselle, from the outer defences of Metz to the ruins of Nieuport. And the struggle was not limited to the west front. While Germany met her ancient foes in decisive contest on the battlefields of France, Italian armies first repulsed then crushed the Austrians on the Piave; Serbian, Greek, French, British, and Italian troops fought Bulgarians in Albania and Macedonia, and British troops overwhelmed the Turk on the Plain of Armageddon. Two continents furnished the battlefields, and five, reckoning Australia, supplied the combatants.

But it was the issue of contest in France which decided the fate of the world and the question of victory and defeat in the great struggle. And in this contest, which French historians already regard as a single engagement and describe as the "Battle of France," all the previous western campaigns were repeated on a hugely increased scale. When the Germans crushed the British Fifth Army in March, 1918, they swept forward over all the territory which had been gained and lost in the First Battle of the Somme and the subsequent "Hindenburg" Retreat.

When in April German effort turned north, it was on the fields of Flanders, the scene of the three great struggles about Ypres, that one more tremendous battle was fought. In April, before the war drifted northward, too, the German storm once more reached the foot of Vimy Ridge. In May, when Ludendorff faced southward, a new conflict




THE FOUR FRONTS

A—Western Front. B—Italian Front. C—Macedonian Front. D—Eastern Front.

broke out upon the battlefields on the Craonne Plateau, where Kluck had checked the French and British advance from the Marne in 1914, where Ludendorff had broken the Nivelle offensive in 1917.

In July the last German attack stormed at the lines held by the French in Champagne, since the first great offensive, that of September, 1915, and in the same hour passed the Marne at the towns where the armies of Bülow and Kluck had crossed and recrossed that stream in the days of the First Battle of the Marne. Indeed, the Second Battle of the Marne in July, 1918, was in so many respects a replica of the First in September, 1914, that history affords no parallel more striking.

When at last the tide had turned, the Allied advance in July followed the roads used by Maunoury, French, and Franchet d'Esperey after the First Marne, while the British victories of August and September were won on the fields of the First Somme, and the battle names of these two months recalled with glorious exactitude the places made famous and terrible by the campaign of two years before. In the closing days of September, moreover, the first American army to enter the conflict struggled forward over the hills and through the villages which had seen in 1916 the beginning of the German offensive before Verdun.

With the coming of October the whole character of the campaign changed. At last one saw the realization of all the various and ambitious plans for Allied operations in the past. The British, emerging from the Ypres salient, swept the Germans from the Belgian coast and turned them out of the industrial cities of the French north. The French and British on the sides of the Noyon salient realized the hopes of their commanders in 1916 and 1917, and entered St. Quentin and Laon, Cambrai, and Douai. Still to the eastward the French and the Americans, on either side of the Argonne between Rheims and Verdun, repeated on a widened front the attack of Joffre in September, 1915, and achieved supreme success. Lastly, in the St. Mihiel salient, the American First Army in its initial engagement put into successful operation the plans of the French in the winter of 1914–15 and, by abolishing the salient, closed the gap in the eastern armour of France.

Flanders, Artois, Picardy, Ile-de-France, Champagne, and Lorraine were, in their turn, scenes of new contests whose extent of front surpassed the limits of ancient provinces, whose circumstances recalled the history of previous campaigns, and disclosed in success the purposes and plans of Allied commanders, which had been in the past imperfectly realized or totally wrecked. And as a final dramatic detail, when at last the Armistice came, King Albert was approaching his capital at the head of a Belgian army; Canadian troops had entered Mons, where British participation in the struggle had begun; French armies were in Sedan, the town for ever associated with the French disasters of 1870; and a Franco-American offensive was just about to break out to the

east of Metz, over the ground which had seen the first French dash into the "Lost Provinces" and the opening reverse at Morhange.

Nor was the drama alone splendid in its magnitude. Every element of suspense, surprise, intensity was present to hold the attention of the world, neutral and engaged alike; and so terrible was the ordeal that, the moment of victory once passed, conqueror and conquered alike sank back exhausted by a strain beyond that which had ever before been placed upon the millions in line, and behind the line, who constituted nations at war.

For history, moreover—which has attached to the Hundred Days of Napoleon a lasting significance as affording a standard of measurement for the rise and fall of one of the world's great figures—there must be hardly less meaning in the span of Ludendorff, longer by twenty days only, which saw the greatest of German military leaders three times on the edge of supreme victory and, on the final day, overtaken by swift defeat, ordering a second retreat from the Marne; and this retreat, in barely more than another hundred days, would end in surrender after decisive defeat, which alone prevented the supreme disaster of a Waterloo twentyfold magnified.

Since Napoleon fell, no soldier had known such intoxicating success as came to Ludendorff in March, in April, and again in May; while between March 26th and November 11th, Foch—first in defeat prepared by his predecessors, and then in victory organized by his own genius—wrote the most brilliant and far-shining page in all military history, and earned the right to rank as a soldier with the great Emperor, who had been his model.

In less than eight months, the finest army in size, equipment, and training ever put into the field by a civilized nation was transformed—after initial victories which had no parallel in this or any other war, after conquests of ground, captures of guns, harvestings of prisoners unequalled in all the past campaigns of the war—into a broken and beaten host, incapable of warding off the final blow, defeated beyond hope of recovery, still retaining a semblance of its ancient courage and in parts a shadow of its traditional discipline, but incapable of checking

its pursuers, of maintaining its positions, of long postponing that ultimate disaster, already prepared, when an armistice—incomprehensible even to the beaten army, by reason of the completeness of the surrender—saved the conquered from the otherwise inescapable rout.

## II. THE TWO PHASES

In this final campaign there are two distinct phases, which in turn fall into three divisions. There is first the German phase, the period beginning with March 21st and ending on July 18th, within which the Germans seek desperately and magnificently to win a decision in three great offensives: that delivered against the British alone, on March 21st, and continued in the April attack which carried the battlefront from Picardy to Artois and Flanders; that of May 27th against the French and British on the Chemin des Dames, which was extended to the heights north of Compiègne, in the early days of June; and finally, that of July 15th, between Rheims and the Argonne and between the Mountain of Rheims and Château-Thierry, which, failing, was totally transformed by Foch's deadly counter-offensive of July 18th.

The Allied phase, between July 18th and November 11th, displays a similar threefold division. It opens with the stroke between the Aisne and the Marne on July 18th, which lives as the Second Battle of the Marne and gained for the Allies the initiative. It continues with the Second Battle of the Somme, delivered on August 8th, Ludendorff's "black day for Germany," in which the British army had its full revenge for the still recent past. It reaches its climax on September 26th and the successive days, in which the Allies break the Hindenburg Line and begin the march to victory, which ends only with the Armistice.

Nor can one be blind to the political as well as the military aspects of this brief but astounding period. When the campaign opened, Germany, by her forty-odd months of success, had created an empire overpassing even that of Napoleon at the zenith of his career. German will was supreme from Schleswig-Holstein to Palestine. Belgium, Poland, northern France and the Ukraine, Serbia and the Baltic Provinces, Roumania and eastern Venetia paid tribute to German power and saw

behind the Austrians, Bulgars, Turks, and Hungarians, who in certain places replaced the German master, the sustaining force of the true conqueror.

Eight months later William II and his family had fled Germany; the ancient dynasties of every German state, the youthful heir of the Hapsburgs, the alien Czar of Bulgaria were fugitives. The "cascade of thrones" had come, and the sole sovereigns left in Europe ruled over neutral states or survived the storm because they had been loyal members of the victorious alliance. Before the year ended, French armies were on the left bank of the Rhine; Poland had risen from her ashes; Roumanian armies awaited only the appointed hour, no longer distant, when they should enter Budapest. In Berlin Germans killed Germans, as Frenchmen had slain Frenchmen in Paris after the disasters of the Terrible Year. Of all the mighty Middle Europe, intact on March 21st, nothing but fragments were left. Germany was a republic, at least in name; the Hapsburg Empire was a memory; Alsace-Lorraine had reëntered the French frontiers; Constantinople was under the guns of an Allied fleet. Of the most colossal national dream in all history there was left nothing but wreckage strewn over three continents, while the German fleet, which had insolently challenged British mastery of the blue water, had come captive to British waters, hauled down its battle ensign, and lay helpless at anchor against the hour when it should be ignominiously scuttled by its crew.

### III. THE GERMAN OPPORTUNITY

Turning now to the military aspects, what were the conditions under which this supreme battle was joined? What was the advantages, resources, necessities of the two contending forces: of Ludendorff, who had now become the supreme master of the fate of Germany; of the Allies, who in the hour of disaster at last transferred the reins to the firm hands of that great soldier who was to save a cause, a continent, the world, from the fatal consequences of German success.

Looking first at the German side, it is clear that the enemy possessed these advantages: They outnumbered the Allies, counting 205 divisions against 177. They had the initiative, the power to strike when and

where they chose, since the Allies had resigned the offensive. They possessed an army more highly trained for the task in hand and, for the moment, better engined. They had devised a method of attack, destined temporarily to transform the very character of the struggle, and they had successfully applied this method in Russia, in Italy, and in Flanders in the closing months of 1917. Finally, they had in Ludendorff a great commander, certainly the greatest German military genius of the war, who was capable of exacting the last ounce from that German machine which he had in part built up, and, for the rest, had become a final expression of the Prussian military tradition. And Ludendorff as master, through this unity of command, added a supreme advantage to all the others in his hands.

Behind the lines, too, the Germans profited by a far better morale. The collapse of Russia, made permanent to the German mind by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; the defeat of Italy at Caporetto; the recognition of the opportunity and the belief in the man who led the German armies, had combined to reanimate German spirits, reawaken all the hopes and expectations of August, 1914, before the Marne, and of February, 1916, before Verdun. Once more the German people were confident of victory, supreme victory, and world hegemony after victory. Army and people expected triumph, and, to achieve it, were capable of unprecedented effort during that period in which the faith survived.

On the other hand, time was no longer an ally of the German. Ludendorff's position was exactly analogous to that of Napoleon when the French Emperor returned from Elba. Since the submarine had failed to close the seas, a time must be expected when American troops would begin to arrive in great numbers. As the problem of Napoleon was to dispose of the armies of Wellington and Blücher in Belgium before those of Russia and Austria could arrive in Lorraine, Ludendorff must destroy the British and the French before the American millions became effective. In 1918, as in 1815, victory might be expected to preclude the possibility of the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements.

It was essential, too, that the success should not be delayed. The first blow must be decisive, if the confidence of the German people was




GERMANY AFTER BREST-LITOVSK

Solid black shows Turkish and conquered territory in German hands at the beginning of the campaign of 1918

to endure. After the experiences of the First Marne and Verdun, delay might spell a fatal decline in civilian morale. Even the hint of another campaign like that before Verdun, the mere suggestion of a check after that first forward rush, which could be calculated upon in advance as the irreducible minimum of profit of any great offensive, would prove a signal for dangerous depression, while the smallest semblance of defeat would not alone banish German hope but would infallibly entail Bulgarian, Turkish, and even Austrian desertion or collapse.

Here, too, were all the elements of the first campaign of the war. Then the French had avoided ruin in the opening defeats, parried the

fatal blow, survived until the Russian pressure had compelled the Germans to give over the offensive in the west and turn to the east, where for three years they would find occupation, would discover a task compelling them to concentrate so much of their effort in saving Austria that they would be unable, save for the brief Verdun interlude, to seek the decision where it alone could be found, namely in the west. But this time the Americans would ultimately play the Russian rôle, and Germany's present opportunity was palpably her last chance.

For the hour which was now come Ludendorff had laboured for three years. His victories in the east from Tannenberg to Tarnopol, his patient labour against the Russian, his moments of agony, when Roumania suddenly thrust in, during the British attack at Arras, throughout the long summer of 1917, had been rewarded. The war on two fronts was over; his hands were free to deal with the western enemies. He could choose the point of attack, be sure of superior numbers at the decisive point; he had three months in which to achieve victory without too much apprehension on the American score. On the whole, it was more than he could have expected and as much as any soldier could hope. Small wonder he turned a deaf ear to those who suggested negotiation in advance of attack.

### IV. THE ALLIED CASE

What, by contrast, was the situation of the Allies? Opposing 177 divisions to 205, they not only confessed inferiority of numbers, but their smaller forces served under divided leadership. The largest single element—the French, counting 99 divisions—had, in Petain, a splendid chief, who had brought them out of the slough of despond of the previous years; restored discipline, confidence, morale; overcome the consequences of the defeat of April, 1917, and the blunders of Nivelle. But the army had already passed its maximum of strength; the losses of four terrible campaigns could only in part be made good, and the moment was at hand when it would be impossible to replace wastage. Yet in strength and in spirit, and even more in mechanical equipment, the French army was formidable—equal, division for division, to the German.

It was different with the British army. Its 58 divisions had not been kept up to proper strength. Reinforcements, replacements, had been denied by reason of the mistaken policy of Lloyd George, who had decided that victory on the west front—and defeat as well—were impossible, and had consented to the transfer of divisions to the east. In March, 1918, the British army was weaker by 180,000 bayonets than it had been a year earlier. The strength of divisions had been reduced by breaking up three battalions in each to reinforce the balance, and this makeshift had contributed alike to disorganize and to discourage.

Not only had political influence withheld the necessary replacements, but it had also consented to the extension of the line. The result was that fewer British troops were on the front; and these necessarily held an extended line more thinly. In addition, taking over the line had not been followed by the proper fortification of the new positions. The time and the labour were lacking and on the new sector, between the Somme and the Oise, the British Fifth Army, dangerously extended, was without proper support lines against the possible emergency which might come.

In addition to this the confidence of the army had been shaken. The terrible losses in Flanders in the previous year, the unmistakable blundering of their commanders, coupled with failure of replacements to come and the weakness disclosed to the soldiers themselves by the extension of the lines, combined to create a situation which might be dangerous, as dangerous as the French situation after the initial defeat in April of the previous year.

The French army was then, relatively, in admirable condition; that of the British was less good. As to the Belgians, they maintained twelve divisions on their own front, admirable divisions but lacking in replacements. Two Portuguese divisions of doubtful value—which was to prove less than doubtful in the later crisis—completed the European troops of the Allies, and their colonial contingents, as well. As to the Americans, four partially trained divisions were actually in France when the campaign opened. But the first of these divisions was not available

for combat use before late April, and the next two to engage went into the furnace as late as June 1st, when the second great German offensive had almost reached its term.

It was still true that in eventual reserves the Allies were stronger than their foes, even with America out of the reckoning. Thus the French counted 682,000; the British, 764,000; the Belgians, 30,000; a total of 1,476,000 against 1,082,000 for the Germans. But the Allied reserves were scattered, a large fraction locked up in Britain, and the result was to be that three months were to pass before the balance of numbers actually engaged was in favour of the Allies; and this would come only when America was able to engage divisions which were still in the United States when the battle began.

At the moment when the first attack was launched, on March 21st, the actual battle strength of the Allies—that is, the troops actually in line or in regular formations behind the line—was in favour to that of the Germans by upward of 300,000. Again, while the German troops were concentrated against the selected front, the Allied were still scattered; the reserves were subject to the command of at least two different general staffs, each of which was, in the nature of things, bound to view the situation of the other through its own glasses.

As to the American contribution, in eleven months of actual participation in the struggle the United States had as late as the end of February sent but six divisions—of which only four were even partially trained—and there was as yet no hint that the pace could or would be accelerated. Therefore the German might conclude that he would have, until the decision had been achieved, a homogeneous army under a single commander assured of superior numbers.

### V. THE DIRECTION OF ATTACK

Even with inferior numbers Foch—as yet nothing but a sort of military adviser at the Versailles Conference of military representatives, charged to "coördinate" the movements of the two great Allied armies—had advised attack. But he had been overruled. Lloyd George was satisfied that the Flanders experiment of 1917 had proved what the

Somme adventure of 1916 had suggested: that an Allied offensive could not bring success, given the existing conditions of warfare.

In the same way George had decided, the views of Haig and Petain tending to confirm him, that a German success was equally impossible, since the German had no greater advantage of numbers or machinery than the Allies had possessed when they attacked at the Aisne and in Flanders in the previous year. But Haig, agreeing with George as to the wisdom of the defensive, had protested vainly against the folly of a defensive which did not envisage adequate numbers to maintain the lines.

Since Foch's suggestion had been overruled and the Allies had adopted a policy of waiting until America could arrive, that is of resigning all hope of a victory in 1918, Ludendorff acquired the initiative without even having to fight for it—that initiative which the Germans had lost on the west front, when the Allied attack at the Somme in July and August, 1916, had compelled Falkenhayn to abandon the Verdun attack.

Having the initiative, his problem was which to strike, the British or the French, since—despite the foolish conjectures of the winter of 1917–18—it was necessary for Ludendorff to strike, if a decisive victory was to be achieved and a truly German peace attained. Obviously, his choice must be to attack the British, because the British army was weak in numbers, as a consequence of the failure of George to furnish replacements, perilously placed because of an extension of line, unwarranted in view of the effectives available, and at a lower ebb of spirits than at any time before or after, during the whole war.

By contrast, the British civilian morale was, on the whole, the strongest among the European allies, and unless the British army were defeated decisively there was little chance of arriving at a peace which would even measurably satisfy the German expectations of March, 1918. But if Ludendorff could strike the British army—defeat it, separate it from the French, drive it back to the edge of the sea, exhausting French reserves wasted in a vain effort to save the British—then he might expect, even in advance of a final blow, that France would surrender.

Ludendorff's objective then was the British army, just as the

younger Moltke's objective had been the French army in the Marne campaign of 1914. The geographical ends which he pursued were of relatively minor importance. Before July, that is until the surprising success at the Chemin des Dames led him to his fatal attack upon the French, his purpose was steadily to smash the British army. In his original plan he had contemplated, after an attack upon the French at the Chemin des Dames, to return to the northern field and finish the task begun in March and pushed well toward completion in April.

To use the familiar comparison, just as Napoleon set out to crush first the Prussian and then the British armies in the Waterloo campaign, Ludendorff set out to smash the British and then, if necessary, the French, in his last campaign. And just as the great Emperor heavily defeated the Prussians at Ligny, Ludendorff even more severely defeated the British in the fighting of April and May. But he did not actually crush them, just as Napoleon failed to dispose permanently of Blücher's Prussians. Nor was he able to put the French out, when he turned against them. Then he was in turn overwhelmed by the British and the French, reinforced by the Americans, as Napoleon was routed by the British reinforced by the Prussians at Waterloo. But one campaign lasted seven days; the other, seven months.

We see, then, that Ludendorff had the advantage of numbers, of the offensive; that he wisely selected the weaker army to attack; that his strategy was Napoleonic. He had one further advantage, which was of almost incalculable value, namely a new and revolutionary system of attack, the efficacy of which was not even suspected by his foes; that method of attack which, after nearly four years, was to restore the element of surprise and, for the moment, bring back the old war of movement, after producing that actual break through, so long sought and hitherto never realized, on a grand scale since the war of trenches had begun in November, 1914, in the deadlock in Flanders.

### VI. LUDENDORFF

Because this gigantic campaign was, on the military side, after the first tragic week, a duel between soldiers, between Ludendorff and Foch,

it is necessary to look for a moment at the men, themselves, the men who played a rôle hardly paralleled in history, since Napoleon, who was conquered at last—not by a greater military genius but by a combination of circumstances, political even more than military, and, even after defeat, lived—and lives—as the supreme military genius of his own age.

Oddly enough, while the personality and the history of Foch are easily discoverable—are revealed alike by his own actions, his written and spoken words, and by the endless tributes coming from all who knew him, whether in the days of preparation or in the period of his greatness —Ludendorff remains, in a measure, a man of mystery. His own heavy volume setting forth his recollections of the war helps but little to explain or even to animate the solid, rather brutal, but enormously virile portrait supplied by all German military photographs.

Erich Ludendorff was born at Kruszezewnia in the Prussian province of Posen won for the Hohenzollerns as a result of the partition of Poland, on April 9, 1865. He was a product, not of the "junker" nobility, but of the small Prussian bourgeosie. He was the first of his name to choose the army as a career, although his father had been a reserve officer in the Prussian cavalry and had served in the wars of 1866 and 1870. His mother was a Swede, a circumstance explaining his retirement to Sweden following German defeat and revolution. His family had few resources to aid him in acquiring education. Poor, like Napoleon, Ludendorff at the very outset of his life dedicated himself to a consuming ambition; but it was not a personal ambition, rather it was a religion, the religion of his country. German greatness he saw attainable only through the army and the navy. His task was military, and to it he devoted his life, the life of a Spartan. With the modern Germany, its excesses, its display of wealth, its exaggeration of the trappings of military life, and its gross imitation of British manners and industrial objectives he had neither sympathy nor patience. He was an "old" German; even his master the Kaiser could enlist his loyalty but could not command his approval.

In 1904 this soldier, already marked for his intelligence, his devotion to work, went to the General Staff. The fruit of his labour was the

later demand of the German army for a gigantic appropriation, an enormous expansion, which preceded by only a brief time the coming of the war, drove France to the three-year service, and constituted one of the last of the interminable warnings.

Ludendorff's first service in the war was brilliant. The attack upon Liége having led to confusion and preliminary failure, he put himself at the head of a small detachment, penetrated the city, seized the citadel, restored the situation. It was a deed reminiscent of the "Little Corporal" at the bridge of Lodi, but it was a single instance of battlefield audacity and courage. Almost immediately he was caught up and transported to the east, where he became the brains of the Hindenburg legend.

The relation between the two men was not unknown in German military history. Gneisenau had played the same part for old Blücher, and the famous marshal had acknowledged it once in London, where he wagered that he was the only man in the drawing room who could kiss his own head, and won the wager by bestowing a sound smack upon Gneisenau's forehead. At first the true mission of Ludendorff was not generally appreciated. The legend grew about Hindenburg and, as it grew, expressed itself in the preposterous wooden statue with its ridiculous nails; but in the end fact outran fiction, and Ludendorff emerged.

In the east his daring won Tannenberg, and but for Austrian blundering he might have conquered Poland in 1914. In the end Austrian necessities compelled a modification of his plans and he delivered the great blow at the Dunajec in 1915, which was the beginning of the Russian collapse. But in 1916 the German offensive at Verdun and the Allied attack at the Somme deprived him of the men to finish the Russian task; and the Russian offensive of June, in Galicia, and the Roumanian eruption of August gave him anxious hours.

Even in 1917, when at last he and Hindenburg had come west, he was unable at once to take the offensive. His first decision was expressed in the famous Hindenburg Retreat, which enabled the Germans to block all the Allied efforts in the west until Russia was finally reduced to chaos and Roumania conquered. In this period Ludendorff consented to the

launching of the submarine campaign because he accepted, with reservations as to time, the forecasts of the naval branch. He did not reckon the American intervention as dangerous; he expected to win the war by an offensive in the west in 1918, if the submarine did not bring a decision before, and he did not dream of the arrival of American masses. This was his supreme miscalculation, but the real blame must rest with the navy.

In the debate over the submarine his voice was decisive, and he gave it for the blockade unhesitatingly. He was unmoved when military necessities involved the destruction of two French provinces in 1917; he was no more considerate of rights or of humanity when the same necessity entailed a policy of marine murder. He dealt with both questions as one might deal with an arithmetical calculation.

In 1918, when he delivered his opening blow, he had been more frequently victorious than any other real or nominal commander-in-chief in the war. He had planned greater battles and brought off more complete successes. He had engineered the crushing of Serbia, Roumania, Russia; the victory over Italy had been won under his direct supervision. His mastery of the German war machine was unquestioned; his power was almost as great as that of Napoleon, and he used it for political quite as much as for military ends, when political circumstances had a bearing upon military conditions. The civil government of Germany, the Chancellor, and even the Emperor, were unable to thwart him.

Reading the man's own account of himself, one recognizes that he was prepared for everything except failure; that he considered everything except the strategy and the moral force of his opponent. His eyes were turned inward, not outward; his memoirs contain hardly a passing reference to his opponents—to Foch, to Haig, to Pershing. When his own offensives failed, he showed himself bewildered; then he attempted to lay the blame, first upon certain units in the army, which failed to accomplish their duty, then upon the civil government and the civilian morale. If his strategy failed it was not because he had met a master; if his armies were defeated it was not because they showed themselves inferior to Allied armies, which had not collapsed in the spring disasters.

When the first defeats came, Ludendorff was seized with a panic and promptly demanded that the government make peace. After August 8th he lost his own nerve, and his official statements shocked the German people, already shaken by the outward appearance of defeat. But even in this crisis he could not believe that the real defeat was the army's, he sought a civilian explanation. When at the last his Emperor accepted his resignation, after rebuking his general for an excess of zeal, Ludendorff retired, still unshaken in his faith in the system which he typified, still incapable of finding any real explanation for the impossible: the defeat and proximate rout of the German army.

A certain genuine sincerity there is about the man Ludendorff in the midst of all the deliberate and the unconscious inveracity of his own memoirs, a measure of arresting simplicity. The man gave his whole life, his great talents, everything to the cause he adopted. He was not unworthy of the great trust, for no selfish aspiration interfered with his service to his country. If he was brutal—and he was brutal—it was inherent brutality, the spirit which he had acquired, which had been born in him, perhaps, as a sharer in the Prussian tradition. But once his faith is shaken by defeat, his gods upset, his religion confounded, the great man becomes unmistakably a very little man; he crumples up with the system, the same weaknesses appear in both.

But in March, 1918, in all the vast German Empire, in all the subject provinces and allied races there was none to question his will. The Kaiser was a pale shade. The Chancellor was without power. Hindenburg was little more than a colossal figurehead, which bowed assent to Ludendorff's words. Personal ambition he had none, he was not a mere cringing courtier, he could take a firm hand with the Kaiser or the Crown Prince, but not as a soldier of fortune, merely as a servant of his country's greatness, as he conceived it.

Grim, silent, heavy handed and, after a fashion, heavy minded—almost a gloomy fanatic—his whole life a deliberate sacrifice to the ideal of his service and his country, Ludendorff was the embodiment of the greatness of Germany, as well as an illustration of her weakness. He would crush, he believed in force, he had little sympathy, and no remorse. He

was the architect of the Hindenburg Retreat, which transformed two provinces of France into a desert. As a man, as a thinker, as a soldier, he was inferior to Foch, but he was the greatest soldier Germany had produced during the war, and he came within two steps of victory. Foch would one day describe the German army as an express locomotive in the hands of a stage-coach driver—but to the present writer he affirmed emphatically that Ludendorff was the best German leader of the World War.

Count Czernin, Foreign Minister of the Hapsburg Empire in the latter days of the war, supplies, in his own memoirs, an admirable picture of Ludendorff. A really trained and able statesman, the Austrian tremendously admires Ludendorff the soldier but bemoans his political limitations, which were those of the German military caste. They could not realize—he points out shrewdly—that a nation might die of military victories which were indecisive, and that unlimited securities for negotiation in the shape of conquered provinces were valueless if the enemy were neither willing nor compelled to redeem them at the German price. The great Moltke was equally dangerous but he had a Bismarck to control him, and Czernin laments the absence of a Bismarck, of a statesman capable of restraining the Ludendorff caste and of seeing beyond the battle map. When Czernin wanted to negotiate, when he proposed the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, the German generals were more amused than angry—victory seemed to them so inevitable. When the generals were at last ready to negotiate, their defeat in battle was so complete that diplomacy could accomplish nothing.

Czernin, like all other critics of Ludendorff, save the German, emphasizes beyond all else the blind, arrogant pride of the man, and sees in this, not so much an individual trait as the ultimate expression of the same characteristic in the whole German-Prussian military caste. Bismarck, in his own memoirs, more than once complains of the same thing. Of Foch one feels that he was a great man, above and beyond all systems; of Ludendorff, that he was the greatest exponent of one system, formidable beyond doubt, but possessing certain dangerous limitations; and the limitations as well as the virtues of the system were

expressed in Ludendorff with equal exaggeration. The more one analyzes German military operations, the more completely this blindness—due to pride, to overweening confidence—discloses itself, the neglect of the actual factors in the situation and the blind reliance upon an estimate based upon a sense of superiority, an assurance rising to a total ignoring of the other side of the barbed-wire entanglements. Like the younger Moltke in 1914, Ludendorff assumed that the enemy had been conquered by his blows and having made the assumption, acted upon it to the ruin of his army and his country. The same misconception underlies the First Marne, Verdun, and the Second Marne. With Foch, victory was a faith, but with Ludendorff, a superstition. The difference is capital.

### VII. FOCH

No greater contrast to Ludendorff—physically, intellectually, morally—can be supplied than by the figure of Foch. Ludendorff had inherited the tradition of a victorious army. Foch began his service in an army recently defeated; he saw Metz, which he knew as French, torn from the Fatherland. For France everything, the army first of all, was to be remade. Foch undertook, with his contemporaries, to return to the Napoleonic tradition, to find in the history of 1870 the causes of defeat, and in the strategy of the great Emperor the principles which would show the way to victory.

The result was the First Battle of the Marne, where the French military school definitely vanquished the German. It could not follow up success with adequate exploitation because numbers were lacking, but the answer had been found, and Foch was a conspicuous factor in delivering the answer. Ludendorff had begun at Liége by victory; Foch began before Nancy by saving a beaten French army, defeated at Morhange. At the Marne he delivered the most brilliant and compelling counter-stroke.

Sent north, he coördinated British, French, and Belgian armies and saved Calais. The genius of that splendid campaign was his, although the glory is shared by British and French armies, by Belgian, too. In 1915

he directed the offensive in Artois which fell short of success. He was hardly more fortunate at the Somme in 1916, and, as a consequence, suffered temporary disgrace. But he kept to his work. After Nivelle fell, he was called to new tasks; when Caporetto came, he was sent to advise the Italians.

Before the war he had been a marked man among soldiers. As head of the École de Guerre his teachings had inspired many. He had also been a frank and uncompromising Catholic, a circumstance which more than once injured his professional prospects. But beyond all else he was a soldier who had taught abstract principles magnificently and tested each of the precepts on the battlefield adequately.

"A lost battle is a battle someone accepts as lost," he had asserted in the past. After August 8th, Ludendorff proved the truth of this assertion, but after Picardy, Flanders, the Chemin des Dames, Foch conceded nothing. "Tell Lloyd George that I still prefer my side to Ludendorff's," he told a friend of the British Prime Minister, recalling the fact that, after the April disaster, he had made a statement, to which he held, when the Chemin des Dames had been lost and Paris was in danger.

Ludendorff, save for the moment at Liége, was an office soldier: he provided armies with plans and with orders. But Foch was something more; his personality expressed itself in contact with his subordinates, and in critical hours he ran from place to place and his presence was an unfailing inspiration. The soul of the man Foch comes out of his deeds and his words alike, and it is possible to perceive how it animated those about him. Exactly this spiritual element is lacking in Ludendorff, and the lack of it makes him impersonal in victory and almost insignificant in defeat.

We have, then, in this tremendous duel, the clash of two great military ideas, the French and the German, for the higher strategy is all Ludendorff and Foch. And in this clash the victory of the French is not only incontestable but in the end simply explicable. We have also the struggle between two minds and two moral natures, and the triumph of the higher mind and the finer moral nature is not less unmistakable.

For Americans it is an interesting circumstance that the two chief figures in the last campaign of the World War were separated by approximately the same years which lay between Grant and Lee in the Civil War. Foch was born at Tarbes, in the Pyrenees, on October 2, 1851, and was thus a "meridional" like Joffre who came from the eastern Pyrenees. His family, like that of Ludendorff, was respectable rather than distinguished. His mother's father had fought with distinction under Napoleon, and his own family had cherished an admiration for the great Emperor, which was disclosed in the fact that one of his father's several names was Napoleon—a circumstance interesting in view of the fact that the future marshal was to prove one of the greatest admirers of Napoleon and, as a student of his campaigns, to discover and revive for France the secrets of system which explained Napoleonic victories.

The story of Foch's career in the French army is little significant now, save as its study reveals the development of the man. Worth recalling, however, is the anecdote—told by his biographer, Raymond Recouly—of the meeting between Foch and Clemenceau in 1908, during the "Tiger's" first ministry, when he sent for Foch to offer him the direction of the Ecole de Guerre.

"But, Mr. President," expostulated Foch, "I'm afraid you don't know the whole truth about me. Do you know that I have a brother who is a Jesuit?"

"I don't care a damn," retorted Clemenceau. "You will teach military science—not religion—and you will make a good director of the college; and that is all I care about."

A significant interview, this, when one recalls the bitterness against the Church in France at that time. And, as director of the École de Guerre, Foch did much to prepare the French high command for war; for the war he always believed inevitable. From this post Foch went out a General of Division in 1911. At the Ecole he met General Weygand, later to serve him as faithfully as Berthier served Napoleon, from the Grand Couronén to the interview at Rethondes.

Reading the teachings of Foch, his lectures, it becomes clear that,

while penetrating the system of Napoleon, he had equally accurately appraised the strength and the limitations of the German method. His analyses of the German campaigns of 1870 disclose a prescient grasp of the methods actually employed in 1914–1918. The weakness before Metz revealed the same misconceptions of the true situation of the enemy—which, had a Napoleon or a Foch commanded Bazaine's army, would infallibly have ruined German prospects in 1870—turn up again; and Foch foresees them before they arrive: at the Marne, at the Yser, finally, and for ever memorably, at the Second Battle of the Marne.

General Pershing, on his return from Europe, characterized Foch as "a great strategist." But he was something far more: he was a great and an accurate psychologist, not merely at headquarters, in the calm of study, but in the heat of battle. Recall his message to Joffre, after four days of defeat and retreat at the Marne:

> "My centre is giving way, my right is retiring, impossible to manœuvre, the situation is excellent, I shall attack."

And attack he did, moving a division across all his rear, putting it in at sunset, and producing that moral effect which won the day—giving just that little added weight which, like the proverbial straw, broke the camel's back.

But, as Recouly points out, his statement: "the situation is excellent," was not bravado, only the result of an accurate appraisal of the enemy's situation. The fury of the attack directed against him, as he told his staff, disclosed the bad turn things were taking for the Germans elsewhere. When in November, 1914, the Prussian Guard was broken at Ypres, he remarked, forthwith: "We shall have a long period of quiet in the west now." The calm lasted, so far as German offensives were concerned, until February, 1916, when the attack on Verdun began.

In a word, one of the salient details in Foch's strategy was his psychology, which enabled him to get at what his enemy was actually thinking, and to act upon this knowledge, while Ludendorff and his predecessors decided on what the enemy *must* think, and then acted on

this assumption, which, on the western front, was almost without exception inaccurate. At La Fère-Champenoise Foch knew that the Germans had their last reserves in and that the hour of decision had arrived. At the Second Marne Ludendorff reasoned that the previous offensives had exhausted French reserves and on this conclusion went to defeat, when French and American reserves intervened.

As one examines the German campaigns, the three great western offensives in 1914, 1916, and 1918, a single characteristic tends more and more clearly to detach itself. There is the same magnificent preparation—the same wise, skilful, scientific upbuilding of a tremendous instrument—an accurate appraisal of the weak points in the enemy's armour. All being ready and marvellously ready, the machine is set in motion. It strikes, and the first impact is tremendous, the first results colossal; but thereafter the machine, in some unaccountable fashion, seems slowly to run down, like a child's electric toy. Its movements become uncertain, its direction indistinct; presently it comes to a dead halt or even recoils. Just at the moment when the Allied publics see utter ruin in plain view and the German people are celebrating victory without limit, something happens, almost miraculously—and some people still believe the First Marne a miracle.

There is a phrase of Foch's, descriptive of German methods in 1870, which admirably sums this up:

"Does not that prove," he asks, "that if a tool is too heavy for the worker's hand, it will either slip through his fingers or pull him over?"

Now, by contrast, when Foch becomes master of the military forces of the Allies, when the great stress due to the necessity to parry the enemy's first blows has passed, one sees his method put into operation. Could anything be more totally different? Instead of a machine complete at the hour of joining battle, his machine seems to grow with the battle—develop, expand, take on new vitality and strength. When Ludendorff struck one saw ruin imminent and colossal; in Foch's offensive the actual victory comes almost as a surprise, the separate steps are so imperceptible. Of Napoleon's method, Clausewitz had written:

In Napoleon's battles a veil seems to cover the tediousness inseparable from taking up positions and carrying out the first movements, but once that is lifted, one always sees the decisive attack by masses of men filling the scene with tragic fury.

In Foch's phrase, the separate attacks of the Germans in 1918 were all "dammed." A dike was stretched across their front, the torrent of water rolled madly against the dike, but somehow the barrier just managed to hold. There is by contrast little to suggest a flood about Foch's attack, the tide rises steadily, the volume of water grows visibly but evenly. The German lines are not suddenly breached at one critical point, rather the water seems to rise regularly until it overflows all along the German dike—not at one place, but at a score; and no temporary barrier can restrain the flood, because there is not one critical point.

All this belongs, perhaps, rather to the examination of the actual conflict than to a discussion of Foch; and yet, to understand the man, it is essential to recognize the method, the thought, quite as much as the will. Ludendorff, like Moltke and Falkenhayn, attempts to snatch a victory from a careless or incautious enemy, imperfectly prepared, inadequately fortified, but possessing enormous latent resources, possessing adequate reserves; and each attempt fails. Foch—patiently, deliberately—prepares his victory. Ludendorff opens the campaign with the blow that was to win the war; Foch's last blow was suspended by the Armistice. Ludendorff's three attacks, in Picardy, in Flanders, and at the Chemin des Dames, dislocated fractions of the Allied front, but only *seriatim.* On November 11th, all the German front, from Holland to the Vosges, was staggering back. Every army was beaten, all reserves were exhausted.

To dismiss this achievement as the result of the operations of a "great strategist" is to deal too brusquely with one of the greatest circumstances in all military history. To see in the contribution of the British, the American, or the French armies, the explanation of victory is to miss the whole truth. Each of these armies performed miracles, given their resources, but all three were but the bricks, the mortar, and the stones, in which the genius of Foch wrought. And not even at the

end was Foch's machine more imposing than that with which Ludendorff opened the campaign.

### VIII. HUTIER'S TACTIC

In all war the essential condition of victory has been and remains the concentration of superior numbers at the decisive point. To achieve this the necessary condition has always been secrecy which in turn produces surprise. The great victories of history have thus been achieved. In the opening phases of the World War the same end had been sought. The first German attack upon France had, as its underlying conception, the sending of an overwhelming force through Belgium to arrive on the western flank of Anglo-French armies before a counter-concentration could be achieved. Joffre's answer had been a retreat until—in turn, and without German foreknowledge—an army had been concentrated on the German flank before Paris.

When the war was transformed into a trench conflict, the element of surprise was not at first abandoned on either side. In the first Allied offensive, French's ill-starred venture at Neuve-Chapelle was successful in achieving surprise because he was able secretly to concentrate overwhelmingly superior artillery at a selected point, and this artillery literally swept away German defences. For hours the road to Lille had been open, but he had so mishandled his infantry that the opportunity passed.

In Artois there had been a similar opportunity in May, which had not been realized. But by September of this same year, 1915, the Germans by organizing in depth were beginning to guard against surprise and the great French offensive of September 25th in Champagne, in part a surprise, penetrated two of the three German defence systems only to be checked at the third, which could not be destroyed by the preliminary artillery preparation.

When the Germans attacked at Verdun, the following February, they were even more successful in bringing off a surprise, but their attack was upon so narrow a front that, after swift and considerable preliminary advances, they were held up by the enfilading fire delivered from the unbroken sections of the French line on either side of the

wedge they had driven into it. Before they could break down the sides of this wedge, the advantage of surprise was gone; the French had achieved a sufficient counter-concentration of men and guns, and the battle became a siege.

At the Somme in July, 1916, the British laid aside all pretense at surprise and sought to achieve a rupture by the intensity of artillery preparation and the prolongation of the bombardment over many days. Partly through the inexperience of their artillery—for they were still a new army just entering their first great battle—the preparation fell short of the expectation, and the initial assaults of the infantry won only limited gains at prohibitive costs. As the battle continued the artillery practice improved but there was no further chance of surprise, and the Germans multiplied their defences behind the sector attacked as the chance of a break through disappeared. This was the Verdun lesson over again.

In 1917, Nivelle endeavoured to change the method. He did not hope to bring off a surprise, but he did expect, by widening the front assailed—by employing Petain's artillery method, which on a narrow front at Verdun had achieved splendid results in the preceding October and December—to destroy German defences on a front so wide that it would not be possible for the Germans to hold up the victors by enfilading fire, as at Verdun. The effort failed; first, because the Germans, knowing where the attack was coming, were able to make an adequate counter-concentration of men and guns; and, secondly, because Nivelle lacked the artillery to make adequate preparation for his infantry.

Finally, in Flanders, in the late summer and autumn, Haig tried a grand offensive, on a front somewhat smaller than Nivelle's but far wider than that of the Germans at Verdun or of the British at the Somme. But he, too, ignored the element of surprise, and the Germans met the first onslaught with a new defensive tactic, an organization in depth, a prodigal use of concrete machine-gun emplacements, and a concentration of infantry reserves behind the front menaced and beyond the range of the artillery preparation. German reserves, counter-attacking when the enemy infantry had won through the first zone of German defence, got beyond its own artillery barrages and, become disorganized

by its own efforts and exhausted by its losses, sufficed to hold up and even to throw back the British.

Thanks to this tactic—developed by Ludendorff himself when he came west in 1916—the first British attacks in Flanders were transformed into dismal failures. Later the British were able to improve upon their own methods, but by this time the Germans were able to match division against division. Moreover, the experience in Flanders confirmed all previous lessons by demonstrating that the very volume and power of artillery preparation for attack almost eliminated hope of successful infantry attack by the fashion in which it turned the country which had been shelled into an impenetrable tangle of impassable shell craters and morasses.

But in the closing hours of the campaign of 1917 the tanks at Cambrai suddenly achieved one of the few real surprises of the war. Transported to the front before Cambrai secretly as was possible, launched after nothing more than a brief preliminary artillery preparation and accompanied by barrages, they cut the way through German defence systems, and the infantry following in their wake were able to advance over a country which had not been torn to pieces by weeks of artillery practice.

The Cambrai offensive failed because there were lacking infantry reserves to exploit the initial success and because the handling of the tanks was not equally good at all points. Moreover, the type of tank employed, because of its size, proved too vulnerable to artillery fire, and too slow and unwieldy, while the tank suffered from lack of accompanying field artillery. Nevertheless, the lessons of Cambrai were to revolutionize the tactics of both armies, and the chief lesson was the demonstration that surprise could be attained, and it had already been proven that without surprise a real success was unthinkable. Therefore the Allies, against the time when they should regain the offensive, undertook to expand the tank attack and began the construction of smaller and swifter tanks and studied the coördination of tanks with their artillery course as with their infantry. In the end, the tactic developed as a consequence broke the German resistance, smashed the Hindenburg Line, and made victory possible. But this was only after many long months of waiting.

The Germans on their side were equally impressed by the Cambrai episode. But Ludendorff did not accept the tank. To be sure, Germany lacked the materials out of which to construct both submarines and tanks, but Ludendorff was convinced by the Cambrai experience that in the end tank attacks could be checked as were those at Cambrai. He did not foresee the eventual expansion of the tank tactic, and he concentrated his attention on improving a German method which should similarly restore the element of surprise, but without making the same demand upon German factories and labour for mechanical equipment. It seems fair to say that Ludendorff totally underestimated the value of the tank, but it is not less accurate to say that he lacked the material to construct tanks in the necessary numbers.

Ludendorff's method was known then and will probably live as the Hutier tactic, deriving its name from the general who first used it, in the taking of Riga in the autumn of 1917. Against the Russians the trial was little more than an experiment recalling the warfare of the grand manœuvres of peace times, since the Russians were too disorganized to offer serious resistance to any attack. The same method was employed in part against the Italians at Caporetto, with supreme success, but once more the low morale and disorganization of the Italians in part seemed to explain success and to blind Allied observers to the efficacy of the tactic. Finally, Marwitz used it against the British in the second phase of Cambrai, bringing off a swinging success after an undeniable surprise. And with these experiences in mind Ludendorff devoted the winter months to improving the system, training the officers and men in it, and gathering up the necessary material to make victory sure.

### IX. FOCH'S DESCRIPTION

The most satisfying definition of this Hutier tactic is found in a communication addressed by Foch to his subordinates on June 16, 1918, at the moment when the successful answer was in the process of formulation. Remembering that at the outset it practically transformed the character of the fighting, and that it was not until July 15th—nearly four

months after it was first employed on a colossal scale—that an answer was found, its value can be fully appreciated. In sum, it represented the fruits of almost four years of study of the lessons of the war by the best brains of Germany, and it almost won the war for its authors. Foch's definition was as follows:

The German method of attack is characterized by surprise, violence, rapidity of execution, manœuvre, and the extreme depth of penetration sought.

I. The surprise is obtained by the brevity of the artillery preparation (three to four hours) and by the transport to the place of attack of units to be engaged at the very last moment, the marches to the front of the troops to be used being made by night and on foot.

Up to the night which precedes the attack there is not the slightest change in the customary appearance of the front; quiet reigns and the usual formations are in line.

The attack always takes place just at daybreak, the infantry being preceded by a barrage consisting of a strong proportion of smoke shells. As a result of the cloud effect thus produced, our infantry and our artillery only perceive the enemy when he is within a few metres of them.

II. The violence is achieved by the intensity of the bombardment, all calibres and every sort of shell being employed simultaneously on a depth of four or five kilometres [between two and a half and three miles] and by the attack of masses of infantry which, during the artillery preparation, assemble at from 700 to a thousand feet before the first lines to be taken.

After the first lines are taken it lengthens out and spreads out, the units in advance aiming as quickly as possible at successive objectives, which have been indicated for them in advance, without having any preoccupation for their own flanks or for cleaning up in their rear, to which task other units are assigned.

The designation of these successive objectives does not imply any halt at any of them, but merely provides landmarks showing the direction to be followed.

III. During the forward movement the infantry is protected by a rolling barrage of artillery, then by the light artillery and *minnenwerfer*, which accompany it. It also makes free use of its own rifle fire and of its machine guns.

If an infantry unit encounters an obstacle which it cannot take by its own strength, it halts and is immediately passed by units which support it, and these are charged with the task of taking the strong point which remains by enveloping it.

IV. The Germans generally employ their best troops in the centre of the attacking front in such a fashion as to give themselves every chance of obtaining a rapid and profound advance in the centre.

The manœuvre consists, first, in enlarging rapidly the breach thus opened, and then in attacking on the flanks of this breach.

V. The penetration in depth is obtained by the rapid and resolute march of the troops upon predetermined objectives situated far within the enemy's lines. It has for its consequence a prompt disorganization of any defence not completely organized by taking from it the essential points of organization, which are its predetermined objectives.

If, in reading the narrative of the successive German offensives, this simple analysis of Ludendorff's method is kept in mind, the seeming confusion will be eliminated. And if, in addition, the fact is recalled that for many months the best troops in the German army had been undergoing training in this method while the Allied troops had no effective preparation to meet the tactic and the Allied High Command no adequate appreciation of its character, the events of March, April, and May will be clearly understood, and the magnitude of Foch's achievement in finding an adequate answer, while the battle was in progress and going steadily against him, will be properly appraised.

But even before the answer was found the Hutier tactic failed to achieve a decision. Actual open warfare was not restored. A colossal break through, unprecedented in the history of the World War, was achieved. Prisoners were captured by the tens of thousands, guns by the thousands, material in amounts incalculable; advances were made in extent hitherto unparalleled on the western front since the opening days of the war. But in the end the Hutier tactic failed, because it too completely disregarded the human factor.

In each decisive phase of an offensive the Germans reached the point where a slight further success meant supreme victory, too weary to deliver the "knockout blow," while the stricken Allies were just able, by something approaching a miracle, to get up reserves to close the breach. German strategy and tactics were alike comprehended in the delivery of the original blow, in delivering it as a surprise, in multiplying the pounds of weight behind it. It was the strategy of the steam hammer, but if the hammer did not crush—if it did not crush immediately, completely, and permanently—then there must be delay, pause, a wait until it could be again raised, prepared, directed against a new obstacle. This delay carried ultimate doom.

There is, moreover, in this circumstance, a truth which it is essential to recognize, for in it lies the key of all the warfare of positions, of all the struggle on the western front from the Battle of the Yser onward. The Hutier tactic revived the element of surprise by its method of concentration, in addition it aimed at and achieved the paral-

ysis of the enemy forces on the front to be attacked, by directing the artillery preparation as much at the human as the material elements in the defence. By the use of gas, by the use of smoke screens, in a multitude of ways, it crushed the capacity for resistance of the elements in line at the point of attack.

Where it failed ultimately was in the fact that it did not and could not prevent the arrival behind the imperilled sector of Allied reserves before the rupture had become irremediable. Behind the whole western front was an admirable network of railways; therefore, just as long as Foch had reserves, he could get them up to the battlefield in time! In the Battle of Picardy the margin was shadowy, but the reserves did arrive in time. The Germans had been able to do the same thing in Flanders and at the Somme, the French at Verdun.

A successful break through had to be preceded by a series of operations which had resulted in the exhaustion of the enemy reserves. This was what Ludendorff strove for when he had failed to bring off the decisive rupture in Picardy. But his successive blows in Flanders and at the Chemin des Dames were too widely separated in point of time. French and British armies had time to refit and recover from their strain. They were ready when the Germans were rested and reorganized and the same units met in each attack, while the steady flow of American divisions to France presently transferred the advantage of numbers from the German to the Allies.

Foch, when he took the offensive, sought to exhaust the German reserves in advance of the decisive thrust by exerting steady pressure on all fronts. At the end he had 100 divisions in reserve and the Germans not more than fifteen. Thus his offensive in Lorraine, planned for November 14th, had it taken place, would have been successful beyond limit, because there were no German reserves left to dam the flood, once there had been a rupture of the front.

The Battle of France in 1918 was beyond all else a battle between two systems of war, between the German machine and the French brain. Foch was no more supremely the embodiment of the military genius of France than was Ludendorff of Germany. By contrast with these two

soldiers all others were less significant figures: Petain, Haig, Pershing on the one side, and the brilliant array of German subordinates on the other. They obeyed orders, they did well or ill what was planned for them, but this was the limit of their contribution.

And of the two men, Ludendorff was the perfect example of the doctrine of Force, of the gospel of Might which crushes and rends all in its pathway, of the German idea which had now challenged the world to yield or perish, while Foch was the equally complete exponent of the intelligence which masters even force and represents the ultimate achievement of civilization itself. All that brute strength, fortified by mechanical skill, could do, Ludendorff did. His failure represented something more than the triumph of French military brains over German, it represented the failure of the whole German conception of mechanically armed barbarism against western civilization. The issue of the conflict was the vindication of the faith to which the western democracies hold.

To see in this mighty conflict of millions of men, of a score of armies, only a military drama—the play of strategies and tactics, the success of generals because of their skill, or the failure of other commanders because of their mistakes—is to miss the reality which underlies the surface glitter. In the campaign of 1918, Germany had a better chance of supreme victory than any one of her prophets and high priests could have hoped for. For three months all the advantages lay with her. Her failure is one of the few great human facts emerging from the chaos which men call history. It was a failure as significant as that of the effort to chain men's faith in the wars of the Reformation or deny men's equality before the law in the wars of the French Revolution. Something more than generals, armies, races met upon the battlefield. The contest was between ideas, and the triumph of the western idea was not an accident of generalship or numbers; it was a revelation of the superiority of the idea, disclosed in its capacity to conquer brute force fortified to the maximum of physical resources.

# CHAPTER TWO

## PICARDY—THE KAISER'S BATTLE

### I

### LUDENDORFF'S PURPOSE

The refusal of the Allied civil and military authorities to consider any offensive operation, such as Foch had advised, automatically bestowed the initiative upon Ludendorff. In his memoirs the German commander tells the world that he considered three possible theatres of operations: the Flanders sector, between Lens and Ypres; the Verdun sector, on either side of the hills actually covering the town; and the Scarpe-Oise sector, mainly included within the boundaries of the old French province of Picardy.

He rejected the Verdun sector completely because the hilly character of the country promised difficulties in the exploitation of any victory, and, though he does not say this, unquestionably because Verdun had an unpleasant sound in German ears and anything but supreme success there would instantly set afloat a wave of pessimism, by recalling the terrible disappointments of the previous offensive. He had, further, very special reasons, easily recognizable now, for preferring to attack the British.

He postponed any Flanders effort, while preparing for it as a later possibility, because the condition of the country, the lowness of the ground, and the certainty of mud in the early spring would necessitate putting off operations until mid-April, a thing highly undesirable in view of the eventual arrival of American troops in France. His own narrative indicates that the time circumstance was decisive in influencing him to attack in Picardy.

Having decided to attack there, his first concern was to choose a time, and he fixed upon March 21st—an early date when one recalls the fact that the French offensive of 1917, launched on April 16th, nearly a




THE WESTERN FRONT

Note the railroad network enabling the Germans to strike with equal ease anywhere between Ypres and Verdun

month later, was fatally compromised by weather conditions. But Ludendorff felt that he could not wait, and as it turned out he was favoured by an almost phenomenal stretch of good weather, while the spring was one of the driest in history.

In choosing the Picardy sector extending from Fontaine-les-Croisilles right down to the Oise opposite La Fère, the German soldier had unerringly hit upon the weakest point in the Allied front. Here the British and French armies made junction, on the south side of the Oise: and the point of junction of two armies, and particularly of two armies belonging to different races and speaking different tongues, is notoriously a danger point.

But to this natural weakness others were added. The larger portion of this selected front the British had but recently taken over from the French against the judgment of British High Command. The troops in the new area mainly comprised the British Fifth Army, commanded by Gough. This army had suffered terribly in the Flanders contest, where Gough's leadership had been such as to shake the confidence of his soldiers. The divisions had a high percentage of replacements, that is of still-untrained troops. And in addition, like all British armies, it had for three years been constantly on the offensive and had not been

allowed time to permit training in the defensive, a circumstance emphasized by Haig in his own reports.

Again, this vital sector was the worst protected in fixed defences. It had been newly taken over from the French, who had not devoted much time to fortification, since, during their occupancy, the Allied armies had been on the offensive. A single good system of defence faced the Germans, but behind this first system a second and a third line had not been more than sketched. The explanation is not in the main to be found in carelessness. The Fifth Army had barely time to reconstruct its forward system before the blow fell, and there was lacking labour to perform the task, since British man-power, outside of the army, was totally occupied in maintaining the navy, the merchant fleet, and the necessary industries.

Even worse was the situation in the matter of numbers. Haig felt, not unnaturally, that the vital sectors for him were those covering Calais and Boulogne; that is, his sea bases. A push of twenty-five miles toward the Channel from the Flanders front would bring the harbours of both towns under German fire, compel a sweeping retirement out of the Ypres salient and back upon the coast, where he would have to fight with his back to the sea. By contrast he had far more elbow room to the south, where his front was twice as far from the sea. Moreover, while at the north he would be for long necessarily dependent upon his own reserves, the French could be expected to reinforce Gough promptly, if he were heavily attacked.

The result was that the sector between the Oise and the Cambrai salient covered by Gough's army was most thinly held. Gough, with fourteen divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, occupied a front of forty-two miles, Gouzeaucourt to Barisis south of the Oise and near La Fère. Byng's Third Army to the north held twenty-seven miles, with fifteen divisions. So weak was Gough, in fact, that he did not feel able to hold all his front in force, and from the point where his line touched the Oise below St. Quentin to the right bank, facing La Fère, he relied upon the river as a barrier and did no more than maintain detached posts. As it turned out, this was a fatal circumstance, for in

the spring of 1918 the river was so low that the Germans were able to cross the stream and overwhelm the British posts.

Finally, from the very outset it was plain that two totally different problems occupied the British and French commanders, Haig and Petain. Haig felt that in any circumstance he must cover his communications with Great Britain, must guard Calais and Boulogne. Petain's chief duty must be to cover Paris. But the British Fifth Army was actually covering the Oise route to the French capital. If it collapsed before French supports arrived, the road to Paris would be open.

Even the safety of Paris could hardly tempt Haig to employ his last reserves in supporting Gough when such a course might lead eventually to opening his southern flank and to weakening his own armies so fatally that, without closing the road to Paris, he would have uncovered the way to the Channel. At a certain point, then, it is clear that the purposes of Haig and Petain would inevitably diverge, and, if there were no commander-in-chief, each would follow his own necessities with results which might be fatal.

Exactly this did happen before the battle was a week old, on March 26th, the most critical day of all, and very nearly resulted in supreme disaster. The selection of Foch as commander-in-chief at the last minute of the eleventh hour alone prevented this terrible catastrophe. Established in the supreme command, Foch restored a community of strategical and tactical purpose, accelerated the pace of French reserves coming from Petain, fixed Haig in his positions, and thus avoided a complete severance of British and French armies with its necessarily fatal consequences.

A similar difference of opinion had, it will be recalled, occurred at a critical moment during the great retreat in the days of the first Marne campaign. Joffre had asked French to stay in line behind the Oise during the period when Lanzerac was counter-attacking at Guise. But despite Joffre's entreaty, Sir John had retired out of line altogether, leaving a gap in the Allied front which compelled a resumption of the retreat. Still again, when Joffre was ready to seek decisive action at the Marne and had ordered a general attack, French was reluctant to agree,

considered a further retirement behind the Seine, and finally did comply with Joffre's request with very great tardiness.

The French Government and High Command had been so disturbed by this refusal of French to coördinate his movements with those of Joffre that Kitchener had been summoned from London; but despite his advice, French insisted upon freedom of decision, pointing to his orders which called upon him at all hazards to preserve his army, the single military reservoir on which the British had to depend for the making of their new army. Thus, all through the Marne campaign, while Joffre was seeking decisive action, French was authorized to coöperate only in so far as such coöperation did not risk the destruction of Britain's only field force.

Foch had faced a similar problem when he undertook to coördinate British and French operations in Flanders in the Battle of the Yser a few months later. There was one critical moment when Sir John French had actually ordered the British to retire out of the Ypres salient—a course which would have spelled ruin to the Allied cause, since the Germans would have reached Calais and thus the Channel coast. Foch surmounted this crisis; French recalled his decision after a memorable conference, but the peril still persisted, since, except during the ill-starred Nivelle period, the two armies acted independently. In 1918, it should be said, Haig had far more justification for his conclusion to follow his own line of action than had French four years earlier. But both at the Yser and in Picardy such a policy, had it prevailed, would have spelled disaster, exactly as it had led to evil consequences in the Marne operation.

### II. LUDENDORFF'S OBJECTIVE

The main and obvious objective of Ludendorff was the whole British army, which he undertook to crush by one or more attacks, with the purpose of breaking the British will for war, the determination to continue the struggle which was still unshaken in the British people. Aside from this larger purpose, his strategy was comprehended in the following purposes:

He planned to employ some sixty-four divisions at once, 750,000 men, between the Scarpe and the Oise in a brutal and terrific attack, nourished by other divisions after the battle opened. This attack might be expected to accomplish a complete break through, and this break through would separate the British and the French armies.

The weight of the blow was to be delivered on either side of the Cambrai salient by the Seventeenth and Second armies, while the Eighteenth was to operate farther south. The three armies were commanded by Below, Marwitz, and Hutier, respectively. Ludendorff calculated that the two northern armies would smash the British line—roll it up north of the Somme and away from the French.

Meanwhile the Eighteenth Army, pushing through the British front on either side of St. Quentin, would drive southwestward. Its purpose would be to some extent determined by the success or failure of the efforts to the north, but it might, in certain circumstances, pursue the double objective of striking at Amiens, the vital centre of Anglo-French communications, and of opening the road to Paris down the Oise Valley by taking the Lassigny Heights southwest of Noyon or by turning them by way of Montdidier.

As the event turned out, neither the Seventeenth nor the Second Army realized more than a small portion of the expectations of Ludendorff. All of the Seventeenth and the fraction of the Second which faced Byng's British Third Army were held—forced to make a slow advance at terrific costs. By contrast, the Eighteenth made a clean break through, routed the British Fifth Army, and thereafter began a swift and terrifying advance both toward Amiens and Montdidier, while Ludendorff, modifying his plans, threw all his reserves to the Hutier army.

Ludendorff's strategic purpose, then, was to destroy the British army; to do it, if possible, by a single blow, but failing this, to isolate the British from the French army and prepare the way for a second blow against the British. On the subject of his own plans, Ludendorff has written as follows:

The centre attack (that on the Picardy front) seemed to lack any definite limit. This could be remedied by directing the main effort on the area between Arras and Péronne toward the coast. If this blow succeeded, the strategic result might indeed be enormous, as we should cut the bulk of the English army from the French and crowd it up with its back to the sea.

I favoured the centre attack; but I was influenced by the time factor and by tactical considerations, first among them being the weakness of the enemy. Whether this weakness would continue I could not know.

After determining the divisions and other forces available for the attack, it was decided to strike between Croisilles, southeast of Arras, and Moeuvres, and omitting the Cambrai salient between Villers-Guislain and the Oise, south of St. Quentin. It was to be supported on its left by a subsidiary attack from La Fère.

The Seventeenth Army, therefore, had to make the attack on the line Croisilles-Moeuvres; the Second and Eighteenth, that between Villers-Guislain and La Fère. In this operation the Seventeenth and Second were to take the weight off each other in turn and, with their inner wings, cut off the enemy holding the Cambrai salient, afterward pushing through between Croisilles and Péronne. This advance was to be protected on the south flank by the Eighteenth Army in combination with the extreme left wing of the Second. The strength and equipment of these armies were adapted to their tasks.

For the decisive operation the Seventeenth and Second armies were to remain under the orders of the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht. The Eighteenth Army joined that of the German Crown Prince.

### III. THE BATTLEFIELD

The front on which Ludendorff elected to attack was some sixty-five miles in extent and lacked any such striking circumstance as the Vimy Ridge or the Craonne Plateau. Beginning at Fontaine-les-Croisilles, the British line ran east and then south, first on the slope and then across the crest of a bare plateau between the Scarpe and the Oise rivers, a central knot of hills in which rise both the Somme and the Scheldt rivers. In its easterly trend the British line lay along the downward slope of the plateau and was crossed by two little streams, the Sensée and the Cojeul, which descend into the Scarpe in the Douai Plain. When it turned southward, having circled the high ground southwest of Cambrai seized in the 1917 battle, the British front approached but did not quite touch the Somme-Scheldt Canal, connecting St. Quentin with Cambrai. As a consequence, both banks of the canal were in German hands and the canal was not an obstacle to German advance.

THE BATTLEFIELD OF PICARDY

Right-hand broken line shows the front on which Ludendorff attacked on March 21st. Solid line shows the front of July, 1916, before the Battle of the Somme. Left-hand dotted line shows the front reached by Ludendorff in the Battle of Picardy.

Circling around St. Quentin, which was less than a mile from the British front, the line inclined southeastward until it touched the Oise near Moy, and then ran behind this stream to the great bend near La

Fère. There it crossed the stream and made junction with the French lines west of the St. Gobain Forest, which remained in German hands. Save for the stretch behind the Oise, the British front was without natural protection, and the Oise barrier was to prove fatally inconsiderable. In addition, the country was devoid of woodland, in striking contrast to the regions south of the Oise and of the Aisne, where the forests of Compiègne and Villers-Cotterets were formidable military obstacles.

If the Germans should succeed in breaking through the defence system of the British between Fontaine-les-Croisilles and La Fère, there was no fully-organized line of artificial defences to be stormed. North of the Somme at Péronne, there was, too, no natural obstacle of any sort until the assailants had passed over all of the old battlefield of the Somme and arrived at the swamps into which the Ancre Brook had expanded after the bombardments of the 1916 campaign. As a consequence of the destructions of the Hindenburg Retreat the country was too destitute of all natural cover; villages, farms, even orchards, all had been methodically razed.

It was true that the tiny Tortille Brook, coming due south and entering the Somme below Péronne, did offer a suggestion of an obstacle, but it was inconsiderable and played no part in the conflict. From Péronne southward, as far as Ham, the Somme offered a natural barrier stretched straight across the pathway of advance of the Eighteenth Army, and this obstacle was prolonged to the Oise, behind the British battle positions, by the Crozat Canal. Ludendorff in his plan had taken cognizance of this natural defence line, and had therefore directed his main effort north of Péronne, where, once the British battle positions were broken, he would have nothing to impede him until he reached the Ancre.

Unfortunately for the British, however, the unusually dry winter had lowered the Somme, so that the stream, inconsiderable in all but flood seasons, constituted nothing like a serious barrier, while the completeness of the collapse of their thin line behind the Oise—similarly due to the low water in that stream—enabled the Germans to push westward

and cross the Crozat Canal and the Somme at Ham, before the British could make good this line or destroy the bridges.

Once the line of the Somme was gone, the British had no real line of defence based on a natural obstacle until they had reached the west bank of the tiny Avre, which—after its juncture with its insignificant tributary, the Trois Doms, a mere brook—flows north from Montdidier to the Somme, which it enters just east of Amiens. Moreover, when the Germans reached the east bank of the Avre they would be within three or four miles of the all-important Paris-Calais railway, coming up to Amiens from Paris, and could cut it by their artillery fire as they cut the Paris-Verdun railway in the offensive of 1916. Likewise they would, by taking them under their artillery fire, abolish all the railway lines which at Amiens bound the British to the French and permitted the free interchange of reinforcements.

Again; from the great bend at La Fère to the hills near Noyon the Oise flows from east to west, parallel to the Somme after that stream turns west from Péronne, and momentarily the German advance could be canalized between the two rivers; beyond Noyon the Oise turns south, away from the Somme, and the corridor thus begins to widen. If the Germans could take Noyon and the hills southeast, in which stood Lassigny—hills which are vividly described in the local name of "Little Switzerland"—they would open the Oise road to Paris by way of Compiègne. Even if they were temporarily checked in these hills they might flow westward and then southward around them, having taken Montdidier, and thus open both the Compiègne and the Creil routes to Paris, down which Sir John French had retired behind the Oise in the far-off Mons campaign.

A collapse of the British defence systems, then, would clear the way for a German advance north of the Somme, where it makes its big bend at Péronne, as far west as the Ancre. South of the Somme there would be the Somme and Crozat Canal barriers. These passed, the Germans would have a clear road to the Avre; and if they reached the Avre they would cut the Paris-Calais railway and menace Amiens at the north and Paris—less immediately, but not less clearly—to the south.

If they were not checked on the line of the Avre, then the rupture between the British and French armies would be complete and permanent; the British armies would be crowded northward and in upon the coast—the French armies flung back upon Paris. If the line of the Ancre collapsed, either together with that of the Avre or before it, the result would be the same, so far as the isolation of the two enemy armies was concerned, but the profit for the Germans would be greater, because Gough's army would be cut off from the British, thus weakening the chief enemy more severely. As a consequence, his area of operations would be more circumscribed and the Somme would offer the Germans a good defensive barrier against the French during the period in which they were driving the British into the sea.

The mission of the British Fifth Army was to hold on until French reserves could arrive. If it could hold on, either at its battle system or at the Somme, the German gain would be unimportant; but a defence of ninety-six hours was essential, to enable the French to get up. If British resistance were broken before the French came, then the disaster might be without limit. As far as Gough was concerned he could rely only on the French for reserves. Byng, on the contrary, might look to Haig for support. In addition Byng had considerable reserves of his own, seven out of fifteen divisions in his army, but Gough had only three in fourteen, because the greater length of his front required more men to garrison.

To understand the Battle of Picardy, the greatest single contest of the whole war, a simple figure may suffice. Striking at the point of junction between the British and French armies, the Germans rushed in like a flood breaking through a dike. Owing to the measurable failure north of the Somme the flood was promptly restricted between the parallel rivers, the Somme and the Oise, as far westward as Noyon and the Lassigny Hills, and it was in a sense canalized. But beyond the point where the courses of these streams diverge, and save for the insignificant Avre obstacle, there was nothing to prevent the flood from spreading to the right and to the left, to the north and to the south, and swirling behind both the British and French lines, thus engulfing

Amiens and the Lassigny Hills, covering the roads to Paris, and also extending to the sea below Abbeville. The effort to prevent the flood from sweeping over the Avre barrier, to block the mouth of the corridor between the Oise and the Somme, comprehends the whole problem of British and French effort between March 21st and April 4th, and Foch's success in doing this was actually as great a contribution to ultimate victory as Joffre's manœuvre at the Marne nearly four years earlier.

A single other circumstance requires notice. Since the German occupied the centre of a great half circle, extending from Verdun to Ypres, he could direct his attack from the centre outward, wherever he chose. Not until the very last moment, when his reserves were almost at the battle front, would his purpose be unmistakable. Up to that hour his enemy could believe that he meant to strike in Champagne or in Picardy, in Artois or in Flanders. Moreover, by making preparations both before the British and the French front, he could compel each commander to retain his own reserves, against expected attack.

Thus, in March, 1918, both Petain and Haig expected attack. Before both Ludendorff had made extensive preparations. In this situation Haig, who was satisfied that the blow would fall south of Arras, although he did not foresee its magnitude or extent, would naturally have declined to send reserves to Petain, even had he possessed them. Petain, expecting a thrust on the Chemin-des-Dames front, where the enemy had made those preparations which enabled him to strike in May, disposed of his reserves to meet the blow he foresaw.

The result was an inevitable delay in the arrival in Picardy of French reserves, mainly concentrated to meet an attack in Champagne, while the absence of a general reserve in the British army, as a consequence of the Georgian estimate of the military outlook, terribly complicated the situation. Haig was right and Petain wrong as to the point of assault, but two months later Foch was wrong and Petain right; a blow did fall with deadly consequences upon the Chemin-des-Dames front, where Petain had expected it in March. For Ludendorff, the value of the initiative was vastly enhanced by having the equally great advantage due to his occupation of the central position.

### IV. THE FIRST PHASE

On March 21st, shortly before four o'clock in the morning, the German artillery opened on the whole front from Arras to La Fère. It was the greatest artillery overture in history to the most colossal battle this planet had ever known. At that hour more than three quarters of a million men, the best troops of the German army—selected with utmost care, trained over many months and brought to the front by secret marches at night and on foot from camps fifty and even a hundred miles from the line—lay in the shelter trenches just behind the German line, awaiting the moment when the artillery should switch from its preparation to that barrage fire which was to cover their great advance.

Thus began Michael's Day, to give it the name the Germans selected in expectation of victory. For many days hundreds of thousands of German troops had been moving toward this designated front. "All Germany is on the march," one German officer had exclaimed, exultantly, and even with a degree of awe as he saw the enormous human tide rolling toward the front. "The chimes of Easter will sound peace," the German Crown Prince had boasted, forgetting his equally confident forecast two years before, when the attack upon Verdun had opened.

A month before, Ludendorff had told the Kaiser that though the battle would be hard the victory would be attained. Now he had moved his headquarters forward to Avesnes, to be nearer the scene of action, and the Kaiser had come in his special train and settled beside his great captain. Two huge armies, those of Below and Hutier, had taken position on either side of that of Marwitz, hitherto holding the sector. Sixty-four divisions were now to fall upon the twenty-nine of Byng and Gough, but unequally, since forty would strike the fourteen of the latter. And of this mighty concentration the British had no adequate warning. Before the battle ended, moreover, the Germans would employ no less than eighty-nine divisions.

Haig expected an attack on March 21st, he expected it astride the Bapaume-Cambrai road, that is on Byng's front. Both Byng and Gough had warned their troops, but as far as Gough was concerned, he had no

other resource, nor is there anything to suggest that he had the smallest hint of the magnitude of the impending blow. Thus at the weakest point in the British line at the decisive hour, Ludendorff had accomplished a secret concentration of unparalleled strength. What was left now was the putting of everything to the touch.

On the subject of this supreme effort to win a decision, Ludendorff's narrative is extremely interesting: "That the attack in the west would be one of the most difficult operations in history, I was perfectly sure, and I did not hide the fact." This is the burden of his comment. It was the "biggest task in history" he says at another point, and at the outset of the assault, his view was: "What we would achieve—whether we should break through and start a war of movement or whether our effort would remain a sortie on a large scale—was uncertain, like everything in war."

The bombardment lasted five hours, and in that time more shells were consumed than in the whole Franco-Prussian War. The morning had been foggy and the smoke shells increased the density of the pall that hung over all the front. Toward the end of the terrible storm the Germans began to employ gas shells in great quantities and of various sorts, paralyzing the defence, forcing the artillerymen to don gas masks, and thus greatly reducing their effectiveness.

At exactly 9:40 A.M. the guns switched to a rolling barrage and the great attack began. Beyond the narrow "No man's land" the Germans entered the forward system of British defence. This system had been modelled upon the similar zone in which the Germans had received the British attacks in Flanders in the previous year. It was thinly held; not a continuous trench line but a series of strong points furnished with machine guns and designed to give a cross fire, and thus stop a hostile rush.

The fog and the smoke produced by the gas shells combined to destroy all visibility. The Germans were upon the strong points before the defenders were able to discover their advance. The efficacy of the cross fire was equally destroyed. All along the front the defensive zone was submerged with little or no really effective resistance and the Ger-

man masses arrived with incredible speed at the battle positions themselves.

Thereafter the rate of German progress was unequal; in the main greater as one looked from north to south, that is before Gough's army rather than Byng's; but by the end of the day the British battle position had been reached everywhere on the front assailed, and in at least three places it had been actually penetrated. Moreover, the attack had been so swift that very large numbers of the forward troops had been submerged and captured or killed. Still, on the night of March 21st the situation did not yet appear critical and the official statements issued by the British led the world to believe that the German attack had been decisively held.

On the following morning, however, still aided by fog, the Germans began to disclose the real extent of their purpose. To the north they opened a breach in Gough's lines, west of St. Quentin and in the valley of the little Omignon Brook, which led to the Somme above Péronne. Thus they penetrated the third and last British position and entered the open country beyond. Meantime, two divisions belonging to the German Seventh Army had crossed the Oise near La Fère and swept through the thinly held line of posts on the west bank, had reached and passed the Crozat Canal, and taken Fargniers. Worst of all, Gough had used up all of his own reserves and French reinforcements were only just beginning to trickle up. Instead of holding out for ninety-six hours the British line, the larger part of Gough's front, had collapsed in less than forty-eight, while French reserves were a whole day late in getting off.

By the 23rd the Germans were across the Somme at Ham, while to the south the Crozat Canal had been permanently lost. To the north of Ham they had passed the Somme at several points and the last barrier, natural or artificial, west of the Avre was thus abolished. Gough's army was beginning to dissolve. It was still maintaining some sort of cohesion to the north, astride the Somme, although a dangerous gap had opened between it and Byng's Third Army, but to the south there was only a confused mass of men, fighting in groups, in handfuls—fighting

magnificently but tossed upon the German flood like chips on an incoming wave. A gap was thus opening between the British and French armies and the road to Paris by the Oise Valley was beginning to be in danger.

The main hope of salvation to the south lay henceforth in the speed and strength of the French troops, which were already on their way in large numbers and beginning to intervene in small units. Still the gap continued to widen; by March 25th the Germans were back in Noyon and the danger of losing the Lassigny Hills, the last considerable barrier on the road to Paris, was acute. Only north of the Somme was the situation improving. There the British had been driven straight across the old Somme battlefield but were beginning to take root behind the Ancre; would, in fact, hold fast—with minor fluctuations on the line coinciding with that front from which they had attacked on July 1, 1916—although Albert and its knot of roads would be lost presently by an unlucky blunder.

South of the Somme, on the contrary, the situation was everywhere approaching a crisis. Ludendorff, feeling himself checked in the north by Byng's forces—for Byng had now assumed command of all of Gough's troops north of the river—multiplied his efforts toward Noyon, toward Montdidier, and last of all toward Amiens. Added to all else was the fact that Haig, now becoming acutely apprehensive for his own army, was beginning to draw his troops back in such fashion as would preclude all chance of closing the gap between the two armies, between the French and the British. Lack of unified command now threatened to produce the supreme disaster, which Ludendorff concedes he expected on this day, March 25th.

### V. FOCH IS CALLED

In this crisis, and on the following morning, British and French military and civil authorities met in solemn conference in the little town of Doullens, north of Amiens and back of the Arras front. Haig and Petain were there, as were Poincaré and Clemenceau. Lord Milner represented Lloyd George for Great Britain. At two o'clock in the

afternoon, the day and hour for ever memorable, Clemenceau and Milner, in the name of the French and British governments and with the approval of Petain and Haig, signed their names to the following document:

> General Foch is charged by the British and French governments with coördinating the action of the Allied Armies on the western front. For this purpose he will come to an understanding with the generals-in-chief, who are requested to furnish him with all necessary information.

A halting, lame, almost pitiful commission to give a general literally called upon to save the world at a supreme crisis and in the presence of an unparalleled defeat, threatening hourly to become a disaster utterly irrevocable. But such as it was, Foch could use it; and the way he would use it would in a few weeks shame the givers into the extension of power which was necessary, if the war were first to be saved and later won. Meantime, Foch undertook the task.

And what a task it was! Between the Lassigny Hills and Bray-sur-Somme the flood of German divisions was ever swirling forward and ever increasing in volume. British divisions, already in ribbons, were tending away from the French, drawn by Haig's anxieties, by their own instinctive drift, toward their own armies. Above all, the German troops were approaching the Avre and the Trois Doms; were drawing near to Montdidier, which would fall the next day; were approaching the Paris-Calais railway, the life-line of Franco-British coöperation. They already seemed about to break out of the sides of the Somme-Oise corridor and thus to engulf Amiens and Montdidier and realize their terrible purpose and separate the British and French armies.

What was Foch's first objective? Unmistakably to prevent the separation of the two armies, to cover Amiens and Paris at one time, by bridling the flood, by constructing a dike across the front of the tidal wave, to make good the line of the Avre. This is the first, the single, the all-compelling task of Foch.

To fill the gap Foch can henceforth depend only on French troops. All available British reserves are required north of the Somme. It will require much effort to persuade Haig to permit his stricken divisions

south of the river to hang on the necessary time, for time will still be required to get up the French divisions, flowing to the danger-point in a flood of horizon blue. Everyone must dig in, hold on, die—but not yield an inch. Joffre's order to his troops on the eve of the First Marne is again the word of command.

"Hold the enemy where he is. We can't afford to lose a single metre more of French soil!" This is Foch's first word to Petain. He will accomplish miracles, literally miracles, in hastening the reinforcements; but now, before they can arrive, he will demand miracles of the weary, defeated, stricken troops, who still fight back, after a week of this agony.

The French historian, Louis Madelin—clearest expositor of this crisis as of the First Marne campaign, whose facts I have frequently followed here—records the first twenty-four hours of Foch's activities thus:

> One hour after his investiture he "runs" to Dury and sees Gough. Settles him at last, by putting his hands upon his shoulders, very energetically. "Make your Eighteenth Corps hold at all costs on its present front. Make your Nineteenth Corps hold at all costs on its front. Wait until you are relieved before you withdraw a single man or retire a single step!"
>
> At Dury he sees also Barthélemy, chief of staff of Fayolle, who now commands the two French armies, those of Humbert and of Debeney, which are struggling to fill the yawning gap. For him he writes a short note, its tone unmistakable: "At all hazards maintain the position of the British army south of the Somme, then as quickly as possible relieve all British troops south of the Somme!"
>
> Having telephoned to Debeney, he decides to join him at Maignelay. "Hold at all costs, where you find yourself, preserving your junction with the British." He reappears at Paris, at ten o'clock that night; writes a letter to Petain, indicating his first ideas; sets out for Clermont, where he sees Humbert and Fayolle. For them the same message, always the same message—"Hold where you are. Organize solidly. Demand of the troops their maximum effort. Make their commanders realize their responsibilities." By noon the next day he is back at Dury, where it is still necessary to hold Gough; and from Gough's headquarters he "runs" to Byng's.

Recall that Foch is sixty-seven; he was seventeen on that far-off evil day when he first saw the German invader in Metz; that he has been in nearly all of the great crises of the war since the Marne; that France held him exhausted a whole year before this March; and the magnitude of the merely physical exertion can be appraised. But the moral overpasses the physical; his spirit is in some mysterious manner almost immediately

communicated throughout the whole Allied host. In the presence of defeat he does not recognize that he is beaten; he will not accept this battle as lost; his mood is that of Napoleon at Marengo.

Months later—the victory won, the war over—Foch will say to his friend, André de Maricourt:

> When, at an historic moment, a clear vision is given to a man, and when he finds as a consequence that this clear vision has directed operations having enormous results in a formidable conflict—and I think that I had that clear vision at the Marne, at the Yser, and on March 26, 1918—I believe that it comes from a Providence in whose hands the man is but an instrument and the victory is directed from above by a higher, by a Divine Will.

### VI. THE FLOOD IS DAMMED

March 26th is the decisive day. The course of events is oddly analogous to that at Verdun two years earlier. Then Falkenhayn attacked on February 21st, and on February 26th began to feel himself checked. But Foch has evil days before him still. The great gap between the British and the French is still open; in truth, there is a series of gaps, his line is still "dotted" rather than solid. On this day the Germans are crossing the Avre and mounting the eastern slope of the narrow plateau between the Avre and the Paris-Calais railway. On this plateau and at Cantigny, American troops, the 1st Division, will a few weeks hence do a heroic deed far-shining and fraught with grave consequences.

If only Gough will stick; if Haig will recall his decision to take his fragments north of the Somme; if Foch can hold the two corners of what has become the Somme salient, the Noyon and the Amiens corners, he will somehow contrive to stretch a dike between them. Again Ludendorff feels himself checked. He has already—he complains of it in his memoirs—been compelled to change his plans once, because of the failure of the forces north of the Somme. Exactly two months later an unexpectedly complete victory will lead him to a second change of plans in mid-battle, this time fatal. He has turned all his attention to the Somme-Oise front and, despite the capture of Montdidier on March 27th, he already senses the fact that the Noyon "corner", the Lassigny Hills, will hold.

Wherefore he turns north, storms against the line from the bend of the Avre to the Somme. Amiens has become his final objective the next day, and he attacks in tremendous force north of the Somme all the way to Arras and to Vimy beyond. This is the beginning of an effort to escape from the effects of the canalizing of his thrust between the Somme and the Oise. It is an effort to break down the northern "corner" of the new Somme salient. We shall see exactly the same manœuvre, partially successful this time in the Battle of the Lys, when Messines and Kemmel are taken. We shall see the same effort in May, a failure on that occasion, when Ludendorff has broken through between Soissons and Rheims and endeavours to break down the Soissons "corner" of the new salient.

This offensive of March 28th is a particularly costly thing for the Germans, repulsed both before Byng's Third Army and Horne's First. Two days later Ludendorff makes his second great effort south of the Somme. He has now abandoned the Montdidier thrust. Amiens has become his last objective, but the thrust is parried.

The 31st is Easter Sunday, whose chimes, in the forecast of the German Crown Prince, were to sound peace. But instead, as Madelin heard Fayolle promise Mangin two days earlier, the Allies sing "halleluiah" in Amiens Cathedral, although the German shells are now falling on that noble pile, seeking to repeat their achievement in vandalism at Rheims, but failing, failing utterly—a thing for which the whole world will be grateful.

April 4th and 5th see the last convulsions, attacks south and then north of the river Somme—the final effort, as Haig says, to prevent the new Allied front from stabilizing, to avoid a return to the war of positions, to escape a repetition of the Verdun check. But these actions, in which he staked so much, prove "indecisive" as Ludendorff later reports. He cannot break the Amiens corner, he cannot extend the dislocation of the British front north of the Somme. On the contrary, he suffers such heavy losses on the ground where the British won the Battle of Arras, just a year before, on Easter Monday, that he abandons all further idea of breaking through between the Somme and the La Bassée Canal, al-

though he will try for Amiens by Villers-Bretonneux on April 24th, making a brief effort at the point where Sandeman Carey performed his great feat. Momentarily successful—thanks to tanks, here used by the Germans for the first time—this effort will be broken by the Australians. The battle has become one of exhaustion and on April 5th Ludendorff breaks it off.

Madelin saw Foch in the closing hours of the battle and his description of the interview is striking. He writes:

I saw General Foch at this period at Beauvais, in the hall of the Hotel de Ville, where he was camping rather than established. There was nothing like the stir one would expect to find about a chief of such importance. A handful of officers worked under the direction of General Weygand, the faithful chief of staff of the Grand-Couronné de Nancy, who had followed the great soldier everywhere, seconding him in an invaluable fashion, and had now hurried thither to resume his rôle as the good right arm. No apparatus; the least German colonel would have had ten times the racket.

The General himself, I found again, just as I had always found him, in his gray-blue uniform, moving about on legs which are a trifle short and strongly bowed as a result of horseback riding, his strong head crowned with short locks and furrowed and bronzed by war. His glance was clear, just a trifle malicious under his wrinkled eyelids, his shaggy gray moustache yellowed with tobacco and—that mouth which could in so few minutes assume so many different expressions of utmost vigour and of ironical good humour!

His gestures are still marvellously quick, prodigiously expressive. His hand as usual emphasized and supplemented his words. I found him calm and just a little bantering, but wholly without conceit. He led me to that map on which in various colours the dying battle was writing itself. He explained the phases to me and then—"There, that is over. What was the problem? To check at all costs," and he made a gesture with his arms which separated slowly. Instantly the "pocket" was dug before my eyes. "Next, to hold fast. That is now," and he plunged both arms to the ground with a gesture which would have stopped the universe.

"And finally, that will be later, *that!*" and his arms opened again and he brought his fists together to smash the reckless adventurer. I have related the circumstances. To-day it seems as if it had been arranged then just as it was going to be one day, but on a day a little further off than he thought then.

In fact, as Madelin points out, Foch was already prepared with his plan for an attack on the Somme side of the new salient by April 8th, but on the next day Ludendorff's attack in Flanders intervened. Foch would have to wait but this attack would come on August 8th, Germany's "black day" in Ludendorff's calendar. Still, on April 4th,

Foch could tell the Allied correspondents that the flood was "dammed"; and he could add, talking to General Maurice, "Ludendorff will probably try again, but he won't get through." That trial on April 5th was the last convulsion of the Battle of Picardy.

### VII. THE RESPONSIBILITY

The Battle of Picardy was the worst British defeat in history. Gough, commanding the Fifth Army, was recalled. But the British army believed, and believes, that the responsibility was with the civilians, with Lloyd George. Haig showed his conviction in his subsequent reports. Buchan makes the same assertion, qualifying it with a concession as to Gough's failure in Flanders. Maurice, after he has left the army as a consequence of a dispute with Lloyd George over this question, writes:

> Had the Government taken in time the measures which it had been urged to take, the reduction of two cavalry divisions and of more than one hundred infantry battalions might have been avoided, and both Gough and Byng might have had sufficient men to have enabled them to hold their battle positions against all attacks, while Haig's reserves might have been increased by at least two divisions.

Gough's statement is contained in the following letter written to an American friend in December, 1919:

> Without inflicting upon you a long description of the battle I think I am fully justified in claiming that the British Fifth Army saved Europe and our Cause in that desperate week's struggle which began at dawn on 21st, March, 1918, and that no troops ever fought against such tremendous odds with more courage, skill, and tenacity.
>
> Some few facts may tend to enlighten you on what the real work of the Fifth Army was, and may interest you.
>
> The Fifth Army knew well that the attack was coming and all were in their places on that fateful morning.
>
> The Germans threw two armies against the British Fifth Army, making a total of forty-eight divisions. The British Third Army, on our left, had nineteen divisions and was only required to hold a front of twenty-eight and one half miles, as compared with the forty-two and a half miles held by the Fifth Army. The Germans attacked the Third Army on the 21st of March with only eighteen divisions and the Third Army could place on the front attacked eight and one half divisions—nearly three times the number of men with which the Fifth Army was forced to hold similar frontage.

Yet the Fifth Army lost no more in depth along its front than did the Third Army on the 21st of March.

By the 24th, the right and centre of the Third Army was broken through by the German attack, though the Fifth Army line, still retiring and fighting, remained intact. This forced the Third Army to fall back behind the Ancre, a distance of six miles, behind the left wing of the Fifth Army.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, a historian of the war of reputation and reliability, states that the losses of the Third Army, though not exposed to anything like the same weight of attack, amounted to 70,000 men, while the Fifth Army's loss only came to 50,000. Therefore, the greatest proportion of losses cannot be laid at the door of the Fifth Army.

Knowing the facts, which have been concealed to a great extent from the knowledge of my countrymen and of our allies, I can feel a justifiable pride in the fighting and handling of the Fifth Army, under my command, though, for reasons which I do not desire to enter into, I was certainly made a scapegoat of, as Colonel Archer-Shee pointed out.

Gough's claim for his army is sharply contradicted by Ludendorff, who held Byng solely responsible for the failure to achieve a complete rupture of the Allied front. The French are rather more severe in their criticism of Gough than are his fellow-countrymen. Yet, as in the case of Ian Hamilton at Gallipoli, whatever mistakes the soldier made, the civilian government had made the fatal blunders in advance.

All things considered, Picardy was Lloyd George's defeat, as Gallipoli had been Winston Churchill's. Foch will have his own difficulties many months later, when he desires to make his final attack, that upon the Hindenburg Line, and Lloyd George holds back. Fortunately, Foch had the decisive aid of Pershing and the uncompromising approval of Haig, who had most at stake and justified his judgment by breaking the Hindenburg Line a few days later, aided by two of Pershing's divisions.

For the rest, the controversy—for controversy there is and will be—need not detain us here, although Gough's fate is reminiscent of that of a British admiral in a far-off century, who was hanged to "encourage the others," as the French said.

### VIII. THE RESULT

It remains to appraise the value of the German offensive—of the Kaiser's Battle, as the Germans had proudly named it in advance. The

battlefield success had been prodigious. There had been a break through on a front of nearly thirty miles; the extreme penetration had been more than sixty miles. One British army had been in part routed, and in the main destroyed. It would never again appear as an army and its commander was recalled in something approximating disgrace. The loss of ground had been unequalled in the history of the war of positions on the western front. In ten days all the territory gained by the British and French in six months of battle at the Somme in 1916—and, as a consequence, of the Hindenburg Retreat in 1917—had been abandoned.

The Germans were back at Noyon. Clemenceau's critics could now taunt him with precisely the fact with which he had taunted his predecessors from August, 1914, to March, 1917. They were westward of their old Somme line. They were within range of Amiens, and their guns commanded the Paris-Calais railway, which was thus closed to traffic. They gravely hindered, if they did not actually prohibit, the use of all the railway lines centring about Amiens and serving the Allied army. They had captured an enormous number of cannon, vast depots of material, hospitals, railway rolling-stock—a booty hitherto unsurpassed on the western front in the whole war.

Of prisoners Ludendorff counted 90,000. In captured and missing, the British alone had lost more than 75,000, including 2,392 officers and 72,968 men. Their killed for March exceeded 20,000, their wounded were in excess of 84,000. The ten days of battle from March 21st to 31st had cost them in killed and wounded approximately as much as the American operations from September 12th to November 11th, that is, in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations, would cost Pershing's army. Killed, wounded, and captured or missing, the British loss for March amounted to 175,000 officers and men, a number as large as Bazaine had surrendered at Metz, and equal to the combined strength of the armies of Meade and Lee at Gettysburg. Counting the loss of the French, Ludendorff's first blow had thus cost the Allies a quarter of a million of men. It had crippled their communications and, by lengthening the battle line, had increased the difficulties of the Allies since they possessed inferior numbers. It had further made a deep

draft upon French reserves rushed up to save the British army and to restore the connection between the two armies.

By contrast, Ludendorff, despite very heavy losses, had realized none of his larger purposes. He had not crushed the British by a single blow. He had not separated them from the French. In his own memoirs he confesses that the hope of March 24th and 25th had not been realized, and concedes that at the close of the gigantic operation the future was obscure and the tactical and strategic outlook unpromising.

What was the cause of the German failure? For failure it was, in the larger sense. It seems to be discoverable in the fact that German strength was worn out before decisive results could be obtained. The great German mass arrived at the Avre, as on the battlefield of the First Marne, exhausted. It had outrun its artillery and used up its provisions; victorious, it was incapable of exploiting the success, of realizing the fruits of its labours. Once more, as at the Marne, German High Command had calculated the mechanical elements of the problem accurately, but had neglected the human factor completely.

Despite the enormous expansion of the front ruptured; despite an immediate progress seven times as great as at Verdun, the actual circumstances had been the same: the armies of Humbert and Debeney commanded by Fayolle, like Petain's immortal army at Verdun, had arrived in time to restore "a delicate situation" and the previous deadlock again prevailed. It reappeared so completely that Ludendorff broke off the engagement rather than run the risk of further repetition of the Verdun experience.

In point of fact, the Allies had lived through the worst crisis of the whole war; their danger would never again be as great although it might seem even more acute in succeeding weeks.

On the human side, the great conflict presents a picture of heroism and of devotion beyond the power of the historian to describe. If the cohesion of the British Fifth Army was largely destroyed in the first days, the isolated groups which survived fought to the end with courage and devotion unequalled. Day after day, unrested and unfed, the British fragments stolidly, doggedly fought on. Through the long moon-

light nights, so favourable to the foe who had timed his attack to gain advantage of a full moon, these beaten men dragged themselves to new positions and at daybreak resumed the conflict.

Nor was the French contribution less splendid. Fayolle, Humbert, Debeney—these are names famous for ever in French history. The first French troops to arrive flung themselves into the furnace without artillery support; made of themselves willing sacrifices in the hope, not entirely vain, of gaining a few hours for the reserves which were coming up behind, and seeking to take root before the German masses arrived.

In the end victor and vanquished alike were exhausted. German divisions advanced, British troops retreated with dragging footsteps—fell asleep by the roads in the midst of the battle. Not even the retreat from Mons brought to British soldiers exhaustion like that of the first week of the March offensive.

Memorable, too, amidst the crowd of unforgettable incidents is the exploit of Sandeman Carey, in command of a force of fortune gathered from all ranks and conditions, like that forlorn hope of cooks and hostlers assembled by Sir John French at the crisis of the First Battle of Ypres, and including a detachment of the Sixth Engineers, U. S. A., Companies B., D., and Headquarters, which renders heroic service and wins deserved praise from Haig. With this "scratch" force Carey barred the road to German advance; not only held the gate, but, by a despairing counter-attack, actually threw the enemy back. Haig will have special and generous words of praise for these engineers later. Equally daring and devoted was the service of British and French aviators who, from the air, checked German divisions, paralyzed German transport, and thus gained time.

In this battle fell Lieutenant Colonel Raynal C. Bolling, the first American officer of rank to give his life in the war. Surprised while reconnoitring the German advance, he was killed, pistol in hand, defending himself to the last. In the circumstances of his death there was a reminiscence of the equally untimely fate of Colonel Ellsworth in the first days of the Civil War. In both cases a brilliant officer marked for greater services was cut down before his real work had more than begun.

## IX. THE MORAL EFFECT

The military consequences of the Battle of Picardy were disappointing to Ludendorff. He had experienced precisely the same discomfiture that Falkenhayn had endured before Verdun. After ten days he had arrived at the position of his predecessor when Douaumont had fallen but French reserves had arrived. And, with Falkenhayn's experience in mind, he had escaped another Verdun siege by breaking off the battle. But if the military effect was relatively inconsiderable, it was far otherwise with the moral, and by one of the strange coincidences of war, the publics of both victor and vanquished nations were at least equally shaken by the results of the contest.

For the British the greatest disaster in their military history came as a shock unforeseen and incomprehensible. The nation believed in the "standing luck of the British army." In centuries of fighting history, no considerable British army had known anything approximating the reverse which had befallen Gough's army. The nation had believed that, once it was able to organize its man-power, equip the masses called suddenly from the factories to the battlefield, its armies would equal, surpass, the German.

Army and nation had felt a sense of actual superiority at the close of the Somme, and even the failures and losses of the Passchendaele contest had not shaken the faith or the confidence of the civil population. From the public the fact was long hidden that the defeat was due primarily to the civil government, not the military command—that Lloyd George, by refusing the replacements and reinforcements needed by Haig and compelling an extension of the line, had prepared the way for Ludendorff. Thus defeat on such a huge scale was totally inconceivable, and inexplicable.

As the news of the onrush of the German flood reached Britain, the wave of depression was immense, the disillusionment was complete. The British public for the first time began clearly to appreciate the fact that the war might be utterly lost: indeed, in the last days of March defeat seemed imminent, and the impression strengthened when the

disaster in Picardy was followed by the defeat in Flanders, and Haig himself was driven to the public declaration that his men were fighting "with their backs to the wall." At no time in British history—not in the days of Napoleon, of Louis XIV, of Philip of Spain—had the peril to England seemed so great.

In France there was hardly less stupefaction. Suddenly, down all the roads leading to Paris from Soissons and Amiens there began to run those tragic columns of refugees, almost forgotten since the evil days at the outset of the war. Literally by thousands, with practically nothing left of their household goods, these refugees flocked southward, while the German flood swept over that devastated area ravaged by the Hindenburg Retreat—in which the returned natives had begun a work of restoration—then passed the limits of this region, leaped the old Somme front, and broke out in fertile lands hitherto unravaged.

For Paris the enormous despair was increased by a new German menace. With the opening of the offensive Paris itself was bombarded by the notorious "*Grosse Bertha*"—a great gun mounted upon a hill at Crépy-en-Laonnois, more than seventy-five miles from Paris and on the road between Laon and La Fère. At first the idea that it was shell fire from a fixed battery within German lines seemed unbelievable. The Parisians looked to the air, and then suspected some concealed gun within French lines.

But the German guns—there were several presently—were soon discovered and the arrival of their shells became immediately a detail in Parisian life. On Good Friday a shell falling on the roof of St. Gervais killed many women and children gathered in the church. But despite the long continuance of the bombardment and the multiplication of air raids, far more fatal to life and property than the "*Grosse Bertha*," the aggregate damage was inconsiderable. Even on the moral side the effect was below German hopes. Neither the morale of France nor that of Paris was broken.

Depressed the French people were. There was no mistaking the bitterness with which they saw Amiens subjected to the bombardments which had already destroyed Soissons, Arras, and Rheims, while they

traced on the map new portions of French soil occupied by the barbarian or ravaged by new battles. But the spirit of Clemenceau prevailed and Ludendorff was forced later to confess, with unmistakable surprise, that the first battle of the new campaign, so far from breaking the Allied will to fight, stiffened it.

Even in the United States the news of the disaster produced a profound impression. On the first Sunday when the German onrush was at its height daily newspapers published hourly editions in many towns and every possible source of news was eagerly besieged. In a sense the war became real as it had never been real before. Moreover, there was an instant recognition throughout the nation that the British defeat and the French losses in restoring the front entailed real American sacrifices. The nation read of Pershing's dramatic gesture, in offering all he had to Foch without condition, made at the crisis of the battle, with ungrudging approval. And it now began to perceive that its rôle in the struggle was destined to be active beyond all earlier expectations.

As for the Germans, the first news, the reports of the opening successes, excited unlimited enthusiasm. It was again as it had been in the first days of the war, in the initial week of Verdun. But when the lines began to settle down again; when the map showed nothing but a huge pocket driven between Amiens and the Oise; when Easter did not bring peace, but exactly the same check which had in the end extinguished hope at the Marne and at Verdun, German morale began to decline.

Nor were the later successes in Flanders and on the Chemin des Dames sufficient to revive the drooping spirits. The German army knew at once of the failure in Picardy and of the enormous cost in men. The German soldier had nerved himself for one supreme effort which should bring peace. He had set out for victory as he had taken the road for Paris and then for Calais in 1914. He had arrived after prodigious efforts only at new trench lines. He was checked, and he recognized the check.

In the Battle of Picardy, the German soldiers did all that was humanly conceivable, more perhaps. We shall perceive, and Ludendorff has testified, that in each succeeding battle his troops fought less well,

even in victory, until with the change of the tide there began to appear fatal failures of German soldiers to perform what was expected of them. And of all this decline the cause may be found in the Battle of Picardy. The German soldier knew that there he had given his best, done his utmost; that he had been tested to the limit and had failed to bring off the promised victory. Tactically a victory, strategically a check, Picardy, the Kaiser's Battle, was thus on the moral side almost a disaster for the victor, while for the vanquished it proved the defeat which was to make ultimate victory possible.

# THE FIGHTING JUST BEFORE THE AMERICANS GOT DOWN TO BUSINESS

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TO THE RESCUE

A French infantry regiment pushing forward to the assistance of the hard-pressed British during the German offensive in March, 1918

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FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS IN ACTION

Pouring a deadly fire into the Germans

*By C. R. W. Nevinson*

1. THE ROADS OF FRANCE

Motor transport carrying troops to the front

© *Underwood and Underwood*

THE MARK OF THE GERMAN "420"

This picture shows a shell hole made by a shot from a German 420 gun. An automobile diving into it accidentally does not quite fill it. Imagine what happened when a shell from this same gun dropped into a church full of worshippers

*By C. R. W. Nevinson*

2. THE ROADS OF FRANCE

At the railhead. Artillery being brought up

*British Official*

THE RESULT OF A DIRECT HIT

All that was left of a motor truck after a shell struck it



*By C. R. W. Nevinson*

3. THE ROADS OF FRANCE

Infantry men marching through a ruined village on the way to the front line trenches. A bit of camouflage showing in the centre of the picture

*British Official*

AT WORK ON THE TRENCHES

The picture shows clearly the rugged nature of the Italian country.



*By C. R. W. Nevinson*

4 THE ROADS OF FRANCE

Through No Man's Land. Abandoned barbed wire in the foreground

*British Official*

AN ARTILLERY OBSERVATION POST

On the British front. The effectiveness of the shooting could be observed from a post like this and telephoned back to the guns

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PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE WAR ZONE

This is a French photographic section at work. The dark room is sandbagged for protection

*British Official*

AN ANZAC RESTING UNDER DIFFICULTIES

Amid the débris of war and the mud of Flanders a soldier rested when he could

WHAT THE GERMANS LEFT BEHIND THEM

A glimpse of the principal street in Combles, in the Somme area, after the Germans had been driven out

*British Official*

REFUGEES FLEEING BEFORE THE GERMANS

A common sight in France during a German offensive

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THE BARRICADE

British Tommies and French lancers awaiting the advance of the enemy

THE CANADIANS IN ACTION

*By Captain Kenneth K Forbes*

Most of this gun's crew were killed but the men that remained, though wounded, carried on

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AFTER THE BATTLE

The scene of some of the most intense fighting during the great German offensive of March, 1918



DETRAINING A HOWITZER

This picture gives a very good idea of the size of these guns

*By Lieut. A. Bastien*

THE "BYNG BOYS"

The famous 22nd French-Canadian Battalion going into action with its characteristic dash and courage

*British Official*

OVER THE TOP

The platoon leaving the trenches to charge. These are British soldiers

*By Captain Kenneth K. Forbes*

IN THE YPRES SALIENT

Sanctuary Wood where the Canadians fought in 1915 and British and French troops advanced in 1918

FRIENDSHIP ON THE BATTLEFIELD

A French poilu bringing a wounded British Tommy to shelter and safety at the risk of his own life

# CHAPTER THREE

## FLANDERS—THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

### I

### FROM PICARDY TO FLANDERS

On the morrow of the Battle of Picardy, the strategical situation of the Germans was unsatisfactory to Ludendorff. He felt the vulnerability of the great pocket or salient which his troops had created between the Somme and the Oise. He recognized instinctively that Foch would endeavour at once to reduce this salient by an attack on the side, by exactly the manœuvre which, on August 8th, he did employ with complete success. And we know now what Ludendorff suspected, that as early as April 8th Foch was contemplating such a strike.

To preclude such a thrust Ludendorff must retain the initiative; he must compel Foch to continue to concentrate his attention on meeting, not making thrusts. He could not pursue his operations in Picardy, for his armies in their new positions lacked communications. They had advanced over the regions devastated by his own orders in 1917, and railways and roads were lacking. It would be weeks before he could bring up guns and munitions necessary to prepare a new attack. His experience of April 4–5 had demonstrated this truth: For the present Foch had the advantage of undestroyed communications behind his front, and the advantage was decisive.

Ludendorff had then to attack elsewhere, and for this eventuality he had prepared, having selected the front from La Bassée to Ypres as the field for a subsidiary effort if the Picardy venture did not realize his hopes. In the very last stages of that battle he had attempted to prepare for the new Flanders operation by assaults on the Artois front, from the Somme to the Souchez, but the troops of Byng and Horne on Vimy and the Loos Plateau above Lens had administered an instant and

bloody check upon his Seventeenth and Sixth armies, and south of La Bassée nothing more could be hoped for.

In shifting his attack from south to north Ludendorff still preserved his main strategic purpose, the destruction of the British military force. He had already disposed of the British Fifth Army; he had weakened both the Third and the First, although unequally, since Horne's troops had only been slightly engaged while Byng's had undergone a terrific test. Actually all of the British reserves had been drawn into the fight and, in addition, a very considerable strain had been placed upon Petain's reserves.

An attack in Flanders would be certain to put a new and almost intolerable burden upon the weary British. The command of the Paris-Calais railway would forbid the quick arrival of French reinforcements, if, indeed, Petain would consent to spare any more of his scanty reserves for British purposes; and before French reserves could intervene, a heavy defeat might be inflicted upon the British. Ludendorff, too, was thinking of the moral as well as the military element; he was attacking the nerves of the British civilians as well as of the soldiers. Would there not be protest in Britain at the enormous expansion of British losses, while the French sacrifice was, by contrast, slight? Finally, the transfer of French divisions to Flanders would, at the very least, open the way for a successful blow at the French front a little later.

Calais and Boulogne were shining objectives, but it is essential to recognize that it was the British army which was the main objective, just as Joffre's army had been the single objective of the German High Command in the Marne time. Ludendorff had now assailed the centre and right of the British; his next attack would be upon the left flank. It might not result in decisive victory, but it would complete the task of trying out the whole British army. It would still further exhaust French reserves and it would prevent Foch from seizing the initiative by any blow at the Somme salient, delivered before the German front had become fortified, furnished with communications, "frozen."

Despite the check at the Avre, Ludendorff still had time. The appeal for American divisions had only just gone forth. He had still




LUDENDORFF'S TWO THRUSTS

The black wedges reaching Abbeville and St. Omer indicate the German objectives in the Battles of Picardy and the Lys. The two white lines mark the front on which the two offensives were checked.

numbers and time. Heavy as his losses had been, he had inflicted heavier, while his wounded would return and the Allied loss in prisoners was a permanent loss. His vast captures in material, in artillery, and supplies were a further advantage, although guns, supplies, and material were beginning to flow across the Channel in unprecedented quantities and at an incredible pace. The Battle of Picardy had ended on April 5th. Ludendorff would begin in Flanders on April 9th, his own birthday and the anniversary of the British offensive at Arras in 1917. Pershing would celebrate his birthday at St. Mihiel in a similar fashion a few months later.

## II. THE NEW BATTLEFIELD

With unerring insight Ludendorff had again selected the vulnerable spot in his enemy's armour, vulnerable alike because of the character of the country and the quality of the troops actually holding the line at this point. From Arras all the way to the La Bassée Canal, east of Bethune, the British line ran along high ground, the profit of several victories. Vimy Ridge had been captured in the Battle of Arras and retained in the recent fighting. North of Vimy the Loos Plateau had been mainly taken in 1915, although Hill 70, overlooking Lens, had only fallen to the Canadians in 1917. This much of the British front had already demonstrated that it was impregnable to direct attack.

But north of the La Bassée Canal, beginning where Smith-Dorrien had fought in October, 1914, was a country in which the natural obstacles were less considerable and the high ground mainly in German hands. In this region was Neuve-Chapelle, where Sir John French had made his first offensive in 1915, striving to take the Aubers Ridge. His failure had left the Germans on this high ground overlooking the British in the flats, which were intersected by various small streams and canals and by the Lawe and Lys rivers. These waterways were normally obstacles of some importance, but the dry weather, which had reduced the Oise and the Somme, had also abolished the customary Flanders mud.

Finally this sector was held by Portuguese troops, commanded by Portuguese officers. The material was good, but the leading notoriously

bad, and the men had been kept in the line far too long, as a consequence of the strain upon British reserves to the south in Picardy. Ludendorff reports that he was worried lest the Portuguese should be relieved before he could attack and the relief was actually in process when his blow fell. The presence of a foreign contingent in the British army naturally constituted a further element of weakness, and this weakness was accentuated by the fact that the troops on either side were newly come from the furnace in Picardy, and having suffered cruel losses there now needed rest and reinforcement.

Above Armentières, that is in the region of Ypres, the British front was mainly on high ground, from "Plug Street" to "Whitesheet" Ridge, including the ground taken by Plumer in his great thrust of June, 1917, and thence by Passchendaele to the Belgian front at the Yser.

North of Armentières and south of La Bassée the British line thus rested upon admirable natural obstacles, but in the centre it was weak —and weakly held. There Ludendorff would attack, and successful penetration of this weak spot led—whither? To Hazebrouck, immediately; and Hazebrouck was the railroad centre of the north as vital as Amiens in the south. An advance of twenty-five miles—half the advance at the Somme—would reach Hazebrouck, compel the Allied retirement out of the Ypres salient and the retreat of the Belgians from the Yser they had held so long. A gain as great as that in Picardy would take Ludendorff to the edge of Calais, to the Channel. Dunkirk would fall, Calais cease to be available as a British base, and Boulogne would be in danger. British communications with England would thus be fatally compromised; what was sought in 1914 might be achieved in 1918.

The real key to the whole situation was the chain of "Mountains" extending from west to east, from Cassel to Kemmel, north of Hazebrouck and Armentières. Mont des Cats, chief summit of the central group, was just under 600 feet high, but they all rose from the Flanders Plain, looked northward over the flat ground in which Ypres was situated, surveying the roads to Calais through Poperinghe, by which the Germans had endeavoured to reach Calais in 1914. Southward they overlooked the gap between their lower slopes and the high ground

beyond the La Bassée Canal, the gap between Armentières and Bethune, through which passed the canal, the Paris-Lille railway, coming east from Hazebrouck, where it sends off a spur which fed the Ypres salient. In this gap, covering Hazebrouck, was the Forest of Nieppe, thick and marshy woodland, the real barrier to Hazebrouck if the British lines on the Lawe and Lys should be broken.

Before the Germans could reach Hazebrouck they must either take the high ground north or south of the plain, back of Bethune, or back of Armentières. But if they could get Kemmel to the north and push on along the "Mountains" toward Cassel, the British and Belgian lines to the north would collapse. The mere fall of Kemmel would make the situation in Ypres precarious, if they could get Cassel they would dominate the whole plain of Flanders. They would arrive at the Channel and their Berthas could bombard Dover, sweep the Strait, open a new submarine base ten times as dangerous as Zeebrugge. Their shells might even, in no distant time, fall in London itself.

Nevertheless, the Flanders stroke was a diversion, a subsidiary incident in the general attack upon the British, and it began in a far more modest fashion. In the first hours the attack was on a front of not more than ten miles, as contrasted with sixty in Picardy, and the number of divisions employed was equally restricted. The extent of front assailed and the number of divisions used both expanded after the first day. Thus Ludendorff used only 9 divisions on the first day, and up to the 12th the number had increased to only 16; by April 16th the number had risen to 21, and by April 29th, the date of the general attack which marked the last spasm of the struggle, he had used 44 divisions, of which 35 were fresh and 9 had already been employed at the Somme.

The units used, moreover, were not comparable with Hutier's "storm troops," although there were good divisions in the two armies. Ludendorff in his memoirs concedes the inferiority of training of the troops; complains bitterly of the manner in which the soldiers abandoned the battle to hunt food, and comments on the failure of the officers to preserve discipline—a new circumstance, henceforth to be familiar. This decline in the quality of the troops, traceable in a degree

to the German method of skimming the cream for the storm divisions, thus lowering the value of the balance, will have grave consequences when the cream has been consumed. But thus early the first evidences appear. This will explain the disastrous collapse in front of the British Fourth Army on August 8th; it will explain the rapid decline in army morale, after each major effort, before July 18th. Still, on April 9th the German divisions engaged were fresh, while the British were exhausted and the Portuguese inferior. Therefore the German advantage was considerable.

As it began, the Battle of the Lys involved only the left flank of Horne's British First Army; as it developed it reached and passed the front of the whole of Plumer's Second Army and finally assailed the front of the Belgian army, between the Yser and the Sea. On the German side the Sixth Army, Quast's, was first engaged; later Arnim's Fourth Army, which had fought the British all through the Flanders struggle of 1917 and at the Somme in 1916. Bernhardi, famous for his "World Power or Downfall," forecast in his book: "Germany and the Next War," commanded a division in Arnim's army, but achieved no great thing.

### III. THE BATTLE

On the morning of April 9th all the circumstances of March 21st are reproduced on a smaller scale. The Portuguese troops are overwhelmed by the preparatory bombardment, and their resistance collapses almost in an instant, although isolated groups still fight gallantly. A fog, intensified by smoke shells, once more gives the Germans an additional advantage. Before the day is over the Germans have crossed the Lawe, have passed the Lys at two points near Estaires, have thus begun to drive a wedge into the British front between Bethune and Armentières and toward Hazebrouck.

The only encouraging circumstance is the resistance along the La Bassée Canal, at the southern edge of the front now attacked. And this Givenchy "corner" will presently have an importance almost equal to that of the Soissons "corner" in the Chemin des Dames operation. Had it given way, the Germans would have swept in behind the British

centre on the high ground from Loos to Arras; there would have been a dislocation of this front, which would have prepared the way for new German operations to the south in the Somme salient. But the Givenchy corner holds and will hold.

By the next day the German pace has increased and there is an extension northward of the front assailed. The battle crosses the Belgian frontier and approaches Messines and "Whitesheet" ridges. Meantime, by the close of the same day, the Germans are approaching the Forest of Nieppe, sole barrier to Hazebrouck and its vital railways. By this time Haig has renounced his share in Foch's proposed offensive east of Amiens and is calling for French reinforcements.

On the same day Haig issues his appeal to his soldiers, an appeal as memorable as that of Joffre on the eve of the First Marne and productive of equally splendid results. Haig said:

> There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end.

The menace of 1914 again seemed to threaten; Britain and France, London and Paris alike felt the solemnity of the words.

By April 13th the Germans had made much greater progress. Armentières had fallen on April 10th. The Germans had reached the edge of the Forest of Nieppe by the 11th. Bethune was close to the front, in extreme danger, and rapidly being reduced to ashes. The precious Bruay mines, all that remained to France of her northern coalfields, were under fire and forcibly closed. The Givenchy corner still held, but not so the Messines anchorage. By this time Messines and Wytschaete had both gone and the Germans were approaching Kemmel from the east and south and were far west of it. The next day Bailleul fell and the Germans were at the foot of the Mont des Cats. Kemmel was thus in danger and the position at Ypres already far more critical than in the evil days of 1914.

On April 16th, too, began the evacuation of the Passchendaele height, taken after so much effort and sacrifice only six months before. The lines were now drawn back upon Ypres itself, and, just as the

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MARSHAL FOCH AND GENERAL WEYGAND

They are in front of the gigantic statue of Germania, in the Niederwald, keeping her Watch on the Rhine. "How did I win the war?" Foch will say chaffingly to André de Maricourt many months later. "By smoking my pipe. That is to say, by not getting excited, by reducing everything to simple terms, by avoiding useless emotions, and keeping all my strength for the job."

conquests of the Battle of the Somme in 1916 had been lost in the Picardy struggle of March, the acquisitions of the Battle of Flanders in 1917 were surrendered in the first days of the Flanders struggle. Thus the rewards of two years of sustained and terrible effort had been wiped out in less than a month.

And a new crisis was now at hand, had actually arrived by April 14th, when Foch's scanty powers were expanded and he became General-in-Chief of the Allied armies. Almost immediately he was faced by an insistent proposal made by Haig and backed by Milner. From them came what amounted to an ultimatum. Foch must agree to recognize the Flanders operation as the major battle of the Allies and divert thither a constant stream of French reserves; or agree to a British retirement, which would amount to the surrender of Ypres, the line of the Yser, the whole region north of St. Omer.

Here, again, is the old difference of opinion, which we saw at the crisis of the Battle of Picardy. Haig sees the immediate crisis developing on his front. Petain perceives the eventual danger on his front in the south. As for Foch, his first hope is for a stroke of his own at the Somme, which shall abolish the dangers on both fronts. This become impossible, he must strike a balance between the views of Petain and those of Haig. Americans may recall a similar crisis in the Civil War, when Early approached Washington, in 1864, and the capital clamoured to Grant for divisions then in Grant's hands south of Petersburg. Like Foch, Grant appreciated the fact that Early's thrust was a diversion, intended to lead him to weaken his Army of the Potomac and lessen the pressure on Richmond, and like Foch he acted with extreme deliberation, cut the thing so fine that Early arrived before Washington as the first divisions from the Army of the Potomac marched through the city streets.

Once more the enormous value of unified command is demonstrated. Without it Haig might have retired, Petain refused the necessary reinforcements! As it is, Foch strikes a just balance between the two policies. He will send more reserves north than Petain wishes, far fewer than Haig asks. He perceives that Ludendorff is seeking to

exhaust French reserves, just as he is striving to smash British military strength. And he must surrender his own cherished hope of a counter-stroke. De Mitry is sent north with the first French reinforcements; more are concentrated, ready if necessary, but only if necessary. Still Petain will be disturbed; and later, on May 6th, will formally warn Foch that the limit of French contribution in the north has been reached. But by this time the Battle of the Lys will have terminated.

Meantime, as early as April 16th, the Battle of the Lys begins to die out. French troops have entered the line; the Belgians have extended their front and thereafter handsomely repulsed a German attack—"made too late" Ludendorff will comment, afterward. On April 25th the Germans do get Kemmel. The French troops cannot hold it because the position has been compromised before they take it over. Kemmel and 6,000 French prisoners are the last considerable captures of the Germans, although on April 29th they make a general attack, like that of April 4th-5th in Picardy, which is repulsed with exactly the same terrible carnage. Thus the northern corner of the salient holds; the Germans cannot advance in the centre, while the Allies from the Givenchy corner and from Mont des Cats become the northern corner—command their rear and communications. Therefore the battle descends with minor convulsions to a calm. The last German adventure "*Nach Calais*" has come to an end. Flanders will be quiet henceforth until Plumer and King Albert take the offensive and break out of the Ypres salient on the road to Ghent and Bruges, on the road to Lille and Mons.

"How did I win the war?" Foch will say chaffingly to André de Maricourt, many months later. "By smoking my pipe. That is to say, by not getting excited, by reducing everything to simple terms, by avoiding useless emotions, and keeping all my strength for the job." The proof of this is revealed, so far as the Flanders phase is concerned, in the testimony of General Maurice, who saw him on April 16th, when the issue of the Battle of the Lys seemed "still doubtful." To Maurice Foch said: "The Battle of Flanders is practically over, Haig will not need any more help from me."

"Not even the loss of Kemmel, a few days later, ruffled him," Maurice adds, and "Foch was right." Foch deliberately left it to the British to bear the greater part of the burden, because he recognized that too great diversion of French reserves to the north would merely open the way for Ludendorff elsewhere.

Haig's appeal to his soldiers created a profound sensation in London, there was anxiety and even criticism at the apparent slowness of French reinforcements to arrive, but they did arrive in time. The German was checked, and Foch repeated on the same battlefield his very great achievement of October and November, 1914, which constituted the winning of the Battle of the Yser.

### IV. THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE

April 29th is the last day of the Battle of the Lys; it is also the date which marks the close of the first phase of Ludendorff's campaign. In these forty days, beginning on March 21st, Ludendorff delivered two blows, but in his own mind they constituted a single operation, designed to break the British will for war. Viewed comparatively, if the Battle of Picardy resembled the breaking of a dike, the Battle of the Lys was little more than the opening of a leak and the subsequent effect of erosion. There was no considerable rupture of the lines in Flanders, nothing to recall the Picardy experience. The Givenchy corner had held from the outset, and except for Kemmel, the northern corner of the "Mountains" had been maintained. The Germans had done no more than excavate a shallow salient, and if from Kemmel they dominated the Ypres salient, they were themselves equally harassed between Scherpenberg and Bethune.

Measured by British casualties, Ludendorff's achievement was more impressive. In March the British losses—killed, wounded, captured, and missing—had amounted to approximately 175,000 of all ranks. In April, 659 officers and 18,088 men were killed; 4,615 officers and 87,637 men were wounded; 1,285 officers and 58,018 men were reported missing or captured. The killed for two months, all but a small fraction in the forty days of battle, totalled 39,000; the wounded, 176,000; the captured

and missing, 135,000. The total loss of all ranks for the period was just under 350,000; and almost half—the dead and missing or captured—represented a total loss. The French loss can hardly have fallen below 150,000 including a considerable number of prisoners. All told, the Allied loss for the first two months of the campaign of 1918 certainly amounted to 500,000 and the cost of forty days in 1918 was as high for the British alone as the whole Verdun campaign for the French, from February to December, 1916.

Maurice asserts that in forty days Ludendorff used 141 divisions against the British and the French, and of these 109 German divisions fought 58 British, and he asserts that the British losses were greater than those in the whole of the Ypres campaign of 1917, in which the British took 24,000 prisoners and only 64 guns, whereas they lost 70,000 prisoners and upward of 1,000 guns in March and April, 1918.

Ludendorff's estimate of results in this period is also enlightening, he says:

> We had achieved great successes that we must not allow later events make us forget. We had defeated the British army. Only a few British divisions were intact. Of the 59 divisions [he counts one more than the British, themselves] 53 had been engaged, 35 of them several times. The French had been obliged to engage nearly half of their divisions. The enemy had lost large quantities of stores.

On May 1st, an official German statement claimed the capture of 127,000 prisoners and 1,600 guns in their western offensive. Haig, in his official report, supplies further figures and an appraisal of the achievement of his own men. In this report, writing of "the task of the British armies," he says:

> It has been seen tnat in the Somme battle, by the end of March, in addition to some ten German divisions engaged against the French, a total of 73 German divisions were engaged and fought to a standstill by 42 British infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. In order to complete the comparison between the forces engaged, and to enable the nature of the task accomplished by our troops to be realized, it will be of value to give similar figures for the Battle of the Lys.
>
> In the Lys battle prior to April 30th the enemy engaged against the British forces a total of 42 divisions, of which 33 were fresh and 9 had fought previously at the Somme. Against these 42 divisions, 25 British divisions were employed, of which 8 were fresh and 17 had taken a prominent part at the Somme.

In the six weeks of almost constant fighting, from April 21st to 30th, a total of 55 British infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions was employed on the battle fronts against a force of 109 different German divisions. During this period a total of 141 different German divisions were engaged against the combined British and French forces.

The splendid qualities displayed by all ranks and services throughout the Somme and Lys battles make it possible to view with confidence whatever further tests the future may bring.

On March 21st the troops of the Fifth and Third armies had the glory of sustaining the first and heaviest blow of the German offensive. Though assailed by a concentration of hostile forces which the enemy might well have considered overwhelming, they held up the German attack at all points for the greater part of two days, thereby rendering a service to their country and to the Allied cause, the value of which cannot be overestimated. Thereafter, through many days of heavy and continuous rearguard fighting, they succeeded in presenting a barrier to the enemy's advance until such time as the arrival of British and French reinforcements enabled his progress to be checked.

In the Battle of the Lys, as has been pointed out above, many of the same divisions which had just passed through the furnace of the Somme found themselves exposed to the full fury of a second great offensive by fresh German forces. Despite this disadvantage they gave evidence in many days of close and obstinate fighting that their spirit was as high as ever and their courage and determination unabated. Both by them and by the divisions freshly engaged, every yard of ground was fiercely disputed, until troops were overwhelmed or ordered to withdraw. Such withdrawals as were deemed necessary in the course of the battle were carried out successfully and in good order.

At no time, either on the Somme or on the Lys, was there anything approaching a breakdown of command or a failure of morale. Under conditions that made rest and sleep impossible for days together, and called incessantly for the greatest physical exertion and quickness of thought, officers and men remained undismayed, realizing that for the time being they must play a waiting game, and determined to make the enemy pay the full price for the success which for the moment was his.

In the course of this report it has been possible to refer to a very few of the many instances in which officers and men of all arms and services have shown courage and skill of the highest order. On countless other occasions, officers and men, of whose names there is no record, have accomplished actions of the greatest valour, while the very nature of the fighting shows that on all parts of the wide battlefront unknown deeds of heroism were performed without number.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

## I

## THE PURPOSE

Ludendorff had now made two attempts to destroy the British army, one in Picardy and a lesser effort in Flanders, but, despite great incidental successes, both had failed to realize his larger purposes. The British army was badly shaken. It had suffered terrific losses, nearly one half of its strength had been put out of action, but French reserves had arrived in time to restore the situation. Thus the British troops had fulfilled their mission, they had held on until Petain's divisions could arrive and the German effort to achieve a complete rupture had failed. The logical front for a further effort was still the British, but both in Picardy and Flanders Allied concentrations and German communications alike forbade immediate attacks.

Before he could attack the British again, then, Ludendorff must do something to draw the French reserves away from the British front. He was still thinking of his original purpose, to smash the British army and thus break the British will for war; his own words demonstrate this. Accordingly he now attempted to administer the leech, the *coup de ventouse* of French military parlance. He was not thinking of Paris; the Paris circumstance does not appear in his narrative; his sole purpose was to compel Foch to withdraw French troops from Flanders and Picardy; thereafter he would resume his operations in the north, for which his preparations were never halted.

There was also the moral element. Ludendorff had always two strings to his bow. If he pressed the British hard, then there was an immediate demand from Haig for French reserves. But if he struck in the direction of Paris, even though he had no serious purpose to seek the French capital, every foot he moved toward that city would intensify the

anxiety of French military and political authorities and increase their demand that French troops be withdrawn from the British front and concentrated before Paris. He had already tested the British; he would now try the French.

The Chemin-des-Dames offensive, therefore, is another step in the strategy directed against the British, and Ludendorff in the last days of May has his eyes still fixed upon Flanders. There he expects to deliver a final blow, when the French reserves have been recalled to the Paris front which he is now going to create. Actually, he will be in conference with the Crown Prince of Bavaria, putting the final touches on this operation, when Foch's counter-stroke of July 18th recalls him to his own headquarters.

But we have now to reckon with a new circumstance, which upsets all calculations. When Ludendorff planned to attack at the Chemin des Dames he set the Vesle as the limit of victorious advance. He directed his commanders to pass the Aisne and to seize the crossings of the Vesle, but he neither expected nor counted upon further advance; he makes this clear in his book. When his troops passed both the Aisne and the Vesle on the first day and the road to the Marne lay open and the roads to Paris seemingly cleared, a new situation arose.

As early as the summer of 1918 French military authorities asserted that at this crisis the Kaiser intervened—supported and perhaps persuaded by the Crown Prince—and insisted that the operation should be continued, both for dynastic and military reasons. Under compulsion, so the French believe, Ludendorff yielded; set his troops in motion again; and, as a consequence, became involved in the deep Marne salient, the Château-Thierry salient of all American accounts. Having done this and being presently checked, Ludendorff found himself in a position in which he must retire or else go on. He could not now turn his attention to Flanders because he must expect immediately a Foch stroke, so awkward was the new salient.

Accordingly, Ludendorff postponed the Flanders thrust and, in the battle of July 15th, endeavoured to exploit and expand his gains in the Marne salient in such fashion as to make possible a later and final

thrust at Paris. In a word, without ever wholly surrendering the Flanders operation, without actually abandoning his determination to destroy the British army, Ludendorff momentarily substituted the Paris objective; and this substitution led to an adventure which proved fatal. It proved fatal because it gave the British time to reorganize, and, when the Marne operation had turned out badly, to attack, in their turn.

Even more than this, thanks to their long period of rest, the British can actually spare troops to support the French, in the decisive phase of the fighting in the Marne salient. This aid is small but precious, and three weeks later, before Ludendorff is able to recover his breath, after extricating his troops from the Marne mess, Haig's attack west of Amiens breaks the German lines and Ludendorff's nerve, and advertises to the world that Germany has lost the war.

The new Marne salient, then, is to prove the abyss in which all German hopes are engulfed. But it is essential to perceive that this is due to a miscalculation—whether imperial or Ludendorff's own is of small consequence—resulting from the extent of the initial success. The Chemin-des-Dames thrust was a logical circumstance in Ludendorff's main strategy, in his campaign against the British, but it was a diversion. When he permitted it to be transformed into the major operation he turned his back upon a British army, shaken but still formidable, and before he could resume his operation against it Haig was able to pass to the offensive. Napoleon made the same miscalculation in the Waterloo campaign; the result was the arrival on the field of Waterloo of the Prussian army, which had been beaten but not destroyed at Ligny.

Again; the Marne adventure consumed six weeks, and at the end of that time American troops, now rushing to the Continent at the rate of 300,000 a month, were able to intervene. Only one American division was available as a combat unit in April or May, but in June Ludendorff had to deal with three, and in July with eight.

During the war there was a natural tendency to see, in the Picardy and Marne operations, deliberate attempts to get to Paris, but in both cases the obvious strategical objective was something else, although both

in Picardy and Champagne German successes resulted in marked advances in the direction of Paris. This was but a repetition of the campaign of 1914. In both instances the German was seeking the destruction of armies, not the capture of cities; and in July, 1918, as in September, 1914, the Germans actually turned their backs upon Paris.

## II. FOCH'S MISCALCULATION

And now it is necessary to face the fact that at the Chemin des Dames Ludendorff, for the first and only time, outguessed Foch. The Battle of Picardy had been engaged before the Conference of Doullens called the "Coördinator." The Battle of the Lys followed before Foch could grasp the reins, and it was only during that contest that he became, in fact, generalissimo.

By the opening of the offensive of May 27th, on the contrary, Foch was firmly established, and his authority had been expanded to the necessary limits. He had begun to build his own plans. His mind had instinctively turned to the offensive as the only possible policy, and we have seen that he had considered a thrust east of Amiens. But his situation remained gravely compromised by the divergent views of Haig and Petain, and Ludendorff's attack in Flanders had forced him to postpone his own project.

The development of this operation had compelled him to transfer French divisions to the north, despite Petain's frequent warnings. He had, moreover, concentrated the balance of his scanty reserves, all French, back of the Somme front—not only because they would there be best placed if Ludendorff resumed his attack in the north, but also because he expected the thrust on the front between Noyon and Montdidier. Ludendorff did strike on this front in the final phase of his second offensive and Foch was able to parry the stroke, because of his preparations; but this was not the main blow.

Foch was still dreadfully handicapped by inferior numbers. It was impossible to be strong on all fronts. May was the dead low water of Allied numerical strength, while German strength reached its maximum. American divisions were becoming available, but not yet in sufficient

strength to replace wastage, to fill the vacancies created by the actual elimination of ten British divisions, incident to the recent battles.

It may also be reasoned that Foch was, after all, right as to the front on which the German should have struck, since the blow at the Chemin des Dames proved so fatal to German purposes, at the end. Still, it must be conceded that, had he accurately divined the purpose of Ludendorff, he would have given far more attention to the Chemin-des-Dames sector and would not have left seven or eight weary and relatively inferior French and British divisions squarely across the track of an approaching cyclone. Foch's error here was Joffre's at Verdun in February, 1916. So disastrous to the German was the Verdun affair, in its later stages, that there has sprung up a legend that the Germans fell into a "trap." Not impossibly we shall presently have a Marne legend, but neither can have the smallest warrant in fact.

Thus, when Ludendorff did strike at the Chemin des Dames, he encountered tired British divisions—filled with raw levies and transferred to a "quiet" sector for rest and refit—and French troops in about the same condition. As a result, he broke through easily, swept down to the Marne again. Paris was crowded with a new horde of refugees, again heard the guns approaching the city, and for a number of days actually expected to see the enemy arrive. Foch's prestige was thus terribly wounded. So much so, that Paris believed, and believes, that he placed his resignation in Clemenceau's hands, only to be met by the answer, worthy of Roman times:

> The greatest soldier in the world can afford to make *one* mistake.

Foch would not make another, and the consequences of this blunder would be fatal not to him but to Ludendorff. Yet, viewing the struggle as a duel between two great soldiers, one must perceive that in May it was Ludendorff who scored. But if Foch was momentarily at fault in failing to foresee the direction of the May thrust, his real greatness never revealed itself more impressively than in the manner in which he set about to repair the damage incident to the defeat at the Chemin des Dames. Henceforth the miscalculation is all Ludendorff's, who will

misunderstand the extent of his victory and be either deceived himself or overborne by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince—will repeat all the blunders of the First Marne and pay the price Joffre could not exact from Moltke four years earlier.

"On the whole, between the strategy of Foch and that of the German High Command," writes Colonel Requin, "lies an essential difference. On the one hand an exquisite sense of proportion, an exactness of measure, essentially French traits, controlled by a superior intelligence and an inflexible will; on the other hand pride, which hurls states as well as military chiefs to perdition when it seeks to erect colossal plans on psychological errors."

### III. THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

For his new front of attack Ludendorff selected the Chemin des Dames. It was old fighting ground before the present war. Napoleon and Cæsar had campaigned over it. The Craonne Plateau, along whose crest the Chemin des Dames runs, had been the first objective of Nivelle in the costly offensive of April, 1917. French and British pursuit after the First Marne had been halted on the southern slopes of the ridge in September, 1914, when Kluck dug in north of the Aisne and, sweeping the crossings of the river, opened what was to be a new and almost interminable phase: the war of positions.

Nivelle had made meagre gains at great costs in April, 1917. Later in the year Petain had made large gains at small costs, and as a result the French had taken and held all the high ground south of the tiny Ailette Brook, from the point where the Paris-Laon highway crosses it eastward to the foot of the eastern crest of the plateau. Thence it ran out into the plain, crossing the Laon-Soissons highway, and then, turning south and passing the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, Cæsar's battleground, it reached the outskirts of Rheims.

There were three quite distinct sectors on this front. There was first the Craonne Plateau itself, a magnificent bulwark extending from west to east, dominating the marsh through which the Ailette Brook, expanded into a well-nigh impassable swamp by shell fire, trickled west-

ward toward the Oise. Seen from the north, this plateau seems almost like an artificial wall, so even against the skyline are the crests, so steep the northern slopes. As a consequence, this sector was held impregnable to assault, the fundamental miscalculation of the whole Allied estimate. But impregnable it had proven to all German assaults in the summer of 1917 before the arrival of the Hutier method and the consequent demolition of all the calculations of nearly four years of war.

Between the eastern end of the Craonne Plateau and the hills on the south bank of the Aisne was the second sector, a stretch of low land through which the Aisne flows westward. This was manifestly the weak joint in the French armour. Nivelle, in his calculations a year before, had planned to use this gap, once his troops were over the Craonne Plateau—to thrust forward his cavalry, which would encircle the plateau from the north and arrive before the walls of Laon on the morning of the second day of the battle.

But Nivelle had neither been able to get over nor to get through. As a consequence this gateway by which the Aisne breaks through the high ground on its way to the Oise remained a danger point even after Craonne Plateau was well within the French lines. The French merely occupied trench systems between Craonne and Berry-au-Bac, which had been elaborately constructed first by the Germans and then by the French, who had first taken the German systems in 1917 and later expanded them. Still there was danger here.

South of the Aisne the forward French lines lay at the foot of the Sapigneul Heights, crowned by Fort Brimont, which Nivelle had endeavoured to take in April and May with terrific losses and ultimate failure. Indeed, it was his insistence on renewing his sterile assaults on Brimont which led to his summary removal. But although the French front lines ran in the low ground, through which also passed the Rheims-Laon highway and the Vesle-Aisne canal, the French support lines were solidly seated upon high ground all the way from the Aisne to the Vesle. Actually, therefore, the French position consisted of two stretches of high ground, separated by a three- or four-mile reach of low ground,

traversed by the Aisne. This low ground is described in French military accounts as the *Trouée* or Gap of Juvincourt.

Ludendorff in his reminiscences recognizes the strength of the position occupied by the enemy, but he correctly remarks that if the artillery preparation were properly made, the defenders, particularly on the Craonne Plateau, would be paralyzed by shell fire and gas and that there would remain only the difficulties of the ground itself to be dealt with.

If the Germans should take the Craonne Plateau, they would still have before them the deep and difficult Aisne from Berry-au-Bac to Soissons; and even if they got across the Aisne they would still have the Vesle to force, and south of the Vesle, as south of the Aisne, the ground was high and thus favourable to the French defenders.

Even south of the Vesle there was still another obstacle, slight but backed by high ground, the tiny Ourcq, which, rising in the Tardenois Plateau, flows first west and then south into the Marne. But if the Ourcq were passed, then the pathway to the Marne would be open. Moreover, in pushing to the Marne, the Germans would be following paths trodden by their comrades in the days of the First Marne Campaign.

For his third offensive thrust Ludendorff concentrated 42 divisions, constituting the German Seventh Army, and commanded by Boehn, between the Soissons-Laon railway, which parallels the highway and the Aisne east of Berry-au-Bac. South of the Aisne 4 divisions belonging to Below's First Army would coöperate. The principal shock would be delivered by 28 divisions. Most of these, moreover, were storm troops; had participated in the Picardy but not in the Flanders fighting; and had been withdrawn for rest, refit, and training early in April. It was a far more powerful blow than Ludendorff had delivered in Flanders, although it was much lighter than that with which he had opened the campaign.

In front of this huge concentration the French had on the Craonne Plateau the Sixth Army, commanded by Duchesne, one corps of which, the 11th, commanded by Maud'huy, was actually on the front to be assailed and consisted of two weak divisions. Between the Craonne Plateau and Rheims stood the French Third Army, commanded by

Micheler, who had under his orders 4 British divisions, 3 of which were actually in line covering the Gap of Juvincourt, on either side of the Aisne. Actually the French and British were now going to oppose rather less than seven divisions of weary troops, which had fought in all stages of the Flanders and Picardy combats, to 28 fresh German divisions, each numerically stronger than French or British divisions and composed of the best material in the German army, supported by an enormous concentration of artillery and fortified by the Hutier tactic.

Even in the case of Gough's Fifth Army the odds had not been immediately as great and the explanation must of course be found in the fact that the Allied commanders, threatened with ruin elsewhere, had drawn off their best troops from the Chemin des Dames, mistakenly convinced that the position itself was impregnable. Even the lessons of Picardy and Flanders had not yet sufficed to emphasize the fact that the real secret of German success must be sought in the Hutier method. Strong as were the positions before him, Ludendorff ironically remarks they were not as strong as these Alpine heights, forced by his victorious troops at Caporetto in the preceding autumn.

Another circumstance contributed to the completeness of the disaster on the Chemin des Dames. The surprise was absolute. As late as the preceding afternoon Maud'huy learned for the first time from prisoners that an attack was coming and warned his commander, Duchesne, who in turn reserved to himself the right to order the destruction of the bridges across the Aisne, while warning his troops to be ready. But this reservation proved fatal, for, when the attack came, the German advance was so rapid that Duchesne ordered the destruction of the bridges after it was too late and the Germans were able to pass this barrier as they had been successful in getting across the Somme and Crozat Canal before the British could destroy the bridges in April.

Thus whatever information was derived from prisoners on May 26th, it did not give any adequate warning. The Allied commanders had not the smallest inkling of the amount of artillery concentrated on their front; they had no suspicion of the number of infantry divisions

which had been brought up by those secret and night marches which were such an essential detail in the Ludendorff offensive. Actually the attack was in all larger aspects a complete surprise because no proper preparation had been made against it.

Moreover, as Ludendorff was now using the Hutier method for the third time and as Foch had not yet developed his answer, it was only natural that experience should have brought with it approximate perfection. Beyond all question the attack of May 27th was, on the professional military side, the best prepared and the best executed of the whole war. In it was disclosed German system working at its highest stage of efficiency. Even in defeat Allied military students and critics alike could not refuse their admiration for the new system; and the fashion in which it revealed itself at the Chemin des Dames contributed, even more than lost ground, to shake Allied confidence by raising the pressing question: Can any "parade" be found to parry the Hutier thrust? Have the Germans actually found the key, the secret of modern war, the method for breaking the trench deadlock, for which all soldiers have been seeking for nearly four years? Shall we be destroyed before we can devise an answer?

One further detail is worthy of note. On April 24th, at Villers-Bretonneux, German tanks appeared for the first time and were used with some effect, although the Germans were still new to the management of the engines and their tanks were too unwieldy. At the Chemin des Dames, on the contrary, the handling was good, and something like a hundred tanks were reported to have been used by the assailants. They were without exception too heavy and too large and they were only in a small degree responsible for a shining success attributable mainly to the Hutier system itself.

### IV. LUDENDORFF'S PLAN

For the Chemin-des-Dames offensive Ludendorff had made the following plans: He would attack on a front from the Soissons-Laon highway on the west to the heights of Sapigneul on the east. His main operation would be a duplicate of that attempted by Nivelle in 1917 but

delivered, of course, in the reverse direction. One mass of troops would seek to hack their way straight across the Craonne Plateau from end to end, passing the Chemin des Dames and reaching the north bank of the Aisne; a second mass would endeavour to break through the Gap of Juvincourt, advancing from east to west astride the Aisne. These two masses would be commanded by Boehn. Still a third, much smaller, would be under Fritz von Below and would push west from Fort Brimont.

Given this arrangement, Ludendorff might calculate that, even if his frontal attack failed, he would take the Craonne Plateau by the blow directed, through the Juvincourt Gap, at the rear of the French and British actually on the Craonne Plateau, while if the frontal attack succeeded, then the enemy troops held in line across the Gap of Juvincourt would be similarly menaced in their rear. Actually this amounted to attacks on front and flank. As it turned out, both were successful, with the result that the credit for victory was divided.

But it was not enough merely to force the Craonne barrier. To be held up immediately at the Aisne might not sufficiently shake Foch to lead him to divert troops from the British front. It was necessary to go at least to the Vesle, and this was the limit first fixed by Ludendorff in his plans. Once the Vesle had been reached and bridgeheads established to the south, he would transfer his operations to the old "Paris front" between Noyon and Montdidier and, seeking to push across the Lassigny Heights where he had been halted in the last days of March, menace Paris and open all roads running down to the French capital from the north. Hutier himself would be called upon to make this attack, but it could not be timed to synchronize with the Chemin-des-Dames blow, because Ludendorff lacked the artillery to demolish both positions at once, and with the Nivelle episode in mind, recognized that any failure to make adequate artillery preparation at the Chemin des Dames would involve stupendous losses and incalculable German depression. He therefore planned to attack at the Chemin des Dames on May 27th and beyond the Oise on June 7th, but he had finally to postpone the second blow until June 9th.

### V. THE ERUPTION

At one o'clock on the morning of May 27th the artillery storm begins on all the doomed front. It is, on the whole, more terrible than all preceding bombardments; the German artillerymen have learned much in the two earlier experiments. More gas is used and the result is the approximate stupefaction of large numbers of their enemy. In truth, the artillery preparation itself this time practically disposes of the defence. The thing which Falkenhayn hoped for at Verdun, Haig and Foch at the Somme, Nivelle before the Craonne Plateau; the thing which Petain had several times achieved on a narrow front, was now accomplished upon a very wide front. Ludendorff has much praise for Colonel Bruchmüller, the German artillery officer who superintended all of the artillery preparations during the campaign.

Before four o'clock the German infantry is on the move. On the eastern end of the Craonne Plateau, on the ground where the French had maintained themselves in the terrific fighting of the preceding summer, the British garrisons are assailed almost without warning. So rapid is the German advance that the Plateau of Californie, the "Winterberg" of German battle reports, is lost in less than half an hour. The attack extends along the British front eastward and southward, and in a few hours one British general is killed, another wounded, and a third captured.

While the morning is still young the British line north of the Aisne has collapsed, the Germans have come over the eastern end of the Craonne Plateau and through the Gap of Juvincourt; they have arrived at the Aisne bridges west of Berry-au-Bac, and the bridges have not been destroyed in time. They will thus be able to cross the Aisne and menace the British and French troops holding the line from the Aisne to Rheims and threaten the French positions north of the river on the western half of the Chemin des Dames.

That is, Boehn's advance by the left flank would threaten the western positions, had they not already fallen; for the French, resistance is no more successful or sustained than the British. On this part of the

front the gas effects are even more disastrous and the infantry well nigh paralyzed. At 4:15 A. M., with a single bound the Germans pass the little Ailette, they push up the heights on either side of the Fort de Malmaison won by Petain in the preceding autumn. Before noon they are streaming down the south side of the Craonne Plateau toward the crossings from Soissons eastward, while the Kaiser, having mounted the Plateau of Californie, is surveying the battle, now gone south, with emotions which a travelling biographer will promptly give to the world. "Fritz was one of the first to cross the Aisne" the Kaiser triumphantly telegraphed the Empress.

The Allied line had now collapsed all the way from Berry-au-Bac to the Crouy region, immediately north of Soissons. Worse; from Vailly, east of Soissons, to Berry-au-Bac the Germans are actually across the Aisne and this line of defence has gone. Before night comes, the advance has crossed the Vesle also, to the west of Fismes, at the point of the German wedge, and thus the line of the Vesle, also, has fallen. Even in the unfortunate first day of the Battle of Picardy there was nothing approximating this collapse. As a consequence of the disaster there is now a sag in the Allied lines all the way from Rheims to Soissons, and both of these cities are in imminent danger. Soissons will fall the next evening, while north of the Aisne, in the angle between the Aisne and the Oise, French lines are recoiling and it is still probable that they will have to be withdrawn behind the Aisne, in upon Compiègne, which will, in turn, necessitate the abandonment of the French positions on the Lassigny Hills west of the Oise.

The first day was marked by a drive at the centre; on the second follows the logical expansion of the attack, the effort to break down the sides of the breach which has been opened. Rheims and Soissons are equally enemy objectives. Meantime, the thrust into the centre of the open gap in the Allied lines continues; the advance dips far below the Vesle.

And on this second day, at a conference held in the evening—attended by the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff—a momentous decision is taken and announced to the armies in a terse

bulletin signed by the Emperor and Hindenburg. "The attack will be pressed." This means—Ludendorff's narrative hints as much—that the Germans, surprised by the extent of their victory, are now going to transform what had been a diversion into a principal operation. They will postpone the Flanders offensive and exploit their victory toward the Marne. The French front has proven incredibly weak. It may be possible to approach Paris before the offensive reaches its term; the stain of the defeat at the Marne in 1914 may be wiped out by a victory on this river four years later. The calculation was mistaken, the consequences of the change of objective in mid-battle would prove fatal, but the situation on May 28th, in the evening, gave no sign of such a conclusion to the most successful stroke in four years of war.

### VI. FOCH RESTORES THE SITUATION

On May 27th the German success was still regarded in Paris with calm. Its real magnitude was hardly appreciated except in military quarters, on the following day, when Petain undertook to deal with the problem. It is only on May 29th that Foch takes a hand, and this is the day on which, as a result of the decision approved by the Kaiser and published to his troops, the Germans had decided to transform the operation from a diversion to a major affair and, abandoning the limits Ludendorff had set for the advance, would seek the most distant objectives; in a word, would strive to exploit the preliminary success to the uttermost.

In examining the second phase of this operation, which unrolled between the Vesle and the Marne, it is essential at the outset to grasp a single fact. The military circumstances were quite different from those which arrested the attention of the civilian public and filled the press of the world. A failure to grasp the military aspects as contrasted with the civilian estimates has served to disguise the actual significance of what happened in the next few days and to give an entirely mistaken interpretation to the part played by American troops, glorious as that part actually was.

We have seen in the two earlier offensives of Ludendorff that the

hoped-for subsequent profit was not realized because in each case the Germans were unable to expand their original break through. In Picardy the resistance of Byng's troops north of the Somme promptly restricted the gap to the south bank of the Somme, while the Oise River and the Lassigny Hills precluded extension southward. Thus the German advance was first canalized between the Oise and the Somme and then actually arrested before it could break out of the western end of this Oise-Somme corridor west of Montdidier and east of Amiens.

In Flanders the same thing had happened. At the outset the British on the southern side of the break about Givenchy had held firm and stopped any widening of the gap toward the south. On the north there had been a preliminary widening, due to German progress on the Messines Ridge and as far as Kemmel. But although Kemmel was taken, the balance of the "Mountains" were firmly held and the German advance thus paused on the eastern edge of the Forest of Nieppe.

Both operations had created salients, or pockets, and the obvious truth about a salient is that the narrower the mouth of the pocket the greater the difficulty in supplying the troops within it, since the communications will be under fire from both sides and the whole rear of the troops in the bulge under enemy bombardment. Moreover, the deeper the salient is, the graver the menace to the troops within it, because they will be farther from their own bases and more exposed to any attack from the sides of the salient, which, if successful, would cut them off and force them to surrender.

This simple military fact explained the failure of many previous offensives which had made initial gains but, in the end, had to be abandoned because the original break was not widened and therefore advance through the gap became perilous. To risk large numbers of troops within a salient was to invite disaster. The subsequent developments of the fighting between the Marne and the Aisne in July will supply a good illustration, even more simply complete is the example supplied by Pershing's successful attack on the sides of the St. Mihiel salient in September, which resulted in the capture of many thousand troops and nearly five hundred guns caught in the pocket.

On May 29th and the succeeding days then, while the Allied and German publics were thinking of Paris, Foch and Ludendorff were directing their attention to something quite different. Ludendorff was seeking to expand his break through on both sides. Foch was endeavouring to prevent the expansion. The success or failure of the new German venture would depend, not upon the depth of the penetration made in the pocket, but on the success or failure of the effort to widen the pocket on either corner, toward Rheims and toward Soissons. In the case of the present field of operations, moreover, unless there were a very considerable and swift widening of the salient on its western side, the southward push would have to stop, because the roads which served this region ran close to this side and both roads and railways were unavailable until Soissons was taken.

Beginning on May 29th, then, the whole problem centred on the resistance of the two corners of the pocket, or the two gateposts of the door which the Germans had suddenly cut in the Allied lines. If the gateposts were maintained, the door was, as yet, too narrow to permit German hosts to get through in numbers which would constitute a menace to Paris. In fact—and the point is capital—if the door were not widened, the Germans in the new pocket would presently find themselves in a dangerous predicament.

Rheims and Soissons were thus the gateposts, or "corners," in military phrase. But neither city was itself of great military value. The Rheims corner actually consisted of the high ground, the "Mountain of Rheims" to the south. As to the Soissons corner, it derived importance immediately from the high ground, also to the south, where the Americans would fight on July 18th, but chiefly from the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, south and west. Unless the Germans could take this, their advance toward Paris would be impossible, while if they captured it, then the whole French line north of the Aisne would collapse and the French would have to quit the Lassigny Hills west of the Oise. This would mean the dislocation of all the French front between the Somme pocket and the new Marne salient and the creation of a real Paris front.

Foch, accordingly, sets out at once to maintain himself in the

Forest of Villers-Cotterets. He will even strive unsuccessfully to hold the heights just southwest of Soissons itself. Thither he will direct his scanty reserve, while smaller reinforcements will be sent to hold the Mountain of Rheims. As for the German wedge rushing toward the Marne, he will neglect this; he will assume the arrival of the Germans at the Marne and leave the fragments of the divisions swept off the Chemin des Dames to retard it as well as may be. Real German success will be measured not by the depth but by the width of the Marne pocket.

In the following days Ludendorff storms at Soissons and Rheims. He will take the latter city and the heights above it. Rheims will be encircled on three sides. The Germans will come up to the edge of the houses; they will see the Roman arch which looks north along the Laon road; new bombardments will complete the ruin of the city, but it will not fall, held by a French colonial regiment called up from rest quarters and arriving "*gentil comme ça*," as observers say afterward.

Ludendorff will have bitter words to say about the failure to get forward more promptly at Soissons when the road was opened—a failure due, after all, it would seem, to the arrival of the offending division at the limit fixed for its progress by Ludendorff himself, before the operation was transformed.

The Germans do get to the edge of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, penetrate the first woodlands. But there they stick, will stick, and, having been pushed back ever so little in the next weeks, will suddenly be assailed by a storm coming out of the same woodlands, an American storm, six weeks hence. They do no better toward the Mountain of Rheims. Only to the south is their progress considerable. They reach the Marne at Jaulgonne on May 30th, Decoration Day in the United States. The same day the 2nd Division of Americans near Beauvais will receive an order long awaited. On the next the German effort is directed against the whole western side of the pocket between the Aisne and the Marne. Again there is small progress in the north; the progress to the south, between the Ourcq and the Marne, is more considerable, but the check is in sight.

On June 1st the Germans are in Château-Thierry and the American

3rd Division, a motorized machine-gun unit, does good service at the Marne Bridge. The 2nd Division has taken root across the Paris-Metz road, west of Château-Thierry, is taking its first full look at Belleau Wood, soon to be known as the Bois de la Brigade de Marine. The Germans will get no farther toward Paris in this offensive or any other, along the Paris-Metz road.

But what happens at the bottom of the pocket is always unimportant by comparison with the events at the corners. And both corners are safe. De Maud'huy, who rallied his stricken divisions and held the Soissons corner in the critical hours, will be Governor of Metz before the year is over. The battle is dying out, although Ludendorff will try between Soissons and Noyon to force the French back to their last lines north of the Aisne. Held here, he will now turn to his final thrust, the blow between Noyon and Montdidier. Up to this moment he has only succeeded in




LUDENDORFF'S PROFITS

Solid black shows French territory occupied by the Germans at the end of the Battle of the Chemin des Dames. White line shows the German front on March 21st

excavating a narrow salient, thirty-three miles deep by forty wide, at the bottom of which his guns cut the Paris-Nancy railway, almost as important as the Paris-Calais line on the Somme front, which he has also abolished. He has failed to get the Soissons corner, to smash the Rheims corner; he has been held between the Aisne and the Oise. The armies so far engaged are exhausted; Foch has brought up his reserves. Perhaps Ludendorff will find the Montdidier-Noyon front weak, since reserves have been called away from that sector, as he found the Flanders front weak after his Picardy effort, for the same reason. At all events, this step is logical and inevitable.

### VII. THE BATTLE OF THE MATZ

Once more, on June 9th, this time with all the customary circumstances, the German guns open on the Montdidier-Noyon front. Following the bombardment, Hutier's Eighteenth Army, the army which broke Gough's Fifth Army at the Somme less than two months before, assails the French in line across the Lassigny Hills, from Mont Renaud, a detached hill, looking down upon ruined Noyon, westward. Compiègne is the objective of this push; Compiègne taken, the French will have to retire behind the Aisne; there will be an extension of the dislocation of the French front from Rheims to Amiens.

But on this June 9th the Hutier tactic encounters something which suggests a counter-tactic. Imperfect still, is this answer, at which Foch—with Petain and every other French staff officer—has been working for almost three months, but a sign of progress. The German advance is still unmistakable. The Lassigny Hills fall. The Germans get south to the little Matz brook, rising in the high ground and wandering down to the Oise, a brook which will give its name to the battle, since the Germans do not get to Compiègne, nor in sight of it.

On June 10th the progress is still continued, but the German marching front has narrowed almost to a point. First and last there has been no rupture of the front, only a yielding under terrific pressure following intolerable artillery punishment. More progress on June 10th, in the morning, but in the afternoon Foch throws Mangin upon the western

*U. S. Official Photo*

SENDING A MESSAGE TO AN AIRPLANE

The signallers seem to enjoy this strange Chautauqua salute

# THE AMERICANS IN ACTION

*From the collection of war pictures at the National Museum, Washington* *By H. C. Murphy*

BREAKING THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE

The 27th New York Division penetrating the "impenetrable"

*U. S. Official Photo*

FOLLOWING THE TRACK OF A TANK

*U. S. Official Photo*

ADVANCING THROUGH A SMOKE SCREEN

American infantrymen in action, Meuse-Argonne. October 27, 1918

*U. S. Official Photo*

WATCHING THE ENEMY FROM A CAPTURED POST

Two American officers observing the German lines from the famous Montfaucon observatory. The made-in-Germany binoculars serve American eyes well

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE MORNING ATTACK

In the haze of the dawn an American battery shells the retreating Germans. This battery works in the desolation of what was No Man's Land in the Argonne

*U. S. Official Photo*

AMERICANS ADVANCING UNDER COVER OF BUSH TO LAY WIRE. NEAR CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

*U. S. Official Photo*

ACROSS THE FIELDS NEAR MONT SEC

This machine-gun company is passing through a regiment of doughboys and a supply train. The picture was taken by a signalman of the 1st Division during the Battle of St. Mihiel

*U. S. Official Photo*

FRENCH CHILDREN OF SOULOSSE

Watching an American ammunition train on the way to the front. April 10, 1918

*U. S. Official Photo*

A GERMAN STRONGHOLD NEAR GRANDPRÉ

From this hill, studded with machine guns and protected by pits, the Americans drove the Boche after three attacks. The camouflage and brush screen have been removed to present a hazy view of the town and swampy valley

*By Captain Harvey Dunn* *U. S. Official Photo*

THE BOCHE LOOTER

*By Wallace Morgan* *U. S. Official Photo*

COLD BREAKFAST ON THE MARCH

The artist has caught the feeling of that cold gray morning in the ruined village

*U. S. Official Photo*

YANKEE SOLDIER AND FRENCH CHILDREN

No wonder the American soldiers were popular in France. The little chap on the bench seems to be enjoying the Sergeant's story

AMERICAN PIES AT THE FRONT

*U. S. Official Photo*

Salvation Army girls at work, gas masks hanging from their necks, making fighting food at their dugouts

*U. S. Official Photo*

SERGEANT LEADING MOPPING UP SQUAD

This picture gives an idea of the difficulty of cleaning out machine-gun nests in a dense thicket. It was taken in the Argonne Forest where the 77th Division fought

*U. S. Official Photo*

AN ILLUMINATION BOMB LIGHTS THE WAY

This is not an exhibition of fireworks but the grim business of war

ON THE ROAD TO SEDAN

*U. S. Official Photo*

Doughboys following the retreating Germans. The open formation is designed to minimize the effect of bursting shells

*U. S. Official Photo*

TAKING MOVING PICTURES UNDER FIRE

These men are in the front-line trenches at Chaussers

TANKS OF THE YANKS

Here is a procession of them going through the Argonne Forest

*U. S. Official Photo*

*U. S. Official Photo*

ATTACKING FROM BEHIND A TANK

These are men of the 107th Infantry, 27th Division, working toward the Hindenburg Line without the protection of a smoke screen

*By Captain Harvey Dunn*

THE ENGINEER—FULLY EQUIPPED

*U. S. Official Photo*

© *Committee on Public Information*

FRENCH AND AMERICAN COMRADES IN ARMS

They are watching the effect of shell fire from the scanty shelter of a ruined stable

THE HINDENBURG LINE NEAR LE CATELET

*U. S. Official Photo*

At this point, where the Scheldt Canal goes underground, American troops broke through on September 28th but suffered terrible losses when the Germans came out of the tunnel and attacked their rear

*U. S. Official Photo*

STREET FIGHTING IN A VILLAGE ALONG THE MARNE

Taking such shelter as was afforded by the corners of houses and broken walls, the Americans drove the Germans out. They found it impossible to withstand the determination of our men to win an objective

*U. S. Official Photo*

"FOX HOLES" IN THE ARGONNE

This picture of men of the 18th Regiment, 1st Division, was taken just one month before the Armistice was signed

*U. S. Official Photo*

SMOKE POTS IN THE ARGONNE

An American officer setting off a smoke producer, forming part of a screen through which the attackers advance

*U. S. Official Photo*

MACHINE-GUN CREW IN ACTION

These men appear to be simply drilling but they are actually creeping toward the enemy lines in the Meuse-Argonne

*U. S. Official Photo*

ATTACKING A MACHINE-GUN NEST

The enemy guns are concealed in the woods beyond the end of the street. Approaching the venomous things, the American sharpshooters take advantage of the protection of the shattered houses

© By Committee on Public Information

PUMPING LEAD INTO THE GERMAN LINES

Two Americans with French automatic rifles early in the morning of the first day of General Pershing's assault upon the salient of St. Mihiel

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE ALLIED GENERALS AT METZ

When the Baton of Marshal was bestowed upon General Petain. The guard of honour behind Marshal Petain is composed of Marshal Joffre, Marshal Foch, of France; Field Marshal Haig, of Great Britain; General Pershing, of the United States; General Gillian of Belgium; General Albricci, of Italy; and General Haller, of Poland

*U. S. Official Photo*

CLEANING OUT A VILLAGE

Imagine the feeling of these men in the open street with Germans lurking at the doorways and building corners

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE HAND GRENADE

Thrown into a shelter from which the Germans are vainly trying to escape. The smoking grenade can be seen in the left centre of the picture

*By John R. Sargent, R. A.*

GASSED

© *Imperial War Museum, London*

*U. S. Official Photo*

TO VICTORY—ON THE RUN

Through the openings blown up by the engineers in the barbed wire. the infantrymen advance to the attack

*U. S. Official Photo*

"KAMERAD"

A German sniper crying for the quarter he would not give

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE HOME COMING

The Frenchman returns to what the retreating Germans have left of his home



A CITY OF THE DEAD

*U. S. Official Photo*

The great American cemetery at Romagne in the Meuse-Argonne—30,000 are buried here in the heart of America's greatest battlefields

flank of the German wedge, coming out of the forest land toward Rollot, south of Mondidier, and Mangin crumples up the flank, takes prisoners, hundreds of them, and a few guns. German reserves are rushed up; the thrust is parried, but Ludendorff breaks off the battle. Mangin has been in disgrace since the failure at the Aisne a year ago, but he has been marked as a leader of attack ever since he retook Douaumont—for a moment in the spring and for ever in the autumn of 1916. He will now get back his army and do wonders with it. Two American divisions under his command will help break the last German offensive five weeks hence. An interesting man, first remembered in the French army by his advocacy of the use of France's colonies in Africa as a reservoir for the French army. One day he will command the first French army to cross the middle Rhine since Napoleon's retreat after Leipzig.

In the Battle of the Matz the Germans got forward some five or six miles on a narrow front, took the Lassigny Hills—a success that might conceivably profit them later, if they could exploit it. But after the first hours, even during them, they encountered unexpected resistance. The charm of their method seemed to have diminished. There was nothing suggesting a rupture of the French front, and with little delay the fighting took on the character remembered from the Verdun time, body to body, bayonet and grenade. Last of all there was a counter-offensive, a swift, sharp thrust not encountered at the Somme, the Lys, nor the Aisne. And the losses, which were terrific, made a lasting impression upon the minds of the German soldiers.

As for Ludendorff, his position at the Marne is not improved by his operation across the Matz. The Villers-Cotterets pivot is not broken, the Soissons corner holds, the French across the Aisne stand unshaken. He can do no more now. Still he seeks to bolster German morale by publishing his bulletins of victory. He has taken 55,000 prisoners in the Chemin-des-Dames operation; by the end of June his captures amount to 208,000 prisoners and 2,500 guns.

But the promise of May 28th, like that of March 25th, has not been realized. He has thrust his neck into a noose at the Marne. He can retire and transfer his efforts to Flanders, come back to the Vesle, as




PARIS MENACED

A—Ground gained by the Germans in the Battle of Picardy. B—In the Battle of the Chemin des Dames. C—In the Battle of the Matz

Paris believed he wanted to do. But if he remains in the salient on the Marne he must concentrate his attention in the south; he must hasten to strike again and abolish his inconveniences, for if he goes north or waits too long, Foch will be upon him.

But before he can strike again he must crank up his machine and this will take nearly seven weeks. And if retirement to the Vesle is possible militarily, it is morally inconceivable. After four years the German General Staff has found no satisfactory explanation for the first retreat from the Marne and the German people are in no mood for another, when, after four years, they are again looking at Paris on the map. And on the map Paris is little more than forty miles from Ribecourt, from Château-Thierry.

Paris, too, and all Allied cities and towns, are looking at the map. Paris is going through the same preparations which marked the approach of Kluck to the forts in August, 1914. There was a brief discussion as to whether Paris should be defended or evacuated, since the bombardment would destroy it. Guillaumat, a Verdun general, who had drafted the plans Franchet d'Esperey will soon use to destroy the Bulgarians, arrives to take Gallieni's place. Gallieni is dead, but his spirit lives in Paris. Life in the French capital has now become a nightmare: *Grosse Bertha* by day, Gotha raids by night, while fresh refugees steadily arrive. It is 1914 over again, after four years of agony.

Ludendorff is watching this circumstance. He tells us that after May 27th he studied the French papers eagerly, seeking the first sign of collapse. Instead he read Clemenceau's words: "I shall fight before Paris, through Paris, behind Paris." And Ludendorff does not withhold his admiration. Even in victory he complains that the German public opinion displays no such firmness. In fact, German public opinion is notably weakening. It has heard "*Nach Calais*" in April, it hears "*Nach Paris*" in June, while Calais is still untaken, and the whisper is going about that the submarines have not wholly prevented the coming of Americans—a whisper angrily controverted by all German official agents but not silenced now and soon to become a charge unanswerable.

Clemenceau had once said that the victory would go to the contestant who could stay through the last quarter of an hour. We are now entering this final quarter of an hour, it is represented by the period from May 27th to July 18th. It is the supreme agony for all Allied publics;

for France first, for Paris most of all, for the Parisians who saw the sky aflame and heard the guns each night, who knew that the barbarian was literally at the gate. But in the darkness Foch worked silently; for him the dawn was already in sight. America had bridged the gap between his numbers and those of Ludendorff. If Allied governments and publics would sustain him for a few more weeks, if the civilians would only "hold," he would be worthy of their confidence. And they would hold.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# THE PEACE STORM—SECOND MARNE

## I

## LUDENDORFF'S STRATEGY

Ludendorff was now chained to his victory. He had not lost the initiative but he had lost freedom of action. He could not conceal his next stroke, since an attack in Champagne was imposed upon him and the element of surprise would be lacking altogether.

Meantime, in June, he had pushed the Austrians into a new effort along the Piave, and this effort, momentarily successful, had ended in a colossal disaster produced alike by Italian resistance and by an Alpine flood. This terrific defeat had abolished what little was left of the Austrian will for war and had similarly banished all chance of the transfer of Austrian divisions in any number to the German front. On the contrary, Italian troops were beginning to appear on the Champagne front and would perform useful service in the next battle.

The American circumstance was even more distressing. By July Ludendorff concedes that America had become the decisive factor in the war. He counts twenty American divisions in France and fifteen in the fighting strength of Foch; and, numerically, fifteen American divisions had the strength of thirty German. He does not reckon the American division a match for the German since ours was still lacking in training, but he recognizes that American troops are fit for service in quiet sectors, thus releasing British and French.

Finally, Ludendorff at this stage of his narrative devotes far more space to the decline in the morale of his own army than to the military circumstances in the decisive battle of the campaign. Obviously he is seeking to find outside of military events an explanation for his defeat, but despite the unmistakable fact that German morale, civilian and military, was breaking down; despite the expansion of American num-

bers; despite the Italian reverse, Ludendorff's blunder in passing the Vesle and becoming enmeshed in the Marne salient was a sufficient explanation for his later reverse. And he was now to make a further and equally great miscalculation. Foch, whose baton now awaited him at the Marne, was not the soldier to permit his enemy to blunder twice without exacting terrible payment.

For this third offensive, which in advance the German people named the "peace storm"—significant evidence of their fondest hopes—Ludendorff prepared a double thrust, wholly comparable to that delivered in Picardy in March. Then he had struck north and south of the Cambrai salient, planning to pinch it out by his advance. Now he contemplated pinching out the Rheims salient by similar attacks on either side.

Between the Argonne and Rheims, where he conceived the Allied lines were weak because of the concentration in front of Paris, Ludendorff prepared to make his




"THE PEACE STORM"
Arrows show main directions of German attack on July 15th

main thrust. He would throw not less than 52 divisions against the French Fourth Army, commanded by Gouraud. His objective would be the Marne from Épernay eastward to Châlons. This attack would uncover the rear of all the French positions on the heights of the Meuse from Verdun southward to the St. Mihiel salient. But its chief effect would be to open the eastern side of the Mountain of Rheims.

At the same time Ludendorff would attack west of Rheims, on a front between the city and the Marne at Château-Thierry, using 30 divisions, and having for his objectives the passing of the Marne and an advance toward Épernay, south of the Mountain of Rheims, to join hands with the German troops attacking on the other side. Other divisions would push south from the Marne to the Morin at Montmirail.

The operation toward Épernay would insure the elimination of the Rheims salient, and with the disappearance of this, all the difficulties incident to his own situation between Rheims and Soissons in the Marne salient would disappear. The advance to Montmirail would still further expand the circle about Paris, from which he might launch another attack if the French should still consent to a prolongation of the war.

But it will be clear that in this offensive Ludendorff had fixed geographical objectives. His first concern was to clear the whole of the north bank of the Marne from Château-Thierry to Châlons and seize the crossings of the Marne on all this front. Until he had accomplished this he would not regain his freedom of action. He could hope that a success as great as that in Picardy would open all the eastern gateways of France, abolish the Verdun positions, accomplish all that the Verdun offensive of 1916 had failed to do. He could calculate that even a more modest success, like that in Flanders, would give him the north bank of the Marne and abolish the Rheims threat to his rear. Finally, if the Chemin-des-Dames circumstances should be repeated, if the Allied line anywhere collapsed as it had on May 27th—and nowhere was the front to be assailed as strong as the Craonne positions had been—then the battle might be the prelude to supreme victory, the "Peace Storm" for which the German people clamoured.

But there was a danger, a very real danger in the new operation. To attack out of the Marne salient was a wise venture only if the western side of the salient, skirting the Villers-Cotterets Forest, were assured against any thrust coming out of the woods and reaching the roads and railways running along the side of the salient, which were the main lines of communication of the troops to the south, whose mission it was to pass the Marne.

No success south of the Marne and west of the Rheims salient which did not amount to instant and supreme triumph, the obliteration of the salient itself, would be of lasting benefit—of any benefit if an Allied blow cut the lines of communication of the troops making the thrust. In a word, it did not matter how much Ludendorff deepened the Marne pocket, he would still have to get out of it, provided that Foch was able to narrow the entrance into the pocket between the Forest of Villers-Cotterets and the Mountain of Rheims; and to make the salient untenable Foch had but to push a force eastward five or six miles from the Villers-Cotterets Forest.

Such a thrust could be made only if Foch still had an abundance of reserves. And the basis of Ludendorff's whole reckoning was that French and British reserves had been exhausted and that American were not yet ready. He assumed that it was safe to neglect the possible attack from the west, because he calculated Foch had not the troops to make it. This was the fatal miscalculation, he underestimated his enemies' resources, while recognizing the peril incident to any such miscalculation. Here lies the key to the whole military situation.

Also, Ludendorff failed to attach sufficient importance to the events which had just occurred in the Battle of the Matz; he failed to perceive that the Hutier method was in that conflict partially checkmated by a new method of defence, which was sure to be still further elaborated between June 9th and July 15th.

## II. THE TWO BATTLES OF THE MARNE

History was now to repeat itself in an amazing fashion. In the last days of August, 1914, after great preliminary victories, the Germans had

pushed south between Paris and Verdun, and in the first days of September Kluck's army, ignoring Paris, had marched southeast and crossed the Marne from Château-Thierry to Meaux. At the same time the other German armies to the eastward had conformed to this southward push and also driven across the Marne or struck at Bar-le-Duc, seeking to cut off the French troops in what had now become the Verdun salient.

This deflection of Kluck from Paris was one of the historic manœuvres of the whole conflict. It was a logical operation, since the objective of the Germans was the French army, not any single geographical detail, not even Paris itself. The French capital would be the prize of victory, if the French army were defeated, while possession of Paris before the French army was disposed of would be a liability.

But if this march across the front of Paris was logical, it was hazardous in the extreme, unless the Germans could be sure that there was in the fortified area no force capable of making a sortie from the forts. For if any considerable French army should be concealed in Paris and were flung against the flank and rear of Kluck's army, which had adventured south of the Marne, then only rapid retreat could save it; and even if this retreat were skilfully and successfully conducted the whole German campaign would be upset and the retreat of Kluck would draw with it the several armies stretched from Sézanne to Vitry-le-François.

We know that the French did have a force in Paris—that this force, Maunoury's army—collected by Joffre against just such an emergency—did issue from Paris, strike Kluck's flank north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq, and compel that general to rush his corps north, away from the front of the British and of the French Fifth Army, drawing Bülow's army back, too, and producing a dislocation of the whole German front south of the Marne.

Unhappily Maunoury's army had been too weak to push its initial advantage to the limit, and the British had failed to move with the speed which had been hoped for. As a result Kluck not only escaped, but gave Maunoury three terrible days of battle and almost forced him back upon Paris. Still in the end the dislocation produced all along the German front south of the Marne by the Maunoury thrust had opened a




THE TWO MARNE BATTLEFIELDS

The lower black line shows the front of the first Battle of the Marne in September, 1914. The upper that of July, 1918

gap between Bülow and Hausen, a gap which Foch had perceived and exploited. Thus the end had been a German retreat, the failure of the first blow, which was to conquer France in six weeks, and the beginning of the war of positions.

Now in July, 1918, Ludendorff was going to repeat the venture of Kluck in August and September, 1914. He was going to attempt to advance on a wide front, between the French positions covering Paris and those defending Verdun and—the point is capital—he was going to ignore the possible peril of a thrust coming from the Paris position, this time the Forest of Villers-Cotteret, not the immediate environs of the city. He was going to do this because he calculated, just as his predecessor had calculated in 1914, that the enemy was incapable of any offensive thrust.

To be sure, both Ludendorff and Kluck took some pains to cover their exposed flank—Ludendorff more than Kluck; but the important fact is that neither took care enough. Kluck has told us that on the afternoon of September 5, 1914, while he was advancing upon the British and French south of the Marne, he was suddenly informed that his Paris

flank was in deadly peril. An army of which he had no suspicion had struck outward from Paris and the First Battle of the Ourcq, the initial phase of the first Battle of the Marne, had begun.

On July 15, 1918, the German hosts were occupying a front parallel to but north of the battlefield of 1914. They were advancing to and across the Marne, seeking to crush all the French armies between Château-Thierry and the Verdun salient. Their lines were curving southward, and they had again left open, toward Paris and toward the Ourcq, their right flank, which between the Marne and the Aisne was charged with the mission of holding back any thrust, which, coming from the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, would threaten all their communications for the armies between Rheims and Villers-Cotterets if it made any progress, and would totally abolish all hope of success or even of permanent occupation south of the Marne if it could reach the Soissons–Château-Thierry highway, hardly more than six miles from its present front.

All the conditions of the First Marne, even to the Ourcq detail, were then reproduced in what was henceforth to be known as the Second Battle of the Marne.

### III. FOCH'S CONCEPTION

Now, at last, Foch was able to plan, not compelled to improvise. He divined the direction of the next German stroke as early as the middle of June and, divining it, he began to prepare, not merely to parry it, but to meet an offensive by an offensive. He had advised attack before he was called to command at all, before the campaign had opened. He had been developing an offensive on the flank of the Somme salient immediately at the close of the Battle of Picardy, when the Battle of the Lys broke and drew his attention elsewhere.

After the Battle of the Lys he had returned to his Somme offensive and he was getting this in shape when the blow at the Chemin des Dames had fallen. Always he remained convinced that he must wrest the offensive from his opponent or fall under the succession of enemy blows. But until July he had been unable to do more than parry blows

which fell too rapidly to give him time to launch a counter-stroke and were so heavy as to exhaust his scanty reserves.

But in July he saw that Ludendorff must attack in Champagne. To be sure, Haig thought otherwise and continued to send to Foch statements of the reports of his intelligence officers indicating what was a fact, testified to again and again by Ludendorff, that the Crown Prince of Bavaria was busy at preparations for a new blow between the Oise and the Lys. But Petain's reports became clearer and clearer and the military situation convinced Foch that Ludendorff had no choice of fronts this time.

Accordingly, Foch set out to build his battle, his ideas being daily clarified as the indications of German purpose became more and more unmistakable. First of all, since the main German thrust would be between Rheims and the Argonne, it was essential to prepare a perfect answer to the Hutier tactic. This answer, Foch, Petain, and the commander of the French Fourth Army would discover. Then, on the assumption that the German would be held between Rheims and the Argonne, it was necessary to construct a counter-offensive which would overwhelm him in his weakest quarter, namely, between the Aisne and the Marne.

Foch had to insure a successful defence of the Rheims-Argonne front and the Rheims-Marne front; this was the foundation of his battle. But if these two circumstances were assured, then he could view with calm a German push from the bottom of the Marne pocket across the river. The more troops the German risked in the bottom of the pocket the more danger to him if the sides of the pocket were not abolished, if, instead, the neck of the pocket were suddenly narrowed. Only it was necessary that the Germans who passed the Marne should not be able to reach Épernay and thus break down the Rheims salient.

Accordingly Foch, in consultation with Petain and Gouraud, arranged that at the last moment before the Germans attacked between Rheims and the Argonne, the Fourth Army should draw back its main forces from all this front, leaving behind them only a small but resolute garrison to maintain a series of concrete defences and strong points.

Behind this line there would be three or four miles of entirely empty territory, then the mass of the French troops would be organized in fixed defensive positions.

Thus, when the German bombardment opened, it would fall upon little more than a thin façade of French defence. When the advance began it would encounter only the surviving remnant in the first positions, who would by wireless telegraph and by rockets signal the start and the circumstance of the attack and supply all useful information. Meantime the enemy, having broken through this thin outpost line, would enter the empty region and there they would be suddenly assailed by a storm of French artillery fire quite as destructive as that which had been sufficient to smash the troops facing Ludendorff in Picardy, in Flanders, and on the Chemin des Dames. Such infantry as survived this storm would at last arrive on the French fixed positions, which were outside the area of the intense artillery preparation of the German tactic and would thus remain unshaken. As for tanks, of which the Germans were correctly suspected of having a considerable number, they would be disposed of by a series of mines fixed along the routes which they must travel.

This answer to the Hutier method was worked out with exactly the same meticulous regard for detail as the German tactic itself. It was the result of a study which approximated vivisection and had been carried on ceaselessly by the French ever since the first disasters. It included a resource for each circumstance in the Hutier tactic, and, as the event was to prove, disposed of the tactic once and for all.

When the German attack east of Rheims had failed, and always provided that the defence of the front between Rheims and the Marne had been reasonably successful, and it was organized in the same manner, then Foch would be ready to launch his counter-stroke. For this he would concentrate in the Forest of Villers-Cotterets a force capable of delivering a crushing blow. In constituting this force he turned to the Americans for assistance and borrowed for the blow their two finest divisions, the 1st and the 2nd, which at Cantigny and Belleau Wood had proven that they were actually combat troops. To them he

would add a number of French shock divisions, including the famous Moroccans. This force would be commanded by Mangin, who had just come back to favour in the Battle of the Matz, by reason of his successful flank attack, but had proven his offensive value in two attacks at Verdun, which in two days had turned the Germans out of all the important gains made in eight months of battle.

South of Mangin, that is between the Ourcq and the Marne, still another army, that of Degoutte, would attack; and in this army, also, there were American divisions: the 26th, in Belleau Wood, and the 3rd, south of the Marne. A portion of the 4th also served in this army, but not as a unit. For this thrust Foch amassed not less than 21 divisions, reckoning each American division as having the numerical value of two European divisions, which was the case. In addition he reinforced Gouraud both with infantry and artillery and marked other troops for use, if the events justified his expectations.

For the whole operation Foch planned to use British, Italian, and American troops, but only two British divisions were actually employed, because of the standing threat in Flanders. Still, despite the fact that eight American divisions—having the value of sixteen British or French—were employed, together with two Italian and two British, the main force actually engaged between the Argonne and Villers-Cotterets was French. Moreover, the leading was entirely French, because the Allied contingents served under French army commanders.

In the calculation, the blow of the Tenth Army, Mangin's, was to be decisive. Foch hoped for a surprise. The forest of Villers-Cotterets was an admirable cover for a concentration, a cover which proved entirely adequate, and he borrowed the Hutier device of moving his troops up secretly by night. But in addition to surprise, Foch planned to employ a new weapon, the small "whippet" tank, which was fast and offered no such target as the old unwieldy monster. Nearly three hundred and fifty of these had been assembled behind the Tenth Army and more than one hundred and fifty behind Degoutte's Sixth Army.

And for this tank arm a new tactic had been developed. There would be no preliminary artillery preparation whatever, since the

Germans occupied newly taken positions, which they had not been able to organize as they had organized the famous lines of the Somme and the Hindenburg system. But the tanks, backed by a mighty rolling barrage, which would support them all the time, would push suddenly forward, followed by the infantry, which would penetrate the enemy line through the gaps opened by the tanks and rely upon these engines to demolish any strong points and machine-gun nests which did not surrender promptly. Artillery and infantry had been trained to coöperate with the tank. Above all, the light artillery was pushed forward with the machines and thus protected them measurably against such a destruction as certain German batteries of light artillery had achieved at Cambrai.

On the morning of July 14th a lucky raid by Gouraud's troops brought back 127 prisoners, from whom it was learned that the German attack would begin at one o'clock the following morning. Therefore, every step was taken in accordance with plans. The first phase of the Second Marne was now to open. If Ludendorff's plans were successfully carried out, the Germans would reach and pass the Marne from Châlons to Château-Thierry and at the same time still further extend the "encirclement" of Paris, by reaching Montmirail and thus drawing a curve about the French capital from Montmirail to Montdidier.

Ludendorff in his memoirs maintains stoutly that after this thrust, which was merely to improve his situation between Soissons and Rheims, he intended to return to Flanders. He does not talk about any Paris drive, but it is not less clear that had he succeeded as he had planned, Paris would have been necessarily a later objective. Failure in the enterprise between the Argonne and Rheims led him to revert to the Flanders scheme, but collapse between Soissons and Villers-Cotterets quite as promptly recalled him from a future offensive to a present and difficult defensive.

### IV. LUDENDORFF LOSES HIS BATTLE

At one o'clock on the morning of July 16th, three days later than Ludendorff had first planned, the German guns were to open the usual

preliminary bombardment on a sixty-mile front from Château-Thierry to the Argonne. So badly had the secret been kept that even in Paris it was known that the decisive struggle was at hand, and the celebration of the national holiday had been overshadowed by a sense of what was coming. This was the story of Nivelle's misfortune of 1917. Ludendorff was now to pay a penalty as great as Nivelle, and France was to have sweet revenge.

One hour before the German was to open his battle the French guns began their overture. Upon the masses of German troops concentrated in the forward trenches for their leap forward at the "zero" hour there fell suddenly a storm of shell fire which wrought terrible havoc. And as far away as Paris the sky was red with the flame of this bombardment, while the roar of the guns was clearly heard. The most terrific night of the whole war, so all those who lived through it testify.

Still the German adhered to his programme. His bombardment continued for several hours, and then the infantry set out upon its advance. It encountered the line of advanced posts, held by officers and men who had accepted death as an inevitable consequence of their mission, and met the enemy with no other purpose than to delay him as long as possible and make his progress as costly as their time and weapons permitted. And as the German wave reached them they warned their comrades far behind of the phases of the storm under their observation.

Inevitably the wave submerged the slight barrier, although not all the strong points were taken before afternoon, and, having submerged it, entered the vacant space beyond, while the vast masses of infantry, whose mission it was to exploit the success once the Allied lines were passed, swept forward in their turn. The Hutier machine began to function with all its accustomed efficiency.

But almost immediately the German troops came under the storm which, from the opposing artillery, swept the vacant area. Appalling casualties resulted, while the tanks, advancing in their turn, were destroyed by the mines which had been left in their pathway. The gigantic blow had been delivered in space; the enemy had been thrown

off his balance by the very weight of the blow, which, encountering nothing, reacted.

In the afternoon the German infantry actually reached the French fixed positions, in a very few cases penetrated them, but in every instance was promptly expelled. The next day Gouraud's troops were actually able to reoccupy the empty zone, which they had evacuated, at certain useful points, notably on the famous Main de Massiges, which had been the scene of desperate fighting on September 25, 1915, and the succeeding days. Actually a German offensive had been broken on exactly the ground which saw Joffre's first tremendous offensive checked after far more considerable initial success, in 1915.

Ludendorff says that he broke off the battle on this front on the second day, July 16th. He conceals the magnitude of his disaster, although conceding the actual check, by reference to valuable local gains, which were, of course, merely the sacrifices of territory incidental to the application of the French tactic. After this check he starts off to the north to see Crown Prince Rupprecht and launch the long-postponed Flanders operation. But he will soon be recalled to more immediate duties.

This victory of the French Fourth Army of Gouraud, hero of Gallipoli, a famous colonial fighter in the days before the present war, is one of the far-shining episodes of the war. Gouraud, a fragment of a man mutilated by previous wounds, is one of the war's most striking and impressive figures. He will share with Mangin the glory of the final phase of the conflict on the French side and fight beside Pershing on the western flank of the Argonne in September and October. He will retake Sedan at the moment when the curtain of the Armistice falls on the war drama.

The measure of the general and of the man is discoverable in the order of the day issued to his soldiers on July 7th and quoted by Babin in his account of the battle:

TO THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS OF THE FOURTH ARMY:

We may be attacked at any moment. You know that no defensive battle has ever been engaged under more favourable conditions. We are forewarned and on our guard. We have been strongly reinforced in infantry and in artillery.

You will fight on a field which you have transformed by your labour and your

tirelessness into a redoubtable fortress. This fortress will be impregnable if all the entrances are well guarded.

The bombardment will be terrible. You will endure it without weakening. The assault will be heavy, made in a cloud of smoke, of dust and of gas, but your position and your arms are formidable.

In your breasts beat brave and strong hearts belonging to free men.

No one will look backward. No one will retire a single step. Everyone will have just one thought: to kill many of them up to the moment when they shall have had enough.

That is why your general tells you that you will break this assault and that it will be a glorious day.

(Signed) GOURAUD.

The companion piece of the Order of the Day of July 16th—the day of victory—follows:

In the day of July 15th you broke the effort of fifteen German divisions supported by ten others.

In accordance with their orders they were to reach the Marne in the evening. You stopped them exactly where we had decided to fight and win the battle.

You have a right to be proud, gallant infantrymen and machine gunners of the outposts, you who signalled the attack, you aviators who have flown above it, you battalions and batteries who have broken it, you staff officers who have so meticulously prepared the field of battle.

It is a heavy blow for the enemy. It is a glorious day for France.

I count on you to do the same every time that he dares to attack you, and from my heart as a soldier I thank you.

Babin asserts that the Kaiser watched this attack as he had observed the German repulse before Nancy four years before, and this is Babin's account of what the Emperor saw at the moment when the assault began:

While "storm troops" were arriving before the outpost line, all the wheels behind them continued to turn according to the schedule based on the hypothesis of a victorious march. The barrage rolled rhythmically forward far in advance of the waves beating against the dike which resisted them. And the divisions of the second line, perfectly satisfied that those of the first line would carry out their regular advance like the point on a dial, were launched behind them at the appointed hour; then the automobile convoys, supply wagons, horse batteries, all in columns of march. Our artillerymen fired over open sights into that mass—pounded it, ground it without respite—and helter-skelter went the men, the heavy cars, and the horses. No one ever saw more beautiful slaughter. At the source of the Ain, on that little knoll which General Marchand once liked and called "the Place de l' Opéra," seventy bodies were stretched in a confused heap. But it was perhaps in the region of the "mountains"

which we abandoned at night, in conformity with plans of the command, that the carnage was most beautiful of all. One saw "them" appearing over the crests, and where no cover concealed them from view at all, then coming down the slopes, magnificent targets. "We shoot into the heap," said the gunners.

The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, had a share in this achievement, and Babin says:

It had the honour of rivalling its French comrades in courage and daring. Its men went under fire as if to a football game, in shirt sleeves, rolled up over sinewy biceps. In one trench where they worked with our chasseurs one could count sixty bodies in less than 750 feet. Ah! the Germans who have seen them at work can't any longer doubt that they are here, or even as our soldiers say, "quite a bit here."

Another American division, the 2nd, will achieve further glory on this field some weeks hence, even capturing the hill from which the Kaiser saw his machine broken.

This is Gouraud's Battle of Champagne, a famous battle on famous fighting ground. Not far way Attila's hosts were broken. On July 15th, German shells fell in Valmy, also a name that lives. Joffre's greatest offensive, that of September 25, 1915, failed gloriously in that vacant area where Gouraud smashed the Hutier machine.

By July 16th, Foch's first concern was abolished. His defence on the main front of enemy activity had been successful. He could now turn to the consideration of his counter-thrust with relative calm. Still it was necessary that the line between Rheims and the Marne should hold, and here the Germans had been more successful. The French lines between Rheims and the Marne were the creation of a few weeks as contrasted with nearly four years of effort on Gouraud's front. The Hutier tactic, therefore, was more effective, and all through July 16th the Germans made some progress west of the Mountain of Rheims, just as on July 15th they had made even more material gains.

But Foch can now reinforce this front from Gouraud's army, which has won its battle with little expense in men and is now secure from all German attack. By July 17th, Foch's mind is at rest on this second point also. The Mountain of Rheims will be held until he has had time to launch his own blow, and this blow will recall the Germans from all

sides of the Marne salient. The two important elements in his defensive have now been accounted for.

South of the Marne, to be sure, the Germans have made material progress. Checked in front of the Americans, the 3rd Division facing Château-Thierry, they have penetrated beyond the Marne Hills, east of the little Surmelin stream. What would under certain circumstances be even serious is the fact that the Germans, having won across the Marne, are now advancing upon Épernay, astride the Marne, and are rather less than seven miles from the town. If they can reach it, then they will, after all, reduce the Rheims salient. To this limited objective, the German grandiose conception has already been reduced.

But Foch is bringing up a new army, to reinforce that of Berthelot, and De Mitry who led the French troops in Flanders, three months before, will soon assume all responsibility for the Germans south of the Marne. Foch is able now, also, to reassure Haig. The German effort in the south forbids any major enemy effort in the north for a considerable time, and the same is true as to the front between the Oise and the Somme. The enemy is pinned down now to the Marne sector. Foch can dispose of his own reserves as he chooses.

Wherefore, on July 17th Mangin is warned that he will be expected to attack the next morning. Degoutte is similarly advised. The two American divisions which are to share in the honour of delivering what will be the decisive stroke not merely of the battle but of the war, the 1st and 2nd, are put in motion; the last of the American troops will arrive for the battle only by double-quicking for the last miles. And tanks, artillery, shock troops, all, arrive without German discovery.

A hurried and somewhat confused operation, this attack on the Soissons corner necessarily is. Foreseen by Foch weeks in advance, it had always to wait upon victory by Gouraud, a successful defence of the Mountain of Rheims by Berthelot. General Summerall, commander of the 1st Division, who presently will have grim and bitter memories of this confusion, will continue to marvel at the success issuing from chaos.

Ludendorff will marvel also. He will have much to say about high corn covering the field of fire, of German carelessness and lack of en-

trenchments. He declares that he warned his subordinates, that they had expected attack, but had looked for it a week earlier and dismissed it when it failed to conform to the German time table. But the French say that the Germans withdrew several batteries on the eve of the attack, which hardly suggests expectation of an offensive; and when it came, the noise of the final preparation silenced by a terrific thunder shower, the German army revealed the first authentic sign of crumbling. Ludendorff says:

> Our infantry had not stood firm at all points, and in particular the division southwest of Soissons, that had been considered so reliable, had given way. The gap rapidly widened, especially toward Soissons.

In the next few days the German strategic situation was to Ludendorff's mind "critical"; and a new attack on Rheims "seemed hopeless."

### V. FOCH BEGINS HIS CAMPAIGN

On the morning of July 18th Foch, like Joffre on the morning of the First Marne, was outnumbered by the enemy in front of him between Paris and Verdun. He was not so heavily outnumbered as he had been some weeks before. Eight American divisions were at his hands and would be used in the fight—200,000 fresh troops of unmistakable combat value, of peculiar value in the present form of attack. More than this, 1,000,000 Americans were in France and more were now arriving at the rate of 300,000 a month. He could afford to use his own and the British troops without stint because he was building up a reserve which would become available when necessary. And before large numbers of the Americans were available for combat they were sufficiently good to take over the line in quiet sectors and release French and British divisions.

Thus on July 18th Allied conditions were far different from what they had been on March 21st, on April 9th, or even on May 27th. Before the month was out Foch would have the advantage of numbers. But he had now the even greater advantage provided by his foes' mistakes and his own success in finding an answer to the Hutier tactic. His enemy was in a fatally defective position. A huge army, which was

only making unimportant progress south of the Marne, had presented him with an open flank between the Marne and the Aisne and particularly between the Aisne and the Ourcq. If he could push Mangin forward six miles at the Soissons corner of the Marne pocket, he would cut the highways, command the railroad, which alone maintained the vast host to the southward. Ludendorff would have to quit the Marne pocket altogether.

At the time the world talked glibly about a German Sedan; it expected to see all the vast host involved in the pocket enveloped and captured. Joffre's strategy had inspired the same hope in the First Marne. But in neither case was this possible, because in both instances the Germans possessed sufficient numbers to postpone envelopment until they were able to extricate their imperilled masses to the southward.

Foch was not playing for a Sedan; this was still a matter for the future. But he was now taking full advantage of his own labours as far back as the Chemin-des-Dames time. He had promptly foreseen the value of the Soissons corner, Petain had recognized it even sooner. Together both had reinforced De Maud'huy, who had just barely held on long enough to permit the Forest of Villers-Cotterets to be retained. Thus in the last days of May the victory of July 18th was made possible.

And between four and five o'clock on the morning of July 18th, France and America, the picked troops of both nations, after a brief but cyclonic artillery blast, step out between the Ourcq and the Aisne. The surprise is complete. Before noon the American 1st Division is well established on the open plateau within three miles of Soissons. These troops would have advanced farther had not the French between them and the Aisne been held up in the difficult Missy-aux-Bois ravine. But Missy-aux-Bois they hold; south of them the French Moroccans have been equally successful; southward again the 2nd Division has done marvels, it has reached Vierzy and approached the Soissons-Château-Thierry highroad, while Allied artillery is bombarding the railway line east of Soissons, which is the single rail artery feeding the whole salient. The Americans alone have taken 4,000 prisoners.




THE SOISSONS "CORNER"

Black line shows the front on July 18th between the Aisne and the Marne. Mangin's attack in which the Americans participated was between the Ourcq and the Aisne. Our 1st Division took Berzy-le-Sec and our 2nd went beyond Vierzy.

Before this first rush the German defence collapsed. Ludendorff in his memoirs complains bitterly of the failure. To him it is inexplicable—as inexplicable as the collapse of the French and British on the Chemin-des-Dames Ridge was to Foch less than two months before. Boehn's troops have been as completely overrun as were Gough's in March. A French commentator compares the effect produced upon the Germans by the tank attack to that produced upon the Romans by the first appearance of Hannibal's elephants. In any event, to their check—to the repulse in Champagne—there is now added actual defeat between the Aisne and the Marne.

Following Mangin's attack, Degoutte launches his between the Marne and the Ourcq. Here the surprise is less complete, the advance

less rapid; still the whole German line retires, and French and American troops—portions of the 4th Division and the entire Yankee 26th (which, with the 42nd, participant in Gouraud's army east of Rheims, will be the first Guard troops to take part in a major engagement)—begin to go forward. The whole western side of the Marne pocket is swaying and Ludendorff's Soissons corner is cracking.

On July 19th Foch attacks all around the sides of the pocket from Rheims to the Soissons corner. The armies of Berthelot, De Mitry, Degoutte, and Mangin are all engaged. At the east, on the Rheims corner, he tries to repeat his success at the Soissons corner. There he undertakes to extend his gains, to clear the whole plateau above Soissons and across the tiny Crise brook which enters the Aisne at Soissons itself. In a word, from both sides he is trying to narrow the exit of the pocket still farther, while occupying all the host still encompassed in it.

But in this latter phase he will be less successful. Ludendorff has heard the news and is hastening back to his headquarters, sending all available troops to the scene of the disaster at once. His first concern will be to hold back the enemy at the Rheims and Soissons corners. He will have to quit the Marne pocket; he realizes this at once; his vital railway is under enemy artillery fire. But in order to get his vast accumulation of men, guns, and material out, he will have to keep the exit as wide as possible and instantly check all further attacks about Soissons and about Rheims.

Still on July 19th, and even on July 20th, Mangin's troops get forward. They reach the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway and even pass it. The American 1st Division takes Berzy-le-Sec, magnificently, before its work is completed, and Berzy-le-Sec commands the Crise Valley as well as the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway. But thenceforward the gains will be inconsiderable; the Germans will hold open their pocket while they evacuate it.

And in this retreat the Germans will show the same skill which they revealed in the First Marne. Once the sides, the corners of the pocket, are assured, they will conduct an orderly retreat—first from the south bank of the Marne, then behind the Ourcq, finally behind the Vesle,

losing relatively few prisoners, surprisingly few guns. Four American divisions—the 3rd, the 28th, the 32nd, and the 42nd—will share gloriously in the pursuit in addition to the 4th, 26th, 1st, and 2nd, which have participated in the opening phases.

By July 21st, however, the strategic consequences of the manœuvre on the Soissons corner are fully foreshadowed. Ludendorff will get his beaten armies back behind the Vesle in good order, although he will have to call upon the armies in the north for reserves and thus use up the resources accumulated against a Flanders offensive. To himself he concedes that the offensive has been lost (Foch will call the next tune), but on the whole his armies, save for the momentary collapse at the Soissons corner on the morning of July 18th, have done well. Nothing suggests that he will be unable to maintain a successful defensive.

The latter phases of the Marne fighting are of little more than calendar importance. The Germans recross the Marne on July 20th. The next day Ludendorff clears Château-Thierry; he will empty the Château-Thierry angle of the pocket first, maintaining his hold on the other Marne corner to the last possible moment. But by August 1st he is back behind the Ourcq, in a position which he can hold for some time—will hold, in bloody and long-continued fighting with American divisions. Nevertheless, the pressure at the Soissons corner continues; is presently redoubled by a new Mangin thrust, to which Soissons falls on August 2nd. Between the Ourcq and the Vesle the enemy again quickens his pace. He destroys his ammunition, burns material, and pillages and burns villages. By August 4th he is behind the Vesle and the Aisne; the Marne pocket is emptied. If he still holds the ground between the Aisne and the Vesle, taken on May 27th, it has no further offensive value; the defeat on the Chemin des Dames has been liquidated.

In prisoners the German lost more than 35,000; in guns, above 700. The French recovered more than 200 villages and towns, including Soissons and Château-Thierry, and reopened the Paris-Nancy railway. Ludendorff had to throw in a large portion of the reserves left to him and marked for a Flanders offensive; he was, therefore, at the end of his offensive possibilities. He must now accept the defensive rôle,

which had been accepted by the Allies at the outset of the campaign and for four months thereafter imposed upon Foch. His "peace storm" had been as unsuccessful as the parade to Paris in 1914. "You will be French, as a result of to-day," an Alsatian soldier reports that his German comrades said to him on July 18th. The German army recognized that the war had been lost. The German public was not less quick to grasp the meaning. As for the Austrian, the Bulgarian, the Turk—they were likewise informed.

On the Allied side the appreciation of the meaning of the Second Marne was not less general. On August 6th Foch became a marshal of France; Petain received the Military Medal; Pershing, the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. Paris could celebrate a second deliverance after a peril even graver than that of 1914, for German artillery had expanded its range, and in 1918 Paris was already under bombardment and might expect ruin if the Germans were able to approach much nearer.

### VI. THE CONSEQUENCES

Like the First Battle of the Marne, the Second was one of the few decisive conflicts in human history. Only the Battle of the Dunajec, which destroyed the Russian Empire and opened the pathway to incalculable developments, can be reckoned beside the two Marne struggles in the World War. But the Second Marne, quite as much as the First, was not a Waterloo or a Sedan; it was, like Joffre's triumph four years earlier, a battle of arrest. The enemy had been checked and turned back; he had not been crushed or submitted to anything more than a local defeat, which did not deprive him of resources sufficient to restore the situation.

The actual parallel for the Second Marne is Napoleon's defeat at Leipsic. The struggle of 1918, like that of 1813, was also a Battle of the Nations. French, British, American, and Italian troops had shared in the struggle, although, of the total, 80 per cent. were French. Leipsic achieved the deliverance of Germany; it led directly to the ruin of Napoleon, since he failed to make peace after defeat and before his army was gravely shaken.

But it is in the moral consequences of the Second Marne that one is most reminded of Leipsic. Ludendorff's defeat on the Marne was the most considerable German defeat in the west since September, 1914, and it was Ludendorff's first reverse. It was clear, even on the morrow of the conflict, that the German soldier had met his master. Amidst all the confusion incident to civilian estimates of military affairs, the fact was inescapable that Ludendorff had been outgeneralled.

Nor was the stroke of Foch a matter of happy improvisation. He had begun to prepare for the victory in the hour of defeat at the Chemin des Dames when he had instantly recognized that Rheims and the Soissons corner must be held; and Petain had shared his clarity of vision, had indeed taken the first steps to achieve that end. After the battle had ended Foch recognized that Ludendorff was involved and must direct his next blow on the Marne front. Accordingly, he had begun in June to prepare his answer, to organize the Mangin stroke, the fame of which filled the world just four weeks later. Joffre had been equally clairvoyant in August, 1914, after the early disasters and during the great retreat, when he had created Maunoury's army, which on September 5th opened the First Marne.

But having won the First Marne, Joffre was less lucky in the matter of reserves than was Foch four years later. His army had been terribly exhausted by its early defeats and its superhuman efforts at the Marne. His effort to turn the Germans out of France by his operation between the Oise and the Somme was transformed into a desperate defensive, after the "race to the sea," by the rush of German reserve formations to Flanders. Therefore Joffre was unable to exploit his success.

Foch was going to be more fortunate. The British army, which had finished the Battle of the Lys in unmistakably bad shape, had thereafter been resting and refitting from May to August. It was now fresh, strong, eager to wipe out the bitter memories of Picardy and Flanders. Therefore, having gained the initiative at the Marne, Foch would be able to employ it at the Somme. The next blow would be his to deliver, his would be the right to choose the time, the place, and the character of the next operation. It would be for Ludendorff to conform to Foch's ac-

tions, as had Foch been compelled from March to July to conform to those of the German.

By contrast, Ludendorff had failed to accomplish the task set for him. It had been beyond his skill, or beyond the strength of the German armies under his command, to defeat the British and the French before the American masses had arrived and become the decisive factor in the contest. Decisive because they enabled Foch first to avoid defeat, then to take the offensive, and thereafter to expend British and French troops without concern for the diminishing man-power of both because all deficits would be made good by the American numbers which were pouring over the seas and would continue to pour for many weeks. He could count on a larger American army for the campaign of 1919 than Ludendorff could hope to engage in the same campaign.

Moreover, success had brought him freedom from the last restraint coming from soldiers or civilians among the Allied governments and armies. His prestige, enhanced in April and early May, had been for a moment shaken at the Chemin des Dames, but the victory of the Second Marne had reëstablished it. He was now to fight with hands as free as those of Ludendorff had been in March and April. Unity of command, exercised by a man now accepted as a supreme soldier, was becoming one of the chief assets of the Allied armies—won through disaster, but won beyond gainsaying.

The military events of the four months which separate the launching of Ludendorff's blow in Picardy from the delivery of Foch's counter-stroke between the Aisne and the Marne remain an open book for all future historians; but who, save those who actually lived through the terrible period, can ever appreciate the agonies, the fears, and the disappointed hopes of those months? Who can quite appreciate in the abstract the horror of the western nations as they saw one German victory after another, perceived Ludendorff's lines inexorably draw nearer and nearer to Paris and to Calais, beheld one Allied defence system after another collapse in a fashion and with a swiftness which suggested that at last the Germans had found the all-sufficing secret of victory?

Who also will forget the sound of the bells of victory, which rang from sea to sea, from Paris to Melbourne, and in America were heard from the Atlantic to the Pacific, when the glad message arrived that, after four months of defeat, there had been an authentic victory, and the defeated German hosts were once more turning their backs to Paris? And for Americans there came with joy the consciousness that the worst humiliation, become acute in recent months—the danger that America would arrive too late—had been escaped. At the critical hour and at the decisive point American troops had fought, shared in the charge that won the day—by the mere force of their numbers made that charge possible by the magnificence of their courage helped to make it irresistible.

Since that far-off hour when the watch announced midnight and the taking of Cornwallis, a whole country had known no such joy and pride as—north and south, east and west—were evoked by reports of the events of July 18th and the following days. The fall of Richmond had been at most a sectional success; the recapture of the Marne salient was, in its American phase, the achievement of soldiers of a united nation, in which North and South were alike honourably represented.

But considerable as was the American contribution, the real effort and the great glory were French. Destiny had willed that the fate of civilization should a second time be decided at the Marne; and, a second time, French military genius and the devotion of French soldiers had been responsible for the issue of the struggle.

# CHAPTER SIX

## AMERICA FROM CANTIGNY TO ST. MIHIEL

### I

### THE FIRST DIVISIONS

The moment has now arrived when it is possible to interrupt the narration of the larger events in the campaign, and examine America's contribution in the period that extends from the opening attack of March 21st to the final retirement of Ludendorff behind the Vesle where he made good his positions for the time being on August 6th. As we shall see, the American part in the war divides itself simply into three periods: that between March and August when we fought under French command at Cantigny and between the Aisne and the Marne; that between August 6th and September 15th when Pershing organized the American First Army and led it to battle at St. Mihiel; and, finally, that period between St. Mihiel and the Armistice occupied by the campaign in the Meuse-Argonne.

Between April and August American troops fought exclusively under the direction of French commanders, generally in divisional units, but not infrequently regiments were intercalated between French units. This first period is the period of testing. The achievement of the 1st Division at Cantigny and of the 2nd at Belleau Wood demonstrated the value of American troops as combat elements. As a consequence of this demonstration, Foch built his counter-offensive of July 18th upon the foundation of American contribution. Had the 1st or the 2nd failed at Cantigny or Belleau Wood this counter-offensive could not have been risked. What eight American divisions did in this counter-offensive led directly to the creation of the American First Army. The triumph of that army at St. Mihiel satisfied Foch that the war could be won in 1918 and persuaded him to undertake the assault on the Hindenburg Line which led directly to the German surrender.




AMERICA'S FIRST BATTLEFIELD

Upper arrow indicates Cantigny, where the 1st Division fought. The lower arrow indicates Belleau Wood, where the 2nd fought. The 3rd Division went into action first just across the river from Château-Thierry.

When the campaign opened, Allied strategy was comprehended in the purpose to hold the Germans in 1918 and, employing American masses in 1919, win the war. The first German successes in March and April drove the British and French governments to make an almost despairing appeal to President Wilson to rush untrained American troops to France to fill the gaps in Allied ranks created by enormous losses in Picardy and Flanders. The divisions thus hurriedly dispatched to Europe did not arrive in time to contribute materially to checking the German assault although two which arrived in May were actually engaged in detachments on July 15th. By contrast, seven of the eight divisions which were in France before the end of March played a conspicuous part in the Second Battle of the Marne, and the eighth, serving

as a replacement division, made good the losses in the other seven. To put the thing simply, the American troops who were in France when Ludendorff began his great offensive lent Foch just the necessary weight to turn the tide after the British and French armies had halted the flood. But it was the great mass of American troops arriving after May 1st which enabled Foch to take the offensive on a gigantic scale and get a decision in 1918.

The first American troops to reach France arrived in May and June, 1917. They consisted of the small contingent which followed Pershing, and were sent at the urgent request of Marshal Joffre and Mr. Balfour who visited America after the failure of the French offensive of April, 1917, and convinced the President that the moral effect of even a small American contingent would be very great. Substantially all of the 1st Division was in Europe by June, and on Bastille Day American troops took part in the parade of the Allies, which marked the French national holiday. Exactly a year later, the 1st Division, with other American divisions which had arrived subsequently, was preparing for the first considerable American action—that known to the French as the Second Battle of the Marne but described in American official documents as the Aisne-Marne.

It was not until August, 1917, that the 2nd Division followed the 1st. September saw the arrival of the 26th, the "Yankee" Division; November brought the 42nd, the "Rainbow"; in December came the 41st, which would serve only as a replacement unit; February brings the 32nd, Michigan and Wisconsin troops; March sees the arrival of the 3rd and 5th, both Regular divisions. This is the situation when the campaign opens: eight American divisions are in France, seven fighting units and one replacement division. In April, the time of great stress in Flanders, the 77th, the "Liberty" Division, is the only addition. Eight active divisions have arrived by May 1st. Two more, arriving in May —the 4th Regular and the 28th, the "Iron" Division, Pennsylvania guardsmen—will by the very gravity of the crisis in July be drawn into the firing line.

When on March 28th Pershing placed all his scanty resources at

# AMERICA'S SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO VICTORY



*U. S. Official Photo*

WITH THE ENGINEERS IN BORDEAUX



*U. S. Official Photo*

THE LARGEST POWDER MILL IN FRANCE

Docks are shown in the foreground

*U. S. Official Photo*

"NEW WORLD WORK ON OLD WORLD SOIL"

American Army Transport Service at Bassens Docks, Bordeaux

MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT SEARCHLIGHTS
In operation at Washington Barracks, Washington, D. C.

*U. S. Official Photo*

*U. S. Official Photo*

CONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN FLYERS' ASSEMBLY PLANT

*U. S. Official Photo*

PLANES FOR AMERICAN FLYERS

Assembly Plant at Romorantin, France

*U. S. Official Photo*

GETTING READY TO FLY

Men of the 96th Aero Squadron testing a Lewis machine gun before putting it on a plane

*U. S. Official Photo*

IN A YANKEE AIRDROME IN FRANCE

The Lewis gun shown in this picture is adjustable to any angle, vertical or horizontal, that may be required to get a bead upon Boche airmen

ASSEMBLING RAILWAY GUNS IN FRANCE

*U. S. Official Photo*

The men are lifting into place one of the big 14-inch guns which later wrought so much havoc in the German trenches




*U. S. Official Photo*

ALL AMERICAN!

This 14-inch railway gun is ready to go into the shop to be disassembled and shipped back to the United States

*U. S. Official Photo*

READY TO FIRE

This picture shows the Browning automatic rifle which was used by the infantry. It weighs 15½ pounds

*U. S. Official Photo*

BATTLE PRACTICE

These machine gunners are not in France, but in the woods near Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Their rifles fire 400 shots a minute

Foch's disposition they actually amounted to two regular divisions: the 1st and 2nd, whose training was practically complete, and two Guard divisions, the 26th and the 42nd, which were capable of entering the line in a quiet sector; four American divisions having the value numerically of eight French or German. In April, in the Toul sector, the 26th would engage in the first considerable American skirmish at Seicheprey, a ruined village in the Woëvre Plain which will see American troops starting out for the first American victory in Europe in the following September. This first skirmish is a score for the Germans but a credit to the fighting spirit of the Yankees.

In April, Foch calls upon Pershing for the 1st Division. It will go into action on the ridge north of Montdidier covering the Paris-Calais railway, along the dike where Foch dammed the German flood a few weeks before. This is a post of honour, a position which must be held at all costs, but the 1st Division, Bullard commanding, will do more than hold. It goes into line on April 25th; four weeks later it will leave its trenches and take Cantigny, a swift and splendid achievement, America's real baptism of fire and the first milestone for Pershing's army. This is on May 26th, one day before the Chemin-des-Dames disaster, and France after the disaster will find solace in the promise of Cantigny. Foch, observing the 1st Division at Cantigny, will dare to entrust the 2nd with an even more considerable responsibility at Belleau Wood five days later. Even the 3rd, which has never yet had even its practice period in the trenches, will be rushed to Château-Thierry—Ludendorff compelling—at the same hour.

As for the 26th and the 42nd, the former in this April crisis relieved the 1st in the Toul sector, freeing it for the Cantigny task; the 42nd relieved two French divisions in the Vosges, whither the 32nd will go to free other French divisions, while the 77th and the 28th will settle behind the British, potential reserves if Ludendorff should attack again in the north. Thither will go many more divisions in the next months aiding Haig mightily in his task of refitting and rebuilding his army.

Cantigny was a slight but promising experiment; a far severer test was now to come.

## II. BELLEAU AND CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

On Decoration Day, May 30th, the 2nd Division was in billets south of Beauvais and under orders to proceed to the Somme area and take over a portion of the front adjoining the 1st Division. This is the fourth day of the German offensive on the Chemin des Dames and the Germans already have reached the Marne. Later in the day the orders are changed and the 2nd is ordered to the Marne area by way of Meaux—infantry to march, artillery to follow by rail.

The line of march will cross the battlefield of the First Marne. As the troops approach the Ourcq they encounter the lamentable tide of refugees, the hundreds and even thousands of women and children fleeing before the invader. They also meet the débris of the French divisions retiring after defeat—the stragglers and the fugitives, for most of the survivors of the disaster are still fighting. The Americans, officers and men, have the impression of those who saw the similar exodus from Verdun in the first hours of the attack of 1916 and of others who witnessed the flight from the Somme area after the British lines collapsed in March, 1918. The roads are jammed, there is a confusion of orders. Harbord, commanding the Marines, will halt his troops along the highway, he will sleep in May-en-Multien, a place frequently mentioned in the days of the First Marne.

In June, the Marine brigade will reach Montreuil-aux-Lions on the Paris-Metz road, a dozen miles west of Château-Thierry. One infantry regiment, the 23rd, will be detached to stop a gap in the French line farther north; the other is on its way. Bundy commands the division, Harbord the Marines; the latter will get the division as a result of the present operation. The expectation is that the men will rest from their forced marches, but at one o'clock in the afternoon General Degoutte, commanding the French corps in this region, sends an urgent appeal for help and the 6th Marines presently move out and take a position astride the Paris-Metz highway and near Clarembaut Woods. The village of Vaux is just under the forward slope, before them, but no American soldier will get there until July. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion will

be in action on this day; will do good service; but the French are still in line ahead and Harbord is in reserve.

In the following days the whole division gets up and into position—the Marines north of the road, the infantry regiments south. The French retire upon the Americans and then through them, withdrawn from the sector on June 4th, on which day the 2nd Division faces the Germans. Their line extends northward from the national highway and then bends westward; it encircles the little village of Lucy-le-Bocage, henceforth the centre of the American sector.

Stretching before the larger portion of the American front is the Bois de Belleau, a considerable area of dense woods, which extends from the little brook just east of Lucy-le-Bocage northward to the highway coming east from Torcy and forking just outside of the village of Belleau. Beyond the fork one branch climbs the hills east of Belleau Wood and continues to Château-Thierry, the other turns south and runs along the eastern edge of the woods through the village of Bouresches and joins the Paris-Metz highway at Vaux. These two roads fairly outline the extreme of American advance in the following days; from Lucy-le-Bocage to Bouresches is less than two miles by the road which follows the brook on the southern edge of the forest. The first Marines to fall are buried where this road crosses the brook a thousand yards east of Lucy.

The Belleau Wood area constitutes a tangle of hills and undergrowth which the 26th, the New England Division, will find reminiscent of their home country, when at last they take over this sector from the 2nd. The western slope, facing the Marines, is gradual, the first portion open, compelling the assailants to move under direct observation and thus to suffer heavy losses. The highest point of the wood is in the northeast corner, looking over the ruined village of Belleau and the cross roads, and crowned by a little stone tower.

For machine-gun cover no more satisfactory circumstances could be imagined, and in among the ledges and rocks the Germans will dig many curious and clever protecting "fox holes," but they will have no real trench system. From the hills to the eastward, hills dominating

the whole surrounding country, they will be supported presently by heavy artillery. Belleau Wood is actually an advanced position, useful as a cover if the offensive is to be resumed, but accepted by the Germans as the natural limit to their advance begun on May 27th and now ending as a consequence of the exhaustion of the troops and the difficulties of getting up supplies, guns, and munitions.

But the Marines do not accept it as the limit of their own front, and on June 6th, at daylight, that is on the second day of their exclusive occupation of this front, they attack. Their objective is the whole of Belleau Wood and their front and that of the French troops north and west of them is outlined by the road coming from Torcy and forking at Belleau, together with the branch which goes south to Bouresches.

The attack is by no means a complete success. The village of Bouresches is taken and the southwest corner of the woods is penetrated. Thereafter it becomes a matter of hacking one's way through the forest. The losses are heavy, the gains restricted but continuous, while the Germans are compelled to reinforce their troops. The contest has no more than local importance; there is no larger strategic purpose served by the capture of the whole area; but since American soldiers are engaged in their second offensive, it is a matter of pride for the Germans to check it.

But check it they cannot. On June 25th, three weeks after they relieved the French, the 2nd Division, with the Marine Brigade assigned to the task, has the whole of the forest, while a few days later the 9th Infantry takes Vaux, after a very brilliant little affair, marked by splendid artillery preparation superintended by a former resident of Vaux, who knew both the surface and the subsurface of the village. Before the middle of July the 2nd Division can surrender its front to the New England troops. It has done its work well; it has advanced on its whole front; it has confirmed the impression created by the 1st Division at Cantigny, after a far ruder test. At least two American divisions may be reckoned as shock troops; even the Germans, in a captured comment, concede this. And it would be a mistake to overlook the part of the 9th and 23rd Infantry. The glory has gone to the Marines, but the infantry did its equal share.

For this achievement the 2nd Division paid heavily. Forty-eight officers and 1,176 men were killed, 196 officers and 4,879 men were wounded, 17 officers and 1,528 men missing. The total casualties were 285 officers and 7,585 men, 7,860 of all ranks, materially more than the traditional 25 per cent. loss, which was reckoned the maximum to be demanded of any unit before it must be withdrawn. And it was withdrawn on July 10th, only to be thrown into another battle, where it would suffer further heavy losses. In revenge the 2nd took 1,654 prisoners and 24 guns and it advanced several miles along its whole front. Belleau Wood, a skirmish in the World War, was for the United States the biggest battle since Appomattox and the most considerable engagement American troops had ever had with a foreign enemy. Not in the Revolution, the Mexican War, or the Spanish conflict had as many soldiers participated in a single engagement.

It remains to mention the service of the 3rd Division. It had been occupying an area south of the Marne and had not yet been subjected to its test of trench-training when, on May 29th, it was warned to move north to the Marne. Its 7th Machine Gun Battalion, which was motorized, arrived opposite Château-Thierry at the moment the Marines went into line on the Paris-Metz highway. But at Château-Thierry the emergency was greater, and in the following hours the detachment of the 3rd Division contributed, probably decisively, to checking the German rush at the river, holding the south bank while the French infantry retired. It was a splendid service.

In the next days the infantry arrived; certain elements were used to aid the French in their unsuccessful effort to hold Hill 204, north of the river, and then the 3rd went into line south of the river facing Château-Thierry, extending as far east as the mouth of the little Surmelin stream, which comes down from the south. On this new front they would presently be heard from and they would have a rôle in both phases of the Second Marne.

Still the glory of the June fighting rests with the 2nd Division. To claim for it that it saved Paris seems extravagant, despite the fact that its sector lay across the Paris-Metz highway, for almost as it went

into line the German advance had reached its inevitable term, because the effort to break the Soissons corner had failed. Its real achievement was its offensive, the taking of Belleau Wood, still surrounded a year later by a circle of military cemeteries, testifying to the cost of the victory.

The following is the tribute contained in a German bulletin:

> The Second Division must be reckoned a very good one and may even, perhaps, be counted as a storm unit. The different attacks on Belleau Wood were carried out with bravery and dash. The moral effect of our gunfire cannot seriously impede the advance of the American infantry. The American nerves are not yet worn out. They lack only training to become formidable adversaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naïve assurance. The words of a prisoner are characteristic—"WE KILL OR GET KILLED."

From the enemy this is the highest praise conceivable.

### III. AISNE-MARNE

The fighting from July 15th to August 6th—the Second Battle of the Marne for the French and British, the Aisne-Marne in American official reports—saw engaged eight American divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Regular and the 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd Guard divisions. The 1st and 2nd fought as a corps under the command of Bullard, but actually as units of Mangin's army. In the first phase during the German attack, the 3rd with a fraction of the 28th was engaged south of the Marne; the 42nd, in Gouraud's army east of Rheims. On July 18th, the 1st and 2nd attacked with Mangin's army south of Soissons, the 26th with Degoutte's army north of Château-Thierry. After the German retreat began the 26th, 3rd, 32nd, and 42nd figured conspicuously in the pursuit; the 28th was in action for two glorious days on the Ourcq; and the 4th rendered brilliant service between the Ourcq and the Vesle. At the close of the battle, the 77th relieved the 4th and the 28th, the 32nd at the Vesle, and the 3rd reappeared briefly at Fismes.

The service of the 1st and 2nd at the Soissons corner was an essential circumstance in the great battle which has already been described. It is one of the finest pages in American military history as it

was a decisive factor in the battle itself. Other divisions won deserved glory afterward, but the achievement of the 1st and 2nd remains preëminent both because of the actual deeds done and because as pioneer units they established the value of the American army in France. Every man who fought in these two divisions from April 25th to July 20th realized that America was on trial, and more than all else, this explains the devotion and the fortitude disclosed at Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the Soissons corner.

Briefly, now, we may review the services of the other six divisions in the Aisne-Marne engagement. In Château-Thierry the services of the machine gunners of the 3rd, on the last days of the Ludendorff drive, will never be forgotten. Sweeping the bridge over the Marne—facing the quay, on which the statue of La Fontaine, the fabulist, native of Château-Thierry, looked out placidly upon the scene of destruction—they covered the French retreat, held on when the Germans mounted a machine gun in the clock face of a tower commanding the main street—Avenue du Maréchal Petain, *now*—and poured down upon them a stream of lead. "One of the finest feats in the whole war," Babin says at the time.

Even more distinguished was the performance on July 15th, when the Germans crossed the Marne east of Château-Thierry and, in the bend of the Surmelin, assailed the 38th Regiment on front and flank. But even thus assailed, the men of the 3rd held on, fought back, broke the attack, and resumed their original front—not a German left south of the Marne in their area, save for 600 prisoners. Of this deed of the 38th, Pershing, chary of praise, wrote:

> On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals.

Of the militia divisions, the 26th, attacking on July 18th, stormed the villages of Torcy and Belleau, swept the heights, crowned by Gonetrie Farm, from which German artillery had pounded the Marines in Belleau Wood. Halted a moment by the check administered to the French on their left, they resumed the advance, pressed through Epieds, reached the Bois de Châtelet, in whose thickets the




THE RETREAT TO THE VESLE

Dotted line shows the Marne salient on July 18th. Solid black indicates the German lines in the last days of July

Germans had hidden another *Grosse Bertha* almost ready to open on Paris.

Even more fortunate were the 32nd and the 42nd, the latter brought round from Gouraud's front. At the crossing of the Ourcq, about the villages of Seringes, Sergy, and Cierges, they crossed bayonets with Prussian and Bavarian Guard troops, militia against élite, literally crossed bayonets. One village was taken and retaken nine times. But the National Guard broke the Prussian Guard and pushed on. This region is dotted with American graveyards, testifying to the bitterness of the battle. And the 4th, relieving the 42nd, pushed the pursuit through the forests of the Nesles and Dôle, actually forced the passage of the Vesle at Bazoches, where many of their comrades sleep on the field of achievement.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

*By C. R. W. Nevinson*

This phase is significant, too, as the time of the testing of the second line, the militia. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, were Regulars; one might expect much of them, but their numbers were scanty. First, before the grand march began, one must know of the new troops, the civilian-soldiers, what they could do. The answer was had at the passage of the Ourcq, also a memorable day in American history.

This July fighting, moreover, removes the last argument urged by Foch and Petain against the creation of an American army. A review of that long debate would be sterile now. In the beginning all Allied commanders felt the emergency too great for an experiment. Pershing was not convinced but yielded to the logic of events. Our men served under French officers in the time when the task was to check and turn the flood, but by the close of the Aisne-Marne the German check had become absolute. The time had come for the British army to pass to the offensive and Pershing would have time to organize an army. Moreover, the prize for which he had long contended had been won for Pershing by his soldiers; the second milestone was passed.

More American soldiers had fought in the Aisne-Marne battle than in any previous army in the history of the United States. Rather more than 175,000 were engaged, a number in excess of the armies of Lee and Meade combined at Gettysburg; and the losses, approximately 45,000, were about those of Lee and Meade together in the great struggle of fifty-five years before. In the battle American divisions captured 9,000 prisoners and 138 guns.

The heaviest loss was that of the 1st Division, 7,870, while it also led in the number of prisoners taken, 3,500. The losses of the 2nd amounted to 3,792 for twenty-four hours of action, but it took 3,000 prisoners and 75 guns against 63 for the 1st. Between June 1st when it went into action at Belleau Wood and July 19th when it went out of action at Vierzy, the 2nd Division had suffered casualties amounting to 12,000, just short of 50 per cent., but it had taken 4,700 German prisoners and nearly a hundred guns. The 3rd between June 1st and July 30th lost 7,966 and captured 8 officers and 1,112 men. The 4th between July 17th and August 12th had total casualties amounting to

6,154. Thus between April and the first days of August, four Regular divisions with a nominal strength of 108,000 had suffered a loss of 36,000, a full third.

Of the militia divisions the 26th had lost 5,300; the 32nd, 4,770; and the 42nd, between July 25th and August 4th, 5,500. Serving with Mangin's army between August 28th and September 3rd, the 32nd would take Juvigny and 1,000 prisoners with a loss of 3,819. These were all very severe losses for militia units still in the training stage. By the close of the Aisne-Marne operation Pershing's army had suffered considerably more than 50,000 casualties, but it had taken more than 10,000 prisoners and more than 150 guns.

Meantime, American divisions had begun to flow to Europe in impressive numbers. Before May 1st, nine had come in all; in May, nine more arrived; in June, seven; in July, four; in August, six; in September, four; in October, three. Such is the amazing record. By the end of October, 42 divisions had arrived, 33 of them between April and November. This represented, roughly speaking, a total of 1,200,000 men, and 29 of the 42 divisions got into action. These 29 had a numerical strength equal to that of the 58 divisions under Haig's command when the Battle of Picardy opened. On Armistice Day, Pershing commanded more troops than Haig and held a longer stretch of line.

With August the scene shifted to Chaumont, American General Headquarters henceforth, as Montreuil was the British and Chantilly had been the French. The greatest experiment in military history was now to be undertaken, an American army was to be organized on a European scale and would fight its first battle five weeks after the close of the Aisne-Marne operation.

One day before Ludendorff attacked in Champagne on July 14th, in the very heart of what was then the Marne salient, Quentin Roosevelt, flying over the enemy lines, seeking information of the coming attack, was brought down to his death near the little village of Chamery. His grave is upon a gentle eminence, overlooking the road by which the Wisconsin and Michigan troops, having taken Cierges, would come charging up a few weeks later. A country which had known the

soldier as a boy, when his father was President, and his youthful pranks had nationwide currency, was moved by this willing sacrifice, and turned a sympathetic glance toward the great American whose day was already drawing to a close, but whose spirit was flaming forth in France wherever American soldiers fought.

One further circumstance. When our troops went into action at Cantigny, Europe—friend and foe alike—waited with the phrase, "too proud too fight" still fixed in mind. The German had said we would not come; he had proclaimed that we would not fight. The men of the first eight divisions knew this: and, knowing, answered what was at once an insult and a challenge.

The fact that the Battle of St. Mihiel was fought under an American commander and by an almost exclusively American army has contributed to divert attention from the Aisne-Marne operation, but the truth is that the Aisne-Marne was an infinitely severer conflict. American casualties of 45,000 in it, as contrasted with 7,000 in the St. Mihiel attack, supply an accurate standard of measurement. Moreover, in July the situation was still far from that of September, and whatever estimate America places upon its three major engagements, there is little reason to doubt that our European associates will continue to regard the Aisne-Marne effort as not only the most hopeful to the common cause but in many ways the most remarkable American performance. And however men may debate the particular sector in which the war was won—and British, French, and American critics may be pardoned their differences on this score—it is not less clear, beyond all debate, that the war was lost in the Marne salient—lost in the early morning hours of July 18th. By contrast the events in the St. Mihiel salient were no more than a "side show," and the far more significant drama between the Meuse and the Argonne only a circumstance in the exploitation of the victory obtained between the Aisne and the Marne.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

# FOCH MANŒUVRES

## I

## THE NEW STRATEGY

Between July 18th, when he regained the initiative, and November 11th, when the enemy surrendered on his terms, Foch sought three definite ends. In the fighting between the Marne and the Vesle he undertook to exact from Ludendorff the highest possible price for the German commander's miscalculations and subsequent defeat. He knew that Ludendorff still possessed sufficient reserves to cover his retirement from the Marne salient. But he also recognized that by compelling Ludendorff to employ these reserves in getting out of the Marne mess he would abolish all chance of a German offensive in Flanders and also draw away from the British front, where he meant to strike next, Ludendorff's reserves still available there.

Despite popular belief at the moment, Foch did not expect or strive for a grandiose Sedan between Rheims and Soissons. What he did aim at and accomplish was the consumption of German reserves, and he spared his own troops largely, contenting himself with brief strokes at propitious moments. In a measure he left it to American troops to get their training while shepherding Ludendorff out of the Aisne-Marne area.

Foch's second operation was the logical extension of the first. He undertook to drive the Germans out of all the country west of the Hindenburg Line which they had occupied as a consequence of their March victory and compel them to retire behind the Hindenburg system. But the underlying purpose was so to punish the Germans between their August front and that from which they had emerged on March 21st—so to use up their reserves—that they would be unable to hold these formidable positions when they had reëntered them. Foch's reasoning was

that the strength of the Hindenburg Line would amount to the strength of the men holding it. His conclusion was that if the morale of the men had been smashed in the fighting between Montdidier and St. Quentin the Hindenburg Line could not be held by the enemy. If, in addition, their reserves were consumed in the struggle to defend it, the victory was assured.

In Foch's third step, his final purpose was, patently, to reap the harvest prepared by the preceding efforts. Somewhere along the road which the German had now entered, the moment would arrive when, his reserves exhausted, Ludendorff would be helpless to resist the final attack. The coming of the hour would wait upon the exhaustion of the reserves. General Buat, a distinguished lieutenant of Foch and later Chief of Staff of the French army, in commenting upon the memoirs of Ludendorff has supplied a lucid and brilliant exposition of the French strategy which won the war, an exposition contained in the examination of the Ludendorff method and the causes of its failure. Thus, the General writes, in the last weeks of 1919, when every reason for secrecy has disappeared:

> Ludendorff launched heavy attacks upon the French front, but his attempts were only made successively and at intervals so widely separated that the effects of the first no longer influenced the course of the second. That is to say: French divisions that were engaged in repelling the first attempt were capable, after rest and replacement, of resisting the second. This is glaring weakness of Ludendorff's method. Ludendorff himself says: "We have not been able, either in the east or the west, once during the whole war, to carry any great break through to its logical conclusion."
>
> Now the principle which dominates and explains all the successful and futile efforts, throughout the war—and, as a consequence, cannot too frequently be emphasized—is that no single attack, however powerful, could lead to anything decisive on the western front. The reason is that the railroads and highways are so numerous in France as to make it absolutely impossible to prevent Allied reserves, accumulated behind the front, from arriving and damming the flood wherever the enemy penetrated our lines.
>
> The obstacle to decisive victory in France did not lie in the difficulty of achieving a break through on an organized front. That was always possible. The trouble was in exploiting that break through. Having smashed down the door, it was necessary to get well into the house. And this explains why, whenever a decision was sought, the dangerous adversary was not the man in the trenches, but the army which would come at top speed to stop the attack at a greater or less distance from the trenches that had been taken.

In other words, the first step was necessarily the annihilation or dispersal of the enemy reserves and the real break through could only come afterward. And to annihilate, disperse, exhaust the enemy reserves there was but one method; namely, to make partial attacks at many points and at short intervals, finishing by piling them one on top of the other, and, by thus compelling the enemy to keep up replacements and reinforcements, continually, suck in all his available resources.

These attacks of usury—or, better, this process of absorption of the enemy reserves—could not lead to a lack of man-power. Aside from other considerations, man is a commodity in which neither combatant is likely to be much richer than the other; hence the objective sought must be to produce a shortage of material. Economy of infantry, prodigality of artillery and other engines of war, prodigality without limit; such ought to be the characteristics of these preliminary operations.

One consequence follows logically. With little infantry one cannot get very far. Therefore, without fixing in advance the absolute limits to these attacks—for it is never wise to leave out the element of luck—one should proceed systematically, one jump after another, under the protection of artillery, keeping the enemy under constant threat.

When, as a consequence of a number of operations of this sort, all the enemy reserves have been absorbed on the front, then, only then, the hour for the break through has arrived. Then, with absolute certainty a final attack, greater than all previous attacks and designed to produce a larger breach, can be launched, provided with the maximum of material, better equipped than before with divisions, organized in depth. And nothing will check the exploitation of this break through, since nothing, or next to nothing, is left to the enemy with which to dam the flood. Then no expectation can be unwarranted.

In other words, it is putting the cart before the horse, before you have exhausted or absorbed the enemy's reserves. Once Ludendorff put us in just the hole I have described. It was in the beginning of June, 1918, on the single occasion when two German attacks came so close together that, to meet them, we were reduced to a condition in which we had no reserve divisions left. If the Germans had been able, at that moment, to make an attack anywhere on our front, no man can say what might have happened.

Exactly in the same fashion, at the beginning of November, 1918, we had successfully absorbed all of the German divisions and brought Ludendorff to the edge of that precipice over which our attack of November 14th would have tumbled him.

It is not difficult to believe that Ludendorff didn't understand this style of warfare. Perhaps he couldn't employ it because it requires an enormous equipment of artillery, airplanes, tanks, and munitions, which he did not possess. But it is less easy to understand why he should have believed that we were incapable of using it in our turn. It is harder to understand, for at this time the German front was marked by a series of salients which literally begged to be attacked.

To meet this attack, Buat insists—to parry this sort of offensive—Ludendorff's sole resource was to find new divisions. But there was only one way to find the divisions, and this was: to shorten his front.

The French general recognizes that such a retreat as was thus forecast was a hard thing to order; still, Ludendorff had ordered it in 1917, at the time of the Hindenburg Retreat, and in any event it was only French territory that was to be surrendered. "When your life is in danger, you can't afford to reject any proper means of surviving," he observes. Then he continues:

> Ludendorff should have ordered such a retreat before July 15th. Closing his eyes to the real situation, he chose to repeat the experiments of March 21st and May 27th, which had turned out badly in the end. Now there are some experiments one cannot repeat in the face of an enemy even a little observant, and thus forewarned, and get off scot-free. Therefore Ludendorff's new assault not only failed of itself, but revealed the utter failure of the German method of headlong attack. His "Peace Storm" collapsed miserably on our Champagne Plains.
>
> Then, the smallest vision of the future ought to have driven Ludendorff to order a retreat to a shorter line without a moment's delay. He could still have saved himself, at least for a time. But in his proud obstinacy he could not bring himself to do it; and in this was his ruin. Gripped on all his fronts by our attacks, he saw his reserves disappear like snow before the sun. Thenceforth we had him.

Thus, the real meaning of the operations from August 8th to the middle of September must be sought, not on the map, not in the record of ground gained, but in the capture of men and guns and in the reports of how the Germans fought. Foch's objective is the German machine; he will undertake to smash it. If he succeeds, lines and forts are nothing.

On the morning of August 6th, when the retirement to the Vesle terminates, the German army is still a formidable machine. It has suffered a sharp reverse, but nothing like Allied defeats in Picardy and in Champagne. After initial defeat the retreat has been conducted in brilliant fashion, will remain a marvel of efficiency in military annals henceforth, and the Germans still hold vast areas of recently conquered territory. Their purpose now is to maintain a successful defensive until winter terminates the campaign and gives diplomacy a chance. If the German army holds out before or behind the Hindenburg Line, German diplomats will have much Allied territory to barter with, and after the strain of a campaign like that of 1918 Allied publics and Allied statesmen are hardly likely to stand out for extravagant terms. Germany cannot expect now such a peace as she hoped for in March, but the

future is not yet dark provided the German army and the German people hold out.

Ludendorff in his comments frequently talks of breaking the Allied will for war; Foch must now break the German will for war. He will not succeed if, in his forthcoming offensives, he gains restricted areas at terrific costs; another Somme, a second campaign like that of Flanders in the previous year, will be more likely to exhaust Allied endurance than German. Foch has the offensive; he must attack, but his attacks must show swift and indubitable successes or the war may end in a draw.

In solving his problem we shall see that Foch from the outset follows a totally different course from that of Ludendorff. The German sought to achieve his end by a series of brutal and terrific blows, so heavy that between each there had to be a period of rest for the assailant quite as much as for the assailed, and in the respite the vanquished regained his strength. Foch will give his enemy no respite, his blows will be short and sharp. No unit will be exhausted before it is withdrawn, no rest will be allowed the enemy. The moment one sector on the front has been shaken the next will be attacked. The dislocation will extend in all directions, the strain upon enemy reserves will be incessant. German High Command will be confused by the rain of blows, but nothing will be attempted beyond the possibilities of the situation.

The intellectual character of Foch's strategy will be disclosed in the nicety with which he calculates and the care which he manifests in avoiding the immediate pursuit of too remote an end. He is steadily striving to reduce the German reserves to that condition in which a general attack without limit can succeed, but he is far too wise to risk the blow before the preparation is complete.

In a word; if Foch is to break the Hindenburg Line in October —if he is to reduce it to impotence in early November—he must wear the German army out in August and September. What takes place between the Avre and the Scheldt will determine the future of the Hindenburg Line.

Thus, in viewing the battles of the next months between the Scarpe and the Oise, it is a mistake to lay too much stress upon the confused and

bewildering phases, to attach supreme significance to the capture of this or that town. The operations, too enormous to be followed exactly, are comprehensible only when they are regarded as details in a general scheme, in a manœuvre directed at the reserves rather than the strategic centres of the enemy. At Waterloo, Napoleon fought all day to reduce Wellington's army to a condition in which it would be helpless to resist the Old Guard when at last he put it in, but, failing to accomplish this end, he saw the Guard broken by the still-unshaken British and recognized his defeat. Foch will be more fortunate, since he will be able to complete his preparation before he makes his final attack. His misfortune will be that the enemy will surrender before the final blow falls, but the surrender itself will tell the full story.

## II. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

From the moment when he had been called to command on March 26th, Foch's mind had always been concentrated upon an offensive from the Amiens front which had become a corner of the Somme salient wholly comparable with the Soissons corner of the later Marne salient. He was preparing for it in April when Ludendorff struck in Flanders, he was still considering it when the offensive on the Chemin des Dames called his attention to the new danger point. At last, with the victory at the Marne achieved, he would be able to carry out his purpose.

This purpose was to throw Haig's Fourth Army, commanded by Rawlinson and in position astride the Somme, against the German line where it was weakest, both by reason of the nature of the country and because of the insufficiency of German defences hurriedly constructed since April. On this plateau a little to the eastward Fayolle had made his sweeping advance to the Somme in the opening day of the battle of 1916, and there was admirable opportunity for employing tanks. An advance of ten or a dozen miles here would be almost as fatal to German communications in the Somme salient as an advance of half that distance had been in the Marne salient, and any considerable advance would compel the Germans to empty the bottom of the Somme pocket as they had been compelled to evacuate the Château-Thierry salient.

In the new operation Rawlinson's army would play the part of Mangin's in July. South of Rawlinson, about Montdidier, Debeney's French army under Haig's command would imitate the rôle of Degoutte's between the Ourcq and the Marne, while Humbert's French army would follow the example of De Mitry's, clearing the Lassigny Heights as De Mitry had cleared the banks of the Marne.




"PICKING LUDENDORFF'S POCKETS"

Solid black shows ground gained by the Germans between March 21st and July 18th. Diagonal white lines indicate ground regained by Foch in his blows at the Marne and the Somme.

Finally, Mangin's army between the Aisne and the Oise, that is at the other corner of the salient, would have something of the mission of Berthelot's army on the Mountain of Rheims. But at the Somme, as in the Marne operation, the decisive thrust would be at the northwest corner. Ludendorff's failure at the Somme, like that at the Marne,

had involved him in an awkward situation, if Foch should gain the initiative. And Foch, having the initiative, was now going to collect the damages. Speaking colloquially, he was now going to "pick the Somme pocket" as he had already "picked" the Marne "pocket." The strategy would be the same, the earlier stages of the operation identical. But later he would expand the Somme operation.

Rawlinson, who commands the Fourth Army, is one of the "old men" of the war. He commanded the "immortal" 7th Division, which was almost exterminated in heroic action in the First Battle of Ypres. He had led the Fourth Army in all the terrible days of the First Somme. Returning to his old field of battle, he would now achieve far greater laurels—would, with the valuable assistance of two splendid American divisions, break the Hindenburg Line at the strongest point a few weeks hence. He commanded, in the present battle, thirteen British infantry divisions, three cavalry, and a regiment from the American 33rd Division, which would do valiant service at Chipilly Ridge, north of the Somme, before the battle terminated. In front of Rawlinson were twenty German divisions, but nothing to compare with the defence system he faced on July 1st, two years before. German soldiers had lost their enthusiasm for trench digging, and this was a relatively new front.

In the period between April 29th, when Ludendorff made his last desperate assault in Flanders, and August 8th, when Rawlinson attacked, the British armies had enjoyed a period of profound quiet. They had been reinforced from the east; their losses in men and material had been made good; and Haig had put his troops through an intensive training, aided in this by the presence of American divisions, which acted as a potential reserve. The British army of August was a totally different thing from that of March or April; it had a new spirit and it had a score to settle. Canadian and Australian divisions were among the shock troops—brought up, Hutier fashion, at the last moment.

Of the completeness of the surprise of the Germans at Amiens there is abundant testimony. The British had prepared a feint to the north, and Maurice mentions an amusing detail—proof of the way the secret

was kept—that King Albert, hearing that a "big show" was coming off in Flanders, near his own front, indignantly demanded why he had not been informed. But as to the nature of the surprise, Ludendorff is the all-sufficient witness. And in the surprise, tanks, as at the Marne, are to prove a potent factor, the chief factor—now and henceforth to the end—in Allied tactics, infantry and artillery learning closer coördination with them in each trial. The disappointment of Cambrai will prove fruitful after all, since there the tank was "discovered."

Quiet as has been the British sector, however, Rawlinson on July 4th had treated the Australians to a "full-dress rehearsal" of a tank attack, whereby the village of Hamel, between Villers-Bretonneux and the Somme, was taken in shining fashion—a promise of what was to come on August 8th—and in the first days of the month Ludendorff began to draw back both in the Somme and the Flanders salients, and quit the west bank of the Ancre, evidently suspecting attack in this region—suspecting it correctly and there making adequate preparations. Rawlinson will make little progress north of the Somme on August 8th.

Ludendorff reports that he had expected the attack; regrouped the armies between Amiens and Noyon—the Second, Eighteenth, and Ninth; placed them under the command of Boehn, a specialist in retreats, the man who had extricated the beaten troops from the Marne pocket in such brilliant fashion. Boehn had not yet taken command. Ludendorff had hoped to turn over to him a well-established line. Foch would prevent this.

August 8th was a foggy morning. Nature would give to Haig the same advantage she had bestowed upon Ludendorff in March. At daylight 2,000 British guns opened on the German front and, as on July 18th, the infantry following the tanks went into action with the guns. This time the German line collapsed far more quickly than had the British Fifth Army on March 21st. Before noon the British had advanced south of the Somme to Framerville; they had captured not only thousands of prisoners but whole staffs. Buchan relates that the Canadian cavalry captured a railroad train on the line near Chaulnes. There was a total and almost instantaneous collapse south of the Somme. The vic-

tory was not only complete but cheap. One Canadian division in the thick of the battle counted only a hundred casualties.

This date, August 8th, was in Ludendorff's account:

The black day of the German army in the history of this war. This was the worst experience that I had to go through. Six or seven divisions that were quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely broken.

And of the moral effect he says:

We had to resign ourselves now to the prospect of a continuation of the enemy's offensive. Their success had been too easily gained. Their wireless was jubilant, and announced—and with truth—that the morale of the German army was no longer what it had been.

Ludendorff investigates the disaster and finds things he had not believed possible in a German army. He learns that whole bodies of his men had surrendered to single troopers or isolated squadrons. He hears of retreating troops who hailed fresh divisions going into battle with the epithet: "Blacklegs!" and the allegation: "You are prolonging the war."

In short, Ludendorff admits it, the Battle of Amiens brought him to the conclusion that the war must be ended. It opened his eyes, and he discovered later that it opened those of Foch. He even tendered his resignation to the Kaiser, who declined it but would accept it some weeks later. From the dilemma in which he was now involved Ludendorff had no hope of finding a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to his own advantage. Even in passing, one cannot help contrasting the mood of Ludendorff now with that of Foch after Picardy, after Flanders, after the Chemin des Dames. The German commander complains of the decline of morale in his army but in his comment he discloses the collapse of his own morale.

To return to the battle: the army of Debeney attacks along the Avre an hour after Rawlinson begins astride the Somme. His gains are smaller, but the next day Humbert's troops are at work on the Lassigny Plateau. On August 10th the German troops in Montdidier surrender. By August 12th Rawlinson's troops have been checked before the old Somme defences held by the enemy before July 1, 1916. Debe-

ney's army is close to Roye; Humbert's army has partially cleared the Lassigny Hills. The German has lost the use of the Roye-Chaulnes railway line; the British have captured 22,000 prisoners and more than 400 guns; Debeney has taken 8,000 more Germans. By a single blow 30,000 prisoners have been captured, Amiens has been unblocked, the Paris-Calais railway has been reopened.

But these are minor details. Foch has disclosed the crumbling morale of the German army. For the first time in the war on the western front the German soldier, and by the thousand, has refused to fight. Perhaps, after all, even the Hindenburg Line will not avail to halt the victor.

After the Battle of Amiens, Ludendorff advised his government to make peace. To the present writer Marshal Foch once remarked that after this day Ludendorff's single resource was an immediate retreat, a far-swinging retreat like that of March, 1917. "Had he done that," said the Marshal, "he would have made me a great deal of trouble. But when he chose instead to go back little by little"—and the Marshal waved his hand back and forth rapidly—"I had him."

Ludendorff had now to subordinate strategic to political considerations. Napoleon did the same in 1813 with equally fatal results. Napoleon was dominated by his anxiety to preserve his German allies; Ludendorff, as he indicates, was equally controlled by his apprehensions as to the effect—in Vienna, in Sofia, in Constantinople—of German defeats and retreats. As early as August 9th Vienna telephoned to know the truth. Ludendorff thinks the Battle of Amiens finished Bulgaria.

The British and French armies north of the Oise were checked by August 16th. The enemy had reacted strongly; further attacks meant additional casualties out of proportion to the profit. Accordingly, Foch now pushes Mangin into action between the Oise and the Aisne on August 18th, and in the next three days Mangin makes a quick advance and takes 8,000 prisoners and 200 guns. August 20th, date of Mangin's greatest progress, is another "black day" for Ludendorff. Thus the whole German front from the Somme to the Aisne has been dislocated, but all the armies engaged on the Allied side have made their advances at small cost—have captured 40,000 prisoners and more than

700 guns, and are still ready for action in a few days. This is a beautiful illustration of the Foch method, of the use of a series of short, quick blows to produce a large result without so exhausting the assailant as to compel him to give his adversary a respite. Now Foch is ready to expand the front, extend the dislocation, and deliver still another swift and painful blow.

Meantime, August 13th and 14th, while Boehn is painfully stopping the gaps between the Somme and the Oise, Ludendorff sees the German Chancellor summoned posthaste to Spa, and tells him that "it is no longer possible by an offensive to force the enemy to sue for peace. Defence alone can hardly achieve the object, and so the determination of the war will have to be brought about by diplomacy." This on August 14th, not quite a month since the stroke at the Soissons corner, the fifth day of Foch's offensive campaign! It is three months, almost exactly, before the Armistice, but even now the enemy concedes that he cannot win. Foch's campaign is directed to prove that Ludendorff must lose. Four years ago, on the day and hour of this Spa Conference, Liége was falling—memorable anniversary.

### III. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME

The next phase of Foch's manœuvre will cover all the battlefield of the First Somme. It will even expand to the southern half of the battlefield of Arras. Foch is going to expand the area of dislocation. The Germans have taken root on their old Somme positions between the Somme and the Oise. Foch will turn them out of this position by a flank thrust from the north. First, Byng's army—the part of it north of the bend of the Ancre in the region where Haig's troops were so badly punished between Serre and Gommecourt on July 1, 1916—will advance toward Bapaume and the high ground about it. Two years before, Haig had struck upward over the famous ridge from Albert, and could not get from Ovillers to Bapaume in six months. Byng will get there shortly. When Bapaume has fallen the Germans between the Somme and the Oise will be in danger; if Byng gets beyond Bapaume they will have to retire.

But the operation is still more forward-looking. On March 21st, Ludendorff's advance north of the Somme was to have been his principal effort, the ground being favourable. Now, with the fall of the old Somme line, he will try to stand behind the Somme from Péronne to Ham, and thence to the Oise behind the Crozat Canal—the barrier that Gough could not maintain in March. North of Péronne he will try to hold the line of the Tortille brook, but if Byng passes the Tortille he will turn the Somme line and Ludendorff will find no other way-station west of the Hindenburg Line.

August 21st, just as Mangin's thrust between the Oise and the Aisne is slowing down, Byng steps out, advances until he reaches the Arras-Albert railroad at Moyenneville—a moderate gain made by severe fighting, but it releases the left flank of Rawlinson's army which the next day takes Albert—and occupies between the Ancre and the Somme substantially the line of July 1, 1916. August 23rd, Byng's troops do better and cross the Arras-Bapaume highway. August 24th, Rawlinson and Byng both move straight across the old Somme battlefield. Byng closes in on Bapaume; Rawlinson takes all of the famous ridge where Haig fought from July to September, and, south of the river, commences to push in on the old Somme line. The pressure at the north begins to alarm Boehn, who retires from Lassigny on the 21st and clears Roye, on Debeney's front, on the 27th. Two days later Byng is in Bapaume and Rawlinson retakes Combles, a name memorable from the Somme days.

August 31st the Australians make a sudden dash forward and take Mont St. Quentin looking down on Péronne. The next day they take Péronne. Ludendorff will not be able to halt on the Péronne-Ham line. One of the finest exploits of the war was this taking of Mont St. Quentin, and on this same day, September 1st, Byng and Rawlinson emerge at the eastern side of the old Somme battlefield. They have covered in twelve days the distance which it took Haig from July to March to traverse in the First Somme operation.

But already there has been a new extension of front. On August 26th, Horne's First Army, last in action at the Battle of the Lys in April,

thrusts forward on either side of the Scarpe eastward of Arras, recovers all the ground taken in April and May, 1917, and surrendered in the face of Ludendorff's attack in March of the current year, and begins to approach the famous Drocourt-Quéant "switch" line, before which Ludendorff rallied his troops after the first terrible days of April, 1917.

By September 1st, the date when the Australians made their brilliant dash, Foch could make his first report. Between July 15th and September 1st his armies had taken 128,302 prisoners, 2,069 guns, 3,783 machine guns. September 1st is Australia's day; September 2nd is Canada's. On this day Horne's right wing, two Canadian divisions ahead, go straight through the Drocourt-Quéant line,




BACK TO THE HINDENBURG LINE

Solid black shows what was left of the Ludendorff gains in the first week of September. Diagonal lines indicate territory regained by the Allies between July 18th and September 2nd.

one of the most astonishing achievements of the campaign. Here at last the British have to do, not with the hastily constructed lines of recent weeks, but with a solid system established and worked over several years. Foch, analyzing this incident, will begin to perceive that the Hindenburg Line may be broken after all. This feat of Horne's Canadians is an authentic sign for the future. It has been clear for days that the Germans could no longer fight in the open nor long hold improvised defences. The Australians at Mont St. Quentin showed that the Germans could no longer defend positions naturally strong, and the Canadians at Drocourt demonstrate that they cannot retain fixed works. Foch's manœuvre is bearing fruit; Horne's operation alone nets 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns. By the end of the first week in September, Ludendorff is drawing in to the Hindenburg Line. At the same time he quits the Vesle and the Lys, the 77th Division will pursue from the Vesle to the Aisne, the 27th will reoccupy Kemmel—two New York divisions for whom far greater distinction is at hand. September 10th, Ludendorff is substantially in the position from which he launched his great attack of March 21st, but the army which has returned to its fortress is something far different from the host which emerged in the springtime. In a single month it has lost 100,000 prisoners, been defeated in ten battles surpassing Gravelotte in magnitude. Its reserves are failing, the ceaseless and terrible strain has done its work, the dislocation of the German front has extended from Rheims to Ypres. Before he closes his manœuvre, his preparation for the final battle, Foch will make one more thrust. September 12th America's First Army will begin at St. Mihiel. Foch's decision as to an attack upon the Hindenburg Line will be made when Pershing's troops have passed their final test.

Meantime, the whole of Foch's strategy lies crystal clear in even the most summary examination of the events between July 15th and September 14th. In this time he has checked a victorious German army, first halted it, then turned it back, and swept it rearward with ever-increasing speed. He has produced in two months the moral and the

military effect that Ludendorff failed to produce in four. He will do nothing new in his final battle. The breaking of the Hindenburg Line is only the logical extension of the method of July 18th and the following days. The manœuvre between the Avre and the Hindenburg Line is no more than a development and a perfection of the method of the Marne salient.

Looking backward to the Marne we see on July 18th, first the attack of Mangin which upsets all the enemy's calculations and imposes upon him the necessity of retreat. The same day Degoutte attacks between the Ourcq and the Marne, then De Mitry below the Marne, while Berthelot is pushing west from the Mountain of Rheims. From July 18th to August 6th blow after blow, until the "pocket" is empty and Ludendorff has saved his divisions but strained his reserves.

The Marne operation is over August 6th. August 8th Rawlinson attacks, Debeney the same day, Humbert the next. All three exploit their successes until the 16th. Two days later Mangin strikes between the Oise and the Aisne. His blow is finished August 21st, and on the same day Byng attacks. The next day Rawlinson resumes while Humbert is active again. August 26th, Debeney strikes once more and Horne comes into action for the first time. September 1st, the Australians take Mont St. Quentin, the credit going to Rawlinson's army. The next day Horne's Canadians take Drocourt. Meantime, between the Oise and the Somme, Humbert, Debeney, Rawlinson, are crowding the Germans, now retiring in haste because of the menace to the north, and Mangin is at work again between the Aisne and the Oise. September 10th, the Somme salient is liquidated. Two days later Pershing is thrown in at St. Mihiel, carrying a new threat after a swift success.

It is by such a summary of events that Foch's strategy is best appreciated, that the strain upon the German army and command, and above all on German reserves, is most clearly set forth.

With the method must go the mind to comprehend exactly the enemy situation. Moltke was defeated at the Marne in 1914 and Ludendorff in 1918 because both of them misunderstood the extent of their success in the fighting which preceded the decisive engagement; both

calculated that the enemy was already incapable of reacting, yet each time their enemy struck back powerfully and unexpectedly. The greatest quality in Foch was his correct appraisal of his opponent's condition. In the last days of September his campaign would have been completely wrecked if he had suffered a check, but he had succeeded where Moltke and Ludendorff had failed, and his foe would fall beneath his stroke.

"Victory," said Marshal Foch at the end of November, 1918—and Requin who quotes this phase adds that Foch was very fond of the comparison—"Victory is the inclined plane down which the ball rolls, very slowly at first, then faster and faster until there is no stopping it." September 13th, when he faced the Hindenburg Line, he recognized that the stopping point had been passed.

The narrative of Ludendorff is the most amazing single document in this period. His lines are broken, his divisions refuse to fight, panic seizes his soldiers when tanks appear, his allies fall away, his own nerve crumbles; the German machine, his machine, breaks down utterly, and he is to the end unconscious of the explanation. He berates the civil authorities, the German people; he scolds everybody and everything; but the fact that his army is disintegrating under attacks which he cannot foresee, forestall, or parry—that his own impotence is at last appreciated by the German soldier and the German public alike—that the failure is at the top, he never suspects. Beaten; he ascribes defeat, not to the general or the strategy which overwhelms him, but to the shortcomings of statesmen and civilians. He believes that the German army is invincible, and when it is beaten, he does not accept the fact. In exactly the same way when he believed the French army was destroyed, beaten beyond possible reaction, he followed his conviction to the disaster at the Marne. Reading Ludendorff, one perceives why in the end Foch must win. "The man is all of one sort," says Buat, "a monolith."

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## ST. MIHIEL

### I

### AMERICA'S FIRST ARMY

In the vast manœuvre between the German front of August 8th and the Hindenburg Line, the Battle of St. Mihiel is the final circumstance. Between August 22nd and September 9th, Maurice reports that the British, in driving the enemy back over the ground taken in the Battle of Picardy, had captured 53,000 prisoners and 470 guns. The French to the south had captured not less than 50,000 prisoners while the struggle between the Aisne and the Marne in July had resulted in the capture of 35,000 Germans. From September 9th to September 26th British and French armies between the Aisne and the Scarpe were driving the Germans from their last advanced positions into the Hindenburg Line itself.

Americans will find in this phase and in the next an admirable parallel in the campaign of 1864 in the Civil War. The relation of Haig, Petain, and Pershing to Foch accurately reproduces that of Sherman, Meade, and Thomas to Grant. Moreover, Americans should find an accurate estimate of the value of unified, as contrasted with divided, command by comparing the experiences of the Northern armies before 1864 with the subsequent progress of events when Grant came east and coördinated the operations of the several great armies for the first time in the war, and began a sustained attack upon the Confederacy. Between May, 1864, and the opening of the brief campaign of the following year, Grant had prepared his victory as Foch was now preparing his.

In the final phases of the war Pershing's relation to Foch was thus the relation of Sherman or of Thomas to Grant, and just as Sherman operated in the rear of the main forces of the Confederacy, Pershing was

now to strike toward the rear and communications of the Germans. Had Foch's plans been completely executed, Ludendorff would have been caught between Haig and Pershing as Lee and Johnston were substantially encircled by the armies of Meade and Sherman in April, 1865. The geographical details of the two campaigns are very different, but the main circumstances are the same, and the strategy of Foch, like that of Grant, had always as its main objective the destruction of the hostile armies rather than any more limited geographical end. We shall see, too, why the armies of Haig and Pershing, like those of Meade and of Sherman, will each be convinced that its was the "knockout" blow.

The constitution of the American First Army was finally resolved upon while the Second Battle of the Marne was still in progress, although Pershing reports that an agreement in principle had been reached as early as May 19th when he conferred with Petain over the sector to be assigned to the new army; but the disaster of the Chemin des Dames postponed the realization of Pershing's dream. The desperate state of Allied fortunes from June 1st to July 18th compelled Pershing to assent to the dispersal of his division amongst French armies, first to check and then to turn back the German hordes.

The Second Marne being won, however, it was plain that the Germans had lost the initiative, and on July 24th, at a conference of all the Allied commanders, held at Foch's headquarters at Bombom, the decision was reached to continue the Allied offensive "emphatically determined," says Pershing, and the first American operation was planned against the St. Mihiel salient. Scattered American divisions were now to be concentrated and the organization of the American First Army under Pershing's personal command was fixed for August 10th.

But as late as August 30th Pershing had to fight for his army. On that day Foch came to the headquarters of the new American army at Ligny-en-Barrois, De Langle de Cary's headquarters in the First Marne, and urged a new dispersal of American divisions among Allied armies as a detail in his scheme for a general Allied offensive. This offensive will be the final stroke at the Hindenburg Line. September 2nd there is a

new conference at Foch's headquarters, with Petain and Pershing both present. After further discussion Pershing's contention is established, henceforth there will be no further debate over the existence of an American army. But now it is agreed that the American army shall make only a limited offensive at St. Mihiel and then transfer its activities to the Meuse-Argonne. Foch's conception of a general offensive from Ypres to Verdun is rapidly taking form. Here already is the skeleton of the plan for the grand concentric attack to open on September 26th.

One detail of this conference worth remembering is noted by Pershing, who says that not even on this day was there any suggestion from any one present that the war could be successfully terminated in the current year. But what Horne was accomplishing on this very day at Drocourt, what Pershing himself would do ten days later, would convince Foch that the hour had arrived. The same conviction came to Grant in the first hours of the campaign of 1865 when Sheridan's success at Five Forks at last disclosed the internal crumbling of Lee's army.

## II. THE HISTORY OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

The history of the St. Mihiel salient is interesting. Like all salients, it represented an incomplete operation. In 1914, after the Marne, the Germans had undertaken a double attack upon Verdun, the Crown Prince had endeavoured to push south between the Argonne and the Meuse and cut the Paris-Châlons-Verdun railway, thus isolating Verdun from the west. At the same time an army coming out of Metz had pushed up the valley of the little Rupt-de-Mad stream and sought to reach the Meuse and cut the Toul-Verdun railway, the only other considerable rail line into Verdun. Together, these operations were designed to isolate Verdun and, ultimately, by joining hands to the south of it, the two armies were to envelop and capture it.

The Crown Prince's expedition was stopped promptly, but the operation from Metz reached the Meuse at St. Mihiel and took Fort Camp des Romains, the only one of the forts of the whole eastern dike of France destined to be a German captive for any length of time, although Douaumont and Vaux were in German hands for most of 1916. The

Crown Prince also established a bridgehead at Chauvoncourt, across the Meuse, and threatened to advance upon Bar-le-Duc and turn the whole French system of defences from St. Mihiel northward. But Joffre's turning movement in the Santerre, also the scene subsequently of the decisive phase of the Battle of Picardy, demanded German attention, and operations about St. Mihiel stopped abruptly.

In the next winter, when their hands were freer, the French attempted to abolish the salient by an attack at its northern corner, not far from the scene of the attack of the 26th Division in the American battle. In this operation the French took Les Éparges, but were subsequently checked with bitter losses. Les Éparges was long a name of evil omen in the French army and was one of the counts in the indictment subsequently pressed against Joffre. The next summer, Joffre tried again on the other corner, on the heights above Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle, at Bois-le-Prêtre, and thence westward to the Forest of Apremont, south of St. Mihiel. But again he was checked. Such gains as were acquired in two months of severe fighting were swept away in one disastrous July day, and the salient still stood. In the Verdun campaign of 1916, the St. Mihiel salient played a great, if passive, rôle. It enabled the Germans to control the Commercy-Verdun railway and prevented munitioning Verdun by the Meuse Valley road and railway. On the other side of Verdun, the German heavy artillery commanded the Paris-Verdun railway and Verdun was thus without adequate rail communications. It was saved by motor transport, but not until the French built a new railway straight up from Bar-le-Duc and out of range of German cannon was the situation as to communications reëstablished. This railway served a useful purpose later, in the American campaign in the Meuse-Argonne, and was materially extended. The sight of huge American Mogul locomotives operating on this remote and commercially insignificant line was one of the amusing details of later days.

The construction of the new line to Verdun reduced the value of the St. Mihiel salient to the Germans, but they still cut the main Paris-Nancy railway at Commercy by artillery fire and compelled the French

to use a détour line by Gondrecourt, which added twenty miles to the distance between Paris and Nancy, but served all necessary purposes. Since the profit accruing from any operation to pinch out the salient between 1916 and the autumn of 1918 would not have been commensurate with the expense, and as the Allies had other uses for their reserves, the St. Mihiel salient became a quiet sector, and, on the Woëvre side, between the Meuse and the Moselle, a training front for American troops.

St. Mihiel itself is a town of just short of ten thousand inhabitants, a garrison place of much importance, as witnessed by the many barracks, now in ruins at Chauvoncourt, across the Meuse, scene of French repulse in the first fighting about St. Mihiel. It has public buildings of some note and in the Church of St. Étienne there is a *chef d'œuvre* of French sculpture, executed in the middle of the Sixteenth Century by Ligier Richier, one of the glorious figures of the French Renaissance and himself a "Sammiellois"; that is, a native of St. Mihiel. American soldiers will also find near the town, after the capture, a huge and hideous German cemetery, literally weighing down the side hill with its burden of German monstrosities in stone. St. Mihiel had a place in history, as the ruins of the Roman camp above it indicate. It played a conspicuous part in the French Renaissance, and it is altogether an interesting place, as the guide-books testify—too charming to remain in German hands, aside from all military considerations. But German it has been since September, 1914, four long years, and not a few of its inhabitants have remained there, compelling the French from the hills across the river to desist from all artillery practice. Comparatively intact the town was before the battle and it remained in reasonably good shape after it.

### III. THE BATTLEFIELD

While the name "St. Mihiel" has been applied to the contest of September 12th, the actual battleground was east and north of the city, which fell as a result of operations which did not extend to the immediate vicinity of the town itself. To understand the situation it is necessary

to grasp the simple topographic circumstances of the region. On the east bank of the Meuse southward from Dun-sur-Meuse, soon to appear in the reports of another American battle, all the way upstream to Commercy, beyond St. Mihiel, the ground slopes upward rapidly to a ridge, rarely more than two or three miles from the river at its highest point. Beyond the crest the high ground falls away much more abruptly to the Plain of the Woëvre. This ridge, the Côtes-de-Meuse, or Heights of the Meuse, in the region about Verdun was the site of the famous forts, Vaux and Douaumont, to name the best known, and the Germans sought in the great struggle to capture all of these forts.

The Woëvre Plain, east of the ridge, extends for thirty or forty miles north and south and for approximately twenty due east to the Moselle. As it approaches the Moselle, the country begins to rise again and dominates that river from another crest, comparable to that of the Heights of the Meuse above the Meuse River. This Woëvre Plain is very flat and marshy, filled with little lakes and ponds at the southern end, where the Americans attacked; and across it, from southwest to northeast, runs the little Rupt-de-Mad, hardly more than a brook, which falls into the Moselle, not many miles south of the outlying fortifications of the German stronghold of Metz.

On the morning of September 12th the German line ran westward from the Moselle Hills, north of Pont-à-Mousson—hills which were heavily wooded—straight out across the open Woëvre Plain until it reached the foot of the Meuse Hills at Apremont. At this point it turned a little south and reached the Meuse itself, just south of the commanding elevation on which stood the old French fort, Camp des Romains, which, in turn, occupied the site of a Roman camp.

Beyond the fort the line turned north, crossed the river in front of St. Mihiel, to take in the little peninsula on which was situated the ruined town of Chauvoncourt, then recrossed the river and ran northeastward, cutting the Heights of the Meuse diagonally and coming back to the Woëvre Plain east of Les Éparges, the scene of the French operation of 1915. Thence the line ran along the foot of the Meuse Hills in the Verdun sector.

There was thus created a fairly deep and narrow pocket, recalling that excavated by the German success at the Chemin des Dames but rather deeper, which had at its point, corresponding to Château-Thierry in the Marne salient, the little town of St. Mihiel. The vulnerable side of the salient was that between Apremont and the wooded hills west of Pont-à-Mousson, where the country is open and, in the main, level. An American advance of a few miles north on this front would cut off all the enemy troops to the westward in the nose of the salient, provided they did not retreat in time. If the operation were combined with a push from the Les Éparges corner, the Germans in the salient would be enveloped, exactly as the world incorrectly believed the German Crown Prince's hordes had been caught in the hours following Mangin's thrust at the Soissons corner of the Marne salient.

It was not possible to attack the salient from the west, near St. Mihiel, owing to the strength of the position on which Fort Camp des Romains stands. From this vantage point, the view up and down the Meuse Valley is one of the most extensive and impressive on the whole battle front. The attack from the Les Éparges corner could not be expected to do more than clear the enemy off the Meuse Heights, for the country was very heavily wooded and was to prove, in its difficult character, a very fair forecast of what was to come in the Argonne.

On the east side of the Meuse Hills the enemy had two striking vantage points, from which his sweep was almost as good as from Fort Camp des Romains. One of his far-reaching views was had from the village of Hattonchatel, from the church tower of which the view extends over all the plain of the Woëvre and as far as the hills in front of Metz: the other was from Mont Sec, one of the most interesting and important circumstances in the military geography of the region, already familiar to all American divisions which had been trained in the Toul sector.

Mont Sec is a detached hill, rising out of the Woëvre Plain a mile or two east of the Meuse Hills and completely separated from them. It was a mile or two inside the German lines, and it surveyed and dominated the whole plain; from it observers were able to mark every interesting

detail in the life of the Allied troops in the lines to the south. The hill had been marvellously "organized" by the Germans. From the ruined village of Mont Sec, just at its foot—itself provided with an admirable example of the German pill box, where the main street turned—a carefully built brick sidewalk led back to a series of magnificent cement caves, excavated from the side of the mountain, to provide shelter for the infantry, and proudly decorated with "iron crosses" worked into the masonry. Beyond these, cement steps led to a tunnel driven into the heart of the mountain; from this tunnel staircases led up to a number of observation posts, from which the Germans could survey the whole Woëvre Plain. These observation posts were totally invisible to the enemy, who could take the air there with full security, except for chance shots, and no chance shot seems ever to have molested them.

Mont Sec could not be taken by direct attack, it was too strong, and in Pershing's scheme of things the troops who attacked would attack on a front just east of the hill and cover their flank toward it with a smoke screen. Actually the 1st Division marched right past the hill, suffering severely from its fire and only partially covered by their smoke screen; but, once it was passed, Mont Sec fell, like St. Mihiel, because the Germans left in it were caught like rats in a trap.

In Pershing's plan of operations the 1st Division, advancing east of the Meuse Hills and their outlying spur, Mont Sec, would join hand with the 26th Division, coming southeast from the Les Éparges Corner, and the meeting place would be the village of Vigneulles, just south of the Hattonchatel Hill, which is the highest summit of the whole Meuse Heights. Meantime, the rest of Pershing's operative force between Pont-à-Mousson and the 1st Division front would keep step. Thus not only would the St. Mihiel salient be pinched out and the Germans encompassed captured when the 1st and 26th divisions joined hands at Vigneulles, but the front would be pushed out eastward toward Metz, beyond the considerable town of Thiaucourt, where the Rupt-de-Mad brook assumes the dignity of a river. This new front would carry a threat both for Metz and for the Briey iron works and mines far to the north.

But the main advantages of a successful attack at this point would be comprehended in releasing the Verdun-Commercy railway and the Paris-Nancy line and establishing solidly the flank which would cover the later advance in the Meuse-Argonne. As long as the Germans held St. Mihiel they held a threat over any force operating in what was still the Verdun salient. Haig had recourse necessarily to a similar operation at the Messines Ridge, before he made his attack in Flanders, from Ypres north and eastward in 1917. It was Byng's failure to establish his left flank toward the Scheldt Canal, in the Cambrai attack of 1917, which opened the way for the counter-stroke of Marwitz. Once the line of the Meuse Heights was solidly held by the Allies from the Verdun forts southward to the Toul area, Pershing could turn his attention to his operations between the Meuse and the Argonne without any misgivings as to flank or rear.

The secondary purpose was to try out his army. The achievement of the 1st and 2nd divisions at Cantigny and Belleau Wood had led directly to the Mangin counter-thrust at the Soissons corner and the use of eight American divisions in meeting and breaking the last German offensive. This performance had persuaded Foch and Petain to consent to the organization of an independent American army. On the performance of the American army in its first "full-dress show" would depend the decision already taking shape in Foch's mind, but opposed by the British Government, by Lloyd George, to risk everything in a general offensive designed to end the war in 1918.

Pershing had already demanded for his army the honour of fighting in the most difficult of all sectors on the whole operative front, that of the Meuse-Argonne. The Battle of St. Mihiel was to demonstrate whether his eyes had been beyond his appetite. America now had an army of its own, but was the army available for serious work in 1918?—or must the decision be sought in another campaign? Foch was going ahead with his preparations for the general offensive; Pershing and Haig had lent valuable support in council; British success in Picardy and Artois was disclosing a growing weakness, actual demoralization in the German ranks; but the German would still be able to last, if he had only

French and British armies to deal with, given their sacrifices and exertions in the earlier months of the campaign. St. Mihiel was a final examination of the American soldier, of the American machine. Cantigny, Belleau Wood, the Aisne-Marne had been no more than preliminary tests; the real trial was now to be faced.

### IV. THE ATTACK

On the night of September 11th, Pershing's army was in place. The concentration had been made secretly, by night marches; the Hutier method was finding Allied application. The German was getting anxious about the St. Mihiel salient. He had begun to get his heavy guns out, but he was taking his time about it and he had no suspicion of the imminence of a major blow. His anxiety was due exclusively to an




THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL

Solid black shows Allied territory on September 11th. The black line from Verdun to Pont-à-Mousson indicates the front reached by the Americans as a result of the victory. Arrows mark directions of main attack.

abstract estimate of the general situation, he was now to have a concrete example.

On the south side of the salient, where the main activity was to be, Pershing thus ranged his forces: From the Moselle westward, the First Corps, Hunter Liggett commanding, with the 82nd, 90th, 5th, and 2nd in line—four divisions, of which only one, the 2nd, is in any sense a veteran unit. Its commander will presently lead the American First Army, now under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. On the left the Fourth Corps, commanded by Dickman, who will also get his army presently. This consists of the 89th, 42nd, and 1st, the two last-named veteran divisions, and the last looking obliquely at Mont Sec.

Thence all the way round to the northeast corner of the salient are French troops, whose mission is merely to occupy the front and pluck the fruit when it has ripened. On the corner is the Fifth Corps, George H. Cameron in command. It consists of the 26th American, the 15th French Colonial, and the 4th American. But only the 26th is to participate; its mission will be to get across the mouth of the pocket or salient until it meets the 1st Division in the town of Vigneulles. Nine American divisions, then, are actually on the front. Only seven of them will be called upon for great exertions, but three more are in reserve. Counting Americans, then, the force is rather less than 300,000 strong; with the French and reserve American divisions it amounts to 500,000, of which 70,000 are French. It is the greatest American army that has yet entered battle; it is the first American army to fight in Europe. September 12th is also Pershing's birthday. It will be appropriately observed.

The bombardment which preceded the attack and lasted four hours was one of the heaviest on record. Thanks to his allies, Pershing also profited by the greatest aviation concentration which had yet been seen during the war. A certain number of tanks also participated. At dawn on September 12th the American troops crossed the trenches and advanced in the open following the rolling barrage of their guns. The Fifth Corps did not start until 8 A.M. Dawn the next morning saw the 1st and

26th in contact in Vigneulles, the honour of actual capture of the town going to the "Yankee" Division. The salient had been abolished. The line now extended from Les Éparges into the plain, passed east of Thiaucourt, and rejoined the Moselle below Pont-à-Mousson. All objectives had been reached, many of them passed; there had been no serious hitch.

The prisoners taken on this day numbered 16,000; the guns, 443; and in addition a vast accumulation of material. The captures of men and cannon are an evidence of the completeness of the surprise. Certain Austrian units in the rear were called upon to save their German comrades, one of the instances of the use of Austrians on the western front and a new evidence of the mounting exhaustion of German cannon-fodder. The total American loss was little more than 7,000, an amazingly low price to pay for such a success. Indeed St. Mihiel was one of the cheapest victories of any size in the whole war. In any other war the capture of 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns would have indicated a major disaster for the vanquished.

But the German still had reserves and he had prepared a line behind the salient—the Michael Line, on which he stopped, undisturbed, for the American objective had been rigidly limited. To be sure, Metz was not far distant, our shells were falling on the railroad station. The battlefields of Gravelotte and Mars-la-Tour, where the war of 1870 had been thrown away by Bazaine, were still nearer, but Pershing was not considering Metz; his task lay on the other side of the Meuse and thither his troops were soon moving. St. Mihiel was, after all, only a curtain raiser, but it had convinced the audience, the examination had been triumphantly passed. Foch could count on American assistance if he should decide to seek victory in the current campaign. And his decision was made. Two months—lacking a day—after St. Mihiel, Germany would surrender.

Our three battlefields in Europe, scenes of really considerable engagements in which large numbers of Americans were engaged, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne are singularly unlike each other. In our first engagement in July our troops were scattered amongst the

French. It is impossible to see any considerable front between the Marne and the Vesle where our troops were in line and the battlefield itself is separated into numerous compartments. Only at the Soissons corner and again where our troops forced the passage of the Ourcq is it possible to get any comprehensive idea of the action. For the rest one must follow the tracks of the several divisions, tracks which lead through dense forests, filled with machine-gun emplacements, tracks along which American field cemeteries testify to the gallantry of our men. Only at the Vesle does one at last come to a front where American divisions stood in line and even passed the river in the face of terribly concentrated fire raining down from the hills above.

But in the St. Mihiel area the whole battlefield is spread before the feet of any visitor who will climb Mont Sec or Hattonchatel. Lookout Mountain does not give a better survey of the battlefields of Chattanooga, and Mont Sec adds to the view one of the most admirable examples of German protective military engineering. At its feet and stretching monotonously eastward are the ruined villages, Rechicourt, Seicheprey, where the 26th met initial reverse, Xivray, Beaumont, Essey, and Flirey. Passing through these ruins, over the tracks, which were once roads and through the débris which was once a coherent part of human habitation, one appreciates the conditions under which our troops were trained and in which our army began.

On the horizon, too, looking from Mont Sec, one sees the Bois-le-Prêtre, above the town of Pont-à-Mousson, where exactly American participation in the war began. There all through the bloody summer of 1915 American ambulance drivers brought back the wounded by Fey-en-Heye, using roads which would be later trodden by thousands of American soldiers come to pay the debt of Lafayette, the first instalment of which was receipted by the gallantry of the American ambulance drivers, two years before the majority of Americans awakened to the meaning for them of the European struggle. Forgotten now in the press of larger events, the achievements of this Ambulance Corps remains one of the finest in the history of American youth.

We shall see in the Meuse-Argonne a country far more savage,

presenting infinitely graver obstacles to military operations, but not outside of Flanders was there along the whole front a more depressing stretch of shell-worked, devastated, flood-invaded territory than that which American divisions passed through and over on September 12th and 13th, a country destitute of all life, of all evidences of human residence, torn by four years of cannonading, presenting to the traveller, long months after the war had passed by and ended in other fields, something of the horror of the rotting fragments of human bodies protruding from the shallow graves along the front of every considerable struggle during the war.

One of the military consequences of Pershing's victory was to excite German anxiety as to the safety of the Briey iron fields to the northeastward, now exposed to attack both from Verdun and from the new Woëvre front of the Americans. This anxiety was due to the fact that these iron fields had become an essential detail in German economic organization, since without the iron, Germany could not continue the struggle, and it led to a miscalculation of the direction of the next American thrust. Ludendorff was expecting a blow east of the Meuse two weeks later, when Pershing attacked west of that stream; and the absence of German reserves, diverted to the Briey sector, contributed to the initial success of the Americans.

Critics of the St. Mihiel operation have justly pointed out that following the attack there was an approximate breakdown of transport behind the line. This seems to have been the case, but in this instance there were no serious consequences, because the American advance was relatively short; a similar failure in the Meuse-Argonne, however, had far more unfortunate consequences. The answer to the criticism is that such a breakdown was an inevitable circumstance of an operation as hastily prepared as either that of St. Mihiel or of the Meuse-Argonne. It was to be expected in a new army. Ours was an emergency army. For it there was no question of doing a technically perfect job, the one question was whether it could do it well enough to turn the scale. Pershing had to make brute strength a substitute for finished performance. His army had to sacrifice itself to make up for lack of time, lack of train-

ing, lack of everything save courage and devotion. And now, despite all the handicaps, it was going to accomplish just that.

In the battles of St. Mihiel and of the Meuse-Argonne our army was about in the stage of the British army at Loos; and at Loos, despite the fact that the British officers had themselves had far more experience than any of ours, not only was there a failure of transport after the battle, but the reserves, which were counted upon to win a battle which had opened with a striking success, did not arrive until the Germans, perceiving the failure of Sir John French to follow up his advantage, stopped their withdrawal from Lens and presently retook Hill No. 70. Loos cost the British 66,000 casualties in little more than a week, with only a two-mile advance on a narrow front. We got through to Sedan, more than thirty miles, with only twice as heavy a butcher's bill.

This is not to say that Pershing's army would have done better than Sir John French's had it tackled Loos under the same circumstances. It is merely to point out that the American army at St. Mihiel was still necessarily at that point in its development when certain limitations were ineluctably imposed upon it. In the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne battles the American army was not a perfect military machine, moving like clockwork. It was a vast, incoherent aggregation of brave men, many of them highly efficient, seeking in eighty days to overcome the consequences of fifty-odd years of systematic neglect of military considerations by the American people and the American Government.

What was actually accomplished was little less than a miracle. The real pity is that, since that time, there has been too much effort to create the impression that we accomplished things which were in truth beyond human accomplishment, and too little appreciation of the fraction of the impossible which was actually achieved. Compared with the German or the French army, compared with the armies of Grant or Lee in 1864, Pershing's army was still a training establishment. But as a fighting aggregation it was beyond praise. It was a young army with the ignorance of youth, possibly, but with the enthusiasm, the courage, the strength of youth, and its spirit availed to surmount all handicaps and to

supply Foch with just that additional power which made victory in 1918 first conceivable and then possible. And St. Mihiel was the sign manual of its capacity; on this victory Foch constructed his Battle of the Hindenburg Line. However disorganized our rear, the Germans on the American front would have a busy time.

### V. AFTERMATH

Pershing saw the Battle of St. Mihiel from the heights of the Meuse, and Secretary of War Baker was with him. Side by side with Petain, Pershing entered St. Mihiel the next day. Poincaré would come soon after to see one more fragment of the Department of the Meuse, his own department, redeemed.

On all sides congratulations rained upon the victor. On the evening of the battle Foch sent this message:

> The American First Army under your command has achieved in this first day a magnificent victory by a manœuvre which was as skilfully prepared as it was valiantly executed.

Everything happened exactly as planned and all the results hoped for were achieved, this was the verdict of Madelin, of Maurice, of all military critics then and since on the Allied side.

Only Ludendorff minimized the episode, came pretty close to lying about it at the time, and, in his memoirs, enters into a long defence of this inveracity, necessary to keep up the morale of the German people, he maintains stoutly: necessary, too, one may conjecture to preserve the fiction, growing pretty thin, that Americans wouldn't come, wouldn't fight, and couldn't fight even if they came and tried to—the last line of defence in the matter of these Americans. Still Ludendorff concedes that his losses were severe, while protesting that local commanders were over-confident and slow in obeying his order to evacuate the whole salient. He confesses that the Americans broke through a Prussian division on the south side, nevertheless, despite local failures, and that an Austrian division "might have done better." Ludendorff is dissatisfied with himself and discovers later that his official report to the

public was too favourable. But just about this time Bulgaria is beginning to cause him more worry than Pershing.

On the human side, the St. Mihiel affair remains interesting. Photographs of the time disclose American soldiers triumphantly affixing the sign "Wilson, U. S. A." beneath the German legend "Hindenburgstrasse" at Thiaucourt, showing a youthful enthusiasm, not unattractive, over their first conquest, to which they were welcomed by the inhabitants who had been slaves rather than prisoners for four years.

Babin, who "made the campaign," writes at the time: "As for the soldiers of General Pershing, there is only one description. They have been prodigious in courage and in daring."

The Marquis de Chambrun, who was also there, has many words of praise, and adds the detail: "'The Grande Rue', in olden days, the name of the principal street of St. Mihiel, now bears the title 'Rue du General Pershing'."

Captain Arthur W. Page, the best critic of American military operations in France, quotes the following comment of the intelligence officer of the German High Command, reporting on St. Mihiel:

> The artillery operation, prior to the attack, was well carried out. The objectives were bombarded with good effect, and they were able to switch from one target to another in the minimum of time and with remarkable accuracy. The coördination between the infantry and the artillery was faultless. If the infantry ran up against a machine-gun nest they would immediately fall back, and very soon new artillery preparation would be directed on that point. A great many tanks were in readiness for the attack, but they were only used in very small numbers, as the masses of infantry accomplished the victory.

Captain Page calls attention to the use of the word "victory." Ludendorff had only recently announced the German retirement was "according to plan."

Pershing, in his final report, says:

> The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully

through his defences. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers, and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theatre of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle totalled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

"The first successes of the American Army," writes Colonel Requin, "did not merely mark an important date in the history of the war. They represented the result on which the respective governments had staked their hopes, and were the deserved recompense of those who had collaborated for a whole year in this work." Again, later, he says of this St. Mihiel affair: "The test was conclusive. Henceforward the American forces were free to undertake army operations."

After all, St. Mihiel was America's answer at the roll call of the Nations on the eve of the final battle of the World War. Foch had already uncovered the weakness of the enemy in the manœuvre between August 8th and September 10th. The Battle of St. Mihiel revealed that new strength which would be a warrant for joining battle and an essential element in achieving victory.

# CHAPTER NINE

# THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE

## I

## FOCH'S SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The Battle of St. Mihiel was the final episode in Foch's manœuvre—"manœuvre of usury," says De Thomasson in a prescient analysis published close to the event. "The process of absorption" Buat described in an analysis previously quoted. Ludendorff's reserves are becoming exhausted. He is beginning to break up some divisions to keep the rest up to strength. His whole number of divisions has fallen from 207 to 185, regiments are melting away; worse than all else, the morale is declining even faster. The victory is ripening.

Moreover, in other fields, the same progress toward the end is discernible. While Pershing's army was cleaning up after its victory, the Army of the Orient was smashing Bulgarian resistance. At the moment when Pershing would attack near Verdun, Allenby would dispose of the Turk; Diaz was already maturing his plans for finishing off the crumbling Austro-Hungarian force; Germany's defeats had reacted upon her allies, and her allies' disasters would now contribute to her own.

This last battle—Armageddon, Maurice calls it, the Battle of France in Madelin's account, more exactly the Battle of the Hindenburg Line—will extend from Ypres to Verdun, from the Yser to the Meuse, would have expanded east of Metz to the scene of French defeat at Morhange in August, 1914, if the German had not surrendered when he did. No battlefront, save that of the First Marne, was ever comparably as vast.

So vast, indeed, is the extent of this new battle that it is easy to be lost in the details. The British, looking at their area, will see it as a contest between St. Quentin and Ypres, designed to break the Hindenburg Line. The Americans will see it as a struggle between the Meuse and the Argonne to reach and cut the all-important Metz-Maubeuge

railway. The French will see it as a kaleidoscopic contest in which French soldiers, now beside the British, now with the Belgians, and now beside the Americans, do heroic service at crucial moments. Even the Belgians, participating considerably and nobly, will describe it as the Battle of their Liberation.

But enormous as is the battle, and Foch will use nearly 4,000,000 men in it, the main facts are still simple; the old laws and lessons of war remain unchanged, remain as they were when Napoleon and Wellington fought all day on a front of less than five miles. Foch, after two months of manœuvre, has brought his enemy to battle under the conditions which he has foreseen. The enemy still occupies strong positions, but he has now neither the moral nor the physical power to hold these positions, and the development of the tank tactic has incalculably diminished the value of all positions.

To grasp this battle of the Hindenburg Line it is only essential to see the thing in terms of previous battles. One may divide both the hosts as of old, thus: Facing east between the sea and the Oise is Foch's left flank, consisting of the Belgian army, four British armies, and one French army. There will presently be a new British Fifth Army, Birdwood of Australia commanding. Between the Oise and Rheims is Foch's centre, held by French armies exclusively, those of Mangin and Berthelot. Between Rheims and Verdun is Foch's right flank, held by Gouraud's Fourth Army west of the Argonne, and Pershing's First Army east of it.

Between the Oise and Rheims the character of the country forbids direct attack. The Forest of St. Gobain has all along been the keystone of the German arch in France while the Chemin des Dames, although no longer to be considered impregnable, does not invite new attack. His centre being unavailable, Foch will therefore attack on both flanks.

The German position in France and Belgium is, after all, a salient—a deep and wide salient, the neck of it between Pershing's lines at Verdun and the Dutch frontier north of Liége, far narrower than the depth of it, between Liége and Ostend. Pershing's thrust northward will steadily narrow the neck of the pocket, just as Mangin's push from the Soissons

# THE ENEMY IN RETREAT

*Brown Brothers*

GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE WAY BACK TO THE FATHERLAND

*Brown Brothers*

GERMAN FOOD SUPPLIES IN BELGIUM

*Brown Brothers*

THIS IS WHAT THE GERMANS DID IN VALENCIENNES BEFORE THE CANADIANS CAME

*U. S. Official Photo*

WHAT THE VANDALS LEFT

A bridge over the Meuse after the German retreat



*U. S. Official Photo*

A SALVO TO THE ENEMY

A battery of American field artillery firing at the retreating German columns. The river at the bottom of the picture is the Aire, the road above runs from Varennes to Grandpré and was one of the main lines of American advance in the Meuse-Argonne

*U. S. Official Photo*

A SHELL HOLE IN THE GERMAN TRENCHES

This is why "Fritz" was in such a hurry to get back home

*Brown Bros.*

THE ENEMY IN RETREAT

German machine-gun sections established in shell craters are covering a retirement from the Hindenburg Line

© *International Film Service*

BACK TO GERMANY

The beaten army, tired of war, and dejected, turn their footsteps homeward, hoping to find the peace which they were driven to violate

*From the collection of war pictures at the National Museum, Washington*

*By Edward H. Potthast*

THE ARGONNE

corner narrowed the neck of the Marne salient. Moreover, just as the vital railroad for Ludendorff in the Marne salient ran close to the Soissons corner, one of the two railroad systems serving Ludendorff's enormous salient between Holland and the Allied line runs close to Pershing's front. If Pershing, advancing to Sedan, can cut the German communications, the railroad line from Metz to Maubeuge, Ludendorff will have to come out of this last salient just as he had to retire from the Marne salient.

But such a retreat will be next to impossible, given the enormous concentration of men and of material in France and Belgium, which will have to be moved by the railroad line crossing the Meuse at Liége and along the few roads which cross the Ardennes between the Dutch frontier and the Chiers. Using his right wing, the Americans, and Gouraud's Fourth Army, Foch will strike for Sedan. To meet this thrust Ludendorff will need to make tremendous calls upon his reserves, but while his reserves are limited, those of Pershing, steadily growing, are almost without limit.

Meantime, on his left, Foch will throw the whole British army, aided by French and Belgians and presently by Americans, straight against all that enormous system of entrenchments between the Oise and the sea. If these are broken, if the German is driven out of them, if he is driven out of them at the same time that Pershing cuts the Metz-Maubeuge railway, a beaten German army will, at one time, have to meet attack in the open, in front, and on the flank. Moreover, to prevent Haig from smashing the Hindenburg Line, Ludendorff will have to pour reserves to this front also, and he no longer possesses a reservoir of reserves adequate to nourish both fronts. We shall see that in the end, lacking the necessary support, the German front before Pershing will collapse entirely and be followed by that swift pursuit which reached Sedan and would have continued without any visible limit but for the Armistice. Actually Foch will use Pershing for his right hand and Haig for his left while Petain's force will furnish the kick, the *savate* permissible in French boxing.

Ludendorff's single problem is to hang on where he is for the few

weeks until the autumn rains make further campaigning impossible. If he can do this, German diplomacy may be expected to find an honourable and not unprofitable peace by negotiation. Even if this resource fails he can, during the winter, repeat the achievement of the Hindenburg Retreat in 1917 and draw back behind the Meuse and the Scheldt, devastating the country behind him, shortening his front and thus increasing his reserves and, what is at least as important, placing the water barriers of the Meuse and the Scheldt in the pathway of the terrible tanks. Ludendorff is fighting for time and Foch's time is patently short.

But once more geographical and strategic objectives are but incidental; Foch has driven the German army into the Hindenburg Line and in a condition which he calculates will make German defence of the line impossible. He is now going to try to drive the German army out of that line and, in doing this, so absorb German reserves that further resistance will be impossible, while also seeking at all times to seize any positions which will further reduce the German chance of resistance.

For four years, as a consequence of the development of modern weapons and the expansion of modern armies, the world has been thinking about positions and has well nigh forgotten that the single purpose of war and of battle must be to destroy the enemy's power to resist. September 26th, Foch will undertake to do this. Such is the real objective sought by Foch. To escape the ultimate disaster, Ludendorff fights vainly, and thereafter his government surrenders swiftly to escape the rout otherwise inevitable.

## II. THE HINDENBURG LINE

We have now to examine briefly that monstrous defence system which four years of German industry had stretched from Metz to the North Sea, the Hindenburg Line of history, subdivided in German nomenclature into sections each bearing a name drawn from Teutonic mythology. Actually, the Hindenburg Line was neither a line nor a single system of fortifications; it was a defensive zone varying in width

from three to a dozen miles, making use of every hill, ravine, river, natural obstacle, but in the main deriving its strength from the successive fields of wire entanglements backed by trenches, block-houses, concrete emplacements. Each point of cover was a machine-gun nest, and every art of modern engineering, of ancient and modern military method, was employed to increase the obstacle.

The theory of the Hindenburg Line was not that the enemy attack would be broken before it, but that the force of such an attack would be lost in the encounter with one or with another of the series of obstacles which would be encountered, and that the enemy, checked in the tangle, would be slaughtered by the concentrated fire from all sides before material progress had been made, or thrown back by a well-timed counter-attack.

Seen at close hand there was seldom anything impressive or imposing about the Hindenburg Line system.




GERMAN DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN FRANCE

The fields of rusting barbed wire; the trenches following the rearward slope of the ground, indiscoverable from in front; the concrete emplacements, rarely discoverable at all, so cunningly were they hidden in the folds of the ground; all these circumstances were designedly well nigh invisible. Seen from the front, from one of the bare Artois hillsides, the Hindenburg system hardly appeared more than an area of desolation curiously furnished with barbed-wire hedges and strangely worked by shell fire.

Before the Hindenburg Line the country had been rigorously cleared; every house, tree, bush had been removed; in Picardy a glacis of devastation stretched before it, a detail in the preparation of 1917. "Between Cambrai and St. Quentin," says Maurice, "the Siegfried system from the outpost positions near Epehy to the rearmost lines near Beaurevoir was as much as ten miles deep. The most elaborate wire entanglements were provided in front of each line of trenches. Standing, after the great battle had been won and the Siegfried system had been pierced, on the ridges east of the St. Quentin Canal, in the heart of the system, one looked over miles of dense entanglements running in every direction, and was filled with amazement that it should have been possible for flesh and blood to storm a way through such obstacles. Heavily concreted shelters for the infantry and machine gunners were provided in the fire trenches, while farther back great underground barracks were constructed at a depth to make them proof against the heaviest bombardment."

"If the assailant were fortunate enough to break through the Hindenburg rampart in all its depth," writes Madelin, "he would find himself face to face with a new system. There are two lines, less continuous to be sure, resting, on one side on the entrenched camp of Lille, which was powerfully organized, and on the other on the fortified area of Metz-Thionville.

"The first of these lines is indicated by Douai, Cambrai, Guise, Rethel, Vouziers, Dun-sur-Meuse, Pagny-sur-Moselle. Still north of these was a series of detached positions: Hunding, Brunhilde, Kriemhilde, Michael." The last two will be well known to Americans, who broke the first in the Meuse-Argonne and reached the second after St. Mihiel.

"The history of war makes no mention of a similar defensive system," thinks Madelin. The reports of this period are filled to overflowing with descriptions of these defences, difficult to recognize on the spot, impossible to describe afterward, constituting a sort of labyrinth of chaos, trenches, caves, rabbit warrens, buttressed with railroad iron, sown with cement structures—monstrous turtles with a single aperture, left for machine-gun barrels. Difficult, well nigh impossible to pass when the battle had gone beyond, was this wilderness, filled then with the débris of conflict, with half-buried bodies, rotting equipment, broken guns; crammed with hand-grenades, with every conceivable engine fatal to touch; having an order, a plan, a method, but revealing it nowhere; concealing an underground world, stretching endlessly like the Catacombs, old quarries newly organized, vast warrens capable of sheltering platoons, whole companies, and reached by stairways going down to the very nethermost depths.

Strongest, this system was most elaborate, most carefully and consistently prepared between Cambrai and St. Quentin, lying in the folds of the hills, before and behind the St. Quentin Canal, burrowing the tunnel of the canal itself for an enormous shelter for troops, a shelter from which they could emerge when the enemy wave has passed forward—a circumstance which will cost the New York Division dearly when it goes straight through the whole infernal system—with Rawlinson's Australians "leap-frogging it," in the first stages of the battle, having on their flank the American 30th, which will be more fortunate and go yet farther.

All that four years of a war of positions has taught, the Germans have applied on this line: art, science, military resource can do no more. "Impregnable," the German organs announce at this moment, "a wall like to nothing that ever was before in history." "A fact conceded," Madelin responds, "but Foch has 'the trumpet of Jericho'." And with all its strength, the Hindenburg Line is, after all, the enemy's last resource. If it falls, all falls. Beaten there, even he will not long hope to hold the relatively insignificant although honorifically named lines behind. In truth, despite its magnificence, the Hindenburg Line is no more than

"the last ditch"—no stronger in its time than Lee's lines before Petersburg, which fell swiftly at the end.

### III. PERSHING OPENS THE BATTLE

On September 26th the honour of opening Foch's final battle falls to Pershing, who attacks between the Meuse and the Argonne, Gouraud following suit west of the Argonne. We shall examine the American operations later. It is enough to recall now that on this date Pershing and Gouraud—constituting, together, the right flank of Foch's forces—set out for Sedan. Pershing is the more fortunate; gets forward four miles and encircles Montfaucon, which will fall the next day; clears all the Hindenburg Line, but falls short of the Kriemhilde. A remarkable achievement is this first attack, not quite as good as Foch and Pershing hoped for, but something totally beyond Ludendorff's remotest expectation.

West of the Argonne, Gouraud advances more slowly. He has first to win clear of the shell-torn area demolished by the preparation for Joffre's offensive of 1915, torn again by Ludendorff's preparation and Gouraud's performance on July 15th of the current year. He does this, but no more. Ludendorff rushes up reserves and the operation on the right flank enters into a second phase in which advances are slow, costly, but the drain upon German reserves is tremendous.

One day after Pershing, Haig attacks, three armies in line: Horne to the north, Byng in the centre, Rawlinson to the south. This day and those which follow immediately are the most splendid in the history of the British army, and a modest share in the achievement belongs to the American 27th and 30th divisions with Rawlinson, the former from New York, the latter composed of southerners, mainly from Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina. No unit in Lee's army of northern Virginia fought with more distinction or success than these sons of the new South.

On September 27th, Cambrai is the direction of the advance and the passage of the Canal du Nord the immediate task, one of the greatest military obstacles on the whole front an unfinished ditch thirty or forty

feet deep in places, a hundred wide, the spoil-banks—that is, the piles of the earth which has been excavated—furnishing posts for machine guns, notably south of Havrincourt. A magnificent exploit was the taking of the canal, which enabled the tanks to get across, and very briefly Byng's army is fighting in the old Cambrai salient, the scene of its success and disappointment a year ago. Ten villages, 10,000 prisoners, 200 cannon, are taken on this day, and the British call the action the Second Battle of Cambrai in revenge for the first. Pershing and Gouraud had taken another 10,000 prisoners on the previous day.

While Byng and Horne fight toward Cambrai, Rawlinson aims for Le Catelet. He has before him the canal between the Scheldt and the Oise, impassable for tanks save only on the narrow front where the canal goes under ground. Therefore Haig turns back to the old method of artillery preparation and pounds the German lines all through September 27th and 28th. On the 29th Rawlinson assails the Hindenburg Line on a front of twelve miles, the Second Corps—American, comprising the 27th and 30th divisions, Major General G. W. Read commanding—in line facing the point where the canal passes underground. On this day Rawlinson opens the breach in the Hindenburg Line where it is strongest, and on the same day Debeney, about St. Quentin, also moves. Three British armies and one French, most but not quite all of Foch's left wing, are in action. By October 1st, St. Quentin has fallen, Rawlinson's Fourth Army is approaching the last barrier in the Hindenburg system. By October 3rd, the Hindenburg Line was smashed; 36,500 prisoners and 380 guns were the British booty. The Germans would continue to hold certain elements in it, but the line and the legend had gone together.

Nor was this all. On the 28th of September, from Dixmude to Armentières, Plumer's British First Army, with King Albert's Belgians, suddenly breaks out of the Ypres salient, which now disappears for ever. Again, supported this time by material aid from Degoutte's French army, there begins that march for Roulers and Menin which Sir John French undertook just four years ago, the march which Haig strove to make one year ago. As for Degoutte, he has travelled far and fast since Harbord's Marines met him conducting a despairing defensive astride

the Paris-Metz road on June 1st. September 28th is a notable day in Flanders, it sees the Germans swept out of all the famous fighting ground of four years of war. Once more, as in the recent fighting at the Somme, ground which once took months to conquer is now cleared in hours and even in minutes.

By the 29th the limits of the old battlefield are everywhere passed. Already the German hold upon the Belgian seacoast is crumbling, Lille is menaced, all German defence between the sea and the Deule is disintegrating. Another 10,000 prisoners are taken. This series of attacks fulfils Buat's formula of accelerating the pace by piling one attack upon another and the consequent absorption of German reserves is correspondingly hastened.

### IV. OCTOBER 10TH

The battle of the Hindenburg Line ends on October 10th. Military writers, including Ludendorff himself, indicate this day as the termination of a distinct phase, although to the civilian mind the transition is almost imperceptible. Let us now analyze Foch's battle, successful, decisively successful on this October 10th, fifteen days after Pershing opened it between the Meuse and the Argonne, 85 days since Foch seized the initiative at the Soissons corner, a month and a day before the end of the fighting, before the Germans surrendered. The world now knows that Bulgaria has surrendered. Turkey is conquered. Diaz has not yet delivered his final blow at the Piave, but Austria-Hungary's appeals for peace indicate what the result will be two weeks hence. Finally, Germany's first peace proposal addressed to President Wilson has been issued five days earlier, sent forward just as Haig's troops are emerging in the open country beyond the Hindenburg Line, agreed upon in the last days of September, the very last days after Pershing and Haig had delivered their first terrible blow.

Foch's strategy lies clearly unrolled on the map. As we have seen, his attack was to have two principal directions followed by his two flanks: Haig on the north with the Hindenburg Line in front of him, and Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Mons as his goals; Pershing on the other

flank with the Meuse-Argonne defence lines, Hindenburg, Hagen, and Kriemhilde Stellungs before him, and Montmédy, Sedan, and the all-important Maubeuge-Metz railway as his goals. In military language (Requin's) this is described as choosing, "as principal directions of attack, those where the most important strategical results are to be expected; in other words, the directions which threaten the enemy communication lines and a tireless pursuit of the offensive along these main lines."

These main lines of communication are all the important railways serving the German front between the Oise and the sea, so far as Haig is concerned; the Maubeuge-Metz railway, on Pershing's side. Up to October 10th and for many days thereafter Pershing and Gouraud to the west of him are substantially checked. The reason is twofold: the nature of the country in which they are fighting and the importance to Ludendorff of the railroad line they are aiming at. The more badly things go in the west and the more unmistakable becomes the certainty that he must draw his armies back from the coast, the more vital to him is the Maubeuge-Metz railway, one of the two lines open for his retirement. You may put the thing simply by saying: Haig is pounding in through the front door, Pershing is trying to close the back door, Ludendorff must strive to hold both doors, but the less successful he is in keeping Haig out, the more imperative for him it is to keep Pershing from closing the back door by which he must get out himself. Ludendorff is being defeated by the Allied left flank, but he is striving to avert disaster by holding up Pershing. His success so far is due in the main to the stream of reserves he is pouring into the Meuse-Argonne battle, but since his reserves are limited, diminishing very rapidly, he is weakening himself before Haig to check Pershing, and he will find in the end that his reserves are inadequate even to do this. In Buat's phrase, Ludendorff's reserves are being "sucked in."

Now the second controlling purpose of Foch, again outlined by Requin, is "to form weak points in the adversary's positions along the rest of the front and cause the successive fall of all these weak points (salients) by encircling them, and thus gradually to bring about the collapse of the western front." Accepting the fact that Foch's right,

Pershing's army, has been checked after material but not yet decisive progress, we may now apply the foregoing principle of strategy to the left between the Oise and the sea. By October 10th, the developments are these: three British armies, Horne's First, Byng's Third, and Rawlinson's Fourth, have attacked between September 27th and 29th from Cambrai to the outskirts of St. Quentin. By October 10th they have penetrated—Rawlinson's army farthest ahead—the whole Hindenburg system, and British troops are on this day advancing in the open country within sight of that battlefield on which Smith-Dorrien made his despairing stand on August 26, 1914, a memorable day in the history of the "Old Contemptibles."

The result of this advance, which has already produced the fall of Cambrai and St. Quentin, has been to drive a deep wedge in the German line between the Oise and the sea. The effect of this wedge is beginning to be felt on either side. To the north the Germans in the great cluster of fortifications about Lille, finding their communications threatened from the rear as a result of Rawlinson's advance, are getting ready to retire. This retirement is hastened by Plumer's pressure to the north, which we will examine in a moment.

At the same time, the German centre, impregnable to direct attack, likewise finds itself menaced as to its rear and communications, and has begun to go back. To put it succinctly, Haig's push has now had the result of turning the Germans to the north of it out of all their splendid system of defences from Cambrai to the sea, and to the south of it out of all that bastion between the Oise and Rheims. This is what Requin means by his phrase "choosing as principal directions of attack those where the most important strategical results are to be expected."

The results are now indicated by the fall of Laon, the evacuation of the heights from which the Germans have for four years pounded Rheims, and the preparations for the approaching retirement from Lille and from the Belgian sea coast.

In addition Foch has created weak points elsewhere in the German line. To meet Haig's mighty thrust south of Lille, Ludendorff drew

heavily on the Ypres sector for reserves. Thereupon Foch threw King Albert's army group—the Belgians, Plumer's British, and Degoutte's French—against the thinned line, and it collapsed exactly as the Allied line on the Chemin des Dames collapsed after Foch had drawn off all the reserves to meet the thrust he wrongly expected west of the Oise. This success has gravely compromised Ludendorff's position because even with the reserves drawn from Ypres he has failed to check Haig while the withdrawal of the reserves has produced a collapse to the north.

In the same way, on a reduced scale, Foch has created a weak point near Rheims. East of that city, in the region where Gouraud checked Ludendorff on July 15th, the German line rests on high ground—"the Mountains" captured by the French in May, 1917, evacuated by Gouraud as a circumstance in his defence in Champagne in July. Ludendorff, who boasted about the capture of this high ground, relied upon it and drew off reserves to face Gouraud and Pershing to the east, whereupon Foch borrows two American divisions, the famous 2nd and the 36th, and the former, in line with the French, storms the crest of these mountains in a magnificent dash while the 36th exploits the success. This is the final circumstance in compelling Ludendorff to retire from before Rheims.

### V. LUDENDORFF *vs.* FOCH

We may now contrast the method of Ludendorff with that of Foch. Attacking with stupendous force, on March 21st, Ludendorff ruptured the Allied front between the Somme and the Oise over an extent of more than thirty miles. Into the gap he poured more than eighty divisions, but despite his colossal effort, he was checked before April 1st, decisively and permanently, while the forces which he had employed in the rush were exhausted. His efforts to extend the dislocation of the Allied front, first by attacks before Arras and then in Flanders, were unsuccessful; he had then to pause from April 29th to May 27th; then he exactly repeated his experience of March and April. He again ruptured the Allied front for an extent of forty miles along the Chemin des Dames and again pushed division after division into the gap he had opened, but by

the first days of June he is once more checked and his effort to extend the dislocation by his operation at the Matz is halted briefly and far more completely than his similar thrust in Flanders.

He then has to pause again, this time until July 15th, when his attack fails instantly and he loses the initiative. His ruin is accomplished in the periods between his several efforts, as a result of the time allowed to his opponents, whom he has beaten and punished severely, to recover—to transport reserves from America and to choose a single commander to direct their policies. In a military way the failure of Ludendorff is disclosed in the fact that in his first two offensives he made only restricted breaches in the Allied front, was unable to expand the dislocation or disorganize the whole of the Allied armies and completely consume their reserves.

Now, by contrast, Foch wins the initiative on July 18th, and between that date and August 6th, when Ludendorff retires behind the Vesle, occupies his enemy and forces him to consume his reserves in covering the retreat from the Marne. Then on August 8th he throws Haig's Fourth Army against the German line at the Somme, achieves local success, and for a whole month exploits this success, expanding the extent of the dislocation of the enemy front until it stretches from the Scarpe before Arras to the Vesle near Rheims. So far from having a breathing spell, Ludendorff is compelled to fling division after division of reserves into the furnace, while all his armies from the Scarpe to the Aisne are subjected to local defeats, inevitable disorganization, and, finally, all of them begin to disclose evidences of demoralization.

Foch, himself, thus describes the matter to Babin:

> You see it's a question of shouldering one's way through—one army advances, another follows, a third makes a push. In order to parry our blows the Germans needed to gain time, to be able to pull themselves together somewhere. But we did not give them a chance. They had to fight to save their necks. They had no end of material stored in a chain of work shops all ready for an advance to Paris, but we upset their programme on July 18th and now we're taking their workshops one after another and they're falling back all the time, which means progressive confusion and disorganization. They need to get away from us, but they can't shake us off. They have no reserves and we are at their heels, allowing them no respite.

This was after the event but General Maurice records that before March 21st, one of the Allied statesmen who had assembled at Versailles, asked Foch point blank:

"But if the Germans do make their great attack, what is your plan?" To this interrogation Foch responded: "By striking out three rapid blows, with his right, with his left, and again with his right, following these by landing out a vigorous kick."

September 10th Ludendorff gets his battered armies back to the Hindenburg Line, but instead of a respite he has a new problem set for him by Pershing's sudden and swift victory at St. Mihiel, a victory which is not only locally costly, since it smashes six divisions, but, by carrying a threat to Briey with its invaluable iron mines, compels Ludendorff to concentrate more reserves in the east; that is, outside the area in which he is now going to be attacked by a tremendous Allied force.

Before Ludendorff can adjust himself to this new condition, to the threat in the east—a threat deriving its real importance from the disclosure at St. Mihiel that the American army will henceforth have an importance hitherto unsuspected—Foch starts his general offensive on September 26th on either side of the Argonne, extends it the next day to the region between the Oise and the Scarpe and, on the next, to the region about Ypres.

More than two months have now passed since the opening of the Second Battle of the Marne, and during that time not one single moment of rest has been allowed Ludendorff, the strain upon his reserves has never been relaxed. Foch's local ruptures of the German front have in all cases been swiftly extended and by this time every one of his armies from the sea to the Moselle, from Ypres to Metz, has suffered disorganizing defeat, and this embraces every effective German army on the western front. In a word, Foch has not only expanded local dislocation of the enemy front, but the disorganization incident to local defeat. It is not positions or battles which he has won that weigh chiefly—Ludendorff counted an impressive number of these between March and July—it is the fashion in which Foch has exploited these successes. It is the result which he has produced by them which is important. Ludendorff

has never been able to realize on his investments, and one unfortunate speculation has not only deprived him of the profits of two ventures, but has also impaired his credit to such an extent that he cannot now discharge the obligations which have come due.

The thing that one feels about the Foch campaign is the apparent ease, the marvellous smoothness with which one success leads to another and each local triumph seems somehow to merge into a second and greater. The drama moves so simply, naturally, logically, that the most astounding developments lack the quality of surprise when they arrive. But the reason, for there is no accident anywhere, must be found in the mind and method of the man. Ludendorff was at least as fortunate, had quite as much luck in the beginning. For him the division of Allied command was an advantage greater than any single card ever put in Foch's hand. The collapse of the Portuguese at the Lys was for him a piece of good fortune quite as great as was for Foch the refusal of a Prussian division to fight on March 8th. The tank tactic was no more effective, unexpected, potent than the Hutier tactic in its own time. The German machine in March was incomparably superior to the Allied machine in July. Ludendorff's superiority in trained troops in March was far more decisive than that of Foch in trained and untrained troops combined in August and September. Foch has said that the German machine was an express locomotive in the hands of a stage-coach driver. This conclusion is inescapable when one reviews the history of the campaign. At the outset Ludendorff had all the cards. He lost because he could neither make the most of good fortune nor survive a run of bad luck.

### VI. THE END OF THE BATTLE

And now, on October 10th, the day which sees the end of the battle of the Hindenburg Line, what exactly is the situation? At the north of Lille, the army group of King Albert—containing the Belgian army, Plumer's British Second Army, and Degoutte's French army, and presently to include two American divisions, the 37th and the 91st—is advancing, is approaching Roulers, and has already made such progress that it is only a matter of hours until the Germans will have to

retire from the Belgian coast and from all of Belgium west of the Scheldt. This army group also constitutes a threat to the Germans in Lille which would compel the evacuation of this city and the enormous tangle of fortifications about it which makes it the western anchorage of the whole German front even if it were not similarly threatened to the south and east. Facing Lille and approaching it is Birdwood's new British Fifth Army, whose mission it is to move in conformity with the armies north and south and exert such pressure as it may upon the Germans in front of it.

South, between Lens and the Oise, are the British armies which have smashed the Hindenburg Line: first is Horne's British First Army, which is closing in on Douai and threatening Lille from the south. It is already setting its feet on the roads trodden by the immortal Expeditionary Army and its troops will see Mons victoriously a month hence after taking Valenciennes. Thanks to it and to King Albert's group, Birdwood's army will enter Lille a few days later. South of Horne's army is Byng's which has just taken Cambrai, is through the Hindenburg Line, and passing Bavay, French's headquarters at Mons. Byng will take Maubeuge before the end.

South again is Rawlinson's Fourth Army, which includes the 27th and 30th American divisions, Read's Second Corps, which has shared with distinction in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line. This army is on the edge of Le Cateau, where Smith-Dorrien fought in August, 1914; will pass through Landrecies, where Haig's corps stood briefly in the Retreat; and before November 11th, will pass Avesnes, where Ludendorff and the Kaiser had their headquarters at the time of the Battle of Picardy.

Astride the Oise, Debeney's French First Army, which held the gap on the Avre in the terrible days of March when Foch arrived, has just taken St. Quentin and is aiming at Guise, where Joffre won his brilliant little battle in August, 1914. Debeney will soon take Guise and be in Belgium before the war is over. South of the Oise is Mangin's Tenth Army, in which Bullard's corps fought at the Soissons corner. It has already passed La Fère and Laon; it will soon give way to the French

Third Army, commanded by Humbert, hero of the Lassigny Hills in March, hero of the Château of Mondement in Foch's army in the First Marne: and Mangin will go to Lorraine to organize the troops destined to make the thrust east of Metz if the enemy continues. Many American divisions will be marked for this adventure, but the enemy will not continue.

East of the Tenth Army is the French Fifth Army, Guillaumat, a Verdun general, replacing Berthelot, who has been called to Roumania on pressing invitation to continue his task begun before the Roumanian surrender was forced by Russian desertion. Guillaumat has passed the Craonne Plateau, reoccupied Rheims, emerged from the Gap of Juvincourt, of evil memory, and is pushing forward north of the Aisne. Mangin and Guillaumat are pushing frontally against the Hunding Stellung, one of the rearward German defence lines between the Oise and the Aisne, the westward extension of the unforgettable Kriemhilde Stellung against which Pershing is beating. Debeney's advance west of the Oise will presently turn this Hunding position. To the east again, Gouraud's Fourth Army is pounding at the Brunhilde Stellung along the Aisne from Rethel to Vouziers and Pershing's First Army is storming the Kriemhilde between the Argonne and the Meuse, with Hunter Liggett commanding. East of the Meuse, Bullard's American Second Army is just coming into line before the Michael Stellung from Verdun to Metz. The French armies between Haig and Pershing are organized in two groups, those to the west commanded by Fayolle, who saved the day in Picardy; those to the east by De Maistre, who did the same at the Second Marne. Both are under the supreme command of Petain.

The military situation at the same moment is as follows: the Germans are under orders to retreat out of all the Hindenburg Line. Their defeat is absolute. Ludendorff hopes to rally his beaten army behind a line running along a canal from the Dutch frontier to Ghent, thence behind the Scheldt to Denain, and thence behind the little Selle to the point west of the Sambre, where begins his last system of defences—the Hermann Stellung, extending to the Meuse below Sedan. But he will still strive to hold back Gouraud and Pershing on the Aisne and at the bend of the

Aire to protect the vital railway, become infinitely more precious as the retreat grows more imminent, the retreat which already looks toward Germany. Still farther to the east is the French group of Castelnau, last survivor of Joffre's lieutenants at the Marne left in command in France—Foch alone excepted—but Franchet d'Esperey, another, has just conquered Bulgaria.

In a word, at the close of the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, and as a consequence of decisive defeat, Ludendorff, on the night of October 9th, orders a retirement of his left and centre, a far-swinging retreat to be halted behind the Scheldt, the Selle, and the Hermann Line. This retreat calls for the evacuation of the Belgian coast, of Bruges, and of Lille, and will carry Foch's left and centre far into Belgium and close to the French frontier. But at the same time, Ludendorff orders his right to hold on in front of Gouraud and Pershing; demands of it, now that the front door is broken in and the enemy is actually in his house, that it hold open one of the two back doors by which alone Ludendorff's armies can escape from the house—and they will need both doors.

The Battle of the Hindenburg Line is over. Foch's problem is now that of Grant after the latter had forced Lee out of his lines about Richmond. Lee's purpose was to escape with his army from the net flung about him and stand again, Grant's problem was to destroy Lee's army before it could escape from the consequences of Five Forks and the subsequent disasters.

In the words of Requin:

> The German staff proposes to establish itself upon the Antwerp-Scheldt-Maubeuge-Mézières-Metz Line, but for that purpose they need a respite, for a new defensive front can not be occupied under good condition unless it is, first, organized ahead, second, occupied by reserve troops, ready to collect the forces engaged and retreating.
>
> The situation of the German army is in fact without an outlet. Their reserves have melted away in the gigantic battle. From sixty-seven divisions back of the front on September 26th they have fallen to forty-six on September 30th, to twenty-six by October 15th, of which only nine are considered fresh. The necessary proportion between the fighting and replacement effectives no longer exists. In order to supply the front, it became necessary to disband twenty divisions. Also in July, the German reduced the fighting effective of all their battalions.

Ludendorff's narrative of this same period becomes one long complaint over the failure of his numbers. The vast captures of Foch's armies, more than a quarter of a million prisoners before the Battle of the Hindenburg Line is over, constituted a drain totally unforeseen. He has gathered the last dregs from Russia, he has swept up all that is left of German man-power, and it has proven woefully insufficient. Pershing's attack in the Argonne has consumed or will consume forty-seven divisions, a quarter of the whole number of German divisions available. Germany is now, as her soldiers and propagandists have proclaimed France for three years, "bled white." The hour has arrived which Bernhardi in his unforgettable book described with prescient accuracy. All Germany's foes have succeeded in putting their full strength into the field at one time; the result will be as he foresaw.

### VII. "APPOMATTOX"

The moment has now arrived for the final effort. Ludendorff's broken and beaten army is staggering back to the line on which it will seek to make a final stand. Foch must now break the last semblance of a power to resist. He will do it by continuing his two main thrusts: Haig's drive toward Mons and Maubeuge, Pershing's drive with Gouraud toward Sedan and the Metz railway. The other operations are by comparison minor.

Once more the chief effort will be made by Haig and Pershing. Haig will seek to break through between the Sambre and the bend of the Scheldt below Valenciennes. He will strike the German line occupying in the main the east bank of the little Selle. If he can break through here, Ludendorff can maintain neither the line of the Scheldt to the north nor the Hermann Stellung to the south. Haig's engagement, the Battle of the Selle, begins on October 17th. It lasts until October 23rd, and Byng, Horne, and Rawlinson are engaged; two American divisions, the 27th and the 30th, fight with twenty-four British against thirty-one German divisions.

In this Battle of the Selle the Germans fight with a determination

not shown in recent engagements. There has been a distinct and impressive rally, but even this rally comes too late and too weakly. At the Selle, 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns are taken, and by October 25th the British armies are far forward. And the next day, the Kaiser, receiving Ludendorff coldly, will accept his resignation.

Haig is breaking his way through the gap between the Sambre and the Scheldt. The Selle was his first barrier. The tiny Rhônelle, which parallels the Selle a few miles to the north, is his last. November 1st he breaks through; the fighting is severe but the result is decisive. The line of the Scheldt to the north and the Hermann Stellung to the south are turned. Haig can now push down the valleys of the Sambre

BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE

Diagonal lines indicate the territory regained between July 18th and September 26th. Solid black marks the territory taken in breaking the Hindenburg Line between September 26th and October 23rd.

and of the Meuse; there is no system of defence in front of him, there is no sufficient natural obstacle to check him. His road is open to Namur and to Liége. As he advances through Maubeuge and Mons, which he will reach promptly, he is narrowing the gap between his front and the Dutch frontier through which all the German armies north of the Sambre must pass if they are to escape envelopment and the choice between surrender to the British and internment in Holland.

Here is the ultimate revelation of Foch's strategy which consisted in making two major thrusts at the points where the largest gains would result. British advances between September 26th and November 1st have already dragged with them the Germans to the north from Cambrai to the sea, and to the south from the Oise to the Aisne. Now Haig's armies are so placed that much and perhaps all of Ludendorff's forces north of the Sambre will be surrounded and have to surrender, and there is left to all the army group of the enemy's centre only a single exit: that part of the Metz-Maubeuge railway from Mézières eastward. If Pershing can realize Foch's conception for his second major thrust, this remaining avenue of escape will be closed.

And Pershing has realized Foch's purpose. The last days of October have seen the American troops bite into the few remaining fragments of the Kriemhilde Line. They have consumed the last reserves the Germans had to put in here and accordingly, on November 1st, while Haig is forcing the passage of the Rhônelle and taking Valenciennes, Pershing's First Army breaks out into the open and begins its amazing rush to Sedan and Montmédy, the rush that will take Liggett squarely across the Mézières-Metz railway, last avenue of escape for the German centre. It will be before Sedan and in sight of Montmédy, with its mission fulfilled, on November 11th; and on this final day, when Haig's army is closing the line of retreat of the German right, Pershing, with Gouraud's assistance as always, has closed the pathway of the retreat of the German centre.

And at this same moment Mangin is in command of a great army containing six American divisions scheduled to break out between Metz and Strassburg on November 14th. On Mangin's front the Germans

have not a single division of reserves left. Mangin's attack would carry him straight through the German left wing across its rear and line of retreat, and this would in a few days have to submit to exactly the same fate already overhanging the right and the centre, while the American army, Bullard's Second Army, would encircle Metz from the northwest and repeat the events of 1870 with a German in Bazaine's place.

But all speculation as to future developments is at once idle and unnecessary. The Germans who met the Allied representatives on their mission to ask an armistice may or may not have said, "The German army is in Marshal Foch's hands," but such was the fact. Haig was master of the fate of the German right; Pershing, of the line of retreat of the centre; Mangin's blow, fast ripening, must dispose of the left, north of the Vosges. And the German surrender, to avoid this supreme disaster, was an unconditional surrender; Ludendorff asserts it, the terms of the Armistice prove it. The final battle and its immediate consequences, the liquidation of the results of the first days, began on September 26th; the last German resistance was broken on November 1st, thirty-seven days in all. From Ludendorff's attack in Picardy to his final check in Flanders was forty days. The master had been well served by his lieutenants, Petain, Haig, and Pershing; they had been well seconded by their subordinates, Fayolle, De Maistre, Gouraud, Mangin, Debeney, Humbert, Berthelot, Guillaumat, Plumer, Horne, Byng, Rawlinson, Liggett and Bullard; but the master was Foch, he was as preëminent among his generals as Napoleon among his marshals. No campaign of Napoleon had been as stupendous in its circumstances, no termination more fortunate, more decisive. Neither at Jena nor at Waterloo were the battlefield results more conclusive; neither in the capitulation at Metz nor at Sedan had the submission been more absolute than that of the German army on November 11th.

As to the legend, that piece of impudent propaganda invented by the German High Command, put forth by Ludendorff—that the German army had been unconquered and was unconquerable, remained capable of saving Germany right up to the moment when the country collapsed behind it—the facts themselves are adequate to refute this final attempt

of the German High Command to preserve its ancient reputation. On this subject General Buat writes with authority in words carrying conviction:

It is a legend which should be demolished, the claim that the German army was unconquered. When it obtained an armistice, that formidable host, which on July 18th counted not less than eighty divisions of reserves, had sunk under the repeated blows of the Allies to a point where it no longer possessed more than fifteen divisions behind its battlefront; and even of these, only two were ready to engage immediately. At the same hour the Allies had a hundred. A Franco-American attack by thirty divisions, followed immediately by thirty more, was just to be launched east of Metz on November 14th and to march straight to the Sarre and the Rhine. Nothing could have stopped it.

So convinced was the German General Staff of this fact that it had ordered the evacuation of Metz and Thionville, the two boulevards of the Rhineland. More than one hundred and sixty German divisions—sadly reduced in numbers, to be sure—were going to be obliged to retreat, with our bayonets at their backs and with their southern flank uncovered, through the gap between the Moselle below Thionville and Dutch Limburg. After the Armistice, unpursued and employing all the roads between Switzerland and Holland, these one hundred and sixty divisions were unable to get away, except by sacrificing the greater part of their material. What would have happened but for the Armistice? In point of fact, it is by the hundreds of thousands of men and thousands on thousands of guns that we should have reckoned our captures, if the Germans had not decided to sign the humiliating document of November 11th.

The statistics of the victory are as follows: Between July 18th and November 11th, Foch's armies had captured 385,000 prisoners—as many as Bazaine surrendered at Metz and Napoleon III at Sedan in 1870—and 6,615 guns. The division of the captures was: British, 188,000 prisoners and 2,880 guns; French, 139,000 prisoners and 1,880 guns; American, 44,000 prisoners and 1,421 guns; Belgian, 14,500 prisoners and 474 guns. The American total is above 50,000, reckoning in it the prisoners taken by the Second Corps, with the British, and the five divisions which fought in Flanders, at Juvigny, and east of Rheims—the captures of the Second Corps alone exceeding 6,000. The number stands against 208,000, Ludendorff's count of the prisoners taken by him between March 21st and June 15th, his total of cannon was 2,500. Even more than the disparity in men, that in guns indicates the difference between the two operations.

# CHAPTER TEN

## THE MEUSE–ARGONNE

### I

### PERSHING'S TASK

Having examined the progress of the battle which won the war, it remains now to consider in some detail the part played in this battle by Pershing's forces. The general place of the American participation in the struggle has been outlined. Pershing's First Army in conjunction with the smaller force of Gouraud constituting Foch's right flank, was to deliver one of the two major thrusts. While Haig's armies were advancing through the Hindenburg Line, through the line of the Scheldt and the Hermann Stellung, through Maubeuge toward Namur and Liége, Pershing was to push down the Meuse and cut the Mézières-Metz railway from Sedan to Montmédy, closing one of the two exits of the German army between the Dutch frontier and the Allied front at Verdun, not only closing one but threatening the other. Haig and Pershing, from widely separated fronts, were thus moving toward the same point, were the essential factors in the great converging attack in the general assault all along the half circle from Ypres to the outskirts of Metz.

In his final report Pershing has set forth the history of the development of the idea for this attack. In the discussion of August 30th Marshal Foch had proposed to the American general operations which were unacceptable to him because they would require the immediate separation of the recently formed American First Army into groups to assist several French armies. This would have rendered useless all the enormous preparations already made for the new army. In addition Pershing asserts:

> The inherent disinclination of our troops to serve under Allied commanders would have grown, and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated

quite clearly, that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

On September 2nd, at a new conference attended by Petain, Pershing was offered the choice between two sectors: that in Champagne, where Gouraud subsequently attacked, and that in the Meuse-Argonne, where the American army actually fought. At this conference Pershing heard outlined the plan for the great converging attack which later became a reality, but records that no one present even hinted that the end was at hand. In discussing the proposed Meuse-Argonne operation, the French High Command indicated its view "that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force the cessation of operations." This estimate proved incorrect, but the month of fighting necessary to get forward from Montfaucon to Landres-et-Saint-Georges demonstrated the reasonableness of the French view. As between the Argonne Forest and the Champagne sector, Pershing chose the former because: "In my opinion no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector, and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometres of front (just under a hundred miles) was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions then in that zone."

At first, however, the St. Mihiel operation was to be pushed, and September 12th saw it carried to triumphant conclusion. What this victory meant to the new American army, Pershing indicates thus:

The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defences. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions

concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theatre of operations. '

What the moral effect of St. Mihiel was, we have seen already. It not only won for Pershing the opportunity to play one of the leading rôles in the forthcoming Allied convergent attack, already foreshadowed on September 2nd, but it also placed an enormous, an impossible burden upon the newly constituted staff of an army just organized. Within a period of two weeks the American First Army had to fight a major engagement at St. Mihiel and then transfer its front to the north, take over new lines, a totally new sector, and deliver an even greater battle. In addition, practically all the veteran divisions used at St. Mihiel, having had no adequate time to rest and refit, were unavailable at the moment and Pershing had to begin the greatest battle in American history with an army composed mainly of green troops, newly come from the United States, lacking in all the essentials of adequate preparation.

Recognizing the magnificence of the actual achievement of these troopson September 26th, it is not unreasonable to believe that, had Pershing been able to employ his veterans, he might have realized his expectation and Foch's hope and broken clear through in the first two days of the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. It is worth recording also that, despite his own difficulties, Pershing had to spare six divisions, three of them certainly among the best in France, during the course of the operation: the 27th and 30th, which served with Haig throughout, and broke through the Hindenburg Line; the 2nd and the 36th, which were lent to Gouraud where they performed remarkable services, and the 37th and 91st, withdrawn in full battle and despatched to Flanders to serve with Degoutte, where the 37th forced the crossing of the Scheldt and took Oudenarde. Thus the measure of Pershing's achievement must be sought in the examination of his difficulties, and his achievement must be put down to the obstinate and dogged determination of his troops and of their commander-in-chief, nor can one restrain admiration at the manner in which the General, confident of his army, undertook the impossible and actually performed an incredible part of it.

He had to train a huge army on the field of battle and, unlike Haig, whose position at the First Somme was otherwise comparable, Pershing did not have adequate mechanical resources, sufficient lines of communication, or any considerable number of trained staff officers.

## II. THE BATTLEFIELD

No battle area on the western front is more difficult to describe than the Meuse-Argonne sector. The Argonne itself, with its densely wooded regions, recalls vividly the circumstances of the Wilderness campaign in the Civil War, and the country over which the New York City Division advanced would have awakened many memories in the minds of the veterans of Grant and Lee. The area between the Aire and the Meuse, with its high and wooded hills and its deep and marshy valleys, bounded on the east by the Meuse, strikingly recalls that country where Gates's army first halted, then broke and captured Burgoyne's army in the campaign which led to the surrender at Saratoga. And in this region between the Aire and the Meuse there is much which recalls the woods and hills of eastern Massachusetts and the points of cover from which the "Minute Men" assailed the British "Redcoats" on their retreat from Concord and Lexington on April 19, 1775.

In advancing from south to north, Pershing's army moved through a corridor rather more than 20 miles wide at the start and narrowing as the Meuse inclined westward to a point which was exactly at Donchery, where, in the Château de Bellevue, Napoleon III capitulated in 1870 after the disaster at Sedan. In this corridor the American difficulties were these: from the west they were assailed by a flank fire delivered by the Germans from the heights and forests of the Argonne which were impregnable to direct attack; a similar fire was delivered from the east, from the Heights of the Meuse on the right bank of that stream; in front they were faced by an enemy posted in an indescribable tangle of wooded hills, marshy bottoms, and deep ravines.

Literally, in all the early stages of the battle, the Americans in the corridor between the Argonne and the Meuse Heights were assailed by a frontal fire and at the same time pounded on both flanks, in their rear, and

along their communications, by the enemy who dominated them from the Argonne and from the Meuse Hills. It had been the expectation of their commander that the advance of the French on the west and of the Americans on the east of the Argonne would compel the Germans to retire at once, but so strong was the position that the enemy held on long after Gouraud and Pershing had passed them on either side and continued to sweep the Americans between the Argonne and the Meuse with a deadly cross fire.

To the difficulties inherent in the character of the country was added still another, produced by the absence of roads. The single good highway from the south to the north travelled down the valley of the Aire which was open and was exposed to direct observation and fire from the




THE WOODS OF THE ARGONNE–MEUSE BATTLEFIELD

The Argonne Forest gave the Germans a strong protection for one flank and the Meuse River similarly protected the other. The numerous smaller woods gave fine protection for defensive measures between as did the hills both at Montfaucon and farther back along the line Romagne, Landres-et-Saint-Georges, Grandpré.

Germans in the Forest of the Argonne all the way from Varennes to Grandpré; that is, to the point where the Germans made their last stand. The only other passable road was that which followed the Meuse Valley from the American front northward, and this was even more completely dominated by the Germans on the Meuse Heights than was the Aire road from the Argonne. A single other road half way between the two rivers wound in and out among the hills from the American front through Montfaucon to the ultimate German position, and this road was a mere country highway totally unsuited to motor traffic, and promptly ruined by shell fire. The greatest single element in delaying the American advance was the question of communications. An army always in excess of a quarter of a million, requiring enormous supplies and munitions, needing stupendous concentration of artillery to open its difficult way, evacuating thousands of wounded daily, engaged in fighting so intense that divisions had to be relieved frequently and replacements hurried up hourly, was condemned to depend upon three roads, one of which, the Meuse route, was totally unavailable; another, that in the Aire Valley, for a long time almost equally forbidden; and what amounted to a rough country lane, already wrecked by four years of bombardment and now torn up anew.

One more circumstance added enormously to the problem of communications. When the Americans "jumped off" on September 26th, they advanced out of lines which were just within the area of the great battle of Verdun in 1916. Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304, the extreme limits of German advance, were their points of departure, and for three miles in front of them was the indescribable chaos of one of the greatest battlefields of the war, which had been subjected to intense artillery fire for months at a time and, in addition, for four years to the intermittent bombardment exchanged between fixed fronts even in quiet sectors.

No pen and no photograph can adequately describe or portray the actual devastation and destruction of the guns in the whole Verdun area, and in no section was this devastation more complete than on the left bank of the Meuse where Petain and the German Crown Prince had fought in March and April of 1916.




THE AMERICAN ARGONNE-MEUSE DRIVE

This final operation of the war was carried out in three phases: I. Driving forward on September 26, 1918, our First Army penetrated to a distance of from three to seven miles, taking about 10,000 prisoners. II. From October 4th to 14th the direct advance being checked the effort was directed toward the flanks. III. Between October 15th and 31st, the Kriemhilde Line was penetrated and on November 1st the First Army pushed northward continuing in pursuit of the disorganized enemy.

And the same devastation extended to the Argonne, in which there had been terrific fighting in the winter of 1914-15. The Argonne Forest itself, a long clay eminence with a crest line some 800 feet above the general level of the country, was ten miles wide, heavily wooded, its steep soft sides cut and eroded by many little brooks. But for five miles in depth before the American front of September 26th, the natural difficulties had been a thousand-fold magnified by four years of conflict, and there extended northward a region of incredible desolation most closely recalling a mountain forest which has been swept by fire. And all this chaos was intensified by a vast glacis of barbed wire miles and miles deep.

East of the Argonne and of the little Aire River was the real Verdun sector, and here directly in front of the Americans was a region comparable only with the Valley of the Ailette north of the Craonne Plateau and with that of the Ypres salient itself. Villages, orchards, trees, every living thing and every circumstance of human life, had long disappeared. Through a narrow valley flowed the tiny Forges brook going eastward to the Meuse, and the shell fire of four years had transformed its valley into an impassable marsh filled with enormous shell craters which had become deep and dangerous ponds, forbidding the passage not merely of transports but even of men. Again and again in the Verdun time soldiers had been drowned in these shell craters, and on the similar front east of the Meuse the French had long relied upon sure-footed donkeys as the sole method of transport.

Thus it will be seen that not only were highways lacking, but that when the Americans advanced they had first to pass over a deep belt of country in which there was no possibility of moving guns or supplies forward until this moat of destruction had been bridged. Men could and did get forward on September 26th, although how they did it will always remain a puzzle to those who know the country; but guns and motor vehicles could not follow, and the check after the first onrush was a consequence. When our waves had penetrated and passed all the first German lines "prepared" by the American artillery, when they had advanced beyond the effective range of their own guns, they en-

countered other German divisions armed with machine guns, fortified with concrete emplacements, protected by German artillery firing upon the assailant from the front and from the flanks. They were forced to halt to wait for the guns which could not come until the moat had been bridged and roads constructed; and in that time the German was able to get up reserves and the battle became one of "usury"—a repetition of the Somme, of Flanders, and, indeed, of the First Verdun itself.

This was what the French High Command foresaw when it warned Pershing that he would not get far beyond Montfaucon before winter came, and the forecast would have been accurate had it not been for the sheer fighting capacity of the green American troops, who, suffering casualties heavier than those which sufficed to break the fighting spirit of Nivelle's armies at the Craonne Plateau in April and May, 1917, wore the German out and ultimately broke through his defence line.

A satisfactory description of the various details in the topography of the country between the Meuse and the Argonne is then quite impossible. It is necessary to think of the country in which our young soldiers fought, in which they pushed forward after their first great dash, as a tangle of wooded hills, separated by marshy valleys, having no ordered system, no central ridge, no dominant hill stretching from west to east in the pathway of Pershing's troops as Vimy Ridge and the Craonne Plateau barred sectors of the Aisne and Scarpe fronts. There was no line of hills blocking our advance from south to north as the Meuse Hills or the Argonne Hills would have blocked an enemy coming from the east westward. Between October 1st, when our first rush came to a halt as a result of the failure of communications, and November 1st, when the remnants of the German army gave it up and took to their heels, our troops simply fought from hill to hill, and the capture of one hill left them with a hill on either side and one in front to negotiate. They struggled through woodland after woodland only to find fresh forests on all sides. They fought a battle of extermination with an enemy who knew the country, who had organized it for defence; whose artillery had marked down every road, every cleared space, every point of assembly, and, on signal from his aviators, deluged it with perfectly aimed shots.

In a word, the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne between October 1st and November 1st resembled Indian fighting in the earliest colonial days to a surprising extent, despite the use of all the weapons of contemporary warfare. It was not a battle of clever manœuvre, a conflict between two brilliant strategies; it was above all a conflict of men, fought at close range, fought with the bayonet, the machine gun, the hand grenade, fought to extermination under conditions of country, weather, and communications which defied comprehension.

### III. THE GERMAN DEFENCE SYSTEMS

There is a very simple figure to describe the German defence systems in the Meuse-Argonne regions. The hills of the Meuse and of the Argonne constituted two distinct ridges running north and south, at first parallel and then converging, enclosing all the region where the real battle took place. The Germans occupied both ridges, and between these ridges they stretched barriers which resembled a series of gates swung from one stone fence to another in a country lane. They were solidly hinged and bolted on either side, and the American effort was to advance north through the lane, breaking down each of the successive gates along this roadway which led to their objective, the all-important railway from Metz to Mézières. There were actually three of these gates to be forced: two were in reality circumstances in the Hindenburg system and close together; the third, which was the Kriemhilde system, was three or four miles farther north and was the final barrier.

The Americans burst through the first two gates on September 26th and 27th, but the check in front of Montfaucon, and the failure of their transport system in consequence of the character of the country, delayed their progress from the second to the third gate until the Germans were able to rush reserves up; and Pershing's army fought these reserves, pushing them slowly but surely back upon the third gate, which they finally smashed on November 1st. Keeping this figure in mind, one can follow the various stages, always remembering that the Americans in the lane were long handicapped, not merely by the opposition in front, but by the punishment they received from the enemy who occupied

# THE MEUSE-ARGONNE

*U. S. Official Photo*

A HILL DEFENDED BY GERMANS: CAPTURED BY AMERICANS

AMERICAN BATTERY IN ACTION

*U. S. Official Photo*

Supporting the 1st Division. Firing at dawn. Note the screens looped up back of the guns

*U. S. Official Photo*

DOUGHBOYS UNDER MACHINE-GUN FIRE RUSHING THROUGH A STREET OF THELONNE, FRANCE

MACHINE GUN AGAINST MACHINE GUN

*U. S. Official Photo*

The Germans are attempting to set up their machine gun in spite of the rapid fire of the Americans

*U. S. Official Photo*

ADVANCING UNDER FIRE

There is nothing of the dramatic massed attack in this open order advance under fire. The photographer who took this picture was under fire, too

*U. S. Official Photo*

TALKING THROUGH GAS MASKS

Receiving instructions through a field telephone from an artillery observer. The information must be passed on to the gunners, gas or no gas

*U. S. Official Photo*

ON WATCH THE DAY BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

An observation tower built of light railway tracks. Picture taken November 10, 1918

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE CHAOS OF CONCENTRATED FIRE

As many as five shell craters filled with mustard gas were found in a space 10 by 13 feet



*U. S. Official Photo*

BIG MINE CRATER

A good example of the way the Germans destroyed the roads during their retreat. The traffic had to go around this gap

ENTANGLEMENTS, NATURAL AND GERMAN-MADE

*U. S. Official Photo*

These are the sorts of obstacles the 77th Division had to overcome in the Argonne

IN THE GERMANS' SECOND-LINE TRENCH

*U. S. Official Photo*

The Americans are resting in the trench they have just captured. In the Argonne

*U. S. Official Photo*

ON GUARD IN A FIRST-LINE TRENCH

A hastily dug trench along the edge of a wood. Not a posed picture. Taken October 2, 1918

"SOMEWHERE IN THE ARGONNE" *U. S. Official Photo*

American Engineers building a temporary bridge across the Aire, northwest of Verdun

*U. S. Official Photo*

YOU ARE LOOKING THROUGH THE PORTHOLE OF A GERMAN "PILL-BOX" IN THE ARGONNE FOREST

Note the way the underbrush has been cleared to permit machine-gun fire

HAND GRENADE THROWERS IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE

*U. S. Official Photo*

*U. S. Official Photo*

ADVANCING WITH RIFLE GRENADES

During the operations of the Argonne

AMERICAN SIGNALMEN LOOKING OVER THE ARGONNE FOREST

*U. S. Official Photo*

positions comparable with the top of the fence on either side of the lane looking down on the Americans and upon their rear and communications.

One other circumstance is worthy of note. On the British front Haig was still, on September 26th, when he attacked the Germans in the Hindenburg Line, a long way from their vital communication, and the Germans had begun to construct their reserve positions many miles back of the Hindenburg Line. The result was that Haig was able to advance rapidly for a considerable distance before he encountered the next line of German obstructions. But Pershing, when he attacked, was only a short distance from vital German communications, and therefore the Germans had constructed their second barrier in this region only a few miles behind the first. The result was that almost immediately after he broke through the Hindenburg system, the two gates of our figure, Pershing encountered the next, whereas Haig was clear through the Hindenburg Line in the first week of October and did not reach the Scheldt-Hermann Line until the last days of the month. This circumstance explains why the advances of both the British and the French were so much more extensive than those of the Americans between October 1st and November 1st. In point of fact, on this day Pershing and Haig, both of them, burst through the last German defence system, and it should be added that the section of this last line facing Pershing was far more complete and fencible than the Selle and Rhônelle defence lines which Haig surmounted.

On September 26th Pershing's army from the Argonne to the Meuse looked northward across the devastated area upon the first and second German defence systems, organized in depth for some six miles, lightly held, mainly by machine-gun detachments. At the northern edge of this fortified zone, midway between the Argonne and the Meuse, was the dominating hill on which stood the ruined village of Montfaucon, which was the point of vantage from which the Crown Prince had watched the opening of his attack upon Verdun. The hill of Montfaucon was more than a thousand feet high, rising out of much lower ground, dominating the whole front in a fashion which suggested the conning tower of a submarine. Madelin describes it as "that eagle's

nest." The whole hill had been fortified by the Germans, who had provided it with a very considerable number of concrete block-houses—low structures with rounding roofs, made of reinforced concrete many feet thick, and commanding all the roads of approach to the village. Toward the Americans they showed only a narrow slit, several feet long but no more than three inches wide, through which machine guns were fired. These concrete emplacements were invisible from the air and impervious to everything except a direct hit by a heavy gun. Inside this cover three or four men could hold up a regiment and inflict terrific losses. Across the single road leading into the village, the Germans had stretched a series of concrete posts to prevent a tank attack.

It was the conception of the German command that an Allied attack between the Meuse and the Argonne would be able to get forward some three or four miles as a result of the preparation made by the artillery. But it calculated that when the assailants reached the vicinity of Montfaucon, they would have passed through the area covered by their own artillery and then, assailed by fire from Montfaucon in front and from the Meuse and Argonne hills on the flanks, the advance would be checked and would die out in front of Montfaucon. This calculation was not quite realized, for Pershing's troops did take Montfaucon on the second day of the first attack, but the town held out just long enough to enable the Germans to rush up reserves which checked Pershing's troops only a little to the north of Montfaucon itself.

Montfaucon is a conspicuous example of the extent to which the German surpassed all his opponents in protective defence works. Mont Sec, in the St. Mihiel sector, was an equally noteworthy illustration; Mont Sec and Montfaucon have furnished two of the most vivid memories American soldiers have carried away of the German defences. Since the Meuse-Argonne front covered a vital line of communication, the German defences were very elaborate. To the intricate artificial works there were added natural circumstances which made Pershing's battlefield perfectly adapted to the use of the machine gun, the Germans' favourite weapon, and the most difficult battlefield on the whole western front.

### IV. FIRST PHASE

The bombardment preceding the attack on September 26th began at 2:30 A.M. and lasted for three hours. It was the usual prelude, and in these three hours more powder was burned than in the whole Civil War. A little less than 3,000 guns were in line, and thirty-five French artillery regiments reinforced the American batteries and supplied the larger part of the heavy artillery. All the guns served by American and French alike, as well as the ammunition, were of French manufacture.

The American army, in line on a 25-mile front, was divided into three corps. The order from west to east was as follows: The First Corps —comprising the 77th, 28th, and 35th divisions—was in line from La Harazee in the Argonne to Vauquois on the eastern edge of the Aire Valley. It was commanded by Hunter Liggett who would presently take over the First Army. The Fifth Corps occupied a front from east of Vauquois to the slopes of Hill 304. It was composed of the 91st, 37th, and 79th divisions, and was commanded by George H. Cameron, who was presently succeeded by Charles P. Summerall, who led the 1st Division at the Soissons corner. The front between Hill 304 and the Meuse was occupied by the Third Corps led by Robert L. Bullard, who had commanded the 1st Division at Cantigny, the American Army Corps at the Soissons corner, and would presently be succeeded by Joseph P. Dickman when Bullard took over the American Second Army. The Third Corps consisted of the 4th, 80th, and 33rd divisions. Of the nine divisions only one, the 4th, had seen severe fighting, while the 33rd had lent some of its units to the British at Chipilly Ridge in the fighting following the offensive of August 8th at the Somme.

In the scheme of things, the main advance was to be made by the Fifth Corps in the centre, which was to pass through Montfaucon and arrive at Romagne and Cunel on the edge of the Kriemhilde Stellung by nightfall. The other two corps were to cover flanks of this advance along the Meuse and astride the Aire. Gouraud's Fourth Army was attacking west of the Argonne, and it was expected that his advance and that of the American centre would lead to a prompt German evacua-

tion of the Argonne, transformed by the two advances into a deep and narrow salient. On the west bank of the Aire the 28th Division, which had seen some fighting in the Marne salient, was expected to reach Apremont, and the 35th to take Exermont on the right bank. Arrived on this front the Americans were to halt, reorganize, and on September 27th, push through the Kriemhilde Line, north of which the German had no organized defensive system. The attack was to be a surprise. It was known that the German had but five divisions in line, only one of them first rate, and it was estimated that he could put no more than six divisions of reserves in during the first two days—four on the first, two on the second. But on the third, he would be able to put nine divisions in and these would be fully sufficient to check the American advance if it had not by that time broken the Kriemhilde Line and routed the Germans before it. Pershing's nine divisions numbered about 250,000 men and he had practically unlimited reserves to draw upon at this time. Thus he had the advantage of surprise, tremendous superiority in artillery, and numerical odds of about five to one.

We may now examine what actually took place. On the right of the line, the Third Corps almost completely fulfilled its mission, the 33rd Division crossing the Forges brook, lined the right bank of the Meuse from its point of departure to the hills north of Dannevoux in the bend of the Meuse. The 80th pushed into the woodland and hills to the westward only a little to the south of Brieulles which was its extreme objective. The 4th pushed on to the eastern edge of Nantillois which was its objective. The Third Corps had therefore substantially performed its mission, having passed through all the Hindenburg system and was in position to cover the Fifth if that corps should perform its mission and be ready to attack on the second day.

But the Fifth was less fortunate, it had the hardest mission, since the 79th Division had to take Montfaucon by direct attack supported by the 37th on its left. The 79th had the most difficult part of the front to cross, the area which had been most torn up in the 1916 fighting. As a result it "lost" its barrage, that is it did not keep up with the curtain of fire, timed to destroy obstacles and keep down resistance just

in front of advancing infantry. This meant that the Germans were able to come out of their shelters after the barrage had passed, set up their machine guns, and punish the advancing infantry which was without artillery support.

As a consequence the 79th did not get to the foot of the Montfaucon Height until just before dark, and the 37th which had also passed through very difficult country was equally late. At this hour the 37th should have been far north of Montfaucon just as the 4th Division actually was. Thus threatened with envelopment, the German garrison in Montfaucon would have had to flee or surrender, and the work of the 79th would have been easy. As it was the Germans hung on, repulsed all attacks of the 79th and the 37th with heavy losses, and the 4th had to come back from Nantillois to protect its flank.

The Fifth Corps, scheduled to deliver the decisive thrust, was thus halted several miles south of its objective, and instead of being able to attack the Kriemhilde Line the next morning had to "mop up" Montfaucon instead, and it was not until night that it was able to get forward again, and even then only a short distance.

As for the First Corps and the 91st Division of the Fifth Corps, their progress had also been disappointing. The 91st had been checked in part by the reason of the failure of the 37th which had been held up in turn by the 79th. The 35th had not quite reached Baulny, while the 28th and the 77th across the Aire, after the first considerable gains, had been checked, as was to be expected by the resistance in the Argonne.

Pershing had now to face exactly the disappointments which came to Byng after his initial success at Cambrai a year before. Then a complete surprise had been partially spoiled by the success of one German battery in the town of Flesquières. This battery delayed the British advance for so many hours that the Germans were able to rush up reserves and to destroy the crossings of the Scheldt. As a result, Byng's cavalry could not get into action in time and a complete rupture of the German line was prevented.

Now the twenty-four hour delay in the American centre, caused by

Montfaucon had enabled the Germans to pour in six divisions of reserves, and nine more were available. Before he could get forward Pershing would have to wait for the guns, reorganize his communications, and evacuate his wounded. He would also have to relieve three divisions which had suffered terribly after partial check: the 79th, the 37th, and the 35th, which, after a brilliant advance on September 28th to the heights south of Exermont, had been forced to retire.

Worse even than this was the fact that the failure of his centre to reach its objectives and a similar delay suffered by the French west of the Argonne had combined to spoil the plan to pinch the Germans out of the Argonne, and they were now able to cross their fire with that of their comrades east of the Meuse, covering the flanks, the rear, and the communications of the Americans. Actually Pershing instead of rupturing the German front between the Meuse and the Argonne had merely driven a wedge, seven miles deep and less than ten miles wide at its broadest point, into the enemy front, and his men in this wedge were being punished by the Germans who occupied the high ground on both sides. In other words, Pershing had now undergone the same experience as all of his predecessors during the war of positions. The Germans when they had attacked Verdun across the Meuse on February 21, 1916, had driven a similar wedge into the French positions for an equal depth. But the fire of the French artillery from Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill, which Pershing's troops had just passed over, paralyzed German advance until French reserves arrived, and the Germans, deprived of all the advantage of their surprise, had to halt and turn their attention to the hills across the river and clear them before they could get on.

Falkenhayn's hope of taking Verdun by a single thrust, and Pershing's design to break through the German defensives between the Meuse and the Argonne and promptly cut the Metz railroad near Sedan, were thus blocked under similar circumstances. Both at Verdun and in the Meuse-Argonne the front-line defence lasted just long enough to enable reserves to get up and prevent a rupture, and thereafter the assailants found themselves involved in a new war of positions in country ad-

mirably adapted for defence and in a posture bound to involve heavy casualties.

The enemy now had behind him good communications while Pershing's army was still separated from its bases both by the stretch of country marked by the destruction of previous battles and by the condition of the roads north of this area, wrecked by the recent battle and swept by German artillery fire alike from the front and both flanks. The result then was disappointing. An advance of seven miles had been made at the extreme point; 10,000 prisoners and 100 guns had been captured, but the enemy front was intact. Pershing was now stuck exactly where the French High Command had prophesied that he would be checked, and the German High Command had planned to halt any attack between the Meuse and the Argonne. Conceivably, had Pershing been able to use his veteran divisions, to use the 1st and 2nd against Montfaucon, his original plan might have been carried out, but both units had been heavily engaged less than two weeks before in the St. Mihiel salient; the two divisions actually engaged were totally new to offensive warfare and were literally going into their first battle.

Had Pershing been able to get to the Metz railroad in the last days of September instead of the first days of November, the effect of this triumph would have been far more disastrous than it could have been later, for between these two dates the Germans undoubtedly evacuated great masses of stores—Ludendorff asserts this. Nevertheless the ultimate arrival did carry for the enemy a deadly peril, escaped only by the Armistice. Moreover, all Allied authorities agreed that what Pershing undertook was not less than the impossible, and neither his French allies nor his German foes believed that, having thrust his army into the neck of the bottle, he would be able to push his way through before winter stopped the campaign. More than this, praise for what was actually accomplished was very generous. Madelin, who knew the Verdun area well, having made all the campaigns there from 1914 to 1917, wrote:

"Our Allies had achieved a grand success. They had taken Montfaucon, that eagle's nest reckoned impregnable, and its peak." And

later he said again: "To have taken Montfaucon was a magnificent exploit, new proof of the bravery of the American soldier."

### V. THE SECOND PHASE

Between September 27th and October 4th Pershing's army was occupied in straightening out its front preparatory to the resumption of a general offensive. Minor gains were made but they amounted in the main merely to liquidating the consequences of the previous attack and the line was still marked by the hills south of Brieulles, by the villages of Nantillois and Cierges and the town of Apremont just west of the Aire on the edge of the Argonne, in which the enemy still held positions in a southward salient. On October 4th Pershing undertook, despite the cross fire from the Meuse Hills and the Argonne, to force his way forward between the Meuse and the Aire. Despite some advances the attack was in the main a complete and disheartening failure. On the right and in the centre the check was immediate and absolute; on the left the 1st Division, which had replaced the 35th, reached the outskirts of Exermont; and the 28th east of the Aire advanced to the vicinity of Fléville. But the 77th, fighting magnificently in the Argonne, went through precisely the experience that the best French and German divisions had undergone in the winter of 1915 when the character of the country forbade rapid or material gain. So far from improving his position Pershing had merely accentuated the salient in which his troops suffered, and the 1st and 28th divisions on the west bank of the Aire in low ground were unmercifully pounded by the Germans in the Argonne from Cornay, opposite Fléville, to Châtel-Chehery. Until he had abolished this Argonne salient, Pershing could not hope to advance northward. Just as Falkenhayn across the river had been obliged to halt his direct advance on Verdun until he had abolished the French flank fire from the hills west of the Meuse, Pershing's next operation must be an attack on either flank to clear the Meuse Heights and the forest and hills of the Argonne. No progress toward or through the Kriemhilde Line could be hoped for until the Argonne salient was abolished; and this manœuvre consumed ten days.

The first blow was struck by the French on October 7th on the heights east of the Meuse. By October 8th the high ground had been cleared for a distance of six miles, while the 33rd Division on this latter date forced the passage of the river in brilliant style joining hands with the 29th on the Meuse Heights. This partially removed the hindrance coming from across the Meuse, but farther to the north, and particularly in the Bois de Châtillon, opposite Brieulles, the Germans hung on and, until the end of the battle, continued to punish the Americans from that flank. On October 8th, by an exceedingly clever manœuvre, Pershing threw the 28th and the 82nd across the Aire from the hills south of Fléville to Apremont, took Châtel-Chehery and Cornay, and began to march across the rear of the Germans in the Argonne salient. The result was immediate. The Germans fled northward, the resistance in front of the 77th collapsed, and by October 13th the 77th and the 82nd lined the banks of the Aire north of the Argonne Forest from Marcq to Chevieres near Grandpré. These two operations had completely abolished the flank fire from the Argonne and greatly reduced that from the Meuse Heights. West of the Argonne, Gouraud's army had made equal progress and Pershing was no longer in a pocket. The Aire Valley road, the best in the whole region, was available for his transport as far north as Fléville, while the Montfaucon road had been put in condition and a spur railroad was being pushed down the Aire Valley to Varennes from the Verdun trunk line. Meantime between the Aire and the Meuse the front had been pushed forward to the outskirts of Romagne and Cunel, and an advance had been made past Brieulles on the wooded hills to the west. In a word, Pershing was getting close to the Kriemhilde Line and Marwitz was approaching his last ditch. This was the situation when Pershing turned over the command of the First Army to Hunter Liggett, put Bullard in command of the newly organized American Second Army, and thus became chief of an army group.

Between October 13th and November 1st the Americans west of the Aire were in action against the Kriemhilde Line; between October 10th and November 1st, those between the Aire and the Meuse were

wrestling with the same problem. This Kriemhilde Line from west to east was thus organized: At the southern end of the forest of Bourgogne, which was itself the extension of the Argonne north of the gap through which the Aire flows to the Aisne, the Germans occupied: Talma Farm on high ground in the midst of the forest; the considerable town of Grandpré, commanding the crossing of the river; Belle Joyeuse Farm above Grandpré, town and farm dominated by the hills of the Forest of Bourgogne; then to the eastward the steep, forest-crowned Bois-des-Loges which dominated the Aire Valley; then the village of St. Juvin and the high ground behind it extending in a well-defined ridge along the road from St. Juvin to Landres-et-Saint-Georges, thence through the Bois de Bantheville to the stretch of hills from Bantheville to the Meuse, along the north side of the little Andon brook which flows through Aincreville and Cléry-le-Petit. All advance on the west bank of the Meuse in the valley was prevented by German fire from the Bois de Châtillon across the river.

The position was exceedingly strong naturally. From Talma Farm to St. Juvin the Aire River, a deep stream flowing in a wide marshy valley, covered the German front, which was heavily wired along the river. From St. Juvin to Bantheville the hills about Landres-et-Saint-Georges dominate an open country. Eastward the Bantheville Forest was a difficult obstacle, while between Bantheville and the Meuse were high, heavily wooded forests, strong in themselves and doubly strong because of the cross fire coming from the east bank of the Meuse.

We have compared the battlefield to a lane barred by three gates. Actually the deep westward bend of the Meuse near Brieulle reduces the lane between the Aire and the Meuse to the width of a footpath, in our figure—a pass less than ten miles wide and actually a narrow gap between Bantheville Forest and the wooded hills west of the Meuse, by which the highway from the Aire Valley goes northward to Dun-sur-Meuse. This was the Thermopylæ which Marwitz attempted to hold in the last days of the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne, a solid ridge from the Forest of Bourgogne to the west bank of the Meuse with a single considerable break, that at Bantheville.

Between October 4th and November 1st, Pershing's "Second Phase," the operations fall into three distinct periods. The first occupies one day. Having regrouped his forces, he relieved the divisions most severely punished by putting in fresh and better-trained units: the 1st on the east bank of the Aire, the 32nd and the 3rd—the former proven in the passage of the Ourcq in the Marne salient, the latter at Château-Thierry. Having partially restored communications and brought up artillery, Pershing tries to repeat the effort of September 26th on October 4th. In doing this he imitates Falkenhayn at Verdun, Byng at Cambrai, Ludendorff himself before Amiens in the preceding spring; and like the other three, his attempt is an instant, complete, and bloody check. Then he has to abandon the attack in the centre, become hopeless until he has widened his front, abolished the flank fire from the Argonne, and at least reduced that from the Meuse Hills. Falkenhayn, after a similar check before Verdun in the last days of February, 1916, had to renounce the attack in the centre and devote his attention to the flanks—to fight the "Battle of the Wings" directed against Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 on the west and Fort de Vaux on the east. Not until late April, with the hills taken and Fort de Vaux partially smothered, could he resume the direct thrust on Verdun. Before he could push this thrust home the Battle of the Somme diverted German reserves from Lorraine to Picardy. The attack on Verdun had to be abandoned.

Pershing's Second Phase was, accordingly, marked by two similar operations on his respective flanks, designed to abolish the German cross fire, which prevented the advance of his centre. On October 7th, 8th, and 9th there were attacks both across the Meuse and the Aire. That across the Meuse was only moderately fruitful, although the achievement of the 33rd, in crossing the deep river and the canal beyond it, was one of the most brilliant circumstances in the battle and a fitting climax to the operation of this division on September 26th. This crossing was made on October 8th, in conjunction with the attacks of American and French troops east of the river.

The manœuvre across the Aire was equally brilliant and wholly successful. The 77th, fighting in the Argonne Forest, performing feats

of heroism and devotion which will always be memorable, was still unable to perform the impossible. Nor was the attack of the 28th, astride the Aire, capable of abolishing the deadly Argonne salient. Accordingly Pershing relieved the fraction of the 28th east of the Aire and replaced it by the 82nd, taken from corps reserve; and on October 7th, while the 77th and the 28th continued their pressure west of the Aire, the 82nd crossed the river—a feat of great daring—stormed the heights crowned by Châtel-Chehery, and reached Cornay the next day. "One of the most extraordinary feats of the whole battle," says Captain Page.

Thereupon the Germans in the Argonne, attacked frontally by the 77th and threatened on their flank and rear by the 28th and the 82nd, cleared out of the Forest and retired behind the Aire, while the 82nd, taking Marcq and repassing the Aire, took St. Juvin a few days later. In all these operations, as in the fighting north and east of the Aire, a certain number of controversies have arisen as to the credit for the taking of various towns, but however important this accurate appraisal of individual achievement may seem to the various units, it is relatively minor in the larger view. The contributions of the three divisions actually engaged in the reduction of the Argonne each possessed sufficient distinction to satisfy the most devoted partisans. The American army as a whole, moreover, can afford to be proud, both of the dogged and never-ending struggle of the 77th in the Argonne and of the dash and gallantry of the 82nd and the 33rd in the passage of the Aire and the Meuse.

By October 10th the operations in the Argonne and the Meuse Heights, corresponding to the "Battle of the Wings" in the Verdun offensive of 1916, were over, and Pershing was able to resume the thrust in the centre, which had been intended as the main attack all along but had been held up, after the first swift advance on September 26th, by the resistance of Montfaucon and again, on October 4th, by the cross fire from the Argonne and the Meuse Heights.

The Third Phase, from October 10th to November 1st, is a direct drive through the Kriemhilde Stellung from Grandpré, which the 77th approached on October 13th and 14th, to the Meuse at Brieulles.

In this last period the fighting is intense all along the line but the decisive progress is on either side of the Montfaucon-Bantheville highway which follows the little Andon brook through the Bantheville gap in the hills of the Kriemhilde Stellung. In this advance, the 32nd takes and passes Romagne, future site of the great American cemetery, on October 14th. The 5th, to the right, takes Cunel, its crossroads, woods, and hills, on October 14th–17th. The 42nd prolongs the advance to the left. Then suddenly, about October 20th, a deep wedge begins to work through the Kriemhilde Line astride the Andon brook. The 32nd enters Bantheville Forest and begins to encircle Landres-et-Saint-Georges. The 89th takes over from the 32nd and extends the wedge, cleans up all of Bantheville Woods by October 21st and 22nd. The 90th gets Bantheville while the 5th and 3rd clean up all the high ground between Bantheville and the Meuse Valley. This means that by the end of October Pershing's centre is clear through the Kriemhilde system.

To the east, the progress is much slower in consequence of the even more difficult character of the country. The 77th takes Grandpré on October 17th, but the 78th, relieving the 77th, is pushed out immediately and not until two weeks later is in possession of Taeema Farm, Grandpré, Belle Joyeuse Farm, and is still absolutely checked before the Bois-des-Loges, where it advanced into the woods after climbing the smooth slopes only to be driven out an innumerable number of times. The 82nd is still checked along the St. Juvin-Landres-et-Saint-Georges Ridge, although it continues to hold St. Juvin, taken on October 15th. The 42nd, fighting furiously, is held before the same ridge.

The real story of this final period from October 10th to October 31st is disclosed on the battle map whereon each day's advance is marked by a red line. The whole story of the battle is in these lines, appropriately red because the price of the progress they reveal was paid in blood.

Looking at these successive days, the name of every hill and village will stir the memories of hundreds and thousands of men who knew in terms of sacrifice and suffering what each meant in October, 1918. These

day-by-day advances, insignificant even on the largest-scale map, are the inevitable circumstance of the war of positions. This is what the British army experienced at the Somme and in Flanders, the German army before Verdun, the French army on the Craonne Plateau in 1917. The battle is one of usury; precisely as long as both sides can continue to pour in reserves at this point of conflict the progress of the assailant will be slow and the wastage on both sides enormous. So far in the war of positions each side has been able to find reserves, and the assailant has been compelled to abandon the struggle either by weather, by losses, or by reason of an attack elsewhere. In meeting and halting the German attack at Verdun in 1916, the French used—not at once but in the aggregate—67 divisions, two thirds of their whole army, and their losses were 350,000. The Germans used fewer divisions but suffered slightly higher loss.

But, unlike all previous generals fighting on the defensive in such a contest, Marwitz cannot match division against division with his opponents. The thing that was sought at the Somme and in Flanders has at last been achieved in the Argonne. The time has come when the German can no longer find reserves to meet all three of his enemies. The result is that Pershing's attack, in his second phase, consumes all the German reserves, 47 divisions in line at one time or another during the struggle; and on October 31st, end of the Second Phase, not only has Liggett's army driven a wedge through the Kriemhilde Stellung, which is like more than one wedge the British drove through the German lines at the Somme, but the American battle has consumed all available German man-power. Positions, strong naturally if not fully prepared, are still in the German's hands, but his position is that of Lee after Five Forks. Marwitz might say, like the great Southern General, "My line has been stretched so thin that it has broken." The assault of the American First Army on November 1st was like the attack of the army of the Potomac about Petersburg on the morning following Five Forks. Positions of great strength, capable of indefinite resistance, were overrun in a few hours because Lee no longer had the troops to man them.

This, after all, is the true meaning of the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. The effort to bring off a sudden rupture—and a rapid advance, to do the impossible—failed after preliminary success that at least justified the hope. Having missed the brilliant achievement, Pershing, like Haig after July 1st at the Somme, set to work to wear out the enemy whom he could not annihilate with a sudden blow. He did it in twenty-eight days. He succeeded where Haig failed because the Germans no longer had sufficient reserves to fight two major battles, one against the British along the Scheldt, and another with the Americans on the Meuse. It took four weeks to exhaust Germany's available resources. When they were exhausted, the road to Sedan was open.

Thus, in a very striking fashion, what Pershing did in the Meuse-Argonne and in a lesser degree at St. Mihiel—that is, in his campaign in Lorraine from September 12th to November 1st—was what Grant did in his campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg in 1864. In each case the power for resistance of the defensive commander was broken by the weight of successive blows, no one of which of itself achieved the immediate success hoped for; but the cumulative effect of all the blows produced not merely victory, but in one case the destruction of the weaker army and, in the other, a retreat more precipitate than had yet taken place on the western front—a retreat not yet ended on Armistice Day—which had involved the surrender of one of the two vital lines of communication of the enemy.

Such was the true meaning of all those confused and confusing struggles in the Argonne Forest itself, for Côte Dame Marie, for Côte de Châtillon, Bois-des-Ognons, Bois-de-Pultierre, Bois-des-Loges, Bois-de-Cunel, and a hundred other hills and woodlands where our soldiers doggedly, obstinately, gloriously met and overcame the resistance of a desperate enemy far better trained and equipped, and, in the end, annihilated some of his finest divisions, still fighting with much of their old skill and determination. The places, after all—the trenches, the machine-gun emplacements, the lines themselves—are of minor significance. One may sum up the second and decisive phase of the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne by the simple statement that, on a front less than

twenty miles wide and four miles deep, Pershing's First Army fought, wore out, and defeated decisively all the divisions Ludendorff could collect to cover his vital communications, and, when this four weeks of fighting was over, swept forward in a practically unresisted march of victory which reached and passed all the objectives indicated as the goals of the campaign.

### VI. THE FINAL PHASE

On November 1st opens the final phase. The German Fifth Army has been fought to a standstill. Forty-seven divisions have been used east and west of the Meuse, mainly to the west; thirteen of these have been used twice and two, three times. Not a few of the German divisions have actually been destroyed, and the commander of at least one has been captured, with the fragments of his division. His honourable boast it was that he had led his unit to the extreme point of penetration of the German advance both in Picardy and at the Marne. Against this formidable concentration twenty-two American divisions and four French had fought. Eleven of our divisions had been used twice and one, three times.

The attack of November 1st was delivered by the First Army, west of the Meuse. Three army corps and seven divisions were employed between the Meuse and the Bourgogne Forest. On the right the Third Corps had the 5th and the 90th divisions. In the centre the Fifth Corps had the 2nd and the 89th and was again the wedge of attack as on September 26th. On the left, the First Corps had the 80th, 77th, and 78th divisions.

"The general assault was preceded," says Pershing, "by two hours of violent artillery preparation. The infantry advanced, closely followed by accompanying guns. The artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coördinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the infantry. By nightfall the Fifth Corps, in the centre, had realized an advance of almost nine kilometres (just short of six miles) to the Bois-de-la-Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of Barricourt,

*By Claggett Wilson*

A SHELL HOLE ON THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

Claggett Wilson went to France in the ranks of the 5th Regiment of Marines in June, 1917. In the spring of 1918 he was transferred to the French Fourth Army for experience as a line officer and saw action on the Chemin des Dames, Rheims, Verdun, and later at Château-Thierry. During the winter of 1918–19 he was with the Army of Occupation in Germany. He was wounded twice and received the Croix de Guerre.

while the Third Corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defence, captured his artillery position, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grandpré.

"On November 2nd and 3rd we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the fronts of the right and centre corps; to the left the troops of the First Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks; while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the railroad from Carignan to Sedan (Metz-Mézières), and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans."

At the same time the 77th and the 80th passed on either side of Buzancy; thenceforth the battle degenerated into a pursuit race, and on November 7th elements of the 42nd were on the left bank of the Meuse facing Sedan—actually astride the Metz-Mézières railroad. Officially it was the French who first entered the city, but the citizens of Sedan testify that the first Allied troops in their town belonged to the "Rainbow" Division.

In the same period there had been a general crossing of the Meuse by Liggett's right and centre while the left was moving on Sedan. The 90th Division took Stenay (once the place of residence of the German Crown Prince); on the last morning of the battle, while the 5th passed the river at Dun, pressed through the forests which cover the northern end of the Heights of the Meuse, and occupied Louppy on the Loison, taking the château of the Marquis d'Imécourt which had been Marwitz's headquarters during the battle. The 32nd crossed the Loison at Jametz, also clearing the Heights of the Meuse.

To the southward the 79th, 26th, and 81st American divisions, with French assistance, completed the clearing of the Meuse Heights in the region which had seen the opening of the attack on Verdun in 1916. At the close of the struggle, the 26th was close to the famous Twin Hills of Ornes from which the Kaiser had watched the Verdun battle and beneath which, in the great forest of Spincourt, the Germans had massed their batteries for the opening phase of that struggle. There is a hill on the Verdun-Sedan highway above Mouzon—where in 1870




AMERICA'S ADVANCE TO THE RHINE

Shaded area shows approximately the territory through which the Americans advanced to the Armistice front on the Rhine.

Moltke's Army crossed the Meuse, to capture Napoleon III at Sedan a few days later —on which, in an open field looking across the river over all its battleground, the Fifth Corps has erected a simple but satisfying monument of rough stones and of mortar with German swords, bayonets, and helmets cemented in, which marks the extreme point of advance of the American army—of the Fifth Corps, which was the centre, in the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. Here, with the river passed and with Montmédy and the Belgian frontier in sight of the 5th Division above Louppy, is the high-water mark of America in battle in the World War, the point reached on Armistice morning.

What might have followed, had the Armistice not intervened, is only in part a matter of conjecture. The roads to Luxemburg and Briey, taken by our troops when the march to the Rhine began, were already open; the power for effective resistance of Marwitz's army was broken. Moreover, while the American Second Army was in line for operations

northwest of Metz, Mangin, with six American corps, was ready for a thrust southeast of the fortress, between it and the Vosges. The evacuation of Metz had indeed begun, and American progress, already inevitable, would have hastened it. To the Americans would unquestionably have fallen the chief honour of restoring Metz to France, within a few days, had German resistance continued.

The actual fruits of American victory were measured in the capture of 26,000 prisoners, 847 guns, and 3,000 machine guns, together with a vast accumulation of war material. In its two months of existence, the American army in France had taken 42,000 prisoners, 1,290 guns, and enormous amounts of material. The American loss at the Meuse-Argonne was 117,000; 124,000 in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne conflicts combined. Twenty-two American divisions had been engaged, while at the moment of the Armistice the total of American divisions which had seen action was 29 and the number of organized divisions in France 42. Reckoning the original strength of the 22 divisions at 600,000, which is high, and the replacements at 150,000, which is also high, we had, engaged, around 750,000 men in the battle; 700,000 is probably more accurate, but our numbers actually engaged at any one moment did not exceed 300,000. Six French divisions, approximately 60,000, had also been under Pershing's command during the conflict, bringing his total up to approximately 660,000, while the Germans, using 47 divisions, certainly did not engage much more than 400,000. The theoretical strength of our 29 combat divisions in France on November 11th and already battle-trained was 1,200,000.

### VII. THE ACHIEVEMENT

What individual divisions or their commanders accomplished, splendid as the deeds were, cannot be examined here. Of Pershing's subordinates, four—Bullard, Liggett, Summerall, in the fighting, and Harbord, in his brief but splendid battle service at Château-Thierry and the Soissons "corner" and his even more considerable contribution in the Service of Supplies—deserve mention in any study, however summary. Liggett, Bullard, and Dickman ultimately commanded armies,

Liggett succeeding Pershing on October 12th and carrying the Meuse-Argonne action forward to supreme success; Bullard taking over the Second Army and bringing it into shape in the brief time following his promotion and preceding the Armistice. Dickman commanded the Army of Occupation after the Armistice.

But necessarily the larger praise must fall to the Commander-in-Chief. Neither in strategy nor in tactics was he called upon or even permitted by circumstances to disclose his resources. It was not in the application of the science of war that he acquired distinction. His supreme service lay in correctly estimating the fighting capacity of his green troops, their capacity for hard, indescribably bitter, and murderous fighting under well-nigh-impossible conditions of country and of weather, coupled with their ability to endure losses, made inevitable by their lack of training and defects in equipment and in accessories. It was this spirit that drove men, again and again, armed only with the bayonet, against machine-gun nests and wired and organized positions, suffering losses very nearly approximating extermination, but losing neither confidence nor determination.

Exact appraisal of what was accomplished does not lessen the achievement of the general or of his army. The American army which fought in the Meuse-Argonne was not superior in morale to the British army which had struggled at the Somme in 1916 or in Flanders in 1917. It was not superior to the French armies, which had won the Marne, defended Verdun, entered the campaign of 1917. It was not superior in this respect to the German army which advanced to the Marne in 1914, attacked Verdun in 1916, or opened the Battle of Picardy in 1918. But, while the youth of all three of the great European contestants had disappeared in the struggle and the survivors were weary beyond words, after hideous and unforgettable disappointments following supreme effort, our men were fresh to their work, unshaken in nerve, unslackened by disappointment.

Nor was our army in any sense a perfect machine directed by a general staff comparable with those of France or Germany. It had not even reached that wholly restricted stage of progress marked by the

British at the Somme, for in 1916 Great Britain had far more trained officers, who had been trained under modern conditions. It was still in the stage of improvisation; officers and men were learning—in the most wasteful and expensive fashion in which soldiers can learn—paying the price America and England have always paid for their peace-time neglect of their armies.

And our army did not spring from the bosom of the nation fully armed and equipped. On the contrary, we were able to engage a vast army in Europe eighteen months after we entered the contest only because our Allies supplied the mechanical equipment. We fought our battles with French cannon and French munitions, exclusively. The failure of an aviation programme was responsible for heavy losses in the Meuse-Argonne, which were totally unnecessary, had we begun in 1914 to put our small army on a proper basis for contemporary conflict. Even in motor transport, we depended largely upon our Allies to the end. But the fact that France could and did furnish most of the tools, covered the failure of the Government, which, in the last analysis, was the failure of the American people, to a dangerous degree, dangerous because the lessons that should have been taught were once more concealed by accidents and fortunate circumstances.

Had our young army undertaken its Meuse-Argonne campaign against a German army such as Nivelle attacked with his veterans at the Aisne in 1917, the result would have been, not mere defeat but swift, complete, and incalculable disaster. Exactly the same thing would have occurred if Pershing with his army had been asked to solve the problem of Haig in Flanders in that same year. Fortunately, when our hour came, the decline in German morale, fighting resources, the reduction of their reserves had reached a point where our superior morale, unlimited numbers, and enormous physical superiority bridged the gap created by the difference between American training and that of German.

Pershing saw that this would happen; he saw it before the Second Marne, and again and again assured Foch that American troops could be used, despite their lack of experience and incomplete training. His opinion was confirmed by the events in the Aisne-Marne fighting, by

the St. Mihiel episode, and by the long, gruelling, but successful Battle of the Meuse-Argonne. The French did not believe that American troops could fight successfully under American commanders and as divisional units in the early summer, because of their lack of training. The French would have been right, had the German condition been that of any previous period of the war; but it was not.

In the late summer the French were still convinced that the American force could not be operated as an army for exactly the same reason, and because, in addition, the training of an army staff is a matter of years, not weeks. Again they were right in theory and wrong in fact, because they were thinking of the German of the past, while Pershing's new army would have to deal with the German of the present. They accurately forecast the check of the American offensive between the Meuse and the Argonne at the precise point where the check came. But they did not foresee that, after the check, Pershing's green army could literally eat up German reserves, paying for their meal in generous and terrible costs, and, in the end, by main strength, force their way through when the German had no more reserves to throw into action. It was at this point that French calculation, eminently correct in the main, broke down and Pershing's estimate proved the more accurate. In a long war there comes a moment when weariness concedes much to be impossible, but to the untired man there is nothing impossible, and Pershing and his army were unwearied.

To compare the American army, on the scientific side, with the German, the French, or even the British which had been at the real practice of modern war a far briefer time than either, is utter nonsense. It is by measuring its accomplishment in terms of the tools it possessed, the training which it had received, the experience of its officers, that one acquires the real and just estimate of its performance. It was called upon to do what had hitherto proven impossible in the war of positions—and the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne from September 26th to November 1st was a battle of positions—it did the impossible because in the autumn of 1918 the impossible had become just possible, but only for brave, determined, absolutely self-sacrificing men.

By far the most just and generous measure of American achievement is furnished by General Maurice, of the British army, an accomplished soldier and in every sense the preëminent British military critic. He writes:

> It is probably true that no French or British staff would, after long experience of previous failure, have advised an attack on the Meuse-Argonne front until elaborate improvements and extensions of the roads and railways behind the front of attack had been carried out and until equally elaborate preparation for prolonging those roads and railways into the territory captured from the Germans had been completed. It is probably equally true that French and British soldiers, after the bitter lessons of the past, would not have attacked with any confidence unless they had ocular evidence that everything had been done beforehand to help them forward. There are times and occasions in war when the valour of ignorance has its advantages. With greater experience the American infantry would have learned to overcome the German machine guns with less loss of life, and the services of supply would have worked more smoothly. Had the American army waited to gain that experience, the war would certainly have been prolonged by at least six months and the cost of life would have been certainly greater than it was.
>
> Pershing must have taken all these factors into consideration when he threw in his vote for fighting the great battle which began on September 26th. He decided that the vigour and valour of his troops would more than counter-balance their lack of battle experience, and he was justified by the result.

"Did America win the War?" No. The campaign of 1918, in France, which ended in victory, was won by the supreme genius of Ferdinand Foch, who was able to direct the operations of more than 6,000,000 men who first and last fought in three great armies, the French, British, and American, with precious assistance furnished by the tiny Belgian force in such fashion that the enemy attack was broken, the enemy strength shaken, and in the final operation completely and decisively destroyed—the will to war and the capacity for resistance annihilated.

Foch could not have won the war without American forces, with anything but a huge American contribution, and he could not have won it in 1918 if the American troops had not been able, led by a man who forced his European associates to recognize the ability of his army, to do what, as late as September, 1918, no one expected it would be able to do. We were the reserves which arrived at the decisive moment, and our arrival enabled the master to repeat the achievement of Napo-

leon at Marengo and win a battle three times lost. And this is glory enough; to claim more is to be unworthy of our own soldiers. For behind 1918, behind July, 1918, when we began, lay the terrible years in which France had saved the war at the Marne and at Verdun and Britain had wasted the German at the Somme and in Flanders. Even in the current year, the resistance of the British and the employment of French reserves had prevented German triumph in two struggles, unexampled in all previous history of war.

Beside the Meuse-Argonne, all other American battles are insignificant, and in no one of its earlier conflicts was the nation more nobly served by an army and a commander, by officers and common soldiers, and general and officers agree in awarding the chief glory and supreme praise to the soldier, for the Meuse-Argonne was, in the very nature of things, a "soldier's battle," and the American soldier won it.

On the battlefield where Petain had said, immortally, "They shall not pass!" Pershing had said, simply, "We will go!"—and both proud prophecies were realized to the undying glory of France and the United States.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN

# THE ARMISTICE

## I

## THE CONQUEST OF LUDENDORFF

The first of the series of German proposals which led to the Armistice of November 11th was uttered by the German Government on October 5th. It saw the light of day at the precise moment when Haig had broken through the Hindenburg Line between St. Quentin and Le Catelet, when Pershing, despite temporary check, was exerting enormous pressure between the Meuse and the Argonne. But before we examine this document, it is necessary to look backward and see the origin of the German decision expressed with ever-growing clarity in the succession of documents issued prior to the final meeting at Rethondes.

It is to Ludendorff that history must turn now and hereafter for any clear explanation of the German surrender. Upon him the Government relied necessarily, as the master of the military destinies of his country, to avert defeat. When the hour arrived in which he became convinced that disaster could be avoided only by negotiation, by armistice, he notified his government: first, that the war could not be won; secondly, that it might be lost if negotiations were not pressed rapidly. The Government first did nothing; then, seized with a panic, sought to reconstruct the ministry, reorganize the electoral and political system of Prussia, and finally, revolution arriving, capitulated, while the Emperor, his heir, and the kings and kinglets of Germany fled the country.

Of the explanation for all this sudden, enormous transformation, Ludendorff from first to last betrays no comprehension, explains frankly that it passes his understanding. Still bewildered, in the closing hours his emperor dismisses him for signing an order urging that the war continue, and Ludendorff goes, sadly forecasting, quite correctly, that within

a fortnight the House of Hohenzollern will cease to rule. Yet underlying all else it is plain that the responsibility is Ludendorff's. Germany, the dynasty, the system, everything was founded upon the rock of military invincibility; when the rock was riven, all crumbled.

The progress of the idea of defeat in Ludendorff's mind is one of the most amazing stories of the whole war, not always told truthfully by Ludendorff himself. But in his narrative the truth is always discernible, sometimes by confession, sometimes by the manner in which, with true Prussian arrogance, he orders it from his presence, denounces it like a drill-sergeant, establishes it by denying it. A strange psychological study is this narrative—something more than a mere memoir of Ludendorff—in truth, the revelation of the soul of the Prussian soldier, exactly the sort of document which might have issued from one of the generals of Frederick the Great, who saw the Frederickan methods collapse, when, with Frederick in his grave, they were employed against Napoleon.

To begin at the beginning, the first chill seizes the German Chief Quartermaster after his first two efforts, March 21st and May 27th, have failed to achieve a decision. He feels the disillusionment behind him, but neither he nor his associates share it. Still, in June, Kühlmann blurts out his prophetic words that military victory is henceforth impossible, impossible for Germany, but the truth finishes Kühlmann and he is no longer Secretary of State. Hintze, the successor, pleases Ludendorff who regards the home front as restored.

But time marches. Foch strikes back between the Aisne and the Marne and Ludendorff recognizes at once that the thing he undertook to do in March is no longer possible in July, he cannot crush the Allies before the Americans arrive in Europe; they have arrived and the situation is serious. He stops his attack and assumes the defensive but—significant circumstance for the psychologist—the Second Battle of the Marne lost, he writes of the desire and need for rest: "Whether the enemy would let us have it was the question!" Now Clausewitz and all his German soldier followers down to Bernhardi have asserted that the ultimate purpose of war is to make the enemy submit to your will,

and, the Second Battle of the Marne lost, Ludendorff's words suggest—his "let" confesses—whose will is now in subjection.

Still Ludendorff hopes for a successful defensive. He prevented Allied victory by his operations in 1916 at the Somme, in 1917 at the Aisne and in Flanders. Recalling these stupendous assaults is there any reason to believe that he will be less successful now? Early in August he can still decide that his army will be able to defeat the coming offensives. Since he has always found a strategical remedy, Ludendorff sees no reason to doubt that he will be equally fortunate now. His army, on the whole, satisfies him, even after the first defeat.

But on August 8th the light suddenly breaks in upon him. Haig smashes his line by the Somme; his troops run away, refuse to fight, curse their officers and their government. Nothing like this has been seen in Prussian ranks since Iena and Auerstädt in 1806, never expected again in German quarters. A "black day," the first of many black days to come! And it brings Ludendorff briefly to the decision, memorable henceforth, that the war must be ended.

Instinctively one turns back four years—almost exactly—to the days when Foch was fighting at Fère-Champenoise, when, after defeat and retreat for four days, on the morning of the fifth he reports to Joffre: "My centre is retiring, my right is broken, impossible to manœuvre. *The situation is excellent. I attack.*" A hard situation, Foch later explains to André de Maricourt; hard because the soldiers are weary. The old orders, like an old tune, no longer enthuse them. They say: "We have been beaten to that tune and we will march to it no more." Then Foch explains. The great test arrives; one must hit upon something new—something that seems new, for the problem does not change, cannot change—something which will lead the soldier to say: "Ha, we haven't tried that before, have we?" And he does try that, perhaps successfully, perhaps not; but time is gained until the moment arrives, the moment at Fère-Champenoise when the blow could be delivered.

Now Ludendorff has no "new tune"; he has no "new mantle to wrap round the old, threadbare costume"—another figure that Foch employed.

He says quite frankly that the war must end. August 13th–14th he explains his views to a conference held at Spa, attended by the Emperor and Hintze. This interview is prolonged by reports furnished by Arz, Austrian general, the Austrian Emperor, Charles, also being in attendance. There is great talk about a Polish arrangement, about all sorts of things. Then Hintze goes home to talk to party leaders, to tell them what Ludendorff says—that the enemy cannot be forced by an offensive to sue for peace, that the defensive cannot bring peace; that the army is showing signs of collapse, on August 8th, and now again on August 20th—this time in front of Mangin, "another black day for Germany." Out of this conference there proceeds exactly nothing: a few vague words spoken in the Reichstag, a general expansion of the wave of depression, but of action, nothing. Meantime, the situation becomes worse, daily. The Allies advance, the retreat to the Hindenburg Line is enforced, the German armies reach the line in bad condition, having suffered enormously. On September 26th—the date is memorable—Pershing breaks the Hindenburg Line in the Argonne; and in the next two days the British break it in Picardy, the Anglo-Franco-Belgian group, in Flanders.

## II. LUDENDORFF'S DECISION

Thereupon, Ludendorff acts—goes into Hindenburg's office at six o'clock on the afternoon of September 28th—a busy afternoon for Pershing, now north of Montfaucon, and for Rawlinson, entering the Hindenburg Line victoriously at the Scheldt Tunnel—and declares that there must be a request for an armistice; that the situation can only grow worse. To all of which the old Hindenburg nods his massive head, will continue to the end to have faith in the old German God and hope for a miracle, but never omits to nod when Ludendorff speaks. Armistice means evacuation of all occupied territory; to Ludendorff it means something worse, an admission of defeat; but the admission has to be made, and Ludendorff and Hindenburg shake hands over it, "as men burying their dearest hopes!" Hintze wept when Ludendorff told him the worst in August.

In a new conference, on September 29th—for which Foch's orchestra

plays disconcerting music in Flanders, in Picardy, in Lorraine—Ludendorff suddenly discovers that before there can be action there must be a change of government. These politicians, so he reveals his thought, talk of a change of government at the moment when the German army is crumbling. Will a new ministry affect Foch? But it has to be, Ludendorff agrees. Hindenburg nods once more, but the note, the demand for an armistice, must issue on October 1st; the date is furnished by Hintze, who wept and will weep, but cannot hurry the politicians or achieve a change of government in three days, not even if these three days are filled with reports of the collapse of the Hindenburg Line, of the Siegfried system, gone with the Wotan the Brunhilde crumbling, a true *Gotterdämmerung.*

Ludendorff is still dissatisfied, therefore he has recourse to a new device: he sends one of his best-informed subordinates up to Berlin with a carefully prepared statement of the exact military situation, to be read to the Reichstag leaders. This is on the night of October 2nd, the news from all the battle fronts continues evil; Bulgaria conquered and surrendered; Turkey conquered and soon to surrender; Austria awaiting the last blow, now in sight; Pershing only just checked, no one can see for how long, Haig unchecked, just beginning to emerge on the German side of the Hindenburg Line; King Albert on the outskirts of Roulers, Bruges, Ghent; the Belgian "pawn" losing its value for the bargain German diplomacy has always had in mind, if worst comes to worst.

Ludendorff's lieutenant, Major Baron von dem Busche, despite his name a direct sort of person, performs his duty; he tells the Reichstag that wastage can no longer be replaced; battalions are shrinking; the "absorption of reserves," lucidly explained by General Buat, proceeding at an unbelievable rate—Allied attacks now piling one on top of the other as Buat indicated; the morale worsening in due proportion; that it is time to make up their minds that the war is "hopeless." He tells them that what is bad will be worse, will grow worse with every twenty-four hours—that the enemy is getting nearer and nearer to the realization of his aim; in substance, that the situation is desperate, the armistice

must be sought immediately, but there must be no outward disclosure of the weakness inwardly manifest.

The result of this exposition of Major Baron von dem Busche might have been foreseen. It produced a panic. Ludendorff had been a little too successful in his effort to hasten things. Instead of being hurried, the whole audience, the whole legislative branch of the German Government, succumbs to the panic. Its world has crumbled suddenly; it has never suspected the truth, despite outward evidences of less fortunate days. It has left everything to the army, and now the army announces with brutally frank words that the war is lost; that High Command, army, everything will collapse in irremediable ruin if the civil government does not get an armistice at once; calls upon it to act, and to act with the appearance of strength. Napoleon made similar demands upon the French legislature in his last days, after having kept it in utter ignorance and servile attitude for years—and with the same result.

Compare this performance with that of the first days of June, when the Germans were at the Marne, forty miles from Paris, their shells falling in the city, their Gothas sowing destruction in the boulevards. Then Clemenceau had told the people how dangerous were the days in which they lived, but he had also told them—Ludendorff read the speech and admired it: "I will fight before Paris, through Paris, behind Paris." But no one speaks this word now in Germany. Ludendorff has succumbed to that moral test, which Foch triumphantly passed at Fère-Champenoise as far back as September, 1914. German leadership is failing now.

In all the history of this World War, to me there seems nothing more tragically satisfying than these next few days. The German structure rested upon the single foundation-stone of force, physical force, embodied by the army. The force begins to crumble; the hour arrives when there is required moral strength, not more than was asked of the Allied leaders in March and in June, but without moral strength all is lost. And in this hour, while the war is still ten times as far from Berlin as it was from Paris in June and not an inch of German territory involved,

leaders, civil and military alike, are seized with paralysis. Their universe has crumbled and they, unlike Foch, cannot improvise; their people and their armies will no longer march to the old tune, they have been beaten marching to it—and the new tune cannot be found. Gambetta found it in 1870. After Sedan, after Metz, there was still France left, and men who could vitalize the conception; but now the German mass is sinking, the granite is becoming clay, the clay softens with each hour.

Ludendorff does not understand the panic he has produced, examines Major Baron von dem Busche with great care but no result. Discovers that a Pole was present at the session, and, as a Pole would—having known Prussia as arrogant and mighty for a century and a half, beholding it shaken and shaking—rushes out and tells the world. And the whole world shortly hears that Germany is in a panic, a circumstance which will contribute to the interpretation that Paris and London, even Washington, will put upon the request for an armistice when it does come, as it must come now.

But meantime there must be the inevitable political manœuvre, a new cabinet. Germany cannot change the tune, to revert again to Foch's figure, so it will seek to change the instruments on which the old tune has been played—a futile performance, Ludendorff correctly asserts. Then, on October 3rd, Ludendorff absent but Hindenburg present, the new cabinet meets and hears from Hindenburg a recapitulation of the Ludendorff view—"there appears to be now no possibility, to the best of human judgment, of winning peace from our enemies by force of arms." Hindenburg adds a pencil note to the effect that Great Headquarters, in advocating an armistice, as the statement indicates, is solely influenced by a desire to obtain an honourable peace. A thoughtful qualification, useful in the future when responsibilities come to be fixed, but a codicil in a last will and testament, becoming valid only after death.

The next day, the new ministry established, the business of the note disposed of, the action is at last taken, seven days after Ludendorff advised it as of immediate necessity. And, in consequence, on the morning of October 5th, the people of Paris, London, Washington, of the

whole Allied world, read headlines arranged to meet the conditions of national interest: "Pershing victorious in a new attack." "Haig is through the Hindenburg Line." "Petain surrounds Laon." "Prisoners taken since September 1st, 123,000; since July 15th, 250,000." "Czar of Bulgaria abdicates." "Panic in Berlin as Allies Advance from Ypres to Verdun." And finally: "The new German Chancellor, Maximilian of Baden, requests the President of the United States to Undertake the Restoration of Peace, Germany Asking an Immediate Armistice." The basis of this peace is to be the Reichstag proposal of July, 1917, before the Russian collapse, before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, before the Treaty of Bukharest: "No annexations and no indemnities." But Foch's figure still stands; this is an old tune, too; the world is marching to Foch's music. And the fact, witnessed by all the yellowing newspapers of that hour, is that the proposal falls flat; newspaper readers glance at it impatiently, and then back at the reports from the fronts, official reports of towns liberated, positions taken, prisoners and guns captured. Allied publics are, in truth, at the beginning of the most satisfying month ever lived by the newspaper readers of nations at war. "Leave it to Foch," begins to be heard from one end of the world to the other.

### III. "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"

The first German note, which cost so much in labour and resulted in so little—little that was advantageous to the German—had incalculable consequences in the Allied world, where it was the first authentic sign of the dawn, after four long years of ineffable darkness. It read:

> The German Government requests the President of the United States to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all the belligerent states of this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening peace negotiations.
>
> It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress on January 8th and in his later pronouncements, especially in his speech of September 28th, as a basis for peace negotiations.
>
> With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and sea.

The speech of January 8th, the message to Congress, was, in fact, the Fourteen Points; that of September 28th, spoken at the

# THE LAST DAYS OF FIGHTING

*U. S. Official Photo*

AT THE BRIDGEHEAD BOUNDARY LINE

One of the many American machine guns covering the neutral zone. The German towns of Frickhofen and Durndorf are within range

*Brown Brothers*

AN AMERICAN SENTRY ON GUARD ON NOVEMBER 11th

He is standing on the line of the farthest American advance before the fighting stopped. At his feet is a shell hole from a German gun

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE AMERICANS ON THE MARCH TO THE RHINE

Before the ladders could be taken down from the arch of welcome erected in Mersch, Luxembourg, to greet the American army on the march to the Rhine, troops of the 2nd Division were pouring through the city in motor trucks, and the work of building and decorating the arch had to be completed while the Americans were actually marching beneath it.

*U. S. Official Photo*

THE AMERICAN WATCH ON THE RHINE

Sentries from the Rainbow Division on the water front

*U. S. Official Photo*

IN AN OUTPOST IN ALSACE

Two doughboys ready for action with an automatic rifle

*U. S. Official Photo*

IN HONOUR OF ROOSEVELT

These American soldiers in Germany are firing a 21-gun salute two days after the Colonel's death at his home in Oyster Bay

*U. S. Official Photo*

SUNSET

American sentries guarding a road near Otzingen, Germany



*U. S. Official Photo*

THE AMERICAN FLAG ENTERING A TOWN IN GERMANY

*U. S. Official Photo*

A VICTORY LOAN POSTER IN GERMANY, APRIL, 1919

*U. S. Official Photo*

ALL ABOARD

Showing how the 85,000 German helmets were loaded on the train for transportation from Metternich, Germany, to the United States for the Fifth Liberty Loan

*U. S. Official Photo*

ON THE RHINE

Provost guards of the city of Coblentz in the foreground. Fortress of Ehrenbreitstein in the background

opening of the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan in New York City, memorable for the assertion: "Militarism must go, root and branch."

Two references damned the German document, two references to peace by negotiation. Neither the nations of Europe nor America, engaged in war with Germany, longer thought of peace by negotiation—the hour for that, thank God, had passed. Across America like wildfire ran the unforgettable words of Grant at Donelson: "Unconditional surrender; I propose to move upon your works at once." And in Europe and America, German bad faith in the past forbade belief in German good faith now, if there were yet good faith.

Accordingly, the President replied on October 6th—no delay necessary on his side of the debate—by three questions:

What does the German Chancellor mean by accepting the two utterances of January 8th and September 28th? Does he mean that the negotiations will be no more than discussions of their application in detail?

Is Germany ready to retire from the invaded regions? If not, of course the President would not feel at liberty to recommend a cessation of hostilities to his associates, without such an evidence of good faith.

Finally, for whom is the Chancellor speaking? The "Old Gang"? The actual text of the note follows:

Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States of the 8th of January last, and any subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into a discussion would be to agree on the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of hostilities to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend on the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor was speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

A moderate and non-committal response, calculated to cause the Germans many misgivings and getting them nowhere, but widely criticised at the moment because the President consented to talk with the Germans at all! "More note-writing," harsher critics said—a criticism no longer valid. The benefit derived from the President's conversations may be exaggerated, but of harm there was not the least. Foch was continuing; he was doing more, he was quickening the pace.

Four days later, the new German Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, Doctor Solf, replies by informing the President that the new Ministry is supported by the great majority of the Reichstag, and that, thus supported, the new chancellor speaks for the great mass of the German people. All that Doctor Solf or anybody else could say under the circumstances, but it proves new cause for protest in Allied countries, particularly in the United States, still clinging to the Wattersonian war cry, "To hell with the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs!" repeated perfectly reverently.

And at just this moment a German submarine must sink a British passenger boat in the Irish Sea; of 150 women and children only seventeen are saved. Still another puts under a Japanese steamer with more women and children similarly murdered. A worse disaster for the German peace offensive than the loss of the Hindenburg Line itself was this new submarine activity! On the heels of this, with both events in mind, the President writes his second reply:

The President acknowledges Germany's acceptance of his terms, without apparent qualification, reminds her that evacuation and armistice are military matters, things that military men must look after.

"See Foch about those," is the direct implication.

Then he continues:

No arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and the Allies in the field.

This means, can mean only, disarmament.

Then the President calls attention to "illegal and inhumane"

methods of German soldiers and sailors. He is thinking of the *Leinster* on water and the still-continuing devastations of the German armies in the region they are evacuating: Lens, Cambrai, Douai—the first destroyed, the other two partially ruined—of St. Quentin, with its cathedral pillars undermined for dynamite, destruction only prevented by the swiftness of the entrance of Debeney. While these offences persist, all thought of armistice is useless. Then the President continues:

> The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.
>
> The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it.
>
> The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

Now it is time to turn back to Ludendorff. On the military side the situation is this: Pershing is still checked, it is costing incredible effort to hold him, but he is being held, will be held for two more weeks. Haig is through the Hindenburg Line, but the Germans from the sea to the Meuse are getting back, crippled but unbroken as to front, to the Hermann Line, line of the Scheldt; there is preparing behind them the line of the Meuse-Antwerp. Most important of all, the German army is fighting, on the whole, better than before, not giving the smallest basis for any hope of victory, but holding out the prospect, rather slim but still discoverable, of keeping together until winter stops the fighting. Prince Max, the new chancellor, ministers, and newspapers generally, are at this moment uttering brave words, calling upon each other and the army to stand firm; and the army is standing relatively firm, firmer than before.

Wilson's second note comes to Ludendorff in this situation as the unmistakable proof of the determination of the enemy to demand unconditional surrender. The determination to "destroy Germany" was, for him, instinct in the President's letter to Solf. Whether Wilson

was sincere in seeking peace by understanding and was overborne by Clemenceau and Lloyd George, Ludendorff does not know, but now there was left but one thing to do: to fight it out, to rouse the country, to appeal to the people. The peace manœuvre had served only to reveal the true state of Allied purpose. Now the hour was come, too, for Prince Max and everyone else to translate their brave words into deeds. Ludendorff had advised peace; if it could be had by negotiation. He was willing to consent to evacuate occupied territories, the military circumstances warranted so much, but he insisted that the armies should stand ready to fight, within their own frontiers, against the possibility of the failure of negotiations.

But Foch believed he could destroy the German army before it reached the frontiers; the Allied publics believed it; soldiers and civilians in Allied countries believed that the German peace manœuvre was, after all, intended solely to save the army, caught now in the vise between Pershing and Haig, doomed to supreme military disaster if the fighting continued. The peace manœuvre had failed, there was nothing left but to resume the fighting. Ludendorff was ready. He was ready, but, unfortunately for him, the situation, momentarily better, was now worsening again, would grow worse henceforth rapidly to the end.

Wilson's second note causes more conferences in Berlin. Ludendorff attends and is asked more questions. Can the war be won? Same answer: No. Not unless the luck of Tannenberg returns. There is one more careful, sorrowful examination of the situation, search for some possible avenue of escape, examination of questions of reserves, of the transfer of troops from the Ukraine. No hope here. As for the western front, Ludendorff believes a break through possible but not probable, does not expect it "on my conscience." But the fighting might grow worse any moment.

This amounts to an effort of the civil government, the new ministry come to power at this awful moment, to take account of stock. It examines the army commander, puts him through one rigorous test after another, submits a formal questionnaire, containing the old questions in a fresh form. But the answer is always the same. Ludendorff

does not want to break off with Wilson, he wants to continue. On the other hand, bad as the situation is, it seems better to fight than to consent to dishonour, to destruction, implied in the suggestion of disarmament.

In the face of this testimony the civil government, weak perhaps, did a thoroughly human thing: it consented to abandon the submarine campaign, issued orders to that effect. For Ludendorff this is capitulation, the supreme confession of weakness, the first long step toward the abyss. There is a new exchange of notes, Germany speaking on October 20th, the President on the 23rd. The German note is immaterial, the President's noteworthy because of the emphasis laid upon the proposal to render Germany incapable of further military effort. The note also contains more than a hint of the suspicion that the "Old Gang" is still in charge in Berlin. "A strong answer to our cowardly note," Ludendorff thinks, received by the German Government on October 24th. The next day Ludendorff tells the Kaiser, Hindenburg nodding approval, that "we must fight on." The Kaiser decides nothing but is still friendly—for the last time—to Ludendorff. And the same day there comes to light an address to the German army, signed by Hindenburg, directed to the German army, containing the declaration:

> Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers.

October 25th Berlin is aflame with this Hindenburg note, Ludendorff held responsible by all. The Reichstag is shaken. The general who cannot win the battle, who has lost the victory, who has confessed that the line may be broken at any moment, declares against peace. How will this message strike the Allied governments—President Wilson, who has just suggested that militarism must disappear, if peace is to be contemplated? In a word; suddenly, completely, the line does break, but it is the home front which collapses. Ludendorff must go.

The same day, having listened to this storm, Ludendorff meets two members of his faithful staff outside the Ministry of the Interior and tells them, "Germany is lost!" He sees the Kaiser the next morning, the final interview, recalling how many memories—recalling the interview in

February when he told the Supreme War Lord that the battle would be hard but that victory was to be attained. The Kaiser listens to his captain's words, his manner changed; refers to the offending order bitterly, accepts the resignation proffered again. On his way out Ludendorff tells a friend that in a fortnight there will no longer be an emperor in Germany. A correct prophecy, for on November 9th Germany was a republic. And so, exit Ludendorff.

In reality it is something more, the German system itself has broken down. The idea of emperor, state, civil government, all founded upon force, has broken down. The hour has come for the nation to rise as France rose in 1792 and again in 1870, in despair the latter time, but Germany does not rise. What happens is the same phenomenon visible in 1814, when Napoleon called upon France to rise, the legislature to rally to the throne, the people to the nation, and on the heels of the appeal the Allied armies occupied Paris, only the soldiers making a gallant but hopeless fight, the people standing quite apart, rather welcoming the invaders. The moment arrives when the nation sees its fate as something totally different from that of its recent master. In the case of Napoleon it was a man. In the German case it is something rather different. The largest man, the Kaiser, Ludendorff, or the imaginary, legendary Hindenburg, derives his stature from the idea he embodies, and crumbles so much the more easily to dust when the idea falls. What is now taking place in Germany is like a rout in a great, disciplined army, when all discipline breaks down with defeat, the "*Sauve qui peut!*" of Waterloo.

### IV. THE END

October 26, 1918, is, then, an ever-memorable date. The departure of Ludendorff is the sign to all the world that Germany has turned in rage upon all her gods. Ludendorff gone, the others, as he foresaw, will follow fast. On this same day, anniversary of the Caporetto disaster a year ago, the Italian army has crossed the Piave, sweeping the ruined Austrian army before it, and the Hapsburg Monarchy has a new prime minister taking office under pledge to make a separate peace. The Upper House of Prussia has passed three electoral reform measures,




THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE PIAVE

Arrows show the direction of the main Austrian attacks

interesting as disclosing panic passion for democracy, but unimpressive to Foch. The British cavalry has occupied Aleppo in Syria, and shortly Turkey will leave the war. The next day, October 27th, Germany replies to the President's letter of October 23rd, giving new assurances, becoming increasingly valid, that the people are in charge of the German Government, which will be wholly true a few days later when the mob appears in Berlin. In Vienna a solemn assurance is given that the rights of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs are recognized, given by the new foreign minister, Count Julius Andrassy, who tells President Wilson no obstacle is now in the way of peace negotiations. Two days later Vienna will appeal to the President, its army now in full flight, to intervene in the name of humanity. October 31st, Turkey does withdraw unconditionally and the Inter-Allied War Council meets at Versailles: Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Colonel House for President Wilson, and Marshal Foch.

The next day Pershing starts for Sedan, Haig for Mons; the German front is at last broken and Vienna and Budapest report revolutions. Count Tisza, Hungarian prime minister when the fatal ultimatum was sent to Serbia four years ago, is shot by a common soldier. Bohemia sets up a new government, the first since the far-off time of the Winter King and the Thirty Years' War. Two new republics, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, appear November 1st, and then on November 3rd the Kaiser approves of an act amending the constitution by "transferring fundamental rights of the Kaiser's person to the people." On the same day the Serbians reënter Belgrade.

And now, November 3rd, the first authentic rumour of revolution in Germany comes from Kiel: the German navy mutinies on rumour of an order to make a final, foredoomed sortie, such as Cervera made at Santiago. The men begin to organize soldiers' and sailors' councils, more than an echo of Russian bolshevism; and on the same day Austria signs a capitulation covering everything, an abject surrender without condition, a document signed for an empire already defunct. At Versailles the Interallied Conference has decided on the terms Germany can have by asking Marshal Foch for them. Meantime Germany has told President Wilson that it has stopped air raids, and is grieved that Allied planes are still spreading panic in the Rhine Valley.

Now at last President Wilson informs Germany on November 1st that, having referred German communications to the Allied cause, he is able to state that the Allied Powers are willing to make peace with Germany on the basis of the Fourteen Points, England reserving liberty of action in the matter of freedom of the seas; France, in the matter of compensation for damages done to the civil population and property.

Two days later German Headquarters asks and receives permission to send representatives through the Allied lines to get Marshal Foch's terms, and as these representatives set out on their penitential progress, Germany suddenly flames up in revolution. November 9th the Chancellor announces the abdication of the Kaiser, who will appear inside the Dutch frontier the next morning, the Crown Prince following by another route. "The cascade of thrones" has begun. In the next few

days Switzerland will be filled to overflowing with German kinglets, grand dukes, Austrian archdukes, the Austrian Emperor fleeing as well. King Constantine of Greece need be lonely no longer. Friedrich Ebert, vice-president of the Social Democratic Party, a person of low extraction, a saddler, is the first president of the German Republic, which will seek more regular elections through a constituent national assembly later. November 12th the Austrian Kaiser imitates the German Kaiser and the House of Hapsburg, like that of Hozenzollern, has ceased to rule or reign. In Berlin, in a score of other German cities, bolshevism raises its head; anarchy marches, Germans are shooting one another as Frenchmen did Frenchmen at the end of the Siege of Paris forty-seven years earlier, Bismarck looking on with cynical interest at Versailles.

In sum, in the week between November 5th and November 11th all the settled and established institutions of the Central Powers are going down in a heap. The captains and the kings are departing. The German army, driven out of Sedan, across the Meuse, out of Valenciennes, across the Scheldt, struggling back to the French frontier, is on the edge of ruin. The Austro-Hungarian army has ceased to exist. Bulgaria is in Allied hands. An Allied fleet has passed the Dardanelles, whose forts have gone silent now, and is anchored off the Golden Horn. Enver, like William II, has fled; Austria-Hungary, its emperor gone, has become a confusion of racial entities. Roumania, rising from recent ruin, has cast off old chains and is stretching out her hands to resume old aspirations.

And in the midst of all this chaos, tumult—perhaps the most terrific week in all human experience—the armies of Foch have pressed on. That western front, that black line stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland, which through four long years of agony had fixed itself upon the minds and the memories of millions, has disappeared. Its rigid and unyielding menace has been replaced by a new line which moves daily, hourly, engulfing new provinces, cities, towns in its liberating waves. The facts of this week remain for history, but who can forget or preserve the emotions of that time—the joy, the gratitude, the relief that came with the recognition at last that Justice would prevail over

Might and that the German sword had been broken and was now being dashed from the German hand.

### V. ARMISTICE

And while Germany is falling into chaos, everything gone or shortly to go which for fifty years has oppressed the minds and the souls of men, there sets out from Spa, Ludendorff's headquarters, a few days before, one of the most sorrowful and satisfying processions this planet has ever seen, headed by Erzberger, one of the "turncoats" who turned in 1917. It proceeds by a long, circuitous route presented by Foch through Avesnes, where the Kaiser and Ludendorff heard the news of March 21st. It is preceded by pioneers whose mission it is to patch up the roads lately destroyed by armies in retreat, to fix a path by which representatives of Germany can go to something far more humiliating than Canossa. It is long after dark when the procession meets the first French picket line, the advance guard of Debeney, some of the men who checked the German rush at the Avre on March 26th and the succeeding days, which saw Foch begin. A strange encounter this was, of which many picturesque descriptions have survived, flashing of lights in the dark, examination of papers, new delays to fill up trenches across the road, strange whiteness of the German faces not difficult to explain, but fixed in the minds of the witnesses out on that lonely road surrounded by the destruction wrought by other Germans not a week ago, cannon still sounding to right and to left, rifles and machine guns still going off. For the war is continuing.

Then at last the German ambassadors are put on their road again, going southward into the wilderness of the Hindenburg Line through the ruins of St. Quentin, seen in the morning light, called to their attention by a Frenchman who says significantly, "There *was* St. Quentin." And at last, after innumerable wanderings in this tangle of desolation—wanderings the Germans afterward allege to have been a part of French design to fix upon their minds, as a prelude to receiving the sentence awaiting them, the reality of what Germany had done—the Germans are embarked upon a special train and arrive, place unknown

to them, in a forest identified later as the Forest of Compiègne, toward which Ludendorff aimed in June, through which Kluck advanced in August, 1914.

The place to which they have come, a mere railroad siding—the nearest village is Rethondes—is the place where Foch awaits them in his own car. They are greeted courteously but coldly; they will complain much of this coldness later, as will other Germans who go to Versailles on a similar errand a few months hence. Not even their passage over the Hindenburg desert can explain to them the coldness of their reception; in fact, they encounter for the first time visible evidence of what mankind thinks of them, of all Germans—has been thinking since Louvain, since the *Lusitania*—has been thinking more clearly with each successive revelation of the German soul.

November 8th, in Marshal Foch's car, they perform their mission. Their reception is as coolly correct as always: formal bows, nothing more. And then the direct question: "What is it that you wish, gentlemen? The question which carries the supreme humiliation—which places upon the Germans the necessity to sue for peace. This is a very far cry from that final moment when Thiers made his last appeal to Bismarck in an interview preserved in a picture known to most Frenchmen and all Germans. Forty-seven years ago Marshal Foch saw the Germans in Metz, and for forty-seven years Foch, like every Frenchman, has remembered the scene at Versailles and looked longingly over Bismarck's frontier into what was once France, and has remained French.

What happened at Rethondes is little memorable in detail: hopeless protests; debates, all from the German side. The army of Foch continuing to sweep forward; the Kaiser abdicating, disappearing, and reappearing upon a Dutch railroad platform; revolution sweeping over Germany; the German ambassadors at Rethondes await the return of a courier sent to Berlin with Foch's terms, and still delayed by roads and war, returning at night, November 10th. Then, finally, at five o'clock on the morning of November 11th the Armistice is signed, and to all the army fronts there goes forth word that at eleven o'clock this morning the war will cease. The enemy has surrendered, and from one end of the

Allied world to the other the news of the victory is flashed forth. At last there will be peace.

Most interesting of all comments on the Armistice is that of Marshal Foch, made long after the event, to his friend, André de Maricourt. The Marshal had been explaining his philosophy of war, his conviction that two things are essential to victory. The general must "will" to conquer and he must also know how to employ his resources. It is in this discussion that Foch said: "Yes, the Kaiser served up to us a formidable machine and some excellent foremen, but all the same the express train was confided to a stage-coach driver. We couldn't help conquering." And then he breaks out as follows:

> And now don't talk to me about glory, beauty, enthusiasm which I know. All these things are mere language, we must avoid these expressions in France. They are useless, they are just so much energy wasted. The war is over. That is worth saying, but epithets are as worthless as phrases. Nothing exists except the fact because, as I have said before, only the proofs are of any use.
>
> What do I consider a useful fact, one that satisfies me? The interview at Rethondes, that was a proof, a testament. That testament established the disintegration of the German Empire, and when I saw Erzberger take his pen passionately and sign that testament, then I was satisfied with having "willed" the victory, and with having employed the resources, for the business was liquidated.

The actual text signed by Erzberger and his associates was as follows:

I—MILITARY CLAUSES ON WESTERN FRONT

One—Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two—Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

Three—Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or convicted).

Four—Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following war material: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfer, 1,700 airplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly, all of the *D 7's* and all

the night bombing machines). The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Five—Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblentz, Cologne), together with the bridgeheads at these points of a thirty-kilometre radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream and at a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier of Holland up to the frontier of Switzerland. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhinelands (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of sixteen days, in all, thirty-one days after the signing of the armistice. All the movements of evacuation or occupation are regulated by the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Six—In all territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offences of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, and equipment, not removed during the time fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed.

Seven—Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in annexure No. 2, and total of which shall not exceed thirty-one days. There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (camione automobiles) in good order, within the period of thirty-six days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the period of thirty-one days, together with pre-war personnel and material. Further, the material necessary for the working of railways in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent ways, signals, and repair shops shall be left *in situ*. These stores shall be maintained by Germany in so far as concerns the working of the railroads in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note, annexure No. 2, regulates the details of these measures.

Eight—The German command shall be responsible for revealing within the period of forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delayed-action fuses on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken




AMERICA'S ADVANCE TO THE RHINE

(such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

Nine—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten—The immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial or convicted. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Eleven—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

II.—DISPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

Twelve—All German troops at present in the territories which before belonged to

Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany, defined as above, as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

Thirteen—Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilians as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

Fourteen—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

Fifteen—Renunciation of the treaties of Bukharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

### III.—CLAUSE CONCERNING EAST AFRICA

Seventeen—Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

### IV.—GENERAL CLAUSES

Eighteen—Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians, including hostages (persons?), under trial or convicted, belonging to the allied or associated powers other than those enumerated in Article Three.

Nineteen—The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or reparation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

### V.—NAVAL CONDITIONS

Twenty—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Twenty-one—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two—Surrender to the Allies and United States of all submarines (includ-

ing submarine cruisers and all mine-laying submarines) now existing, with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which shall be specified by the Allies and United States. Those which cannot take the sea shall be disarmed of the personnel and material and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready for the sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designated for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of fourteen days after the signing of the armistice.

Twenty-three—German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall be immediately disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or in default of them in allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They will there remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The following warships are designated by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), fifty destroyers of the most modern types. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States, and are to be completely disarmed and classed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military armament of all ships of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage will be given by wireless.

Twenty-four—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defence works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

Twenty-six—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States shall give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Twenty-seven—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight—In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and in fact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

Twenty-nine—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized

are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in Clause Twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty—All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

Thirty-two—The German Government will notify the neutral governments of the world, and particularly the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately cancelled.

Thirty-three—No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

VI.—DURATION OF ARMISTICE

Thirty-four—The duration of the armistice is to be thirty-days, with option to extend. During this period if its clauses are not carried into execution the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning forty-eight hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of Article III and Section Eighteen, under IV, shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insuffitient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted. This commission will act under the authority of the allied military and naval Commanders-in-Chief.

VII.—THE LIMIT FOR REPLY

Thirty-five—This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

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*This armistice has been signed the Eleventh of November, Nineteen Eighteen, at* 5 *o'clock French time.*

F. Foch,
R. E. Wemyss,
Erzberger,
A. Oberndorff,
Winterfeldt,
Von Salow.

VI.—PREMATURE?

Since the actual signing of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, a mighty controversy has arisen and continues, a controversy turning on the question as to whether it would not have been better to pursue

the fighting to the logical end. This debate has been marked by charges and counter-charges, the contestants alleging and denying that the decision to grant an armistice was premature. As the Treaty became a matter of controversy, in its turn, the indictment of the Armistice was added to the others filed against President Wilson, who was accused of having enabled the German military party to escape complete exposure, ultimate humiliation, by opening "conversations" with the Germans over the heads of the soldiers.

As to the main discussion, decision is perhaps impossible; as to the allegation against the American president, it has little foundation. It is equally untrue that his conversations conquered or saved the Prussian, and the claims of his friends and the accusations of his critics are equally outside the limits of reason. Yet even if decision in the main controversy is impossible, certain illuminating facts are spread upon the record.

Thus General Maurice, when the controversy was just beginning, on the morrow of the Armistice, went to France and talked with the soldiers, who were reported as most indignant. What he learned, he has written. From the Dutch frontier near Ghent to the Meuse, the Allied armies were approaching the limit of immediate exploitation on their successes. Behind them lay a desert, lacking in communications, needing weeks to bridge; before them the enemy was retiring, creating still another gulf of chaos. Pursuit between the Scheldt and the Meuse was destined to slow down shortly, should the combat continue.

East of the Meuse it was different. Between Metz and Strassburg the French and Americans were about to break out in a new offensive, thirty divisions in line, thirty in reserve. The country was undevastated, their communications intact. The Germans were without reserves and there was no approximate limit to the progress that might be made, after the first severe fighting, which would attend the rupture—that definitive rupture described by Buat.

But even this campaign carried with it certain obvious dangers. The Kaiser had long ago sworn that if ever the French should succeed in their determination to regain their "lost provinces" they would re-

cover only a wilderness. To have prolonged the war meant to transform Alsace-Lorraine into another Hindenburg desert. It meant to risk a similar wasting of all of Belgium, through which the German armies would retire. The victory was certain, but the price, not merely in blood but in destruction, was sure to be colossal.

The decision to permit the Germans to sign an armistice saved Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine. It gave back to France her old lands intact, with an industrial equipment capable of making good in large measure the losses suffered in the north of France. It insured to France under the later terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the Saar Coal Basin, which would in part, at least temporarily, replace the ruined Lens Basin, until such time as the mines of the Pas-de-Calais were again in working order. If Rheims, St. Quentin, Soissons, Lens, and Arras had been destroyed, France received immune from all injuries, Strassburg, Metz, Mühlhausen, and Colmar.

If it was an irritating and a disturbing circumstance that the German armies returning home should be welcomed as victors, greeted with arches of triumph, hailed as conquerors; if, in Germany, Ludendorff and his associates could propagate the legend that the German army had been invincible and the defeat had been the work of civilians—could allege that the nation had collapsed behind an unshaken army—this inveracity was too great to endure the test of time. The terms of the Armistice were the witness to absolute defeat and the position and condition of the German armies—facts which would stand forth more and more clearly as the years passed.

Beyond all else the sacrifice had been too great to permit the shedding of one more drop of blood unnecessarily. Europe was too near the edge of the abyss to dare risk any prolongation of the strain of war. To Foch was left the task of fixing the terms, and it is common knowledge that neither he nor his comrades could believe that any German army, however beaten, would accept such terms as he handed to Erzberger at Rethondes. The farther one was from the front on November 11, 1918, the more loudly was heard the clamour for "finishing the job." But the decision to end it by the Armistice must seem, with each suc-

ceeding year, more warranted, as the true extent of the dislocation of the machinery of government and existence is more accurately appraised.

Realizing the difficulties, the barriers in the pathway of reconstruction despite the termination of hostilities on November 11th, one may calculate what might have been the situation if the war had proceeded for a few more weeks or months and, between the Scheldt and the Meuse on the west and the Rhine on the east, a new belt of ruined provinces had been created, including all of Belgium, together with Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the German Rhineland. A Waterloo or Sedan, however stupendous, would hardly have been an adequate compensation.

One final and memorable circumstance, preserved in millions of letters and innumerable accounts of the moment, is the testimony of the meaning to the soldiers themselves, when, on the hour, silence suddenly fell along all the front from Holland to Switzerland. At 10:59 shells were still falling, bullets were striking, all the noise of destruction which had continued for more than fifty-two months was still audible. But at eleven o'clock exactly there was silence—so abrupt, so complete as to be oppressive. Almost as in a dream men rose from the trenches for the first time, save at the moment of attack, and looked steadily across the "No Man's Land" to the enemy trenches beyond.

In a score of tongues and dialects the phrase sounded: "The war is finished!" The hour so long looked forward to, so long held almost beyond hoping for, had at last arrived and found millions of men, on either side of the firing line, so exhausted that the defeated welcomed the relief that accompanied surrender and the conquerors celebrated their triumph in a sleep at last unbroken by shells or alarums. Paris, London, New York might give way to an enthusiasm which needed expression, but for the real victors the sweetest circumstance of victory, aside from safety, was the sleep it permitted. For them the longest nightmare in human experience had ended and, remembering how great were their agonies, their sacrifices, the sum of their miseries, one may well find unconvincing the arguments of those who would have prolonged the march of victory to the Rhine or even to Berlin.

# CHAPTER TWELVE

# THE OTHER FRONTS

## I

## THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION

It remains now briefly, very briefly, to summarize the events on four fronts including the period from March to November in which the issue of the war was decided on the western front. These four other fields of conquest were the Italian, the Macedonian, the Turkish, and that sea front on which the submarine was fought and checked, and it is only on this last front that success exercised anything like a decisive influence upon the issue of the main conflict. Had the submarine been able to perform the task allotted to it, it would have been impossible for two millions of American soldiers to cross the ocean; starvation would have come to Britain; and the Allies would have been compelled, while the German armies were still advancing toward the Paris front, to make a peace of approximate submission.

As for the three land campaigns, only that of Italy was of real magnitude or exercised any considerable influence upon events in France. The Italian front was actually, as Allied official statements and comments of the time indicated, the right flank of Foch's single front, which thus extended from the North Sea to the Adriatic, from the Yser to the Piave; and the brief interruption of the continuity of this line, incident to the interposition of Swiss territory, did not actually separate the two fractions. At the time of Caporetto, Italian disaster had made immediate and compromising demands upon British and French reserves. To this Haig ascribed his inability to exploit the initial success at Cambrai in that year. As late as March and April, 1918, British and French divisions were in Italy and had incontinently to be recalled during the Battle of Picardy.

In June, at the moment when the Battle of the Chemin des Dames in

all its peripheries had come to an end, Ludendorff called upon his Austrian allies to make a major offensive on the Piave. Success would mean the recall of Italian troops beginning to appear in Champagne; it would mean the necessity of another transfer of Allied reserves, desperately needed before Paris, to the valleys of the Adige and the Po. It might mean the collapse of Italy, and the corresponding disarray of Allied affairs.

This battle was to be delivered at the moment when Allied forces were at their lowest ebb and, following immediately upon the success at the Chemin des Dames, was to continue the moral as well as the military pressure upon Allied statesmen, public and military leaders. A second Caporetto might present to Foch the choice between (*a*) fatally weakening his Paris front, to reinforce the Italian, and (*b*) seeing the Italian army removed from the war because of the failure of Allied reinforcements to arrive and the subsequent appearance of Austro-Hungarian divisions in decisive numbers along the French front. Nor was it totally beyond calculation that the Italian armies, having been eliminated, the victorious Austrian hosts would sweep across the Valley of the Po and, by menacing France with invasion by all the Alpine passes from Mentone to Switzerland, compel Foch to divert French divisions from Champagne and from Picardy to Savoy, Dauphiné, and Provence.

The fact that with relatively insignificant Allied assistance, with only a handful of British and French troops present, Italy broke this attack at the Piave, must be reckoned an enormous contribution to Foch's victory. By the time Ludendorff was ready for his final offensive, that of July 15th, Foch could not only dismiss all anxieties as to his Italian flank but he could also count on a material Italian contribution to his resources in man-power on the French front. He could dismiss all calculation which might involve the transfer of French and British divisions to the Adige. He could, in sum, say to himself: "The next circumstance on the Italian flank will be an Italian attack; the offensive power of the Austrian army has been broken not for the moment, but for the rest of the war."

The Piave was the Italian Marne. In its relation to the general

Allied cause the Second Battle of the Piave was similar to that of Castlenau's victorious defence at Nancy, to the First Battle of the Marne, and Gouraud's equally shining resistance between Rheims and the Argonne to the Second. In the nature of things the attention of the world was concentrated upon the Paris front. Italy's triumph produced a general sense of relief but no accurate appraisal of achievement. Nevertheless, on the military side it was a very real factor in Foch's campaign. On the moral side it was the first "lift"—the first authentic victory after the opening of the terrible round of defeats on March 21st.

### II. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE PIAVE

The plans of the Austrians for their attack—which was fixed first for June 11th, the date when Ludendorff broke off the Battle of the Matz, and then postponed until June 15th—were as follows: there was to be a feint at Adamiello, just south of the Swiss frontier and looking toward the Valtelline, to distract Italian attention, and then three converging thrusts—the first on the Asiago Plateau, where Cadorna had just barely checked the Austrian offensive of 1916, and where weather and French troops had assisted Diaz in another successful defence after Caporetto; the second, directed at the Montello Heights where the Piave enters the plain and turns south toward the sea; and the third, between Montello and the sea, mainly along the Udine-Vicenza railway.

It was the purpose of Arz, the commander-in-chief of the Austrians, to turn the Italians out of the Piave line by smashing through from the mountains and coming down in the plain by the Astico and Brenta valleys exactly as his predecessors had sought to do in 1916 and 1917. If the Italians could be driven off the hills—they only held the southernmost slopes—and the success were swift and complete, then the Italian troops holding the Piave line might be enveloped and captured. If the progress were slower, ultimate success would mean a retirement behind the Adige and the Po, the surrender of Venice and Padua and the approach to Verona. But if the thrust out of the mountains failed, the capture of the Heights of Montello would involve an Italian retirement from the line of the Piave to the Brenta, and the capture of Venice.

Finally, the purpose of the third thrust, between Montello and the sea, was mainly to occupy the Italians on this front, prevent the diversion of reserves to the north, and exploit any success at Asiago or Montello. It will be seen that the largest profit which the Austrians could hope to attain would be realized by decisive success on the Asiago Plateau. Actually the conditions recall those of Caporetto, and a similar immediate and complete success, a repetition of Below's achievement with German troops, would have reproduced the terrible circumstances of the previous year.

But there was no repetition of Caporetto. First of all the Italians in the hills on the Asiago Plateau and on Monte Grappa stood firm—briefly and completely broke Arz's most dangerous thrust. This phase ended abruptly and Diaz was assured of the stability of his flank and the safety of his communications. By contrast the fighting on Montello was much more desperate and the issue for several days doubtful. The Austrians succeeded in passing the Piave, climbed the eastern and northern sides of Montello, and thus threatened the line of the Piave southward to the sea. They also succeeded in passing the river farther to the south, notably in the lagoons where the front was nearest to Venice. But Italian resistance stiffened, a small British contingent rendered valuable assistance, and presently the Austrians were pushed off the summit of Montello by counter-attacks which restored the situation. The Austrian thrust was thus checked, the advances were inconsiderable, and the line of the Piave was maintained.

But at this point there was a heavy rain in the mountains. The Piave rose suddenly and swept away many of the Austrian bridges, particularly those behind their troops on the slopes of Montello. Thereupon the Italians again counter-attacked and the Austrians were compelled to retire north and east of the Piave, to abandon all of their gains and many of their guns; many thousands of their troops were actually drowned in the flooded river. Thus the last phase of what had been termed "the hunger offensive," designed to be an impressive prelude to Ludendorff's July "peace storm," ended in a disaster of vast proportion leading directly to bitter recrimination in the Hungarian Parliament, to a confession of a

loss exceeding 100,000 in killed and drowned alone, the final destruction of morale, and of the hope of victory or the willingness to continue, in the Hapsburg Monarchy. Henceforth, until the supreme disaster of the closing days of the war, the Austrian army swiftly disintegrates. Although the Italians did not follow up their advantage until three months later, the Second Battle of the Piave actually broke the Austrian military power.

Ludendorff comments bitterly on this disaster. He notes that the Austrian soldier seemed to have fought well, and he suspects the cause of defeat was to be found in the fact that the attack was made on too broad a front. But what angers him most is the disclosure in the Hungarian Parliament. On the military aspect Ludendorff says that the failure was extremely painful to him and abolished the hope that relief on the western front might be gained in Italy. He now proposed the transfer of Austrian troops to the western front. Two divisions did come after delays, arriving in July, but the condition of these was wretched and they required training before they could be put into quiet sectors. Two more came in September but proved of little use. Pershing encountered and captured some of these Austrians at St. Mihiel.

On the moral and on the military side Italy rendered a supreme service to her allies in the Second Battle of the Piave. The Italian army fought in a manner which disclosed the fact that the soldiers and the country had recovered alike from the consequences of the disaster at Caporetto and from the infection of pacifism and treason which had contributed to that earlier disaster. Not even the magnitude of the events on the northern front should obscure this service, nor can any one who recalls the state of Allied minds between the Chemin des Dames and the Second Battle of the Marne forget the encouragement and relief consequent to the realization that the Allies, thanks to Italy, had at last won a battle and abolished one front of peril.

### III. IN MACEDONIA

Three months after the victory at the Piave the Army of the Orient, by a swift and brilliant victory, abolished the Macedonian front

and brought Bulgaria to the point of capitulation. Sarrail had been removed from the command of the Salonica army upon the arrival of Clemenceau, who feared neither politicians nor political generals. Guillaumat, Nivelle's successor at Verdun, replaced Sarrail, reorganized the Army of the Orient, now materially reinforced by Greek troops raised by Venizelos. But before he could put into operation his plans for an offensive, Guillaumat was recalled to become Governor of Paris, again threatened by the Germans. He was succeeded by Franchet d'Esperey, one of the army commanders at the First Marne who had been in charge of the army group to which belonged the French Sixth Army, victim of the Chemin-des-Dames offensive—a circumstance which explained D'Esperey's transfer to the Army of the Orient. By an odd coincidence the two generals who were now to win amazing victories in the east, D'Esperey in Macedonia and Allenby in Palestine, had been transferred to the scene of their subsequent successes under circumstances which suggested demotion.

The Macedonia offensive opened on September 15th, three days after Pershing had abolished the St. Mihiel salient, and at the close of those actions which constituted Foch's manœuvre between Montdidier and the Hindenburg Line. Before the composite Army of the Orient—containing Italian, French, Serbian, Greek, and British contingents—stood three enemy armies, all of them composed of Bulgarian troops, but one of them still called the Eleventh German Army and commanded by a German general, although its German contingent had disappeared. The two Bulgarian armies occupied the front east of the Vardar in a semicircle from the gulf into which the Struma empties to the Vardar near the old Serbo-Greek frontier. The so-called German army occupied the front from the Vardar to Lake Ochrida and Austrian contingents prolonged the line across Albania to the Adriatic.

The decisive manœuvre in the Macedonian battle was that of the Serbs. They occupied the sector between the Vardar and the Plain of Monastir along the old frontier. In front of them was a tangle of high mountains, Sokol, Dobropolie, and Vetretnik constituting the highest peaks. While the British between the Struma and the Vardar with

Greek assistance demonstrated vigorously, the magnificent Serbian remnant pushed north, took the mountain peaks, descended into the valleys of the Cerna and the Vardar, thus separating the so-called German army from the two Bulgarian forces, and threatening the rear of the Bulgarians between the Vardar and the Struma. What followed was swift and complete. The so-called German army, pursued by the French on their front and threatened by the Serbians in their rear along the Vardar Valley, unsuccessfully endeavoured to retire upon Uskup and thus acquire a line of retreat into Bulgaria; failing, it surrendered, while the Bulgarian Government proposed an armistice and then, sending commissioners to Salonica, made an unconditional surrender and retired from the war. About 75,000 prisoners and an enormous booty in material were the immediate fruits of victory, while the Bulgarian army was forced to give up its arms and demobilize.

In his memoirs, Ludendorff has many bitter words to say about the Bulgarian episode. He regards it as merely the consequence of treachery, of a prearranged bargain with the Allies, which is hardly to be borne out by any subsequent indication of tenderness for the Bulgars. He angrily alleges that Bulgarian divisions actually refused to fight, a circumstance which alone could explain for him the Serbian success. But granted this, he has already confessed that Prussian divisions had refused to fight, as far back as the "Black Day" of August 8th, nearly six weeks before the Bulgarians are accused of following Prussian example.

The fact is that Ludendorff fails to appreciate the effect upon his allies of his own defeats. His effort to explain the disasters in the west, after September 15th, by reference to Macedonian circumstances is, as General Maurice points out, merest moonshine. But the reverse is unmistakably true. Bulgaria entered the war merely because she believed, her despicable Czar believed, that Germany would win. She continued in the war because German aid was necessary to hold the territories conquered from Serbia. She quit the war when it became clear that Germany, so far from winning, was on the point of losing the conflict and dragging her allies with her.

Ludendorff might have found ample analogy for what occurred after his August defeats by the most cursory examination of the experiences of Napoleon after his Russian reverses. Then the Prussians were the first to go over to the enemy, not merely to surrender as did the Bulgars. Later the Saxons quit him on the battlefield of Leipsic, while the Bavarians, who had profited by his prosperity, endeavoured to forbid his retreat to France. The moral effect of the Bulgarian defeat and surrender, of the swiftly following Turkish collapse, was undoubtedly felt upon the western front, but in both instances the eastern collapse had only followed Ludendorff's own defeats at the Marne, along the Somme, and his disastrous retreat to the Hindenburg Line—events which were not to be mistaken anywhere, least of all in Sofia or in Constantinople. That the Bulgarian surrender led to the Austrian collapse is more arguable, but the Austrian collapse did not come until Ludendorff had been driven out of the Hindenburg Line and had forced his government to ask an armistice, which was a confession of defeat, emphasized by the circumstances attending the German demand.

On the military side, the consequences of the Bulgarian surrender were relatively minor, because the decision of the war was had absolutely in France, before the victorious Army of the Orient was able to intervene effectively. Of course, Roumania promptly rose, threw off her German shackles, and would in the briefest time have mobilized her armies and, placing them beside the Army of the Orient, moved north to Budapest and to Vienna, to Germany beyond, reinforced by Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks, had Austria survived or Germany held out. As it was, Roumania, although rushing her preparations, was not called upon to intervene again, and was able to occupy the districts promised her before her first entrance into the war: Transylvania, the Bukowina, ultimately the eastern half of the Banat, and, as Russian anarchy continued to march, that Bessarabian fraction of Moldavia which had been Latin since the days of Trajan and had been last stolen from the Roumanians by the Russians in sorry return for Roumanian service at Plevna.

The surrender of Bulgaria also opened the land route to Constan-

tinople, which was being followed by British forces, when Turkey succumbed, following disasters in Palestine. But most satisfactory of all consequences of the victory was the reëntry of the Serbs into their capital after three years of absence. The actual triumph which brought them into their own had resulted from the stroke of Marshal Mishitch's survivors of that army which the gallant old Putnik had led south across the Albanian mountains in the terrible winter retreat of 1915. It contained veterans who had defeated the Turks at Kumanovo in 1912, Bulgarians at the Bregalnitza in 1913, and had twice, in 1914 and 1915, routed Austrian armies at the Jedar and Valievo.

There is no finer national page in the history of the World War than that which sets forth the Serbian struggle. No nation, not even Belgium, had known so much of hostile occupation or of enemy brutality; no people had been so ravaged by disease, so maltreated by enemies seeking their extinction. Yet at the moment when the House of Hapsburg—which had plunged the world into war to abolish the Serbian menace to the persistence of Austrian tyranny—was in exile, its monarchy in ruins, King Peter was reëntering Belgrade, and Serbia was not only intact but about to realize the age-long dream of the Southern Slavs. Poetic justice could ask no more, while contrasted with Serbian glory was Bulgarian shame; two treacherous attacks upon her neighbours had not merely gained her nothing, they had left her territorially weakened, with her Macedonian ambition unrealized and her dream of Balkan hegemony shattered.

## IV. ARMAGEDDON—"SIDE SHOWS"

On September 19th, four days after the victory in Macedonia and one week before the opening of the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, Allenby struck the Turks north of Jerusalem and standing between Jaffa and the Jordan well north of Jericho. The battle taking its name from Samaria, and doubly memorable in history because the final phase terminated on the Plain of Armageddon, was fought between Allenby's British army, containing a large Indian contingent and a very small French detachment. and the Turkish Eighth and Seventh armies, which when the

battle began were in line from the Mediterranean eastward. During the first stage of the battle the Turks fought well but were steadily pressed back. Presently the Turkish front between the sea and the Jordan was broken, and through the gap along the sea coast Allenby launched his cavalry, which swept first northward and thence eastward to Nazareth and the Plain of Armageddon, across the rear of the whole Turkish host. The German commander, Liman von Sanders, barely missed falling into the net by a precipitate flight northward. The balance of the two Turkish armies, more than 60,000 men and 400 guns, fell into Allenby's hands, while Sanders and the remaining Turkish army, the Fourth, fled north to Damascus and thence to Aleppo, pursued by the British and their Arab allies led by Emir Feisul, son of the Sherif of Mecca. At a single blow Turkish military power had been broken and Allenby would be a field marshal and Lord of Megiddo in recognition of his victory. On October 31st Turkey capitulated. Enver Pasha and his Germanophile associates fled eastward.

Allenby's victory brought the final ruin to the Turkish Empire, which, however it might survive in some weakened form, was now definitively deprived of its Arabian provinces. Mesopotamia passed entirely into British hands and French claims upon Syria would be presently recognized. Like Ferdinand of Bulgaria, Enver Pasha had staked his country's future upon a German victory, and German defeat had brought utter ruin.

With the victories in Palestine and Macedonia, as with the victory of Maude's army at Bagdad in a preceding campaign, the history of the so-called "side shows" terminated. Each of them was a failure in so far as it was designed, by an operation in a minor field, to produce or to influence the result in the main theatre of operations, which was always the western front. With the troops wasted at Gallipoli Sir John French might have been able to achieve considerable results in the unfortunate offensive at Loos in September, 1915. Had the Gallipoli venture not been undertaken, the Serbian army might have been saved and the Danube barrier to German expansion maintained. It was necessary to maintain troops in the east to cover Egypt and India, but the attempt

to expand the useful occupation of Basra and the adjoining oil fields into a dash to Bagdad, which should counter-balance the defeat at Gallipoli, was a rash and costly venture.

The Salonica episode is less clearly to be set down as a total loss. It unquestionably prevented the delivery of Greece to the Central Powers and the use of its coast and islands for German submarine bases with fatal consequences to Britain's Mediterranean line of communications. But it no less patently represented the locking up of very considerable troops needed elsewhere, and a tremendous expansion of the strain placed upon Allied shipping. Indeed, so great was the strain that the British had resolved in the spring of 1917 to insist upon the evacuation of the whole Macedonian front, which would have led to very grave consequences.

In the end, victories were won in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, and in Macedonia, but they were won only after the results in the main field had been assured. Moreover, while Germany was never able to draw from her Turkish and Bulgarian allies those divisions she asked for to use on the western front, she was not required, save during some brief operation, to employ German troops on these fronts, while her Turkish and Bulgarian allies occupied many French and British divisions which would otherwise have been available in France. Moreover, at one great crisis, when Roumania entered the war in 1916, Bulgarian and Turkish troops, commanded by Mackensen, contributed the necessary strength to render harmless what might have been a fatal stroke.

The moment arrived in the war when Germany's allies demanded help from her. It was the hour when the German situation was gravest in the west. Failing these reinforcements, both her allies succumbed; the Turkish resistance was more considerable than the Bulgarian, but the collapse of both was prompt and beyond all remedy. Not only this, but the Bulgarian collapse opened the Hungarian frontier both to Allied and Roumanian attacks, Roumanian blows—had they been needed—to finish off the Hapsburg nation.

In sum: it is clear that the Allies wasted men and material and severely taxed their transport by endeavouring to achieve a victory in a

minor field. The Gallipoli venture was indefensible, the Salonica investment one of its evil consequences. The first Bagdad gamble was as futile as the Gallipoli affair and necessitated great subsequent investments in men and material, made necessary to retrieve lost prestige. Nor did the capture of Bagdad lead to any useful result, since the collapse of Russia abolished all possibility of an extension of the campaign northward. Palestine was a brilliant incident, after an unfortunate beginning at Gaza, but the divisions which were locked up in this army might have saved Gough on March 21st, and the victory in France would, in any event, have brought Turkey to her knees.

The Germans, on the contrary, made no such mistakes; they kept their attention on the western and Russian fronts, using the minor fields only as scenes of brief campaigns, in which they were able to harvest shining results at small costs—results which, notably in 1915 and in 1916, drew attention away from real reverses in other regions.

It was the German purpose to create a vast central empire, a Mittel-Europa, extending from Hamburg to Basra, including all of the Turkish Empire and menacing Egypt and even India. By their conquests of Serbia and Roumania and by their alliance with Bulgaria and with Turkey, they did construct this empire and, but for Venizelos, Greece would have been enlisted by Constantine. But the dream of Mittel-Europa was shattered at the Second Marne and at the Hindenburg Line, and could not have survived even had there been no victories in the battles in Macedonia and Palestine.

On the dramatic side, however, there is obvious satisfaction in seeing the great German Mittel-Europa crumble under blows from all sides which, falling simultaneously, demolish it. The battles which achieved its ruin in Macedonia and in Palestine are themselves brilliant episodes in the war, which have brought justly deserved rewards to the successful commanders.

So complete were the Turkish and Bulgarian surrenders that the recapitulation of the terms of the two armistices can add little. In sum: Bulgaria and Turkey laid down their arms; opened their territories, their railroad lines, their harbours, and their waterways to their enemies;

A SMOKE SCREEN FOR AMERICAN DESTROYERS

# THE AMERICAN NAVY IN THE WAR



*U. S. Navy Official*

A SUBMARINE'S GUN

Many of the smaller patrol boats were outranged by the guns carried by U-boats, but seldom did the Germans risk an engagement, preferring to use their shells on defenceless merchantmen

AMERICAN BATTLE SQUADRON IN THE NORTH SEA

*U. S. Navy Official*

BEHIND THE GUNS ON AN AMERICAN DESTROYER

DEPTH BOMBS IN AIR

These were fired from Y-guns

*U. S. Navy Official*

A CAMOUFLAGED AMERICAN DESTROYER

BRITISH "OLYMPIC" WITH AMERICAN TROOPS ON BOARD

*U. S. Navy Official*

THE PERISCOPE OF AN AMERICAN SUBMARINE OFF THE IRISH COAST

A SUBMARINE "CRASH DIVE"

*U. S. Navy Official*

AMERICAN SUBMARINES ALONGSIDE MOTHER SHIP IN BANTRY BAY, IRELAND

*© Committee on Public Information*

AN AMERICAN SCHOONER ON FIRE

But the Allied vessels in the neighbourhood hesitate to go to the rescue for they think it is a German decoy ship simulating distress to bring them within torpedo distance

AMERICAN SUBCHASERS IN PORT

Though but 110 feet long they patrolled the open sea despite heavy weather



*U. S. Navy Official*

A Y-GUN FOR FIRING DEPTH BOMBS

It is constructed so that both sides may be discharged at once

*U. S. Navy Official*

A GUN IN ACTION ON THE STERN OF A DESTROYER

In the submarine zone crews were constantly on watch at their guns, and fired at suspicious objects on the least provocation. The great amount of wreckage floating in the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay during the height of the submarine peril kept the gun crews always alert, but very seldom were submarines actually sighted

agreed to demobilize their armies, to surrender war materials and all else, including the derelict Turkish fleet, which might be required. Turkey agreed to the evacuation of Persia, Syria, Mesopotamia, the Hedjaz, and the Yemen; in fact, placed herself unreservedly and unconditionally in Allied hands.

### V. THE LAST OF AUSTRIA

On October 24th the Italian army, with certain British and French contingents and an American regiment, the 332nd, passed the Piave from the mountains to the sea in the final offensive of the war. For the first days the struggle was severe, and then, in the week which saw the Caporetto disaster in the previous year, Austrian resistance collapsed. Armies were transformed into mere fleeing mobs. The rout which had come to a single Italian army in the days of Caporetto now overtook the whole Hapsburg host, and it fled eastward, disintegrating as it ran, until no army was left. Since Waterloo there had been no such battlefield collapse on the continent of Europe.

Too late to change events, and after vain appeals to the United States and to the Allies, Austria surrendered at discretion, unconditionally, abjectly. Already more than 400,000 prisoners, 7,000 cannon, 250,000 horses, booty unequalled in this or any other war, had been gathered in. During the next few days Trent and Trieste welcomed Italian armies, all that Italy had lost in the war was reclaimed, all that Italy had longed for since the fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy was seized. Before the world had grasped the true meaning of the colossal victory, Italian troops were at the summit of the Brenner Pass and Italian warships occupied Austrian ports. Italia Irredenta was redeemed and Trieste and Trent welcomed their liberators a full month before Strassburg and Metz.

Such were the consequences of the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto. Actually a nation had collapsed behind its army; had more than collapsed, it had resolved into its component racial elements. There was no more Austria, no more Hungary, in the sense in which both had existed for centuries. Italian, Roumanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Slo-

vakian, Czechic, and Polish tribes turned at last to their own racial and national pathways while the wretched Austrian fragment, German by language, proclaimed a republic, and Hungary, shorn of all her subject races, began that internal degeneration which would culminate in Bela Kun and the Roumanian invasion.

It was to avoid this disintegration that Austrian statesmen, encouraged by German leaders, had risked the fatal ultimatum now more than four years old. After the Balkan wars, Austria-Hungary had felt herself doomed by Slavic renaissance unless insolent and menacing Serbia were conquered and crushed. Germany had felt with the decay of Austria her own position between France and Russia would become dangerous while her dream of a Middle European empire, of a "place in the sun," would be shattered. To avoid this, Austria and Germany had risked all and now had lost all. At the moment when German armies were at the point of capitulation, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become a memory and the Emperor of Austria would reign but a single day longer than the German Kaiser.

On the military side the Italian victory in the final struggle at the Piave is not to be compared with that of June or that of the previous year. It was a great victory, mainly an Italian victory, for Diaz had but two British and a single French division under his command. Nevertheless, if his own success in June had contributed materially to decisive Allied victories in July and August in France, the reaction of those victories and of the further triumphs in September and October had produced the moral collapse which gave to his early successes in the last battle their unlimited horizons.

The value of Italy to her allies in the war has been singularly underestimated. Her notification to France of her assured neutrality, in August, 1914, enabled Joffre to use in the north those divisions which otherwise would have been immobilized along the Alps to the utter ruin of France at and even before the Marne. Italy's entrance into the struggle in 1915 exactly coincided with Russian disaster at the Dunajec, and had Austrian troops not been drawn to the Italian front, Russia might have been completely crushed in 1915, and Germany with

Austrian assistance might have come west in 1916 before Great Britain was ready. What the blow at Verdun might have been under these circumstances is not difficult to perceive.

A year later Russian collapse did occur, and it was Italy who suffered the first blow in consequence, having inflicted heavy losses upon the Austrians and kept them fully occupied at the Isonzo until the moment when the release of German divisions on the western front and the decline of Italian morale, due to the enormous sacrifices on the Bainsizza Plateau, made Caporetto possible. The rally of Italy at the Piave is a splendid page in national history and proved as fatal to Austrian purposes as the French stand at the Marne had been to German designs.

In 1918 Italy won the first victory in a very great and desperate battle which had immediate and continuing influence upon events in the French field. And in 1918 Italy prevented the transfer of any appreciable number of Austrian troops to the western front while she sent thither splendid divisions of her own, two of which played a very real part in the defence of the Mountain of Rheims in the German phase of the Second Battle of the Marne, and continued gallantly and usefully in the subsequent fighting.

Without Italian aid it seems impossible to calculate the victory which was finally achieved. It is true that after Caporetto a certain number of British and French divisions were sent to Italy, some of which remained even to the moment of the Battle of Picardy, but they cannot be regarded as counter-balancing in any appreciable degree that whole mass of Austrian military establishment which would have been available for use on the western front after Russian collapse had Italy remained neutral or retired from the war. Further than this the Italian navy was of very great assistance in the Mediterranean, and but for Italian participation in the Balkan campaign, the Salonica operation must have been abandoned and Greece surrendered to the Central Powers.

Had Russia continued in 1917 and 1918 to fight with the determination and energy which she displayed in 1916, it is not unreasonable

to suppose that Germany would have been beaten in the latter year; but, with Italy in and Russia out, the Allies were still unable to win the war, and it required the uttermost strength of all three nations to hold the line until America could arrive. Therefore, it seems simple justice to say that Italian participation was an indispensable condition not alone of victory but of the earlier escape from defeat.

### VI. THE SUBMARINE

During all the period of the fighting on land until, on the eve of complete surrender, the Germans abandoned their undersea campaign, the submarine remained a grave menace, checked measurably but only measurably and, in the judgment of Tirpitz, was destined to have become more dangerous with the new craft Germany had in hand in October. One may say of the campaign waged against the submarine nothing more positive than that at the moment when it was abandoned the total of Allied building had over-passed the monthly average of sinking, and that the realization of the American shipbuilding programme, together with the acceleration of British construction, had abolished the immediate peril, while the new method of convoy, depth bombs, and the patrol, made possible by American light craft in European waters, were slowly but surely reducing the harvest of the underseas boat.

The great achievement, however, was the successful moving of more than 2,000,000 soldiers across the ocean with only one real disaster, the sinking of the *Tuscania*. Half a million were moved in the first thirteen months and 1,500,000 in the last six months. A miracle was accomplished alike in the movement of the army and of the cargoes, and the total of tons rose from 373,000 in April to 750,000 in October. In these figures is revealed the true failure of the submarine campaign. It was designed to bring Britain and France to their knees before America could effectively intervene in the war. It failed in its primary purpose, although it did bring the United Kingdom to the outer edge of starvation, and it totally failed to prevent the transportation of American masses whose total casualties due to the submarine were less than 700 in a total of more than 2,000,000 embarked.

But it is essential to remember that, although the campaign failed, the failure was by no means assured before the end of 1917, and the losses remained grave to the very end. Thus in 1917 the total sinkings were 6,200,000 tons, and for the first four months of the unlimited sinking, 2,700,000 tons. The monthly average for the eleven months of the campaign of 1917 was 530,000 tons. The measure of the success of the anti-submarine operations is revealed in the reduction of this average to 255,000 tons in the ten months of submarine warfare in 1918. The margin between the two rates represents the postponement of decisive defeat during the time when new construction could be carried forward, and it was one of the ironies of the situation that the German ships interned in American ports, and presently seized and operated by the United States Government after we entered the war, played a decisive part in the transport of American troops to France.

For the ten months of unrestricted warfare in 1917, the Germans sank 5,502,000 tons; in 1918, for a similar number of months, 2,554,000 tons. To have reduced the submarine destruction by nearly 3,000,000 tons in ten months represents the achievement of the Allied navies, but mainly of the British fleet. It was accomplished by the convoy system, by the use of depth bombs, patrols, "mystery ships"; it was facilitated in a measure by the decline in the morale of the German sailors, a consequence of increased Allied efficiency in destruction. The mutiny in the German navy in the closing hours of the war, when the orders were issued for the High Seas Fleet to go out on an adventure like that of Cervera at Santiago, represented the results of British strength as disclosed in the Battle of Jutland, and Allied success in the long battle with the submarine. Admiral Sims has reported that of the German submarines not less than 205 were sunk, 13 by Americans, a certain number by French, Italian, and Japanese ships, but the vast majority by the British navy, which in addition earned world-wide admiration by Sir Roger Keyes's brilliant exploit in bottling up the harbour of Zeebrugge on April 23rd. This venture, directly modelled upon Hobson's deed in the *Merrimac* at Santiago, but a far more considerable, dangerous, and successful achievement, for the time at least sealed up the

Zeebrugge outlet to the Bruges submarine base, while on May 10th Commodore Hubert Lynes performed a similar feat at Ostend, thus closing the other gateway to the Belgian "wet triangle."

Tirpitz believes that had the submarine campaign been pressed instead of suspended under American pressure, in 1916, it might have won the war; and he discloses the interesting circumstance that, while the world held him responsible for the first submarine blockade venture, he had in fact opposed it—for practical, not for humane, reasons—believing at that time that such a blockade was beyond German resources and that the blockade of the Thames estuary held out greater promise of profit and less risk of international complications.

But whatever else may be said of Tirpitz's conclusions, he is certainly correct in his belief that the submarine and the campaign in the first months of 1917 brought the Allies nearer to defeat than any military operation during the war, and brought Great Britain nearer to absolute surrender than at any time in her history since the Norman Conquest; but, by contrast, it brought Germany to absolute ruin by bringing America to Europe. Like Ludendorff, Tirpitz concedes that the campaign of 1917 would never have been launched had German leaders suspected the swift onset of Russian revolution. One of the great blunders of all history this submarine campaign must be reckoned, and however near it brought Germany to success, its responsibility for the ultimate collapse is unmistakable.

In truth, like the Hutier tactic in the field, the submarine campaign at sea in the end encountered a defensive tactic which deprived it of its deadliest possibilities. This was inevitable and should have been foreseen by the Germans. Napoleon's march to Moscow was no more ruinous to his empire than the submarine gamble eventually proved to be for the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. By it Germany lost the war, aroused the animosity of neutrals as well as the implacable hatred of belligerents, and found herself at the end compelled to surrender her own merchant fleet to make good in part the ravages of her undersea boats.

And despite the submarine interlude the British navy played an

even greater part in the ultimate downfall of Germany than it had in the destruction of Napoleon. It not merely conveyed more than half the American army to Europe in its merchant ships, but in the first days cleared the ocean of German vessels, war and merchant alike, and held the seaward gates of the German Empire in a relentless grip from the beginning to the end. If the German people did not literally starve, a very considerable number of them suffered from hunger, and the military machine was more and more handicapped by the absence of necessary materials obtainable only from the outside world. Great as was the physical and material handicap imposed upon Germany by the British fleet, the moral blockade was almost more deadly. Germany was isolated from the world, and while both in peace and war the products of American forge and farm, mine and factory, flowed to Germany's enemies, Hamburg and Bremen became as deserted as the ancient harbour of Carthage. The German flag became unknown on the high seas or in foreign ports and all the magnificent achievement of German commercial expansion was reduced to nothing.

Yet, aside from the Battle of Jutland, the naval phase of the war was lacking in every larger element of appeal. If Beatty more than Jellicoe possessed the "Nelson touch" it revealed itself in no Trafalgar, had no opportunity to reveal itself. The war on the sea was in a sense as unromantic, as hard, as painful as the war in the trenches. Yet it had a far more shining reward. On the day on which a German admiral brought the German High Seas Fleet to Scapa Flow under its own steam, and, on Beatty's order, hauled down the German ensign, Great Britain won a greater triumph over a naval rival than had been known since the days when Rome conquered Carthage. The Kaiser had challenged British supremacy of the seas, and the end of the conflict was the scene at Scapa Flow, one of the most complete and absolute victories ever won, a victory which not alone destroyed the enemy's power to resist but shattered the tradition without which no navy can exist. Without the British navy there could have been no victory on land, and if Beatty had no victory of the Second Marne or of the Hindenburg Line to reward his labours, Foch was no more successful in reviving for the

French army the tradition of Napoleon than was Beatty in preserving for the British navy the prestige of Nelson. That the American navy served usefully and gallantly under Beatty must be a cause for national pride hereafter, not less for the navy than the Meuse-Argonne achievement for the army.

And not only had Western ideas of democracy and liberty prevailed against the Prussian conception of autocracy and of militarism but the military tradition of the French Revolution had again triumphed over that of Frederick the Great. Moltke had met Joffre at the First Marne and been defeated, Falkenhayn had met Petain at Verdun and been repulsed, Ludendorff had encountered Foch and been conquered. Not only had the defeats of Wörth, Gravelotte, and Sedan been avenged in the two Marne battles and before Verdun, but for the Prussian share in Waterloo and the German accomplishment at Sedan Foch had paid measure for measure at the Battle of the Hindenburg Line. His campaign from March 26th to July 18th, made in adversity, had been as brilliant as Napoleon's last campaign in the Marne valley in 1814, and Foch had succeeded where the Emperor failed. His campaign from July 18th to November 11th had been as successful as any one of the great Emperor's earlier campaigns which culminated at Austerlitz, Jena, or Wagram, and in the cause of Washington, Foch had revealed the genius of Napoleon.

In the cause of human liberty he had employed talents which will entitle him hereafter to rank with Cæsar and Napoleon as one of the supreme soldiers of all time, and he had employed those talents, not to achieve for himself imperial glory or world dominion, but to establish for his own country and for the democracies allied with France those liberties which the German had sought to abolish. Through him France had risen once more from the dejection of defeat to her ancient estate as the first champion of human liberty in the world. And before the splendour of Foch's achievement every other personal contribution to the greatest struggle in all human history sinks into insignificance.

# CONCLUSION

The victories whose decisions were written in the several armistices settled all the issues on which the war had been fought. The German effort to dominate the Continent by force of arms was shattered at the Battle of the Hindenburg Line as that of Napoleon had been broken at Waterloo. The return of Alsace-Lorraine, determined in the document of Rethondes, righted the ancient wrong of 1871 and repealed the Treaty of Frankfort which for forty-seven years had oppressed all conceptions of justice and troubled the peace of the world. The arrival of the German fleet in Scapa Flow terminated a German challenge to British sea power which had been developing since the opening of the reign of William II.

Beyond all else, the victories of the armies of Marshal Foch at last refuted the Prussian doctrine practised by Frederick the Great in Silesia, by him and by his successors in Poland, by William I in Schleswig and in Alsace-Lorraine. The archaic conception that the necessities of the strong are sufficient warrant for the plundering and enslavement of the weak fell with the revelation that however long the evil principle may seem to prevail, in the end the concerted efforts of the weak will overthrow the strong.

Once more a nation had endeavoured to realize the ambition of Charles V and Philip II of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon of France. Tempted by unmistakable superiority in numbers, organization, military and economic resources, Germany had sought a continental supremacy by arms which was to be the prelude to a revival in the world of the Roman episode. And once more the end had been as before. After shining victories and temporary successes the attempt had failed, and the failure had brought untold miseries and humiliations to the dynasty and the nation. In all essential details history had but repeated itself, the will of the separate nationalities and races for liberty had vindicated itself upon the battlefield.

And it was to vindicate this will for liberty that the several nations had taken up arms, that Belgium had resisted invasion; that Britain, seeing herself threatened, had declared war; that invaded France had borne all agonies with unflinching determination to die rather than to be conquered or enslaved.

As the German purpose and the German spirit more and more clearly revealed not only the ambition but the savagery of conquest, one nation after another was drawn into the struggle, with the conscious or unconscious instinct for self-preservation dictating its action. In the end the circle of Germany's foes extended around the world, and men of Australia, Canada, and the United States, fought beside those of Europe and of the white populations of Africa on the western battle front.

And this issue, the supreme issue of the war, however disguised in eloquent phrases or camouflaged by moral appeals, was settled in the battles which preceded the Armistice. The world fought Germany because the world saw in the German purpose a direct and deadly threat to its own liberties, to its own safety, alike to its institutions, its ideals, and its simplest and most material interests. The only solution to the struggle could be the destruction of German military power, and that power was broken by the victories from July to November, 1918.

Nor was the downfall of Germany the sole consequence of the victories. Not only did the races which had been free on August 1, 1914, retain their liberties on November 11, 1918, but other races, long held in subjection but never surrendering their national faith and their instinctive longing for liberty, escaped from bondage as an incident in German defeat. The Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Southern Slavs, the Italians of Austria and the Roumanians of Hungary were emancipated by the fact of victory. In the first eleven days of November, 1918, a new Europe emerged from chaos, and even in Asia there were far-reaching transformations.

These things, in the words of Marshal Foch, were "facts." They were enduring evidences that the issues for which the war had been fought were settled. The Peace Conference might, after long deliberation and mighty discussion, endeavour to trace lines upon the map

which would express the facts of the war, the results of the victory and of the defeat, but the results themselves lay beyond the authority of the Peace Conference to modify or measurably to transform.

This had been true in 1648 after the Thirty Years' War, in 1815 after the Wars of Napoleon. In each case an attack upon the liberty of the world had been repulsed. The fall of Napoleon and the collapse of the French effort to dominate the Continent were achieved results. The efforts at Vienna to make the decision of the question immediately at issue extend to cover the questions of the future failed utterly and miserably. The defeat of Napoleon had not rendered permanent the subjection of Italy, the disunion of Germany, the damnation of the principles of the French Revolution. It had done no more than dispose of the question for which Europe had struggled toward settlement from Austerlitz to Waterloo.

The actual progress of the Conference of Paris is, perhaps, the best illustration of the truth, established in history, that peace settlements settle nothing; rather, they signal the arrival of that new set of problems, controversies, conflicts out of which is made the history of a later period. What was decided at Vienna remained a matter of controversy a century and more after the Congress had adjourned and decades after its last participant had died. But what was done at Waterloo—the result, the decision—has not changed since the evening of June 18, 1815, when, the Guard having failed, Napoleon took the road for Paris and St. Helena. In our own experience it is at Appomattox that the Civil War ends. What lies beyond is the period of Reconstruction, the development of a new phase.

Therefore this history of the World War closes with the battles of the Hindenburg Line, of Vittorio-Veneto, of Macedonia, and of Armageddon, and with the narration of their immediate consequences, which were: the surrender of Germany; the separation of Austria-Hungary into its racial fragments; the restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine; the occupation by Italy of her Irredenta; the liberation of Belgium and Serbia, restored to national independence; the revolution in Germany and elsewhere, which temporarily or permanently removed from

the hands of a few that arbitrary power which they had exercised in such fashion as to oppress millions and to menace the freedom of all mankind.

There are those to whom the victory will seem vain, if to the deliverance from the German menace there be not added security against all future war, insurance against every later international conflict. The aspiration is a great and noble dream, and any fraction of it actually realized will be of enduring benefit to all mankind. But for myself, I am content that the German attack has been repulsed. Terrible as has been the sacrifice and great as is the suffering which still continues, I cannot conceive that the existing misery approximates that which would have resulted had Foch failed to hold the line between March 26th and July 18th, or if between the Marne and the Meuse he had not broken the German army and that for which the German army stood in the sum total of human existence.

Not a few of my friends have given their lives in the struggle, and my life is the poorer because of the loss. Much of the world that I knew and loved has been turned into ruins, which I have seen in their full desolation and ugliness. I have seen the horror and the misery of battle at the front and behind the front and known the agony which comes to a whole nation when the enemy is literally at the gate.

And yet, remembering the days of September, 1914, when the German army approached Paris, when that incarnation of ruthless force which was the German army seemed about to engulf all that was beautiful and free in the world; recalling the hours of Verdun, the even more terrible hours in the spring of 1918, when German victory seemed not merely possible but probable; turning back to the moments immediately following the invasion of Belgium, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the moments in which the character, the power, and the purpose of the German were revealed and it seemed as if all our conceptions of right, justice, of all that makes for sweetness and light in this world, were about to be shattered; I cannot but feel grateful and content at those fruits of victory which are assured, were assured at the moment when German surrender wrote the everlasting condemnation of the German idea and the German conception of human existence.

Nor can I believe that the awful sum of human misery and sacrifice this war has brought is proven vain, if the single profit be the repulse of one more monstrous effort to enslave men's spirits with the idea of force and men's bodies with the application of that force, as Germany applied it in Belgium, in France, in Poland—as Germany's allies applied it in Serbia, in Roumania, in Hapsburg Austria and Hungary.

At Verdun I saw thousands of men, in the heat of battle, marching to death which was imminent and well nigh inescapable, with a single thought in their minds, a single phrase on their lips—"They Shall Not Pass!" And if the realization of their will be all of our victory which stands the test of time, I cannot believe the benefit to mankind has been incommensurate with the sacrifice. Nor can I fail to be humbly grateful to the men of my own race, who on those same Verdun hills so wrought that the French sacrifice of 1916, which might otherwise have been sterile, became a fruitful sowing against the harvest of 1918.

This Volume Concludes Mr. Simonds's
History of the World War

Editor

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# AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY

## By MARSHAL FOCH

On March 21st, Germany launched her offensive against the hinge of the allied armies in the region of Saint-Quentin. You know what its effects were. It soon reached the Scarpe, advanced up the Somme, which it crossed, and progressed down the Oise. The situation suddenly became very grave.

In those critical days, on the 28th of March, General Pershing and General Bliss generously came forward with an offer to lead their men into battle, and they both said to me: "We are here to be killed; forward then with our men."

Soon after, on the 25th of April, at Sarcus, we met the same generals; on the 2nd of May, at Abbeville, with the concurrence of the Allied governments, we asked the American Government to land in France, each month, 120,000 infantry men or machine gunners, and replacement troops.

In fact, during the month of March, the United States sent to us 69,000 men; in April, 94,000; 200,000 in May; 245,000 in June; 295,000 in July; 235,000 in August.

The strength of the American army went up from 300,000 men on the 11th of March to 954,000 in July and 1,700,000 in October.

On the 2nd of June, the Versailles Supreme War Council asked President Wilson to continue sending troops in the same way, from 200,000 to 300,000 men per month, and to have in readiness for the spring of 1919 one hundred American divisions. President Wilson answered that he agreed and that if more were needed, they would be forthcoming.

But during that time the American troops did not remain idle. As early as the month of May, two American divisions went into the fight with the French First Army in the region of Montdidier; three were in the Vosges, where they relieved the French; two were in training.

In June, two more were on the Marne, at Château-Thierry, and in the Belleau Wood, where they assumed a large share of the resistance offered to the enemy.

On July 18th, five American divisions took part in the victorious counter-offensive of the French Sixth and Tenth armies, and contributed greatly to its success.

At the same time, on the 24th of July, the American First Army was formed, under the command of General Pershing. Its appointed task was to clear

the communications between Paris and Nancy by pushing the enemy back at Saint-Mihiel.

On the 12th of September, 14 American divisions, 8 in the first line and 6 in support, conquered the salient of Saint-Mihiel, capturing 200 guns and 15,000 prisoners.

Some days later, on the 26th of September, between the Aisne and the Marne, in the rough Argonne region, 14 American divisions went into a great offensive. On the second day, Montfaucon was left behind; on the 14th of October Grandpré was taken; Châtillon on the 21st, Bantheville on the 30th; on the 1st of November, Buzancy; on the 4th, Beaumont, and on the 9th the whole line of the Meuse, from Mouzon to Bazeilles, was in our possession.

In the meantime, two American divisions lent their assistance to the French Fifth Army near Romains; two others to the British armies in the region of Saint-Quentin, and still two others, jointly with the French Fourth Army, stormed the formidable positions at Orfeuil; then, two American divisions shared in the offensive of the Flanders group, on the Lys and the Scheldt. Finally, six more were getting ready, together with the French army, for the offensive of the 14th of November in Lorraine, when the Armistice of November the 11th was signed, taking our weapons from us.

Thus the American army had powerfully aided in winning the victory, for the Armistice was tantamount to a capitulation, an absolute capitulation.

Thus the American army, supported by a government firmly determined to keep up the fight to the very end, had returned to France the visit Lafayette had paid to America at the time of America's birth.

I think of those moving memories of days of anguish and days of success as I salute the American nation which so valiantly upheld us in the war.

I salute my American comrades in arms, generals, officers and soldiers, all equally glorious, thanks to whom a decisive victory has been achieved for freedom.

# II

# A CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS OF THE WORLD WAR

## 1914

June 28.—The Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand, is murdered at Serajevo, Bosnia, by a Serbian.

July 23.—Austria-Hungary sends an ultimatum to Serbia.

July 25.—Serbia agrees to most of the demands of Austria-Hungary, and asks arbitration of the rest.

July 28.—Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.

July 31.—Germany demands that Russia cease its mobilization.

August 1.—Germany declares war on Russia.

August 2.—German troops enter the neutral Duchy of Luxemburg.

Belgium refuses free passage of German troops.

August 3.—Germany declares war on France.

German troops enter Belgium, meeting with stubborn resistance.

August 4.—Great Britain declares war on Germany.

August 6.—Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

August 8.—The first British troops are landed in France; French troops cross the German frontier into Alsace-Lorraine.

August 15-23.—French armies are forced to retire after engagements at Morhange (Alsace-Lorraine) and at Neufchâteau and Charleroi (Belgium).

August 16.—Japan demands the German possessions at Kiau-chau, China.

August 19.—The German army occupies Liége, having been delayed two weeks by Belgian resistance.

August 20.—Germans occupy Brussels.

August 23.—The British at Mons (Belgium), holding left wing, are attacked by a superior force and compelled to join in retreat of whole Allied line.

Japan declares war on Germany.

August 26.—Louvain is destroyed as punishment for an alleged attack by Belgian citizens on German troops.

August 28.—British and German warships meet in the first naval engagement in Heligoland Bight; five small German vessels are destroyed.

A Russian army invading East Prussia is disastrously defeated at Tannenberg.

September 2.—A Russian army invading the Austrian province of Galicia occupies Lemberg after decisively defeating the Austrians.

September 3.—The seat of the French Government is transferred to Bordeaux.

September 5.—Great Britain, France, and Russia agree not to conclude separate peace.

September 6-10.—In the Battle of the Marne, the French defeat the Germans, stop the march toward Paris, and force a hasty retreat.

September 12.—The German retreat is halted at River Aisne, from Soissons to Argonne Forest; trench warfare begins.

September 20.—The "race to the sea" is begun—the rival armies in France endeavouring to turn each other's western flank, and the intrenched line mounts northward from the Oise to the North Sea.

The famous Cathedral at Rheims, France, is wrecked by German guns.

September 22.—Three British cruisers are sunk in the North Sea by a German submarine.

October 9.—Antwerp is occupied by Germans after ten days' bombardment; the Belgian army escapes.

October 16-28.—In the Battle of the Yser, German attempt to sweep down Belgian coast is blocked chiefly by flooding of rivers and canals.

October 20-November 11.—The First Battle of Ypres results in loss of territory by British and French, but in failure of Germany's attempt to reach Channel ports.

October 29.—Turkey enters the war as an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, bombarding Russian ports on Black Sea.

November 1.—A naval engagement is fought off coast of Chile, two British cruisers are sunk by the German fleet.

November 7.—The Japanese capture Tsingtau, the fortified portion of German possessions at Kiau-chau.

November 9.—The British War Secretary announces that 1,250,000 men are in training in England.

November 15.—The deadlock on the western front begins, destined to last, with little change, four years.

December 6.—The Germans occupy Lodz, Poland, after six weeks of sanguinary fighting during which both German and Russian armies in turn face disaster.

December 8.—The German Pacific fleet

is destroyed by a British squadron near the Falkland Islands; four German warships are sunk and one escapes.

December 14.—Austrians evacuate Belgrade and all Serbia, after a severe defeat.

December 16.—German cruisers bombard cities on east coast of England.

December 17.—Great Britain declares Egypt to be a British protectorate, terminating suzerainty of Turkey.

December 26.—The United States protests to Great Britain against seizure and detention of cargoes for neutral ports.

## 1915

January 3-4.—Russian armies defeat Turkish forces in the Caucasus.

January 16.—Russian armies begin to pass over Carpathians from Galicia into plains of Hungary.

January 24.—A naval engagement is fought in the North Sea off Dogger Bank, between powerful British and German fleets, ending in a British victory.

January 26.—The German Government seizes all corn, wheat, and flour—the beginning of a rationing system.

January 30.—German submarines sink several British merchant ships.

February 2.—Great Britain decides to seize grain and flour shipments to Germany.

February 4.—Germany declares a submarine war zone around the British Isles, after February 18, and announces that enemy merchant ships will be destroyed; neutral vessels are warned of danger.

February 10.—The United States protests to Germany against risks created by German war-zone decree—the "strict accountability" note.

The United States protests to Great Britain against use of American flags on British vessels.

February 12.—A second Russian invasion of East Prussia comes to an end, after a disastrous defeat in the Masurian Lake region.

February 16.—Germany offers to withdraw war-zone decree if Great Britain permits movement of foodstuffs to civil population of Germany.

February 18.—The German war-zone decree becomes effective; Germany disclaims responsibility for accidents to neutral vessels.

February 19-20.—British and French warships bombard Turkish forts at entrance to Dardanelles.

February 20.—The United States sends an identic note to Great Britain and Germany, sugesting agreement on (1) Britain's interference with food for German civilians and (2) German submarine methods.

February 20-23.—Two American steamships are sunk by mines in North Sea.

March 1.—Premier Asquith announces Great Britain's intention to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.

March 10.—The British employ for first time massed artillery fire preliminary to an infantry advance; they occupy Neuve Chapelle, but fail to win road to Lille.

The German converted cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* enters Hampton Roads, after a seven-months' commerce-destroying voyage from China.

March 14.—The German cruiser *Dresden* (which escaped from Falklands battle) is sunk by British warships off Chile.

March 19.—One French and two British battleships are sunk by floating mines while bombarding forts in the Dardanelles, ending the attempt to force a passage without support from land.

March 21.—A third Russian invasion of East Prussia is brought to an end, by a defeat at Memel.

March 22.—The Austrian fortress of Przemysl is surrendered to the Russians, after a long siege, with 130,000 prisoners.

April 5.—Russia announces capture of Carpathian positions on a 75-mile front.

April 11.—The German converted cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm* enters Hampton Roads, having remained at sea eight months.

April 21.—Britain's army in active service is officially said to be 750,000.

April 22-May 8.—In the Second Battle of Ypres the Germans gain ground north of that gained in the first battle, but again fail to break through the British line; they employ asphyxiating gas for the first time.

April 25.—Anglo-French troops are landed on both sides of the Dardanelles, after suffering heavy casualties.

May 1.—A Russian army is destroyed in the Battle of the Dunajec (east of Cracow), and other Russian armies in the Carpathians are forced to retreat hastily.

May 7.—The *Lusitania* is sunk by a German submarine without warning; 1,154 persons lose their lives, including 114 Americans.

May 12.—A British commission investigating charges of German cruelty in Belgium reports deeds unparalleled in three centuries of civilized warfare.

May 13.—The United States protests to Germany against its submarine policy culminating in sinking of *Lusitania*, and declares that it will not omit any word or act necessary to maintain the rights of its citizens.

May 23.—Italy enters the war, against Austria-Hungary only.

May 25-27.—Two British battleships are sunk by a German submarine in the Dardanelles.

June 3.—Russian forces evacuate Przemysl and continue the retreat in Galicia.

June 8.—The American Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, resigns.

June 9.—The United States sends a second note to Germany relating to the *Lusitania*.

June 11.—Italian forces occupy Gradisca, in an advance toward Trieste.

June 29.—Austria-Hungary protests to United States against supplying war materials to Allies.

July 5.—The Austro-German movement against Russians ends—having blocked the threatened invasion of Hungary and practically cleared Austria of Russians.

July 8.—Germany offers safety to United States vessels in submarine zone under specified conditions.

July 9.—German Southwest Africa is surrendered to Union of South Africa troops under General Botha.

July 15.—Germany admits that American steamer *Nebraskan* was damaged by torpedo from a German submarine.

July 21.—The United States declares Germany's submarine proposal to be "very unsatisfactory," and states that further incidents will be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly."

July 25.—The American steamer *Leelanaw*, carrying contraband, is sunk by a German submarine, warning being given.

August 4.—German troops occupy Warsaw, capital of Russian Poland, after a swift encircling advance over vast territory from north, west, and south.

August 7.—Additional British troops are landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, at Suvla Bay, in an unsuccessful attempt to flank the Turks.

August 15.—The British Government registers all persons in the United Kingdom between ages of 15 and 65.

August 16-20.—The Germans fail in attempt to enter the Gulf of Riga, losing several small vessels.

August 17-September 20.—The Germans capture Kovno, Brest-Litovsk, Grodno, Vilna, and other fortresses on Russia's second line of defence.

August 19.—The *Arabic* is sunk by a German submarine on way to New York; twenty passengers (including several Americans) being drowned.

August 21.—Italy declares war on Turkey.

The British Government declares cotton absolute contraband.

September 1.—The German Ambassador at Washington declares that hereafter liners will not be sunk by German submarines without warning.

September 7.—The Russian Grand Duke Nicholas is displaced from command of all Russian armies.

September 9.—The United States demands recall of Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba.

September 20.—The Bulgarian army is mobilized.

September 23.—The Greek army is mobilized.

September 25.—The French undertake an offensive in Champagne region, which gains ground but fails to break through the German line.

Anglo-French troops north and south of Lens gain ground in an offensive designed principally to aid the French attack in Champagne; but the British, at Loos, suffer heavy losses.

October 3.—Russia demands that Bulgaria expel German and Austrian officers.

October 4.—Allied forces are landed at Salonica, Greece, to help Serbia resist a threatened Austro-German invasion.

October 5.—Germany regrets the *Arabic* sinking, and declares similar incidents impossible.

Premier Venizelos of Greece resigns, his war policy being supported by Deputies but vetoed by King.

October 7.—Austro-German armies begin an invasion of Serbia.

October 11.—Bulgaria, invading Serbia, enters the war as an ally of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey; the Serbians are obliged to withdraw to south and west.

October 12.—Edith Cavell, an English nurse at Brussels, is shot by German military authorities, for assisting enemies of Germany to escape from Belgium.

October 15.—The Greek Government refuses to help Serbia, although bound by a defensive treaty.

October 21.—The United States, in a second protest against detention of cargoes for neutral ports, declares Britain's blockade "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible."

October 28.—Aristide Briand (Socialist) succeeds Viviani as Premier of France.

November 9.—The Italian passenger steamer *Ancona* is sunk in the Mediterranean by an Austrian submarine.

November 11.—A War Council is formed in Great Britain.

November 19.—A British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia is defeated at Ctesiphon, near Bagdad.

November 28.—Germany declares the campaign against Serbia at a close, practically the entire country being overrun by Austro-German and Bulgarian armies and the Serbian army being half dispersed, half annihilated.

December 1.—Italy joins in Allied agreement not to conclude a separate peace.

December 3.—The United States requests the recall of German naval and military attachés at Washington.

December 6.—The United States protests to Austria-Hungary against the "wanton slaughter of defenseless noncombatants" on the *Ancona*.

December 9.—Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg informs Reichstag Socialists that Germany cannot propose peace without indicating weakness, but is ready to discuss Entente proposals.

December 15.—General Sir Douglas Haig becomes commander-in-chief of British armies in France and Belgium, succeeding Sir John French.

December 30.—Austria announces that the submarine commander who torpedoed the *Ancona* has been punished.

## 1916

January 4.—The United States protests to Great Britain against interference with American mails to and from neutral countries.

January 9.—British and French forces withdraw from Gallipoli Peninsula, and the attempt to force the Dardanelles is abandoned.

January 11-17.—Montenegro is overrun by Austro-Hungarian armies.

January 24-27.—A compulsory service bill applicable to unmarried men between 18 and 41 passes British House of Commons and House of Lords.

February 1.—The British passenger steamer *Appam* is brought into Hampton Roads, Va., by a German prize crew.

February 10.—Germany and Austria announce that they will treat armed enemy merchant ships as war vessels.

February 16.—The Turkish fortress at Erzerum, Armenia, is captured by Russians.

February 21.—The Germans launch a great offensive at Verdun, destined to last until August, but to fail in the attempt to break through French line.

February 26.—Austrian armies force Italians to evacuate Durazzo, Albania.

March 8.—Germany declares war on Portugal, for breaches of neutrality.

March 15.—Admiral von Tirpitz, foremost advocate of submarine ruthlessness, resigns as German Minister of Marine.

March 24.—The British Channel steamer *Sussex* is torpedoed without warning by a German submarine.

April 3.—The French make their first important counter-attack at Verdun.

April 18.—The United States warns Germany that unless present methods of submarine warfare are abandoned, diplomatic relations will be severed.

April 20.—Russian troops are landed in France.

April 22.—A German attempt to land arms and ammunition in Ireland is thwarted; Sir Roger Casement, Irish nationalist leader, is taken prisoner.

April 24.—A revolution breaks out in Dublin, Ireland, led by members of Sinn Fein society; suppressed within a week, casualties on both sides totalling 304 killed and 1,000 wounded; sixteen leaders are convicted of treason and shot

April 28.—A besieged British army of 9,000, under General Townshend, surrenders to the Turks at Kut-el-Amara upon exhaustion of food; thus the first British attempt to reach Bagdad fails.

May 4.—Germany informs United States that submarine commanders have been ordered not to sink merchant vessels without warning and without saving lives.

May 17.—An Austrian offensive causes Italians to withdraw in Trentino.

May 24.—The United States again protests to Great Britain and France against interference with mails at sea, declaring it can no longer be tolerated.

May 25.—The British Government's new compulsory military service bill, applicable to men between 18 and 41, receives royal assent.

May 31.—British and German fleets meet off Jutland (Denmark) in the greatest naval engagement of history, the Germans finally withdrawing; British admit loss of six large cruisers and eight destroyers; Germans admit loss of a battleship, a battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers; 9,500 lives are lost.

June 4.—A Russian offensive is begun on front of 250 miles in Volhynia, Galicia, and Bukowina; the Russians later claiming 200,000 prisoners in three weeks.

June 5.—Earl Kitchener, British Minister of War, on his way to Russia is drowned by the sinking of cruiser *Hampshire* by mine or torpedo.

June 6.—Continued German assaults at Verdun (beginning in February) result in capture of Fort de Vaux.

June 14.—An Economic Conference of the Allies is held at Paris.

June 16.—The Austrian offensive against Italy ends, and an Italian counter-offensive is begun.

June 28.—Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, is sentenced to thirty months' imprisonment for peace activities.

July 1.—A great Allied offensive is launched by British and French, at River Somme—to last until November, which gains ground, but fails in its larger purpose.

July 9.—The German commercial submarine *Deutschland* arrives at Baltimore having crossed the Atlantic with cargo of chemicals—returning on August 23 with gold, nickel, and rubber.

July 23.—Great Britain replies to United States mail protest, upholding efficiency of methods.

July 26.—The United States protests to Great Britain against blacklisting of certain firms and individuals.

August 3.—Sir Roger Casement is hanged at London for treason in promoting the Irish rebellion.

August 7-9.—Italian troops capture Gorizia, in a brilliant attack.

August 27.—Italy declares war on Germany.

Rumania enters the war and begins an invasion of Transylvania, Hungary.

August 29.—Field Marshal von Hindenburg succeeds General von Falkenhayn as German Chief-of-Staff

September 4.—Bulgarian and German troops invade Dobrudja, Roumania, overrunning the whole district by January.

September 14.—The British use for first time (in the Somme battle) the "tank" or armoured and armed motor truck, capable of crossing trenches and demolishing obstacles.

October 8.—The German war submarine *U-53* sinks six European merchant steamships off Nantucket.

October 11-16.—Greece's fleet is taken over by Allied fleet; the government of Venizelos is recognized.

October 24.—The French at Verdun regain important positions lost to Germans from February to June

November 1.—The German merchant sub-

marine *Deutschland* arrives at New London, Conn., on a second voyage, returning safely on December 10.

November 5.—A new kingdom of Poland is proclaimed by Germany and Austria, confined to territory conquered from Russia.

November 7.—Cardinal Mercier, of Belgium, issues protests to civilized world against deportation of Belgian citizens for forced labour in Germany.

November 19.—After decisively defeating Roumanians in Transylvania, German armies begin an invasion of Roumania; Bukharest, the capital, is reached on December 6.

November 21.—Francis-Joseph, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, dies at Vienna; he is succeeded by his grand-nephew Charles I.

Dr. Alfred Zimmermann succeeds Von Jagow as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany.

December 6.—David Lloyd George becomes Premier of Great Britain, succeeding Asquith.

December 12.—Germany offers to enter into peace negotiations; the offer is later declared by the ten Allies to be "empty and insincere."

General Nivelle succeeds Joffre as Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

December 18.—President Wilson sends a note to the belligerent nations, suggesting an avowal of respective views regarding peace terms.

December 21.—Secretary Lansing declares that the United States is "drawing nearer to the verge of war," later denying change of neutral policy is contemplated.

December 26.—Germany replies to President Wilson's note, proposing a meeting of peace delegates, but failing to state war aims or peace terms.

## 1917

January 10.—The Entente Governments reply to President Wilson's note, stating general peace terms, which include restoration, reparation, and indemnity.

January 22.—President Wilson addresses United States Senate on peace: "It must be a peace without victory"; there should be an independent and autonomous Poland; outlets to sea should be neutralized and the seas should be free; military and naval armaments must be limited.

January 31.—Germany resumes unrestricted submarine war, declaring that "from February 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice" [without warning]; American passenger ships may sail once a week under prescribed conditions.

The British Secretary of State for the Colonies declares that captured colonies will never return to German rule.

February 3.—The United States severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

February 4.—President Wilson invites neutral nations to take action against Germany similar to that taken by United States.

February 13.—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden present an identic note to Germany refusing to recognize the submarine blockade as legal.

February 22.—A fleet of seven Netherlands steamers is destroyed by a German submarine, after having been assured of "relative safety."

February 23.—Great Britain inaugurates drastic measures to meet the food crisis by increasing home production and curtailing imports.

February 25.—Kut-el-Amara, in Mesopotamia, is captured by British (after a campaign begun on December 13), retrieving the surrender of April, 1916.

February 26.—President Wilson asks Congress for authority to arm merchant ships.

February 27.—Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg declares in German Reichstag that the United States has submitted to isolation from Germany while guarding the right of its citizens to trade with and travel in France and England.

February 28.—A proposal from Zimmermann, German Foreign Secretary, becomes known, looking to alliance with Mexico in event of war with United States, and also suggesting Japanese participation; Mexico to receive financial support and to be compensated with New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona.

March 2-3.—Japan and Mexico deny that any proposal was received from Germany to join in a war against United States; Herr Zimmermann defends his plan, as operative only in event of war.

March 11.—A revolution breaks out in Petrograd, Russia, the disturbances beginning over shortage of food, with sympathetic strikes in munition factories and finally with mutiny of troops; the Duma assumes direction of the movement.

Bagdad, most important city of Mesopotamia and terminus of Germany's railway project, is captured by British troops.

March 12.—The United States announces that it has decided to arm merchant vessels.

March 15.—Czar Nicholas abdicates the throne of Russia; Prince Lvoff becomes Premier.

March 17-19.—The Germans withdraw before the British, evacuating 1,300 square miles of French territory, from Arras to Soissons, including Bapaume.

Alexandre Ribot succeeds Briand as Premier of France.

March 26.—The United States refuses to interpret and supplement the Prussian treaty of 1799, with reference to status of enemy residents.

March 27.—A British expedition in the Holy Land defeats the Turks near Gaza.

March 31-April 2.—The British and French capture a score of French villages near St. Quentin, where the German withdrawal had stopped.

April 2.—President Wilson asks Congress to declare that recent acts of German Imperial

Government are in fact war; the Senate adopts the war resolution, 82 to 6, on April 4; the House, 373 to 50, on April 6.

April 5.—Russian troops advancing from Persia effect a junction with the British army in Asia Minor.

April 6.—The United States enters the war against Germany; ninety German vessels (600,000 tons) are seized.

April 7.—Cuba and Panama follow the United States and declare war against Germany.

The German Emperor directs the Chancellor to assist in obtaining franchise reforms for the people.

April 8.—Austria informs the United States that it has decided to sever diplomatic relations.

April 9-May 3.—The British launch an offensive against the German lines near Arras, carrying Vimy Ridge, gaining from three to five miles, and piercing the famous Hindenburg Line.

April 11.—Brazil severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

April 13.—Bolivia severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

April 16-May 6.—The French launch an offensive against the German line along the Aisne, advancing on a front of 25 miles between Soissons and Rheims, capturing Craonne Ridge.

April 20.—Turkey severs relations with the United States.

April 21.—A British mission arrives in United States headed by Foreign Secretary Balfour.

April 24.—A French mission arrives in United States, headed by ex-Premier Viviani and Marshal Joffre.

April 28.—Guatemala breaks off relations with Germany.

May 4.—The American navy begins active participation in the war, a destroyer flotilla coöperating with the British fleet in the war zone.

May 9.—The Russian Provisional Government declares that "the frightful spectre of civil war and anarchy hovers over Russia, threatening its freedom."

May 11.—The Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates vote to call a peace conference in a neutral country.

May 15.—General Petain succeeds General Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French armies.

May 15-24.—The Italians make progress in an offensive against the Austrians, from Tolmino to the Adriatic.

May 17.—A. F. Kerensky, a Russian Socialist leader, becomes Minister of War.

May 18.—President Wilson signs a bill creating an army of 500,000 men under a selective conscription system—in addition to Regulars and National Guard.

May 19.—The reorganized provisional government in Russia rejects "all thought of a separate peace," but welcomes a general peace without annexation or indemnity.

June 4-7.—The Austrians in a counter-attack on Carso Plateau recover a third of territory recently lost to Italians.

June 5.—The French Chamber of Deputies, 453 to 55, declares that peace terms must include the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine.

June 7.—With a great mine explosion, the British blast away the top of Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, dominating Ypres from the south, and wipe out a German salient.

June 9.—President Wilson warns the Russian provisional government against German propaganda.

June 12-29.—Greece becomes a belligerent: King Constantine abdicates the throne on June 12, in favour of his son Alexander, in response to the demands of England, France, and Russia; Venizelos becomes Premier on June 25, and diplomatic relations with Germany are severed on June 29.

June 13.—Major-General Pershing and his staff arrive in Paris, to prepare for the first American expedition.

June 15.—An American mission to Russia, headed by Elihu Root, is welcomed at Petrograd by the provisional government.

The first American war loan is closed, with the $2,000,000,000 offered oversubscribed by 50 per cent.

June 17.—The Russian Duma votes in favour of "an immediate offensive in close coöperation with Russia's allies."

June 18.—Haiti severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

June 26.—The first American troops arrive in France, having sailed secretly on June 14.

June 28.—Brazil revokes its decree of neutrality—equivalent to a declaration of war on Germany.

July 1-17.—The Russian army, led by Minister of War Kerensky, assumes an offensive (in Galicia) for first time since the revolution; Halicz is captured, and 36,000 German, Austrian, and Turkish prisoners.

July 11.—Premier Ribot declares that France's right to Alsace-Lorraine will not admit of a plebiscite.

July 14.—A German political crisis over peace demands brings the resignation of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Secretary Zimmermann; Dr. Georg Michaelis becomes Chancellor.

July 19.—The German Reichstag adopts a peace resolution (proposed by Socialists, Radicals and Catholics) expressing desire of German people for peace without forcible acquisitions of territory, and with mutual understanding and lasting consideration.

Finland proclaims its independence, the beginning of a widespread movement throughout Russia to establish separate governments.

July 19-26.—The recently victorious Russian army mutinies and retreats in the face of a German counter-attack; Kerensky becomes Premier, with unlimited powers.

July 22.—Siam declares war on Germany and Austria.

July 25.—A convention assembles at Dublin to settle the Irish question.

July 27.—The Allies decide to withdraw from Greece, with the exception of Salonica.

Premier Lloyd George declares that Great Britain has enrolled more than 5,000,000 soldiers, besides 500,000 in the navy and 1,000,000 from dominions and colonies.

July 30.—The French High Commissioner to the United States declares that France's present fighting strength is 3,000,000 men, who hold two-thirds of the western front.

July 31.—A Franco-British offensive in Flanders, Belgium, results in an advance of two and a half miles, heavy rains interfering.

August 6.—Richard von Kuehlmann becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany.

August 7.—Liberia declares war on Germany.

August 14.—China declares war on Germany and Austria.

August 15.—A peace appeal by Pope Benedict (dated August 1) is made public; he suggests disarmament, evacuation of Belgian and French territory, restitution of German colonies, and settlement of political and territorial questions in a conciliatory spirit for the general welfare.

Canadian troops capture Hill 70, dominating Lens (declared impregnable by Germans).

August 20-24.—Dr. Alexander Wekerle becomes Premier of Hungary.

A French attack at Verdun results in the capture of important positions and 4,000 prisoners.

August 24-September 14.—Italian forces capture Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele, Austrian strongholds near Gorizia.

August 27.—President Wilson replies to the Pope's peace message; he condemns proposals for punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, and the establishment of economic leagues, but declares that a peace agreement made by present German rulers must be supported by German people.

American exports to neutral countries are placed under Government control.

September 3.—Riga, Russia's second most important seaport, is occupied by Germans, the demoralized Russian army withdrawing.

September 6.—Premier Ribot declares that France will not consent to diplomatic discussion of Alsace-Lorraine question.

September 7-10.—Premier Ribot resigns and Paul Painlevé becomes Premier of France.

September 8.—Intercepted telegrams from Luxburg, German Chargé in Argentina, to Berlin, recommend that Argentine vessels, if sunk by German submarines, should be destroyed "without leaving a trace."

September 15.—A Russian republic is proclaimed.

September 18.—Premier Painlevé states France's war aims as the disannexation of Alsace-Lorraine, reparation for ruin, and a just peace with guarantees against aggression.

September 19-25.—The Argentine Congress votes to break diplomatic relations with Germany; President Irigoyen does not carry out the recommendation.

September 20-October 12.—A series of British attacks in the Ypres sector are all retarded by muddy ground.

September 21.—German and Austrian replies to the Pope ignore the status of occupied territory, but declare for immediate negotiations among the belligerents; a supplemental reply on September 26 offers to contribute toward compensation to Belgium, but demands economic rights and a guarantee against any "Belgian menace such as threatened Germany in 1914."

October 6.—Peru severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

October 7.—Uruguay severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

October 12.—The German Minister of Marine, Admiral von Capelle, resigns following a mutiny in the Baltic Fleet.

October 17.—The American transport *Antilles*, homeward bound, is torpedoed and sunk with the loss of 70 lives.

A naval engagement in the Gulf of Riga results in the sinking of a Russian battleship.

October 20.—Five Zeppelin airships are destroyed in France after a raid over England.

October 23-25.—A French offensive near Soissons results in a maximum gain of nearly four miles with 12,000 prisoners.

October 24-November 10.—An Austro-German army, with overwhelming artillery, breaks through the Italian line and causes withdrawal not only from Austrian territory, but from northern Italy to the Piave River line.

October 26.—Brazil declares war on Germany, following the sinking of a fourth merchant vessel.

October 27.—Subscriptions for the second American war loan are closed; acceptances totalling $3,808,766,150.

October 30.—Count George F. von Hertling succeeds Michaelis as Chancellor of Germany.

Vittorio Orlando becomes Premier of Italy, succeeding Boselli.

November 3.—Germany announces the first capture of American soldiers, north of Luneville.

November 5.—American patrol boat *Alcedo* is sunk by a German submarine with a loss of 21 lives.

November 8-14.—A second revolution in Russia, under direction of Bolsheviki (or Maximalist faction of Radical Socialists), results in overthrow of Kerensky government; the new Premier Lenine and Foreign Minister Trotsky declare for an immediate democratic peace, the handing over of land to peasants, and the convocation of a constitutional assembly.

November 9.—A Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a military representative from each Government.

November 12.—Premier Lloyd George speaks in Paris on lack of coöperation among the Allies; he recalls the Serbian "tragedy," its repetition in Roumania, and the Italian disaster.

November 13-15.—Painlevé resigns and Georges Clemenceau becomes Premier of France.

November 17.—The British in Palestine occupy Jaffa.

November 20.—The British at Cambrai move forward without the usual artillery preparations, gaining five miles on a wide front and capturing 8,000 Germans; "tanks" play an important part.

November 28.—The revolutionary government in Russia makes public a secret agreement entered into with Italy on April 26, 1915, by Great Britain, France, and Russia; Italy's claims to Austrian territory were recognized in return for joining the Allies.

November 29.—An Inter-Allied Conference is opened at Paris, the Premiers of France and England attending and Col. Edw. M. House representing U. S.

November 30-December 5.—German counter-attacks regain half the ground recently lost to British near Cambrai.

December 1.—German East Africa, last and largest of Germany's overseas possessions, comes under complete control of Allied forces.

December 4-7.—The United States Congress, following recommendations by President Wilson, declares war on Austria-Hungary.

December 6.—A large section of Halifax, Nova Scotia, is destroyed by an explosion; 150 persons are killed and 20,000 rendered homeless.

United States destroyer *Jacob Jones* is sunk by a German submarine, with a loss of 66 lives.

December 7.—An armistice goes into effect on the Russo-German front.

December 8.—Ecuador severs diplomatic relations with Germany.

December 10.—Jerusalem is occupied by British forces.

December 20.—Premier Lloyd George states Britain's peace terms: restoration of German-occupied territory, with reparation; the future of German colonies to be based upon wishes of native races.

December 22.—A peace conference assembles at Brest-Litovsk, German-occupied Russia, with delegates from Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; the Central Powers propose a general peace without forcible annexations and indemnities, the Allies to join with Russia; Russia must recognize the demand of the peoples of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia for self-government, and German troops will not be withdrawn from those territories.

## 1918

January 5.—Premier Lloyd George restates war aims of Great Britain, declaring that destruction of Germany or Austria-Hungary and the separation of Turkey's capital are not war aims; the Alsace-Lorraine wrong of 1871 must be reconsidered, the Dardanelles must be neutralized, and Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine must not be restored to Turkish sovereignty.

January 7.—Earl Reading, Lord Chief Justice of England, is appointed High Commissioner and Special Ambassador to the United States.

January 8.—President Wilson addresses Congress on America's programme of world peace, specifying fourteen "rectifications of wrong and assertions of right."

January 16.—The United States Fuel Administrator orders the closing of manufacturing industries for five days, and of all non-essential businesses for nine Mondays, to save fuel and relieve railroads.

January 20.—In a naval engagement at the Dardanelles, with British vessels, a Turkish battleship is sunk and another disabled.

January 21.—Strikes in Austrian cities, in favour of peace, but aggravated by food shortage, cause the closing of important war industries.

January 24.—Chancellor von Hertling replies to peace terms of Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson—declining to allow interference in Russian affairs, leaving Italian matters to Austria-Hungary to answer, pledging support to Turkey against proposals affecting its territory, declaring that withdrawal from France should be agreed upon between Germany and France, that Belgian details be settled at a peace conference, and that dismemberment of Alsace-Lorraine can never be considered.

The Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister states that Austria demands no territory from Russia, and makes overtures for a direct "exchange of ideas" with the United States.

January 28-February 4.—Strikes occur in Berlin and other German cities in favour of peace without indemnities or annexations, the abolition of militarism and war industries, and participation of workmen in peace parleys.

February 5.—The British transport *Tuscania*, carrying 2,200 American soldiers under British convoy, is sunk off Ireland, 170 soldiers being lost.

February 6.—The French High Commissioner to United States declares there are 4,725,000 French soldiers under arms, nearly three million being in war zone, holding three-fourths of the western front of 470 miles.

February 9.—The first peace treaty is signed between representatives of Central Powers and the new republic of Ukraine, in southern Russia.

Germany claims the capture of American prisoners at Xivray, east of St. Mihiel.

February 11.—President Wilson, addressing Congress, analyzes recent Austro-German peace utterances and restates four principles upon which a just and permanent peace could be founded.

The Russian Government, though refusing to sign a peace treaty, declares war with Central Powers at an end.

February 18-19.—Germany resumes hostilities against Russia; the Russian Government declares its willingness to sign the peace treaty dictated by the Teutons.

February 22.—Norway guarantees that Amer-

ican imports will neither reach Germany nor replace Norwegian products exported to Germany.

**February 25.**—Chancellor von Hertling expresses fundamental agreement with President Wilson's four principles, and declares that peace can be discussed on such a basis; England's war aims are still "thoroughly imperialistic."

**February 27.**—Japanese military operations in Siberia are proposed, to save vast quantities of military supplies.

**March 3.**—A peace treaty is signed at Brest-Litovsk, between Russia and the four Central Powers. Besides territory already occupied by Germans, new terms compel Russia to "evacuate" Ukraine, Esthonia and Livonia, Finland, the Aland Islands, and the Transcaucasian districts of Erivan, Kars, and Batum.

**March 5.**—A preliminary peace treaty is signed between Roumania and the Central Powers, Roumania giving up province of Dobrudja to the Danube and accepting "frontier rectifications" demanded by Austria-Hungary.

**March 7.**—A treaty of peace is signed between Germany and Finland.

**March 9.**—The Government of Russia is transferred from Petrograd to Moscow.

**March 10.**—The American Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, arrives in France on a tour of inspection.

It is announced that American troops are in trenches at four points—on the Lorraine front, northwest of Toul; in the Champagne; in Alsace near Lunéville; and in the Chemin-des-Dames region northwest of Rheims.

**March 11.**—President Wilson expresses sympathy with Russian people in a message to the Congress of Soviets, meeting at Moscow to ratify German peace treaty.

**March 20.**—The United States seizes Dutch vessels in American ports after giving notice that the shipping agreement reached with Allies, postponed through fear of Germany, should be put into effect.

**March 21.**—The British Admiralty publishes its record of merchant ships sunk to end of 1917; British ships, 7,079,492 tons; total ships, 11,827,572 tons.

**March 21-29.**—The first phase of the greatest battle of the war. The Germans launch an attack against fifty miles of British and French line in Picardy, from Arras to La Fère, gaining a maximum of thirty miles.

**March 23.**—Paris is bombarded by long-range guns from a distance of seventy miles.

**March 29.**—General Ferdinand Foch, the French strategist, becomes commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in France—British, French, American, Italian, Belgian, and Portuguese.

**April 2.**—The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, declares that the four points laid down by President Wilson on February 11 are a basis on which to discuss general peace; he doubts whether the President will succeed in uniting his allies on such a basis.

**April 6.**—President Wilson condemns Germany's peace treaties forced upon Russia and Roumania, and proclaims that America will meet with "force to the utmost" Germany's challenge.

**April 9-16.**—The second phase of the great battle. The German blow shifts to the north, from La Bassée to Ypres, the British evacuate portions of Messines and Passchendaele ridges.

**April 10.**—The Russian Commissioner of Commerce states that the treaty with Germany has taken away 300,000 square miles of territory, with 56,000,000 inhabitants (32 per cent. of Russia's entire population), besides one-third of her railways, 73 per cent. of iron, and 89 per cent. of coal.

**April 11.**—The French Government makes public a letter from Emperor Charles of Austria (dated March 31, 1917) communicated to President Poincaré, pledging support to "France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine" and to reëstablishment of Belgium and Serbia.

**April 12.**—The Irish Convention, after eight months of deliberation, presents a divided report to the British Government, proposing an Irish Parliament of two houses; it was not found possible to overcome objections of Ulster Unionists.

**April 13.**—German troops occupy Helsingfors, Finland.

**April 14.**—The Navy Department announces that the U. S. S. *Cyclops* has been missing since March 4, with 293 persons on board.

**April 18.**—Premier Lloyd George's Man Power bill becomes a law in Great Britain, raising the age limit for compulsory service to fifty years, and extending conscription to Ireland.

**April 21.**—Guatemala declares war against Germany.

**May 7.**—Nicaragua declares war on Germany and her allies.

**May 27-June 1.**—The third phase of the great battle for Paris. The Germans move southward along the front from Soissons to Rheims, reaching the Marne—a maximum advance of thirty miles.

**June 9-11.**—The fourth phase of the German offensive. The Germans advance toward Compiègne, between the salients created by the first and third phases.

**June 15-23.**—The Austrians launch a supreme effort along the whole line of the Piave River, are partly successful at first, but are thrown back in disorder across the river by an Italian counter-offensive.

**June 19.**—The fifth phase of the great battle in France. The Germans attempt to take the city of Rheims by attacks from three sides; they gain ground but fail in their main object.

**July 15.**—Haiti declares war on Germany.

**July 16.**—The sixth phase of the great German offensive. The Germans attack along a fifty-mile front centring at Rheims, gaining ground to the west but being held on the east.

July 18.—The Allied army in France (French and American units), under the lead of the strategist Foch, launches a successful counter-attack against the western side of the salient in the German line from Soissons to Château-Thierry; gains are immediate and constant, and by August 3 the whole salient is abolished—an advance of twenty-five miles.

July 19.—Honduras declares war against Germany.

August 4.—The opening of the fifth year of war finds the Allies on the offensive all along the line in France, the initiative having been wrested from the Germans.

August 8-10.—A new Allied drive is directed against the German salient near Amiens; the attacking troops are British, French, and American, under Field-Marshal Haig, and they advance fourteen miles.

August 15.—American troops land at Vladivostok, to coöperate with an Allied army in Siberia.

August 18-20.—A third offensive is directed against the German line by the British in the Lys salient south of Ypres.

August 20.—The Allied army's blow is shifted once again, to the region between the Oise and the Aisne; the superiority of the Allies becomes clear, and a forced evacuation of French territory is begun by the Germans—Albert is reoccupied on August 22, Noyon and Bapaume on the 29th, Péronne on September 1, St. Quentin on October 1, Lens on October 2, Cambrai on October 9, Laon and La Fère on October 13, Lille and Ostend on October 17, Valencienes on November 2, Sedan on November 7, Tournai, Mézières, and Tournai on November 8, and Mons and Maubeuge on November 11.

September 3.—The United States recognizes the Czechoslovaks as a co-belligerent with a de facto government.

September 4.—American troops are landed at Archangel, Russia.

September 12.—The American army carries out its first great offensive, wiping out the long-standing and dangerous salient at St. Mihiel and restoring 150 square miles of French territory.

Thirteen million Americans from 18 to 45 register for military service under the amended Selective Draft Act.

September 14.—Austria-Hungary invites belligerents to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace; President Wilson refuses to entertain the proposal, on September 16.

September 15.—The Serbian army, supported by French, British, and Greek forces, launches an offensive against the Bulgarians.

September 19-20.—British forces under General Allenby decisively defeat the Turks; 40,000 prisoners are taken by September 25; Damascus is reached on October 1, Aleppo on October 26 (an advance of 275 miles).

September 27.—President Wilson declares for impartial justice at the peace table, and expresses belief in a league of nations as most essential, with no alliances within the league.

September 29.—Bulgaria withdraws from the war, accepting terms dictated by the Allied commander, including evacuation of Serbian and Greek territory and the use of Bulgarian roads by Allied troops.

October 2.—Prince Maximilian of Baden becomes German Imperial Chancellor, succeeding Count von Hertling.

October 4.—King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates in favour of Crown Prince Boris.

October 5.—The new German Chancellor requests the President of the United States to take a hand in the restoration of peace, and accepts as a basis for negotiation the President's programme as set forth in his speeches of January 8 and September 27.

October 14.—President Wilson informs Germany that no armistice can be arranged without safeguards for the military supremacy of the Allies, and calls special attention to one of his July 4 peace essentials—the destruction of arbitrary power in Germany.

October 21.—The German Foreign Secretary declares that recent changes in form of government place responsibility with the people.

October 23.—It is announced that 2,000,000 American soldiers have sailed for overseas service, nearly half of them since July 1.

October 24.—The Italian army, aided by British and French forces, opens an attack which results in the complete collapse of the Austro-Hungarians.

October 31.—Turkey withdraws from the war, accepting terms dictated by the Allies.

November 3.—Mutiny spreads throughout the German fleet and naval bases.

November 4.—Austria-Hungary withdraws from the war, accepting an armistice dictated by the Allies.

November 5.—The United States informs Germany that the Inter-Allied War Council has agreed to make peace with Germany on terms laid down in President Wilson's addresses, with two exceptions: freedom of the seas must be reserved for the peace conference, and compensation for damage done to civilian population and property must be made by Germany.

November 9.—It is reported that Wilhelm has abdicated as German Emperor; Friedrich Ebert, Socialist, is appointed Imperial Chancellor pending establishment of a constitutional assembly.

November 11.—German delegates sign an armistice agreement presented by Marshal Foch, and hostilities come to an end.

# THE PRONUNCIATION OF WAR NAMES

By C. O. Sylvester Mawson, Litt.D., Ph.D.
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KEY TO PRONUNCIATION

Vowel sounds: āle, bâre, ärm, àsk, senāte, ăm, orgăn, sofà; ēve, êvent ĕnd, novĕl, bakēr; īce, ĭll; ōld, ôrb, ŏbey, ŏdd, cŏmbine; ūse, ûrn, ŭnite, ŭp, locŭst; fo͞od, fo͝ot; ou as in *out;* oi as in *oil;* ü as in *menu.*

Note.—*u,* as in French *menu* or German *Müller,* has no equivalent in English. To produce it, hold the lips rigidly in position to say o͞o and attempt to say ē. *ö* or *oe* in German resembles the English *u* in *urn;* e. g., *Göthe* or *Goethe* is pronounced gû'tē.

Consonants: As in English. *ch* as in *chair; g* as in *go; kw* for *qu* as in *queen; s* as in *so; sh* as in *she; z* as in *zone; zh* as *z* in *azure.*

Special symbols: ʜ (small capital) for *ch* as in German *ich* or Scotch *loch;* ɴ (small capital) indicates nasal tone of preceding vowel, as in French *bon* (bôɴ); ŋ (= ng) for *n* before the sound of *k* or hard *g* as in *bank* (băŋk), *finger* (fiŋ'gēr); ' indicates the elision of a vowel, or a mere suggestion of a vowel sound, as in *Ypres* (ē'pr').

Accents: The *principal* or *primary* accent is indicated by a heavy mark (ˈ), and the *secondary* accent by a lighter mark (ˌ); thus, *Bouvines* (bo͞oˈvēnˈ); *Massachusetts* (măsˌa-cho͞oˈsĕts).

Note.—French names have the primary accent on the final full syllable, but this accent should generally be very slight. The other syllables are marked with equal stress. In German names, the principal accent is placed earlier in the word, as in English. In Hungarian and Bohemian names, the accent is on the first syllable. In Polish, as in Italian, the accent is on the penult. In Russia, the accent is capricious but very marked.

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**Aachen** (*or* **Aix-la-Chapelle**), **ä'ʜĕn**
**Aalst** (*or* **Alost**), **älst**
**Abbeville, àb'vēl'**
**Abée, à'bā'**
**Acheux, à'shû'**
**Achicourt, à'shē'ko͞or'**
**Achiet, à'shyā'**
**Acossée, à'kŏ'sà'**
**Acoz, à'kō'**
**Acq, àk**
**Adelsberg, ä'dĕls-bĕrɢ**
**Adige** (river), **ä'dē-jā**
**Adinkerke, àd'ĕn-kēr'kē**
**Adria, ä'drē-ä**
**Aerschot, är'sʜŏt**
**Aerseele, är'sā'lē**
**Aettfrycke, ät'frē-kē**
**Aehre, ä'rē**
**Agincourt, à'zhăɴ'ko͞or'**; *Eng.* **ăj'ĭn-kōrt**
**Agordo, ä-gôr'ŏd**
**Ahrdorf, är'dôrf**
**Ahrweiler, är'vī-lēr**
**Aidin, ī-dēn'**
**Aincreville, ăɴ'krˈ-vēl'**
**Aintab, ĭn'tàb'**
**Aire, âr**
**Aisne** (river), **ân**
**Alvenne, à'vĕn'**
**Aix-la-Chapelle** (*or* **Aachen**), **āksˈlà'-shà'pĕl'**
**Ala, ä'lä**
**Albeek, äl'bāk**
**Albert, àl'bâr'**
**Albesdorf, äl'bĕz-dôrf**
**Albona, äl-bō'nä**
**Aleppo,** *a*-lĕp'ō
**Alexandretta** (*or* **Iskanderun**), **ăl'ĕ-zăn-drĕt'à**
**Alken, äl'kĕn**
**Allarmont, à'làrˈmôɴ'**
**Alle, äl'ē**
**Allennes, à'lĕn'**
**Allenstein, äl'ĕn-shtīn'**
**Allondrelle, à'lôɴ'drĕl'**
**Alost** (*or* **Aalst**), **à'lôst**
**Alsdorf, älz'dôrf**
**Alsemberg, äl'zĕm-bĕrɢ**
**Althofen, ält'hō'fĕn**
**Altkirch, ält'kĭrɢ'**
**Altzingen, ält'zĭng-ĕn**
**Amance, à'mänsˈ**
**Amanweiler, ä'màn-vī'lēr**
**Ambacourt, ăɴ'bà'ko͞or'**
**Amblimont, ăɴ'blē'môɴ'**
**Ambresin, ăɴ'brˈ-sĂɴ'**
**Amel, ä'mĕl**
**Amiens, à'myĂɴ'**
**Amohines, à'mō'ēn'**
**Amont, à'môɴ'**
**Amougies, à'mo͞o'zhē'**
**Ampezzo, ăm-pĕt'sō**
**Ancre** (river), **ăɴ'krˈ**
**Anderlecht, ăɴ'dĕr-lĕxt**
**Andenne, ăɴ'dĕn'**
**Angres, ăɴ'grˈ**
**Anhée, ăɴ'ā'**
**Aniches, à'nēsh'**
**Anlier, ăɴ'lyà'**
**Anloy, ăɴ'lwà'**
**Anneux, à'nû'**
**Annevois, án'vwä'**
**Anor, à'nôrˈ**
**Anould, à'no͞ol'**
**Anoux, à'no͞o'**
**Ans, äɴs**
**Ansauville, äɴ'sō'vēl'**
**Anthée, ăɴ'tā'**
**Antheit, án'tīt**
**Anthelupt, án'tē-lûp'**
**Antilly, ăɴ'tē'yē'**
**Antioch, ăn'tĭ-ŏk**
**Antreppe, ăɴ'trĕp'**
**Anvin, ăɴ'vĂɴ'**
**Any, à'nē'**
**Anzelin, ăɴzˈlĂɴ'**
**Anzin, ĂɴˈzĂɴ'**
**Apilly, à'pē'yē'**
**Apremont, à'prˈ-môɴ'**
**Arbe, ârb**
**Arcey, âr'sē'**
**Archennes, àr'shĕn'**
**Arches, ârsh**
**Arco, ar'kō, Ardahan, är'dà-hän'**
**Ardoye, àr'dwà'**
**Argenteau, àr'zhăn'tō'**
**Argonne, àr'gŏn'**
**Arleux, àr'lû'**
**Arlon, är'lôɴ'**
**Armentières, àr'mĂɴ'tyâr'**
**Arnaville, àr'nà'vēl'**
**Arques, ârk**
**Arracourt, à'rà'ko͞or'**
**Arras, à'räs'**
**Arraye, à'rā'**
**Arry, à'rē'**
**Ars, ärz**
**Arsdorf, ärz'dôrf**
**Artes, ârt**
**Artois, àr'twä'**
**Arville, àr'vēl'**
**Asch, äsh**
**Ascq, àsk**
**Asiago, à'zyä-gō**
**Asolo, à'zō-lō**
**Assche, äs'kĕ**
**Assweiler, äs'vī-lēr**
**Ath, àt**
**Athesans, à'tē-sĂɴ'**
**Athies, à'tē'**
**Athus, à'tü'**
**Attalnville, à'tĂɴ'vēl'**
**Attigny, à'tē'nyē'**
**Atweiler, ät'vī-lēr**
**Aube** (river), **ōb**
**Aubel, ō'bĕl'**
**Aubencheul, ō'bĂɴ'shûl'**
**Aubenton, ō'bĂɴ'tôɴ'**
**Auberive, ōb'rēv'**
**Aubers, ō'bâr'**
**Aubigny, ō'bē'nyē'**
**Aublain, ō'blĂɴ'**
**Auchel, ō'shĕl'**
**Auchy, ō'shē'**
**Audenarde** (*or* **Oudenarde**), **ou'dē-när'dē**
**Audincourt, ō'dĂɴ'ko͞or'**
**Audun, ō'dŭɴ'**
**Auge, ōzh**
**Augustowo, ou'go͞os-tō'vō**
**Aulnois, ōl'nwä'**
**Aulnoye, ōl'nwä'**
**Aumetz, ou'mĕtz**
**Auronzo, ou-rônt'sō**

**Autel-Bas**, ō′tĕl′-bä′
**Autving**, ō′twĂn′
**Autrey**, ō′trĕ′
**Auvillers**, ō′vē′lâr′
**Avecapelle**, áv′ká′pĕl′
**Avelghem**, á′vĕl-gĕm
**Avennes**, á′vĕn′
**Avesnes**, á′vân′
**Aviano**, ä-vyä′nō
**Avion**, á′vyŏN′
**Avioth**, á′vyō′
**Avricourt**, á′vrē′kōōr′
**Avril**, á′vrēl′
**Ay**, á′ē
**Ayette**, á′yĕt′
**Awenne**, á′vĕn′
**Azerailles**, á′zē-rá′y′
**Azoudange**, ăt′sou-dăng′ē

**Baccarat**, bá′ká′rá′
**Badia**, bä-dē′ä
**Baelegem**, bä′lē-gĕm
**Baelen**, bä′lĕn; bä′lăN′
**Bagdad** (*or* Bhagdad), bág-dăd′; *Eng.* băg′dăd
**Bagneux**, bán′yû′
**Balleux**, bä′lû′
**Bailleul**, bá′yûl′
**Baisieux**, bä′zyû′
**Baku**, bá-kōō′
**Bâle** (*or* Basel), bäl
**Ballersdorf**, bäl′ĕrz-dôrf
**Bambrugge**, bäm′brōōg′ē
**Bannonville**, bá′nôN′vēl′
**Bapaume**, bá′pōm′
**Barbarano**, bär′bä-rä′nō
**Bar-le-Duc**, bär′-lē-dük′
**Baroncourt**, bá′rôN′kōōr′
**Baronville**, bá′rôN′vēl′
**Baronweiler**, bä′rôn-vī′lĕr
**Barst**, bärst
**Barvaux**, bár′vō′
**Bascoup**, bä′kōō′
**Basel** (*or* Bâle), bä′zĕl
**Basra** (*or* Busra), bŭs′rä
**Bassano**, bäs-sä′nō
**Bassée, La**, lá′ bá′sā′
**Bastogne**, bäs′tôN′y′
**Batilly**, bá′tē′yē′
**Batum**, bä-tōōm′
**Baudrecourt**, bō′dr′-kōōr′
**Bauffe**, bōf
**Baugnies**, bō′nyē′
**Baulon**, bō′lôN′
**Bautersem**, bou′tĕr-sĕm
**Bavay**, bá′vē′
**Bazeilles**, bá′zâ′y′
**Beaucourt**, bō′kōōr′
**Beaumetz**, bō′mĕs′
**Beaumont**, bō′môN′
**Beauquesne**, bō′kân′
**Beauraing**, bō′răN′
**Beaurevoir**, bō′rē-vwä′
**Beauvais**, bō′vē′
**Beauval**, bō′vál′
**Beauvillers**, bō′vē′lâr′
**Bebing**, bä′bĭng
**Bechy**, bĕK′ē
**Beckingen**, bĕk′ĭng-ĕn
**Becquevoort**, bĕk′vōrt′
**Beeringen**, bā′rĭng-ĕn
**Beernem**, bār′nĕm
**Beerst**, bärst
**Beine**, bân
**Beinheim**, bīn′hĭm
**Beirut** (*or* Beyrout), bā′rōōt′
**Belfort**, bĕl′fôr′
**Belgrade**, bĕl′grād′
**Bellefontaine**, bĕl′fôN′tĕn′
**Belleghem**, bĕl′ē-gĕm
**Bellem**, bĕl′ĕm
**Bellevaux**, bĕl′vō′
**Bellicourt**, bĕl′ē′kōōr′
**Bellignies**, bĕ-lē′nyē′
**Belluno**, bĕl-lōō′nō
**Belosi**, bá-lō′sē
**Belval**, bĕl′vál′
**Belverne**, bĕl′vĕrn′
**Beney**, bē-nĕ′
**Benningen**, bĕn′ĭng-ĕn
**Bensdorf**, bĕnz′dôrf
**Berchem**, bĕr′ĸĕm
**Berg**, bĕrĸ
**Berlaimont**, bĕr′lĕ′môN′
**Bernacourt**, bĕrn′kōōr′
**Bernissart**, bĕr′nē′sár′
**Bernweiler**, bĕrn′vī-lĕr
**Berquette**, bĕr′kĕt′
**Bertincourt**, bĕr′tăN′kōōr′
**Bertogne**, bĕr′tôn′y′
**Bertrichamps**, bĕr′trē′shăN′
**Bertrix**, bĕr′trē′
**Berzée**, bĕr′zā′
**Besançon**, bē′zăN′sôN′
**Bethonvilliers**, bē-tôN′vē′yâr′
**Béthune**, bā′tün′
**Bettainvillers**, bĕ′tăN′vē′lâr′
**Bettemberg**, bĕt′ĕm-bĕrĸ
**Beuthen**, boi′tĕn
**Beverloo**, bĕv′ĕr-lō′
**Beverst**, bĕv′ĕrst
**Beyrout** (*or* Beirut), bā′rōōt′
**Bhagdad** (*or* Bagdad), bág-dăd′
**Bialystok**, byä′lĭ-stôk
**Bienville**, byĂN′vēl′
**Biesme**, bē′âm′
**Biestre**, bē′ĕs′tr′
**Bievre**, bē′âv′r′
**Bihain**, bē′ĂN′
**Bilsen**, bĭl′sĕn
**Billy**, bē′lē′
**Binche**, bĂnsh
**Bioncourt**, byôN′kōōr′
**Bionville**, byôN′vēl′
**Bisten**, bĭs′tĕn
**Bitburg**, bĭt′bôrĸ
**Bitschweiler**, bĭt′shvī′lĕr
**Biwer**, bē′vä′
**Blagny**, blá′nyē′
**Blamont**, blá′môN′
**Blandain**, blĂN′dĂN′
**Blaregnies**, blá′rá′nyē′
**Blaton**, blá′tôN′
**Bleialf**, blī′álf
**Bleiburg**, blī′bôrĸ
**Bleid**, blīd
**Blenod**, blĕ′nô′
**Bloemendaele**, blōō′mĕn-dä′lē
**Blumenthal**, blōō′mĕn-täl
**Bockryck**, bôk′rēk
**Boelhe**, bōōl′ē
**Boesinghe**, bōō′zĭng-ē
**Boevange**, bōō′vång-ē
**Bohain**, bô′ĂN′
**Boisleux**, bwá′lû′
**Boismont**, bwá′môN′
**Boltweller**, bōlt′vī-lĕr
**Bomal**, bô′mál′
**Bomy**, bô′mē′
**Boncourt**, bôN′kōōr′
**Bonhome**, bô′nôm′
**Bonlez**, bôN′lĕ′
**Bonnes**, bôn
**Bonneville**, bôn′vēl′
**Bonnevoye**, bôn′vwä′
**Bonviller**, bôN′vē′yä′
**Boom**, bōm
**Borg**, bôrĸ
**Borgo**, bôr′gō
**Borsbeke**, bôrz′bā-kē
**Bosphorus** (*or* Bosporus), bŏs′pō-rŭs
**Bosseval**, bôs′vál′
**Botoshani**, bô-tô-shâ′n′y′
**Botzen**, bōt′sĕn
**Bouchain**, bōō′shĂN′
**Bouchout**, bōō′shōō′
**Bouconville**, bōō′kôN′vēl′
**Boucq**, bōōk
**Boudoir**, bōō′dōōr′
**Bougnies**, bōō′nyē′
**Bouillon**, bōō′yôN′
**Boulers**, bōō′lâr′
**Boulogne**, bōō′lôn′y′; *Eng.* bōō-lōn′
**Boult**, bōōl
**Bouquemalson**, bōōk′mă′zôN′
**Bourbourg**, bōōr′bōōr′
**Bourcy**, bōōr′sē′
**Bourdonnay**, bōōr′dô′nā′
**Bourg-Bruche**, bōōrĸ′-brōōĸ′ē
**Bourg-Fidèle**, bōōr′-fē′dâl′
**Bourgogne**, bōōr′gôn′y′
**Boursies**, bōōr′sē′
**Boussy**, bōō′sē′
**Bousval**, bōōs′vál′
**Bouverie**, bōōv′rē′
**Bouvignes**, bōō′vēn′y′
**Bouvigny**, bōō′vē′nyē′
**Bouvines**, bōō′vēn′
**Bouvron**, bōō′vrôN′
**Bouxières**, bōō′zyâr′
**Boves**, bōv
**Bovigny**, bô′vē′nyē′
**Bovrinnes**, bô′vrĭn′
**Bra**, brä
**Brabant-le-roi**, brá′bĂN′-lē-rwä′
**Braffe**, bráf
**Braila**, brä-ē′lá
**Braine**, brân
**Braine-le-Comte**, brân′-lē-kôNt′
**Braives**, brâv
**Branchon**, brän′shôN′
**Brand**, brănt
**Braquis**, brá′kē′
**Bras**, brä
**Bratte**, brát
**Braunsberg**, brounz′bĕrĸ
**Braux**, brō
**Bray**, brĕ
**Bray-sur-Seine**, brĕ′-sür′-sân′
**Bray-sur-Somme**, brĕ′-sür′sôm′
**Breganze**, brā-gänt′sā
**Brenta** (river), brĕn′tä
**Brest-Litovsk**, brĕst′-lyê-tôfsk′
**Bretton**, brĕt′ôn
**Brie**, brē
**Briey**, brē′ē′
**Brin**, brĂN
**Brioni**, brē-ô′nē
**Brixen**, brĭk′sĕn
**Brouay**, brōō′ē′
**Brouck**, brouk
**Brouckirk**, brou′kĭrk
**Brouveliers**, brōōv′lyâr′
**Bruay**, brü′ē′
**Bruges**, brüzh
**Bruly-de-Pesche**, brü′lē′-dē-pâsh′
**Brusa** (*or* Brussa), brōō′sä
**Brussels** (*or* Bruxelles), brŭs′ĕlz
**Bruxelles** (*or* Brussels), brü′sĕl′
**Bruyeres**, brü′yâr′
**Bry**, brē
**Bucquoy**, bü′kwä′
**Buczacz**, bōō′chăch
**Buderschied**, bōō′dĕr-shēt
**Budin**, bōō′dĭn
**Bug** (river), bōōg
**Buhl**, bōōl
**Buire**, bwēr
**Buironfosse**, bwē′rôN′fôs′
**Bukharest** (*or* Bucharest), bōō′ká-rĕst′
**Bukowina** (Bukovina), bōō′kō-vē′nä
**Bullingen**, bōōl′ĭng-ĕn
**Bully**, bü′yē′
**Bult**, bül
**Burano**, bōō-rä′nō
**Bures**, bür
**Burnhaupt**, bōōrn′houpt
**Bursf**, bōōrsf
**Burtscheid**, bōōrt′shīt
**Busendorf**, bōō′zĕn-dôrf
**Bushire**, bōō-shēr′
**Busigny**, bü′sē′nyē′
**Busra** (*or* Basra), bŭs′rä
**Butgenbach**, bōōt′gĕn-bák
**Buttia**, bōōt′yä
**Buzegney**, bü′zâ′nyē′
**Buzy**, bü′zē′
**Buziéres**, bü′zyâr′

**Caesarea** (*or* Kaisarich), sĕs-ä-rē′ä
**Caeskerke**, käz-kĕr′kē
**Calais**, ká′lĕ′; *Eng.* kăl′ā
**Callenelle**, kál′nĕl′
**Camblain**, kĂN′blĂN′
**Cambrai** (*or* Cambray), kĂN′brĕ′
**Cambrin**, kĂN′brĂN′
**Camisano**, kä′mē-zä′nō
**Canfanaro**, kän′fä-nä′rō
**Cantain**, kĂN′tĂN′
**Capelle, La**, la′ ká′pĕl′

**Capodistria**, kä′pō-dēs′trē-ä
**Cappet**, kăp′ĕt
**Caprino**, kä-prē′nō
**Carency**, ka′răN′sē′
**Carignan**, ka′rēn′yäN′
**Carnières**, kär′nyâr′
**Carole**, kä-rō′lä
**Carvin**, kär′vĂN′
**Cassel**, kas′ĕl′
**Casteau, Le**, lē ka′tō′
**Catillon**, ka′tē′yôN′
**Caudry**, kō′drē′
**Cavalese**, kä′vä-lā′zā
**Cavarzere**, kä-vär′dzā-rā
**Cerfontaine**, sĕr′fôN′tân′
**Cernavoda** (*or* Tchernavoda), chĕr′nä-vō′dä
**Cernay**, sĕr′nĕ′
**Cetinje** (*or* Cettinje), tsĕt′ĕn-yā
**Chalons-sur-Marne**, shä′lôN′-sür′-märn′
**Chalon-sur-Saône**, shä′lôN′-sür′-sōn′
**Chambley**, shäN′blĕ′
**Chambrey**, shäN′brĕ′
**Champagney**, shäN′pä′nyĕ′
**Champigny**, shäN′pē′nye′
**Chapelle, La**, lä′shä′pĕl′
**Charency**, shä′răN′sē′
**Charey**, shä′rē′
**Charleroi** (*or* Charleroy), shär′lē-rwä′
**Charleville**, shärl′vēl′
**Charmois**, shär′mwä′
**Chassart**, shäs′är′
**Chastre**, shäs′tr′
**Chatalja** (*or* Tchatalja), chä-täl′jä
**Château-Regnault**, shä′tō′-rē′nyō′
**Châteauroux**, shä′tō′rōō′
**Château-Salins**, shä′tō′-sa′lăN′
**Château-Thierry**, shä′tō′-tyĕ′rē′
**Châtel**, shä′tĕl′
**Châtelet**, shät′lĕ′
**Châtillon**, shä′tē′yôN′
**Châtillon-sur-Marne**, shä′tē′yôN′-sür′-märn′
**Chaudefontaine**, shōd′fôN′tăN′
**Chaulnes**, shō′n′
**Chaumont**, shō′môN′
**Chauny**, shō′nē′
**Chauvency**, shō′vĂN′sē′
**Chaux**, shō
**Chemin des Dames**, shē′măn′ dä̆dám′
**Chenevières**, shĕn′vyâr′
**Chenicourt**, shē-nē′kōōr′
**Cherain**, shĕ′răN′
**Cherso**, kĕr′sō
**Chièvres**, shĕ′ĕ′vr′
**Chimay**, shē′mĕ′
**Chiny**, shē′nē′
**Chioggia**, kyōd′jä
**Ciney**, sē′nĕ′
**Cittadella**, chēt′tä-dĕl′lä
**Cividale**, chē′vē-dä′lā
**Clary**, klä′rē′
**Clavier**, klä′vyā′
**Clemency**, klĕm′äN′sē′
**Clerken**, klĕr′kĕn
**Clermont**, klĕr′môN′
**Clervaux**, klĕr′vō′
**Cleurie**, klû′rē′
**Clezentaine**, klĕz′äN′tân′
**Codroipo**, kō-drô′ēpō
**Coingt**, kwĂN
**Colroy**, kōl′rwä′
**Combles**, kôN′bl′
**Comines**, kō′mēn′
**Commercy**, kō′mĕr′sē′
**Compiègne**, kôN′pyĕn′y′
**Condé**, kôN′dā′
**Conegliano**, kō′nāl-yä′nō
**Conflans**, kôN′flăN′
**Cons**, kôNs
**Conselve**, kôn-sĕl′vä
**Constanta** (*or* Kustendje), kôn-stän′tsä
**Corbais**, kôr′bĕ′
**Corbeek Loo**, kôr′bāk lō
**Corbion**, kôr′byôN′
**Corceuil**, kôr′sû′y′
**Corcieux**, kôr′syû′
**Corcy**, kôr′sē′
**Cornieville**, kôr′nē′vēl′
**Cornimont**, kôr′nē′môN′
**Corravillers**, kŏ′ra′vē′lâr′
**Cortemarck**, kôr′tē-märk
**Cortessem**, kôr′tĕs-ĕm
**Cortina**, kôr-tē′nä
**Coucy**, kōō′sē′
**Coucy-le-Château**, kōō′sē′-lē-shä′tō′
**Coulommiers**, kōō′lô′myā′
**Coulonges**, kōō′lônzh′
**Courcelles-Chaussy**, kōōr′sĕl′-shō′sē′
**Courrières**, kōō′ryâr′
**Courtemont**, kōōrt′môN′
**Courtrai**, kōōr′trĕ′
**Court-St.-Étienne**, kōōr′-săN′-tā′-tyĕn′
**Couvin**, kōō′vĂN′
**Cracow** (*or* Krakow), krä′kō
**Crajova** (*or* Craiova), krä-yō′vä
**Craonne**, krä′ôn′
**Crécy** (*or* Cressy), krā′sē′; *Eng.* krĕs′ĭ
**Crécy-sur-Serre**, krā-sē′-sür′-sâr′
**Crevic**, krĕ′vĕk′
**Crimea**, krī-mē′*a*; krī-mē′*a*
**Croisilles**, krwä′sēl′
**Croismare**, krwä′mär′
**Croix**, krwä
**Crombeke**, krôm′bā-kē
**Crupet**, krü′pĕ′
**Cuesmes**, kwĕm
**Cuinchy**, kwĂN′shē
**Cul-des-Sarts**, kül′-dĕ-sâr′
**Custines**, küs′tēn′
**Cysoing**, sē′swĂN′
**Czenstochowa**, chĕN′stō-kô′vä
**Czernowitz**, chĕr′nō-vĭts

**Dagny**, dä′nyē′
**Dagonville**, dä′gôN′vēl′
**Daleiden**, dä-lī′dĕn
**Dalheim**, däl′hīm
**Dalstein**, däl′shtīn
**Damas**, dä′mä′
**Damascus**, *dä*-măs′kŭs
**Damerkirch**, dä′mĕr-kĕrĸ
**Dammartin**, dăN′mär′tĂN′
**Damvillers**, dăN′vē′yā′
**Daniele**, dä-nyä′lā
**Danjoutin**, dăN′jōō′tăN′
**Danne**, dän′nē
**Danzig** (*or* Dantzic), dän′tsĭk
**Dardanelles**, där′dä-nĕlz′
**Darhamps**, där′ĂN′
**Darmont**, där′môN′
**Dedeagatch** (*or* Dedeagach), dĕ-dĕ′ä-gäch′
**Deerlyck**, dār′lĕk
**Delatyn** (pass), dĕ-lä′tĭn
**Delle**, dĕl
**Delme**, dĕl′mē
**Denain**, dē-năN′
**Dendermonde** (*or* Termonde), dĕn′ dĕr-môn′dē
**Dergneau**, dĕr′nyō′
**Devres**, dâv′′r′
**Diarbekr** (*or* Diarbekir), dē-är′bĕk′′r
**Dickenbusch**, dĭk′ē-bŭs
**Diedenhofen** (*or* Thionville), dē′dĕn-hō′fĕn
**Dieulouard**, dyû′lōō′är′
**Dieuze**, dyûz
**Differdingen**, dĭf′ĕr-dĭng′ĕn
**Dignano**, dē-nyä′nō
**Dijon**, dē′zhôN′
**Dinant**, dē′năN′
**Dippach**, dĭp′äĸ
**Dixmude**, dĕks′müd′; dē′mûd′
**Dnieper** (river), nē′pĕr
**Dniester** (river), nēs′tĕr
**Dolleren**, dôl′ĕr-ĕn
**Dombasle**, dôN′bäl′
**Dommartin**, dôN′mär′tăN′
**Dommary**, dôN′mä′rē′
**Dompaire**, dôN′pār′
**Don**, dôN
**Doncourt**, dôN′kōōr′
**Dongelberg**, dŏng′ĕl-bĕrĸ
**Donjoutin**, dôN′jōō′tăN′
**Dormans**, dôr′mäN′
**Dornach**, dôr′näĸ
**Douai** (*or* Douay), dōō′ā′
**Doullens**, dōō′lăN′
**Drave** (river), drä′vē
**Drohobycz**, drō-hô′bĭch
**Drouville**, drōō′vēl′
**Dubno**, dōōb′nō
**Dukla**, dōōk′lä
**Dunkirk**, dŭn-kûrk′
**Durazzo**, dōō-rät′sō
**Durbuy**, dür′boi′
**Düren**, dü′rĕn

**Eberstein**, ā′bĕr-shtīn
**Ebersweiler**, ā′bĕrs-vī′lĕr
**Ébly**, ā′blē′
**Echternach**, ĕĸ′tĕr-näĸ
**Ecly**, ĕ′klē′
**Écoivres**, ā′kwä′vr′
**Écossines**, ā′kō′sēn′
**Ecouviez**, ā′kōō′vyā′
**Edeghem**, ā′dē-gĕm
**Edingen**, ā′dĭng-ĕn
**Eecke**, ā′kē
**Eecloo**, ā-klō′
**Eessen**, ā′sĕn
**Eglingen**, ĕg′lĭng-ĕn
**El Kuds** (*or* Jerusalem), ĕl kōōdz
**Ellezelles**, ĕl′zĕl′
**Elsenborg**, ĕl′zĕn-bôrĸ
**Élouges**, ā′lōōzh′
**Éloyes**, ā′lwä′
**Elverdinghe**, ĕl′vĕr-dĭng′ē
**Embken**, ĕmp′kĕn
**Enghien**, äN′gĂN′
**Enos**, ā′nŏs
**Entroeungt**, äN′trō′ûN′
**Épernay**, ā′pĕr′nĕ′
**Épinal**, ā′pē′nal′
**Epirus**, ē-pī′rŭs
**Eppe Sauvage**, ĕp′ sō′väzh′
**Erdorf**, ĕr′dôrf
**Eregli**, ĕr′ĕ-glē′
**Erivan**, ĕr′ē-vän′
**Ermeton**, ĕr′mē-tôN′
**Erneuville**, ĕr′nû′vēl′
**Ernonheld**, ĕr′nôn-hĕld
**Erpent**, ĕr′päN′
**Erpion**, ĕr′pyôN′
**Erpoin**, ĕr′pwĂN′
**Erquelinnes**, ĕrk′lĕn′
**Errouville**, ĕr′ōō′vēl′
**Ertvelde**, ĕrt′vĕl-dē
**Ervilliers**, ĕr′vē′yâr′
**Erzingan**, ĕr′zĭn-gän′
**Erzerum**, ĕrz-rōōm′
**Escaudain**, ĕs′kō′dĂN′
**Esch**, ĕsh
**Eschweiler**, ĕsh′vī-lĕr
**Esnes**, ân
**Esneux**, ĕs′nû′
**Espierres**, ĕs′pyâr′
**Esqueheries**, ĕs′kē-rē′
**Essey**, ĕs′ē′
**Estaires**, ĕs-târ′
**Esti**, ĕs′tē
**Estinnes**, ĕs′tĭn′
**Estre Blanche**, ĕs′tr′-blăNsh′
**Étain**, ā′tĂN′
**Étalle**, ā′tăl′
**Étival**, ā′tē′văl′
**Ettelbruck**, ĕt′ĕl-brŏŏk
**Étueffont**, ā′tü′fôN′
**Eulmont**, ûl′môN′
**Eupen**, oi′pĕn
**Euphrates** (river), û-frā′tēs
**Everbecq**, ĕv′ĕr′bĕk′
**Evergem**, ā′vĕr-gĕm
**Évette**, ā′vĕt′
**Eydtkuhnen**, īt-kōō′nĕn
**Eynatten**, ī-nät′ĕn
**Eyne**, ī′nē
**Eysden**, īs′dĕn

**Falaen,** fȧ′län′
**Falisolle,** fȧ′lē′zȯl′
**Falmagne,** fȧl′män′y′
**Famars,** fȧ′mär′
**Famillaveux,** fȧ′mēl′ȧ′vû′
**Farschweiler,** färsh′vī-lēr
**Faulx,** fō
**Fauvillers,** fō′vē′lȧr′
**Fays Dillot,** fē′dē′yō′
**Felgnies,** fĕ′nyē′
**Feltre,** fĕl′trā
**Feluy,** fē-loi′
**Fépin,** fā′pĕn′
**Fère, La,** lȧ′ fȧr′
**Fère-Champenoise,** fȧr′-shäN′pē-nwäz′
**Fère-en-Tardenois,** fȧr′-äN′-tard′-nwä′
**Ferrière,** fĕ′ryȧr′
**Ferté-Gaucher, La,** lȧ′fĕr′tȧ′-gō′shā′
**Ferté-sous-Jouarre, La,** lȧ′ fĕr′tā′-sōō′-zhōō′ȧr′
**Fianona,** fyä-nō′nä
**Filsdorf,** fĭlz′dȯrf
**Finnevaux,** fĭn′vō′
**Fins,** fĂNs
**Fiume,** fyōō′mā
**Flawinne,** flȧ′vĭn′
**Fleurbaix,** flûr′bĕ′
**Fleurry,** flû′rē′
**Fleville,** flē′vēl′
**Fligneux,** flē′nyû′
**Flines,** flēn
**Flirey,** flē′rē′
**Flobecq,** flō′bĕk′
**Florennes,** flō′rĕn′
**Florenville,** flō′rän′vēl′
**Florée,** flō′rā′
**Fontaine,** fôN′tĕn′
**Fontenay,** fôNt′nĕ′
**Fontenoy,** fôNt′nwä′
**Fontoy,** fôN′twȧ′
**Fonzaso,** fôn-tsä′zō
**Forrières,** fȯ′ryȧr′
**Fosse,** fôs
**Fouchy,** fōō′shē′
**Foucogney,** fōō′kôn′yē′
**Foug,** fōō
**Fougerolles,** fōōzh′rȯl′
**Fourmies,** fōōr′mē′
**Foville,** fȯ′vēl′
**Fraire,** frȧr
**Fraise,** frȧz
**Fraize,** frȧz
**Framières,** frȧ′myȧr′
**Framont,** frȧ′môN′
**Frécourt,** frā′kōōr′
**Freisdorf,** frīz′dȯrf
**Fresne,** frĕn
**Fresnes-en-Woëvre,** frĕn′-äN′-vȯ′ĕv′r′
**Fresnoy,** frĕ′nwä′
**Fretin,** frē-tăN′
**Freudenburg,** froi′dĕn-bōōrĸ
**Freux,** frû
**Frévent,** frā′väN′
**Frévillers,** frā′vē′lȧr′
**Fribourg,** frē′bōōrĸ
**Fricourt,** frē′kōōr′
**Friesach,** frē′zäĸ
**Frisang,** frē′zäN′
**Froidchapelle,** frwȧ′shȧ′pĕl′
**Fromelles,** frȯ′mĕl′
**Frouard,** frōō′ȧr′
**Fumay,** fû′mā′
**Furnaux,** fûr′nō′
**Furnes** fûrn

**Gaesbeek,** gäz′bāk
**Gail** (river), gīl
**Galatz,** gä′läts
**Gallcia,** gȧ-lĭsh′ĭ-ȧ
**Gallaix,** gȧ′lĕ′
**Gallipoli,** gäl-lē′pō-lē
**Gammerages,** gȧm′rüzh′
**Gand** (*or* Ghent), gäN
**Gargnano,** gär-nyä′nō
**Gavis,** gä′fĭs
**Gavrelle,** gȧ′vrĕl′
**Gaza** (*or* Ghazzeh), gä′zȧ
**Geet Betz,** gāt bĕts
**Gelinden,** gĕl′ĭn-dĕn
**Celucourt,** gā′lcɔ-kɔ̄rt
**Gembloux,** zhäN′blōō′
**Gemona,** jȧ-mō′nä
**Gémonville,** zhā′môN′vēl′
**Gemund,** gȧ′mōōnt
**Genappe,** zhē-näp′
**Gérardmer,** zhā′rär′mā′
**Gerbetal,** zhĕrb′päl′
**Gerbeviller,** zhĕrb′vē′yā′
**Gérouville,** zhā′rōō′vēl′
**Gesponsart,** zhē′pôN′ȧr′
**Ghazzeh** (*or* Gaza), **gŭz′ĕ**
**Ghent** (*or* Gand), **gĕnt**
**Ghistolles,** gē′stĕl′
**Ghyvelde,** gē-vĕl′dē
**Gibecq,** zhē′bĕk′
**Gildweiler,** gēlt′vī-lēr
**Girecourt,** zhēr′kōōr′
**Giromagny,** zhē′rō′mȧ′nyē′
**Gironville,** zhē′rôN′vēl′
**Givenchy,** zhē′väN′shē′
**Givet,** zhē′vĕ′
**Givry,** zhē′vrē′
**Gladbeek,** gläd′bāk]
**Gleiwitz,** glī′vĭts
**Glimes,** glēm
**Glons,** glôN
**Gmünd,** g′münt
**Gnesen,** g′nā′zĕn
**Godarville,** gō′dȧr′vēl′
**Gogney,** gō′nyĕ′
**Golbey,** gōl′bĕ′
**Gondrecourt,** gôN′dr′-kōōr′
**Gondreville,** gôN′dr′-vēl′
**Gorcy,** gȯr′sē′
**Gorizia** (*or* Görz), gō-rĭd′zē-ä
**Gorgue, La,** lȧ′ gȯrg′
**Görz** (*or* Gorizia), gûrts
**Gosselies,** gȯs′lē′
**Gouvy,** gōō′vē′
**Gouy,** gwē
**Gradisca,** grä-dēs′kä
**Grado,** grä′dō
**Graide,** grȧd
**Grainconrt,** grĂN′kōōr′
**Grammont,** grȧ′môN′
**Grandfontaine,** grĂN′fôN′tĕn′
**Grand Pré,** grĂN′ prā′
**Grandvoir,** grĂN′vwä′
**Granges,** grĂNzh
**Graty,** grȧ′tē′
**Gravelines,** grȧv′lēn′
**Gravelotte,** grȧv′lȯt′
**Grembergen,** grĕm′bĕr-gĕn
**Grenay,** grē′nĕ′
**Greux,** grû
**Grevenmacher,** grā′vĕn-mäĸ′ĕr
**Grignée,** grĂN′nā′
**Gruchten,** grōōĸ′tĕn
**Grupont,** grû′pôN′
**Gueblange,** gūb′länge-ē
**Guebwiller,** gūb′vī-lēr
**Guentrangen,** gün′träng-ĕn
**Guewenheim,** gü′vĕn-hīm
**Guiscard,** gēz′kär′
**Guise,** güēz′
**Gulpen,** gōōl′pĕn
**Gumblnnen,** gōōm-bĭn′ĕn
**Gundolsheim,** gōōn′dōlz-hīm
**Gussainville,** gü′zĂN′vēl′

**Habay-la-Vielle,** ȧ′bĕ′-lȧ′-vē′ȧ′y′
**Hablainville,** ȧ′blĂN′vēl′
**Habonville,** ȧ′bôN′vēl′
**Hacht,** hȧĸt
**Hachy,** ȧ′shē′
**Hadol,** ȧ′dȯ′
**Hadonville,** ȧ′dôN′vēl′
**Haesdonck,** häs′dôŋk
**Hal,** häl
**Hallaer,** hȧl-lär′
**Hallainville,** ȧ′lĂN′vēl′
**Halling,** häl′ĭng
**Halma,** häl′mȧ
**Halsdorf,** hälz′dȯrf
**Hamah,** hä′mä
**Hamme,** hăm′ē
**Hamoir,** ȧ′mwä′
**Hamonville,** ȧm′ôN′vēl′
**Han,** hän
**Hannapes,** ȧ′näp′
**Hanret,** äN′rȧ′
**Haraucourt,** ȧ′rō′kōōr′
**Harcigny,** ȧr′sē′nyē′
**Hargicourt,** ȧr′zhē′kōōr′
**Hargnies,** ȧr′nyē′
**Harlebeke,** här′lē-bā′kē
**Harmignies,** ȧr′mē′nyē′
**Harnes,** ärn
**Harre,** ăr
**Harville,** ȧr′vēl′
**Hary,** ȧ′rē′
**Hasnon,** ȧs′nôN′
**Haspres,** ȧs′pr′
**Hastière,** ȧs′tyȧr′
**Hatrize,** ȧ′trēz′
**Haubourdine,** ō′bōōr′dēn′
**Haudemont,** ōd′môN′
**Haussy,** ō′sē′
**Hautchin,** ō′shĂN′
**Haut Fays,** ō′ fē′
**Hautmont,** ō′môN′
**Havangen,** ha′fäng-ĕn
**Havay,** ȧ′vē′
**Havre** (*Fr.* Le Havre), hä′vēr; *Fr.* lē ȧv′r′
**Hayange** (*or* Hayingen), ȧ′yänzh′
**Hayingen** (*or* Hayange), hī′ĭng-ĕn
**Hazebrouck,** ȧz′brōōk′
**Heer,** hār
**Helderschied,** hĭ′dĕr-shēt
**Heimbach,** hīm′bäĸ
**Helmsbrunn,** hīmz′brŏŏn
**Heinerschied,** hī′nĕr-shēt
**Hélène,** ȧ′lĕn′
**Helgoland** (*or* Heligoland), hĕl′gō-länt
**Heilebeeg,** hĕl′ē-bāĸ
**Hellemmes,** ĕl′ĕm′
**Hem,** ĂN
**Hénin,** ā′nĂN′
**Hennemont,** ĕn′môN′
**Henripont,** ĂN′rē′pôN′
**Herbesthal,** hĕr′bĕz-täl
**Herbeumont,** ĕr′bû′môN′
**Herbeviller,** ĕrb′vē′lȧ′
**Herchies,** ĕr′shē′
**Herent,** hā′rĕnt
**Herenthals,** hā′rĕn-tāle
**Herenthout,** hā′rĕnt-out
**Hergarlen,** hĕr′gär-lĕn
**Hergenrath,** hĕr′gĕn-rät
**Hergnies,** ĕr′nyē′
**Héricourt,** ā′rē′kōōr′
**Héristal** (*or* Herstal), ā′rē′stȧl′
**Hermies,** ĕr′mē′
**Herrines,** ĕ′rēn′
**Herseux,** ĕr′sû′
**Herstn,** ĕr′stĂN′
**Herstal** (*or* Héristal), hĕr′stȧl
**Herzegovina,** hĕr′tsē-gō-vē′nä
**Herzheim,** hĕrts′hīm
**Hesdin,** ĕs′dĂN′
**Hestrud,** ĕs′trü′
**Heuchin,** û′shĂN′
**Heudicourt,** û′dē′kōōr′
**Heusweiler,** hoiz′vī-lēr
**Heusy,** û′sē′
**Hèverlé,** ȧ′vēr′lā′
**Heyst,** hīst
**Hinckange,** hēn′käng-ĕ
**Hinges,** ĂNzh
**Hirson,** ēr′sôN′
**Hives,** ēv
**Hody,** ō′dē′
**Hofen,** hō′fĕn
**Hoffeld,** hō′fĕlt
**Hogne,** ôn′y′
**Hollebeke,** hōl′ē-bā′kē
**Hollenthal,** hōl′ĕn-täl
**Hollerich,** hōl′ĕr-ĭĸ
**Holluin,** ō′lwĂN′
**Holsbeek,** hōlz′bāk
**Hombeek,** hōm′bāk
**Homécourt,** ō′mā′kōōr′
**Hompre,** ôn′pr′
**Hon,** ôN
**Hondschoote,** hōnd′shō-tē
**Hooglede,** hō′glā-dē
**Horodenka,** hō′rō-dĕŋ′kä

**Horpmael,** hôrp'mäl
**Houdain,** ōō'dăN'
**Houdremont,** ou'dr'-môN'
**Houplines,** ōōp'lēn'
**Houx,** ōō
**Houyet,** ōō'yĕ'
**Huiron,** wē'rôN'
**Huldenberg,** hōōl'dĕn-bĕrĸ
**Huppayo,** ŭ'pä'
**Huy,** hoi

**Ichteghem,** ĭĸ'tē-gĕm
**Iddergem,** ĭd'ĕr-gĕm
**Idria,** ē'drē-ä
**Igny,** ē'nyē'
**Illangen,** ĕl'ăng-ĕn
**Illy,** ē'yē'
**Incourt,** ăN'kōōr'
**Inden,** ĭn'dĕn
**Ingelmunster,** ĭŋ'gĕl-mŭn'stēr
**Ire,** ēr
**Iseghem,** ĭz'ē-gĕm
**Iskandorun** (*or* Alexandretta), ĭs-kăn' dēr-ōōn
**Ismailia,** ēs'mä-ēl'yä
**Itegem,** ĭt'ē-gĕm
**Itterbeek,** ĭt'ĕr-bāk
**Ittre,** ē'tr'
**Ivangorod,** ē-vän'gô-rôt
**Izel,** ē'zĕl
**Izier,** ē'zyā'

**Jabbeke,** yäb'ā-kē
**Jallet,** zhä'lĕ'
**Jamagne,** zhä'măn'y'
**Jamboli** (*or* Yamboli), yäm'bô-lē
**Jamotz,** zhä'mĕs'
**Jamoignes,** zhä'mwän'y'
**Jarny,** zhär'nē'
**Jaroslaw** (*or* Jaroslau), yä-rôs'läf
**Jarville,** zhär'vēl'
**Jassy** (*or* Yassy), yäs'ē
**Jaulny,** zhōl'nē'
**Jeandelize,** zhăN'dē-lēz'
**Jeantes,** zhäNt
**Jedda** (*or* Jidda), jĕd'ä
**Jehay,** zhē-ĕ'
**Jemappe,** zhē-măp'
**Jenlain,** zhăN'lăN'
**Jerusalem** (*or* El Kuds), jĕ-rōō'sä-lĕm
**Jeumont,** zhû'môn'
**Jidda** (*or* Jedda), jĭd'ä
**Jodoigne,** zhô'dwän'y'
**Jœuf,** zhû'ŭf'
**Joncherey,** zhôN'shē-rĕ'
**Jonville,** zhôN'vēl'
**Jouarre,** zhōō'är'
**Junglinster,** yōōng'lĭn-stēr
**Junivllle,** zhü'nē'vēl'
**Juprelle,** zhü'prĕl'
**Jurbise,** zhür'bēz'
**Juseret,** zhü'sē-rā'
**Juvigny,** zhü'vē'nyē'
**Juville,** zhü'vēl'

**Kain,** kăN
**Kaisarieh** (*or* Kaisariyeh *or* Caesarea), kī'sä-rē'yĕ
**Kaisersberg,** kī'zĕre-bĕrĸ
**Kalisz,** kä'lyĕsh
**Kall,** käl
**Karahissar,** kä-rä'hĭs-sär'
**Kattecherberg,** kät'ē-chĕr-bĕrĸ'
**Kattenhofen,** kät'ĕn-hō'fĕn
**Kedange,** kā'dăng-ē
**Keltsy** (*or* Kielce), kyĕl'tsĭ
**Kelz,** kĕlts
**Kemmel,** kĕm'ĕl
**Kemplich,** kĕmp'lĭĸ
**Kerbela,** kĕr'bĕ-lä
**Kerling,** kĕr'lĭng
**Kessel,** kĕs'ĕl
**Keyem,** kī'ĕm
**Kholm,** kôlm
**Khotin,** kô'tyĕn
**Kief** (*or* Kiev), kē'yĕf
**Kielce** (*or* Keltsy), kyĕl'tsĕ
**Kishinef** (*or* Kishinev), kē-shē-nyĕf'
**Klagenfurt,** klä'gĕn-fōōrt
**Klausen,** klou'zĕn
**Kleinhau,** klīn'hou
**Koekelberg,** kōō'kĕl-bĕrĸ
**Kohlscheid,** kōl'shīt
**Kolomoa,** kō'lô-mā'ä
**Kommern,** kôm'ĕrn
**Königsborg,** kû'nĭĸs-bĕrĸ
**Kovel,** kô'vĕl-y'
**Kragojevatz** (*or* Kraguyevatz), krä-gōō'yĕ-väts
**Krainberg,** krīn'bĕrĸ
**Krakow** (*or* Cracow), krä'kō
**Krath,** krät
**Krautscheid,** krout'shīt
**Kremenchug** (*or* Krementchug), krĕm'ĕn-chōōk'
**Kromnitz,** krĕm'nĭts
**Kreuzau,** kroi'tsou
**Kronenberg,** krō'nĕn-bĕrĸ
**Kuds, El** (*or* Jerusalem), ĕl kōōdz
**Kur** (*or* Kura, river), kōōr; kōō'rä
**Kurisches Haff,** kōō'rĭsh-ĕs häf
**Kustendje** (*or* Constanta), küs-tĕn'jĕ
**Kut-el-Amara,** kōōt'ĕl-ä-mä'rä

**La Bassée,** lä' bä'sā'
**La Capelle,** lä' kä'pĕl'
**La Chapelle,** lä' shä'pĕl'
**Ladeuze,** lä'dûz'
**La Fère,** lä' fâr'
**La Fère-Champenoise,** lä' fâr'-shäN'-pē-nwäz'
**La Fertè-Gaucher,** lä' fĕr'tā'-gō'shä'
**La Fertè-sous-Jouarre,** lä' fĕr'tā'-sōō'-zhōō'är'
**Lagarde,** lä'gärd'
**Lagny,** lä'nyē'
**La Gorgue,** lä' gôrg'
**Laibach,** lī'bäĸ
**Laires,** lâr
**Laison,** lā'zôN'
**Laix,** lā
**La Laterne,** lä'lä'tĕrn'
**Lamarche,** lä'märsh'
**Lamorteau,** lä'môr'tō'
**Landrecies,** läN'drā'sē'
**Landres,** läN'dr'
**Laneffe,** lä'nĕf'
**Langemarck,** läŋ'gē-märk'
**Langres,** läN'gr'
**Languion,** läN'gē'ôN'
**Lannoy,** lä'nwä'
**Laon,** läN
**La Panne,** lä' pän'
**La Pinte,** lä' păNt'
**La Roche,** lä' rôsh'
**Latakia,** lä'tä-kē'ä
**Latisana,** lä'tē-sä'nä
**La Trouche,** lä' trōōsh'
**Laumesfeld,** lou'mĕz-fĕlt
**Lautenbach Zell,** lou'tĕn-bäĸ tsĕl'
**Laveline,** läv'lēn'
**Laventie,** lä'väN'tē'
**Lavoir,** lä'vwä'
**La Voivre,** lä' vwä'vr'
**Lebbeke,** lē-bā'kē
**Le Cateau,** lē kä'tō'
**Lodeberg,** lā'dē-bĕrĸ
**Ledeghem,** lā'dē-gĕm
**Leeuw,** lā'ōō
**Legnago,** lā-nyä'gō
**Le Havre,** lē áv'r'
**Leidenborn,** lī'dĕn-bôrn
**Le Mans,** lē măN'
**Lembecq,** läN'bĕk'
**Lemberg** (*or* Lwów), lĕm'bĕrĸ
**Londmara,** länd-mä'rä
**Lens,** läNs
**Lovico,** lā'vē-kō
**Le Quesnoy,** lē kā'nwä'
**Liancourt,** lē'äN'kōōr'
**Liart,** lē'är'
**Libau,** lē'bou
**Lichtenborn,** lĭĸ'tĕn-bôrn
**Lichtervelde,** lĭk'tēr-vĕl'dĕ
**Liederkerke,** lē'dēr-kĕr'kē
**Liège,** lē'ĕzh'
**Lienz,** lē'ĕnts'
**Lierneux,** lē'ĕr'nû'
**Lierre,** lē'âr'
**Liessies,** lē'ĕs'ē'
**Ligne,** lēn'y'
**Ligneville,** lēn'y'-vēl'
**Ligny,** lē'nyē'
**Ligny-en-Barrois,** l..'nyē'-äN'-bä'rwä'
**Lille** (*or* Lisle), lēl
**Lillers,** lē'lâr'
**Limburg,** lĭm'bûrĸ; *Eng.* lĭm'bûrg
**Limey,** lē'mē'
**Linden,** lĭn'dĕn
**Linne,** lĭn
**Lironville,** lē'rôN'vēl'
**Livenza** (river), lē-vĕnt'sä
**Liverdun,** lē'vĕr'dŭN'
**Lixlères,** lē'zyâr'
**Locon,** lô'kôN'
**Lodz** (*or* Lódz), lôdz; lōōj
**Lommor,** lôm'ĕr
**Lommorsweiler,** lôm'ĕrz-vī'lĕr
**Lomprez,** lôN'prĕ'
**Lomza** (*or* Lomzha), lôm'zbä
**Longarone,** lôŋ'gä-rō'nā
**Longchamps,** lôN'shäN'
**Longeville,** lôNzh'vēl'
**Longlier,** lôN'lyā'
**Longvilly,** lôN'vē'yē'
**Longwy,** lôN'vē'
**Lonny,** lô'nē'
**Loo,** lō
**Loos,** lô-ōs'
**Lophem,** lō'pĕm
**Lorentzweiler,** lō'rĕnts-vī'lĕr
**Lorraine** (*or* Lothringen), lô-răn'
**Lorry,** lô'rē'
**Losheim,** lōz'hĭm
**Lothringen** (*or* Lorraine), lôt'rĭng-ĕn
**Lotzen,** lût'sĕn
**Louette St. Denis,** lōō'ĕt' săN' dē-nē'
**Louette St. Pierre,** lōō'ĕt' săN' pyâr'
**Lougres,** lōō'gr'
**Louvaigne,** lōō'vĕn'y'
**Louvain,** lōō'văN'
**Louvignies,** lōō'vē'nyē'
**Lubey,** lü'bē'
**Lublin** (*or* Lyublin), lyōō'blyĕn
**Lucheux,** lü'shû'
**Lucy,** lü'sē'
**Lünebach,** lü'nē-bäĸ
**Lunéville,** lü'nā'vēl'
**Lure,** lür
**Lussin,** lōōs-sēn'
**Luttange,** lōōt'ăng-ē
**Lutterbach,** lōōt'ĕr-bäĸ
**Luttre,** lü'tr'
**Lutzk** (*or* Lutsk), lōōtsk
**Luxembourg,** lük'säN'bōōr'
**Luxemburg,** lŭk'sĕm-bûrg; *Ger.* lōōks'ĕm-bōōrĸ
**Lwów** (*or* Lemberg), lvōōf
**Lys** (river), lēs

**Machecourt,** mâsh'kōōr'
**Mâcon,** mä'kôN'
**Macquenoise,** mák'nwäz'
**Magneux,** mä'nyû'
**Magnières,** mä'nyâr'
**Magny,** mä'nyē'
**Mährisch-Ostrau,** mâ'rĭsh-ôs'trou
**Mainville,** măN'vēl'
**Mainz** (*or* Mayence), mīnts
**Maisiers,** mā'zyâr'
**Maisons-Alfort,** mā'zôN'-zál'fôr'
**Maizeray,** mäz'rĕ'
**Maizeville,** mäz'vēl'
**Maizy,** mā'zē'
**Malamoceo,** mä'lä-môk'kō
**Malatia,** má'lá-tē'á
**Maldegem,** mäl'dē-gĕm'
**Malines** (*or* Mechlin), má'lēn'
**Malo-les-Bains,** má'lô'-lā'-băN'
**Malroy,** mál'rwä'
**Malvaux,** mál'vō'
**Mamers,** má'mâr'
**Manage,** má'näzh'
**Mance,** mäNs
**Manicamp,** má'nē'käN'
**Manneren,** mán'ē-rĕn
**Manonvillers,** má'nôN'vē'lâr'
**Mans, Le,** lē măN'
**Mantova** (*or* Mantua), măn'tô-vä
**Mantua** (*or* Mantova), măn'tû-ä

**Marainviller**, mȧ′rĂN′vē′yā′
**Marbache**, mȧr′bäsh′
**Marche**, mȧrsh
**Marchiennes**, mȧr′shyĕn′
**Marchin**, mȧr′shĂN′
**Marcinelle**, mȧr′sē′nĕl′
**Marck**, mȧrk
**Marcoing**, mȧr′kwĂN′
**Marcq**, mȧrk
**Marenne**, mȧ′rĕn′
**Maretz**, mȧ′rĕs′
**Margival**, mȧr′zhē′vȧl′
**Mariakerke**, mȧ-rē′ȧ-kĕr′kē
**Maricourt**, mȧ′rē′kōōr′
**Marienburg**, mȧ′rē′ĕn-bōōrĸ
**Marieux**, mȧ′ryû′
**Markirch**, mär′kirĸ
**Marlemont**, mȧrl′môN′
**Marles**, mȧrl
**Marloie**, mȧr′lwä′
**Marly**, mȧr′lē′
**Maroilles**, mȧ′rwä′y′
**Maron**, mȧ′rôN′
**Marquin**, mȧr′kĂN′
**Marsai**, mär′zȧl
**Marseille** (*or* Marseilles), mȧr′sȧ′y′
**Marseilles**, mär-sālz′
**Mars-la-Tour**, mȧrs′-lȧ′-tōōr′
**Martincourt**, mȧr′tĂN′kōōr′
**Marville**, mȧr′vēl′
**Massemen**, mȧs′ē-mĕn
**Massiges**, mȧ′sēzh′
**Maubert-Fontaine**, mō′bȧr′-fôN′tĕn′
**Maubeuge**, mō′bûzh′
**Maulde**, mōld
**Mazenchamp**, mȧ′zĂN′shĂN′
**Mayence** (*or* Mainz), mȧ′yĂNs′
**Mazée**, mȧ′zā′
**Meaux**, mō
**Mecca** (*or* Mekka), mĕk′*ȧ*
**Mechlin** (*or* Malines), mĕk′lĭn
**Medernach**, mā′dĕr-näĸ
**Medina**, mȧ-dē′nä
**Meerssen**, mär′sĕn
**Mekka** (*or* Mecca), mĕk′*ȧ*
**Meile**, mĕl
**Meliier**, mĕl′yȧ′
**Melreux**, mĕl′rû′
**Melun**, mē-lŭN′
**Membruggen**, mĕm′brŏŏg-ĕn
**Menii**, mē-nēl′
**Menin**, mē-nĂN′
**Menil-la-Tour**, mē-nēl′-lȧ′-tōōr′
**Merbecque**, mĕr′bĕk′
**Merbes**, mĕrb
**Merchtem**, mĕrĸ′tĕm
**Mercken**, mĕr′kĕn
**Mercy-le-Bas**, mĕr′sē′-lē-bä′
**Mercy-le-Haut**, mĕr′sē′-lē-ō′
**Merlemont**, mĕrl′môN′
**Mersch**, mĕrsh
**Merval**, mĕr′vȧl′
**Merville**, mĕr′vēl′
**Messancy**, mē-sĂN′sē′
**Messein**, mē-sĂN′
**Messines**, mē-sēn′
**Mestre**, mĕs′trȧ
**Métaires**, mā′târ′
**Metnitz**, mĕt′nlts
**Metrich**, mĕt′rĭĸ
**Mettecoven**, mĕt′ē-kō′fĕn
**Metz**, mĕts; *Fr.* mĕs
**Metzeral**, mĕt′sē-rȧl
**Metzerwiese**, mĕt′sĕr-vē′zē
**Meulebeke**, mû′lē-bā′kē
**Meuse** (river), mûz; *Eng.* mūz
**Méziéres**, mā′zyâr′
**Mirwart**, mēr′värt
**Mitrovicza** (*or* **Mltrovitz**), mē′trō-vĕt′sa
**Moerbeke**, mōōr′bā-kē
**Moerkerke**, mōōr′kĕr-kē
**Moere**, mōō′rē
**Moggio**, môd′jō
**Mohammera**, mō′hȧ-mā′rä
**Mohivlile**, mō′ē′vēl′
**Mohon**, mō′ôN′
**Moircy**, mwär′sē′
**Moldava** (river), môl-dä′vȧ
**Molhain**, mō′lĂN′
**Monastir**, mŏn′*ȧs*-tēr′
**Monceau**, môN′kō′
**Moncel**, môN′sĕl′
**Monchy**, môN′shē′
**Mondelange**, mōn′dē-lȧng′ē
**Monfalcone**, mōn′fäl-kō′nä
**Mons**, môNs
**Mons-en-Pévéle**, môN′-zĂN′-pā′vāl′
**Mont**, môN
**Montagnana**, mōn′tä-nyä′nä
**Montbéliard**, môN′bā′lyȧr′
**Montdidier**, môN′dē′dyā′
**Montfaucon**, môN′fō′kôN′
**Montherme**, môN′tĕrm′
**Monthureux**, môN′tû′rû′
**Montigny**, môN′tē′nyē′
**Montjoie**, môN′jwä′
**Montmédy**, môN′mȧ′dē′
**Montmirail**, môN′mē′rȧ′y′
**Montoise**, môN′twäz′
**Montreau Vieux**, môN′trō′vyû′
**Mont-St.-Amand**, môN′-sĂN′-tȧ′mĂN′
**Mont-St.-Aubert**, môN′-sĂN′-tō′bâr′
**Mont-St.-Éloy**, môN′-sĂN′-tā′lwä′
**Mont-St.-Jean**, môN′-sĂN′-zhĂN′
**Mont-St.-Martin**, môN′-sĂN′-mȧr′tĂN′
**Mont-St.-Pierre**, môN′-sĂN′-pyâr′
**Mont-St.-Rémy**, môN′-sĂN′-rā′mē′
**Montsec**, môN′sĕk′
**Moorsiede**, mōrs′lā-dē
**Moreuil**, mō′rû′y′
**Morey**, mō′rē′
**Morlville**, mō′rē′vēl′
**Morville**, mȯr′vēl′
**Mosul**, mō′sōōl′
**Mouaville**, mōō′ȧ′vēl′
**Mouchin**, mōō′shĂN′
**Moulbaix**, mōōl′bĕ′
**Moulins**, mōō′lĂN′
**Mouscron**, mōōs′krôN′
**Moustier**, mōōs′tyā′
**Mouvaux**, mōō′vō′
**Mouzay**, mōō′zā′
**Moyen**, mwȧ′yĂN′
**Moyenmoutier**, mwȧ′yĂN′mōō′tyā′
**Moyenneville**, mwȧ′yĕn′vēl′
**Mozet**, mō′zĕ′
**Muggia**, mŏŏd′jä
**Mülhausen**, mül′hou′zĕn
**Münster**, mün′stēr
**Murville**, mür′vēl′
**Mush**, mōōsh
**Musson**, mü′zôN′
**Muysen**, moi′sĕn
**Muzeray**, mü′zē-rē′

**Nadrin**, nȧ′drĂN′
**Nakhitchevan**, nȧ′kē-chē-vän′
**Nampteuil**, nĂN′tû′y′
**Namur**, nȧ′mür′
**Nancy**, nĂN′sē′; *Eng.* năn′sĭ
**Nandrin**, nän′drĂN′
**Narew** (*or* Narev river), nä′rĕf
**Nassogne**, nȧ′sôn′y′
**Nazareth**, (Belgium) nȧ′zȧ′rĕt′
**Nennig**, nĕn′ĭĸ
**Nesle**, nȧl
**Neubois**, nû′bwä′
**Neuenburg**, noi′ĕn-bŏŏrĸ
**Neufchâteau**, nû′shȧ′tō′
**Neufchatel**, nû′shȧ′tĕl′
**Neufchef**, nû′shĕf′
**Neuilly-sur-Marne**, nû′yē′-sür′-mȧrn′
**Neumarkt**, noi′märkt
**Neutitschein**, noi′tĭt′shĭn
**Neuve Chapelle**, nûv′ shȧ′pĕl′
**Neuve Église**, nûv ā′glēz′
**Neuve Maison**, nûv′ mā′zôN′
**Neuves Maisons**, nûv mā′zôN′
**Neuvilie**, nû′vēl′
**Neuweiler**, noi′vīlĕr
**Niekirchen**, nē′kēr′ĸĕn
**Niel**, nēl
**Nieuport**, nē′ōō-pôrt
**Nikolaief** (*or* Nikolayev), nyē′kō-lä′yĕf
**Nîmes** (*or* Nismes), nēm
**Ninove**, nē′nōv′
**Niveiles**, nē′vēl′
**Nives**, nēv
**Noerdange**, nōōr′dȧng-ē
**Noirefontaine**, nwȧr′fôN′tĕn′
**Noirval**, nwȧr′vȧl′
**Noisy-le-Sec**, nwä′zē′-lē-sĕk′
**Noreuil**, nō′rû′y′
**Norroy-le-Sec**, nō′rwä′-lē-sĕk′
**Norvenich**, nōr′fē-nĭĸ
**Nouzon**, nōō′zôN′
**Noville**, nō′vēl′
**Novogeorgievsk**, nō′vō-gĕ-ôr′gĕ-yĕfsk
**Noyelle**, nwȧ′yĕl′
**Noyen**, nwȧ′yĂN′

**Obaix**, ō′bā′
**Oberbruck**, ō′bĕr-brŏŏĸ
**Obersagegen**, ō′bĕrz-gā′gĕn
**Ober-Weiler**, ō′bĕr-vī′lĕr
**Ober-Weiss**, ō′bĕr-vīs′
**Occoches**, ō′kôsh′
**Ochamps**, ō′shĂN′
**Octringen**, ŏk′trĭng′ĕn
**Oderen**, ō′dē-rĕn
**Oderzo**, ō-dĕrt′sō
**Oedelem**, ōō′dē-lĕm
**Offey**, ō′fē′
**Ogeviller**, ōzb′vē′yā′
**Ogy**, ō′zhē′
**Ohain**, ō′ĂN′
**Ohey**, ō′ē′
**Oignies**, wȧ′nyē′
**Oise** (river), wäz
**Oisy**, wȧ′zē′
**Oilignies**, ō′lē′nyē′
**Olloy**, ō′lwä′
**Oimütz**, ōl′müts
**Olzheim**, ōlts′hīm
**Omicourt**, ō′mē′kōōr′
**Onnaing**, ō′nĂN′
**Oombergen**, ōm′bĕr-gĕn
**Oostacker**, ōst′äk′ēr
**Oostcamp**, ōst′kämp′
**Oostkerke**, ōst′kĕr-kē
**Opont**, ō′pôN′
**Oppy**, ō′pē′
**Orbey**, ȯr′bē′
**Orchies**, ȯr′shē′
**Orchimont**, ȯr′shē′môN′
**Orcq**, ȯrk
**Origny**, ō′rē′nyē′
**Ornel**, ȯr′nĕl′
**Orsay**, ȯr′sē′
**Orsera**, ȯr-sā′rä
**Orval**, ȯr′vȧl′
**Ossero**, ȯs-sā′rō
**Ostigila**, ȯs-tē′lyä
**Ostrog**, ȯs-trôĸ′
**Ostrow**, ȯs′trȯf
**Ottendorf**, ȯt′ĕn-dȯrf
**Ottignies**, ō′tē′nyē′
**Ottingen**, ȯt′ĭng-ĕn
**Ouchez**, ōō′shā′
**Oudenarde** (*or* Audenarde), ou′dē-när′dē
**Oudler**, ōōd′lā′
**Ouffet**, ōō′fā′
**Ouire**, wēr
**Ourcq** (river), ōōrk
**Ourthe** (river), ōōrt

**Padova** (*or* Padua), pä′dō-vä
**Padua** (*or* Padova), pȧd′û-*ȧ*
**Pagny**, pȧ′nyē′
**Pagnies**, pȧ′nyē′
**Pago**, pä′gō
**Paiiseui**, pȧ′lē′sûl′
**Paimanova**, päl′mä-nō′vä
**Pange**, pȧng′ē
**Panne, La**, lȧ pȧn′
**Pannes**, pȧn
**Parenzo**, pä-rĕnt′sō
**Paris**, pȧr′ĭs; *Fr.* pȧ′rē′
**Parroy**, pȧ′rwä′
**Pas-de-Caiais**, pä′-dē-kȧ′lē′
**Passchendaele**, pȧs′kĕn-dä′lē
**Patignies**, pȧ′tē′nyē′
**Pattingen**, pȧt′ĭng-ĕn
**Pâturages**, pä′tü′rȧzh′
**Paxonne**, pȧ′zŏn′
**Pecq**, pĕk
**Pelingen**, pä′lĭng-ĕn
**Peliestrina**, pĕl′lĕs-trē′nä

**Peltre**, pĕl'trā
**Pepinster**, pĕp'ĭn-stĕr
**Perck**, pĕrk
**Peremysl** (*or* Przemysl), pĕ-rĕ'mĭshl-y'; pshĕ'mĭshl-y'
**Perl**, pĕrl
**Pernes**, pĕrn
**Péronne**, pā'rŏn'
**Perthes**, pĕrt
**Peschiera**, pā-skyā'rā
**Petersbach**, pā'tĕrz-bäĸ
**Petingen**, pĕt'ĭng-ĕn
**Petit-Croix**, pē-tē'-krwä'
**Petit-Magny**, pē-tē'-mä'nyē'
**Petitmont**, pē-tē'môn'
**Petrokov** (*or* Piotrków), pyĕ'trŏ-kôf
**Peuthy**, pû'tē'
**Peuvillers**, pû'vē'lâr'
**Pfaffenheim**, pfäf'ĕn-hīm
**Pfetterhausen**, pfĕt'ĕr-hou'zĕn
**Philippeville**, fē'lĕp'vēl'
**Phlin**, flăN
**Piacenza**, pyä-chĕnt'eä
**Piave** (river), pyä'vā
**Picardy**, plk'ar-dĭ
**Pierrefonds**, pyâr'fôN'
**Pierrepont**, pyâr'pôN'
**Pietro**, pyĕ'trō
**Pieve di Cadore**, pyĕ'vä dē kä-dô'rā
**Pilken**, pĭl'kĕn
**Pillon**, pē'yôN'
**Pinte, La**, lä' păNt
**Piotrków** (*or* Petrokov), pyôtr'kôf
**Piove**, pyô'vā
**Piræus**, pī-rē'ŭs
**Pirano**, pē-rä'nō
**Pitthem**, plt'ĕm
**Plainfaign**, plăN'făN'
**Plancher - les - Mines**, plăN'shā'-lā'-mēn'
**Plasschendaele**, plàs'kĕn-dā'lē
**Plombières**, plôN'byâr'
**Podgórze**, pŏd-gōō'zhĕ
**Poelcapelle**, pōōl'kä'pĕl'
**Poitiers**, pwä'tyā'
**Poix**, pwä
**Poix-St.-Hubert**, pwä'-săN'-tü'bâr'
**Pola**, pō'lä
**Polleur**, pô'lûr'
**Pont-à-Celles**, pôN'-tä'-sĕl'
**Pont-à-Marcq**, pôN'-tä'-märk'
**Pont-à-Mousson**, pôN'-tä'-mōō'zôN'
**Pontebba**, pôn-tĕb'bä
**Ponte di Piave**, pōn'tä dē pyä'vā
**Pontoy**, pōn'toi
**Pont-Pierre**, pôN'-pyâr'
**Pont - Ste. - Maxence**, pôN' - săNt'-mä'zäNs'
**Pont-sur-Sambre**, pôN'-sür'-säN'br'
**Poperinghe**, pō'pē-răNg'
**Pordenone**, pōr'dā-nō'nā
**Portogruaro**, pōr'tō-grōō-ä'rō
**Portole**, pōr'tō-lā
**Portore**, pōr'tō-rā
**Port Said**, pōrt sä-ēd'
**Potteaux**, pô'tō'
**Poziéres**, pō'zyâr'
**Predazzo**, prā-dät'sō
**Pripet**, prē'pĕt
**Prisrend**, prē'zrĕnt
**Profondeville**, prō'fôNd'vēl'
**Promontore** (cape), prō'mōn-tō'rā
**Pronsfeld**, prônz'fĕlt
**Proskurof** (*or* Proskurov), prŏ'skōō-rôf'
**Proven**, prō'vĕn
**Provenchères**, prō'văN'shâr'
**Provin**, prō'văN'
**Prum**, prōōm
**Pruth** (river), prōōt
**Przasnysz**, pshăs'nĭsh
**Przemysl** (*or* Peremysl), pshĕ'mĭshl-y'
**Pulnoy**, pül'nwä'
**Pultusk**, pōōl'tōōsk
**Pussemange**, püs'măNzh'
**Püttlingen**, püt'lĭng-ĕn
**Puxieux**, pü'zyû'

**Quareux**, kä'rû'
**Quarnero**, kwär-nā'rō
**Quartes**, kärt
**Quatre-Bras**, kä'tr'-brä'
**Quesnoy, Le**, lē kā'nwä'
**Quevaucamps**, kē-vō'käN'
**Quievrain**, kē'ē-vrăN
**Quievy**, kē'ē-vē'

**Raddon**, rä'dôN'
**Radmaunsdorf**, räd'mounz-dôrf
**Radom**, rä'dŏm
**Radzivilov**, räd'zē'vē-lôf'
**Raeren**, rā'rĕn
**Rambervillers**, răN'bĕr'vē'lâr'
**Rambruch**, răm'brōōĸ
**Ramecourt**, răm'kōōr'
**Ramet**, rà'mā'
**Ramillies**, rà'mē'yē'
**Ramonchamps**, rà'môN'shäN'
**Ramont**, rà'môN'
**Rance**, răNs
**Ranconnière**, răN'kô'nyâr'
**Raon**, răN
**Raon-l'Étape**, răN'-lā'tàp'
**Rappoltsweiler**, räp'ôlts-vī'lĕr
**Rastenburg**, räs'tĕn-bōōrĸ'
**Raucourt**, rō'kōōr'
**Raulecourt**, rôl'kōōr'
**Raulseur**, rōl'sûr'
**Rava** (*or* Rawa), rä'vä
**Raves**, răv
**Raville**, rà'vēl'
**Ravnagora**, răv'nä-gō'rä
**Rawaruska**, rä'vä-rōōs'kà
**Rechingen**, rĕĸ'ĭng-ĕn
**Recogne**, rē'kôn'y'
**Redu**, rē'dü'
**Regnieville**, rē'nyē'vēl'
**Réhainvillier**, rā'ĕN'vē'yā'
**Réhan**, rā'ĕN'
**Reichlange**, rīĸ'läng-ē
**Reims** (*or* Rheims), rēmz; *Fr.* răNs
**Reisdorf**, rīz'dôrf
**Releghem**, rēl'ē-gĕm
**Remagno**, rē-màn'y'
**Rémaucourt**, rā'mō'kōōr'
**Remich**, rā'mĭĸ
**Remiremont**, rē-mēr'môN'
**Rémy**, rā'mē'
**Renaix**, rē-nĕ'
**Renland**, rān'länt
**Renlies**, răN'lē'
**Renwez**, răN'vā'
**Repaix**, rē-pĕ'
**Resteigne**, rĕs'tĕn'y'
**Rethel**, rē-tĕl'
**Reuland**, roi'länt
**Revin**, rē-văN'
**Rezonville**, rē-zôN'vēl'
**Rheims** (*or* Reims), rēmz; *Fr.* răNs
**Ribecourt**, rēb'kōōr'
**Ribemont**, rēb'môN'
**Richterich**, rĭĸ'tē-rĭĸ
**Riempst**, rēmpst
**Risnne**, rē'ĕn'
**Riga**, rē'gä
**Rigny**, rē'nyē'
**Rimbach**, rēm'bäĸ
**Rimogne**, rē'môn'y'
**Rinnthal**, rĭn'tāl
**Rivière**, rē'vyâr'
**Robecq**, rō'bĕk'
**Robechies**, rōb'shē'
**Robelmont**, rō'bĕl'môN'
**Roche, La**, lä' rôsh'
**Rochefort**, rôsh'fôr'
**Rochehaut**, rôsh'ō'
**Rochesson**, rôsh'sôN'
**Roclincourt**, rō'klăN'kōōr'
**Rocroi**, rō'krwä'
**Rodemachern**, rō'dē-mäĸ'ĕrn
**Roeux**, rō'û'
**Roisel**, rwä'zĕl'
**Roly**, rō'lē'
**Rombas**, rōm'bàs
**Roncq**, rônk
**Roobors**, rō'bôrs
**Rorbach**, rôr'bäĸ
**Rosée**, rō'zā'
**Rosières**, rō'zyâr'
**Rosières-en-Santerre**, rō'zyâr'-săN' eăN'târ'
**Rossart**, rō'eär'
**Rotgen**, rōt'gĕn
**Rothau**, rō'tou
**Roubaix**, rōō'bĕ
**Rouen**, rwăN
**Rouffach**, rōō'fäĸ
**Rougemont**, rōōzh'môN'
**Roulers**, rōō'lā'
**Roupy**, rōō'pē'
**Rousbrugge**, rous'brŏŏg-ē
**Rouves**, rōōv
**Rouvres**, rōō'vr'
**Rouvrois**, rōōv'rwä'
**Rouvroy**, rōōv'rwä'
**Roux**, rōō
**Roverbella**, rō'vĕr-bĕl'lä
**Roveredo**, rō'vā-rā'dō
**Rovigno**, rō-vē'nyō
**Rovigo**, rō-vē'gō
**Royaumeix**, rwä'yō'mĕ'
**Royo**, rwä
**Rozoy-sur-Serre**, rō'zwä'-sür'-sâr'
**Rozzo**, rŏd'zŏ
**Ruddervoorde**, rŭd'ĕr-vōr'dē
**Rudlin**, rüd'lăN'
**Rulles**, rül
**Rumbeke**, rŭm'bā-kē
**Rumes**, rüm
**Rumigny**, rü'mē'nyē'
**Rupt**, rüp
**Russen**, rŭs'ĕn
**Rzeszow**, zhĕ'shŏŏf

**Saar** (river), zär
**Saarbrücken**, zär'brük'ĕn
**Saarburg**, zär'bōōrĸ
**Sablon**, sà'blôN'
**Sachsenburg**, sák'sĕn-bōōrĸ
**Sacile**, sä-chē'lā
**Safed**, sà'fĕd'
**Saffelaere**, sáf'ē-lā'rē
**Saida**, sä'ē-dà
**Sains**, săN
**Sains-Richmont**, săN'-rēsh'môN'
**Saint-Amand**, săN'tà'măN'
**Saint-Benoit**, săN'-bē-nwà'
**Saint-Blaize**, săN'-blâz'
**Saint-Bresson**, săN'-brē-sôN'
**Saint-Cyr**, săN'-sēr'
**Saint-Denis**, săN'-dē-nē'
**Saint-Dié**, săN'-dyā'
**Saint-Étienne**, săN'-tā'tyĕn'
**Saintes**, săNt
**Saint-Genest**, săN'-zhē-nĕ'
**Saint-Georges**, săN'-zhôrzh'
**Saint-Gérard**, săN'-zhā'rär'
**Saint-Germain**, săn'zhĕr'măn'
**Saint-Ghislain**, săN'-gĕs'lăN'
**Saint-Gilles**, săN'-zhēl'
**Saint-Hilaire**, săN'-tē'lâr'
**Saint-Hubert**, săN'-tü'bâr'
**Saint-Jean**, săN'-zhăN'
**Saint-Josse-ten-Noode**, săN'-zhŏs' tăN'-nōd'
**Saint-Julien**, săN'-zhü'lyăN'
**Saint-Laurent**, săN'-lô'răN'
**Saint-Léger**, săN'-lā'zhā'
**Saint-Léonard**, săn'-lā'ô'nár'
**Saint-Marcel**, săN'-mär'sĕl'
**Sainte-Marguerite**, săNt'-mär'gē-rēt'
**Sainte-Marie**, săNt'-mà'rē'
**Saint-Martin**, săN'-mär'tăN'
**Saint-Maurice**, săN'-mō'rēs'
**Saint-Medard**, săN'-mē-dâr'
**Saint-Michel**, săN'-mē'shĕl'
**Saint-Mihiel**, săN'-mē'yĕl'
**Saint-Nabord**, săN'-nà'bôr'
**Saint-Nicholas**, săN'-nē'kô'lä'
**Saint-Omer**, săN'-tô'mâr'
**Saint-Ouen**, săN'-twăN'
**Saint-Paul**, săN'-pôl'
**Saint-Pierre**, săN'-pyâr'
**Saint-Pol**, săN'-pôl'
**Saint-Privat**, săN'-prē'vä'
**Saint-Quentin**, săN'-kăN'tăN'
**Saint-Remy**, săN'-rē-mē'
**Saint-Simon**, săN'-sē'môN'
**Saint-Suipice**, săN'-sül'pēs'
**Saint-Trond**, săN'-trôN'
**Saint-Venant**, săN'-vē-năN'

**Sainville,** sĕN′-vēl′
**Salcux,** sá′lû′
**Saloniki** (*or* Salonica), sä′lō-nē′kē
**Salvore,** säl-vō′rā
**Sambro** (river), sĂN′**br**′
**Samrée,** säN′rā′
**San** (river), säN
**Sancourt,** sĂN′kōōr′
**San Giorgio,** säN jôr′jō
**Santeuil,** sĂN′tû′y′
**San Pietro,** säN pyā′trō
**Sapogno,** sá′pōN′y′
**Sappois-le-Bas,** sá′pwà′-lē-bä′
**Sappois-le-Haut,** sá′pwà′-lē-ō′
**San Vito,** säN vē′tō
**Sarajevo** (or Sarayevo), sä′rá-yá-vô
**Sarifa,** sä-rē′fä
**Sart,** sár
**Sarthe** (river), **sart**
**Saulnes,** sōn
**Saulnot,** sō′nō′
**Sauvigny,** sō′vē′nyē′
**Saulxures,** sō′lür′
**Save** (river), sáv
**Saventhem,** sä′vĕn-tĕm
**Schaerbeek,** sĸär′bāk
**Scheven,** sĸā′vĕn
**Schifflingen,** shĭf′lĭng-ĕn
**Schio,** skē′ō
**Schirmeck,** shēr′mĕk
**Schleiden,** shlī′dĕn
**Schmidtheim,** shmĭt′hĭm
**Schoenecken,** sĸōō′nĕk-ĕn
**Schöneberg,** shû′nĕ-bĕrĸ
**Schooten,** skō′tĕn
**Schopp,** shŏp
**Schrierlach,** shrēr′läĸ
**Scutari** (*or* Skutari), skōō′tä-rē
**Seclin,** sē-klĂN′
**Sedan,** sē-dĂN′
**Segelsem,** sä′gĕl-sĕm
**Seicheprey,** sēsh′prē′
**Seine** (river), sän
**Selbach,** zäl′bäĸ
**Seloignes,** sē-lwàn′**y**′
**Seneffe,** sē-nĕf′
**Senlis,** sĂN′lēs′
**Sénon,** sā′nôN′
**Sentheim,** zänt′hĭm
**Seny,** sē-nē′
**Seraing,** sē-rĂN′
**Seres,** sĕr′ĕs
**Sereth** (river), **sā-rĕt′**
**Serres,** sâr
**Servance,** sĕr′vĄNs′
**Servigny,** sĕr′vē′nyē′
**Seuil,** sû′y′
**Sevran,** sē-vrĂN′
**Sézanne,** sā′zán′
**Sibret,** sē′brā′
**Sichen,** sĭĸ′ĕn
**Siedlce** (*or* Syedlets), shĕl′tsĕ
**Sierck,** zērk
**Signy-l'Abbaye,** sē′nyē′-lá′bā′
**Signy-le-Petit,** sē′nyē′-lē-pē-tē′
**Silenrieux,** sē′läN′ryû′
**Silliegny,** sē′lē′nyē′
**Silly,** sē′yē′
**Simmerath,** zĭm′ĕ-rät
**Sin,** sĂN
**Sinay,** sē′nĕ′
**Sinoh** (*or* Sinope), sē-nŏb′
**Sinope** (*or* Sinob), sĭ-nō′pŏ
**Sinsin,** sĂN′sĂN′
**Sinspelt,** zĕnz′pĕlt
**Sirault,** sē′rō′
**Sivas,** sē′väs′
**Sivry,** sē′vrē′
**Skoplje** (*or* Weküp), skŏp′lyĕ
**Skutari** (*or* Scutari), skōō′tä-rē
**Sleydinge,** slī′dĭŋ-gē
**Slype,** slēp
**Snaeskerke,** snäs′kĕr-kĕ
**Sochaux,** sō′shō′
**Sofia** (*or* Sophia), sō′fē-á; sō-fē′ä
**Sohier,** sō′ē′ä′
**Soignies,** swá′nyē′
**Soire,** swâr
**Soissons,** swá′sôN′
**Sokolof** (or Sokolow), sō′kō-lôf′
**Solbach,** zōl′bäĸ
**Solesmes,** sō′lām′
**Sologne,** sō′lôn′y′
**Somain,** sō′mĂN′
**Sombrin,** sôN′brĂN′
**Somergem,** sō′mĕr-gĕm
**Somme** (river, department), sôm
**Sommerviller,** sō′mĕr′vē′yä′
**Somzée,** sôN′zā′
**Soppe,** zŏp′ē
**Sorcy,** sôr′sē′
**Sotenich,** zō′tē-nĭĸ
**Sottegem,** sŏt′ē-gĕm
**Souain,** sōō′ĂN′
**Souilly,** swē′yē′
**Soulosse,** sōō′lōs′
**Soultzbach,** zoults′bäĸ
**Soultzmatt,** zoults′mät
**Soumagne,** sōō′mán′y′
**Soumay,** sōō′mē′
**Soupir,** sōō′pēr′
**Sourbrodt,** zour′brōt
**Sourvoy,** sōōr′vwà′
**Spilimbergo,** spē′lĕm-bĕr′gō
**Spincourt,** spĂN′kōōr′
**Spittal,** shpĭt′ăl
**Spy,** spē
**Staple,** stá′pl′
**Staufen,** shtou′fĕn
**Steenbrugge,** stän′brōōg′ē
**Steenvoorde,** etän′vōr-dē
**Steige,** shtī′gē
**Sterrebeek,** stĕr′ĕ-bāk
**Stettin,** shtē-tēn′
**Stosswihr,** shtôs′vēr
**Stoumont,** stōō′môN′
**Straimont,** strē′môN′
**Stralsund,** shträl′zōōnt
**Stree,** strā
**Strigno,** strē′nyō
**Struma** (river), strōō′má
**Stryj,** strē′y′
**Sugny,** sû′nyē′
**Suippes,** swēp
**Suwalki,** sōō-väl′kĕ
**Sweveghem,** swā′vē-gĕm
**Swevezeele,** swā′vē-zā′lē
**Swinemünde,** svē′nē-mün′dē
**Syedlets** (*or* Siedlce), syĕd′lyĕts

**Tabriz,** tá-brēz′
**Tahure,** tà′ür′
**Taintrux,** tĂN′trû′
**Tarcento,** tär-chĕn′tō
**Tarcienne,** tár′syĕn′
**Tarnopol,** tár-nŏ′pŏl-y′
**Tarnow,** tár′nōōf
**Tavaux,** tá′vō′
**Tavigny,** tá′vē′nyē′
**Tchatalja** (*or* Chatalja), chä-täl′jä
**Tchernavoda** (*or* Cernavoda), chĕr′ná-vô′dä
**Tellancourt,** tĕ-läN′kōōr′
**Tellin,** tĕ-lĂN′
**Templeuve,** tän′plûv′
**Tentre,** tĂN′tr′
**Termes,** tĕrm
**Termonde** (*or* Dendermonde), tĕr′môNd′
**Ternuay,** tĕr′nü′ē′
**Thann,** tän
**Thaon,** tĂN
**Thélus,** tā′lü′
**Thérouanne,** tā′rōō′án′
**Thézey,** tā′zē′
**Thiant,** tē′ĂN′
**Thiaucourt,** tyô′kōōr′
**Thiefosse,** tyē-fōs′
**Thielt,** tēlt
**Thiene,** tyē′nā
**Thil,** tēl
**Thillot,** tē′yō′
**Thionville** (or Diedenhofen), tyôN′vēl′
**Thirimont,** tē′rē′môN′
**Thourout,** tōō′rōō′
**Thuin,** tü′ĂN′
**Tillet,** tē′yā′
**Tincourt,** tĂN′kōōr′
**Tirlemont,** tēr′l′môN′
**Tolmezzo,** tōl-mĕt′sō
**Tomasof** (or Tomaszow), tō-mä′sōōf
**Tongres,** tôN′gr′
**Tourcoing,** tōōr′kwĂN′
**Tournay** (*or* Tournai), tōōr′nā′
**Traubach,** trou′bäĸ
**Trenchiennes,** trĂN′shyĕn′
**Trebizond,** trĕb′ĭ-zŏnd′
**Tregnano,** trā-nyä′nō
**Trélon,** trā′lôN′
**Treviso,** trā-vē′zō
**Triaucourt,** trē′ō′kōōr′
**Trieste** (*or* Triest), trē-ĕst′
**Trieux,** trē′û′
**Trouche,** ła, lá′ trōōch′
**Turkheim,** tōōrk′hīm

**Uberstrasse,** û′bĕr-shträe′ĕ
**Udine,** ōō′dē-nā
**Ugny,** ü′nyē′
**Umago,** ōō-mä′gō
**Unie** (*or* Unich), ü-nē′ĕ
**Urbach,** ōōr′bäĸ
**Urbeis,** ōōr′bīs
**Urfa,** ōōr′fä′
**Urmatt,** ōōr′mät
**Urmiah** (*or* Urmia, Urumiah), ōōr′mē′ä
**Urrel,** ōōr′ĕl
**Uruffe,** ü′rüf′
**Usküp** (*or* Uesküb, Skoplje), üs-küp′

**Vacquerie,** vá′kĕ-rē′
**Vagney,** vá′nyē′
**Valenciennes,** vá′läN′syĕn′
**Valhey,** vál′ē′
**Valjevo** (*or* Valyevo), väl′yá-vō
**Valmerangon,** vál′mē-ráng′ĕn
**Valmy,** vál′mē′
**Vance,** väNs
**Vancouleurs,** väN′kōō′lûr′
**Vandières,** vàN′dyâr′
**Vannes,** ván
**Vardar** (river), vär′där′
**Varennes-en-Argonne,** vá′rĕn′-**zĂN**′-ár′gŏn′
**Vaucourt,** vô′kōōr′
**Vaudemont,** vôd′môN′
**Vaux,** vô
**Vécoux,** vā′kōō′
**Veglia,** vā′lyä
**Veiving,** ĭí′fĭng
**Velaines,** vē-lân′
**Velasnes,** vē-lán′
**Vellerois,** vĕl′rwä′
**Vellescot,** vĕl′skô′
**Vendée,** väN′dā′
**Vendegies,** väND′zhē′
**Vendin,** väN′dĂN′
**Venezia** (*or* Venice), vā-nĕt′syä
**Venice** (*or* Venezia), vĕn′Is
**Vennezey,** vĕn′zĕ′
**Ventron,** väN′trôN′
**Verdenal,** vĕrd′nál′
**Verdun,** vĕr′dŭN′
**Vermand,** vĕr′mäN′
**Verneuil,** vĕr′nû′y′
**Verona,** vĕ-rō′ná; *It.* vā-rō′nä
**Versailles,** vĕr′sä′y′; *Eng.* vĕr-sālz′
**Verviers,** vĕr′vyâr′
**Vervins,** vĕr′vĂN′
**Verzy,** vĕr′zē′
**Vladen,** vē′á-dĕn
**Vicenza,** vē-chĕnt′sä
**Vigneulles,** vē′nyül′
**Villafranca,** vēl′lá-frăŋ′kä
**Villemontoire,** vēl′môN′twár′
**Villers-Bretonneux,** vē′lâr′-brē-tô′nû′
**Villers-Cotterets,** vē′lâr′-kô′tē-rē′
**Villers-la-Ville,** vē′lâr′-lá′-vēl′
**Villerupt,** vēl′rüp′
**Villiers,** vē′yā′
**Vilvorde,** vēl′vôrd′
**Vimy,** vē′mē′
**Vincey,** vĂN′sē′
**Vireux,** vē′rû′
**Vistula** (*or* Weichsel), vĭs′tû-lá
**Vitrimont,** vē′trē′môN′
**Vitry-en-Artois,** vē′trē′-ĂN′-ár′twä′
**Vitry-le-François,** vē′trē′-lē-frĂN′swä′
**Vittorio,** vĕt-tō′rē-ō
**Volvre, Ła,** lá′ vwà′vr′
**Volga,** vôl′gä; *Russ.* vôl′gä

**Volhynia**, vŏl-ĭn'ĭ-ȧ
**Volta**, vōl'tȧ
**Voorde**, vōr'dē
**Vosges**, vōzh
**Vottem**, vŏt'ĕm
**Vouziers**, vōō'zyȧr'
**Vy-les-Lure**, vē'-lā'-lūr'

**Wahlesscheid**, vä'lĕz-shīt'
**Walcourt**, vȧl'kōōr'
**Walhelm**, väl'hĭm
**Wallendorf**, väl'ĕn-dȯrf
**Wallers**, vȧ'lȧr'
**Wancennes**, väN'sĕn'
**Wanlin**, väN'lăN'
**Wardin**, vȧr'dăN'
**Warta** (*or* Warthe), vär'tē
**Warzée**, vȧr'zā'
**Wasigny**, vȧ'sē'nyē'
**Wasmes**, väm
**Wasserbillig**, väs'ĕr-bĭl'ĭĸ
**Wassigny**, vȧ'sē'nyē'
**Waterloo**, wô'tĕr-lōō'; *Du.* wä'tĕr-lō'
**Watigny**, vȧ'tē'nyē'
**Watweiler**, vät'vī-lĕr
**Wavre**, vȧv'r'
**Wavrin**, vȧ'vrăN'
**Waxweiler**, väks'vī-lĕr
**Weerde**, wȧr'dē
**Weerf**, wārf
**Wehingen**, vā'hĭng-ĕn
**Welchsel** (*or* Vistula), vĭk'ĕĺ
**Weismes**, vīz'mĕz
**Weiten**, vī'tĕn
**Weitersweiler**, vī'tĕrz-vī'lĕr
**Wembach**, vām'bäĸ
**Werlaing**, vĕr'lăN'
**Wervicq**, vĕr'vĕk'
**Weselberg**, vā'zĕl-bĕrĸ
**Wetteren**, wĕt'ĕr-ĕn
**Wibrin**, vē'brăN'
**Wignehies**, vēn'yē-ē'
**Wiltz**, vĕlts
**Wintzenheim**, vĭnt'sĕn-hīm
**Wizernes**, vē'zȧrn'
**Woel**, wōōl
**Woëvre**, vō'ĕv'r'
**Woippy**, voi'pē
**Wolmeringen**, vōl'mĕr-ĭng'en
**Woluwe-Saint-Lambert**, wŏl'ŭ-wē-eĕnt-lăm'bĕrt
**Wörth**, vûrt
**Würselen**, vür'zĕ-lĕn

**Xammes**, zȧm
**Xaronval**, zȧ'rôN'vȧl'
**Xertigny**, zĕr'tē'nyē'
**Xironcourt**, zē'rôN'kōōr'
**Xivry**, zē'vrē'
**Xures**, zûr

**Yassy** (*or* Jassy), yäs'ē
**Ypres**, ē'pr'
**Yser** (river), ē'sā'
**Yvoir**, ē'vwȧr'

**Zabern**, tsä'bĕrn
**Zamosk** (*or* Zamosc), zä'mȯsbch
**Zeebrugge**, tsā'brōōg'ē
**Zellenburg**, tsĕl'ĕn-bōōrĸ
**Zirknitz**, tsĕrk'nĭts
**Zittau**, tsĭt'ou
**Zloczów**, zlô'chōōf
**Zweibrücken**, tsvī'brük'ĕn

NOTE: This index covers fully the historical text written by Mr. Simonds. It omits the supplemental material with which each volume concludes, as the detailed tables of contents made the indexing of this matter superfluous.

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